Lake Oroville BOC Reports 1 Through 13 (Searchable Text Version)

Lake Oroville Spillways Emergency Recovery
Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 1 March 10, 2017

Prepared by the California Department of Water Resources
Summary & Response
Issues Noted for Consideration
The BOC noted the original design plans showed the slab on the gated spillway at 12 inches, and that
compacted clay was used to fill depressions in the rock foundation. This was very preliminary
information presented by DWR to the BOC that warranted further evaluation and investigation.
Compacted clay is also a term sometimes used to describe highly weathered rock. As constructed
conditions are often different than the design drawings, the slab actual thickness must be explored prior
to making any conclusions.
Question 1
The BOC concurs with DWR that the use of the emergency spillway should be avoided until further
improvements are made. The gated spillway chute and the powerhouse should instead be relied upon
to manage all flows during 2017.
The BOC acknowledged that current exploration is needed to better understand the geology beneath
and around the spillways. Although previous exploration and descriptions completed during the original
construction of the dam are useful, more up to date information is necessary.
Question 2
DWR described various conceptual approaches to repairing the gated spillway chute. Based on this
preliminary information, the BOC questioned if all work could be completed in one season. The BOC
described alternative approaches that were presented to them, including buttressing the end of the
damaged spillway and placing a flip bucket as a contingency plan, which could easily be completed by
November 1.
Question 3
DWR presented preliminary design criteria. Prior to designing detailed plans and specifications, there
needs to be an understanding regarding the criteria that will be used to ensure the project meets its
objectives. The BOC acknowledges that both spillways may not be able reach their full design capacities
by November 1, 2017. However, they agree the preliminary design criteria for the November 1, 2017
deadline will be adequate which can pass flows well beyond the historical maximum storms.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #1 | RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

Question 4
Self-explanatory
Question 5
The BOC acknowledges that information at this point is very preliminary and little conclusions can be
drawn at this point of the review.
The BOC concludes that since 1968, the concrete within the spillway has not had any significant damage
during its life, but acknowledges that spalling and cracking through the years has occurred and was
continuously repaired.
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Memorandum
DATE: Friday, 3/10/2017
TO: Mr. Ted Craddock, Project Manager

Oroville Emergency Recovery Spillways
California Department of Water Resources
FROM: Independent Board of Consultants for

SUBJECT: Memorandum No. 1 - Orientation Meeting March 1 & 3, Site Visit

March 2, and Design Concepts Meeting, March 10, 2017
INTRODUCTION
This initial Board of Consultants (BOC) Memorandum covers activities for the first
orientation and introductions meetings which took place March 1 and 3, the site visit to
view the spillway damage on March 2nd, and the first design concepts meeting on March
10, 2017.
INITIAL INTRODUCTORY MEETING AND ORIENTATION
The first meeting of the BOC was held at the California State Department of Water
Resources (DWR) on March 1st, 2017. Only BOC members Cassidy and Kollgaard were
able to attend on the afternoon of March 1st. The purpose was to introduce the staff of
DWR who will be working on the restoration design and representatives from the Army
Corps of Engineers and Stantec, who were present.
The meeting started at about 1:00 pm and DWR team members were introduced and
their positions described. Some of the drone video of the damage to the Oroville Dam
facilities was then shown. A summary of the events during the spillway failure was given
and the timeline for repair and restoration was discussed. The BOC members were
given time to briefly review some of the documents and plans related to the spillway
[Gated Spillway] design and performance. Individual contracts for BOC services were
provided to Dr. Cassidy and Mr. Kollgaard and the meeting closed shortly after 5:00 pm
after arrangements were made for the field trip to Oroville the following day.
1
Oroville Emergency Recovery Spillways Ted Craddock
Board of Consultants Report No. 1 March 10, 2017
Drs. Makdisi and Cato had the opportunity on Friday, March 3rd, to review the same
information regarding the history of the design and operation of the spillway [Gated
Spillway] at the DWR offices.
FIELD TRIP TO INSPECT SPILLWAY DAMAGE
On Thursday, March 2nd, the BOC were taken to Oroville Dam for their first view of the
extent of the damage. BOC members Dr. Makdisi and Dr. Cato were also in attendance
for the field trip to inspect the spillway [Gated Spillway] damage. On the morning of
March 2nd, the BOC members joined a large party of participants, including staff from
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the California Division of
Safety of Dams (DSOD), to view the Oroville spillway [Gated Spillway] condition during
the short period that the service spillway discharge has been shut off. The group was
escorted to four viewpoints where the extensive damage could be seen. Intensive
efforts are underway to get the powerhouse back in operation and to inspect and map
the service spillway [Gated Spillway] damage during the gates closure so that the
restoration could be started as soon as possible. The stabilization of the Emergency
Spillway damaged area appears to be nearly completed such that this facility would be
able to discharge if this should be needed. The BOC members returned to Sacramento
at around 5:00 pm.
ISSUES NOTED BY THE BOC FOR CONSIDERATION, DURING RESTORATION

DESIGN
Based on their review of project documents, the BOC noted the number of repair
instances that have been done to the concrete spillway chute slabs. Of particular
concern is the necessity to cut the concrete in order to fill voids discovered beneath the
concrete. It is also noted that the slab is only 12-inches in thickness, and at the
herringbone drains, the thickness is further reduced. In some areas of the foundation of
the chute slab, compacted clay was used to fill depressions in the rock foundation. This
calls into question whether the portions of the slab that appear undamaged by the
failure should be replaced during the restoration.
The amount of drain water flowing from the pipe discharge openings along the spillway
training walls seems extraordinarily large. This drainage system picks up any seepage
from the herringbone system of drains under the chute slab and surface water from the
backside of the training walls. It appears also that the drains are collecting leakage
through cracks in the chute slab and/or defects in the construction joints between slabs.
The drains appear to flow for some appreciable time after the gates are closed and no
precipitation is occurring. It was noted that no flow was coming from the drains
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downstream from the row of sandbags on the spillway chute that diverted flow to one
side of the chute. Clearly flow coming from the drains is at least partially coming through
cracks and spalls in the slab. The BOC believes this situation should be investigated. It
seems likely that piping of foundation material beneath the chute slab may be
responsible for the voids that have been found and repaired in the past.
The BOC concurs that restoration of the service spillway to operational service is a first
priority, it is anticipated that some portions of the work will involve interim solutions and
final completion of all restoration efforts may require more than one season.
RESTORATION DESIGN MEETING MARCH 10, 2017
On March 10, 2017, the BOC met at offices of DWR for presentations of restoration
design concepts by DWR. An agenda for the meeting is attached. All BOC members
were present. The attendees at the meeting are shown on the attached Attendance List.
QUESTIONS FOR THE BOC
1. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations regarding the

emergency site repairs?
Response
The BOC believes that the DWR plan presented during BOC Meeting 1 is a
reasonable approach. Our comments address the short-term plan and the, as yet
to be formalized, long-term mitigation. One aspect of the short-term Emergency
Spillway plan is to manage operations so that flow over the Emergency Spillway
does not occur during the spring 2017 wet season; this is absolutely critical.
Additional aspects of the short-term mitigation consist of the cyclopean backfill

placed downstream of the approximately 1,000-ft-long monolithic ogee weir
section. The weakest point in this plan occurs at the downstream end of the
armoring where all flows are directed and become channelized. To this end,
DWR has placed small, 3-ft-high cyclopean check dams to slow the flow in these
areas and control the gradient. The knickpoints in these channels downstream of
the check dams could be problematic should future flows occur.
The BOC believes that additional flows over the Emergency Spillway will result in
further erosion in two general areas (channelized section downstream of the
armoring that was discussed above, and the area immediately downstream of the
800-ft-long overflow weir). Thus, we will state what appeared clear to everyone
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during the presentation, that it is imperative that the Emergency Spillway not
receive additional flows and that a long-term mitigation and re-design plan begin
now.
We believe the planned geologic exploration that will commence this coming
week should provide important information. This includes 8 seismic geophysical
lines and 5 exploratory borings on the slope that leads down to the Feather
River. Near the Emergency Spillway structure about 14 borings will be drilled on
the downstream toe of the spillway (some will be drilled through the armoring that
has recently been placed) and about 5 borings are planned on the upstream side
of the structure. All of these will provide details for the conceptual design of the
ultimate fix for this element of the project.
2. Does the BOC have any comments on the process or preliminary design
recovery concepts developed for restoration of the gated and Emergency
Spillway structures?
Response
The DWR staff has narrowed the concepts for restoration of the service spillway
to a small number of variations. These are specific to the phase of restoration
that must be accomplished to operate the spillway during the period until May
2017 and to the interim period when the spillway must pass the 2017/2018 flood
flows and to the final solution to completely restore the spillway to modern design
standards. Basically, the plan calls for rebuilding the spillway in the same
configuration as the original design: rebuilding the entire length of the chute,
retaining walls and energy dissipation structure at the exit.
For the initial period to be able to operate until the spring runoff is over in the
beginning of May, strengthening of the chute slabs at the end of the upper chute
section is underway by installation of anchors and armoring of the slope below
the spillway. Extensive efforts are underway to locate and repair any voids
beneath the upper chute slab and patch any spalls and seal cracks or joints that
permit water to enter the under-drain system. The BOC concurs that this work
needs to be completed on a priority basis.
Restoring the original spillway will require that the entire lower section of the
chute training walls and flip bucket be rebuilt. Whether this can be completed in
the short time period until November is questionable. It would require rebuilding
the foundation for the chute slab and walls in the deeply eroded holes with
concrete. This seems likely to be done using conventional concrete in the bottom
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of the depressions to obtain a level surface to place Roller Compacted Concrete

(RCC) up to the foundation level. The reinforced concrete chute slab and training
walls would then be placed starting at a connection to the existing upper chute.
The BOC questions if this can all be completed before November. The BOC is of
the opinion that a temporary end of chute paving could be configured with a small
flip angle to throw the discharge a distance downstream where it might impact on
the remaining paved chute near the existing flip bucket. This would be used only
for one flood season. Some additional downstream erosion should be expected
and would be considered acceptable. During the next construction season, this
portion of the chute would be completed.
The upper chute section and its training walls will also need to be completely
replaced or restored to a condition acceptable for long term service. During the
construction period between May and November of 2017, there is not sufficient
time for a complete replacement. Interim measures to address any voids beneath
the slab, repair spalls and deteriorated concrete, and caulking of all open cracks
and joints are planned. The existing training walls will be anchored to improve
their stability and strength. The BOC agrees that these measures should be
accomplished as an interim solution. The complete replacement of this section of
the chute should be scheduled as part of the work during the second season.
Another alternative for repair of this upper chute section is to anchor a reinforced
concrete overlay on top of the existing slab as a permanent fix. In the BOCs
opinion, this solution leaves too many unknowns unanswered as to the
foundation conditions beneath the existing slab. However, the BOC emphasizes
the need for all spalls and any areas of deteriorated concrete in the chute surface
of this upper spillway portion to be properly patched and repaired to avoid the
possibility of cavitation or uplift causing damage during its remaining service. If
an overlay is considered as a temporary measure, it would need to be removed
together with the existing concrete slab when the final fix of the upper section of
chute is done.
3. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations on the Design

Teams intended approach for developing the project design criteria?
Response
The BOC was presented with a draft of the Design Teams approach to
developing the projects design criteria. It is the BOCs understanding that design
criteria will be developed for both the short-term repair measures, and the long-
5
term mitigation. The BOC recommends that a clear distinction be made between
criteria developed for the two remediation goals.
It was also noted that design criteria will be selected in tandem with flood control
operation of the reservoir.
The presented design criteria for spillway flows are as follows:
Restore both spillways to pass the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) flows without
failing, and with damage below the Emergency Spillway to be expected. These
include the following estimated flows:
Gated Spillway peak design outflow of 277,000 cfs

Emergency Spillway peak design outflow of 369,000 cfs
Operational maximum release goals are as follows:
Operate the reservoir to limit the Gated Spillway maximum design

release to 100,000 cfs
Operate the reservoir to prevent spill over the Emergency Spillway.
It is the BOCs understanding that peak outflows through the Gated Spillway will
be limited to about 150,000 cfs, which is consistent with historic peak releases,
and are designed to prevent overtopping of levees and flooding of communities
downstream of the dam.
The current inflow to the reservoir is about 13,000 cfs. Using the current snow
pack, and based on forecasts from historical snowmelt seasons, a conservative
estimate of inflows during the April and May months indicate inflows of the order
of 25,000 cfs. With the gates closed, current outflows through powerhouse are
about 13,000 cfs, resulting in a net inflow of about 12,000 cfs. Thus, the reservoir
should be operated to address the net inflow during the snowmelt season.
Design criteria for the components of the repair were not presented in enough
detail to allow the BOC to provide specific recommendations. It is understood
that such details would be presented in subsequent BOC meetings.
It is understood that flood and seismic design criteria for long-term remediation
will follow deterministic approaches. Risk approaches will be used for design of
interim measures. Details of these approaches were not presented during this
meeting.
6
The BOC concurs with the Design Teams approach of incorporating both the
operational and flood control constraints in its development of design criteria for
the project.
4. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations on the preliminary

project schedule?
Response
The schedule is controlled by the time available between now and the beginning
of November (the potential beginning of the rainy season). The schedule given to
us calls for completion of required geotechnical studies by mid-May and award of
grading contracts by March 31. The final-design alternative will be selected by
April 7. That leaves only two weeks for 95% completion of plans by mid-May.
This in turn leaves only about 3 weeks to prepare final drawings. Bid packages
would need to be sent out and bidders would need to be briefed in the last two
weeks of May. To accomplish this it would be wise to begin evaluation of
qualifications of potential contractors immediately if this has not been done
already. Construction contracts would be awarded by June 1. This is a very
demanding schedule, as everyone recognizes. There seems to be no room
anywhere to expand any part of the schedule. A very significant risk would be
incurred if the Gated Spillway is not operational by November 1.
5. Does the BOC have any other comments, advice, recommendations, or

questions for the Design Team?
Response
General Comments. At this early meeting, the BOC does not have much specific
information to go on in offering advice and recommendations.
The BOC cautions that any interim concept that has a discharging flow impacting
an RCC placement risks losing some of the concrete.
Chute Spillway [Gated Spillway]. The chute spillway [Gated Spillway] has
operated many times since its completion in 1968. Although the floor of the
spillway chute [Gated Spillway] in this section has experienced a good deal of
spalling and cracking, there has been no significant damage. The cracks and
spalls have been repaired several times. The velocity of flow in the upper chute is
lower than that experienced in the vicinity of the February failure.
Planned Geologic Investigation. The BOC believes the planned geologic

investigation is warranted and we encourage this effort. For the immediate
7
emergency response effort, the information obtained about the Gated Spillway
Chute rock foundation conditions and the interface between concrete slabs and
the condition of underlying materials (such as whether it is clay, weathered rock,
or possibly voids) will be timely and influence the immediate design response.
The seismic lines and borings outside the spillway will be useful for the
permanent design for the Gated Spillway.
BOC RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY (COMPILED BY STEPHEN W. VERIGIN)
Issues noted by the BOC for consideration during restoration design (from March 2,
2017 site visit):
MO 1.1 In some areas of the foundation of the chute slab, compacted clay
was used to fill depressions in the rock foundation. This calls into
question whether the portions of the slab that appear undamaged
by the failure should be replaced during the restoration.
MO 1.2 The drains appear to flow for some appreciable time after the gates
are closed and no precipitation is occurring. The BOC believes this
situation should be investigated.
MO 1.3 The BOC concurs that restoration of the service spillway to

operational service is a first priority, it is anticipated that some
portions of the work will involve interim solutions and final
completion of all restoration efforts may require more than one
season.
Emergency Site Repairs, Question 1:
M1 1.1 One aspect of the short-term Emergency Spillway plan is to

manage operations so that flow over the Emergency Spillway does
not occur during the spring 2017 wet season; this is absolutely
critical.
M1 1.2 DWR has placed small, 3-ft-high cyclopean check dams to slow the
flow in these channelized flow areas and control the gradient. The
knickpoints in these channels downstream of the check dams could
be problematic should future flows occur.
M1 1.3 It is imperative that the Emergency Spillway not receive additional

flows and that a long-term mitigation and re-design plan begin now.
8
Preliminary Design Concepts for Gated and Emergency Spillway, Question 2:
M1 2.1 Extensive efforts are underway to locate and repair any voids
beneath the upper chute slab and patch any spalls and seal cracks
or joints that permit water to enter the under-drain system. The
BOC concurs that this work needs to be completed on a priority
basis.
M1 2.2 The BOC is of the opinion that a temporary end of chute paving
could be configured with a small flip angle to throw the discharge a
distance downstream where it might impact on the remaining paved
chute near the existing flip bucket.
M1 2.3 Interim measures to address any voids beneath the slab, repair
spalls and deteriorated concrete and to caulk all open cracks and
joints are planned. The existing training walls will be anchored to
improve their stability and strength. The BOC agrees that these
measures should be accomplished as an interim solution. The
complete replacement of this section of the chute should be
scheduled as part of the work during the second season.
M1 2.4 Another alternative for repair of this upper chute section is to

anchor a reinforced concrete overlay on top of the existing slab as
a permanent fix. In the BOCs opinion this solution leaves too many
unknowns unanswered as to the foundation conditions beneath the
existing slab.
Design Teams Intended Approach for Developing Design Criteria, Question 3:
M1 3.1 It is the BOCs understanding that design criteria will be developed

for both the short-term repair measures, and the long-term
mitigation. The BOC recommends that a clear distinction be made
between criteria developed for the two remediation goals.
M1 3.2 It is the BOCs understanding that peak outflows through the Gated
Spillway will be limited to about 150,000 cfs, which is consistent
with historic peak releases, and are designed to prevent
overtopping of levees and flooding of communities downstream of
the dam.
9
M1 3.3 The reservoir should be operated to address the net inflow during
the snowmelt season.
M1 3.4 The BOC concurs with the Design teams approach of incorporating
both the operational and flood control constraints in its development
of design criteria for the project.
Preliminary Schedule, Question 4:
M1 1.4 Bid packages would need to be sent out and bidders would need to
be briefed in the last two weeks of May. To accomplish this it would
be wise to begin evaluation of qualifications of potential contractors
immediately if this has not been done already.
Advice, Recommendations, Questions for Design Team, Question 5:
M1 5.1 The BOC cautions that any interim concept that has a discharging
flow impacting an RCC placement risks losing some of the
concrete.
M1 5.2 The BOC believes the planned geologic investigation is warranted

and we encourage this effort.
Respectfully submitted,
John J. Cassidy Eric B. Kollgaard Faiz Makdisi Kerry Cato

2884 Saklan Indian Drive 4820 Eagle Way 1 Kaiser Plaza, Ste.1125 P.O. Box 891930
Walnut Creek, CA 94595 Concord, CA 94521 Oakland, CA 94612 Temecula, CA 92589
Tel (925) 933-5994 Tel (925) 798-9475 Tel (510) 529-8110 Tel (951) 834-2619
jjcassidyhydro@comcast.net ebkollgaard@astound.net fmakdisi@sageengineers.com kerry@catogeoscience.com
10
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
OROVILLES EMERGENCY RECOVERY SPILLWAYS
Board of Consultants Meeting No. 1
Date: Friday, 3/10/2017

Handouts: Board Report Template
Location: Room 1603
AGENDA
Questions for the Board

1. Does the Board have any comments or recommendations regarding the emergency site
repairs?
2. Does the Board have any comments on the process or preliminary design recovery
concepts developed for restoration of the gated and emergency spillway structures?
3. Does the Board have any comments or recommendations on the design teams intended
approach for developing the project design criteria?
4. Does the Board have any comments or recommendations on the preliminary project
schedule?
5. Does the Board have any other comments, advice, recommendations, or questions for
the design team?
9:00 9:15 Welcome, introductions Ted Craddock

9:15 9:30 Questions for the Board and review of agenda Steve Verigin
9:30 10:00 Briefing on emergency response repairs Ghassan Alqaser
Break
10:15 11:15 Briefing and discussion of preliminary spillway Dale Brown/Jesse
restoration design concepts Dillon
11:15 noon Briefing and discussion of project definition and Steve Verigin
design criteria
Lunch
12:30 12:45 Briefing on preliminary project schedule Ted Craddock
12:45 1:15 Geologic and geotechnical exploration Holly Nichols/Craig
Hall
1:15 4:15 Board closed session Board
4:15 5:00 Board report Board
1
Present, did not sign in; arrived at 10:00 am
Present, did not sign in
Present, did not sign in

Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways Project Review Meeting No. 1 - March 8, 2017
Name Affiliation
Laughlin, Noel HOR
Lewis, Liz GEi
Lindell, James MWH Stantec
MacArthur, Robert MWH Stantec
Nichols, Holly DWR
Pandey, Ganesh DWR
Putnam, Jim GEi
Rogers, Mike MWH Stantec
Royer, Joe DWR
Sturm, Joel
Todarro, Sal USACE
Torres, Ralph DWR
Verigin, Steve GEi
Wagner, Annie DWR
White, Molly DWR
2
Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways Project Review Meeting No. 1 - March 8, 2017
Name Affiliation
3
Summary & Response
Question 1
Question 1 relates to presentations made by DWR regarding the proposed and ongoing exploration
program to ensure engineers have a detailed understanding of the geologic conditions of the site. A
geologic exploration program includes drilling holes into the ground to determine the rocks
characteristics. The BOC concurred with the approach that DWR was taking in evaluating the geologic
conditions. The BOC reminded the DWR geologists to think broad when evaluating the geologic
conditions.
Question 2
Question 2 relates to presentations made by DWR regarding design criteria. Prior to designing detailed
plans and specifications, there needs to be an understanding regarding the criteria that will be used to
ensure the project meets its objectives. DWR presented the various criteria that will be used during the
design which is based on various standards for dam design. The BOC concurred with the design criteria
and will make further comments as more detailed criteria is established.
Question 3
Question 3 relates to preliminary design concepts that were presented to the BOC. Prior to completing
detailed design, it is customary to develop various concepts and to determine which concepts make the
most sense and which should be pursued further. The concepts are broken out into three main
components of the project, including the upper chute of the gated spillway, the lower portion of the
gated spillway chute (this is the area that received the most damage), and the emergency spillway.
Two preliminary concepts were presented for the upper chute of the gated spillway. The alternatives
included:
- Placing a temporary concrete overlay of the existing chute, since the entire chute cannot be
replaced in one season; and
- Removing and replacing the slab as time permits.
The BOC expressed the opinion that replacing the slab is a better option.

The BOC also had the opinion that it would be difficult to completely replace the lower chute in one
season, but noted that there are alternatives available if the entire chute was not replaced in the first
year.
The BOC recommended a final design of a fully-lined emergency spillway may be needed, but also noted
further exploration and investigations are needed prior to selecting a final design.
It is important to understand that at this phase, all discussions revolve around preliminary information
and take place at the conceptual level.
Question 4
DWR had been in contact with several potential contractors to expedite the process. The BOC
concurred with this approach.
Question 5
Self-Explanatory
Question 6
The BOC gave opinions regarding the damaged spillway, and postulated possible causes to concrete
cracking. It should be noted that the BOC was referring to failure mechanisms after the initial failure.
The BOC recommended that future designs consider air slots based on these observations.
The BOC reiterated comments made in Question 3 that the entire upper chute should be replaced rather
than use a temporary concrete overlay, and noted it may not be possible to replace the entire upper
chute in one season.
###

OROVILLE EMERGENCY RECOVERY SPILLWAYS
Board of Consultants Memorandum


SUBJECT: Memorandum No. 2
INTRODUCTION
On March 17, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at the
Sacramento office headquarters of the California State Department of Water Resources
(DWR) for a geologic site briefing presentation of remediation draft design criteria and
further discussion of development of design concepts by DWR. An agenda for the
meeting is attached. All BOC members were present. The attendees at the meeting
are shown on the attached Attendance List.
The following pages contain the BOCs responses to the questions posed as listed on
the attached agenda.
1. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations pertaining to the

geology briefing?
Response
Based on the presentations made to the BOC, during todays meeting, the BOC
has several comments that are listed below. First, as stated one week ago, the
BOC continues to believe that the DWR plan presented during BOC Meeting 1 is
a reasonable approach to obtain necessary data regarding: 1) the Emergency
Spillway structure; 2) the outflow path for the Emergency spillway flows; 3) the
wall areas adjacent to the Gated Spillway Chute; 4) the rock quality underlying
the Gated Spillway Chute and the interface between the concrete chute and
earthen materials; and 5) the slope left of the Gated Spillway Chute that is above
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information

DO NOT RELEASE 1
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2 March 17, 2017
the deep eroded channel. By listing these 5 elements and seeing the large area
on map (see Figure 1, from the geology presentation), it is evident that this
exploration program is broad-based, provides important information that will be
used in multiple designs, and the data must be obtained in a very short time.
Thus, it is important that an open and flexible approach be maintained as this
program continues. By its very nature, exploration may discover new things that
we did not know and that will need to be pursued. Maintaining good, open, and
on-going communications between the engineering geologists in the field and the
design engineers in the office is challenging during any construction project, but
given the unusual fast pace of this project it is even more important.
This point can perhaps be illustrated using this interaction. During the meeting, a
suggestion to rotate the entire geophysical array by 45 was made. The idea for
the rotation would be to move the East-West seismic lines so they will cross the
dominant northeast oriented rock fabric foliation orthogonally. It is worth asking if
an exploration plan maximizes data collection efforts. In regard to the suggestion
made during the meeting, it should be noted that if one set of seismic lines cross
foliation orthogonally, then the other set will parallel the foliation (so does the
rotation minimize the value of the parallel set?). However, at this site it appears
that shears and not foliation are the major controlling factor on localized
weathering. The point is that the investigation program goals must be kept in
mind when developing these plans or when suggestions are made to alter the
field program.
A second comment on the investigation program involves the part of the geology
presentation that discussed the historical documents on the chute geology. This
presentation emphasizes the importance of accurate As-Built geologic
documentation and final foundation treatment.
This reaffirms the BOCs position that if at all possible, the

removal and replacement option of the chute should be pursued.

