AA, an American married BB, a Filipino in Manila in October 1994.

They have a daughter, CC

born on June 1995. In April 1998, BB sought and obtain a divorce decree from the Circuit Court
of Detroit. The court dissolved the marriage and awarded BB sole custody of CC.
On March 2001, AA and BB executed in Manila a contract for joint custody of CC. In July 2004,
AA sued BB in RTC Makati to enforce the contract. AA claims that in violation of the contract,
B exercised sole custody of BB.
Q: Is the agreement between AA and BB regarding the joint custody of CC valid?
No, the agreement is void ab initio for being contrary to law.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is undisputed: no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother. This statutory awarding of sole parental custody to
the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here. Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a post-
divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven
years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of
the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old
and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime
for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within
this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or
divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated
mother. (Dacasin vs Dacasin G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010)

AA married BB and bore him three children, XX, YY, and ZZ. The family resided at the house of
CC and DD, the parents of BB and thus the grandparents of XX, YY and ZZ. The family business
of BB provided him a monthly salary of Php 20,000 to shoulder the family expense. AA had no
source of income.

Following a violent confrontation with BB, AA abandoned the residence, bringing along the
children (all minors).
AA sued BB, CC, and DD for support, amounting to Php 50, 000 jointly. The trial court rendered
judgment ordering BB, CC and DD to jointly provide P50,000 monthly support to AA and the
children, with BB shouldering P20,000 and CC and DD the balance of P30,000. CC and DD
questioned their liability arguing that while BBs income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions
its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by the Family Code.
Q: Are CC and DD concurrently liable with BB to provide support to AA and the children?
Yes, CC and DD as grandparents are liable to provide support however they are only liable up
to the amount of monthly support needed by XX, YY and ZZ.

While parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters
 inability to provide sufficient support. The inability of AA and BB to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the
paternal and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, is to
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children
because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed
are more than able to fill the void. However, CC and DDs partial concurrent obligation extends
only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood
of lower degree. As grandchildren by blood, only XX, YY and ZZ belong to this category.
Indeed, AAs right to receive support extends only to her husband BB, arising from their marital
bond. (Lim vs Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009)

Can a legitimate be allowed to use the surname of step-dad? Surname of mother?

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable
cause for which the change is sought. A legitimate child generally bears the surname of
his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of
right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty
reasons are shown. To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second
husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also
create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother
with her first husband, were in fact sired by the second husband, thus bringing their
legitimate status into discredit. (Republic v CA, G.R. No. 88202. December 14, 1998)

The Court has allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her
mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is
no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is
entitled. The word "principally" as used in Art. 364 of the Civil Code invoking the use of
the fathers surname is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if
a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which
it is equally entitled. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second
only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation
considering his circumstances. (In the Matter of the Petition for Change of Name of
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte, Estrella S. Alfon, Vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980)

Can an illegitimate child be allowed to use the surname of step-dad?

Rule: They are required to use the surname of their mother. (Art 176 FC as amended by
RA 9225). But they acquire the right to use the surname of the illegitimate father in the
following situations:

i. If his/her filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register; or
ii. When an admission of paternity is made by the father in a public document or
private handwritten instrument.

The Court clarified that Art. 176 of the FC, as amended by RA 9225, gives illegitimate
children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not
the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
 illegitimate children. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
the illegitimate children. Hence, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. (Grande v Antonio, G.R. No.
206248. February 18, 2014)

May an adopted child be allowed to drop the surname of his adopter and resume use of
biological parent?
Rule: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopter for all intents and purposes. Being a legitimate child by virtue of adoption, it
follows that the adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname f the
adopter. (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.
148311. March 31, 2005)

In a case decided by the Supreme Court, the Court allowed an adopted child, after the
death of the adopting father, to drop the surname of the adopter and use again the
surname of the natural father. The Court reasoned that the change of name does not
define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties
flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is
altered is only the name. (Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992)

What is an alias?

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was
registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a
competent authority; a mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known as aliases.9 An alias is thus a
name that is different from the individuals true name, and does not refer to a name that is
not different from his true name. (Liamson vs Gonzales, G.R. No. 162205, March 31,
2014)

Equitable Mortgage

An equitable mortgage has been defined as one which although lacking in some formality,
or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the
intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing
impossible or contrary to law. (Lumayag vs Heirs of Jacinto Nemeo, G.R. No. 159048,
July 3, 2007, citing Benny Go vs Eliodoro Bacaron, G.R. No. 159048, October
11,2005, 472 SCRA 338, 347). The essential elements requisites of an equitable mortgage
are: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale, (2) but their intention
is to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. (Vda. de Delfin vs Dellota, G.R. No.
143697, January 28,2008, citing Ramos vs Sarao, 451 SCRA 103, 113)

Distinguish from pacto de retro

 In pacto de retro, ownership of the property sold is immediately transferred to the vendee
a retro, subject only to the repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period.
The vendor a retros failure to exercise the right of repurchase within the agreed time vests
upon the vendee a retro, by operation of law, absolute title to the property. Such title is not
impaired even if the vendee a retro fails to consolidate title under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code. (Ramos vs Sarao, 451 SCRA 103, 113). On the other hand, an equitable mortgage
is a contract that, although lacking the formality, the form or words, or other requisites
demanded by a statute nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to burden a piece
or pieces of real property as security for a debt. The essential requisites of such a contract
are as follows: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale, (2) but their
intention is to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. The nonpayment of debt when
due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply
the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the loan obligation. (Ramos vs Sarao, 451
SCRA 103, 113)

Presumption of equitable mortgage

Article 162 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract, regardless of its
nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage. They are as follows

a. When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

b. When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
c. When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
d. When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
e. When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and
f. In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties
is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of
any other obligation.