PATULA VS PEOPLE

DOCTRINE:

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, viz.: Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public
or private.

Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments, and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are
private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document,
by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:

(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;

(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;29

(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted;30 or

(d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private individuals executed or
generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they
could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 20. Proof of private documents.Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA 135, G.R. No. 164457 April 11,
2012

FACTS: That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of
Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company
under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from
complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud
the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but
instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her
own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.

Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[1]

Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not
avail herself of plea bargaining.Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she
became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming from
different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from
them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit
the receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him
to confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk
discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he
learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that balance appeared
unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any
money of Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and
that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work. [2]

On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination and re-crossexamination were completed.

The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16,
1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him
that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted her
audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the
course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the
amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go
a written report denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly
Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount
ofP131,286.92.[3]

During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies
as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that
identified the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that
summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50thledger could
no longer be found.

In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the
figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not
themselves presented in court.[4]With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to
be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.

TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and
duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies.[5]

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the
intention to do so, and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for
decision.[6]

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to present evidence for her defense the
Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA
PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and
accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties
provided by law and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum until fully
paid and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be
effective only until the promulgation of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion on May 7, 2004

ISSUE: WON the lack of proper authentication rendered Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives inadmissible as judicial evidence

HELD:

Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite
their being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
 Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public
or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an
ancient one within the context of Section 21, [28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable
document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;[29](c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document

have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.[31]

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private individuals executed or
generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they
could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in various receipts, to wit:

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original receipts, do you have copies of these
receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you assure this

(Next Page)

ATTY ABIERA (continuing):

Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this,or offer the same as soon as the original
receipts can be presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, Im going to point to you a certain
signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the
signature and tell the Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word collector.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original receipts Your Honor, because its quite
voluminous, so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the same using
 the testimony of another witness, for purposes of identifying the signature of the accused. We will
request that this signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case be marked, Your Honor,
with the reservation to present the original copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the
meantime, this is only for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt
which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit A You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A.
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A-1.

(Next Page)

COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the number of that receipt?

ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila Askin.[32]
xxx

As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a
document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled
out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt,
the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other
receipts. But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of
petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go
authenticate both themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt was
wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary
Evidence.

It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough
Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had
earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the
Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for
all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely differentdocument entitled List of
Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997.

In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained
the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner.
Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such
signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her testimony bear out:

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other receipt is the one showing her payment
prior to the last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit B-3, receipt number 20441.

(Next Page)

COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your familiar with that signature? (shown to
witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit B-3-a
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
 The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 and the signature as Exhibit B-4-a.
COURT:
Mark it.[33]

xxx

ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this
receipt if this is the receipt of your office?
A.Yes.
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this?
A.Ms. Patula.
Q.How do you know that this is her signature?
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34]

We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies
between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers.
Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report on petitioners supposed misappropriation
or conversion, revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony show:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this Cecilia Askin has an account
of P10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it to the customers for confirmation.

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by
the customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by the customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of P10,971.75.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of this customer is still P10,971.75

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):

[i]n your office?
COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.[35]

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable
Court on that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in
the original

(Next page)

WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt she has still a balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---

COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to
as the receipts, the original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that particular customer still has a balance of Ten
Thousand something?
 A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger?

A. Yes.[36]

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely
objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA:

CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION

Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is her account in your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question, let me interpose our objection on the ground
that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the person who made the same. This witness will be
testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who
made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already duly identified by this witness. As a
matter of fact, it was she who brought them to court

(Next Page)

COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that
the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries were taken. So, you answer the query of
counsel.
xxx

ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those
ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.

COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.

Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected
with Footluckers?

A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,

COURT:
Alright proceed.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]

The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to
the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to
prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
 be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely
did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[38]

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay
because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondents cause of
action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner
avers that even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires
Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondents
cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets
received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is founded on breach of insurance contract covering
cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its importation of
10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondents
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and
therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets.
She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of
the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on
steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondents documentary
evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the
person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent
admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received
had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.

xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall
under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn, provides that
before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who
saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in
Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted
in evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of
the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient
competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.

That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and
did not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans
testimony bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no
probative value.[39]Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and
were defects that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts
overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.

Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers
were prepared in the regular course of business.[40]Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received
as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:

(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;

(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;

(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[41]
 The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that
in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so
herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal
should follow.
REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES GIMENEZ

DOCTRINE: The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court.
Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced: The nature of documents as either public or
private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed
by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

In Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 (2012), the Supreme Court (SC) held that mere collection of documents by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Indeed,
in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 (2012), this court held that mere collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such
documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the
course of its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule. Petitioner presented as witness its
records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody
of the PCGG in the course of the Commissions investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for
which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, [i]f the writings
have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses. Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their
personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these
documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves. Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these
Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not
generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiants statements, parts of which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.
FACTS:

This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 2 and September 13, 2006.3 The
Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted
the Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to
evidence.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion,
Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. 7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten
wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos[.]"8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent
transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. 10 Witnesses testified on the
bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses. 11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel's testimony. 12The Republic then manifested that it was
"no longer presenting further evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal
offer of evidence."14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of
evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date. 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. 17 This
Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. 18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by
the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. 19 Thus, it declared that
the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence. 20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The first assailed Resolution provides:

It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27, 2006, and it appearing further that it
failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days
original period plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.

WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants' evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning as
previously scheduled.21chanrobleslaw

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006.22 He argued that the Republic showed no right to
relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.23Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of
failure to prosecute.24Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez's demurrer to evidence.

According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed by respondents and dismissed the case
despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and documents on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets.

ISSUE: WON THE TAKING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS AND USED IT MADE IT A PUBLIC DOCUMENT

HELD: Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified as either public or private. Rule 132,
Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public documents:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.
. . . .
SEC. 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a
copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
. . . .
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document,
by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court.137 (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is material with regard to the fact the
evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:

not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:
.

"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under
Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories
. . . is proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of
the execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner
executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the different kinds of public instruments.
Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which
are required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the
jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits
are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between mere copies of audited financial statements
submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited
financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised
Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The
financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited
financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial
statements are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless
they are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

. . . .

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted to
the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured
from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private
documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or
that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a
memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While
there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof
available must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's external
auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements were never
authenticated.141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents public
documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se public records
referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had been
gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission's investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to
their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can
testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only
testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover,
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 143 (Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to
Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due to petitioner's failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It
brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the
Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner's testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner's
witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten
wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez's incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to
her and her husband's salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents.

As provided in the Civil Code:

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred
when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them
to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only
are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor
presented evidence to the contrary.

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And
this is what transpired in the instant case.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at
the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondents marriage
with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null
and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
 MALAYAN INSURANCE VS PHILIPPINES NAILS AND WIRES

FACTS: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated September 30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
45547, affirming the decision dated December 10, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the resolution
dated March 25, 1999, of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[1]

Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all risks its shipment of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued
at P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance Company Inc.The shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage,
respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value of undelivered steel billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other
charges paid by respondent. Petitioner refused to pay.

On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for sum of money with the RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or
undelivered cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in the
wrong venue. The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This was also denied.Upon motion for
reconsideration, the petition was reinstated. However, it was eventually dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and its dismissal became final and
executory.

On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended complaint which the trial court granted. It sent petitioner
summons and a copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also gave petitioner until October 31, 1993 to file its answer.

On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in default. The trial court granted and allowed the presentation of
evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court. Respondent presented its lone witness, Jeanne King.

On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim. Upon motion by the respondent, the trial court expunged
from the records the answer for late filing.

On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by default which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay the
following:

1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost and/or not delivered 377.168 metric tons of steel billets plus legal rate of interest
from date of filing of this complaint until fully paid;

2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as attorneys fees; and

3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[2]

Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion. Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of appeal
which was given due course.

Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court issued the corresponding writ. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ. The Court of Appeals granted the prayer for the
temporary restraining order. The writ of execution was likewise stayed by the trial court which favorably considered petitioners urgent motion
to stay execution pending appeal and to approve the supersedeas bond.

Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, where petitioner argued that the
trial court erred in rendering judgment by default notwithstanding that issues were joined by petitioners filing of an answer; in awarding
damages to respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence and hearsay; and in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular
in nature and not in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the lower court, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.[3]

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor err when it expunged the answer from the records because
petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed period. It further held that respondents witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness
because she personally prepared the documentary evidence and had personal knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. In addition, the
appellate court said that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial courts were entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed
unless for strong and cogent reasons, which were not present in this case. Lastly, the absence of a written report by the branch clerk of court
on the ex parte proceedings did not necessarily deny petitioner due process. Nothing in the Rules of Court stated that the absence of the
commissioners written report nullified a judgment by default. The appellate court observed that if there was a defect, such was only procedural
that can be waived. Besides, petitioner was declared in default because of its own failure to answer within the prescribed period. It cannot
claim denial of due process because it was given the opportunity to be heard.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred and acted contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence in:

I. GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENTS SOLE WITNESS.
II. AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH WAS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADMITTED WITHOUT
BEING PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED

ISSUE: WON respondent should authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at the trial

HELD:

The due execution and authenticity of private documents need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence.Under the rules on
evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among those
enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence. With the
exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning their
authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In
sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.