DO NOT RELEASE 2
Finally, the role of the BOC is to advise and offer opinion to those involved in the
day-to-day design and exploration; we cannot see all the data you see and the
details regarding how each of your decisions is made. What we can do is
encourage you to keep the big concepts in mind as you become wrapped up in
time-dependent details. Thus, keep asking the big questions. For example, it
was pointed out that there was a spring about 200 ft right and upstream of the
Sta 29+00 chute erosion. Do we know why it is there? Is it significant? If so, will
this exploration program address why it is there and what causes it. If it is a
shear, then the geophysics should pick it up, but what is its trend, depth, etc.
Continue to develop your site engineering geologic models (yes, we need to do
so even on 49-year-old projects) and use this exploration program to answer not
only the many small questions, but also the big questions that no one thought to
ask. We got to this point because of a crisis, but while we are here use this as
an opportunity to learn as much about the engineering geology as possible.
2. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations on the Draft

Design Criteria?
Response
The BOC heard presentations from the Design Team on brief summaries of the
following draft design criteria: Roadway and Site Plan Design Criteria; Geologic
and Geotechnical design; Structural design; Hydrology & Hydraulics Design.
It is the BOCs understanding that the general objectives of the selected design
criteria for the project features are intended to provide guidelines to help ensure
that repairs of the various project components are designed in a consistent
manner to meet short-term dam safety requirements. Design criteria were also
presented for components that are intended to serve for the long-term design life
of the project.
It is also the BOCs understanding that selected design criteria will follow the
regulatory guidelines of the FERC and DSOD, and, where applicable, design
guides of the USACE and the USBR.
Design objectives for the short-term interim repairs were selected to pass a
total projected outflow of 304,000 cfs. The Gated Spillway is to be designed to
pass 271,000 cfs; the Emergency Spillway will be retrofitted to pass the balance
of 33,000 cfs.

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Structural components that will be designed to function for the short-term were to
be designed for seismic ground motions for return periods of 144 years, based
on the results of probabilistic seismic hazard analyses. For long-term structures,
design criteria are based on deterministic median (50th percentile) estimates for
maximum magnitude earthquakes on controlling seismic sources.
The BOC considers the above criteria as reasonable and appropriate however it
recommends that project components whose failure could lead to development of
a potential failure mode that would result in uncontrolled release of the reservoir
should be designed to the same criteria adopted for the dam embankment.
A summary of geologic and geotechnical design criteria were presented for the
geotechnical design of foundations and for geotechnical components and
features that would support the design of structural repairs of both spillway
structures. These included criteria for excavation and preparation of acceptable
foundations, identification of competent rock formations that would serve as
foundations, design of slopes and stabilization measures of currently eroded
slopes to prevent further erosion; and providing criteria for identifying depth to
competent rock that would serve to anchor the existing or newly constructed
Gated Spillway chute slab, or the required depth of anchors for stabilizing the
Emergency Spillway pier structure.
The BOC notes that the seismic design criteria presented for the design of
geotechnical components provide for ground motions based on return periods of
2475 year. For consistency these ground motions should be compared with the
median estimates specified for the structural components of the project. The
BOC also notes that acceptable factors of safety for the design of slopes were
specified as 1.5 for static loads, and 1.1 for seismic loads. For seismic loads,
acceptable performance should also be specified based on acceptable
deformation.
The BOC generally concurs with the presented criteria summary, but will provide
additional review and specific comments once it receives the detailed design
criteria documents.

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3. Does the BOC have any comments or questions regarding the Design
Teams approach for further development of the design concepts?
Response
The DWR staff is still working on refining the options for restoration concepts with
the view to presenting the selected design by March 31st. In todays meeting,
the presentations made clear that the remediation of the upper section of the
spillway chute has priority and will be repaired or replaced such that the first 500
to 1000 feet of the chute and training walls can safely discharge the full flow
allotted to the gated spillway. The BOC concurs with this decision but points out
that in the event of large spillway discharges some additional erosion damage
may be expected to occur to the foundation rock in the downstream portion of the
spillway or to concrete placements which may have been previously completed.
The BOC favors doing the total replacement of this portion of the spillway chute
and walls in the first construction season from May to November of 2017 in
preference to repairing the existing chute and walls by anchoring and placing an
overlay which would then at some time in the next few years be totally removed
and replaced with a properly designed chute placed on satisfactory rock
foundation. The BOC believes it would not take appreciably more time to put in
the new slab than doing a repair with an overlay.
The lower portion of the spillway chute is not expected to be able to be

completely restored to the final condition during the May to November
construction season. Two options are being studied in the planning of this
potion. The first concept is to rebuild the foundation for the lower section of the
chute with conventional concrete or RCC. This chute foundation would be wide
enough that RCC can be brought up on both sides to serve as training walls.
Flows would then be allowed to use the unfinished RCC lower spillway chute
during the 2017/2018 flood season with the expectation of finishing the reinforced
concrete chute and training walls during the next construction season.
The other option is to make use of the eroded channel on the left side to carry
some of the excess flow of large spillway discharges while the existing
downstream chute carries a smaller portion and handles the lower discharges by
itself. The eroded hole at the break in the chute would be configured to be a
plunge pool by constructing sort of a side channel weir with RCC that allows
flows over a certain discharge to be sent down the eroded gully. Some backfill

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concrete would be needed to improve the lower chute and provide some training
wall structure to keep this flow in the chute.
The BOC favors the first option and believes the alternative concept requires
about the same construction time and effort as the first but has greater probability
of erosion damage to the chute foundation and greater likelihood of depositing
material in the river channel.
The hydraulic operating criteria make use of the emergency spillway only for
passing flows greater than the capacity of the gated spillway. The emergency
spillway is then counted on to be able to pass 33,000 cfs in the event it should be
necessary to pass the Interim Design Flood of 304,000 cfs. Repairs have been
made to the gullies that eroded in the apron downstream of the emergency
spillway weir by dumping riprap and using slush concrete and shotcrete. Further
protection by construction of cutoff walls at selected locations may be warranted
if deemed necessary.
It is
questionable whether the nappe would adhere to the concrete with large flows
over this crest and negative pressure would almost certainly occur. It is noted
that no splitters on the crest are provided for aeration. Further, the condition and
quality of the foundation materials are not well understood. The BOC believes the
best solution would be to construct a stepped buttress on the downstream side of
the weir using RCC. This could provide the needed improvement of stability and
would provide energy dissipation in flow passing over the structure.
The channel downstream of the emergency spillway still remains an issue

regarding its erodibility and is still under investigation as to the final long-term
solution. The same is true of the means of energy dissipation before the flow
enters the river. If a well-controlled passage of extreme flood flows without
severe erosion of the hillside downstream of the emergency spillway is the
objective, the BOC is of the opinion that an auxiliary gated spillway with fully lined
chute and designed energy dissipation may be a preferred solution. It is
recommended that such an option be included in the studies.

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4. Does the BOC have any comments or questions regarding the contractor
outreach?
Response
In general the BOC concurs with the approach for an early contractor selection
(see the repose to Question 5 below).
5. Does the BOC have any comments or questions regarding the draft project
schedule?
Response
Further attention has been given to the schedule for the project. Potential
contractors have been contacted and some pre-qualifying has been done and at
least three potential contractors have been briefed about the project.
Consideration is now underway to identify possible contracts. The BOC
recommends that the number of different contract packages be minimized in
order to reduce potential interference between contractors and reduce
mobilization time. For example it would be wise to have clearing, grubbing, and
grading of haul roads and constructions for work on the emergency spillway be
together in one contract package. Doing so could minimize interference between
contractors and optimize the contract schedule.
6. Does the BOC have any other comments or recommendations for the
Design Team?
Response
Three photos of very low flow on the upper chute taken after the chute failure,
clearly show a hole on the left side of the spillway approximately at or near the
construction joint near station 29+00. The second photo shows flow occurring at
very small depths (probably due only to gate leakage). At this very low flow,
what appear to be role waves, or possibly disturbances due to flow over
construction joints or cracks are clear. The third photo shows the hole that
developed shortly after initial failure. In this photo, the damage to the chute is
totally downstream of the construction joint. Later photos show the damage has
taken place on the upper side of the construction joint and has migrated to
approximately station 29+00.
These photos show that failure was initiated at the hole at the left side of the
chute near station 33+00. The failure, likely occurred as a result of high velocity
flow (in the range of 85 to 90 feet per second), penetrating under the slab,

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causing a strong uplift force and causing the slab to lift, eventually causing all or
part of the slab to break away. Subsequent erosion of foundation material
caused progressive failure both upstream and downstream.
Repairs had been made to the spillway slab several times since its completion in
1968. The most recent documented repair took place in 2009. Locations of
numerous existing cracks and spalls were shown in the report. The spalls were
probably caused and enlarged by freeze-thaw damage. Some of these holes
were quite large and extended as deep as the reinforcing steel. The hole that
triggered the failure was probably of the latter type.
If cavitation damage had a role in the slab failure it was probably minor. If
cavitation did occur, it would have been damped by aeration in the disturbed flow
leaving the gated structure. The thick piers cause large rooster tails downstream
of the thick columns downstream of the gates. The waves caused by the piers
are efficient aerators. This effect has been used by the Chinese as an aeration
device on their design of steep high-velocity chutes and have been found to be
effective in preventing cavitation damage. In their design, the channel between
the thick walls is actually narrowed slightly to increase the air entrainment. The
Chinese call these spillways Flared Chutes or Flared Spillways.
The BOC believes that the aeration produced by flow past the Gate-Structure
walls, is sufficient for this spillway.
The BOC encourages further consideration of total replacement of the chute floor
and walls in the upper chute. The construction schedule might be impacted by
doing so, but there are a number of flaws beneath and on the top of the floor slab
that should be corrected that it would be wise to choose total removal and
reconstruction. If the schedule for total reconstruction cannot be accommodated,
total repair of cracks and spalls is certainly required. The method and techniques
of repairs should be carefully considered in order to judge whether there are any
desirable changes in material and technique that would add confidence to
duration and/or functionality of the repairs.

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Some other minor comments are:
It would be useful to have station numbers painted on the training walls large
enough to be easily seen in video footage taken by drones during spillway
operation.
It was pointed out that excavation of the chute foundation to place a thicker
slab would require careful blasting. The BOC suggests investigation of
whether the rock in this foundation could be brought to grade with the use of
mechanical equipment such as pavement breakers.
If the reservoir level is above the gate sill elevation in the spillway control
structure, Care-of-Water is an item to contend with in the construction
contracts.
BOC RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
M2 1 There is a need to keep a flexible approach as the exploration program

proceeds and to maintain open on-going communications between the field
and the design staff in the office.
M2 2
M2 3 The BOC considers the seismic criteria presented are reasonable and
appropriate but recommends that any project components where failure might
lead to uncontrolled release of the reservoir be designed to the same seismic
standards adopted for the dam itself.
M2 4 There should be consistency in the ground motions specified for geotechnical
components compared with median estimates specified for the structural
components of the project.
M2 5 Acceptable performance for project components under seismic loading should
be based on both factors of safety and acceptable deformations.
M2 6 The BOC points out that by giving first priority to remediation of the upper
portion of the gated spillway chute, some further erosion of and damage to
the foundation rock for the lower chute section must be accepted.
M2 7 The BOC recommends that the chute paving and training walls of this upper
chute section be completely rebuilt on properly cleaned and prepared bedrock
foundation during the 2017 May to November construction season instead of

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repairing the existing chute with a reinforced concrete overlay and delaying
construction of a long term replacement.
M2 8 For the interim reconstruction of the lower portion of the spillway chute in the
2017 construction season, the BOC recommends that the foundation of the
chute and side walls be repaired using conventional concrete and RCC
backfill to allow discharge to safely flow in the RCC surfaced channel with the
expectation that designed concrete lining and walls will be added in the next
construction year.
M2 9 The BOC recommends as part of the remediation for the interim period, that
the concrete overflow weir monoliths on the emergency spillway be
strengthened by a stepped RCC buttress on the downstream face to add
stability and provide energy dissipation to the overflow discharge.
M2 10 The long-term solution to provide for passage of extreme flood flows in
excess of the capacity of the present gated spillway will require further study
and exploration to determine the best plan for the emergency spillway. A
second auxiliary gated spillway should be included as one of the options for a
long term solution.
M2 11 Construction contracts should be packaged to minimize interference between
contractors working on separate portions of the remediation efforts.
M2 12 The BOC reiterates that it is vital to construct the restored spillway chute on a
rock foundation of known quality properly prepared with suitable drainage
M2 13 The BOC recommends that an air supply slot be built into the reconstructed
chute at the location where the slope changes to a steeper incline.
M2 14 Marking chute stations on the training walls visible in video taken by drones
would aid in interpreting surveillance imagery.
M2 15
M2 16 Care-of-Water may need to be an item in the construction bid documents.

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Tel (925) 933-5994 Tel (925) 798-9475 Tel (510) 529-8110 Tel (951) 834-2619

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Summary & Response
Question 1
The BOC response for Question 1 continues the discussion from BOC Memorandum No. 2 regarding the
ongoing exploration. The BOC describes the exploration program and resulting findings as they were
described to them by DWR. Seismic geophysical lines are part of the exploration program which
provides engineers and geologist insight into the quality of the foundation rock. Preliminary geologic
information described by the BOC will eventually be used in the design of the new features, in addition
to help with construction procedures.
Question 2
The BOC response for Question 2 continues the discussion from the BOC Memorandum No. 2 regarding
the design criteria. DWR proposed a maximum flow criteria of 270,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) for the
upper chute of the gated spillway, which is significantly higher than the record flow.
Complete repair of the emergency spillway is not anticipated by November 1, 2017. However, work will
continue on the emergency spillway to ensure it can safely pass the original design flow criteria by
November 1. It should be noted that the emergency spillway design flow of 371,000 cfs is in addition to
the capacity of the gated spillway. The priority is to complete the work on the gated spillway.
The BOC describes the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis, MCE (Maximum Credible Earthquake) and
other earthquake parameters as they were described to them by DWR. These terms which refer to the
level of design for the potential earthquake loads that will be used to design the various concrete
structures. The BOC considers the earthquake parameters proposed by DWR reasonable and
appropriate.
Question 3
Responses to Question 3 are consistent with comments made by the BOC and in most cases, are a
repeat of what has already been documented in Memorandum No. 2.
DWR is proposing to completely reconstruct the lower chute area. However, the BOC notes the all work
may not be completed by November 1, 2017, and therefore describes various techniques that can be
used as back-up plans. Many of these techniques will depend on the amount of work that can be
completed by November 1. If the entire gated spillway chute cannot be completed by November 1, the
end of the gated spillway chute where damage occurred will be buttressed with concrete the spillway
can be used. There are other intermediate steps that can be taken depending on the progress of the
work. In all cases, the spillway will be able to be used for all expected flows by November 1, 2017.

Question 4
Self-Explanatory
Question 5
Question 5 relates to many construction methods and details that could be considered to complete the
project in a timely manner.
Question 6
Naturally occurring asbestos is present in various parts of the state, and is monitored on many large
earth-moving projects. DWR continues to monitor air quality to ensure that it is safe for workers and
nearby residents. The BOC recommends continued air quality monitoring.
###



INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at offices of the
California State Department of Water Resources (DWR) at 1:00 pm for a presentation of
design criteria, further development of design concepts by DWR and the status of
Construction Contracts No.1 and No. 2. The presentations continued on March 31st and
the meeting ended with a reading of the BOCs report at 4:15 pm. An agenda for the
meeting is attached. All BOC members were present. The BOC met with
representatives of DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants
that are working on the Oroville Spillway Recovery project; the attendees at the meeting
are shown on the attached attendance lists.
The BOC has reviewed the status of past comments and recommendations in the log
and this is included in the attachments.
1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the field

exploration program?
Response
The field exploration program, tasked with providing geological and geotechnical
information to support the Oroville spillway mitigation, is ongoing with exploratory
boreholes still being drilled in the areas of the Flood Control Outlet (FCO)
spillway chute (aka Gated Spillway) and above the slope left of the FCO Chute.
The seismic geophysical lines were planned to begin this week. Detailed
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information 1

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comments regarding the FCO spillway, left slope above the FCO Chute, and
Emergency Spillway are listed below.
FCO Chute spillway: The presentation discussed findings of the concrete coring
in the chute floor that is investigating the rock/concrete interface. While
preliminary, since the drilling is not yet completed, this is important information
that may shed light on the piping potential of material the concrete was placed
upon. Initial drill coring results show slab thickness varying from 2.0 to 3.2 ft. It
should not be inferred that this thickness is indicative of the entire slab thickness.
Analysis of historical construction photographs continue to show that the
concrete slab was placed on a variety of materials that ranged from clean, hard,
bedrock to highly weathered rock that appeared soil-like. These borings are
being drilled to depths of 15 to 30 feet to determine the depth to fresh rock and,
hence, the required depth of the new anchor embedment.
Left slope above the FCO Chute: Exploratory borings are being drilled on top of
the unstable slope on the left of the FCO Chute. These 100-ft-deep-borings are
for determining depth of soil, and rock weathering zones that will be used in
stabilizing this slope. These borings will be converted into monitoring wells and
inclinometers. This slope must be stabilized before work to mitigate the scour
hole can commence.
Emergency Spillway: Field investigations for the Emergency Spillway have yet to
be completed; only the seismic geophysics is in progress. However, the
identification of a preferred mitigation alternative (i.e., downstream cutoff wall,
RCC buttress, and RCC splash pad) was discussed and this may impact the
future field investigations. Even though anchors drilled through the ogee
monoliths may not be pursued, it is still prudent to obtain geotechnical
information about the weirs foundation conditions; and, although the RCC
foundation is planned to be taken to the same depth, the adequacy of this
foundation must nonetheless be verified.
The northern 800+feet of the Emergency Spillway approach and weir foundation
were created by excavating a 50-ft-high bedrock hill. Thus, some of the exposed
ground surface in this area is on rock that varies in its weathering
If the DWR recommended design option moves

forward then knowledge of rock weathering depths all along the weir and cutoff
wall alignment should be determined in advance of finalizing the design.

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If the seismic geophysical lines prove useful in determining rock weathering

depths, then consideration should be given to extending geophysics to provide
coverage to the northern 800 feet of the Emergency Spillway and also to provide
some information on weathering depth downstream of the cutoff wall.
2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Design

Criteria?
Response
In its previous two reports, the BOC provided comments and recommendations
on draft copies of the Design Criteria Memoranda. The BOC has reviewed the
revised drafts (dated March 20 and 27, 2017) and generally concurs with the
revised documents as addressing earlier comments provided by the BOC.
In summary, the BOC understands that the design objectives for the Oroville
Emergency Recovery Spillways Project are: a) for the Interim Repairs to
allow the Flood Control Outlet (Gated Spillway) chute to pass a peak routed
outflow of 270,000 cfs based on the anticipated first year hydrologic criteria; and
b) the long-term repairs are to allow the chute to pass its portion of the Probable
Maximum Flood (PMF) peak outflow of 300,000 cfs.
The Emergency Spillways Interim Repairs are designed to allow the spillway to
pass peak flows of 30,000 cfs, with a peak reservoir elevation overtopping the
spillway weir crest by about 3.3 feet. The long-term repairs are designed to allow
the Emergency Spillway to pass peak a PMF flow of 371,000 cfs.
The BOC concurs with the Projects flood design criteria, but notes that while the
FCO spillway chute can be designed to pass its portion of the extremely rare
PMF flows, the Emergency Spillway repairs may not be capable of passing a 16-
foot-overtopping and a peak flow of 371,000 cfs without significant erosion
damage downstream.
The structural design criteria Memo indicates that: Interim repairs will be
designed based on a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) with a 144-
year return period. Permanent restoration structural features will be designed to
the Median (50th percentile) MCE with a maximum water surface elevation of 901
feet. The targeted seismic structural performance criteria will be essentially linear
elastic structural behavior; no instabilities, minimal cracking, and no permanent
deformations.
The BOC considers these criteria to be reasonable and appropriate.

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Deterministic ground motions at the dam site, as reported in the Supporting

Technical Information Document (STID), were estimated at the 50th percentile
level from a magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the Cleveland Hills fault. The peak
ground acceleration (PGA) was estimated at 0.57g. The Cleveland Hills fault is
reported to have a low slip rate of about 0.05 mm per year. The Division of Safety
of Dams (DSOD) provides a Consequence Hazard Matrix that uses the
consequence of dam failure and probability of earthquake hazard (described by
the slip rate on the controlling seismic source) to select the appropriate statistical
level for deterministic ground motions. The Consequence Level for a dam is
defined by the Total Class Weigh (TCW), which is a function of the dam height,
the reservoir capacity, and the downstream consequences of failure. The TCW
for Oroville Dam is 36, which classifies it as Extreme Consequence. According
to DSODs Consequence Hazard Matrix, for an Extreme Consequence dam
and a seismic source with a low slip rate of less than 0.1 mm per year, ground
motions should be selected between the median (50th percentile) and 84th
percentile levels. The choice of what statistical level to use is guided by the
results of probabilistic seismic hazard analyses (PSHA). To guide this selection,
the USGS hazard maps from the 2014 National Seismic Hazard Mapping
(NSHM) Project were queried for the Oroville Dam site, with a site Vs-30 (the
shear wave velocity in the upper 30 meters of rock foundation underlying the
dam) of about 1,200 meters per second. It should be noted that the actual Vs-30
of the foundation rock underlying the dam, based on recently measured velocities
is about 2,400 meters per second. The value of 1,200 meters per second used to
query the USGS hazard curves was because the ground motion prediction
equations (NGA West-2) used in the hazard analyses all have a maximum limit of
1,200 meters per second for Vs-30. According to the USGS 2014 NSHM, the
median PGA of 0.57g from the Cleveland Hills fault has a return period of greater
than 10,000 years. Thus the BOC judges that selection of the median level of
ground motions for the long-term design of repair measures that are related to
dam safety is considered reasonably conservative and appropriate.
The BOC considers the geologic and geotechnical criteria for the appropriate
excavation and preparation of foundations for the various project features to be
reasonable and appropriate.
The BOC considers the use of a 28-day concrete strength of 5,000 psi, and
reinforcing steel fy of 60,000 psi to be appropriate. The use of rock anchors and
dowels with PTI Class I corrosion protection for all permanent features is
considered a requirement.

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3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the

Alternatives Analysis or selection?
Response
FCO Upper Chute: The BOC concurs with DWRs recommendation to remove
and replace the FCO's upper portion of the chute and training walls. It is,
however, doubtful that the entire length of upper chute all the way to Sta. 28+00
can be replaced in the first construction season, and therefore the portion that is
not replaced must be strengthened as necessary to serve through the first winter
flood season. Construction contract package 2 should have language specifying
a minimum length to be completed and stating that this must be located at the
start of the chute immediately downstream of the FCO structure. Provisions to
prevent the demolition of the existing concrete chute from getting too far ahead of
the concrete placement should be added. It is vital that a continuous concrete
replacement chute in this upper portion of the spillway be completed and
available at the start of the flood season.
It was pointed out that it will be necessary to protect the downstream end of the
upper chute where it drops off into the first erosion hole. This could be protected
with a conventional concrete or RCC buttress to prevent any further back cutting
in the event the first flood seasons discharges must be routed down the eroded
gully. This work will be coordinated with the construction being done for
restoration measures of the lower portion of the FCO Chute channel.
FCO Lower Chute: The BOC agrees with DWRs recommended concept for the
FCOs lower chute restoration which contemplates completing the reconstruction
of the foundations for the continuation of the reinforced concrete chute to connect
with the terminal energy dissipater. This RCC emplacement would also be built
up at the sides of the channel to support the retaining walls.
The DWR is recommending that the upper scour hole be left open during the
RCC construction until it can be confidently determined that the entire lower
spillway chute length would be completed before the November 1 deadline. This
would be considered a fallback position for discharging flow down the eroded
gully if the channel is not ready by the onset of the flood season. The BOC
believes that the possibility of needing to route discharge down the gully is small.
The BOC anticipates that the filling of the upper scour hole with RCC to restore
the chute channel will take care of the requirement that the end of the upper
chute must be protected.

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Lining of the RCC chute channel with reinforced concrete and the construction of
the training walls will be accomplished during the second construction season.
The flood discharges during the next flood season will therefore pass from the
reinforced concrete paving in the upper chute portion onto an RCC surface on
the lower channel section. The BOC has previously stated that RCC can
probably withstand flow without extensive damage. However, the discharge
velocities in this lower part of the chute are over 100 fps
If allowed to progress, a portion of the
newly placed chute could be lost. The BOC believes some surfacing means
should be used on the top lift of RCC that can provide a smooth surface.
Transverse joints in the top lift of RCC will need to be carefully formed to avoid
disturbance to flow. The BOC suggests that the RCC test pad include some
preparation and testing of surface preparation to obtain a hard, smooth finish free
of bug holes, tracks and undulations.
The BOC is pleased that the measures recommended for restoring the FCO
Chute during this initial restoration to accommodate the interim criteria will serve
for the long-term restoration as well.
Emergency Spillway: The BOC supports the Recommended Alternative EM-2A

(RCC Buttress, RCC Splash Pad and D/S Cutoff Wall) as the mitigation option.
One advantage of this measure is that it can be installed in phases with the
1,700-ft-long downstream cutoff and the replacement of the 800-ft-long small
overflow weir being the only elements required by November 1, 2017. The
addition of the RCC buttress downstream of the larger ogee monoliths and the
RCC splash pad (that covers the area between the weir and the downstream
cutoff wall) can be installed later; it is conceivable that this RCC work could occur
after November 1. The BOC recommends continued analysis of the scour
potential for flow downstream of the northern 800 feet of the cutoff wall.
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on Construction

Contract No. 1?
Response
The BOC has the following comments on Construction Contract No. 1. This
contract was recently awarded to Teichert Construction and they are presently
mobilizing to the site. The purpose of this contract will be to improve site access
to the spillway areas and perform local site preparation. There was discussion
about possibly making changes to this contract to address unforeseen issues as
they arise. Given the necessity of getting a contractor operational in the field,

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perhaps before a few elements were fully investigated and designs completed, it
is no surprise that some needed changes have arisen. The BOC believes that
shifting as much work to this contract as possible is prudent if it can further
expedite work in the subsequent Contract No. 2 that has yet to be awarded.
A major element of Contract No. 1 addresses stabilizing the eroded slope on the
left side of the lower FCO Chute. Once the slope is stabilized, workers in
Contract 2 can safely work beneath the stabilized slope to clean out debris and
perform any foundation preparation for concrete backfill activities. It is important
to expedite analysis of the near vertical slopes that abut the left side of the chute
in the Station 29+00 to 31+00 area. If blasting and shaping (or even if removal is
deemed necessary) of this rock monolith is determined to be necessary then
adding a blasting task to Contract No.1 and performing that work immediately
may provide more options for contract 2 in regard to scour hole mitigation.
Another related issue is the cleanup and stabilization of the unstable eroded area
on the right side of the upper scour hole; currently this is not included in Contract
2, but thought should be given to cleaning and exposing the geological conditions
in this area as soon as possible, as it will also be part of the scour hole backfill
foundation.
The aggregate testing and mix design analysis being performed as part of
Contract 1 is an extremely important aspect of determining the future production
rates of RCC. As this could be a critical path item to some of the proposed
options in Contract 2 (e.g., complete versus partial backfill of the scour hole), we
endorse these efforts.

