Article VIII Section 5

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM

PAYM
ENT OF
COURT'S SHERIFF'S FEES OF COOPERATIVES,
A.M. 12-2-03-0-13 MARCH 20102-668 SCRA
Facts :
The Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCC) seeks the implementation
before the court
the exemption of cooperatives payment of court and sheriffs fees in
pursuant to RA 6938, as
amended by RA 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of
2008.

Held : Yes. Such cooperatives cannot claim exemption from payment of court
and sheriff fees. The Court emphasized that the exemption granted to
cooperatives under Section 2, par. 6 of RA 6938 clearly do not cover the amount
required to defray the actual expenses of the sheriff, process server or other
court-authorized person in the service and other court processes issued related to
the trial of the case.

Sto.Tomas v. Salac. 685 scra 245, Nov. 13, 2012

In 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA and TESDA, from
regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et alinvoked Sections 29 and 30
of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that
recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the
passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully
deregulated. Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10
(DOLEDO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit
the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further
issuing rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the
policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.s petition and
ordered the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and
placement of OFWs. The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all
other orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of
deregulation under R.A. 8042. Prompted bythe RTCs above actions, the
government officials concerned filed the present petition in G.R. 152642 seeking to
annul the RTCs decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the
petition.

Held: :Yes. R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the
injustices and abuses suffered by
numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has
in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the
wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence,
in theabsence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional,
the Court must uphold its validity.

In Re Cunanan

Facts:Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar
Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.Section 1 provided the
following passing marks: 1946-1951: 70% ; 1952:71% ; 1953:72% ;
1954:73% ; 1955:74% . Provided however, that the examinee shall have no
grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75%
in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average in
subsequent bar examinations.

Ruling:
No. This would amount to not just amending the rules but reversing the Courts
application of an existing rule.

Erwin B. Javellana, petitioner, v. Department of the Internal and Local

Government, G.R. No. 102549 Aug. 10, 1992
FACTS:
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an Administrative Case against
petitioner, Atty. Erwin B. Javellana, an incumbent member of the Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari praying that Memorandum Circulars No.80-
38 and 90-81 and Sec. 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional for violating
Sec. 5(5) of Art. 8 of the Constitution.

Held: It does not trench upon the Supreme Courts power and authority to
prescribe rules on the practice of law. Sec. 90 of RA 7160 simply prescribed rules
of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between the discharge of
their public duties and private practice of their profession. Petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Velez vs. Atty. De Vera

Facts:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for
the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on
the following grounds: 1) Atty. De Veras alleged misrepresentation in concealing
the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California. 2) That
the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found
to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill
Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in
Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that
the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in
the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension.

Held: Yes, there is substantial evidence of malpractice by Atty.De Vera. SC

suspended him for two years.

Atty. De Veras actions caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble
profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants
to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
profession betrays their trust and confidence.

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty

Facts: On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo
in Vinuya et al, vs Executive Secretary was promulgated. On july 19, 2010 counsel
for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque Jr. and Romel Regalado Bagares,
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, where they posited the first time
their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.

Held: A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they
had charged one of its memebers of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution.It
was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by
whichrespondents, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have
expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the
proper disposition and consderation of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution.The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumearted the statements
that the Court considered execessive and uncalled for under the circumstances
surroundingthe issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP
Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.

DOMINADOR B.BUSTOS
vs.
ANTONIO
G. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:The petitioner herein, an accused in acriminal case, filed a motion with the
Courtof First Instance of Pampanga after he hadbeen bound over to that court for
trial,praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace
courtof Masantol, the court of origin,
Held: Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and
circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The
Supreme Court t said that section 11 of Rule 108does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds
of the defendants right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to
bring out the truth.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, FABAR INCORPORATED, JOSE MA.
BARREDO, CARMEN B. BORROMEO and TOMAS L. BORROMEO,
respondents. G.R. No. L-46095 November 23, 1977
FACTS:
Petitioner, granted in favor of Fabar Incorporated various credit accommodations
and advances. Petitioner likewise made advances by way of insurance premiums
covering the chattels subject matter of a mortgage.For failure of private
respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding repeated demands, petitioner
instituted a case for collection against all private respondents.

