1.
Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita
National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional
FACTS: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law
decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this also resulted to
the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as
a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose,
territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the
Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law
principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by
RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was
440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this
Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our internal waters, but
the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.
However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent
passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not
diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main
archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a
larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the
natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based
rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
_________
Facts: In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial
sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements
complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as
geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime
space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing
vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke
its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the
Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.
______________
Facts: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law
decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power,
in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary
treaties.
RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
RA 9522s treatmentof the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
Issues: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Discussions: The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect
the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as
internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
Rulings: No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step
in safeguarding the countrys maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that
extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It
is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic
waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe
the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or
producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government
reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with
UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other
and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it
reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime
passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and
of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the
lives of the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be
directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the
countrys maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a
mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty
that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure
said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the
treatythe role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000
square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points,
increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the Philippines
sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS
III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the
legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over
KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in
accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions delineation of internal
waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal
waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar
the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted
principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it
is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states
in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables
the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS
III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law and
not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it
shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
2. Henares v LTFRB GR No. 158290 October 23, 2006
FACTS: Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4.
Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby
sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental policies
and programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and programs,
projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project
and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this
Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental
laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal
sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Moreover, as held
previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the
Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand
that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding
the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an
act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of
government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
________________
FACTS: Petitioners insist that it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with
power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, they challenge this Court to issue a writ of
mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. According to petitioners, Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy
environment, as enunciated in Oposa. The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749
Particularly Section 4 which states that, when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this
case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by
the government.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and
the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General
explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act
No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CN Gas alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUE: Whether LTFRB can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through a writ of Mandamus.
HELD: NO. First, there is an executive order (E.O. No. 290) implementing a program on the use of CNG by
public vehicles which took effect on February 24, 2004, hence, to a certain extent, the instant petition had been
mooted. A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed.
Second, regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and
the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious
reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation
cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally in firm. It is
the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection
of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the
present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the
citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we
must admit in particular that
petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a
grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles.
It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
3. Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083)
Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16);
Summary: An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to stop
issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the
Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented others of their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter:
[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions.
The right is linked tot he constitutional right to health, is fundamental,constitutionalised, self-executing and issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans
judicially enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The court
stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding
generations as
the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
FACTS: This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44children, through their parents, claiming that
they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop
deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking
to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting
and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR
Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind--
the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in
the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
HELD: The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.Under
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as
a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but
for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
4. Felipe Ysmael jr v Secretary of Environment and NatRes gr no 79538 oct 18 1990
FACTS: Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356
subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President
and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioners prayers were to
no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.
HELD: The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope without
need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to
determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which
avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect
of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent
authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction
The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latters duty to develop and
conserve the countrys natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the
grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek
affirmative relief.
_________________
FACTS: On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public
forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya
from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo
Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and
cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential
instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its
contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the
cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioners TLA was re-
awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July
31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal
award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos.
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office
of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural
Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August
1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the
concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating,
among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void.
The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the
Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber
license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively.
HELD: NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders
the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right
itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar,
petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the
validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its
inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the
time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the
issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are
pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to
be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of
utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
5. Carino v Insular Govt 212 US 449 Feb 1909
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario, an Igorot, went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his
inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo
only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that
the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost.
Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous
cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute
owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as
to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but
pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by Cario for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient
length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers,
and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
_____________
FACTS: Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the
CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11,
1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for
holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture).
1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail.
1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only
established possessory title.
Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of
1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation
ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
HELD: YES. Petition Granted. Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is
enough. For uncultivated, 30. Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings
against him or his father ever was made. Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser. There must be
a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far
as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.
6. Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private
landowners.
ISSUE: WON the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership
over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
7. Social Justice Society v Atienza, Jr. G.R. No. 156052
FACTS: This is a resolution of a decision dated March 7, 2007. After the Court rendered its decision, oil
companies (Chevron, Petron, Shell) and the GRP (represented by DOE), filed their respective motions for leave to
intervene and for reconsideration of the decision. Petitioners SJS et al, in an original petition for mandamus,
sought to compel Hon. Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 (dated Nov 2001). The Ordinance reclassified
certain areas in Manila from industrial to commercial and directed the owners of businesses to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months. Among the businesses situated in the area
are the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
In 2002, the City of Manila and DOE entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the terminals was the most viable and practicable option.