Contract No. 2?
Response
The BOC can well understand the opinions expressed by Contractors when
shown the scope of work in the draft Construction Contract No. 2 that there are a
lot of priorities for completion before November 1 in this job. Contract No. 2 as
written, attempts to cover all the needed work to restore the FCO Chute to full
operation. It should be recognized that this will likely require two or more work
seasons and some clarifications will no doubt be needed in the contractual
language to explain this.
During the meeting, the question was raised as to whether the grade line of the
spillway chute could be raised by the additional slab thickness to avoid having to

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excavate an additional thickness of foundation for the thicker slab. The BOC is of
the opinion that this would be possible and would not be difficult to achieve with a
short transition and a vertical curve. However, the thickness of the original
concrete chute slab appears to vary widely from the specified thickness, and the
condition and suitability of the underlying foundation will not be known until the
concrete is removed. It would be premature to change the line and grade at this
time.
In general, the BOC believes the details of the chute concrete, anchorage,
drainage and reinforcing are well conceived as shown on the drawings. It was
noted by the BOC that some of the RCC construction details shown on the draft
plans are appropriate for dam construction but unnecessary for building up the
new foundation for the chute.
It appears that making the initial placement of concrete in the upstream scour
hole may be hazardous for workers because of the danger of rock falls. The BOC
agrees that flowable concrete can be used in the bottom and that the large rock
pieces that ended up on the bottom of the scour hole can be left in place and
incorporated in the fill. Plum stones might also be used. When the level of
concrete placement reaches a height at which suitable space becomes available
for safe RCC placement, the operation can be changed.
The issue of drainage under the backfill behind the training walls was discussed.
If the replacement of the chute and training walls is only partially finished before
November, the outfall from these new drains needs to be determined.
The under drainage planned for the slab is, in general, satisfactory. Slabs are
planned as approximately 30-ft by 30-ft panels and will be placed in
checkerboard fashion to allow proper curing time prior to pouring of adjacent
slabs. Loads used in the structural design include full dynamic pressure under
the slabs. Both transverse and longitudinal joints will be provided with water
stops. Water stops between slabs were apparently not included in the design of
the original spillway and the lack of them was no doubt an important factor in the
February failure of the slab on the FCO Chute. It will be very important to have
constant construction inspection when slab concrete is poured to assure proper
imbedding of the water stops.
There are differences between treatment of construction-joints on Drawings S-

401 and S-403.

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Drawing S-401 shows no features for drainage between the leveling concrete
and the chute slab. For some designs it may be desirable to consider installation
of some form of drainage in this location. Some typical designs use a wrapped
half-round slotted drain for such an application. It is not clear whether leveling
concrete as shown on Drawing S-401 will be used for the upper chute since the
condition of the foundation is not fully understood. The BOC is not in favor of
introducing this additional interface and prefers the slab concrete to be placed on
the properly prepared rock surface.
For the final construction of the reinforced concrete chute slab on the lower
portion where the slab will be placed on RCC, a drainage system design could be
considered. It was stated that undulations in the surface of the RCC would
apparently be limited to 2 inches in depth. This limitation in the surface of the
RCC would be rougher than useable for installation of drainage pipes as well as
greater than desirable for the flow velocities anticipated. The BOC does not
advocate the use of an under drainage system where the chute slab is placed on
the RCC foundation portion of the lower spillway section.
Considerable discussion regarding under drainage design for spillway chutes

took place.
The
idea was not supported by the BOC for the upper chute restoration. Although
many cracks developed in the original slabs, the new slab will be thicker, panel
dimensions will be much smaller, and will be more heavily reinforced. These
provisions will make the slab much less prone to developing such shrinkage or
temperature cracks.

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6. Does the BOC have any other recommendations or comments for the
Design Team?
Response
The BOC has comments on other items as listed below.
Provisional Air Slot: In previous meeting comments, the BOC suggested that it
could be advisable to add a designed air slot near the beginning of the steep
slope. Although cavitation was probably not the root cause of the slab failure, it
may have aided in the progress of the slab failure. Adding air could aid in
aerating the flow on the steep slope and dampening the added damaging effects
of cavitation. It may be advisable for these air slots to be analyzed in the
hydraulic model tests that are currently taking place.
Asbestos: About two weeks ago, the local Air Quality Management District at
Oroville discovered the occurrence of asbestos in an air quality sample. The
amount was small, but this finding has produced concern about this potential
health hazard to construction workers and nearby residents. Initial site
investigation reports indicate that the amphibolite metamorphic rocks at the site
are not a significant source of asbestos. We understand that DWR is conducting
their due diligence study of this issue. This study should include testing of air
samples in the crushing and borrow handling areas as well as any areas where
rock excavation or rock handling is planned.
M3-1 The BOC concurs with the Projects flood design criteria, but notes
that while the FCO spillway chute can be designed to pass its
portion of the extremely rare PMF flow, the Emergency Spillway
repairs may not be capable of passing a 16-foot-overtopping and a
peak flow of 371,000 cfs without significant erosion damage
downstream.
M3-2 The BOC considers the structural design criteria based on 144-year
return period ground shaking for interim repairs, and median
deterministic ground motions for long-term repairs to be reasonable
and appropriate.
M3-3 The BOC considers the deterministic median peak ground

accelerations estimated for the design of long-term dam safety-

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related features to be reasonably conservative and appropriate

considering the very long return periods associated with these
deterministic levels.
M3-4 The BOC considers geologic and geotechnical criteria for the
excavation and preparation of foundations for the various project
features to be reasonable and appropriate.
M3-5 The BOC concurs with the proposed strength criteria for the
concrete and reinforcing steel elements, and for the use of
corrosion protection for rock anchors.
M3-6 The BOC recommends that rock-weathering depth be determined

for all elements of the Emergency Spillway (monolith section, 800-ft
long weir section, and 1,700-ft cutoff wall) prior to the design being
finalized. Weathering depth and, hence, scour potential
downstream of the northernmost 800-ft of the cutoff should be
estimated.
M3-7 The BOC concurs with the restoration methods recommended by

DWR for the upper chute section.
M3-8 The Contractor should be made aware that the length of upper
chute that is restored by Nov. 1 must connect with the portion still to
be replaced to operate during the flood season.
M3-9
M3-10 The BOC concurs with the plans recommended by DWR for
restoration of the chute channel in the lower spillway chute portion.
M3-11 The surface of the RCC channel which will be subject to high
velocity flow needs to be smooth
It is suggested that the RCC test pad
provides a means to investigate surfacing methods.
M3-12 The BOC has no objection to changing the line and grade of the
upper chute lining if this offers an advantage.

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M3-13 The BOC points out that under drainage provisions for the lower
chute slab on RCC foundation has yet to be designed.
M3-14 The BOC does not favor the use of a leveling concrete course
below the reinforced concrete spillway chute slab.

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Board of Consultants Memorandum No.4 -April 11, 2017

Prepared by the Department of Water Resources
Summary & Response
Question 1
Question 1 relates to the construction work that is just beginning adjacent to the lower chute of the
gated (flood control) spillway. The slope is being laid back to provide a safe working environment for
future work in the lower chute.
The "slope" is the massive rocky area adjacent to the gated spillway. "Laid back" refers to cutting back
the slope to make an area for the construction crew and equipment.
Question 2
Recent exploration reveals the foundation of the upper chute is better than the foundation under the
failed section. Previous BOC reports concluded the best option is to replace the upper chute slab, rather
than placing a concrete overlay on it.
The BOC concurs with DWR's approach to replace portions of the upper chute in the first season, and
replace any remaining slabs in the second season. Although the BOC concurs with the recommendation
to replace the entire chute, they recommend that repair measures should be completed for any slabs
not replaced in the first season.
Question 3
Material that eroded from the hillside adjacent to the gated spillway and deposited in the river was
removed and stockpiled. This material will be used to make roller compacted concrete (RCC). The
contractor is now preparing this material so it can be used for the RCC. The BOC describes the details on
how best to prepare this material so it can be used efficiently.
Question 4
Question 4 refers to the exploration that is currently being completed to evaluate the foundation rock of
the spillway and slopes adjacent to the lower spillway chute. The evaluation of the information is not
yet complete.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #4 I RELEASED MAY 3,2017

Question 5
The Boe concurs with the preliminary design on the gated spillway chute that has thus far been
completed. The BOe notes that the proposed design of the spillway is the current state of the practice,
and therefore updates and corrects a number of the design details that were included in the 1960s
design.
Question 6
The BOe describes the details that were presented to them regarding the slope work that is being
completed adjacent to the lower spillway chute. This work is being completed to allow workers in the
lower chute area.
Boe MEMO SUMMARY #4 I RELEASED MAY 3,2017

DATE: April 10 - 11, 2017
Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways

SUBJECT: Memorandum NO.4
INTRODUCTION
On April 10 and 11, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at offices of
the California State Department of Water Resources (DWR) for a presentation of design
criteria, further development of design concepts by DWR and the status of Construction
Contracts No.1 and NO.2. The meeting ended on April 11 with a reading of the BOC's
report at 4:30 pm. An agenda for the meeting is attached. All BOC members were
present. The BOC met with representatives of DWR Engineering Division, DSOD,
FERC, and industry consultants that are working on the Oroville Spillway Recovery
project; the attendees at the meeting are shown on the attached Attendance List.
and this is included in the attachments.

Contract No.1?
Response

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways Ted
Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2 April 11,2017
The contractor for Construction Contract 1 has been working onsite for about 3
weeks. The work has focused on the left slope modification (left of the FCO
chute spillway) and testing for the RCC aggregate and mix design. The BOC's
comments on RCC are contained in our comments on Question 3.
maintain a safe distance from the steep slope, and as such, efforts to stabilize
the steep portions have yet to commence. The removal of soil and weathered
rock has been by excavators and no blasting has occurred to date.
A summary of the kinematic analysis of the slope stability was provided. _
additional discussion on this in Item 6 - Stabilization of Slopes.

Contract No. 27
Response
The Board has the following comments on Construction Contract NO.2
Alternative Approach for Construction of the Upper Spillway Chute Section
The Design Team presented a detailed review of construction documents that

included photographs taken during foundation preparation of FCO spillway chute
slab, the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) and DWR inspection reports during
construction, and the results of borings and core holes drilled through the
spillway chute slab during the current field investigations. On the basis of this
review, the design team concluded that the foundation conditions under the
upper spillway chute are different from and better than those encountered under

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No.2 April 11. 2017
the failed section downstrea
On the basis of this assessment, the project design team informally presented
the BOC with an option that is being considered as an interim repair measure for
the upper spillway chute. This modification of the sequence of construction would
keep the existing structure in place, and, with appropriate strengthening,
measures that could be completed in the first construction season, would allow
the interim design flows to pass over this upper section during the coming flood
season. The motivation for adopting such an approach is to replace the currently
proposed "remove-and-replace" option of the upper spillway chute (which has
been slated for the 2017 construction season) which is likely to present
challenges in being completed by the November 1st deadline. This alternative
option would allow completion of the reinforced concrete lower spillway chute
(founded on an RCC-backfilled foundation) and the scour hole repair to be
accomplished during the 2017 construction season.
The replacement of the upper chute with the new design for the chute slab and
training walls could proceed from the lower end as time allows in 2017 with the
completion of the entire new lining in 2018. A major benefit of this sequence of
construction would be the provision of a fully concrete-lined chute capable of
carrying the interim design flood discharge during the coming 2017/2018 flood
season.
The BOC considers this option a feasible alternative, provided repair measures
to the existing chute consider the following measures:

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report NO.2 April 11, 201 7
With these provisions made. the BOC would agree that the revised sequence of
construction is the preferable plan for restoration of the FCO spillway to full
functionality and recommends this construction plan be adopted.
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the RCC mix
and production planning?
Response
The results of the investigations for crushing the eroded rock recovered from the
river channel as aggregate for RCC have shown that the crushing methodology
used in the initial tests does not produce suitable material. However. useful
information was obtained by the tests. The tests have demonstrated that
washing of aggregate will probably be necessary. The results of crushing using
a cone crusher to produce the sand fraction show that this type of crushing
equipment is not suitable. The samples from these early tests have a high
percentage of flat particle shapes and elongated pieces. Another type jaw
crusher will be needed. The decision on the type of crushing equipment will be
left to the Contractor for Contract 2.
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure Infol1Tlation

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2 April 11 ,2017
The test program has produced a stockpile of 6-inch minus material that the
Contractor for Contract 2 can use to setup his own crushing methodology. This
work needs to be accomplished as soon as possible in order to start the RCC
test program. The BOC looks forward to seeing the results of this test program.
An RCC test mix is specified in the Contract 2 documents.
The Contractor will be required to demonstrate his means and methods for
placing RCC on a 25% slope. Although RCC dams have been constructed in
other countries using the sloping lifts placement, American contractors are
generally not familiar with this type of RCC construction.
The RCC test pad is expected to be done in June. The BOC would appreciate
the opportunity to witness the placement of the RCC test pad.
4. Does the BOe have any recommendations or comments on the

geologic/geotechnical exploration program?
Response
The BOC received a status update of the on-going field exploration program that
includes mapping, drilling, surface geophysics, and instrumentation. As of this
meeting 23 of 56 exploratory borings, 10 of 13 FCO concrete cores, and 6 of 16
seismic lines have been completed.
COntains Critical Energy Infrastructure Information

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report NO.2 April 11, 2017
The geologic characterization and coring undertaken in the upper chute to date,
were summarized. The five borings described were drilled in areas where shears
were located with the results that somewhat deeper weathering and poorer rock
quality were encountered.
impact on the necessary required removal volume and excavation depth in this
local area. The BOC recommends that the amount of additional excavation
required, and its effect on the schedule, be determined.
The exploratory borings that are being drilled to evaluate steep slopes on the left
side of the FCO spillway are in progress.
it should
be noted that this borehole is located along trend of some of the shears mapped
in the deep scour hole.
_ Also the effect of such features on slope stability should be evaluated.
Four cores of concrete and rock obtained from the floor of the FCO chute were
described.
Locations of the aforementioned concrete borings were guided by targeting

anomalous GPR (Ground Penetrating Radar) results and areas designated on
the foundation cleanup maps as not well cleaned (reference Construction
Geology Report C-38).

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Craddock
The completed six seismic geophysical lines are just now being processed so no
technical details were presented. Since the last meeting the line layout was
expanded to include coverage of the emergency spillway, and specifically lines
that parallel the weirs and the cutoff call. The BOC endorses these attempts to
determine rock weathering depths along these alignments. Due to the "noise"
interference that is created by the increasing use of onsite construction
machinery and the upcoming spillway flow at the end of the week, it appears that
the geophysical data obtained this week will be all that can be feasibly obtained
before Construction Contract 2 is in full force. The BOC awaits the results of this
program.
Inclinometers and piezometers (about 10 of each) installed in boreholes should

be remotely accessible on Dashboard by later this week. A plan to install a
piezometer underneath the FCO chute was described; however, since this only
results in one instrument at one location and requires considerable expense and
labor, the consensus was that the effort should not be pursued.
As this was a status report of ongoing field activities, the BOC awaits the
completed results.
5. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the spillway

design?
Response
The BOC has the following comments on spillway design:
Design Provisions for the Lower Chute

The spillway chute design is in general, well done. Some design details are the
same as those developed for the Folsom Auxiliary spillway, which operated for
the first time during the same storm that led to the failure of the Oroville service
spillway in February. It could be valuable to the design team to determine if any

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Craddock
lessons learned from the recent experience at the Folsom spillway in passing the
February flood.
The designs developed have corrected a number of problems that were inherent
in the original design.
Historical photos and construction reports indicate that there were locations
where the surface of the
Water methods should continue to be used as well.
The joint details, shown in DWRG 8-403, as used on the Folsom Auxiliary
spillway appear to be satisfactory.
Proper attention is given to c1eanout

provisions for cleaning all lengths of the drain piping. All bends in the c1eanout
piping should be specified as "long-radius" bends in order to provide for ease in
using the c1eanouts. No drain piping should be installed without c1eanout
provisions.

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report NO.2 April 11.2017
The BOC recommends that, in the lower chute, where the new slab will be
-
placed on RCC,
Design Provisions for the Existing Upper Chute
Since the lower chute is to be constructed first, the existing upper chute needs to
be updated to provide confidence that it will provide satisfactory operation during
the next rainy season. Part of the rehab considerations should be complete
surface restoration of all surface defects. That will include patching of all holes
and other surface defects. Patching of these holes should include dressing the
holes to remove all loose material, painting the interior of the hole with epoxy to
provide adequate bond, and then filling the hole with concrete. Proper dressing
or grinding is then required to produce a smooth surface.
Addressing cracks is particularly important. All cracks should be chipped out and
then filled with an epoxy grout. The finished patching should then be dressed to
provide a smooth watertight surface.
RCC Design Details

The reinforced concrete chute slab and training walls that will be placed on RCC
surface at the lower spillway portion have somewhat different details than the
slab and training walls placed on a rock foundation. It is intended that joints will
be built in the RCC by the usual methods employed for dam construction. The
RCC joints will be spaced to match the spacing of joints in the slab. _

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 2 April 11, 2017
The BOC recommends that the RCC shoulders that were to be constructed to
the height of the training walls for support of the reinforced concrete wall be
omitted since it is now intended that the reinforced chute lining of the lower
spillway section will be completed during the 2017 construction season.
Therefore, the same training wall design, used where the chute lining is on rock
foundation, can be used throughout the length of the lower chute. The RCC
section can thereby be made somewhat smaller and there will be no transition
sections needed for the wall design.
The RCC placement has assumed uniform side slopes at 1.0 H to 1.0 V with the
slope being smoothed and compacted by tamping equipment during placement.
The BOC agrees this is an acceptable solution and eliminates forming. On the
right side of the upper erosion hole, suitable foundation rock has not been
uncovered for properly founding the RCC toe. It appears that considerable
excavation of overburden and highly weathered rock will be needed to expose
suitable foundation. To avoid this excavation, the contractor may elect to form
this side of the RCC vertically or on a steeper stepped slope. Precast concrete
blocks have also been used as forms to construct steep slopes on some RCC
construction.
A section of the RCC buttress designed for the Emergency Spillway weir blocks
was shown during the presentation but the details were not discussed at this
BOC meeting. The BOC endorses the use of a buttress to stabilize the weir
blocks instead of anchors and believes the stepped downstream face of the RCC
buttress will provide some energy dissipation to the overflowing discharge.
Design Team?

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Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report NO.2 April 11. 2017
Stabilization of Slopes
The design team presented results of field investigations to help characterize
rock quality and strength in the vicinity of erosion holes next to the failed slab to
aid in the design of slope stabilization measures to provide for safe access for
placing mass and RCC in the erosion holes that will form the foundation for the
lower spillway chute.
Both surface mapping and the results of core drilling provided rock weathering
profile, discontinuities, and joint spacing that would help in performing kinematic
and stability analyses of proposed slope inclinations.
Two design slope profiles (Slopes 1 and 2) were presented in the vicinity of the
large, deep erosion hole to the left of the failed portion of spillway chute. Slope 1
was in the immediate vicinity and to the left (east) of the upper end of the break
in the slab. Slope 2 was to the left (east) and downstream of the upper end of the
spillway break. Slope 2 was above the deepest point of the scour hole. At this
location, the height of the erosion scarp is about 140 feet. Proposed design
inclinations for these two slope stabilization sections were 2H:1V and 1H:1V.
Both Wedge sliding and Flexural toppling analyses were performed for the two
slopes. Results of analyses for slope 1 indicate an inclination 2H:1V (1.7H:1V
between benches) would provide for a stable slope. Similar results were
presented for Slope 2.
Proposed approaches were presented for laying back these slopes to a safe
inclination that included the following:
1. Full slope layback
2. Fill-in the hole with Concrete
3. Provide a high concrete buttress against the slope
4. A combination of partial slope layback and partial fill-in with concrete.

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Craddock
Drilling and blasting was presented as an option for excavating and laying back
the slopes to the stable inclination and for avoiding the potential for debris falling
into the hole..
It is the BOC's understanding that these assessments are ongoing, and will be
improved as more field investigation data becomes available to refine properties
of the rock that feed into the stability analyses.
The BOC also indicates that the stabilization of these two slopes at this location,
as well as laying back the slopes on the right side of the spillway chute training
wall on the opposite side of Slope 1, (because of the highly weathered and
sheared nature of the rock formation at this location) may create challenges for
the schedule of completing filling of these erosional holes to allow for timely
completion of the lower chute section. Specifically, the BOC notes that the FCO
spillway will begin flowing on Friday of this week (April 14) and, except for a one-
week hiatus, will flow continuously until about June 1. During this time, access to
the scour hole and slope will be unavailable.
begin placing RCC in this area by the planned date of July 1. While this task
appears to be doable, completing it in the time allowed appears to be
challenging. The BOC encourages the development of other options to continue
work to proceed while the FCO spillway flows occur.

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Craddock
The BOC recommends that efforts to investigate and stabilize the steep slope left of the
big scour hole proceed so that stabilization efforts do not impact the start of RCC or
cement-stabilization at the bottom of the scour hole that is scheduled to begin on July 1.
The BOC suggests that consideration be given to allowing the Contractor the option of using
vertically formed RCC walls in the deep scour hole, on both or just one side. On the right
side its use could minimize the current extensive and deep excavation necessary to expose
slightly weathered rock. On the left side, its use could minimize the need for personnel to
work directly under the steep slope and could have an advantage on the construction
schedule."
The BOC endorses the sequence of construction now planned to finish the RCC and
new concrete lining of the lower spillway portion dUring the 2017 construction season,
and to construct the replacement chute on the upper section in 2018.
The RCC aggregate production and the RCC mix strength testing are now turned over to
the Contract 2 constructor. Results of this work are needed at an early date. The BOC
would appreciate the opportunity to witness the RCC test pad placement.
Demonstration of the Contractor's RCC placement means and methods will include
construction of an RCC Test Pad. The BOC would wish to observe construction of the
test placement.
The BOC recommends that RCC shoulders for chute training walls be eliminated and
the standard reinforced cantilevered training wall detail be used throughout the lower
chute.
The BOC endorses the use of an RCC buttress to strengthen the Emergency Spillway
weir blocks and looks forward to further discussion on the design of this RCC buttress.
The design details for the replacement chute and training walls have corrected problems
that were inherent in the original design. The current design has much smaller and
thicker concrete slab panels with increased reinforcement and anchorage, All joints
have waterstops and a better underdrainage system is employed. Training walls
designs are more robust and designed to meet seismic criteria. The BOC agrees that
the design details are satisfactory for the replacement design.
The existing upper chute condition needs to be further improved to provide assurance
that it will provide satisfactory operation during the next rainy season. Rehabilitation
measures should be taken to properly repair concrete spalls, seal cracks and joints and
add anchorage.

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Craddock
John J. Cassidy Eric B. KolIgaard Faiz Makdisi Kerry Cato

Tel (925) 933-5994 Tel (925) 798-9475 Tel (510) 529-8110 Tel (951) 834-2619
ncassidyhydro@comcast.net ebkollgaard@astound.net frnakdisi@sageengineers.com kerry@catogeoscience.com

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4
Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 5 April 25, 2017
Summary & Response
Question 1
Self-Explanatory
Question 2
Question 2 relates to the steep rock slopes that resulted adjacent to the main spillway chute and were a
result of the scour from flows through the damaged spillway chute. The BOC is describing and in
agreement of the approach to flatten the slopes.
Question 3
Question 3 relates to design details associated with the new design of the conventional and roller
compacted concrete spillway chute of the main spillway gated structure. Much of the discussion
revolves around construction methodology and sequencing. The BOC also has comments associated
with the design details of the new drainage system.
Question 4
Question 4 mainly relates to the earthquake parameters and resulting loading criteria which will be used
for designing the structures. The BOC agrees with the approach presented by DWR.
Question 5
Question 5 relates to the construction sequencing associated with the upper spillway chute. The BOC
also recommends criteria for strengthening the upper chute that not be repaired this construction
season.
Question 6
Questions 6 relates to the details associated with the emergency spillway. Specifically the BOC is
recommending the DWR pay special attention to ensure the new secant wall is embedded in good rock
that is not erodible.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #5 | RELEASED MAY 19, 2017

DATE: April 25, 2017

SUBJECT: Memorandum No.5
INTRODUCTION
On April 24 and 25, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at offices of
the California State Department of Water Resources (DWR) for a presentation of design
criteria, further development of design concepts by DWR, the status of Construction
Contracts No.1 and No.2, and concepts regarding sequencing of construction on the
Upper Chute replacement. The meeting ended on April 25 with a reading of the BOC's
draft report at 3:20 pm. An agenda for the meeting is attached. All active BOC members
were present; we note that BOC member Jack Cassidy resigned this week due to health
issues. The BOC met with representatives of DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC,
and industry consultants that are working on the Oroville Spillway Recovery project; the
attendees at the meeting are shown on the attached Attendance List.
and this is included in the attachments. The BOC will provide comments on the status of
the project Design Team responses to its recommendations, and closure, where
appropriate, in a future submittal.

Contract No.2?
Response
The BOC is pleased to learn that Contract 2 has been awarded and that the
Contractor is ready to quickly start. The fact that the Contractor has just come off

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No" 5 April 25, 2017
a similar spillway construction job is a favorable factor, and that his lead staff
recognize the importance of the design details and specifications in the
restoration of this vital facility. The suggested modifications that the Contractor
has proposed during post-bid meetings with the Design Team are generally
considered improvements that can speed up construction and, for the most part,
appear acceptable. Specific discussion of design details for the spillway
construction under Contract 2 are found in the response to Question 3.

Contract No.1?
Response
The BOC received an update regarding Contractor activities on Construction
Contract 1. The plan for stabilizing the steep slopes above the scour hole
(Stations 29+00 to 33+00) has been formalized into a combination of partial
slope layback and partial fill-in with concrete. Drilling and blasting have been
added to Contract 1 to expedite the slope stabilization activities. The drilling and
blasting plan for excavating and laying back the upper slopes to a stable
inclination was described as a two-phase sequence. In this approach, the
Contractor will first proceed to excavate the inboard Zone 1 using vertical blast
holes drilled to a pre-determined grade. The BOC observed videos of a test blast
of an initial portion of Zone 1, which showed that minimal blast material debris fell
off the slope and into the scour hole. Once Zone 1 is removed, then angled
borings will be used for the blasting of Zone 2 along the top of the slope. The
BOC endorses this excavation concept.
As the Contractor for Construction Contract 2 has just been selected and the
lower scour hole slope will be stabilized in Contract 2, no details were presented
on the cleanup and backfill of the large scour hole and stabilization of the base of
the steep slopes.
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on Spillway

Design Details?
Response
The BOC believes the Design Team's decision to delete the Type 4 training wall
design, which was to be used within the RCC "bathtub' or "shoulders" of the RCC
Lower Chute section, is a very beneficial modification. The deletion of this wall
type will make for more uniformity in the wall design and facilitate"the
Contractor's operations. It also eliminates the bottleneck the Contractor will have
in his placing operation on these small upper portions of the RCC cross-section.