DYCOCO VS ORINA

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: On petition for review on certiorari is the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the dismissal of the action
for annulment of real estate mortgage and transfer certificate of title with damages.

Virgilio Dycoco (Dycoco) is alleged to have executed on October 9, 1995 a Real Estate Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged Property
without Judicial Proceedings (REM) in favor of respondent Adelaida Orina (Adelaida), covering a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 105730 in Dycocos name. The REM was notarized on even date by Notary Public Arwin
Juco Sinaguinan.

By Adelaidas claim, Dycoco was indebted to her in the amount of P250,000.00, payable in six months, to bear monthly interest rate of
five percent (5%), to secure which Dycoco executed the REM.

For Dycocos alleged failure to pay his obligation, Adelaida extrajudicially foreclosed the REM and as no redemption was made within the
reglementary period, Dycocos TCT was cancelled and, in its stead, TCT No. 243525 was issued in her name.

Dycocos attorneys-in-fact-brothers-in-law Cristino, Jose and Adolfo, all surnamed Grafilo, who occupy the property covered by the REM as
caretakers/tenants, did not turn-over its possession to Adelaida, hence, she, joined by her husband represented by her attorney-in-fact Evelyn
Sagalongos (Evelyn), filed a complaint for ejectment against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Upon receiving notice of the complaint, Dycoco, represented by his attorneys-in-fact, filed a complaint for annulment of the REM and transfer
certificate of title with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100522, against Adelaida and her husband German Orina represented by Evelyn
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

Dycocos attorneys-in-fact claimed that Dycocos signature on the REM was forged, to prove which they presented various documents
that Dycoco was working in the United States of America as a licensed physician on the alleged date of execution of the REM. They also
presented Dycocos U.S. Passport, personal checks, Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit; and a Certification from the Clerk of Court of RTC
Manila that the office does not possess a copy of the REM, Notary Public Sinaguinan having not submitted her notarial report for October
1995.

Herein respondents Adelaida et al., maintaining the due execution of the REM, presented Evelyn who testified on a photocopy of the
REM.

By Decision of May 23, 2005, Branch 15 of the Manila RTC dismissed Dycocos complaint, holding that:

Plaintiff, [Dycoco], through the testimony of their (sic) lone witness as well as their (sic) documentary exhibits
tried to show that it was not . . . Dycoco who mortgaged the said property. Cristino Grafilo even testified that their brother
Miguel, admitted to having stole (sic) the title and have (sic) it mortgaged. Plaintiffs (sic), however, failed to establish that
the mortgagor, (sic) defendant Adelaida Orina, knew it was not Virgilio Dycoco who mortgaged the same.[2] (underscoring
supplied)

By the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of Dycocos complaint, it holding that albeit Dycocos
questioned signature appearing on the REM and the documentary evidence presented by his attorneys-in-fact bear striking differences, since
Dycoco was not presented on the witness stand to establish the genuineness, due execution and contents of the documentary evidence, no
probative value can be ascribed thereto.

In not crediting evidentiary weight on Dycocos U.S. passport showing that he was not in the Philippines when the REM was executed, the
appellate court held:
 . . . [T]he existence, genuineness, due execution and contents of Exhibit I have not been properly established. Again, the
identification made by plaintiff-appellant Cristino Grafilo (sic) will not suffice since he is not privy to its issuance and
execution. The plaintiff-appellants (sic) should have presented a person competent to testify to establish the genuineness
and contents of Exhibit I like an officer from the Bureau of Immigration. But the plaintiff-appellants (sic) failed to do so.
Thus, this court finds the stance of plaintiff-appellants (sic) that Virgilio Dycoco was out of the country at the time of the
execution of the questioned deed unsupported.[3]

The motion for reconsideration of Dycocos attorneys-in-fact having been denied by Resolution of October 3, 2008, the present petition for
review was filed.

A perusal of the REM which is, as stated earlier, a merely photocopy, shows the incompleteness of the acknowledgment portion. It
reads:

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila, this 9th day of October 1995, personally came and appeared
____________________ (sic) with Res. Cert. No. : 12262297 C issued on 27 July 95 at Manila and Tax Account No.: 110-
783-724 known to me and to me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument which he acknowledged
before me as his free and voluntary act and deed.[4]

As the above-quoted acknowledgment shows, the name of the person who personally appeared before the notary public is not stated.

HELD:
Documents acknowledged before a notary public, except last wills and testaments, are public documents.[5] Since the subject REM was not
properly notarized, its public character does not hold.

Since the REM is not a public document, it is subject to the requirement of proof for private documents under Section 20, Rule 132, which
provides:

Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (underscoring supplied)

It was thus incumbent upon Adelaida to prove that Dycocos signature is genuine. As stated earlier, a mere photocopy of the REM was
presented. It is axiomatic that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of
standard signatures with the questioned signature, the original thereof must be presented. [6] Why respondents did not present the original,
they did not explain. Why they did not present Adelaida, who must have been present at the execution of the REM as her purported signature
appears thereon, or the notary public, or any of the witnesses, neither did they explain. Sec. 5 of Rule 130 which reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.