Resolution No 97 was passed, declaring the MOU effective for 6 six months beginning July 2002. The Court held
in the 2007 decision that Hon Atienza had the ministerial duty under the LGC to enforce all laws and ordinances.
The issue of whether the MOU could amend or repeal Ordinance 8027 was not decided since the resolutions
which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City expressly gave it full force only until April 30, 2003.
There was nothing that hindered the mayor from enforcing the ordinance. In the motions for reconsideration, the
oil companies call to attention the fact that on April 23, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint against the Mayor
and City of Manila in the RTC for the annulment of the ordinance. The RTC granted the injunction. Petro also
filed a similar case which was also granted. In 2006, the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119 (Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006), which the oil companies complained before the
RTC. This ordinance reclassified areas in the City to High-Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone. The RTC issued
a TRO. Given these additional info, the petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. WON the movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene YES
2. WON the ff are impediments to the execution of the 2007 decision a) Ordinance No 8119 NO
b) Writs of injunction and status quo order issued by RTC NO
3. WON the implementation of Ordinance 8027 will unduly encroach upon DOEs powers and functions
involving natural resources NO
HELD:
1. The oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance 8027. Their claim
is that they will need to spend billions if they are compelled to relocate their oil depots out of Manila. They should
be allowed to intervene even if they filed their motions long before the 2007 decision. Also, there are compelling
reasons to allow the motions in light of the new information filed.
Likewise, DOEs motion for intervention is allowed.
2. a) Ordinance 8119 is not a legal impediment since it did not repeal Ordinance 8027. The conflict between the
two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No 8027 is applicable to particular areas only, whereas Ordinance
8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.
b) The writs of injunction and status quo are not legal impediments since the constitutionality of ordinance 8027 is
not clearly challenged. Nowhere in the judges decision is there a showing that he was convinced that the oil
companies had made out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of
validity of the ordinance.
3.Ordinance 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its police power. Police power is
the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
The ordinance was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and
general welfare of manila residents.
The ordinance does not encroach upon DOEs powers. Under RA 7639, DOE was given the power to establish
and administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution and storage of energy
resources. Under RA 8749, DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the Industry which serve the
interest of the public.
Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in Art II, Sec 25 of the constitution. An entire article (Art X) has also
been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of the LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by
Congress to ensure autonomy of local governments. The Court does not see how the laws relied upon by the oil
companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its powers to enact ordinances in the exercise of police power
and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. When the ambiguous powers contained in the statutes are
pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power, it is not difficult to favor the latter.
_________
Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose
L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28,
2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the
most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements,
within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution,
the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months
starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to
the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and
the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
8. Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July 2002)
FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental
and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
_______
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Paraaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus
void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary
to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition
for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of
courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a
final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to
the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation
of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged
areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation
performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural
lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the
possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under
the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition
for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its
lands. The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone.
PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a
negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal
or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held
by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant
case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply
with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure
the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
 4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights
to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right
to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late
for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents
and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity
of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to
conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to
public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use
the property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property
not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public
dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the
territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-
executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer
needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private
parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be
classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of
this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands
for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always
reserved these lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent
the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming
part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is
vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through
private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable
lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD
No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while
EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however,
expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the
government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price
as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original
JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of
the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands
of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional
ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the
hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
______
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and
leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would
later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a
TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these
events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim
that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA
between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable
or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
_____
FACTS: President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also
transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a
JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in
the absence of any public bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was
conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale
of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening
between the parties.
ISSUE: W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine,
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned by the
State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila
Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and
it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other
natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be
alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of
these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
9. VELMONTE VS BALMONTE170 SCRA 256
Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of
names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million
each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs.Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to
serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy
General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of
the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June
1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez,
Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil
action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be
directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information.
ISSUE: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest
loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to
GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that
prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the
actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as
Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the
benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to
be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its
transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office
held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still,
Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a
policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite
any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition.
His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues.
The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as
the repository of all State power.
____________
FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager,
requesting to befurnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa including
the ten (10) oppositionmembers who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on guaranty of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos. And if such is notpossible, an access to those said documents. Apart from Valmontes letter, he is
stressing the premise of the request onthe present provision of the Freedom constitution at that time which is Art.
IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of thepeople to information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte,
aware that such request contains serious legalimplications seek the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy
General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a confidentialrelationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty toits customers to preserve this confidentiality;
and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentialityunless so ordered by the courts.On June
26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, Petitioner
Valmontewrote another letter saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free
to do whateveraction necessary within the premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public
interest.Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidatedreply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The
parties havingcomplied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.In his comment, respondent raise procedural
objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is thatpetitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Managerare reviewable by the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is
therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no causeof action.
ISSUE: Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents sought,
by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
HELD: The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
state. Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. Peoples right to information is
limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977
provide for annual appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to
GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern of
the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to
see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above
board.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that
a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. He further contends that in
view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents,
evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe vs.
Mutuc, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando stated that ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in
all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards
a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control.
Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the
individual in his private capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the
right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since
the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation
would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers.
The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to
be violated.
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are private in nature and hence, are
not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees access to
officiall records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions only. Further,
they argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage
of the peoples right to access to official records.
This Dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation of
Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government, WHETHER carrying out
its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT justify the
exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to information.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General Manager of the Government
Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans
granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable
regulations as to time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem
necessary. SO ORDERED.
10. Legaspi VS. Civil Service Commission G.R. no. 72119
Facts: Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis (petitioner) request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health
Department in Cebu. Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information. The Solicitor General challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does
not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the
petitioner with the information he seeks.
Issue: WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees.
Held: Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to
confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
______________
Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department
of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed
the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.
The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition
is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit
Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA
27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction
of the exercise of the public right.
________________
FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this
special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities
of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees,
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed
the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees
HELD: The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject
to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or
deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . .
the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87
Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled
by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public
officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the
instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request
is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned
claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position,
the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
11. Tano v Socrates gr no 110249, aug 21 1997
Facts: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-
92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF.
To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series
of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN
ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS,
TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE
ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS
PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE
FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live
fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within
the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.
On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No.
33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING,
SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT:
FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS
(PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS
(TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND
OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER),
EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL
AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,
and,
ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993
Entitled, Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3.
Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo),
5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger
Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae
(Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.
Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of
Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade.
Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances deprived them of due process
of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23 contained
no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the
Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit and; that Ordinance No. 2 of the
Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of
live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful
fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful
ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly
prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to
carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.
And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null and void,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD: It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have
been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities
with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami,
and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation
of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang
panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms
of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers
and lakes or of ecological imbalance.
12. Chiongbian et al v orbos et al gr no 96752, june 22, 1995
13. Sultan Mohamad ali dimaporo v comelec gr no 93201, june 26, 1990
14. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided
to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation. In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos
who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of
Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as
an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning
of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of
the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within
the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also
reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of
foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino
and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges
and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped
from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the
foreigners are qualified, too.
15. Aranda v. Republic gr no 172331, aug 24, 2011
16. Miners association of the Philippines inc v Factoran gr no 98332, jan 6 1995
FACTS: Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements
involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, the DENR Secretary issued DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series
of 1989, entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." Under
the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining
leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources
covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one
(1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down
the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through
Negotiation."
The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition
assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.
Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that the administrative orders do not
conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment
of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative
Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining agreements and automatically
converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand,
Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease
agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57
and/or the consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3,
Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary
to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided
under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into mining
agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary are
unconstitutional.
HELD: NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.
The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law
under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic
growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained,
and their force and effect upheld.
Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of
Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and
conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress
may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-
impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the aforesaid
mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that
the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The
provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into
production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibly
contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements
are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term
"production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiation between the Government and the
applicants, if they are so minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by
petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the
minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in
the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.
17. Heherson alvarez v PICOP resources gr no 162243,164516, 171875, dec 3, 2009
18. Cruz v ncip gr no 135385, dec 6, 2000
19. Republic of the philippines v naguiat gr 134209, jan 4, 2006
20. Province of rizal v exec secretary gr no 129546, dec 13, 2005
21. Alcantara v commission of the setlement of land problems gr no 145838, july 10, 2001
22. Cheesman v IAC gr no 74833, jan 21, 1991
23. Gavino corpuz v sps gorospe gr no135297, june 8, 2000
24. People v maximo maceren gr no l-32166, oct 18, 1997