Coordinates: 40274N 171227E

Battle of Taranto
The Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 1112 November
1940 during the Second World War between British naval forces,
Battle of Taranto
under Admiral Andrew Cunningham, and Italian naval forces, under Part of the Battle of the Mediterranean of the
Admiral Inigo Campioni. The Royal Navy launched the first all- Second World War
aircraft ship-to-ship naval attack in history, employing a small
number of obsolescent Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers
from the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious (R87) in the Mediterranean
Sea. The attack struck the battle fleet of the Regia Marina at anchor
in the harbour of Taranto using aerial torpedoes despite the
shallowness of the water. The devastation wrought by the British
carrier-launched aircraft on the large Italian warships was the
beginning of the ascendancy of naval aviation over the big guns of
battleships. According to Admiral Cunningham, "Taranto, and the
night of November 1112, 1940, should be remembered for ever as
having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has
its most devastating weapon."[2]
Aerial view of the inner harbour showing
damaged Trento-class cruisers surrounded by
floating oil.

Contents Date 1112 November 1940

Location Taranto, Italy
1 Origins
40274N 171227E
2 Attack
Result Decisive British victory[1]
3 Aftermath
3.1 Influence on Pearl Harbor Belligerents
4 Notes United Kingdom Italy
5 References
Commanders and leaders
6 Further reading
Andrew Inigo Campioni
7 External links
Cunningham
Lumley Lyster
Strength
Origins
21 biplane torpedo 6 battleships
Long before the First World War, the Italian Regia Marina's First bombers 9 heavy cruisers
Squadron was based at Taranto, a port-city on Italy's south-east coast. 1 aircraft carrier 7 light cruisers
In that period, the British Royal Navy developed plans for countering 2 heavy cruisers 13 destroyers
the power of the Regia Marina. Blunting the power of any adversary 2 light cruisers
in the Mediterranean Sea was an ongoing exercise. Plans for the 5 destroyers
capture of the port at Taranto were considered as early as the Italian
Casualties and losses
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.[3]
2 killed 59 killed
In 194041, Italian Army operations in North Africa, based in Libya, 2 captured 600 wounded
required a supply line from Italy. The British Army's North African 2 aircraft shot down 1 battleship lost
Campaign, based in Egypt, suffered from much greater supply 2 battleships heavily
difficulties. Supply convoys to Egypt had to either cross the damaged
Mediterranean via Gibraltar and Malta, and then approach the coast 1 heavy cruiser slightly
of Sicily, or steam all the way around the Cape of Good Hope, up the damaged
whole east coast of Africa, and then through the Suez Canal, to reach 2 destroyers slightly
Alexandria. Since the latter was a very long and slow route, this put damaged
the Italian fleet in an excellent position to interdict British supplies 2 aircraft destroyed on
and reinforcements. the ground

Following the concept of a fleet in being, the Italians usually kept

their warships in harbour and were unwilling to seek battle with the Royal Navy on their own, also because any ship lost bigger than
a destroyer could not be replaced. The Italian fleet at Taranto was powerful: six battleships (of which five were battleworthy, Andrea
Doria having her crew still in training after her reconstruction), seven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers, making
the threat of a sortie against British shipping a serious problem.

During the Munich Crisis of 1938, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, was concerned
about the survival of the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious in the face of Italian opposition in the Mediterranean. Pound ordered his staff
to re-examine all plans for attacking Taranto.[3] He was advised by Arthur LStG Lyster, the captain of Glorious, that her Fairey TSR
Swordfish were capable of a night attack, using aerial torpedoes. Indeed, the Fleet Air Arm was then the only naval aviation arm
capable of it.[3] Pound took Lyster's advice and ordered training to begin. Security was kept so tight there were no written records.[3]
Just a month before the war began, Pound advised his replacement, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, to consider the possibility. This
came to be known as OperationJudgment.[4]