Upon the other hand, Dycocos attorneys-in-fact presented his U.S. passport documenting when he entered and exited from
the Philippines, as well as various documents showing his genuine signature. The appellate court, although upholding the admissibility of Dycocos
documentary evidence, did not ascribe weight to it, however, upon the justification that [e]ven if . . . Cristino Grafilo was empowered to appear
for and on behalf of plaintiff-appellant Virgilio Dycoco in this case by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, the powers couched in said
document do not vest upon the former the power to testify on matters [of] which he has no personal knowledge.[7]

Contrary to the appellate courts stance, there was no necessity to present Dycoco on the witness stand or to present the one
who made the entries on his U.S. passport. In respondents Comment/Opposition to Dycocos formal offer of evidence, the passport was
objected to as being immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent.[8] Such comment is a virtual admission of the authenticity of the entries in
the passport.

But more important, one of the documents offered by Dycoco is a Special Power of Attorney executed on June 2,
[9]
2000 in Illinois, U.S.A. showing his signature, notarized and certified in accordance with Public Act No. 2103, which effectively dispenses with
the requirement of presenting him on the witness stand.

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if
the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg daffaires, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of the United States, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2)
a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known
to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In
case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding
paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg daffaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the United
States, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify
under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public
or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had
authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was
taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Evelyn insisted that Dycoco was present during the signing of the REM on October 9, 1995:

ATTY. MERCADO:

Q: Madam Witness, when this document was prepared, were you present?

WITNESS:
A: Yes sir.

Q: Are you a witness in the execution of this document?

A: Yes sir.

Q: On page 2 of this document, the (sic) appears a signature above the type-written name Adelaida Orina, will you please
inform the Honorable Court whose signature is this?

Q: Why do you know that it is the signature of Adelaida Orina?

A: Because she is included there.

Q: What do you mean by kasama po siya?

A: There were four of us at the office of the Notary Public.

Q: When you said four of you, whao (sic) are they?

A: Adelaida, Virgilio, two other witness (sic) and me.

Q: You are not four, you are five?

A: Yes sir.[10] (underscoring supplied)

Evelyns testimony not only contradicts the entries in Dycocos U.S. Passport, however, it appearing therein that Dycoco visited
the Philippines on April 2, 1990 and arrived in the United States on April 9 of the same year. Contrary to her claim, the REM does not reflect
here as one of the witnesses to its execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a NEW judgment be entered declaring null and void the document entitled Real Estate Mortgage with Special Power to Sell
Mortgaged Property without Judicial Proceedings purportedly signed by Virgilio Dycoco in favor of Adelaida Orina.
 Progressive Trade And Services Enterprise vs Antonio

DOCTRINE: It is settled that handwriting experts, while useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or
signatures.The trial courts ruling that Secundina failed to prove her allegation that the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa was a forgery
because she failed to present expert witnesses does not lie. It is settled that handwriting experts, while useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwritings or signatures.

For Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be
the handwriting of the person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the hand-writing of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also
be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence
is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Progressive Trade & Service Enterprises vs. Antonia, 600 SCRA 683,
G.R. No. 179502 September 18, 2009

FACTS: Virgilio Cebrero (Cebrero), registered owner of a 2,281 square meter parcel of land situated in Sampaloc, Manila and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 158305[1] (the land) died on December 19, 1989.

On January 19, 1991, Cebreros wife Secundina Magno Cebrero (Secundina) and children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of the Deceased Virgilio D. Cebrero With Waiver of Rights [2] allotting the land to Secundina.

On September 27, 1994, Secundina sold the land to Progressive Trade and Services (petitioner), through its president and chairman
Manuel C. Chua (Chua), via Deed of Absolute Sale.[3] TCT No.158305 was thus cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 225340 [4] was issued in the name
of Secundina on December 11, 1995 and, on even date, TCT No. 225340 was cancelled and TCT No. 225341[5] was issued in the name of petitioner.

On September 22, 1997, herein respondent Maria Milagrosa Antonio (Milagrosa) filed a Complaint[6] before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-85178, for Annulment of Title and Documents with Damages against petitioner and Secundina,
claiming that on April 30, 1985, Cebrero, with Secundinas consent, sold to her the land for P9,124,000;[7] that she was not able to register the
sale because she had to go to the United States to attend to personal family matters; and that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
and the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner are null and void.

In its Answer,[8] petitioner claimed that it bought the land in good faith and for value from Secundina and that Milagrosas claim
appears to be questionable, dubious, spurious, or inexistent;[9] that any claim of Milagrosa would only be as between her and Secundina; and that
Milagrosas rights, if any, had been forfeited by laches, estoppel, and prescription.