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This is particularly true on the right side where rock is the abutment contact.
Although the RCC infill section might be made smaller with the elimination of the
shoulders, the BOC recommends that the width of the RCC foundation remain as
wide as currently shown. The extra space will prove useful.
The Design Team has chosen to include the cross drain chute under-drainage in
the RCC foundation portion. The BOC does not consider drainage of this
interface necessary but has no objection to including the standard chute drain
detail throughout this chute section founded on RCC.
Including drains in the ReC section presents a problem with routing the collector
drain pipe, which will require a support system on the exposed outside wall on
the left side training wall. The BOC offers a suggested solution that could simplify
the entire Lower Chute under-drainage:
The cross drains can be

installed with a slight gradient toward the ditch exit, although it is doubtful this
would be needed for them to function.
The BOC recommends that this design revision be considered.
This drain modification is worth consideration as a measure for improvement of

the existing Upper Chute section during the interim period until its replacement.
The BOC understands that, with the existing training wall design,
backfill is needed for wall stability for the design load case of full PMF flow in the
chute.
The new training
walls for the restored chute are designed to be adequate without backfill.
The Contractor's preference for a straight back slope on the training walls makes
sense. The change in chute panel dimensions also should be acceptable as it
eliminates a longitudinal joint along the entire length. The BOC accepts the panel
size increase to 3D-foot by 37-foot-6-inches, as suggested by the Contractor.

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A new conceptual detail for the transverse contraction joints in the slab was
presented using a slanted joint with the upstream slab serving to lock the
downstream panel from uplifting. The BOC has no objection to this modification if
it is adopted
Other design changes, including greater thickness for

the slabs of the Upper Chute, and specifying larger bar sizes for slab
reinforcement and anchors, will provide greater conservatism of the design and
are examples of these defensive means.
It was mentioned during the meeting that the dentate blocks on the energy
dissipation structure will need repair but no design details were given. Concrete
in the damaged areas will be hydro-blasted to expose reinforcement, and new
concrete added to restore the original design lines. Enough concrete needs to be
removed to create a large enough volume of repair concrete that has adequate
reinforcement and dowels to properly adhere to the mass block.
The BOC has a number of concerns regarding details of the RCC chute
foundation reconstruction in the scour hole locations. The Contractor has stated
their intent to place RCC starting at the bottom of the erosion holes. The BOC is
of the opinion that it will be necessary to first build up a suitably level and wide
enough RCe working surface with conventional backfill concrete in order to
effectively compact the ReC with equipment. Certainly, the large blocks of rock
seen in the bottom of the upper erosion hole will need to be removed and the
bottom effectively cleaned up in order to place RCC at such depth. However,
some of this rock debris could be left in place and incorporated into a
conventional concrete backfill.
The drawings show that an application of cement grout is to be used at the

contact of Ree lifts with the foundation rock when the contact is at a shallow
angle. The BOC does not consider this necessary for the purpose of placing
RCC to rebuild the chute foundation.
The Contractor is required to demonstrate compaction of ReC on a 25% slope

with a heavy vibratory roller during the construction of the RCC test pad. The
BOC understands that the lifts of RCC are placed horizontal and the ends of the
lifts form the 25% slope on which the compactor needs to roll for final
compaction. This operation will require several lifts to be placed and then

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trimmed to the proper slope and compacted before the RCC is allowed to set.
The BOC foresees some difficulties with this operation particularly when the
depth of the RCC to be placed is only 3 or 4 lifts in height above the rock. The
Contractor should be allowed the option to use conventional concrete to achieve
the final slope ready for the structural concrete slab.
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on Technical

Memoranda?
Response
The BOC was informed that a number of Technical Memoranda in "Draft or Draft
Final" versions were placed in the BOC's folder for its review. A number of the
documents included Design Criteria Memos that are intended to guide the design
of the various features and components of the repair project. Other documents
provided the basis for design and supporting material for the design of the
various structures. The BOC was requested to provide its input on the drafts of
design criteria memoranda; other documents were provided for the BOC's review
and comment where appropriate.
Two design criteria memoranda were provided in draft versions: Structural

Design Criteria (SRT-ORO-ST-01), and Geologic/Geotechnical Design Criteria
(SRT-ORO-GE-01) Memos. The BOC had reviewed earlier drafts of the Design
Criteria Memos and provided its comments and recommendations in its reports
of earlier meetings.
In addition, three reports providing estimates of ground motions and acceleration

time histories were prepared to provide input to seismic analyses of the retrofit
designs. These included: Recommended Earthquake Ground Motion Estimates
for Design (SRT-ORO-ST-03) dated March 16,2017; Revised Earthquake
Ground Motion Estimates (SRT-ORO-ST-12), dated April 4, 2017; and
Acceleration Time Histories for Oroville Dam Flood Control Outlet Structure Non-
Linear Stability Analysis (SRT-ORO-ST-12) dated April 10, 2017.
The March 16, 2017 report provided an update of the ground motions (reported
in the 2012 STID), using the 2014 Next Generation Attenuation (NGA-West 2)
relationships. The updated ground motions indicate a reduction in the estimated
median peak ground accelerations at the site from 0.57g (in 2012) to 0.38g. It is
the BOC's understanding that the Design Team has opted to use the originally
estimated PGA value for the long-term seismic design of the repairs. The BOC
considers such an approach conservative. However, the report describing the

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selection of time histories for use in the non-linear dynamic analysis provides
three sets of three-component time histories that were spectrally matched to the
updated median response spectra with a PGA of 0.38g, This approach is
considered reasonable and appropriate, considering that the return period for the
median PGA is about 6,000 years (based on the results of the USGS
probabilistic seismic hazard analyses).
The BOC did not have time to review the documents provided for review during
this meeting; additional comments may be forthcoming.
5. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Upper

Chute Construction Sequencing?
Response
In technical memorandum "SRT-FCO-DOC-06 FCO Upper Chute Construction
Sequence and Phasing," the Design Team has documented the thinking behind
their recommendation for the sequence of construction of the replacement FCO
Upper Chute section and how it fits with the completion of the Lower Chute
restoration. Essentially this calls for completion of the RCC foundation restoration
and reinforced concrete chute with training walls for the full length of the Lower
Chute section by November 2017. Construction of the replacement Upper Chute
section would proceed from the downstream end as time allows during 2017 with
the goal of completion in 2018. The BOC concurs with the adoption of this
construction approach and urges that this sequence ofconstruction be agreed to
with the Contractor. It is understood that the existing Upper Chute and training
walls will require further investigation as to the character of the foundation rock
and measures to strengthen and repair the concrete chute slab to safely serve in
the interim until its replacement.
The current p~an is to use the remaining, undamaged portion of the of the Upper
Chute spillway for 1 or 2 seasons until it can be demolished and replaced. The
BOC recognizes that evaluation criteria for the remaining components are still
being evaluated and some general concepts were discussed.

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The scope of work required and the design details to be used for strengthening
the existing Upper Chute have not been fully delineated.
Design Team?
Response
The potential for erosion to occur on the northern-most Emergency Spillway
slope should be addressed in the design. The secant wall columns will each be
founded on slightly weathered rock with the final depth to be determined by
actual conditions encountered during installation. However, deep weathered
zones in bedrock, that have shown to be erodible, appear to cross the area
downstream of the Emergency Spillway. Any such weathered zones on the
unprotected rock slopes that will receive Emergency Spillway flow should be: 1)
located as part of the geoiogic exploration; and 2) their erodibility and effect on
secant wall stability should be addressed in the design.
BOC RECOMMENDAnONS SUMMARY
M5-1 The BOC concurs with the elimination of training wall Type 4 and
the supporting RCC shoulders in the downstream chute section. All
training wails will have the same general configuration.
M5-2
The BOC considers this drainage concept a simpler

design to construct, easier to inspect and maintain and fully
functional.

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Oroville Emergency Recove~y - Spillways Ted Craddock
M5-3
M5-4 The BOG concurs with the chute slab design changes which
include a greater slab thickness throughout the length of the chute,
heavier reinforcement and anchor bar sizes, and accepts the
somewhat larger panel dimensions.
M5-5 The use of cement mortar at the foundation rock RGG contact is
unnecessary where RGG is placed for the FCO chute support.
M5-6 The BOG has concerns that placing RGG and compacting on a
25% slope will be a difficult construction operation especially where
the thickness of RCG over rock foundation is small. It is
recommended that conventional concrete be allowed as a leveling
bed on the RGG surface where needed.
M5-7 The BOG suggests continued analysis of erosion potential, and

considers that assessment of conditions of the unprotected rock
slopes downstream of the Emergency Spillway cutoff walls is
warranted.
Eric B. KolIgaard Faiz Makdisi

h~
Kerry Cato

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Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 6 May 16, 2017
Summary & Response
Question 1
Question 1 relates to the most recent geologic exploration that was completed to ensure an adequate
understanding of the conditions associated with the geology in and around the spillways. There are a
variety of tools that DWR used in understanding the geologic conditions which are outlined in the BOC
memorandum. The BOC also describes the piezometer data that was recently collected. This
instrumentation was recently placed to get a better understanding of the pressures within the
foundation beneath the spillways.
Question 2
Self-Explanatory
Question 3
Question 3 relates to the review of the plans and specifications by the BOC. The BOC is recommending
that DWR consider various designs to collect water that will be adjacent to the FCO Spillway.
Question 4
DWR discussed the various design and construction deficiencies associated with the original spillway
design that were outlined by the Forensic Team. The purpose of this discussion was to ensure the new
design would not repeat any problems that could have been a factor of the failure of the chute or
erosion of the rock downstream of the emergency spillway. The BOC concludes that the new design will
alleviate the issues outlined by the Forensic Team.
Question 5
Question 5 relates to a Potential Failure Mode Analysis (PFMA). As part of any new design, FERC
requires a PFMA. The PFMA process lays out what if scenarios including every conceivable issue of the
physical conditions then ensures each issue has been mitigated. The primary purpose of this PFMA was
to evaluate all possible ways any feature of the spillways could fail that would result in some level of
consequences to the project and or the downstream reaches. A team of experts worked together to
understand all potential weaknesses that may exist so that actions or re-designs could take place to
reduce or eliminate that weakness. The BOC reviewed the PFMA for the Oroville Spillways and
concluded the study was comprehensive and will ensure the operations and construction will be safe
based on the study.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #6| RELEASED JUNE 7, 2017

Question 6
Question 6 relates to an independent study conducted by the US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to
ensure the reservoir could be operated safely during the summer months since the radial gates would
need to be closed to allow construction. The BOC concludes that the independent study by the Corps
supports DWRs conclusions which emphasizes that the operation of the reservoir through the summer
and fall as planned will result in a safe condition.
Question 7
Question 7 relates to the same subject of question 6 and is in regards to the supporting engineering
used by DWR to evaluate the operation of the gates during the summer months.
Questions 8 and 9
Self-Explanatory

-------- ----.-.-----_._--
DATE: MAY 16, 2017


INTRODUCTION
On May 15 and 16, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at offices of
the California State Department of Water Resources (DWR) for presentations on the
status of geologic explorations, various new or revised technical memoranda, details of
design' revisions to the drawings and specifications for Contract 2, and discussions on
various engineering documents related to the Oroville Spillway Recovery. The meeting
ended on May 16 with a reading of the BOC's draft report at 4:30 pm. An agenda for the
meeting is attached. All current BOC members were present; we are pleased to
welcome new BOC member John Egbert. The BOC met with representatives of DWR,
DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants that are working on the Oroville Spillway
Recovery project; the attendees at the meeting are shown on the attached attendance
record.
1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the geologic

explorations?
Response
The BOC received a status update of the on-going field exploration program that
includes mapping, drilling, surface geophysics, and instrumentation. As of this

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------ - - - - - -

Independent Board of Consultants Report No.6 May 16, 2017
meeting, 94 of -100 exploratory borings, and 33 of 39 concrete cores in the FCO

Upper Spillway Chute, have been completed. Seven piezometers (5 vibrating
wire and 2 open standpipe) have been installed. An optical or acoustic televiewer
was used to image all borings.
The characterization of results from the geophysical seismic lines is ongoing. It

should be mentioned that many lines have been extended or moved from their
initial planned locations, or their lengths extended to adapt the exploration to the
new geological information that has been obtained. Due to the seismic "noise"
the lines cannot be run while the FCO Spillway is flowing (which has been
flowing for most of the last two weeks) or when construction machinery or traffic
is nearby. An important design change that has come about, based partially on
seismic line results, but also on borehole exploration data, is that the secant
cutoff wall for the Emergency Spillway has been moved about 350 feet further
downstream and is now located about 600 feet downstream of the Spillway. This
change was in order to place the cutoff wall in an area where better quality rock
is closer to the surface. The BOC awaits a more complete geologic
characterization of the new cutoff wall alignment.
Several of the 8-inch-diameter concrete cores obtained in the upper FCO

Spillway Chute were shown to the BOC, as well as video imagery of conditions in
some of the shallow core holes; these borings showed that bond conditions were
better than expected at the concrete and foundation interface in the upper Chute
for much of the upper FCO Chute floor that will remain in place during the 2017-
2018 flow season. Areas with poor bonding, such as the far downstream end
(Stations greater than 23+00) or in the area where either more clay or highly
weathered rock existed will either be
removed or receive mitigation repairs. In almost every case, the Chute concrete
thickness was greater than 2.5 feet. Much of this information has been
summarized in a Technical Memorandum (TM SRT-FCO-GO-03, "titled,
"Spillway Chute - Phase 1 Exploration Drilling Observations") for the Phase 1
activities in April 2017 and another TM (TM SRT-FCO-GO-04) is in progress for

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Independent Board of Consultants Report NO.6 May 16, 2017
subsequent and current activities. The BOC recommends that all available
borehole records (in whatever state they currently exist) be posted so they can
be reviewed by the BOC.
The BOC was given an update on data obtained by piezometers (vibrating wire)
that were installed in borings outside of the FCO Spillway. Of the eight
piezometers installed, two showed some response during the short time that
FCO Spillway flow occurred (from April 14 to May 1,2017). One piezometer (B-
39) showed erratic response and its data is being re-evaluated. It may be useful
to assess the hydrologic conditions that have contributed to, or restricted flows to
the piezometers.
The BOC was given an update on data obtained from piezometers that were
installed beneath the existing upper FCO Spillway Chute. Piezometers were
installed at 4 locations, and at two of these borings, two vibrating-wire
piezometers were installed, one located near the top of the amphibolite, near the
concrete interface, and the other piezometer is located deeper within the rock
with both instruments hydraulically separated by concrete backfill (thus, 6
piezometers at 4 boring locations). The data from these instruments will be
obtained remotely once the FCO Spillway flow is stopped. The BOC awaits the
results of what water pressures exist at these depths after Spillway flows have
occurred.
2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the technical

memoranda?
Response
Members of the BOC have reviewed and provided comments on a number of
draft technical Memoranda in its previous reports. The seismic design criteria
were included in the following TMs:
Geologic/Geotechnical Design Criteria Memorandum (SRT-ORO-GE-01)

Structural Design Criteria (SRT-ORO-ST-01)
Recommended Earthquake Ground Motions Estimates (SRT-ORO-ST-03)

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Revised Earthquake Ground Motion Estimates (SRT-ORO-ST-12)

Acceleration Time Histories for Oroville FCO Structure Non-Linear Stability
Analysis (SRT-ORO-ST-13)
The above TMs have now been issued as final documents. The BOC provided
specific comments on these documents and concurred with adopted criteria.
However, there are minor differences in seismic design criteria between
documents that need to be reviewed and explained or reconciled. As an
example, the Structural Design Criteria TM indicates that "Interim Repairs"
should be designed based on 2,475-year return period ground motions based on
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analyses (PSHA). This criterion, as recommended
in the ground motion estimates in SRT-ORO-ST-03, would indicate a horizontal
peak ground acceleration (PGA) at bedrock of 0.26 g. The seismic design criteria
listed in the Geologic/Geotechnical Design Criteria Memorandum (SRT-ORO-
GE-01) indicate that the design of short-term "Interim" structures is based on an
Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) with a return period of 144 years, with a PGA
of 0.08 g. For the permanent "Non-Dam Safety-Related" structures the specified
ground motions are based on a 475-year return period with a PGA of 0.12 g. The
differences between the adopted design criteria need to be explained and/or
reconciled.
The BOC would like to review the revision to the structural criteria TM, SRT-
ORO-ST-01 Structural Design Criteria, before providing its final comments now
that all structural elements in the design are defined.
The BOC has reviewed the TM entitled SRT-FCO-CS-03 Flood Control Outlet
(FCO) Spillway Alternative Foundation Construction Methodology and concurs
that this is a suitable option for treatment of the lowest part of the erosion
channel by use of flowable concrete to encapsulate the large loose rock located
in the bottom. This was presented as an optional method, which the Contractor
can choose to use for startup of his RCC placement.

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The BOC considers that the TM's SRT-FCO-DOC-06 Revised FCO Upper Chute
Construction Sequence and Phasing and SRT-FCO-GE-03 Independent Expert
Peer Review FCO Left Slope Stabilization have been reviewed and discussed
during past meetings and has no further comment in their regard.
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the plans and
specifications?
Response
The BOC members have had a limited amount of time to fully review revised
specifications and drawings but an initial perusal of the plan set indicates that the
design has been fleshed out to suit the foundation conditions throughout the full
length of the Chute, and design details have been developed to satisfy all
loadings and requirements. The BOC is of the opinion that the drawings and
specifications are ready for final review.
A presentation was made of the design changes that have been incorporated in
the revised drawing set. The major issues that required revision of the design
and drawings included an increase in the height of the training walls to
accommodate a revised hydraulic profile of the maximum FCO Spillway
discharge and a revision of the location of the secant wall downstream cutoff to
better fit the existing geology. The BOC commends the Design Team's attention
to calling for rigorous remedial treatment of spalls and defects in the Chute
surface in the portion of the existing upper Chute which will remain in service
until 2018.
A prior recommendation in BOC Report 5, suggested that consideration be given

to modifying the Spillway under-drainage system to use an open ditch for
collection of water from the transverse Chute drains. Such a ditch would parallel
the training walls on either side and would also serve to pick up precipitation
falling on the rock slope of the excavation cut. The Design Team reported that
they questioned the practicality of providing a ditch of reasonable size that could
handle the rainfall runoff from an extreme event. Concern over the velocities in

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the ditch channel, which might occur in the steep area of the Chute, could require
energy dissipation. Therefore, the Design Team preferred to retain the collection
pipe system for both under-drainage and the precipitation runoff as shown on the
drawing set. The BOC agrees that the drainage system as currently designed will
function well and corrects the deficiencies of the existing Chute drainage system.
The BOC would, however, urge reconsideration of the open ditch drain system
because of the advantages that a simpler open ditch design offers. It will be
easier and quicker to construct. The outflow from individual cross-drains will
facilitate monitoring of flow and maintenance and cleaning of the drains. These
advantages, in the opinion of the BOC, outweigh the possible increased slope
excavation which may be needed to provide room for the ditch. Calculations
indicate a 4-foot-diameter half-round concrete precast channel section would
have the capacity required and maximum velocities at the steepest slope of the
ditch would be approximately 17 feet per second, well within the acceptable
range to not require any special treatment.
The BOC is pleased to see that the RCC "shoulders" have been eliminated in the
RCC Chute foundation section and the same general type of cantilevered training
wall layout will be used throughout the entire length of the Spillway Chute. The
revision also provides room for the open ditch drainage channels.
We were informed that the secant wall design was being modified to eliminate
every third secant pile but no details of the layout were presented. This
effectively creates independent wall elements that are 10 feet long and are
separated from the next element by a 1-ft gap to allow for drainage. The BOC
understands that a grade beam will tie the elements of the secant piles together
as a stable wall capable of withstanding head cutting erosion. The BOC looks
forward to reviewing the overall RCC blanket and wall design as well as the
geologic characterization of the new secant wall alignment.

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-_ .... ~~~~~- ~~~~~ ..._._. __.. - .. _-_.--_ .. ------------ ..._ - - ~ ~ - - _ . _ . -

4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Forensic

Team briefing?
Response
The Forensic Team has cited a list of 24 design and construction deficiencies
they identify as possible factors in the failure of the FCO Spillway Chute. The root
cause of the initiation of the destructive damage has not been specifically
identified at this time, but most certainly lies with one or more of these factors in
combination. In the preparation of the redesigned Chute for the restoration of the
FCO Spillway, the DWR Design Team has been cognizant of providing remedial
measures and safeguards against all cited factors in their development of the
replacement design. The BOC is confident that the design of the Spillway Chute
that has been issued for construction meets the current standards of practice and
provides a conservative solution to address all original design deficiencies.
Four concerns with the Emergency Spillway were also cited by the Forensic
Team as Safety of Dams deficiencies. The DWR Design team has designed
remedial measures to address each of these concerns and the BOC believes if
these improvements are made on the Emergency Spillway, it can safely meet the
criteria under the Interim Operational Period.

Supplemental PFMA briefing?
Response
The BOC was presented with a summary briefing of the results of a Potential
Failure Modes Analyses (PFMA) workshop that was completed on May 2-4,
2017. The workshop was attended by members of the Design Team, FERC,
DSOD, DWR's Dam Safety and Operations staff, and a representative from
Contractor, Kiewit. The workshop was facilitated by a designated Facilitator, and
followed the format specified in FERC's guidelines. The workshop participants
attempted to identify potential failure modes (PFMs) that could result in
uncontrolled release of the reservoir water. Twenty-two PFMs were identified in
the process, and were categorized as defined in FERC's PFMA guidelines.

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The BOC understands that this PFMA workshop was performed in accordance
with FERC's Chapter 14 guidelines that require a "Supplementary" PFMA
workshop be conducted a~er failure of a structure or prior to major modification
or remedial work on a structure. The BOC believes that this PFMA approach
provides a valuable tool to address credible potential failure scenarios that need
to be explored and mitigated during the design process.
In addition to the formally developed PFMs, important "Other Findings" from the
workshop indicated the need for a long-term solution; the potential significant
impact of construction delays; the reliability of the Hyatt Power House for
reservoir releases; and a proper documentation of DWR's decision-making
process for reservoir operations. The BOC concurs with these findings.
The BOC understands that a draft report summarizing the results of the
workshop is currently being prepared by the Project Team.
6. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the USACE

SQRA?
Response
A presentation by US Army Corps of Engineers personnel on their Semi
Quantitative Risk Assessment evaluated the following risks associated with: 1)
closing the FCO flows prior to June 1, 2017; 2) the reservoir pool elevation on

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November 1 resulting from a closing of FCO on June 1, 2017; 3) operating the

FCO, in its current condition (up to 100k cfs); and 4) operating the Emergency
Spillway in its current condition (up to 11 Ok cfs). The study indicates there is a
low risk of the reservoir exceeding elevation 865-ft (FCO gate elevation) or 901-ft
(Emergency Spillway crest), prior to June 1. The study analyzed several PFMs:
potential failure of the existing FCO Chute slab (within 1,000 feet of the gated
structure) and breach of the gated structure; potential failure of the Emergency
Spillway monolith 19 by headward erosion through the current protection (placed
during the last 2 months), as well as headward erosion into monolith 3. The study
concluded that closing the FCO anytime in May presents low risk. Failure of
either Emergency Spillway monoliths was deemed very unlikely. The BOC feels
this study was comprehensive and effectively integrated geologic, hydrologic,
operations, and risk. Further, this study emphasizes that the planned project
approach to operations and construction will be performed in a safe manner.
7. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Reservoir

Pool Elevation - Frequency Curves for Long-Term RA?
Response
The BOC followed with interest the presentations on the development of the data
and tools, which are being used for assessing the hydrologic risk during the
current FCO shutdown and in the coming winter flood season. These tools
provide the means to quickly relate inflow, reservoir level and outflow by the FCO
and/or powerhouse and obtain predictions of both near and long term
projections. This capability is invaluable for use in reservoir operation and
operation of the FCO Spillway particularly during the construction and the interim
period of operation.

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8. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the contract

and construction status?
Response
The BOC requests a copy for each member of:
Bid Schedule
Summary of Work
The BOC appreciates the Contract and Construction Status review, and requests
that the review continue and that future status reports contain the following:
Submittal Register
RFI's
Memorandum Directives and Change Orders
Claims/Disputes
Serial Letters and Contractor Letters
The BOC is primarily interested in comments to the above, which may have an
impact to the schedule and/or which may result in a design change.
The BOC requests that presentation of the Three Week Roll Up Schedule and
the Plan View photo continue.
Design Team?
Response
The BOC has no additional recommendations or comments for the Design Team.
M6-1 The BOC recommends that geological exploration data (i.e.,

borehole, geophysical, mapping, groundwater level, slope stability,
photography, drone videography, etc.) be made electronically
available so they can be reviewed by the BOC in real time; that is,
in whatever state they currently exist. As discussed, during the
question and answer session after the BOC report presentation, on
this project we do not have the luxury to wait on preparation of a

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~ ~ _ _-----...c _

formal DWR report before exploration records are made available,

otherwise design will be completed and construction will have
begun prior to reports and data being available. The BOC
recommends that field records be made available as soon as
feasible after the data is collected.
M6-2 The BOC recommends that a more complete geologic

characterization of the new cutoff wall alignment be performed. All
that has been presented to date are two seismic geophysical
profiles.
M6-3 The BOC would like an assessment of groundwater hydrologic

conditions that contribute to, or restrict, flow to piezometers that are
located outside of the FCO Spillway Chute.
M6-4 The BOC would like a presentation on the water pressures

recorded in the piezometers under the Chute after Spillway flow
events. Six piezometers were installed underneath the upper Chute
FCO slab prior to commencement of flows at the beginning of May.
M6-5 The BOC recommends that differences in seismic design criteria

between as currently presented in the structural and geotechnical
TMs be explained and, or reconciled.
M6-6 The BOC has done a preliminary review of the revised Contract 2
drawing set and agrees with the revisions that were made to the
Spillway Chute design.
. M6-7 While the BOC agrees the Chute under-drainage system using
collector pipes as presently designed is fully functional and corrects
the inadequacies of the existing Chute drain system, it is suggested
that changing the collection means to an open ditch design offers
significant advantages.
M6-8 The BOC looks forward to reviewing the layout of the secant cut-off
wall for the Emergency Spillway.