The fall of France and the consequent loss of the French fleet in the Mediterranean (even before Operation Catapult) made redress
essential. The older carrier, HMS Eagle, on Cunningham's strength, was ideal, possessing a very experienced air group composed
entirely of obsolescent Swordfish aircraft. Three Sea Gladiators were added for the operation.[3] Firm plans were drawn up after the
Italian Army halted atSidi Barrani, which freed up the British Mediterranean Fleet.[3]

Operation Judgment was just a small part of the overarching Operation MB8.[3] It was originally scheduled to take place on 21
October 1940, Trafalgar Day, but a fire in an auxiliary fuel tank of one Swordfish led to a delay. (The 60 imp gal (270 L; 72 US gal)
auxiliary tanks replaced the usual third crewman (gunner) to extend the operating range of the aircraft enough to reach Taranto.) This
minor fire spread into something more serious that destroyed two Swordfish.[3] Eagle then suffered a breakdown in her fuel
system,[3] so she was eliminated.

When the brand-new carrier HMS Illustrious, based at Alexandria, became available in the Mediterranean, she took on board five
Swordfish from Eagle, and launched the strike alone.[5]

The complete naval task forcecommanded by Rear Admiral Lyster,[3] who had authored the plan of attack on Tarantoconsisted
of Illustrious, the heavy cruisers HMS Berwick and York, the light cruisers HMS Gloucester and Glasgow, and the destroyers
HMS Hyperion, Ilex, Hasty and Havelock.[6] The 24[3] attack Swordfish came from 813, 815, 819, and 824 Naval Air Squadrons.
The small number of attacking warplanes raised concern that Judgment would only alert and enrage the Italian Navy without
achieving any significant results.[3] Illustrious also had Fairey Fulmar fighters of 806 Naval Air Squadronaboard to provide air cover
[7]
for the task force, with radar and fighter control systems.

Half of the Swordfish were armed with torpedoes as the primary strike aircraft, with
the other half carrying aerial bombs and flares to carry out diversions.[3] These
torpedoes were fitted with Duplex magnetic/contact exploders, which were
extremely sensitive to rough seas,[3] as the attacks on the German battleship
Bismarck later showed. There were also worries the torpedoes would bottom out in
the harbour after being dropped.[3] The loss rate for the bombers was expected to be
fifty percent.[3]

A Fairey Swordfish
Several reconnaissance flights by Martin Maryland bombers (of the RAF's No. 431 General Reconnaissance Flight)[3] flying from
Malta confirmed the location of the Italian fleet. These flights produced photos on which the intelligence officer of Illustrious spotted
previously unexpected barrage balloons; the attack plan was changed accordingly.[3] To make sure the Italian warships had not
sortied, the British also sent over a Short Sunderland flying boat on the night of 11 November, just as the carrier task force was
forming up off the Greek island of Cephalonia, about 170 nmi (310 km; 200 mi) from Taranto harbour. This reconnaissance flight
alerted the Italian forces in southern Italy, but since they were without any radars, they could do little but wait for whatever came
along. The Regia Marina could conceivably have gone to sea in search of any British naval force, but this was distinctly against the
naval philosophy of the Italians between January 1940 and September 1943.

The complexity of OperationMB8, with its various forces and convoys, succeeded in deceiving the Italians into thinking only normal
convoying was under way. This contributed to the success ofJudgment.[3]

The base of Taranto was defended by 101 anti-aircraft guns and 193 machine-guns, and was usually protected against low-flying
aircraft by barrage balloons, of which only 27 were in place on November 11, as strong winds on Nov. 6th had blown away 60
balloons. Capital ships were also supposed to be protected by anti-torpedo nets, but 12,800 m (42,000 ft) of netting was required for
full protection, and only one-third of that was rigged before the attack due to a scheduled gunnery exercise. Moreover, these nets did
4 in).[8]
not reach the bottom of the harbour, allowing the British torpedoes to clear them by about 60 cm (2

Attack
The first wave of 12 aircraft, led by Lieutenant Commander M.W
. Williamson RN of
815 Squadron, left Illustrious just before 21:00 hours on 11 November 1940,
followed by a second wave of nine about 90 minutes later. Of the second wave, one
aircraft turned back with a problem with its auxiliary fuel tank, and one launched 20
minutes late, after requiring emergency repairs to damage following a minor taxiing
accident, so only eight made it to the target.