In her Answer,[10] Secundina denied that she and her husband sold the land to Milagrosa, claiming that the sale to petitioner was lawful
and for valuable consideration; and that, in any event, laches and prescription had set in to bar Milagrosas claim.

Branch 35 of the Manila RTC found petitioner to be a purchaser in good faith. With respect to Secundina, it concluded that since she
and her husband twice sold the land to two different vendees without their knowledge and consent, [she] must compensate [the plaintiff
Milagrosa] who was damaged by her fraud.[11] Thus the trial court disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing the complaint as far as defendant Progressive Trade & Services Enterprises, represented by its
President and Chairman Manuel C. Chua, is concerned;

(2) Confirming the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 225341 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila in the name of Progressive Trade & Services Enterprises, a single proprietorship represented by its
President & Chairman Manuel C. Chua, for Lot 68-A-l-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-314533, located in
Sampaloc, Manila;

(3) Ordering the defendant Segundina, a.k.a. Secundina, Cebrero to pay the plaintiff:

(a) The sum of P9,124,000.00, plus interest thereon at the legal rate computed from September 22,
1997;

(b) The sum of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees; and

(c) The costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]
 Both Milagrosa and Secundina appealed.[13] By Decision[14] of October 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision. However, on Milagrosas Motion for Reconsideration,[15] the Court of Appeals, finding the title, TCT No. 225340, issued to Secundina
spurious, rendered an Amended Decision[16] on March 26, 2007 in favor of Milagrosa, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Plaintiff-Appellants Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Concomitantly, judgment is rendered:

1. Cancelling TCT No. 225340 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila in favor of the Defendant-
Appellant, Segundina M. Cebrero, for being spurious;

2. Cancelling TCT No. 225341 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila in favor of the Defendant-
Appellee, Progressive Trade and Services Enterprises, for the reason that it is a purchaser in bad faith;

3. Upholding the validity of TCT No. 158305 in the name of the late Virgilio D. Cebrero; and

4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new title over the subject property in the name
of Plaintiff-Appellant, Maria Milagrosa Antonio, in lieu of TCT No. 158305.

SO ORDERED.[17] (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Hence, the present petition,[18] petitioner alleging that the Court of Appeals erred

x x x in ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 225341 which was duly issued by the Register of Deeds
of Manila in favor of the petitioner.[19]

xxxx

x x x in not ruling that the petitioner purchased the subject property in good faith and for value.[20]

xxxx

x x x in not upholding the principle of indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system of registration.[21]

x x x in ruling that the attendant circumstances did not constitute a case of double sale.[22]

xxxx

x x x in not finding that under the circumstances, respondent had forfeited whatever pretended rights she
has, if any, on the grounds of laches, estoppel and prescription.[23]

xxxx

x x x in not finding that the respondent has no cause of action against the petitioner.[24] (Emphasis in the
original)

In the meantime, as Milagrosa died on June 15, 2006, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its residual jurisdiction, substituted
Romualdo Uy for Milagrosa as plaintiff-appellant[25] on December 12, 2007.

ISSUE:

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

The former lawyer of the Cebrero spouses, Judge Celso D. Lavia (Judge Lavia), who is familiar with the signatures of the spouses,
testified that Cebreros purported signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa (marked Exhibit B in the deed but designated Exhibit A
during trial in Milagrosas formal offer of evidence)[26] is not his.[27]

A naked eye comparison of Cebreros signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa which is, by the way, a mere
photocopy[28] with the sample signatures identified by Judge Lavia as those of Cebrero and which were executed at around the time the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa was executed shows marked differences,[29]indicating that they were not affixed by one and the
same hand.

A comparison too with the naked eye of Secundinas signatures in public documents which she identified to be hers, as well her
signatures which she executed in open court and the signature attributed to her in the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa [30] in which her name
is typed as SEGUNDINA and her signature above it reads also Segundina, shows that they were not written by one and the same hand.
 The trial courts ruling that Secundina failed to prove her allegation that the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa was a forgery
because she failed to present expert witnesses[31] does not lie. It is settled that handwriting experts, while useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwritings or signatures.[32] For Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of the person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also
be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Underscoring supplied)

Complementing the said provision is Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which allows the reception of the opinion of a witness, like
Judge Lavia, for which proper basis is given, as evidence regarding a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity.

As the Court finds that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Milagrosas favor is not genuine, it transmitted no rights to her. Consequently,
the subject land part of Cebreros estate which was allotted to Secundina was validly sold by her to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-85178 lodged at the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 35 is DISMISSED.

RAZ VS IAC

DOCTRINE: Execution and authenticity of any private writing; Letters, in the case at bar, were admissible as evidence of private respondent;
Reasons.The petitioner was actually arguing against herself in invoking Rule 132, Section 21, for one of the modes prescribed therein for
proving the execution and authenticity of any private writing is by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker.