Held: Rules of court being procedural cannot supercede a substantive law, Neither
shall it be applied when a substantive law is applicable. Otherwise stated, Section
6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article
1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter,
substantive. Moreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in
Section 5 paragraph 5, Article 8, provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

TERESITA G. FABIAN,
petitioner, vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON.
JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luz
on; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

Facts: Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of

PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was
engaged in the co
nstruction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Held: WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act

of1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or
issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

PEOPLE v. LACSON [October 7, 2003]

Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover
procedures,and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused.
Petitioner asserts thatSec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the
accused in line with theconstitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.

Held:
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners
contention that while it secures the rights of the accused, it doesnt & shouldnt
preclude the equally important right
of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would
work injustice,the said may not be given a retroactive application.

The Court isnt mandated to apply rules retroactively just because its favorable to
the accused.The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State &
the accused. When the
rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively
and notretroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the States
right to due process.A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust &
oppressive consequences to the State& to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

Planters Products inc

vs
Fertiphil Corp

Facts: FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the
state in ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and
that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed fell on the
ultimate consumers. RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an
exercise of the power of taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for public
purpose as PPI is a private corporation.

Held: In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in

interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

ANDREA TAN, CLARITA LLAMAS, VICTOR ESPINA and LUISA ESPIN

A, Petitioners,
vs.
BAUSCH & LOMB, INC., Respondent
Facts:
Andrea Tan, Clarita Llamas, Victor Espina and Luisa Espina of Best Buy Mart,
Inc. were convicted for feloniously distributing and selling counterfeit RAY BAN
sunglasses causing prejudice to BAUSCH AND LOMB, INC.
Respondents filed a motion to quash ,contending that BP 129 had already
transferred the exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide violations of intellectual
property rights from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC and that the Supreme Court
had also issued Administrative Order No. 104-96 deleting and withdrawing the
designation of several branches of the MTC and MTCC as special intellectual
property courts.

Held: The Supreme Court can promulgate rules (in this case administrative orders)
to provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases. (In this case assigning RTC, to take cognizance of special cases of deciding
intellectual property cases)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive Secret

ary Eduardo R. Ermita, the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC),
and the MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA),
vs.
HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch
117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.
, INC
Facts: The Government of the Philippines filed a case of expropriation and
deposited the initial amounts representing the NAIA 3 terminals value for taxation
purposes to Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F.
Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon).The respondent court issued a Writ of Possession
pursuant to Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which only requires the
Government to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary.
However, the RTC issued an order amending its prior issuance of the Writ of
Possession.The amendments were in done in accordance with Republic Act No.
8974, in which under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate d
required to make immediate direct payment to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession.

Held: Appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well

within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in
determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to
national government infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment
thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the
continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all
matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain
ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and
such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions
on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioners
,
v.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, VELASCO, JR., and BUREAU O
F CUSTOMS, and
BRION,
JJ.
,
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS EDWARD O. BALTAZAR,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 172457
December 24, 2008
Facts:
Section 3 of Proclamation 420 granted tax incentives to Special Economic
Zone that entitled Camp John Hay SEZ to exemption from the payment of
taxes, both local and national, for businesses
located inside the SEZ,. The petitioner filed for a declaratory relief as a remedy
but was denied by RTC. It raised the issue to Supreme Court as a question of law.

Held; A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its
subject matter. One of the requisites of a declaratory relief is that the issue must
be ripe for judicial determination. This means that litigation is inevitable or there is
no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding. CJH is not left
without recourse. The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) provides for the
administrative and judicial remedies available to a taxpayer who is minded to
contest an assessment, subject of course to certain reglementary periods. The
TCC provides that a protest can be raised provided that payment first be
made of the amount due.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner,
vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 143275
September 10, 2002

Facts: The petitioners filed with the RTC, Branch 63, Tarlac, which is the
designated Special Agrarian Court to ask the court to fix the just compensation for
the property. The DAR and Land Bank both filed separate appeal appeals using
different modes. DAR filed a petition for review while LBP interposed an ordinary
appeal by filing a notice of appeal. CA dismissed the appeal of LBP on the
ground that the mode of appeal is incorrect.

Held: In affirming the dismissal by the appellate court of LandBank's ordinary

appeal, the Court held that Section 60 of RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review as the appropriate mode of
appeal from decision of the Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61, which Land
Bank bases its argument for review as the correct mode of appeal from
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts, merely makes a general reference to
the Rules of Court and does not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as the
correct way of questioning decisions of Special Agrarian Court.