The first wave, which consisted of six Swordfish armed with torpedoes, two with
flares and 4 (250 lb.) bombs, and four with 6 bombs, was split into two sections
when three of the bombers and one torpedo bomber strayed from the main force
while flying through thin clouds. The smaller group continued to Taranto Attack directions of the British planes
independently. The main group approached the harbor at Mar Grande at 22:58.
Sixteen flares were dropped east of the harbour, then the flare dropper and another
aircraft made a dive bombing attack to set fire to oil tanks. The next three aircraft,
led by Lieutenant Commander K Williamson RN of 815 Squadron, attacked over
San Pietro Island, and struck the battleship Conte di Cavour with a torpedo that
blasted a 27 ft (8.2 m) hole in her side below her waterline. Williamson's plane was
immediately shot down by the Italian battleship's anti-aircraft guns.[9] The two
remaining aircraft in this sub-flight continued, dodging barrage balloons and
receiving heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Italian warships and shore batteries, to Italian battleship Littorio surrounded
by salvage tugs
press home an unsuccessful attack on the battleship Andrea Doria. The next sub-
flight of three attacked from a more northerly direction, attacking the battleship
Littorio, hitting it with two torpedoes and launching one torpedo at the flagship, the battleship Vittorio Veneto, which missed. The
bomber force, led by Captain O. Patch RM, attacked next. They found the targets difficult to identify, but attacked and hit two
cruisers moored at Mar Piccolo hitting both with a single bomb each from 1,500 ft (460 m), followed by another aircraft which
straddled four destroyers.[5]

The second wave of eight aircraft - nine were lined up on deck, but number 8 and 9 collided while preparing to launch, one took off
but had to abort when an auxiliary fuel tank fell off in flight; meanwhile, the other was repaired and launched late[10] - led by
Lieutenant Commander J. W. Hale of 819 Squadron, was now approaching from a northerly direction towards the Mar Grande
harbour, with two of the four bombers also carrying flares, the remaining five carrying torpedoes. Flares were dropped shortly before
midnight. Two aircraft aimed their torpedoes at Littorio, one of which hit. One aircraft, despite having been hit twice by anti-aircraft
fire, aimed a torpedo atVittorio Veneto but the torpedo missed. Another aircraft hit the battleship Caio Duilio with a torpedo, blowing
a large hole in her hull and flooding both of her forward magazines. The aircraft flown by Lieutenant G. W. L. A. Bayly RN was shot
down by antiaircraft fire from the heavy cruiser Gorizia[9] following the successful attack on Littorio, the only aircraft lost from the
second wave. The final aircraft to arrive on the scene 15 minutes behind the others made an unsuccessful dive bombing attack on one
Illustrious, landing at 02:39.[5]
of the Italian cruisers despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, then safely returned to

. The other two were killed.[11]

Of the two aircraft shot down, the two crew members of the first were taken prisoner

The Italian battleships suffered significant damage:

Conte di Cavour had a 12 m 8 m (39 ft 26 ft) hole in the hull, and permission to ground her was withheld until it
was too late, so her keel touched the bottom at a deeper depth than intended. 27 of the ship's crew were killed and
over 100 more wounded. In the end, only her superstructure and main armament remained above water .[12] She
was subsequently raised and was still undergoing repairs when Italy switched sides in the war, so she never
returned to service;[13]
Caio Duilio had only a slightly smaller hole (11 m 7 m (36 ft 23 ft)) and was saved by running her aground;[13]

Littorio had considerable flooding caused by three torpedo hits. Despite underwater protection (the 'Pugliese'
system, standard in all Italian battleships), the damage was extensive, although actual damage to the ship's
structures was relatively limited (the machinery was intact). Casualties were 32 crewmen killed and many wounded.
She was holed in three places, once on the port side (7 m 1.5 m (23 ft 0 in 4 ft 11 in)), and twice on the starboard
side (15 m 10 m (49 ft 33 ft) and 12 m 9 m (39 ft 30 ft)). She too was saved by running her aground. Despite
this, in the morning, the ship's bows were totally submerged.[13]