This mode must be read with Section 23 of the same Rule, which says thatx x x Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. We have made such comparison and find that the signature of Encarnacion
G. Villanueva on the Conditional Assignment (which is not disputed) is similar to the signatures affixed to the two letters sent to the petitioner.
There is no doubt that the agreement and the two letters were signed by private respondent Encarnacion G. Villanueva. Consequently, their
authenticity and execution having been established, we hold that the letters were admissible as evidence of the private respondent.

The subject of this petition is a Conditional Assignment of Rights and Interests over a Foreclosure Judgment entered into between petitioner
Reva Raz and the original private respondent herein, Encarnacion Villanueva, on August 7, 1972. 1

The said judgment was rendered in favor of Villanueva on February 5, 1969, and ordered the defendants therein to pay her the amount of
P35,000.00, with 12% per annum interest from August 7, 1965, and other amounts, in default of which the property subject of the proceeding
would be sold at public auction to satisfy the amounts owing her. 2 This property was a parcel of land located at Quezon City which had been
mortgaged by the defendants to secure the payment of a loan she had extended to them. The judgment was pending appeal before the
respondent court at the time of the execution of the Conditional Assignment.

By virtue of the Conditional Assignment, Villanueva transferred all her rights and interests in the said judgment to Raz in consideration of the
sum of P75,000.00 to be paid by the petitioner as follows:

a) The ASSIGNEE shall pay the ASSIGNOR, her heirs and/or assigns the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND (P22,000.00), upon the
signing of this agreement.

b) The ASSIGNEE shall pay the ASSIGNOR, her heirs and/or assigns the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00), within one year
from August 7, 1972, and not later, August 7, 1973;

c) The balance of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND (P33,000.00) plus costs mentioned in the said judgment shall be paid within the next
following year and not later, August 7, 1974. It is further understood that the full consideration mentioned in paragraph 3, and the
costs mentioned in par. c, hereof shall be fully liquidated in two (2) years time from the signing of this agreement and not later,
August 7, 1974.

It was also stipulated in Par. 3 (d) of the agreement

d) That the ASSIGNOR shall, as soon as the decision in the aforementioned case shall become final and executory, proceed with the
execution of the judgment and the auction sale if allowed by law of the property subject matter of the aforementioned case, and the
ASSIGNOR and/or her heirs shall as soon as the full consideration hereof is fully satisfied, and if by operation of law shall become
the legitimate owner of the said property, execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the ASSIGNEE or her heirs, and/or assigns in order to
make this CONDITIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS permanent. All expenses for such execution and auction sale
and other expenses necessary thereto shall be for the account of the ASSIGNEE.
The petitioner paid the first installment of P22,000.00 on August 7, 1972, and the second installment of P20,000.00 on August 7, 1973.
However, she refused to pay the third installment of P33,000.00, which was supposed to be due on August 7, 1974, on the ground that
Villanueva had not complied with her obligation under their agreement.

On April 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the private respondent, claiming that the
latter had reneged on her duty to deliver the property to the assignee in accordance with their agreement. In her answer, Villanueva alleged
that it was the petitioner who had defaulted in her payments and thus given just cause for the rescission of the agreement. This was authorized
in its Par. 3(h) reading as follows:

h) If for any reason, any of the above terms and conditions cannot fully be complied, the same may be considered rescinded by either
party, in which event the ASSIGNOR shall return whatever money she or her heirs may have received from the ASSIGNEE, and the
said ASSIGNEE, shall relinquish any and all rights which if any she or her heirs may have, and this contract shall forthwith be
considered null and void and without force and effect whatsoever.

To support her claim, Villanueva presented two letters 3 she said she had sent Raz, the first to remind her of the third installment that had not
yet been paid and the second to tender her the refund of her earlier payments in view of the rescission of their contract. These letters follow:

April 22, 1975

Reva Raz
16-A A. Matiyaga St.
Quezon City

Dear Mr. Raz:

I am writing you this letter to remind you of your obligation under the Deed of Assignment we have entered into. You have not complied with
your promise to pay me the P33,000.00 the costs and expenses corresponding thereto.

Hoping that you give this matter your preferential attention. Final demand is hereby made that you pay the aforesaid amount otherwise I will be
constrained to rescind the contract and avail of my rights provided for in the contract. Truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENCARNACION G. VILLANUEVA

xxx xxx xxx

May 13, 1975

Mr. Reva C. Raz

16-A Matiyaga St.
Quezon City

Dear Mr. Raz:

I am writing you this letter again to inform you that inasmuch that you failed to pay me the P33,000.00 the costs and expenses corresponding
thereto as provided in our contract of August 7, 1972, I am making to you this formal tender of payment of the P42,000.00 you paid me before.

