REMEDIAL LAW> Criminal Procedure> Bail

Overlap with
POLITICAL LAW> Constitutional Law> Bill of Rights> Right to Bail
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner
vs
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
G.R. No 213847, August 18, 2015
En Banc
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. A warrant was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which
was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty
would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not admission to bail in offenses punished by death, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Enriles
motion to fix bail.
HELD #1: YES.
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal
cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, "such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for
the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been
a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined
in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
HELD #2: YES.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also
to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated
his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his admission to
bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
HELD #3: YES.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari
, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Special Civil Action for Certiorari
Overlap With
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Motion to Quash

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014
FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: The mauling incident involving neighbors outside the house of the petitioners. Claiming
themselves to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano, Rommel Morano and Perla
Beltran
Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile in the MTC with frustrated homicide, and with
less
serious physical injuries. MTC issued its joint resolution, whereby it found probable cause against
the
petitioners for less serious physical injuries. The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint
resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their having been given medical
attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries
dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to the
case
of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed
by
the Rules on Summary Procedure. The MTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
because
the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to
be
reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which
prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with
motion
to quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment. The MTC denied the motion to quash,
and
ruled that the cases for less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary
procedure;
and reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order
denying their motion to quash, and the order denying their motion for reconsideration. RTC Judge
Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders
issued by the RTC, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the
part of the RTC. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced
in
the RTC. CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for .certiorari and prohibition
for
being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal; and ruling that they should have filed
their
notice of appeal
ISSUE #1: Whether or not petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper in assailing the decision of RTC
dismissing an original action for certiorari.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not it is proper to invoke motion to quash the information filed in the MTC.
HELD #1: No. Considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of
the
petition for certiorari, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration, were in the exercise of its
original
jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by reason of their completely disposing of the case,
leaving
nothing more to be done by the RTC. The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by
notice of appeal, taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and
prohibition
in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and
impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional
errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC dismissed the
petition
for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioners
motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion to quash correct, for it
would be
premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the
supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical
attendance
for them. Indeed, the timeand the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.
HELD #2: No.
The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the
complaint
or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. Section
3,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or
information,
as follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person
of
the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is
charged
except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or
liability
has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute
a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
Xxx
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged the
petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the
ultimate facts
constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue
injury
or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints
were
not quashable.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure/Bail
Overlap with
Legal Ethics
ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL, Complainant
vs.
JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI,
Respondent..
A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845; October 5, 2011
[FIRST DIVISION]
FACTS: Judge Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a
warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case and without recommendation
for bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings
and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an
information for murder (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of
P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch.
Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from
custody. Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the aforesaid twin orders, filed a Very Urgent Motion For
Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant
Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An
Apparent And Patent Error. Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion on the ground that the
motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor and that he had not been
authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. When no order regarding
the matter of bail was issued, Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross
incompetence manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail. He also
contend that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held
for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Infante is correct in granting bail to the accused without conducting the
requisite bail hearing?
HELD: NO.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action. Even where there is no petition
for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate
and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance
to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. Being the trial judge,
Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing
being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through such
hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak
or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
1. Distinguish a motion to quash from a demurer to evidence