Italian defences fired 13,489 shells from the land batteries, while several thousand were fired from the ships. The anti-aircraft barrage
was formidable, having 101 guns and 193 machine-guns. There were also 87 balloons, but strong winds caused the loss of 60 of
them. Only 4.2 km (2.3 nmi; 2.6 mi) of anti-torpedo nets were actually fielded around the ships, up to 10 m (33 ft) in depth, while the
need was for 12.8 km (6.9 nmi; 8.0 mi). There were also 13 aerophonic stations and 22 searchlights (the ships had two searchlights
each).[13] Denis Boyd, Commanding Officer HMS Illustrious, stated in his after-action report, "It is notable that the enemy did not
[14]
use the searchlights at all during either of the attacks."

Littorio was repaired with all available resources and was fully operational again within four months, while restoration of the older
battleships proceeded at a much slower pace (repairs took seven months for Caio Duilio, and the repairs for Conte di Cavour were
never completed). In all, the Swordfish attack was made with just 20 aircraft. Two Italian aircraft were destroyed on the ground by
the bombing, and two unexploded bombs hit the cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio. Near misses damaged the destroyer
Pessagno.[13]

Meanwhile, X-Force cruisers attacked an Italian convoy. This force had three cruisers (HMS Ajax, Orion and HMAS Sydney) and
two Tribal-class destroyers (HMS Nubian and Mohawk). Just past midnight, they met and destroyed four Italian merchantmen (Capo
Vado, Catalani, Locatelli and Premuda), damaging the torpedo-boatFabrizi, while the auxiliary cruiserRamb III fled.[13]

Cunningham and Lyster wanted to strike Taranto again the next night with Swordfish (six torpedo-bombers, seven bombers, and two
flare-dispensers) one wag in the pilot's room remarked, "They only asked the Light Brigade to do it once!"[15] but bad weather
prevented the action.[13]

Aftermath
The Italian fleet lost half of its capital ships in one night; the next day, the Regia Marina transferred its undamaged ships from
Taranto to Naples to protect them from similar attacks,[5] until the defenses at Taranto (mainly the anti-torpedo nets) were brought up
to adequate levels to protect them from further attacks of the same kind (which happened between March and May 1941).[16] Repairs
to Littorio took about five months, to Caio Duilio six months; Conte di Cavour required extensive salvage work and her repairs were
incomplete when Italy changed sides in 1943.[17] Cunningham wrote after the attack: "The Taranto show has freed up our hands
considerably & I hope now to shake these damned Itiys up a bit. I don't think their remaining three battleships will face us and if they
do I'm quite prepared to take them on with only two." Indeed, the balance of power had swung to the British Mediterranean Fleet
which now enjoyed more operational freedom: when previously forced to operate as one unit to match Italian capital ships, they
could now
split into
two

Aftermath of the battle showing an Italian battleship

down by the bows and beached (far right).

Aerial photo of Italian warships moored inMar

Grande harbour at Taranto. Note the 'Y' jetty.

[18]
battlegroups; each built around one aircraft carrier and two battleships.

Nevertheless, Cunningham's estimate that Italians would be unwilling to risk their remaining heavy units was quickly proven wrong.
Only five days after Taranto, Campioni sortied with two battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers
to successfully disrupta mission to
deliver aircraft to Malta. The follow-up to this operation led to the Battle of Cape Spartivento on 27 November 1940. Two of the
three damaged battleships were repaired by mid-1941 and control of the Mediterranean continued to swing back and forth until the
Italian armistice in 1943.

The attack on Taranto was avenged a year later by the Italian navy in its Raid on Alexandria, when the Mediterranean fleet of the
Royal Navy was attacked usingmidget submarines, severely damaging HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant.

However, measured against its primary task of disrupting Axis convoys to Africa, the Taranto attack had very little effect. In fact,
Italian shipping to Libya increased between the months of October 1940 January 1941 to an average of 49,435 tons per month, up
from the 37,204-ton average of the previous four months.[19] Moreover, rather than change the balance of power in the central
Mediterranean, British naval authorities had "failed to deliver the true knockout blow that would have changed the context within
[20]
which the rest of the war in the Mediterranean was fought."