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----- - - - - - _ .__ ._._---

M6-9 The BOC concurs that the DWR's design for the restored FCO
Spillway has adequately addressed all the deficiencies identified by
the Forensic Team in their evaluation of the existing Chute failure.
M6-10 The BOC notes that the battery of hydrologic data and curves that
have been developed provide an excellent means for projections of
inflow to the reservoir and planned operation of FCO and
powerhouse releases.
Based on a conference call after the meeting between the DWR Liaison member and
the BOC, it was decided that DWR will provide the BOC with more detailed information
prior to future BOC meetings that will be covered in the meetings. This will allow BOC
members to begin their review before the actual day of the meeting. The BOC believes
this will allow a more thorough review and better-written BOC Report.
~8~
!!7 fb
Eric B. KolIgaard Faiz Makdisi Kerry Cato

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Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 7 May 31, 2017
Summary & Response

Question 1
Question 1 relates to the hydraulic design of the spillway. Essentially how the water will flow through
the spillway at the maximum design flow from a maximum probable flood inflow. The design inflow
corresponding to the maximum probable flood is nearly 4 times the historical inflow into the reservoir.
Although the spillway has not experienced any evidence of cavitation, the BOC discusses the need for
further study regarding aeration in the spillway which helps prevent cavitation.
The BOC also suggests further study regarding the hydraulic design of the emergency spillway and
requests DWR to consider a model study to understand the flow conditions at this spillway.
Question 2
Question 2 relates to ongoing studies to estimate the PMF. The PMF is the design maximum inflow of
water into the reservoir during this very rare event. The PMF is the basis for the design of the spillways
to prevent the dam from overtopping. The BOC recommends ensuring the most up to date information
be used in designing the spillways.
Question 3
Self explanatory.
Question 4
The BOC has reviewed the plans and specifications and notes the new design will correct deficiencies
from the original design of the FCO. The first comment from the BOC notes that designing a vertical
offset between the concrete slabs is redundant and not necessary. The second comment is in regards
to the placement temperature of the concrete. In some cases, the concrete needs to be cooled during
mixing so that excessive heat during placement of the concrete does not occur. The BOC is
recommending the contractor provide a plan to ensure this does not occur.
Question 5
Question 5 relates to required foundation conditions beneath the proposed spillways and notes more
specific definitions are needed for the foundation beneath the emergency spillway.
The BOC notes that it is the control structure that is the sole feature that must be protected for the
emergency spillway.
The BOC recognizes the extensive exploration that was conducted in the upper chute of the FCO.

DATE: MAY 31, 2017


INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at offices of the
California State Department of Water Resources (DWR) between 9:00 am and 2:00 pm
for presentations on the Spillway hydraulics, the PMP re-study, DSOD review of the
hydrology and hydraulics, geology, and the structural design, and DSOD and FERC
design review comments. Representatives attended from DWR Engineering Division,
DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the Oroville Spillway recovery
project; the attendees at the meeting are shown on the attached attendance lists.
Following the presentations, the BOC met with members of the Design Team by
discipline to review the individual design drawings, details and specifications. The
meeting ended at 6:30 p.m. An agenda for the meeting is attached.
The BOC reconvened on May 31 at 8:30 am and continued to meet with members of
the Design Team by discipline to review the design drawings, details and specifications.
The meeting ended at 5:00 pm after a reading of the BOCs draft report.
The BOC reviewed the status of past comments and recommendations in the log that is
included in the attachments.
The BOC was pleased to welcome new BOC member Paul Schweiger who replaced
BOC member Jack Cassidy who resigned due to health issues. All BOC members were
present on both days.

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Oroville Emergency Recovery Spillways Ted
Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 5 May 31, 2017
1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Spillway

hydraulics?
Response
The BOC received a thorough briefing on the preliminary hydraulic analyses
performed for the FCO Spillway and the Emergency Spillway. The FCO Spillway
hydraulics are being evaluated for flows up to the peak Probable Maximum Flood
(PMF) design flow of 296,000 cfs using a spreadsheet (simplified one-
dimensional model), a CFD model (Computational Fluid Dynamic, FLOW 3D),
and a 1:50 scale physical model prepared at the hydraulics laboratory at Utah
State University. The Design Team evaluated different Spillway rehabilitation
configurations, including modifying the recently scoured area into a plunge pool.
Based on the physical model simulations of various plunge pool configurations,
and an evaluation of the original Spillway design, the Design Team decided to
rehabilitate the Spillway with the same configuration as the original Spillway. The
BOC agrees with this decision.
For the Peak PMF design flow of 296,000 cfs, the steady state spreadsheet
calculations show the flow in the Spillway accelerating throughout the length of
the Spillway from 63.4 fps (43.2 mph) from the FCO structure at Station 12+50 to
167 fps (114 mph) at the energy dissipater at Station 43+00. The PMF reservoir
water surface elevation for the analysis was assumed to be 917.5 feet. The
spreadsheet computations with air entrainment show the required top of Spillway
training wall elevations to be approximately 2 feet higher than the existing wall
heights. The BOC agrees with raising the Spillway walls as proposed in design
memorandum SRT-FCO-HR-04. The height of the raised wall profiles should be
confirmed with the physical model study. The BOC also recommends that the
physical model be used to evaluate unbalanced releases from the Spillway
gates.
Photographs and videos of the Spillway flowing during past events, including the
historical peak flood in 1997 when the Spillway flowed at approximately
161,000 cfs for 6 hours were presented. The video of the 1997 event confirms
the successful performance of the Spillway geometry, except for a flow surge
near the upstream end of the Spillway that nearly overtops the Spillway training
wall. The BOC commends the Design Team for procuring photographic and
video documentation of past FCO Spillway discharges, and for carefully

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examining this important information to assess the hydraulic performance of the

Spillway. The BOC encourages the Design Team to try to determine the water
surface profiles from the photographed events (the peak of the 1997 event, in
particular), and use this information to confirm their numerical and physical
models.
It was noted that the capacity of the gated FCO control structure at the design
reservoir elevation of 917.0 feet appears to be limited to passing 277,000 cfs
when fully open instead of the assumed design flow of 296,000 cfs. Although this
does not appear to be a critical factor during passage of the PMF, and is not a
critical path design feature, the BOC recommends that an accurate determination
of the actual discharge from the FCO control structure at the design elevation of
917.0 be determined.
Similarly, during the design pool at elevation 917.0 with both the FCO Spillway
and the Emergency Spillway flowing at maximum capacity, the total discharge
capacity of both Spillways is assumed to be approximately 624,000 cfs. An
unknown is the combined approach flow conditions to both Spillways and the
influence of these conditions on the overall stage-discharge capacity for the
Spillways and the performance of the Spillways. The BOC recommends that a
2D hydraulic model or CFD model of the Spillway approach conditions be
developed to evaluate approach hydraulics and confirm the performance of the
Spillways during events up to the PMF.
Cavitation damage within the Spillway Chute upstream of the terminal structure
prior to the slab failure has not been observed. Although cavitation was probably
not the root cause of the slab failure, it may have contributed to the slab failure.
Calculations presented by the Design Team show that cavitation damage has the
potential to occur within the lower portion of the Spillway Chute during the peak
design flow if the flow is not sufficiently aerated. The need to provide additional
features within the Spillway to aerate the flow at selected locations within the
Spillway, such as installing one or more air troughs, ramps, steps or a
combination of these near the beginning of the steep portion of the Chute and
further downstream should continue to be evaluated. Aerating the flow on the
steep FCO Spillway slope appears to be the most effective way of reducing or
eliminating potential cavitation damage. Given the accelerated design and
construction schedule, the BOC acknowledges that there may not be sufficient
time to design and test new aeration features for the Spillway for extreme flood
events. The BOC encourages the Design Team to try and resolve this issue as

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part of the current Spillway design. If this is not possible, the BOC recommends
that the Design Team consider including features within the new Spillway design
to accommodate, as much as possible, future modifications to the Spillway to
provide flow aeration, where it may be needed, unless additional analyses
determine that it is not required.
Regarding the hydraulics of the Emergency Spillway, the BOC recommends that
a physical model study of the ogee spillway with the proposed RCC buttress
section be performed. The physical model study could consist of a cross section
analysis of the maximum section of the Spillway. The purpose of the physical
model study would be to evaluate the flow pattern over the top and downstream
face of the stepped RCC buttress section incrementally for the full range of
potential flows. There is a concern that the overtopping flow could jump the steps
rather than dissipate the flow energy on the stepped downstream face of the
structure. See photograph below from a physical model study of an initial
downstream stepped face Spillway which showed this phenomenon.
2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the PMF

analysis?
Response
As noted by DWR H&H consultant, estimates of the Probable Maximum Flood
(PMF) are periodically updated for reservoirs throughout the United States due to

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enhanced understanding of atmospheric conditions that lead to the probable

maximum precipitation (PMP), improved hydrometeorological monitoring,
improved watershed rainfall-runoff-routing model capabilities, and changed
atmospheric, hydrologic, hydraulic, or operational conditions. The PMF analyses
for Oroville Dam have been reviewed and revised several times since the dam
was designed in 1965 (in 1968, 1980, 1983, 2003 and 2012). During the period
from 1965 to 2003, the peak PMF inflow/outflow varied from a low of
718,000 cfs/624,000 cfs (original design) to a high of 1,167,000 cfs/798,000 cfs
(1983 assuming Butt Valley Dam breached due to overtopping during the PMF).
The current PMF has a peak inflow of 725,000 cfs with a peak outflow of
671,000 cfs. The current PMF estimate does not include the failure of Butt Valley
Dam. All of the PMF analyses assume the initial pool of Oroville dam is full at
El. 900.0 feet. None of the previous PMF evaluations resulted in overtopping of
Oroville Dam. The total Spillway capacity of Oroville Dam with zero freeboard is
estimated to be 828,000 cfs with 308,000 cfs passing through the FCO Spillway
and 520,000 cfs passing over the Emergency Spillway.
The comprehensive review of the 2003 PMF in 2012 identified several issues
that warranted additional investigation. DWR subsequently authorized their
consultant to re-estimate the PMF in 2016, just before the Spillway incident
arose. To support design of the restored Spillways, work on the PMF estimation
has been accelerated, with a tentative completion date of July 4, 2017. The BOC
is in agreement with the PMF update approach proposed as outlined in SRT-
ORO-HY-03 and presented at the May 30 BOC meeting. The BOC recommends
that the confirmed stage-discharge relationships for the FCO Spillway and
Emergency Spillway that takes into account restrictions of the Spillway gates and
the Spillway approach conditions be used in the PMF analysis.
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the technical

memoranda?
Response
The BOC reviewed and provided comments on a number of draft technical
memoranda in its previous reports. The BOC has the following additional
recommendations and comments on the technical memoranda. The BOC will
continue to provide more detailed comments in future documents.
The BOC recommends that a structural design basis technical memorandum be

prepared summarizing the methodology, material characterizations, loading

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assumptions and other relevant criteria together with the results of the analyses
as part of the final design report. This would include the design calculations of
DM SRT-ORO-ST-11, Calculations of Structural Design.
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the plans and
specifications?
Response
Prior to the meeting, the BOC members reviewed the Plans and Specifications
last updated on May 18, 2017. Comments were provided to technical leads of the
Design Team, by discipline, reviewing individual drawings and specifications in
detail. The comments will be addressed by the Design Team. The BOC is of the
opinion that the current design of the FCO Spillway Chute for the Oroville
Spillway Recovery Project will function well and corrects the deficiencies in the
original design of the existing Chute. The BOC concurs that the plans and
specifications will be ready for approval and issuance for construction once the
comments have been satisfactorily addressed.
In addition to the review comments provided during the aforementioned working

session with the designers, the BOC offers the following suggestions in the spirit
of improving the overall design:
1. Consider shortening the height of the vertical offset at the transverse slab
joints as part of the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis. It is the
opinion of the BOC that the proposed transverse slab joint detail which
includes continuous steel reinforcement, a keyway, dowels and anchorage of
the slabs to bedrock and RCC provides sufficient restraint to limit differential
vertical movement of the slabs.
2. It is recommended that the concrete specification require the Contractor to

develop and submit a Thermal Control Plan for the Spillway slabs and walls
prior to their construction. A thermal control plan is the temperature
monitoring procedure that the contractor intends to follow when placing
concrete in hot weather, cold weather, or for mass placements, including
cooling methods, curing methods, use of thermal blankets, etc., and how they
are going to monitor concrete temperatures to prove compliance with the
specifications. As part of the plan, the contractor must determine the
maximum allowable concrete temperature and temperature differential that
will prevent concrete cracking during the heat dissipation period. In addition,

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the contractor must identify the type of equipment, location, and frequency of
concrete temperature measurements. Thermal Control Plans are often
specific to a particular mix design.
5. Does the BOC have any other recommendations or comments?
Response
1. During the meeting, DSOD and FERC representatives made presentations on
the geology, structural engineering, hydraulic, and other design issues. The
BOC appreciated the presentations and the discussions that they prompted.
During the discussions, it was pointed out that the section of the RCC
buttress shown on Drawing S-701 shows excavation of a shear key below the
foundation level of the overflow weir block. The BOC agrees that a shear key
is not required and the foundation of the buttress should be founded on fresh
or slightly weathered rock.
For the Emergency Spillway repairs it was noted that the foundation
preparation criteria for the RCC apron foundation are poorly developed or do
not exist. Comparatively, the FCO Spillway Chute foundation is specified to
be placed on moderately weathered rock, except in areas of lower quality
rock where treatment will occur. As shown on the current version of the plans,
the Emergency Spillway RCC apron foundation will be excavated to a grade.
DSOD pointed out that substantial areas of the RCC apron may be placed on
apparent soil-like material or intensely weathered rock. The BOC recognizes
that DWR is still developing the Emergency Spillway repair design and
encourages the development of material criteria for the RCC apron foundation
that are similar to those developed for the FCO Chute foundation, but modify
those criteria to be appropriate for the Emergency Spillway.
It was also pointed out that the foundation at the left and right ends of the
Emergency Spillway overflow weir (the speed bump) appears to be founded
on intensely weathered rock and that this could present a problem regarding
water seepage under the structure during high reservoir conditions. Based on
the updated hydrology analysis presented at this meeting, the frequency and
duration of high reservoir conditions that produce Spillway flows are rare and
of relatively short duration. It is important to remember that the primary goal of
the Emergency Spillway structure is to pass these flows without breaching the
control section. The BOC believes that some event seepage under the

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Emergency overflow weir may occur, but will not threaten the integrity of the
structure. As part of the continued development of the Emergency Spillway
repair design, it may be prudent for the Design Team to verify that seepage
will not produce any issues or instability in the RCC apron.
The BOC believes that the FCO chute design is well-developed and should
not be significantly changed. Certainly it is prudent to consider ideas that
could minimize concrete cracks and improve the underdrain design.
2. The BOC understands that a total of 56 borings and concrete cores were
drilled into the concrete slab of the upper chute. This section will remain in
place during the 2017-2018 flood season. Information from the retrieved
cores provided documentation of the quality of the contact between the
concrete slab and the supporting foundation material. A number of these
cores indicated clean contact with hard, fresh rock; others showed highly
weathered rock or residual soil; and in some cases, a cavity beneath the slab.
The locations of some of these exploration points were selected to target
areas identified in earlier construction geology reports as representing highly
weathered and sheared rock, or areas of poor foundation cleaning and
treatment. The BOC recommends that this information be reviewed to
estimate the percentage of cores out of the total sample explored that
indicated good contact between the slab and underlining competent rock
foundation. This information could be included in one of the updated
Geologic/Geotechnical Technical Memorandums, and would provide
additional support to the conclusions of the Design Team regarding the more
favorable foundation conditions beneath the upper portion of the Spillway
Chute.
M7-1 The BOC recommends that the physical model of the FCO Spillway
be used to evaluate unbalanced releases from the Spillway gates.
M7-2 The BOC recommends that the photographs and videos of the FCO
Spillway taken during past flow events be used to determine the
water surface profiles for known discharges, and that this
information be used to confirm the numerical and physical models
developed for the Spillway.

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M7-3 The BOC recommends that an accurate determination of the actual

discharge capacity from the FCO gated control structure at the
design elevation of 917.0 be determined.
M7-4 The BOC recommends that a 2D or CFD model of the Spillway

approach conditions be developed to evaluate approach hydraulics
and confirm the performance of the Spillways during events up to
the PMF.
M7-5 The BOC encourages the Design Team to continue to investigate

the need for aeration of the flow within the FCO Spillway to prevent
the possibility of cavitation at any discharge. Since modifications of
the design to provide aeriation may not be possible during the
current construction season, provisions should be considered in the
Chute construction to allow for future modifications, if aeration is
determined to be needed.
M7-6 The BOC recommends that a physical model study of the proposed
buttressed section of the Emergency Spillway be performed.
M7-7 The BOC recommends that the confirmed stage-discharge

relationships for the FCO Spillway and Emergency Spillway that
take into account any restrictions of the Spillway gates and the
approach conditions, be used in the PMF re-analysis.
M7-8 The BOC recommends that a structural design basis technical

memorandum be prepared.
M7-9 The BOC concurs that the current design of the FCO Spillway
Chute provides for a safe and adequate facility for construction and
corrects the deficiencies in the original design of the existing Chute.
M7-10 The BOC recommends consideration of reducing the vertical

offset at the transverse slab joints.
M7-11 It is recommended that the concrete specification require the

Contractor to develop and submit a Thermal Control Plan for the
Spillway slabs and walls prior to their construction.

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M7-12 The BOC recognizes that the design of the RCC buttress shown on
Drawing S-701 Emergency Spillway RCC Buttress and Apron, is
preliminary and will be refined when foundation geology information
becomes available. The BOC agrees that a shear key is not
required and the foundation of the buttress should be founded on
fresh or slightly weathered rock.
M7-13 The BOC recognizes that the Design Team is still developing the
Emergency Spillway repair design as the geotechnical exploration
data becomes available and encourages the development of
material criteria for the RCC apron foundation appropriate for the
Emergency Spillway.
M7-14 The BOC recommends that the information from core drilling of the
existing Spillway Chute be reviewed to estimate the percentage of
cores out of the total sample explored that indicated good contact
between the slab and underlining competent rock foundation to
support the conclusions of the Design Team regarding the more
favorable foundation conditions beneath the upper portion of the
Spillway Chute.
Eric B. Kollgaard Faiz Makdisi Kerry Cato
John Egbert Paul Schweiger

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0
Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 8 June 23, 2017
Summary & Response
This 8th meeting of the Board of Consultants (BOC) occurred in the field at Oroville Dam. Part of the
meeting was to allow the BOC to inspect construction progress.
Question 1
Question 1 relates to construction progress of the cut-off wall within the ground downstream of the
emergency spillway. Construction is just beginning in this area at the time of the BOC inspection.
Question 2
Question 2 relates to whether aeration considerations should be part of the design for the main
spillway. Spillways are sometimes designed to introduce aeration into the flow to prevent cavitation of
the concrete. The BOC notes that historically there has been no signs of cavitation which matches the
design predictions. The BOC also note that changing the design to introduce aeration, may cause a
delay in the construction. Since there has been no signs of historical cavitation and based on the
calculations thus far, the BOC recommends that construction of the spillway chute should not be
delayed. Further consideration of aeration features could be studied and modifications to the spillway
could be done later if necessary.
Question 3
The BOC recommends that DWR review and confirm the contractors construction schedule.
Question 4
Question 4 relates to a test section for placement of the roller compacted concrete (RCC). The purpose
of the test section is to allow the contractor to demonstrate their method of placement and allow any
adjustments in construction or design that may be necessary in advance of full production of RCC
placement.
Question 5
Question 5 relates to 2 issues associated with general construction. The first issue relates to flowable
fill. This is concrete type material that has a very fluid consistency to allow the material to get within all
cavities and allow a flatter surface for construction of the RCC.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #8 | Released July 13, 2017

The second issue is related to a method of construction associated with future drains in the RCC.
Question 6
Question 6 relates to several issues.
The first issue relates to how DWR has investigated and documented the foundation conditions. The
BOC then discusses the cleaning of the foundation. Typical for dam construction, the rock surface needs
to be clean of loose material prior to placing concrete.
The second issue relates to recent investigations of the existing concrete chute. The BOC notes that
material was not placed as part of the original construction.
The third and fourth issue are self-explanatory.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #8 | Released July 13, 2017

DATE: June 23, 2017


INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at the DWR
Oroville Field Division Main Conference Room offices at 7:00 am for a safety briefing
and then visited the site for a demonstration of roller-compacted concrete (RCC)
placement at the RCC Test Section that lasted until about 10:30 am. Representatives
from DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the
Oroville Spillway recovery project also witnessed the RCC placement demonstration.
Following the RCC test section demonstration, the BOC was given a tour of the Flood
Control Outlet (FCO) spillway to observe construction progress. During the afternoon, a
meeting was held to provide an overview of the construction work by the construction
contractor (Kiewit). This was followed by a presentation on the onsite RCC aggregate
production, RCC mix design, and RCC placement approach. The BOC then visited the area
immediately downstream of the Emergency Spillway to observe the preparatory work for
the construction of the secant pile erosion cut-off wall. The BOC returned to the Oroville
Field Division Main Conference Room offices at 3:30 pm to discuss observations, and
departed for the day around 4:00 pm.
The BOC reconvened on June 22 at 9:00 am at the DWR Oroville Field Division Main
Conference Room offices for briefings on the geology and geotechnical exploration
investigations, the secant pile wall design, the FCO Spillway aeration study, the latest
revisions to the construction plans and specifications, the Technical Memoranda, and
an update on the forensic exploration of the FCO Spillway failure and the Emergency
Spillway erosion. BOC members Cato and Egbert stayed on site to observe the secant
pile guide wall installation, and placement of the final lift of RCC on the Test Section.
They departed at about 6:00 pm.

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Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 8 June 23, 2017
On Friday, June 23, the BOC continued their deliberations from 8:00 am until 11:00 am.
This was followed by a reading of the BOCs draft report with representatives from DWR
Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the Oroville
Spillway. The meeting was adjourned at noon.
BOC members present were Eric Kollgaard, John Egbert, Kerry Cato and Paul
Schweiger. Faiz Makdisi was out of the country and did not attend this meeting.
1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the secant pile
wall design?
Response
The BOC viewed construction progress of the north end of the secant pile
erosion cut-off wall where working platforms with guide walls for the secant
drilling are being prepared from about Sta. 12+50 to Sta. 18+00 (see Figure 1).
The Contractor has created level working platforms and about 300 to 400 feet of
scalloped concrete guide walls with another 500 feet of exposed trench where
guide walls have yet to be formed. The BOC was informed that about 200 feet of
the northern end of the cutoff wall has been removed and this leaves 1,500 feet
of total secant pile wall that will be constructed.
Figure 1. Photo of secant guide wall trench at approximate Station 13+00.

View to the south.

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As part of the Geology presentation, the BOC was shown a geologic cross
section that has the planned bottom of the wall depth superimposed. The
geology is based on seismic refraction data and 12 geotechnical exploration
borings. The wall is designed to have about 15 feet of embedment within slightly
weathered rock. The BOC observed exposed amphibolite rock in the southern
end of the trench that is intensely to slightly weathered (see Figure 2). At the
location of the aforementioned rock exposure, the planned depth of the cutoff
wall will be approximately 65 feet. The BOC believes this is good construction
progress and awaits the actual drilling progress information for the wall
construction, especially in areas where better quality rock is close to the natural
ground surface.
Figure 2. Photo of moderately weathered amphibolite rock exposed in a

portion of the secant guide wall trench near approximate Station
17+00.
A significant portion of the Contractors work platform appears to be constructed

on fill material previously placed at varying thicknesses above Natural Grade.
Moreover, the top of the Contractors scalloped concrete guide wall template
matches the elevation of the work platform.
While the BOC has not seen the Contractors submittal, the note on Drawing
S-601, Section D, requiring Approx. 3 0 to 5 0 soil to be removed prior to

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drilling Secant Pile and further requiring that soil removal to extend below
Natural Grade may be in conflict with the Contractors means and methods.
2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the FCO Spillway
aeration?
Response
Since the last BOC meeting on May 31, the Design Team completed additional
investigations regarding the potential for cavitation damage from flows in the
FCO Spillway and the need to provide additional features to aerate the flow to
prevent cavitation damage. The investigations were summarized in the following
draft technical memoranda:
1. Preliminary Estimates of Flow Depth and Uplift Forces along the Gated
Spillway Profile Draft SRT-FCO-HR-03,
2. Recommended Wall Heights and Drain Heights for the Gated Spillway Profile
Draft SRT-FCO-HR-04,
3. Cavitation and Aeration of FCO Spillway, Draft SRT-FCO-HR-05,
4. Aeration Ramp Design Criteria - Draft SRT-FCO-HR-06, and
5. Recommendations for FCO Spillway Chute Aeration Design Draft SRT-
FCO-HR-07.
The Design Team evaluated the past performance of the FCO Spillway, the
spillway design flow (probable maximum flood - PMF), the theoretical potential
for spillway cavitation, and the existing spillway aeration. Important findings from
the recent analyses include:
1. During the 50-year period since 1969, the FCO Spillway has flowed 25 times
(on average every other year) with peak flows exceeding 150,000 cfs, which
is more than 50 percent of the spillway design flow of 296,000 cfs. During this
period there have been no reports of cavitation damage to the spillway.
2. When the cavitation index () for a spillway is less than 0.2, and the flow is
not adequately aerated, the spillway has the potential to sustain cavitation
damage. The Cavitation Index () along the spillway profile computed by the
Design Team for the full spectrum of flows falls below the desired minimum
value of 0.2 beginning at Sta. 31+00, approximately 1,800 feet downstream of
the gated control structure, and continues to decrease over the remaining
1,200 feet of the spillway chute to a minimum value of 0.10 at the dentated
terminal structure.

DO NOT RELEASE 4
3. The Design Team computed the theoretical air content along the profile of the
spillway for a range of flows due to the upstream piers and from self-aeration.
The computations show the spillway flows are initially aerated immediately
downstream of the piers and gradually lose entrained air until a minimum
equilibrium air content is reached. The flows then begin to experience
increased entrained air from self-aeration when the boundary layer reaches
the free surface. The point of increasing entrained air from self-aeration is a
function of the spillway discharge and occurs further downstream for
increasing discharges. The minimum equilibrium aeration increases with flow,
and for the design discharge of 296,000 cfs, the minimum equilibrium aeration
was computed to be 5.7 percent.
4. Examination of photographs and videos of the FCO Spillway shows aeration

of the flow through the majority of the chute length for a wide variety of flows,
and appears to corroborate the air concentration conditions computed by the
Design Team.
5. A review of the computed cavitation index and entrained air along the FCO
Spillway profile for the full range of flows shows that the cavitation index is
either higher than the minimum desired value, or the mean air concentration
is higher than the minimum recommended value to prevent cavitation
damage. Therefore, the analyses indicate that there is no need to add
aerators within the spillway to prevent cavitation damage.
6. The design and construction of one or more aeration features within the FCO
Spillway could delay completion of the spillway chute during the 2017
construction season.
Based on the above, the BOC believes that the contribution of the downstream
free-surface aeration is an important factor that needs to be included in the
decision of whether or not supplemental aeration features are needed within the
FCO Spillway. The BOC recommends that the Design Team continue to research
the performance of similar spillways without aeration features (Itaipu Dam, Brazil,
which has experienced large flows for sustained periods). If possible, the
cavitation and aeration analysis of the FCO Spillway should be independently
confirmed with a physical model of the spillway. The model could be a sectional
model at an appropriate scale to simulate aeration.