Please give this matter your preferential attention because if I will not hear from you within a period of two (2) days from receipt hereof I will
be constrained to consign aforesaid amount in court at your own costs.

Yours truly,

(Sgd.) ENCARNACION VILLANUEVA

For her part, Raz contended that it was the private respondent who had incurred in delay and bad faith.1wphi1 The petitioner pointed out that
the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the appellants on August 16, 1972, and was granted by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated
December 15, 1972. Yet it was only on August 16, 1973, that the private respondent filed a motion for execution of the foreclosure judgment.

This motion was granted by the trial court on October 6, 1973. The property was sold at public auction on January 23, 1975, and the certificate
of sale was issued in favor of Villanueva on February 25, 1975. This was registered on March 26, 1975, and the period of redemption expired
one year later. However, it was only on February 9, 1978, that the court, on Villanueva's motion, ordered the confirmation of the sale and a new
certificate of title was issued in her name.

According to the petitioner, the two letters allegedly sent to her by the private respondents should not have been admitted in evidence not only
because there was no proof that she had received them. No less importantly, their genuineness had not been established in accordance with
Rule 132, Section 21, reading as follows:

Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

 b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

c) By a subscribing witness.

The petitioner likewise submitted that the rescission of the agreement was improper because it was Villanueva who had violated the contract by
refusing to deliver the property to her. Moreover, every rescission, even if extrajudicial, requires proper notice to the other party, and there
was no proof that such notice had been served on her.

The Court has deliberated on the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the respondent court 4committed no reversible error
in sustaining the trial court 5 and dismissing the appeal.

The petitioner was actually arguing against herself in invoking Rule 132, Section 21, for one of the modes prescribed therein for proving the
execution and authenticity of any private writing is "by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker." This mode must be read
with Section 23 of the same Rule, which says that

. . . Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted
or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

We have made such comparison and find that the signature of Encarnacion G. Villanueva on the Conditional Assignment (which is not disputed) is
similar to the signatures affixed to the two letters sent to the petitioner. There is no doubt that the agreement and the two letters were
signed by private respondent Encarnacion G. Villanueva. Consequently, their authenticity and execution having been established, we hold that the
letters were admissible as evidence of the private respondent.

The Court is also convinced that the two letters were correctly sent to and personally delivered at the petitioner's address as stated in the
Conditional Assignment, were actually received there and later presumably conveyed to her. Indeed, the signature of the person who received
the first letter closely resembles that of one of petitioner's counsel as an examination of her pleadings will reveal. 6 At any rate, even if they
were not really transmitted to the petitioner and the letters were correctly rejected as inadmissible, Raz would still be bound by her own
admission in the complaint, where she made the following allegations in Par. 8:

a) A week or so before August 7, 1974, defendant demanded from plaintiff the payment of the balance of P33,000.00 of the
consideration;

xxx xxx xxx

e) In view of plaintiffs insistence that the P33,000.00 would be paid only after defendant had obtained ownership of the subject
property and would thus be ready to execute the corresponding deed of sale, defendant instead offered to return the amount of
P42,000.00 already paid to her by plaintiff and have the contract rescinded, clearly revealing her interest not to recognize the
aforesaid contract. (Emphasis supplied.)

The last quoted-paragraph is especially telling because it belies the petitioner's insistence that she had not been notified of the rescission. By
her own words, she has admitted understanding the letter of May 13, 1975, as informing her that because of her failure to pay the balance of
the stipulated payment, the contract was being rescinded by the private respondent. As she herself alleged, Villanueva "offered to return the
amount of P42,000.00 already paid to her by the plaintiff and have the contract rescinded." This is a judicial admission that the petitioner
cannot now disavow. 7

While it is true that a certain degree of delay did accompany the registration of the property in Villanueva's name, this was not entirely
imputable to her. Good faith is presumed except in the face of the strongest evidence to the contrary, which is not present here. The Court
also notes from her conduct that the petitioner is not entirely blameless either. Considering the investment she had made in the land, having
already paid thereon the sum of P33,000.00, we feel she should have been more vigilant in the protection of her interests.

The petitioner's counsel repeatedly says it was informed of each development in the sale and registration of the property "later on." 8 By this
vague statement, which suggests that it was not following up the matter closely, it would absolve its client of all negligence. We do not agree.

It seems to us that in view of her substantial stake in the property, it behooved the petitioner to see to it that the private respondent
discharged her part of the bargain without delay, especially so since no specific date was imposed upon the private respondent to transfer the
land to the petitioner. If Raz felt that Villanueva was dilly-dallying, she should have taken steps to make her move faster (short of refusing to
pay the last installment). As the trial judge observed, "plaintiff could very well have paid the whole amount and then substituted herself as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10109." But she did not and just stood by, waiting to hear of developments "later on."