Aerial torpedo experts in all modern navies had previously thought that torpedo attacks against ships must be in water at least 75 ft
(23 m) deep.[21] Taranto harbour had a depth of only about 39 ft (12 m); but the Royal Navy had developed a new method of
preventing torpedoes from diving too deep. A drum was attached beneath the nose of the aircraft, from which a roll of wire led to the
nose of the torpedo. As it dropped, the tension from the wire pulled up the nose of the torpedo, producing a belly-flop rather than a
nose dive.[22]

Influence on Pearl Harbor

It is likely the Imperial Japanese Navy's staff carefully studied the Taranto raid during planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor
because of the issues with a shallow harbour. Japanese Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, the assistant naval attach to Berlin,
flew to Taranto to investigate the attack firsthand and probably wrote a report, but no copy of such a report has ever been found.
Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with CommanderMitsuo Fuchida about his observations in October 1941.[23] Fuchida
led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941. More significant, perhaps, was a Japanese military mission to Italy in May 1941.
Japanese Navy officers visited Taranto and had lengthy discussions with their Italian Navy opposite numbers.[24] However, the
Japanese had been working on shallow-water solutions since early 1939, with various shallow ports as the notional targets, including
Manila, Singapore, Vladivostok, and Pearl Harbor.[25] In the early 1930s, the Japanese were using a breakaway wooden nose to
soften the torpedo's impact with the water.[25] By mid-1941, the Japanese, regardless of any contribution made by studying the
Taranto attack, had, through hard work and careful testing, perfectedbreakaway wooden finsfor added aerial stability.[26]

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a considerably larger operation than Taranto. All six Imperial Japanese fleet carriers, each
one equipped with an air wing having over twice the number of planes of any British carrier, took part. It resulted in far more
devastation: seven American battleships were sunk or disabled, and several other warships were destroyed or damaged. However, the
Japanese raid on the United States Pacific Fleet did not alter the balance of power in the Pacific in the same way that the attack on
Taranto did in the Mediterranean. In May 1942, the Japanese fleet suffered a strategic defeat in the Battle of the Coral Sea. In June
1942, it suffered a decisive defeat in theBattle of Midway: all four Japanese fleet carriers involved in the action were sunk; one of the
three American carriers was also, but the other two survived essentially unscathed; the Japanese Navy never regained equality. The
U.S. Navy thereafter designed its fleet operations in the Pacific Ocean around its carriers instead of its battleships as capital ships.
Battleships were found to be less useful in the expanses of the Pacific than in the confines of the Mediterranean; the older ships were
[27]
too slow to escort the carriers, and were chiefly used as fire support for amphibious operations.