DO NOT RELEASE 5
The Design Team assumed a Mannings n value for the chute to be 0.012 and
a roughness height (ks) for concrete to be 1 mm. This is smoother than the
current spillway chute concrete roughness. As the concrete surface of the new
spillway roughens over time, the effect of this change should be understood. The
BOC recommends that a sensitivity analysis be performed on the computed
cavitation index, the self-aeration air content, and the top of wall elevation along
the profile of the spillway, as they relate to the assumed roughness of the
concrete chute.
The BOC recommends that the construction of the spillway chute not be delayed
by the design of additional aeration features, especially since the recent analyses
indicate that aerators are not required. If a decision is made to add aerators in
the FCO Spillway, they should be thoroughly evaluated and tested to make sure
that they do not adversely impact the performance of the spillway.
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the FCO

construction sequence?
Response
Now that the design of key elements of the spillway has been completed, the
BOC recommends that the Design Team evaluate the Contractors progress and
ability to complete the new concrete lining of the FCO Spillway within the 2017
construction season. This should include a review of the Contractors proposed
construction schedule with an emphasis on identifying critical path work items
and an assessment of realistically achievable production rates.
The BOC will defer a definitive response regarding the FCO construction
sequence pending future presentation of DWRs evaluation and determinations
on this issue.
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the RCC design or
test section?
Response
The RCC test section was used to test and demonstrate critical aspects of
proposed RCC construction including the workability of the RCC mix, the
performance of the RCC plant, the adequacy of the proposed placement and
compaction equipment, various construction methods, and workmanship (see

DO NOT RELEASE 6
Figure 3). The BOC observed the RCC placement and found the RCC mix to be
workable with no segregation, easily compacted, and can be placed within the
temperature restrictions, despite high ambient temperatures exceeding 100
degrees Fahrenheit. The Contractors workers demonstrated the necessary
skills. The equipment used to spread and compact the RCC appeared to be new
and appropriate for the work. The BOC was pleased with the demonstration.
Figure 3. Photo of RCC placement of lift 8 and the vibratory finish of the
1H:1V slope.
BOC Comments:
1. Because of the accelerated construction schedule and need to remove

the RCC test section to provide access for construction equipment,
there will be no opportunity to obtain, examine and test core samples
to confirm bonding of RCC lifts with Hot Joints, the effectiveness of
the grout-enriched vibratable RCC (GEVR), and in-place RCC
properties. The BOC recommends that during removal of the RCC test
section, efforts be made to learn as much as possible regarding these
features. For example, the effectiveness of the Hot Joint treatment

DO NOT RELEASE 7
can be confirmed by the lifts of RCC remaining bonded and coming

apart in monolithic chunks during demolition as opposed to the RCC
coming apart in unbonded layered slabs. Similarly, the GEVR should
be examined during demolition to see how well the RCC mix has been
consolidated.
2. Prior to removing the RCC test section, the BOC recommends that the
exposed 4H:1V RCC slope receive Cold Joint cleaning treatment to
determine what the surface will look like prior to placing the new
concrete slabs (see Figure 4). Photographs of the 4H:1V surface
should be taken prior to and after it has been pressure washed in
accordance with the specifications for cold joint treatment.
Figure 4. Photo of the 4H:1V ramp on the RCC Test Section that is
planned to be formed by vibratory rollers.
3. At the time that BOC Meeting No. 8 ended, all eight horizontal RCC
lifts had been placed for the test pad and a trial lift is planned to be
placed and compacted on the 4H:1V slope to prove out the ability to
use the compaction rollers on this slope. The BOC believes that this
needs to be demonstrated, as it may be an important procedure in
construction of the chute foundation, and looks forward to a
presentation of the test results.

DO NOT RELEASE 8
5. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments for project

construction?
Response
1. Use of Flowable Fill in FCO Spillway Foundation. It appears that less
flowable fill will be placed in the lower portions of the FCO Spillway foundation
than originally anticipated, and that more RCC is planned to be placed
instead. The flowable fill that has been placed is in the bottom of the
downstream scour hole (see Figure 5). Placement of RCC in tight spaces and
around large boulders that project above the lift surface appears challenging.
The infilling of the upper scour hole has not been started since access to the
area will cross the lower RCC placement. The BOC is of the opinion that the
use of additional flowable concrete in these bottom areas of the infilling to
provide working surfaces for RCC placement would facilitate construction.
Figure 5. Flowable fill that has been placed in the scour hole near
approximate Station 32+00.
As the RCC infill is raised, there will also be narrow crevices that can only be
effectively filled by flowable fill or dental concrete. The BOC suggests that a
combination of RCC and flowable fill placed concurrently be considered in
tight spaces where compaction of RCC cannot be accomplished with
equipment.

DO NOT RELEASE 9
2. FCO Spillway Slab Underdrains within RCC Foundation. The BOC

recommends that the Design Team consider constructing the slab underdrain
trenches within the top of the RCC foundation by removing the RCC within
the trenches by milling or saw cutting rather than forming the blockout with
inserted metal strips and breaking out the RCC for the drains.
Response
1. Mapping of FCO foundation and inspection, assessment and
acceptance of cleaned foundation. The BOC commends the Design Team
for a methodical and extremely thorough mapping of the FCO Spillway
foundation and surrounding area. The use of high-resolution drone aerial
imagery in combination with GIS software is state-of-the-practice and
provides an excellent record of foundation conditions and completed work.
The gridded layout of the foundation and use of standardized worksheets will
help maintain records, coordinate completed work with the Contractor, and
provide a means to forecast future productivity and schedule requirements.
The cleaning of areas of the chute foundation for placement of RCC or

leveling concrete that were observed by the BOC (see Figures 6 & 7) appear
to have been well done and represent a significant improvement in contrast to
the prepared foundation surface for the original FCO Spillway construction.
2. Update on investigation of existing FCO spillway chute foundation

condition. The BOC was provided an update to findings on the investigation
of the interface between the concrete and rock material. Four concrete
cutouts were excavated and exposures described. Subsequently, and as part
of the concrete removal, the Contractor created a 200-foot-long centerline
exposure of the interface from Stations 25+00 to 27+00. Where present, the
soil material that did exist appeared to be semi-consolidated fines and
angular rock debris that was not removed as part of the initial (1960s era)
foundation surface cleanup. The interpretation of the investigators was that
the localized occurrence of the soil and its angular nature did not appear to be
fill that was purposefully placed as bearing material. A photo of this material is
shown as Figure 8.

DO NOT RELEASE 10
Figure 6. Cleaned FCO spillway chute rock that has been geologically mapped
and is close to being accepted for concrete placement. Near
approximate Station 33+00.
Figure 7. Close-up of cleaned rock surface near Station 33+00 in FCO spillway
chute foundation.

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Figure 8. Soil material left in place in the existing FCO chute spillway foundation
interface. Location is near Station 25+30. Tool at right is 1.5 inches
wide.
3. Contractors Construction Approach, Use of Site and Mobilized

Equipment. The BOC is favorably impressed with the Contractors general
approach, use of the job site and the mobilized equipment. Critical elements
including the conventional concrete plant, the RCC batch plant, the aggregate
production facility, the access roads, crane pads, staging areas and office
complex appear to be thoughtfully located, carefully laid out and well
organized. Almost all of the critical construction equipment appears to have
been mobilized and ready for major construction work to begin. Most of the
equipment is new, and appropriately selected and sized for the kind of work
that will be performed.
4. Updating Estimated Quantities in Bid Schedule. The BOC recommends

that the Estimated Quantity for the items listed below from the Bid Schedule
be updated and reviewed as appropriate to reflect current known conditions.
The original estimated quantities contained in the Bid Schedule appear to be
based on original plans which have subsequently been revised twice.

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Item Spec. Estimated

No. Section Item Unit Quantity
11 02217 Foundation Preparation SY
12 02217 Foundation Preparation Dental Excavation CY
13 02217 Foundation Preparation Dental Concrete CY
14 02220 Selective Demolition (Upper FCO Chute) CY
15 02200 Selective Demolition (Lower FCO Chute) CY
15a 02200 Selective Demolition (Emergency Spillway) CY
20 02300 Rock Excavation CY
51 03300 Structural Concrete CY
52 03300 Erosion Resistant Concrete CY
54 03300 Mass Concrete CY
55 03300 Leveling Concrete CY
59 03304 Emergency Spillway Secant Pile Cut-Off Wall SF
63 03800 Roller-Compacted Concrete (FCO Chute) CY
63a 03800 Roller-Compacted Concrete (Emergency Spillway) CY
M8-1 The BOC believes good construction progress is being made on

the secant pile erosion cut-off wall and looks forward to seeing
actual drilling progress information in the near future.
M8-2 The BOC believes the contribution of the downstream free-surface

aeration is an important factor that needs to be included in the
decision of whether or not supplemental aeration features are
needed within the FCO Spillway.
M8-3 The BOC recommends that the Design Team continue to research
the performance of similar spillways without aeration features
(Itaipu Dam, Brazil, which has experienced large flows for
sustained periods).
M8-4 If possible, the cavitation and aeration analysis of the FCO Spillway
should be independently confirmed with a physical model of the
spillway. The model could be a sectional model at an appropriate
scale to simulate aeration.

DO NOT RELEASE 13
M8-5 The BOC recommends that a sensitivity analysis be performed on

the computed cavitation index, the self-aeration air content, and the
top of wall elevation along the profile of the spillway, as they relate
to the assumed roughness of the concrete chute.
M8-6 The BOC recommends that the construction of the spillway chute
not be delayed by the design of additional aeration features,
especially since the recent analyses suggest that aerators are not
required. If a decision is made to add one or more aerators in the
FCO Spillway, they should be thoroughly evaluated and tested to
make sure that they function as desired and do not adversely
impact the performance of the spillway.
M8-7 Now that the design of key elements of the spillway has been
completed, the BOC recommends that the Design Team evaluate
the Contractors progress and ability to complete the new concrete
lining of the FCO Spillway within the 2017 construction season.
This should include a review of the Contractors proposed
construction schedule with an emphasis on identifying critical path
work items and an assessment of realistically achievable
production rates.
M8-8 The BOC recommends that during removal of the RCC test section,
efforts be made to learn as much as possible regarding the bonding
of the RCC lifts, the consolidation of the GEVR and other RCC
properties.
M8-9 Prior to removing the RCC test section, the BOC recommends that
the exposed 4H:1V RCC slope receive Cold Joint cleaning
treatment to determine what the surface will look like prior to
placing the new concrete slabs. Photographs of the 4H:1V surface
should be taken prior to and after it has been pressure washed in
accordance with the specifications for cold joint treatment.
M8-10 As of the time of the close of BOC Meeting No. 8, all eight
horizontal RCC lifts had been placed for the test pad and a trial lift
was planned to be placed and compacted on the 4H:1V slope to
prove out the ability to use the compaction rollers on this slope. The
BOC believes it is important that this be demonstrated and looks
forward to a presentation of the results.

DO NOT RELEASE 14
M8-11 The BOC is of the opinion that the use of additional flowable
concrete in the bottom areas of the FCO Spillway infilling to provide
working surfaces for RCC placement would facilitate construction.
The BOC suggests that a combination of RCC and flowable fill
placed concurrently be considered for filling narrow crevices and
small areas where RCC compaction is not possible.
M8-12 The BOC recommends that the Design Team consider constructing
the slab underdrain trenches within the top of the RCC foundation
by removing the RCC within the trenches by milling or saw cutting.
M8-13 The BOC commends the Design Team for a methodical and
extremely thorough mapping of the FCO Spillway foundation and
surrounding area. This also applies to the cleaning of the spillway
rock surface.
M8-14 The BOC is favorably impressed with the Contractors general

approach, use of the job site and the mobilized equipment.
M8-15 The BOC is pleased with the level of foundation cleaning being
done for foundation preparation of the RCC and leveling concrete in
the FCO chute reconstruction.
M8-16 The BOC recommends that the Estimated Quantity for the items
from the Bid Schedule that appear to be critical to meeting the
Contractor's schedule be updated and reviewed as appropriate to
reflect current known conditions.
(Not present)

DO NOT RELEASE 15
Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 9 July 19, 2017
Summary & Response
Question 1
Question 1 relates to design details associated with the lower part of the Flood Control Outlet (FCO)
chute. The lower part of the chute will be constructed with roller compacted concrete (RCC). During
the 2018 construction season, structural concrete (concrete and steel reinforcement) will be placed on
the RCC lower chute. Since the schedule will not allow the placement of structural concrete within the
entire lower chute, the final layers of the RCC (layers at the top of the RCC) that could potentially
experience flow will need to have higher strength.
A test section is used to allow the contractor to practice and refine construction techniques for the
placement of the RCC and is typical for RCC construction.
DWR proposed and the BOC concurred with the possibility of including a detail to allow aeration.
Aeration allows air within the flowing water and could be beneficial to the temporary RCC section to
help mitigate for the possibility of cavitation. RCC is typically not as resistance to cavitation as structural
concrete.
Schedule Implications
The BOC is interested in ensuring they are kept informed of the schedule and progress of construction.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #9| Released August 9, 2017

DATE: July 19, 2017

INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met via a conference
call at 10:00 AM PST that lasted until 11 :15 AM with the last 15 minutes of the call
focused on questions and answers. The one topic of this meeting was the FCO
construction sequence and schedule with emphasis on remediation options. After the
conference call, the BOC conducted closed deliberations on a call that lasted for
approximately 40 minutes. BOC findings were verbally presented to the group on
another conference call that was followed by some additional questions, answers, and
discussion. The meeting concluded at approximately 12:15 PM. Representatives from
DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the
Oroville Spillway recovery project, including Kiewit Construction, attended this meeting.
During the initial conference call presentation, several topics were presented to the
BOC from a 57-page PDF document that contained graphical displays, tabular
information and four individual technical memoranda. This document was provided to
the BOC in an e-mail attachment the day before the conference call. The content of the
document is listed in the table below.
Page Content Author

-- 1
Agenda
2-6 FCO Mitigation Options (Alternatives Risk Rating table Staff
and a plan view/cross section of each option)
7-10 Kiewit Construction Memorandum, June 30, 2017, "FCO Petersen
, Chute Construction Se uence"

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Oro'" .e
Erre(ge~cy Reco/ery - SPI lN3jS Ted Crad,~oc~
Inde3endent Board of Consulta~ts Repor~ 1"10 9 July 19 2017
DWR Technical Memorandum, May 1,2017, "Spillway

11-22 Nichols
Chute - Additional Ex loration and Drilling Details
DWR Technical Memorandum, May 10, 2017, "Spillway
23-49 Nichols
Chute Phase 1 Drilling Observatio,:..:ns","---cc=-c-= -=~_
+-------
DWR Technical Memorandum, July 10, 2017, Structural
50-58 Assessment of Damage - Friday June 30, 2017 17:30 Dillon
Blast Near Station 23+00 Spillway Left
59-61
62-67 White
The information contained in the PDF document provided background to the discussion;
however much of the information about the planned mitigation options was only
presented verbally.
The meeting focused on the mitigation options for making the FCO spillway functional
for the 2017-2018 seasonal flows. The BOC was informed that it is no longer
considered possible to fully complete the spillway chute repair downstream of Station
23+00, based on current construction progress. As a result, interim mitigation
measures that will allow the spillway to pass the flows expected during 2017-2018 have
been evaluated and these options were presented to the BOC. In general, the
proposed interim mitigation measures consist of reducing the lineal footage of
reconstruction of the reinforced concrete in the lower FCO Spillway chute, completing
the RCC fill to the foundation grade, and constructing temporary RCC gravity walls
(spillway training walls) to a height of approximately 10 feet.
The BOC was also informed that on June 30, 2017, a blast at the slope left of the
spillway damaged a portion of the spillway slabs and training walls upstream of Station
23+00. It was reported that the structural damage to the FCO spillway is confined to
downstream of Station 22+50. Through discussions with the contractor to complete
reconstructing the FCO Spillway chute by November 2018, it was determined that the
upstream work limits for the reconstruction of the FCO Spillway chute should be moved
further upstream from Station 23+00 to Station 20+30. The substantial change in the
proposed plan is the demolition and reconstruction of an additional 200 feet of the upper
FCO Spillway chute. Overall, with the proposed interim mitigation measure and the
recommendation to relocate the upstream work limits, this plan provides a net reduction
in FCO Spillway chute construction during construction season one, but still allows the
work to be completed in two seasons.

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways T ad Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No 9 July 19.2017
With the aforementioned design and schedule changes, the final repairs to the spillway
chute are planned to be completed during the 2018 construction season. This change
is not expected to affect the emergency spillway repair schedule.
BOC members present were Eric Kollgaard, John Egbert, Kerry Cato and Paul
Schweiger.
1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the proposed FCO
limits of work, construction sequence and schedule?
Response
Since it is not possible to fully complete the spillway chute repair downstream of
Station 23+00, the BOC is in agreement with the proposed interim mitigation
measures that will allow the spillway to pass flows expected during 2017-2018
and recommends that the contractor be authorized to proceed with this plan.
The BOC understands that the RCC slab surface will be placed near the level of
the base of the structural concrete slab to be constructed in 2018. The final lift of
RCC is to be placed and compacted on the sloping 4H:1V chute surface. To
help achieve an erosion-resistant flow surface, the top RCC lift will have a higher
cement content for higher early RCC strength. In addition, a chemical treatment
is being investigated that may be applied to the finished surface of the RCC that
will reportedly improve its resistance to erosion by increasing the surface material
strength to 8,000 - 10,000 psi. The BOC is interested in the details of this
procedure and the reasoning of how it will be successfully used for this spillway.
In addition, the flow surface must also be free of abrupt discontinuities or offsets,
but does not need to have a highly-finished surface.
It was reported that a supplemental RCC test section will be constructed to

confirm and refine the construction techniques proposed to place and compact
the final lift of RCC on the sloping 4H:1V chute surface. The BOC encourages
this activity. The contractor may want to consider evaluating the use of a
conventional or modified paving machine to place and consolidate the top lift of
the RCC. This technique was used at Renwick Dam to construct RCC paved
roads with good results. Photographs showing this technique are presented in
Figure 1 and Figure 2.

DO NOT RELEASE 3
Oro'dle Emergenc,/ Recovery - SpIllways Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No 9 July 19. 2017
Figure I. Photographs showing placement of RCC using a conventional mechanical paver

machine at Renwick Dam at Icelandic State Park in North Dakota.

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Oroville Emergency Reco'/ery - Splll'Nays Ted Craddock
l'1dependent Board of Consultants Report No 9 July 19. 2017
Figure 2. Photographs showing RCC placed using a conventional mechanical paver machine at
Renwick Dam at Icelandic State Park in N011h Dakota.

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Oro'lIl1e Emergency Reco'/ery - Spll N3'jS Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Reoort No, 9 July 19. 2017
Transverse joints will not be provided in the top lift of RCC but will be in the RCC
placements below. It is anticipated that cracking will occur in the top lift but the
cracks will have limited opening. It will be important to inspect the slab after
initial operation to check for spalls where crack edges may have broken and be
prepared to repair any found.
The BOC believes that the temporary RCC training walls may present the
greatest difficulty to the plan for constructing the RCC section of the chute in the
tight time schedule allotted. It is not clear that the problems of placing narrow fills
of RCC on a relatively steep slope are fully recognized. The usual practice of
using temporary ramps for delivery of RCC and for movement of operating
equipment is not practical because of the steep drop-offs on either side of the
chute. The BOC will be interested in hearing more detail regarding the
contractor's means and methods to accomplish this construction.
The RCC training walls will be removed for the construction of the reinforced
concrete permanent training walls in 2018.
Specialty contractors are available who have gained experience in these

procedures from slot cutting dams to alleviate problems from alkali reactivity.
The BOC would encourage making such provisions to facilitate the placement of
the permanent structural concrete in 2018.
The BOC recommends that the Design Team take advantage of this opportunity
to include an aerator ramp or slot at the upstream end of the exposed RCC
foundation. The BOC believes that this would be a highly effective measure to
protect the RCC surfaces exposed to high velocity flows. A new spreadsheet for
the design of aerators for spillways based on the work of Mr. Henry Falvey is
available from Mr. Tony Wahl of Reclamation to help expedite the design.
Transitions between the structural slabs and RCC section will be necessary at
both the upstream and downstream ends of the exposed RCC (at Sta. 27+75 and
Sta. 39+27). The BOC recommends that a physical model study of the proposed
interim spillway configuration be performed to evaluate the transition details and
the aerator, if it is included in the design. There was no discussion about when
the dentate surface repair will occur; the BOC presumes this activity will still
occur in the 2017 construction season.

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O~O'I ,f:' Erpec~enC'1 ReclJ'/f:"'j- S:J ,haj5 Ted CradGOCk,
lr:de:Jendent Boa'd of Con5u:tan~5 Re;)ort f'lo 9 J'cl, 19. 2017
Schedule Implications:
The 67-page document presented to the BOC, in preparation for the July 12,
2017 conference call, contained the contractor's Serial Letter 034 dated June 30,
2017 ".. .regarding a revision to the FCO Chute Construction Sequence and
required milestone dates." These revisions are significant and seem to follow the
contractor's presentation made to the BOC on June 21, 2017 during which the
BOC was made aware of the contractor's anticipated schedule impacts.
The contractor's Serial Letter 034 contains two critical milestones for 2017 Work.
Both RCC Placement and Structural Concrete Placement have "Expected
Completion" dates of October 15, 2017. Also, the "Last RCC Placemenf' and
"Last Structural Placemenf' are both October 31,2017. These activities appear
to conflict and their completion dates should be confirmed.
The BOC looks forward to reviewing the contractor's updated schedules and
sequences of work from those presented on June 21, 2017; specifically,
quantitative progress on foundation cleanup, RCC placement, chute slab
placement, and wall placement should be updated. The BOC would also like to
review updated quantities (SY and CY) and production rates.
The BOC recommends a weekly schedule/progress meeting be held between the

contractor and DWR management with the goal of determining measurable
contractor progress and developing look ahead schedules.
BOC Recommendations Summary
M9-1 The BOC is in agreement with the proposed interim mitigation

measures that will allow the spillway to pass flows expected during
2017-2018 and recommends that the contractor be authorized to
proceed with the proposed plan.
M9-2 The BOC encourages additional RCC test section work be

performed to confirm and refine the construction techniques
needed to place and consolidate the final lift of RCC on the sloping
4H:1 V chute surface to provide a hard, durable surface free of
discontinuities.
M9-3 The BOC believes that the temporary RCC training walls may
present the greatest difficulty to the plan for constructing the RCC
section of the chute in the tight time schedule allotted. The BOC will

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Oro'lIlIe Emergercy Recovery - SpIllways Ted Craddock
Indepe(!cent Board of Consultants Report No, 9 July 19. 2017
be interested in hearing more detail regarding the contractor's

means and methods to accomplish this construction.
M9-4 The BOG encourages including provisions in the RGG gravity walls
to facilitate their demolition following the 2017-2018 seasonal use
of the spillway so that the placement of the permanent structural
concrete can be completed within the 2018 construction season.
M9-5 The BOG would like to be provided details of chemical treatment

planned for the RGG flow surface.
M9-6 The BOG recommends that the Design Team take advantage of
this opportunity to include an aerator ramp or slot at the upstream
end of the exposed RGG foundation. The BOG believes that this
would be a highly effective meas.ure to protect the RGG surfaces
exposed to high velocity flows.
M9-7 The BOG recommends that a physical model study of the proposed
interim spillway configuration be performed to evaluate the RGG
transition details, and the aerator, if it is included in the design.
M9-8 The BOG looks forward to reviewing the contractor's updated

schedules and sequences of work from those presented on June
21, 2017; specifically, quantitative progress on foundation cleanup,
RGG placement, chute slab placement, and wall placement should
be updated. The BOG would also like to review updated quantities
(SY and GY) and production rates.
M9-9 The BOG recommends a weekly schedule/progress meeting be

held between the contractor and DWR management with the goal
of determining measurable contractor progress and developing
look-ahead schedules.
Not present
~f1#
1rf" ;: 4Jt
John Egbert
9J~
Paul Schweiger

DO NOT RELEASE 8
Independent Board of Consultants Report No 9 July 192017
Meeting Title: Board of Consultants, Meeting 9

Date: 07112/2017
Name Affiliation
Blackett, Frank FERC
Boyer, Doug FERC
Brand, Bruce FERC
Brown, Dale DWR
Cato, KelTY BOC
Craddock, Ted DWR
Fortner, Mark GEl
Egbelt, John BOC
GutielTez, David GEl
Harder, Les HDR
Kolhmard, Eric BOC
Lewis, Liz GEl
Mihyar, Mutaz DSOD
Rogers, Mike MWH Stantec
Schweiger, Paul BOC
Veri gin, Steve GEl

DO NOT RELEASE 9
Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 10 July 25, 2017
Summary & Response
Discussion and comments on presentation to the Board of Consultants (BOC)
These initial paragraphs summarize a variety of topics presented to the BOC. The first few paragraphs
relate to similar discussions from BOC #9. As outlined in the BOC #9 summary, the lower chute will be
constructed with roller compacted concrete. The first four paragraphs cover the construction details
associated with construction techniques of the RCC.
The cavitation potential investigations were also previously covered in BOC #9 and the summary. The
BOC is providing recommendations for consideration of construction details of the RCC to mitigate for
the potential of cavitation.
The construction progress and schedule section outlines the discussion regarding construction progress
and schedule. This presentation was a result of a request by the BOC during BOC meeting #9.
Question 1
Points 1, 2, 3 and 4 continue from BOC #9 and relate to the details associated with the construction of
the RCC in the lower part of the chute.
Point 5 relates to the repair or reconstruction of the dentate structure. The dentate structure refers to
the very large blocks at the very end of the spillway which provide dissipation of the water just before
entering the river.
Point 7 relates to the initial placement of RCC in the smaller crevices and canyons.
Question 2
Question 2 relates to the techniques associated with cleaning the foundation. Rock foundation for dams
and its appurtenant structures are typically cleaned which could include washing and sometimes
vacuuming the rock to allow adhesion between the rock and newly placed RCC or concrete.
Question 3
Question 3 relates to the construction schedule and follows the request made by the BOC to keep them
informed of progress and schedule.
The topic of the secant wall relates to the wall that is being placed downstream of the emergency
spillway. There are currently scheduling conflicts between the construction of the secant wall and

relocation of overhead transmission lines. This has been brought up to the BOC since this could possibly
delay the completion of the secant wall by a couple months.
Question 4
Point 2 of question 4 relates to instrumentation that has been placed within the foundation beneath the
FCO chute. Piezometers are instruments that allow engineers to measure water pressures that could
possibly occur beneath the chute within the rock foundation.