The sum of it all is that the petitioner, in insisting on the registration first in her name of the subject property before paying the balance, was
invoking a right not stipulated in the Conditional Assignment. What was clearly provided therein was that the balance of P33,000.00 would be
paid by her within two years from the date of the agreement and not later than August 7, 1974. For her refusal to make this payment, the
contract was, pursuant to its terms, properly rescinded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.

Same; Same; Same; For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and

(2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and

(2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

ARCILLA VS TEODORO

The case of the Heirs of the deceased spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro (August 11, 2008) involved an application for land registration filed in 1995.
Through oversight and inadvertence, the applicant failed to include in her application a verification and certificate against forum shopping. The
MTC nonetheless admitted the same and eventually granted the application despite the opposition of the Arcillas who claimed ownership of the
property. The RTC and the CA affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal of the Arcillas.

Before the SC, one of the issues raised by the Arcillas was the certification of non-forum shopping which appears to have been executed by the
applicant in Maryland and notarized before a notary public in Maryland. The Arcillas invoked the Lopez decision.

According to Justice Austria-Martinez of the Third Division of the SC, the ruling in Lopez is inapplicable to the present case because the Rules
of Evidence which were in effect at that time were the old Rules prior to their amendment in 1989. The rule applied in Lopez was based on
Section 25, Rule 132 and spoke of an official record or an entry therein. When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Sec. 25, Rule 132
became Section 24, Rule 132 and the amendment consisted in the deletion of the introductory phrase an official record or an entry therein,
which was substituted by the phrase, The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19.

Sec. 19 refers to classes of documents and sub-paragraph (a) refers to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country.

Thus, Justice Austria-Martinez said that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under Sec. 24 refers only to the
documents referred in Sec. 19 (a). In Lopez, the requirements of then Sec. 25, Rule 132 were made applicable to all public or official records
without any distinction because the old rule did not distinguish.

She agreed with the position of the Court of Appeals penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with concurrence of Justices Andres B.
Reyes Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong that Sec. 24 of Rule 132 does not include documents acknowledge before a notary public abroad and
explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the same.

HELD: The law does not require that parties to a document notarized by a notary public should be residents of the place where the said
document is acknowledged or that they affix their signature in the presence of the notary publicwhat is necessary is that the persons
who signed a notarized document are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before the notary public in order to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.Petitioners claim that the Affidavit of Quitclaim is null and void on the
ground that the signatories thereto are not residents of Virac, Catanduanes and that they affixed their signature in places other than Virac,
Catanduanes where they supposedly acknowledged the said document, is not persuasive. The Court finds no error in the finding of the MTC, as
affirmed by the CA, that the execution of the subject Affidavit of Quitclaim or the signatures of the affiants appearing therein were never
contested nor raised as an issue and that petitioner Sarah Arcilla herself acknowledged her own signature in the said Affidavit. In any event,
the law does not require that parties to a document notarized by a notary public should be residents of the place where the said document is
acknowledged or that they affix their signature in the presence of the notary public. What is necessary is that the persons who signed a
notarized document are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before the notary public in order to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
NEDLLOYD VS GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES

FACTS: Petitioner Nedlloyd is a foreign corporation, doing business in the Philippines thru itslocal ship agent, co-petitioner. Respondent
Glow Laks enterprises, Ltd., is likewise a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong with no license to do
business in the Phils. On September 1987 respondent loaded on board MS Scandutch, owned by Petitioner, at the Port of Manila a total
343 cartoons of garments, to Colon, Panama via Hongkong. By an unfortunate turn of events, however, unauthorized persons
managed to forge the covering bills of lading and on the basis of the falsified documents, the ports authority
released the goods.

Hence this formal claim with Nedlloyd. In disclaiming liability for the misdelivery of the shipments, that they were
never remiss in their obligation as a common carrier and the goods were discharged in good order and condition into the custody of the
National Ports Authority of Panana in accordance with the Panamanian law. They averred that they cannot be faulted fort the release of
the goods to unauthorized persons, their extraordinary responsibility as common carrier having ceased at the time the possession of the
goods were turned over tothe possession of the port authorities.

The RTC dismissed the case against Petitioner. It ruled that Panama law was duly proven during the trial and pursuant to the said
statute, carriers of goods destined to any Panama port of entry have to discharge their loads into the custody of Panama Ports Authority
to effective government collection of port dues, customs duties and taxes. The subsequent withdrawal effected by
unauthorized persons on the strength of falsifed bills of lading does not constitute misdelivery arising from the fault of the common
carrier. CA reversed.

ISSUE: WON Panamian Laws were duly proved as ruled by the RTC

HELD: NO.

It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.13 To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court14 which read:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreigncountry, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and

(2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) it must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and

(2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. Such official publication or
copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer
has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.