Article VIII Section 6

Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
,
petitioner
Vs. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez et al,
respondents
Facts:
This case concerns a petition filed by petitioner as regard to his certificate of
services. Atty. Abiera interrogated the validity of petitioners judgment claiming
that the petitioner forged his certificate of services in which he declares that all
cases of criminal and civil which have been submitted for decision for a period of
90 days have been decided on or before January 31, 1998.

Held: Ombudsman has no jurisdiction in determining whether a criminal case

against the judges or courts personnel covers administrative matter by itself. He
may entertain but itmust be first referred to the Supreme Court. It is clearly
specified in the provision of the constitution under article 8 section 6 that only the
Supre
me Court can oversee the judges and staffs of the courts amenability with the law.
When (Inferior Courts) commit fault or any violation thereof, it is the Supreme
Court can take the proper supervision action contrary to them and no other
organization of the government can interfere into this jurisdiction.

SALVADOR M. DE VERA,
petitioner ,vs
HON. BENJAMIN V.
PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court,
Pasig City; and EVALUATION AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
respondents
Facts:

Petitioner filed a criminal case against Judge Pelayo for knowingly rendering
unjust judgment and malicious delay in the administration of justice before the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman referred the case to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action. P assails the referral of the case to the Supreme Court arguing
that the Ombudsman, not the Supreme Court, is the one vested with jurisdiction to
resolve whether the crime charged was committed by the judge.

Held: The determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the

disposition of a case is an exclusive judicial function. Thus, the Ombudsman acted
in accordance
with law and jurisprudence when he referred the cases against Judge Pelayo to the
Supreme Court for proper action.

Section 6
Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman

FACTS: The present case involves 2 members of Judiciary who were

entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of
furniture.

Held:
The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a complaint
against a judge or court employee involves anadministrative matter# The
Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the Supreme Court the determination as to
whether an administrative aspect is involved in all cases against judges and court
personnel ledbefore it.

Article 8, Section 7
In Re JBC vs. Judge Quitan
JBC No. 013 | Aug 22, 2007
Facts:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.Subsequent thereto, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) received confidentialinformation that administrative
and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then
Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),
Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the
service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.In Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the JBC judge quitan declared that there were 5
criminal cases filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, all were dismissed.
No
Administrative Case was disclosed by Quitan in his PDS

Deputy Court administrator Christopher Lock requested certifie true copies of the
criminal
cases relative to the administrative complaints filed against Quitan, particularly
Adminisrative
Order 180 which dismissed Quitan from service.
In a letter dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the
Court
Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was
indeed
dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the
amounts
reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of
expenses.

Held: No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge
Quitan was dismissed from public service and that he deliberately withheld this
information. Resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in service. Netither does his
resignation render the administrative case Moot and Academic. Judge Quitain
was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave
misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the
required qualifications to be a member of the Bench. WHEREFORE, in view of
our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which
would have warranted his dismissal from the service.

Kilosbayan v. Ermita
GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Facts: Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen and that his own
birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate reveals that
at the time of respondent Ongs birth, his father was Chinese and his mother was
also Chinese. Petitioners invoke Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Held: The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent
Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records
of this Court. Respondent Ong has the
burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as citizenship under the
time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept
an appointment to this Court as
that would be a violation of the Constitution.

Topacio vs. Ong, 574 SCRA 817, December 18, 2008

Facts: In the 2003 case of Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court enjoined
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong from accepting an appointment to
the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position
and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully
completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in
court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen (and not a Chinese citizen
as shown in his birth certificate) and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
Thus, in 2007 Justice Ong filed a Petition for the amendment/ correction of an
entry in his birth certificate with the RTC Pasig. At that time, Justice Ong was still
exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.

Held: proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and
void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being
unconstitutional. The Court ruled this that the petition for certiorari and prohibition
must be dismissed for being a collateral attack on a public officers title. Doctrine:
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by a quo warranto,
proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally.

Article 8, Section 8
Chavez v. JBC
Facts:
Instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from
the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature.It is this practice
that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondent contends that
the phrase
a representative of congress refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of
congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature.

Held: The court held that the phrase a representative of congress should be
construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house,
not both. Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution provides for only one representative from congress

De castro v. JBC 615 scra 666

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Held:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.