DATE: July 25, 2017

INTRODUCTION
On Monday, July 24,2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at the
DWR Oroville Field Division Main Conference Room office at 9:30 am. Representatives
from DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the
Oroville Spillway Recovery project participated in the meeting.
Presentations were made by DWR and their consultants on both design and
construction progress. The meeting began with a brief presentation on the timeline of
key design milestones that have been accomplished since the initial FCO Spillway and
Emergency Spillway erosion inCidents occurred approximately five months ago.
Milestones included:
Organizing design teams.
Performing an alternatives analysis.
Preparing 30 percent designs.
Advertising the construction contract.
Awarding the construction contract.
Mobilizing equipment and plants.
Procuring construction materials.
Preparing final plans and specifications.
Proceeding with major construction activities.

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Oro'lille Emergency Recovery - Spill Nays Ted Craddock
IndeDencent Board of Consultants Report No 10 July 25. 20' 7
Presentations were made on the progress of the RCC foundation construction for the
FCO Spillway, provisional RCC transition details for the FCO Spillway chute, the
sensitivity of the hydraulic performance of the FCO Spillway chute to the surface
roughness of the exposed concrete and RCC, and an update on the FCO Spillway
foundation conditions and foundation preparation.
Later in the afternoon, the meeting was moved to the Contractor's field office at the dam
site for a presentation by the Contractor's representatives on construction progress.
Following this, the meeting was moved to the DWR onsite construction trailer for an
update on the construction of the Emergency Spillway secant pile cutoff wall.
Descriptions and comments made on the individual presentations are contained in the
section that follows.
The BOC returned to the dam site at 8:00 pm after having dinner to observe RCC
placement within the scour hole adjacent to the foundation of the FCO Spillway chute,
and departed around 9:30 pm.
During the morning of Tuesday, July 25, the BOC toured the dam site to observe
construction progress. This included the following:
An overlook at the gate structure of the FCO Spillway.
A review of the remaining demolition work near Station 20+30 of the FCO
Spillway.
An inspection of the FCO Spillway chute rock foundation that is currently being
cleaned from approximate Stations 23+00 to 27+00.
An overlook of the spillway chute leveling concrete placement near Station

37+00.
An overlook of the RCC placement on the left side of the FCO Spillway near
Station 36+00.
An inspection of the reinforced-concrete test slab for the FCO Spillway.
An inspection of the drilling for the Emergency Spillway secant pile cutoff wall.
The BOC then returned to the DWR Oroville Field Division Office Main Conference
Room to deliberate and prepare the report. This was followed by a reading of the BOC's
draft report with representatives from DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and
industry consultants working on the Oroville Spillway. The meeting was adjourned at
4:30 pm.
BOC members present were Eric Kollgaard, John Egbert, Kerry Cato, Faiz Makdisi and
Paul Schweiger.

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Orovil:e EfTlergency Reco',~r'l- Spillways Ted Cradcloc:<
IndeJenden r Board 0; Consui~ant5 Re~o'l ~l') 10 Joly 25 2017
DISCCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON PRESENTATIONS TO THE BOC

Design Details for the 1,1 09-foot-long Provisional Section of the FCO Spillway
Chute between Stations 28+20 and 39+29 - At our previous meeting, the BOC was
informed that the RCC in this area will be overlain with a 1-foot-thick layer of higher
strength RCC with a mix design containing 300 pounds per cubic yard (pcy) of Portland
cement and 175 pcy of fly ash. The original RCC foundation has a mix design with 175
pcy of Portland cement and 175 pcy of fly ash (2,500 psi and 4,000 psi compressive
strength after 28 days and 1-year, respectively). The top layer of RCC is designed to
have a 14-day strength of 3,000 psi. A surface hardener treatment is being evaluated
that is reported to increase the strength of the RCC chute surface to about 8,000 psi.
At Station 28+20 where the new reinforced-concrete FCO Spillway transitions to the
provisional RCC chute, the transition detail consists of a temporary 15-foot-long section
of reinforced-concrete slab and downstream cutoff wall that is anchored to the bedrock
foundation. The downstream cutoff wall has a minimum depth of 8 feet and is also
anchored to the bedrock foundation. When the RCC foundation material and the 1-foot-
thick layer of higher strength RCC overlay are placed against the reinforced concrete
cutoff wall, a 3-foot vertical step will result that can be used to aerate spillway flows.
The lower transition detail at Station 39+27 is similar and consists of a zone of high
strength RCC placed against a temporary 1V: 1H tapered reinforced-concrete cutoff wall
and slab section anchored to bedrock. The zone of high strength RCC will be placed
approximately two inches higher than the top of the downstream reinforced-concrete
chute slab to avoid the possibility of stagnation pressures from developing at the RCC -
reinforced-concrete interface.
The temporary spillway training walls will be constructed using horizontal lifts of RCC
placed concurrent with the horizontal lifts of the RCC foundation. The vertical inside
faces of the wall will be formed using a Hilfiker welded wire wall forming system, and
later surfaced with a 6-inch thick application of 7,000 psi shotcrete reinforced with steel
fibers. The finished exposed inside height of the temporary RCC training walls will be 15
feet.
RCC Placement Progress - It was reported that RCC placement began on Thursday,
July 20, and is progressing well with no adverse issues related to placement
temperatures. Adjustments are being made to address surface bleed water and
occasional Vee-Bee time exceedances that have been traced to moisture variations in
the fine aggregate stockpile. Modified RCC side slope compaction equipment was
reported to be working very well. RCC surface cleaning equipment and techniques are
being refined.

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Independent Board of Consultants Report No 10 July 25, 2017
Cavitation Potential Investigations - The sensitivity analysis of the roughness of

exposed concrete and RCC surfaces within the FCO Spillway chute was conducted
using a computational approach developed by the Bureau of Reclamation. The
numerical analysis consists of varying the Manning's "n" value for the spillway chute
from 0.014 to 0.023. The sensitivity analysis showed that the roughness of the finished
chute surface has a significant impact on the spillway hydraulics and the potential for
cavitation damage within the chute. For the higher Manning's n value of 0.023, the
computed cavitation index along the profile of the spillway chute for a uniform flow of
100,000 cfs was shown to be above the critical cavitation index value of 0.20,
suggesting that the potential for cavitation damage for this scenario would be minimal.
For lower Manning's n values, the cavitation index was less than 0.20 downstream of
Station 32+00 suggesting that there would be potential for cavitation damage to the
spillway chute if the flow is not aerated. Water surface profiles computed using the
higher surface roughness were determined to be acceptable for the provisional RCC
spillway chute section. Various configurations of air vents in the transition wall at Station
28+20 that are being considered by the Design Team were also presented.
Spillway Foundation Preparation - The update on the FCO Spillway foundation
conditions and foundation preparation included a virtual tour of the FCO Spillway chute
using drone imagery. Foundation shear zones, foundation cleaning, placement of dental
and leveling concrete, erection of transverse drain forms, chute anchor installation,
instrumentation, drain pipes, RCC placement, remaining drilling and blasting demolition
work and other features were shown and discussed. Information on the July 19, 2017
small slide located at the right side of the FCO Spillway "arena" cut near Station 28+50
was presented and discussed, Foundation mapping, cleaning, and acceptance
procedures were presented.
Construction Progress and Schedule - The presentation by the Contractor's
representatives focused on construction progress, revised schedule milestones,
expected production rates, planned construction schedule, tools being used to track
daily progress, manpower loading (including subcontractors), daily quantity tracking,
critical path items and problems that have been encountered and how they have been
addressed. The Contractor is focused on completing the required work within the
remaining 100 days until the November 1, 2017 deadline, and presented details on how
they plan to complete the work. The Contractor currently has approximately 120 full-
time staff and 450 craftsmen onsite. Detailed commodity curves, initial production rates
and material supply issues were presented and discussed.
Because of higher than anticipated waste from the processing of excavated onsite
material for coarse and fine RCC aggregates, the production rates of these materials
was determined to be insufficient to meet required RCC production rates. The

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Independent Board of Consultants Report No, 10 July 25, 2017
Contractor is therefore mobilizing a second onsite plant to manufacture RCC

aggregates, The Contractor also noted that the available stockpiled material may not be
adequate to provide the needed quantity of RCC aggregate, and that there may be a
need to identify alternate sources of rock to process to manufacture RCC aggregate.
The Contractor also summarized information concerning onsite conditions and final
design features that have impacted the original construction schedule. Quantities for
critical contract items have been updated to reflect current actual conditions. Key items
included the increase in excavation for the FCO chute from 97,000 CY to 347,000 CY
(357% increase), the increase in slab anchors from 37,400 LF to 113,120 LF (302%
increase), the increase in RCC from 242,000 CY to 300,000 CY (20% increase), etc.
Progress and challenges for individual critical path work items was presented and
discussed. The BOC is confident that the Contractor's scheduling and forecasting
system allows for easy understanding and accurate tracking of construction progress.
Secant Pile Cutoff Wall - The update on the construction of the Emergency Spillway
secant pile cutoff wall noted that the majority of the leveling pad and starter wall has
been constructed and the secant pile wall construction equipment has been mobilized to
the site. A total of 605 secant piles will be drilled and installed to construct
approximately 121 individual panels of 5 piles each (piles in each panel are designated
as A, B, C, D & E). The Contractor's sequence for completing both the Primary Piles
and Secondary Piles in three panel groups was detailed. The first test panel has been
partially constructed. The Contractor used a single BG-40 rotary drill for work to date. A
second drill, a BG-50 drill using a down-hole hammer and button bits for drilling the
harder less weathered rock is scheduled to commence drilling this week. The
documentation and geologic logging of the secant pile walls was presented and
discussed. Ground-water was present at approximately 30 feet in most holes drilled to
date. The Design Team added 7 piezometers in the area for monitoring. The reservoir is
currently at Elevation 801 feet. Complications with construction of the secant pile wall
due to restrictions under the powerline were also presented and discussed.

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IrldeGenC:ent Board of Consultants Report No 10 July 25 2017

1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the design
concepts and details for the FCO Spillway Chute between Station 28+20 and
Station 39+30?
Response
The BOC compliments the Design Team and the Contractor for the highly
responsive way they are creatively and effectively addressing problems as they are
encountered. The design concepts and details for the FCO Spillway chute between
Station 28+20 to Station 39+30 represent unique challenges for constructing a
provisional segment of the spillway chute that will perform satisfactorily for the
seasonal wet period following the 2017 construction season. The BOC is in
agreement with the proposed design concepts and details, and offers the following
comments and recommendations.
1. The BOC encourages the Design Team to continue to work towards including an
aerator at Station 28+20. The proposed 3-foot stepped transition provides a
unique opportunity to include an aerator at the upstream end of the provisional
RCC section of the chute. The BOC continues to believe that this would be a
highly effective measure to protect the RCC surfaces exposed to high velocity
flows.
2. The BOC is interested in the details of the Sika surface hardener and how it will
be used for this spillway. The BOC recommends that the application of the
surface hardener be demonstrated on the proposed supplemental RCC trial
section. The BOC also recommends that the Design Team consider selective
use of the Sika surface hardener, and reserve its application to zones of high
impact such as where the flow impinges on the chute downstream of the
transition step at Station 28+20. As described in the discussion section above,
the BOC is concerned that the application of the surface hardener may create an
unusually smooth uniform surface that would result in higher flow velocities and
increase the potential for cavitation and scour damage. The sensitivity analyses
performed by the Design Team show that having a uniform but rough RCC
surface could be beneficial by lowering flow velocities and thereby reducing the
potential for cavitation and erosion damage.
3. The BOC recommends that the Design Team evaluate steepening the slope of
the outside RCC foundation face near Station 28+50 to avoid placing RCC in the
area of interference with the hillside landslide that is located at the right side of
the FCO Spillway. This might require forming a portion of the RCC face.

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Independent Board of Consulta"ts Report No 10 July 25 201-
4. The BOC recommends that a physical model study of the proposed interim
spillway configuration be performed to evaluate the transition details and the
aerator, if it is included in the design.
5. The BOC understands that the dentate structure is scheduled to have the
surficial damage repaired during the 2018 construction season. This repair will
require careful concrete removal in order to prevent damaging the existing
embedded reinforcement as little as possible, and then dowelling in the new
concrete to restore the original dentate configuration. It was stated that the
Contractor has suggested that completely demolishing the dentate structure and
reconstructing a new structure could save money because easier construction
would be facilitated. The BOC would encourage further investigation of this
option if restoring the dentate structure really needs to be done at this time.
In actual fact, the dentate structure has performed exactly as it was designed.
Some erosion of dentate surfaces can normally be expected over the lifespan of
such structures. The Oroville Spillway dentate structure was exposed to an
exceptional condition being battered by large sections of concrete in high velocity
flow, but appears capable of still serving its function for years. The BOC believes
the option of leaving its replacement or reconditioning to a future date might be
considered.
6. The Design Team has suggested that the Contractor
The BOC agrees that this would be a useful provision. It is also

noted that the hydro-blasting anticipated for concrete removal for construction of
the dentate structure restoration would prove useful for removal of the temporary
RCC portions of the chute from Station 28+20 to Station 39+30.
7. The BOC was pleased to see that the lower scour hole had been cleared of the
material that had been cleaned out of the "Hell Canyon" feature in the chute and
dozed into that area. The initial placements of RCC had already risen high
enough to provide a clear area for equipment to work more expeditiously. During
the night visit to observe RCC placement, the BOC was able to witness
placement and compaction of an RCC lift. The Contractor's adaptation of several
pieces of mechanical equipment to spread and compact the RCC in small
corners and recesses was particularly appreciated as beneficial innovations to
speed up the RCC operation. Overall, the BOC believes the RCC operation is off
to a good start.

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Oro'lIl1e Emergency Recovery - SPII Nays Ted Craddock
2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the foundation

conditions and preparation?
Response
1. Cleaning of the FCO Spillway Foundation. The BOC is impressed with the
progress and quality of the foundation cleaning. The cleaning of areas of the
chute foundation for placement of RCC and leveling concrete that were observed
by the BOC exceed expectations and represent significant progress. The BOC
visited an area of the spillway chute rock foundation that was being cleaned from
approximate Stations 23+00 to 27+00 (see photographs in Figure 1). This rock
surface is rough and all soil material has been removed by cleaning. This differs
from the original chute foundation design that allowed some soil to remain under
the original leveling concrete. The thickness of leveling concrete appeared to
typically range from 3 to 6 feet in thickness, but in local areas where fractured or
more weathered material was removed, the leveling concrete thickness may
exceed 10 feet. At this location the BOC also observed the Stay-Forms that are
being used to create the drains that extend through the leveling concrete to the
rock foundation surface (see Figure 1).

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OrO'lllle Emergency Reco'/ery - Spltlwa'js Ted Craddock.
Figure 1. Photographs of typical FCO foundation preparation showing foundation cleanup

and Stay-Form (upper photos), and placement of leveling concrete (lower photo).

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Inde;:>~ndent Board of Consultants Report No 10 July 25. 2017
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the construction

schedule?
Response
1. The BOC was pleased with the progress made since the last onsite meeting. It is
clear that the Design Team and the Contractor are effectively communicating
with each other and are fully aware of the urgency of the project. They appear to
be working well together and cooperating to accomplish this deadline-driven
project. Initial work items such as the demolition of sections of the FCO Spillway
and foundation preparation have been very well executed. It is apparent that the
Design Team and the Contractor's investments in planning and preparation for
critical path construction work is paying off and resulting in an efficient and
productive execution of the work. The amount of work completed since the
spillway erosion incident occurred just five months ago is impressive.
2. On the basis of the Contactor's presentation, The BOC understands that
progress on the secant pile construction has been impacted by the rate of drilling
of currently used drilling equipment, and expected constraints of working in the
vicinity of the overhead transmission towers. The currently projected completion
date for this task is late December or early January, 2018. The BOC understands
that the Contractor has already brought a heavy duty percussion drilling rig to
improve on the current rate of drilling. The BOC recommends that measures be
explored for relocating the transmission towers in a timely manner to minimize
their impact on the completion of the secant pile construction.
3. The BOC would appreciate receiving weekly information on construction
progress and schedule updates similar to those shown by the Contractor during
their July 24, 2017 presentation to the BOC.

Response
1. The BOC compliments the Design Team on their organization of the information
presented during the meeting and the quality of the presentations. A significant
amount of information on a wide range of topics covering many disciplines was
clearly presented, and is appreciated by the BOC.
2. The BOC understands that a number of vibrating wire piezometers have been
installed (at 7 locations) beneath the reinforced concrete slab in the upper FCO
Spillway chute between Stations 14+00 and 28+00. These piezometers should
provide useful information on the ground-water conditions beneath the chute.

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The BOC recommends that these piezometers be monitored on a regular basis

to provide a baseline for comparing the performance of the existing chute slab to
that of the replacement structure completed in 2018, particularly at high reservoir
levels.
3. The BOC visited the Emergency Spillway secant wall installation where the
smaller of the Contractor's two drills is being used to drill through the intensely
and moderately weathered rock. The hardness of the rock results in low drilling
rates and significant wear on the drill teeth. Once the percussion drill begins
operation in the lower portion of the holes that are in the slightly weathered
amphibolite, a better understanding of the effective drilling rate can be
determined. The BOC awaits ramp-up to full production.
4. The BOC understands that piezometers are currently being installed upstream
and downstream of the secant pile wall to help monitor ground-water levels and
verify that the designed separation between the pile panels is providing the
intended drainage to prevent buildup of pore pressure under the RCC buttresses,
scheduled to be installed in 2018 construction season. The BOC concurs with
these measures.
5. Before demolishing the reinforced-concrete FCO Spillway test slab, the BOC
suggests that the Design Team consider taking core samples to obtain data on
the bond between the slab and the leveling concrete.
Contains Criticai Energy Infrastructure Information

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Oro'llie Emergency Recovery - SP'1 Nays Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No 10 July 25 2017
BOC Recommendations Summary

M10-1 The BOC encourages the Design Team to continue to work
towards including an aerator at Station 28+20. The BOC continues
to believe that this would be a highly effective measure to protect
the RCC surfaces exposed to high velocity flows.
M10-2 The BOC recommends that the application of the RCC surface
hardener be demonstrated on the proposed supplemental RCC trial
section.
M10-3 The BOC recommends that the Design Team consider selective
use of the Sika surface hardener, and reserve its application to
zones of high impact such as where the flow impinges on the chute
downstream of the transition step at Station 28+20.
M10-4 The BOC recommends that the Design Team evaluate steepening
the slope of the outside RCC foundation face near Station 28+50 to
avoid placing RCC in the area of interference with the hillside
landslide that is located at the right side of the FCO Spillway.
M10-5 The BOC recommends that a physical model study of the proposed
interim spillway configuration be performed to evaluate the
transition details and the aerator, if it is included in the design.
M10-6 The BOC encourages further investigation of the dentate removal
and reconstruction option if restoring the dentate structure really
needs to be done at this time. The BOC believes the option of
leaving its replacement or reconditioning to a future date might be
considered.
M10-7 The BOC recommends that measures be explored for relocating
the transmission towers in a timely manner to minimize their impact
on the completion of the secant pile construction.
M10-8 The BOC would appreciate receiving weekly information on
construction progress and schedule updates similar to those shown
by the Contractor during their July 24, 2017 presentation to the
BOC.
M10-9 The BOC recommends that the piezometers being installed in the
existing upper spillway chute slab be monitored on a regular basis
to provide a baseline for comparing the performance of the existing
chute slab to that of the replacement structure completed in 2018,
particularly at high reservoir levels.

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Splll"vays Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Consultant.s Re;:>ort No 10 July 25 2017
M10-10 The BOC suggests that the Design Team consider taking core
samples of the reinforced-concrete FCO Spillway test slab before it
is demolished to obtain data on the bond between the slab and the
leveling concrete.
M10-11 Orice the secant percussion BF-50 drill begins operations, the BOC
would appreciate an interim-meeting update on the drilling rates in
the slightly weathered amphibolitic rock.
Eric B. Kollgaard
Ch",Q!~
Faiz Makdisi
~~
Kerry Calo
Jr!;: 14
John Egbert
9J~
Paul Schweiger

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Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 11 August 25, 2017

Summary & Response
Introduction of Board of Consultants (BOC)
The BOC met on August 24 and 25 to observe construction progress on the various components of the
spillways recovery. The meeting included a field inspection and a series of presentations from DWR staff
and consultants to the BOC.
Question 1
Question 1 relates to the construction schedule. The contractor and DWR are working towards a
schedule to complete construction on various components of the project by November 1, 2017. The
BOC notes various issues and their associated coarse corrections necessary to keep to the schedule. The
details described such as fly ash and concrete aggregate are components of the concrete that is being
used to construct the spillway. The BOC also references the placement rate of RCC. During the
beginning of RCC projects, there is very little area to work. As the RCC is placed, the surface area of
placement increases and then the rate of placement increases. The BOC notes the RCC placement rate
is expected to increase.
During major construction projects, issues typically arise that need to be resolved. The BOC
compliments the Design Team and the Contractor for aggressively addressing the production problems
that are encountered.
Question 2
Question 2 relates to the conventional and structural concrete being used for the spillway. There are
generally two concrete mix designs being used in this project. Roller compacted concrete (RCC) is
currently being used to fill the large erosion areas that were created by the incident. Conventional or
structural concrete is used along with steel reinforcement for components such as the slabs and walls of
the new spillway. The BOC notes flange beams are used within the walls. This is part of the
construction process of building the walls.
Question 3
Question 3 relates to foundation preparation. Prior to placing any concrete, the foundation receiving
concrete needs to be prepared. This preparation includes excavating to acceptable rock and cleaning
the rock so there is bond between the concrete and foundation. The BOC notes the foundation
preparation work exceeds their expectations.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #11 | Released September 14, 2017

Question 4
Question 4 relates to the RCC and the tests being completed to check the strength and resistance to
flow of the RCC. The final layer of RCC will be placed on a slope versus placing it in horizontal lifts. This
final lift will be stronger and be more resistant to the spillway flows. The RCC within parts of the lower
chute could potentially be relied upon during this winter. Structural concrete will be placed over the
RCC during the next construction season. Therefore parts of the RCC will be removed during next
construction season to receive the future structural concrete.
Question 5
Question 5 relates to the secant wall which will be constructed downstream of the emergency spillway.
This will ultimately be an underground wall the length of the emergency spillway. The BOC notes the
construction of the secant wall is behind schedule. The BOC is recommending the length of wall near
where most of the damage occurred (headcutting) be constructed as a priority if the entire length does
not get finished within the prescribed schedule.
Question 6
Question 6 relates to instrumentation in and around the construction site. Piezometers are used to
understand the water level beneath the ground. Slope indicates are used to understand if there is any
movement of the slopes in and around the construction site. The BOC concludes that groundwater
levels in and around the spillway are not directly affected by the reservoir. They also conclude any
movement of the sloping ground is not significant.
Question 7
Question 7 relates to hydraulic models being used to calculate expected flow conditions for the new
spillway. The physical model is a scaled model constructed in Utah. The numerical model refers to
mathematical models. Both types of models are used to predict how the spillway will perform with
respect to water flowing down the spillway. The BOC commends DWR for the in-depth modeling that is
being performed.
Question 8
Question 8 relates to the schedule and is self-explanatory.
Question 9
Question 9 relates to the vegetation that has periodically been seen on the face of the dam even before
the dam was complete. The BOC completed an independent assessment of the vegetation that is on the
downstream slope of the dam. The BOC notes the teams assessment was thorough. The BOC
concluded the source of water that affects the vegetation is not related to seepage originating from the
reservoir and is not a dam safety concern.
Question 10
Self-explanatory.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #11 | Released September 14, 2017

DATE: August25,2017

INTRODUCTION
On Thursday August 24, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at the
Department of Water Resources (DWR) Oroville Project Site Office, Trailer No. 12 at
8:00 am. Representatives from DWR Engineering Division, California Division of Safety
of Dams (DSOD), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Contractor, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and industry consultants working on the
Presentations were made by DWR, their consultants, and the Contractor on design and
construction progress. Presentations were made on the progress of the roller-
compacted concrete (RCC) foundation construction for the Flood Control Outlet (FCO)
Spillway, the provisional RCC transition details for the FCO Spillway chute, an update
on the construction of the Emergency Spillway secant pile cutoff wall, and the hydraulic
analyses for the FCO and Emergency spillways. Descriptions and comments made on
the individual presentations are contained in the section that follows.
During the morning of Friday, August 25, the BOC toured the dam site to observe
construction progress. This included the following:
an inspection of the remaining exposed FCO Spillway chute rock foundation

cleaning;
a review of the upstream spillway chute transition from the old spillway to the
new spillway near Station 20+30;
the RCC and structural concrete placement within the FCO Spillway;
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure information

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Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 11 August 25,2017
the construction of temporary RCC gravity spillway training walls;
erection of the steel reinforcement and forms for initial segments of the
permanent FCO Spillway training walls;
an inspection of the high strength RCC test slab placed on a 4H: 1V slope;
an overview of the vegetated area ("green spot") on the downstream

embankment slope; and
an inspection of the drilling and construction for the Emergency Spillway secant
pile cutoff wall.
The BOC then proceeded to the DWR Oroville Project Site Office, Trailer No. 13 at
10:30 am for a presentation by the Design Team regarding their comprehensive
investigation of the vegetation area. The presentation included the design features and
construction history of the dam embankment with an emphasis on the performance of
the dam since it was put into service 50 years ago, and on the causes of the vegetation
observed on the downstream slope at various locations. The BOC then met to
deliberate and prepare their report. A reading of the BOC's draft report was made to
representatives from DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry
consultants working on the Oroville Spillway at 4:00 pm. The meeting was adjourned at
4:30 pm.
Paul Schweiger.

construction progress and schedule?
Response
1. The Contractor and the design team are aggressively monitoring the
construction schedule and -critical path work items. Some work items have
been impacted due to lower than targeted production rates which were
explained by the design team and Contractor, and which are related to
cement and fly ash delivery problems, conventional concrete aggregate
supply issues, and low initial placement rates for the RCC associated with
working in small areas within the foundation and the addition of RCC walls in
the middle section of the FCO chute. The Contractor has addressed these
problems by leasing more trailers to expedite delivery of cement materials,
locating new concrete aggregate suppliers, and increasing the number of