Notes
1. History of World War II (https://books.google.com/books?id=SKDhPHvv_c0C&pg=P
A206). 1. Marshall Cavendish
Corporation. 2004. p. 206.ISBN 0-7614-7483-8.
2. Simpson, Michael (2004).A life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham. A w
T entieth-century Naval Leader.
Routledge Ed., p. 74. ISBN 978-0-7146-5197-2
3. Stephen, Martin (1988). Grove, Eric, ed.Sea Battles in Close-up: World War 2. Volume 1. Shepperton, Surrey: Ian
Allanm. pp. 3438. ISBN 0-7110-1596-1.
4. "Taranto 1940" (https://web.archive.org/web/20101024184628/http://www .royalnavy.mod.uk/history/battles/taranto/).
Royal Navy. Archived from the original (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/history/battles/taranto/)on 2010-10-24.
5. Sturtivant, Ray (1990).British naval aviation: the Fleet Air Arm 19171990
. London: Arms & Armour Press. pp. 48
50. ISBN 0-85368-938-5.
6. 'The Aeroplane, Vol. LXXIII No. 1887, August 8, 1947, p. 154
7. Wragg, David, Swordfish, Weidenfiled & Nicholson, 2003, pp 7879
8. Giorgerini, Giorgio (2002).La guerra italiana sul mare : la marina tra vittoria e sconfitta : 19401943
(1. ed. Oscar
storia. ed.). Milano: Mondadori. pp. 2189.ISBN 9788804501503.
9. La Notte di Taranto (http://www.fabiosiciliano.it/htm/verdeguerra/pdf/notte.pdf) [The Taranto night] (PDF) (in Italian),
Fabio Siciliano.
10. O'Connor
11. Australian Naval Aviation Museum (1998).Flying Stations: a story of Australian naval aviation
. Sydney: Allen &
Unwin. p. 23. ISBN 1-86448-846-8.
12. Dent, editor, John Jordan ; assistant editor, Stephen (2010). Warship 2010 (2010 ed.). London: Conway. pp. 8185.
ISBN 9781844861101.
13. Santoni, Alberto (November 1990), "L'attacco inglese a aranto"
T [The English attack on Taranto], Rivista Italiana di
Difesa (in Italian): 8895
14. Boyd's Report was attached to an Intelligence Report filed with the Of
fice of Naval Intelligence by Lt Commander
John N Opie, III, USN. Opie's report is found at the National Archives, Record Group 38, A-1-z/22863D.
15. Newton, Don & A. Cecil Hampshire,Taranto, London, W Kimber, 1959, p 165.
16. Giorgerini, Giorgio (2002).La guerra italiana sul mare : la marina tra vittoria e sconfitta : 19401943
(1. ed. Oscar
storia. ed.). Milano: Mondadori. p. 223.ISBN 9788804501503.
17. Playfair, Vol I, p. 237.
18. O'Hara, Vincent (2009). Struggle for the Middle Sea. London. p. 65.
19. Bragadin, Italian Navy in World War II, p. 356.
20. Caravaggio, p. 122.
21. Christopher O'Connor Taranto, The Raid, The Observer, The Aftermath Dog Ear Publishing, 2010, page 79
22. Lowry, Thomas P; Wellham, JWG (1995), The Attack on Taranto, Stackpole, pp. 3839
23. Interview with Mitsuo Fuchida, 25 February 1964, Donald M. Goldstein Papers, Archives Service Center
, University
of Pittsburgh
24. Fioravanzo, Giuseppe (January 1956), "The Japanese Military Mission to Italy",
USNI Proceedings: 2432.
25. Peattie, Mark R (2007).Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power
, 19091941. Naval Institute Press. p. 144.
ISBN 978-1-59114664-3.
26. Peattie 2007, p. 145.
27. Keegan, John (1993). Battle at Sea. London: Pimlico. pp. 157211. ISBN 0-7126-5991-9.

References
Bragadin, A, Italian Navy in World War II, 1st Ed, US Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1957.ISBN 087021327X
Caravaggio, A.N, Lieutenant Colonel, 'THE A TTACK AT TARANTO: Tactical Success, Operational Failure',Naval
War College Review, 1997.
Playfair, Major-General I.S.O.; with Stitt, Commander G.M.S; Molony , Brigadier C.J.C. & Toomer, Air Vice-Marshal
S.E. (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO:1954]. Butler, J.R.M, ed. Mediterranean and Middle East Volume I: The Early
Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Uckfield,
UK: Naval & Military Press.ISBN 1-84574-065-3.

Further reading
Lamb, Charles To War in a Stringbag. Cassell and Collier Macmillan (1977)ISBN 0-304-29778-X
Lowry, Thomas P. & Wellham, John W.G. The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor. Stackpole Books (1995)
ISBN 0-8117-1726-7
O'Connor, Christopher Patrick Taranto: The Raid, The Observer, The Aftermath. Dog Ear Publishing (2010)
ISBN 978-160844-721-3
Konstam, Angus Taranto 1940; The Fleet Air Arm's precursorto Pearl Harbor. Osprey Campaign Series #288.
Osprey Publishing (2015)ISBN 978-1-4728-0896-7

External links
La notte di Taranto Plancia di Commando
Order of battle
IWM Interview with John Wellham, who piloted a Swordfish during the battle
Battle of Taranto Diorama

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