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spiiiways Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 11 August25,2017
work crews. The RCC placement rate is expected to increase due to having
more and larger work areas. The Contractor has effectively shown that RCC
placement production has increased as the placement area increases beyond
the narrow rock crevasses. In addition, the Contractor's learning curve has
been steep, but he has shown innovation and dedication to quality. This has
included staff training, familiarity with project specifications, and managing
site-specific conditions. The Contractor and Design Team are confident that
production rates will continue to improve over the remaining 68 days to meet
the November 1 deadline. The Contractor currently has approximately 122
full-time staff and 549 craftsmen onsite.. The BOC compliments the Design
Team and the Contractor for aggressively addressing production problems as
they are encountered and for developing a thoughtful plan to stay on
schedule. During the tour of the construction site on Friday August 25, the
BOC was impressed with the organization and execution of the construction
work being performed and is optimistic that the project will be completed as
planned.
2. RCC aggregate production is a concern, not for the construction of the FCO
spillway but for the construction of the RCC apron for the Emergency
Spillway. Actual waste material from the aggregate production is
approximately 50 percent as opposed to the 20 percent assumed in the
Contractor's projections. In response, the Contractor has set up a second
aggregate manufacturing plant, and is investigating additional onsite sources
of rock to process. Offsite material sources are also being considered.
3. Despite some items being behind schedule, the BOC notes that the work
being performed is of high quality and in compliance with the specifications.
The BOC is pleased with the quality control, quality assurance and worker
safety programs for this project.
4. The one schedule item of note is with the secant cutoff wall installation due to
the subcontractor's lower than anticipated production rate. The lower
production rate has been due to equipment problems, equipment being slow
to arrive on site, and variable subsurface rock conditions. The BOC endorses
the Design Team's modifications to this work and believes the changes to the
specifications recognize actual rock conditions, and will not adversely affect
the quality of the finished cutoff wall.
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Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 11 August 25.2017

conventional and/or structural concrete design and placement?
Response
1. The Contractor's use of vertical wide flange beams (WFBs) within the FCO
spillway training walls is viewed by the BOC as a positive feature and a bonus
for the project. Consolidation of the concrete around WFBs within the walls,
however, may be a challenge and should be monitored carefUlly.
2. The BOC agrees with the Design Team's rationale for adding anchors to, and
reducing the depth of, the cutoff wall for the broad-crested weir control section
("speed bump") of the Emergency Spillway based on the higher quality
bedrock encountered in this area.
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the foundation

prep and construction?
Response
1. The cleaning of the chute foundation areas for placement of RCC and leveling
concrete is almost complete. All of the foundation preparation work
completed to date continues to exceed the BOC's expectations. The
foundation preparation for the new FCO spillway is of the highest quality and
is an important accomplishment for the success of the project.
2. During placement and consolidation of the drain fill material over the slotted
drain pipe, some fine-grained material entered the drain pipe through the
drain slots. Although the amount of the fine-grained material is minor and
does not impact the hydraUlic capacity of the drainage system, the BOC
recommends that the drain pipes be cleaned and video inspected at the
conclusion of construction to establish a neat baseline for future inspections.
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the RCC design
and placement?
Response
1. The BOC recommends that consideration be given to reducing the thickness
of the final lift of RCC if it is determined that the 12-inch thickness becomes
too difficult to compact. The extra time required for additional passes of the
roller compactors could adversely impact the Contractor's completion
schedule.
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Independent Board of Consuitants Repolt No. 11 Augusl25,2017
2. The BOC looks forward to learning the outcome of the hydraulic erosion tests
scheduled to be performed on the 4H:1V RCC test section to assess the
benefits of using a surface hardener on the grout enriched RCC lift. When
these tests are performed, they should test the treated and untreated areas
for comparison.
3. The vertical inside faces of the provisional RCC spillway training walls are
being formed using a Hilfiker welded wire wall forming system, and will later
be surfaced with a 6-inch-thick application of 7,000 psi shotcrete reinforced
with steel fibers. Some concerns were expressed with the embedment of the
NO.4 transverse anchor bars that will be used to anchor the shotcrete steel
reinforcement to the vertical face of the RCC gravity wall. Some of the NO.4
anchor bars embedded in the RCC could easily be twisted after the RCC had
set. The BOC recommends that steel plates like those shown in Figure 1 be
added to the ends of the transvers anchors, or that the ends of the anchors
be bent 90 degrees to increase their pull-out resistance.
Figure 1. Example of anchor rods embedded in RCC equipped with steel plates.
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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spillways 'red Craddock
4. The BOC was pleased that the RCC test fill on the 4H to:1V slope surface
demonstrated the ability of the Contractor's equipment to effectively place
and compact RCC on this slope. The RCC had a relatively uniform smooth
surface generally free of rough patches and rock pockets. Some minor
rutting and tire tracks were observed, but it is anticipated that.using the plate
compactor on the production placement will eliminate these in the final RCC
chute surface. The concrete surface hardener was tested on a number of
areas of the test fill and these will be subjected to the hydraulic testing
described previously.
5. The BOC recommends that blasting not be used in removing the provisional
RCC spillway training walls where such demolition is close to any structural
concrete slabs or walls. It was noted that the Contractor has made provisions
to use wire cutting to separate the walls from the base slab and to cut the
wall into segments. These segments could be reduced to manageable
pieces by light charges or the use of a hoe ram.
6. The BOC understands that the Contractor will remove one half of the original
RCC test fill by blasting, and the other half using a hydraulic hammer. This
will be a trial demonstration in preparation for the eventual removal of the
provisional RCC gravity walls in the FCO chute in 2018. As previously
noted, the BOC' recommends that blasting not be used in close proximity to
any permanent work.
7. The BOC understands that chute under-drainage is intended to be used in

the portion of the chute structural slabs that are placed on RCC in 2018.
Consideration could be given to reducing the diameter of these drain pipes
thereby allowing for smaller trench cuts into the RCC.
5. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the secant pile
wall construction?
Response
1. ~ the desired production rates are not achieved and the construction schedule
and deadlines become a concern, the BOC recommends that the Contractor
focus his resources on completing the sections of the cutoff wall at the two
areas where the flow is anticipated to be concentrated and the headcutting is
of greatest concern.

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Independent Soard of Consultants Report No. 11 Augusl25,2017
2. The BOC agrees with the Design Team's proposed revised criteria for
determining the point when the secant pile drilling depth has met the
requirement for 15-foot penetration into fresh or slightly weathered bedrock.
6. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on

instrumentation?
Response
1. Emergency Spillway: Based on information from secant pile borings and
groundwater piezometers that are located upstream and downstream of the
secant pile cutoff axis, the groundwater depths and flow directions have been
determined. These observations indicate that groundwater is not directly
responding to the reservoir level.
2. FeO Spillway: Several piezometers have been installed in the FCO spillway
chute. They are designed to record water that could infiltrate through the
concrete slab floor and deeper flow that could come from the bedrock. For
instruments that have been installed underneath the new concrete slabs, data
can be obtained in real time, even while spillway flow is occurring.
Several inclinometers that have been preViously discussed, exist
A few small slope movements have been documented,
that required minor slope re-grading, but to date, no significant slope
movements have occurred.
3. Artificial fill area: In the artificial fill area that is located about 500 to 1,000 feet
left of the FCO spillway chute dentates and near the RCC plant, some slope
movement has been observed. It is believed the observed downslope
movement (toward the river) is contained within or along the base of a
hillslope that is made up of artificial fill that was placed in this location at the
time the dam was constructed. Inclinometers installed within the slope show
that cumulative movement to date, is on the order of almost 'Y2-inch. This
amount of movement is not alarming, but it will continue to be monitored as
some aggregate stockpiles exist on the overlying slope.
4. The BOC believes the instrumentation in both the Emergency Spillway and
FCO Spillway and in the artificial fill area is appropriate and adequate. DWR
has been proactive with instrument installations and the BOC feels this
approach is prudent.
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Omville Emergency Recovery - Spii!ways Ted Craddocl,
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 11 August 25, 2017
7. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the hydrology

and hydraulics update?
Response
1. The numerical and physical hydraulic modelling for the FCO Spillway and the
Emergency Spillway are critical to the success of the provisional and final
spillway features and have provided important design information. The BOC
commends the Design Team for the extent and level of detail of the hydraulic
analyses being performed for this project. The BOC encourages the Design
Team to continue to evaluate and confirm key features of both spillways using
these design tools.
2. On July 31, 2017, Paul Schweiger, on behalf of the BOC, visited the Utah
State University's Water Research Laboratory to observe the operation of the
physical model of the FCO Spillway. The model study is being conducted
under the direction of Dr. Michael Johnson. During the visit, Dr. Johnson and
his assistants operated the model for full-scale flows representing 10,000,
20,000, 50,000, 100,000, 150,000 and 270,000 cfs. The version of the model
observed included an aerated 30-inch vertical step at Sta. , and two air
slots further downstream of the chute
. Observations from the physical model corroborate the numerical
computations and design recommendations of the Design Team. The
following main observations were made:
a. The two aerators downstream of Sta. appear to be excessively

large and create considerable flow disturbance within the FCO
Spillway chute, especially at lower flows. The benefit proVided by
these additional aerators is questionable.
b. VW~h~e~n~t~h;e~3~0~-i;n~ch~s:te~p~a~t~s:t:a .::~is~a:e~r:at:e(dit
I

appears to perform
very well as an aerator for the full range of flows up to the maximum
design flow. At the maximum design flow, the amount of air supplied
to the step could be increased to improve the aeration for this extreme
flow condition, however it still appears to work satisfactorily as an
aerator. Increasing the size of the air vents as currently proposed by
the Design Team is recommended.
c.

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spi!iways Ted Craddock
------------_.
The BOC is in agreement with the Design Team's

decision
3. The BOC agrees with the Design Team's decision to include an aerator at the
transition step near Station
_ and encourages the Design Team to proceed with a similar design for
the permanent spillway configuration.
4. The BOC agrees with the Design Team's revised configuration for buttressing
the agee section of the Emergency Spillway with RCC. The BOC suggests
that the Design Team consider using small steps to transition the new RCC
buttress to the conventional concrete agee section rather than using a
smooth inclined transition as currently proposed. Constructing the first step
would require making a longitudinal saw cut along the existing agee section.
8. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the additional.

work?
Response
1. The BOC is in agreement with the Contractor proceeding with construction of
the RCC apron downstream of the broad-crested weir section ("speed bump")
of the Emergency Spillway. This work would commence after completion of
the RCC in the FCO chute in 2017 and will allow the Contractor uninterrupted
placement of RCC using crews and equipment already on site. This is an
important consideration in assuring that the Contractor can complete all
construction during the 2018 construction season.
2. The BOC awaits the results of the stability analysis and final configuration and
design of the Emergency Spillway buttressed agee monoliths, the details of
the excavation plan for the downstream RCC blanket, and the drainage
details under the RCC blanket.

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spiilways Ted Craddock
Independent Board of Cons;uitants Report No. 11 August 25, 2017
Figure 2. Photographs of Physical Model of FCO Spillway at Utah State University's

Water Research Laboratory
Cont::1ins Criticai Ener-gy lrrfrastructure irforrnation

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Oroville Emergency Recovery - Spiiiways fed Craddock

9. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Oroville

Dam vegetation area?
Response
1. The Design Team made a presentation regarding the history and probable
causative mechanism of the Oroville Dam Embankment vegetation area. The
presentation included discussions on the design and construction history of
the dam with an emphasis on the internal zoning of the embankment; the
core, filter, chimney and blanket drains downstream of the core; the seepage
collection features; the make-up and construction of Zone 3 shell material
within the downstream slope near the left dam abutment; and the final grading
of the downstream slope.
The BOC agrees with the Design Team's thorough assessment of the
construction records as they relate to the observed vegetation area on the
downstream slope of the embankment. The BOC notes that this condition
has been observed and documented before the first filling of the reservoir,
and was reported by multiple independent safety inspection boards and
independent consultants with the conclusion that this is not a dam safety
issue. The BOC agrees that the vegetation observed at various levels on the
downstream slope near the left dam abutment (and at other locations on the
downstream face) is a result of infiltration of rainfall that could be perched on
lenses of fine-grained Zone 3 material and exits on the downstream face. It is
the BOC's jUdgement that the observed vegetation areas on the downstream
embankment slope are not related to seepage originating from the reservoir
and are not considered a dam safety concern.
Response
1. The BOC recommends proceeding with development of a monitoring plan for
the provisional and permanent FCO and Emergency spillways.
2. The BOC recommends that the maintenance of the gates to reduce side-seal
leakage be performed now to allow close-up surveillance of the chute surface
during future monitoring of the FCO spillway.

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Independent Soard of Consultants Report No. 11 August 25, 2017
M11-1 The BOC recommends that the drain pipes under the FCO Spillway
chute slabs be cleaned and video inspected at the conclusion of
construction to establish a neat baseline for future inspections.
M11-2 The BOC recommends that consideration be given to reducing the

thickness of the final lift of RCC if it is determined that the 12-inch
thickness becomes too difficult to compact.
M11-3 The BOC recommends that steel plates be added to the ends of the
transverse anchors embedded in the vertical face of the RCC
training walls of the FCO spillway, or that the ends of the anchors
be bent 90 degrees to increase their pUll-out resistance.
M11-4 The BOC recommends that blasting not be used to remove the
provisional RCC gravity spillway training walls where the demolition
is close to any permanent structural concrete slabs or walls.
M11-5 The BOC recommends that the Design Team consider reducing the
diameter of the drain pipes that are proposed under the reinforced
concrete chute slabs placed on RCC to allow for smaller trench
cuts into the RCC.
M11-6 If the desired production rates for the construction of the secant pile
cutoff wall are not achieved and the construction schedule and
deadlines become a concern, the BOC recommends that the
Contractor focus his resources on completing the sections of the
cutoff wall at the two areas where the flow is anticipated to be
concentrated and the headcutting is of greatest concern.
M11-7 The BOC endorses the Design Team's proposed revised criteria for
determining the point when the secant pile drilling depth has met
the requirement for 15-foot penetration into fresh or slightly
weathered bedrock.
M11-8 It is the BOC's jUdgement that the observed vegetation areas on

the downstream embankment slope are not related to seepage
originating from the reservoir and are not considered a dam safety
concern.
Contains Critical Energy infrastructure information

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M11-9 BOC recommends proceeding with development of a monitoring

plan for the provisional and permanent FCO and Emergency
spillways.
M11-10 The BOC recommends that the maintenance of the gates to reduce
side-seal leakage be performed now to allow close-up surveillance
of the chute surface during future monitoring of the FCO spillway.
~8~
Eric B. Kollgaard
C~"<'''~?a':::'::::'
Faiz Makdisi
Jr:7r1P
Kerry' Cato
PJ~
Contains Critical Energy Infrastructure lnformalion

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Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 12 September 22, 2017

Summary & Response

Question 1
Question 1 relates to the construction schedule similar to the Board of Consultants (BOC) questions
relating to this subject and as outlined in the previous BOC meeting No. 11. As expected the Roller
Compacted Concrete (RCC) production rate is higher. The BOC notes and compliments DWRs design
team and the Contractor as they continue to identify and evaluate critical path issues then resolve
those issues by ensuring the appropriate level of resources are procured.
The leveling concrete is placed on the foundation to level out the surface as preparation for the
structural concrete. The structural concrete includes concrete and reinforcing steel and is what is placed
on top of the leveling concrete. The BOC notes that placement of the final leveling concrete is nearing
completion.
The secant wall is being placed under the ground downstream of the emergency spillway. The purpose
of the wall is to prevent head-cutting of foundation rock towards the emergency spillway, thus
protecting the emergency spillway if water were ever to flow over the emergency spillway again. The
BOC endorses the modifications that DWR has made to the criteria that defines how deep the wall
needs to be placed.
Question 2
Question 2 relates to Geologic mapping, the RCC borrow source, groundwater monitoring, piezometer
installations and the emergency spillway weir foundation. Geologic mapping refers to information the
geologists gather and document which defines and describes the foundation rock and other information
related to the geology around the site. This information is for the record and also used to design the
spillways.
The borrow site refers to the location where material is borrowed from to make the RCC. This material
is rock material that is crushed than mixed with cement and cement to make the RCC. Additional rock
material is needed for the RCC and therefore sites are being investigated to determine the appropriate
borrow source.
The groundwater monitoring refers to the studies that are being conducted by DWR to understand how
water flows through the ground in the vicinity of the main and emergency spillways. This information is
useful to fully understand any possible affect groundwater could have on the spillways in the future.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #12 | Released October 16, 2017

The piezometer installations is also related to the groundwater monitoring and is the instrument that is
used to help understand the water pressures under the ground. This information is used to help
understand any potential affects groundwater could have on the future spillways.
The emergency spillway weir foundation discussion refers to the foundation rock that is beneath the
concrete weir.
Question 3
Question 3 relates to the physical model studies being conducted in the laboratory. A 1:50 scale model
is used to help engineers predict the behavior how water will flow over the new spillway. Most of the
discussion relates to aeration of the water. Air is introduced into the water to help mitigate for the
possibility of cavitation on the new spillway. The studies are being conducted to determine if the design
needs to consider this issue.
Question 4
Question 4 relates to information that was provided by the forensic team to the BOC. The BOC is
reviewing the findings of the forensic team to ensure these findings are considered as part of the new
design.
Question 5
Self-Explanatory
Question 6
Since RCC is not usually as strong as structural concrete, tests are being performed to ensure any water
flowing over the spillway this coming year will not damage the RCC. A test section includes constructing
a very large section of the RCC. This test section is used by the engineers to investigate the potential of
damage to the RCC under flowing water conditions. The BOC visited the test section and provides
comments on the expected performance of the RCC. This test section is not in the same area of the new
spillway and is only used for testing.
The BOC is also commenting on tests that could be performed later to monitor the drains that are under
the spillway.
The BOCs recommendation regarding detailed inspections of the upper chute is self-explanatory.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #12 | Released October 16, 2017

DATE: September 22, 2017
Califomia Department of Water Resources

INTRODUCTION
On Thursday September 21,2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at

the Department of Water Resources (DWR) Oroville Field Division Office Main
Conference Room at 8:00 am for a brief progress report followed by a tour of the dam
site to observe construction progress. The following construction features were
observed:
cleaning of the remaining area of exposed FCO Spillway chute rock foundation
(excluding the remaining RCC foundation);
upstream spillway chute transition from the old spillway to the new spillway near
Station 20+30;
RCC and structural concrete placement within the FCO Spillway;
construction of the FCO Spillway slabs,

construction of the temporary FCO Spillway RCC gravity training walls including
the shotcrete treatment for the inside face of the RCC walls;
erection of the steel reinforcement and forms for segments of the permanent
FCO Spillway training walls;
drilling and construction for the Emergency Spillway secant pile cutoff wall; and
exposed rock foundation for the Emergency Spillway weir section located on the
right side of the Emergency Spillway.

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Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 12 September 22. 2017
Representatives from DWR Engineering Division, the Division of Safety of Dams

(DSOD), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and industry consultants
working on the Oroville Spillway Recovery project participated in the tour of the site.
Following the tour of the site, a meeting was convened at the DWR Oroville Field
Division Office Main Conference Room beginning at 12:30 pm. Representatives from
DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the
Presentations were made by DWR and their consultants on design and construction
progress related to the following:
FCO Spillway foundation preparation;
placement of leveling and structural concrete within the FCO Spillway;

RCC construction;
Emergency Spillway weir; and
Emergency Spillway secant pile cutoff wall.

The BOC was then updated on the progress of the hydraulic numerical modeling for
both the FCO Spillway and the Emergency Spillway.
On the morning of Friday, September 22, the BOC met at the DWR Oroville Field
Division Office Main Conference Room at 8:00 am for presentations by the Design
Team on:
site geology investigations and FCO Chute exploration;
condition of the Emergency Spillway monoliths and foundation;

site groundwater analysis;
RCC aggregate borrow source investigations; and

Independent Forensic Team Report.
The BOC then met to deliberate and prepare their report. A reading of the BOC's draft
report was made to representatives from DWR Engineering Division, DSOD, FERC, and
industry consultants working on the Oroville Spillway at 3:00 pm. The meeting was
adjourned at 3:30 pm.
Paul Schweiger.

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Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 12 September 22, 2017

construction progress?
Response
1. The Contractor and the Design Team continue to aggressively monitor the
construction progress and critical path work items. The Contractor and the
Design Team performed an assessment of the existing concrete and RCC
plants along with other essential construction equipment to identify potential
replacement parts and backup equipment that may be needed to avoid delays
during the final stages of the FCO spillway construction leading up to the
November 1, 2017 deadline. As a result of this assessment, the Contractor
has procured a backup crane, generator, secant pile drill rig and other
equipment and parts.
The Contractor has demonstrated that RCC placement production has

increased as the placement area increased beyond the narrow rock
crevasses, and has recently achieved RCC placement rates exceeding
5,000 cubic yards per day, resulting in the RCC placement being ahead of
schedule. This is favorable given the additional quantity of RCC recently
determined to be needed (-30,000 cubic yards) in the foundation of the FCO
spillway. The Contractor has also increased the number of on site workers and
currently has approximately 112 full-time staff and 576 craftsmen onsite.
The increase in the quantity of the Leveling Concrete has impacted the
schedule for the Structural Concrete (Slabs and Walls). Now that the Leveling
Concrete is complete, the Structural Concrete can progress unrestrained as
the production from the batch plant can be dedicated solely to the Structural
Concrete on both shifts. The production rate for construction of the Structural
Slabs should increase as less formwork is required due to the checkerboard
placement pattern of the slabs. The production rate of the Structural Wall
should also increase. The number of forms has more than doubled. In
addition, and as a result of initially placing every other wall section, the fill in
concrete placements will not require the time-consuming bulkhead formwork.
The BOC recommends careful and continuous monitoring of the progress of
these critical construction items.
The BOC compliments the Design Team and the Contractor for assessing
critical path work items and pro-actively developing contingency plans to

DO NOT RELEASE 3
minimize down time due to anticipated plant and equipment maintenance

requirements. The BOG continues to be impressed with the organization,
planning and execution of the construction work.
2. The cleaning of the FGO Spillway chute foundation areas for leveling
concrete, and the placement of leveling concrete, ar!8 nearing completion.
The last foundation area to receive leveling concrete under the structural slab
was being cleaned at the time of the BOG site tour. The steep slope of the
arena cut awaits final cleanup in advance of placement of the lifts of RGG. All
of the foundation preparation work exceeded the BOG's expectations. The
foundation preparation for the new FGO spillway is of the highest quality and
is an important accomplishment for the success of the project.
3. RGG aggregate production which has been an ongoing concern due to higher
than anticipated waste material, appears to have been resolved by mobilizing
a second aggregate manufacturing plant. The aggregate production rate has
increased and the total aggregate production is close to being on schedule.
4. The concerns with the low production rates for the secant pile cutoff wall
installation have been addressed by mobilizing additional drill rigs. The more
favorable than anticipated bedrock conditions encountered within the
foundation of the secant pile cutoff wall may allow reducing the required depth
of the wall at some locations. The Design Team presented modifications to
the criteria for establishing the minimum depth of the piles for all panels
outside of the main drainage channel (i.e. excluding Panels 95 to 118). The
revised criteria will be applied to each pile to determine their as-built final
depths by satisfying the following three conditions:
(1) pile depth below original ground is 35 feet or more;
(2) embedment of the pile is at least 15 feet into slightly weathered or

fresh rock; and
(3) a percussion rate of advancement using BG-50 drill rig is less than an
average of 3 feet over a 12-hour shift.
The BOG endorses the Design Team's modifications to the secant pile cutoff
wall and believes recognizing the favorable bedrock conditions is appropriate
and will improve the rate of production of pile installation while satisfying the
design intent.

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2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the geologic

conditions?
Response
1. Geologic Mapping. The BOC was given an update on the geologic mapping
that has, for the most part, been completed in the field and is presently being
compiled into As-Built completion reports. Most site mapping has been
conducted at 1-inch = 5-feet scale (as compared to the original 1960's
construction scale of 1-inch = 20 feet). In addition, all mapping data has been
compiled onto photographs obtained through the use of Unmanned-Aerial-
Vehicles (UAV or the vernacular "drones"). The detail shown on the maps and
in the aerial photography is the most detailed that we are aware of on a
project of this scale. Some of the derivative products that are in progress
include an attempt to classify shears by their prominence and through-going
nature in regards to their effect on rock quality and weathering across the site.
The BOC commends the site personnel for their attention to quality and detail,
and also to DWR for raising the bar in regards to project documentation.
2. New RCC Borrow Source Area: The BOC was informed that due to the
planned RCC volumes increasing from 452,100 cubic yards to 860,000 cubic
yards (an approximate 90% increase) the existing rock borrow will not be
sufficient to meet the increased RCC aggregate demands. After an analysis
of new offsite and onsite borrow areas, it appears the preferred borrow area
will most likely be developed onsite, to the left of the FCO spillway (Station
29+00 to 36+00). This site has environmental and logistical advantages
because this borrow area is located in the area of existing construction and is
located near the rock crushing plant. Initial subsurface investigations show
that the rock materials are of good quality and will have minimal waste. A
preliminary kinematic analysis of planned quarry walls shows that several
different types of slope instabilities will need to be monitored.
The existing rock crushing plant is located several hundred feet downslope
from this proposed rock borrow quarry. The slope below the rock crushing
plant is currently instrumented with slope inclinometers and they show that
some downslope movement has occurred. The rock crushing plant is a
critical facility in terms of being able to maintain the construction schedule.
Not allowing excessive RCC aggregate stockpile placement on this slope
should be an operational requirement so as not to induce new slope
movements. For example, when the RCC aggregate stockpiles are sufficient

DO NOT RELEASE 5
to meet FCO RCC placement requirements, the additional RCC aggregate

could be stockpiled downstream of the Emergency Spillway near the
proposed location of the relocated RCC plant. Monitoring the slope stability
below and around the rock crushing plant should be continued with the
existing slope inclinometers. Consideration should also be given to the
suggestion provided in the presentation by the Design Team to monitor both
the proposed quarry slopes and the rock crushing plant slopes with a slope
monitoring system such as the use of a ground-based L1DAR system.
3. Groundwater Monitoring: The BOC was given an update on the site

groundwater conditions in the FCO and Emergency Spillway areas. A map
of the vibrating wire and open pipe piezometers that were installed in 2017
was presented. Results from these instruments were discussed in a
presentation that included graphs of results from individual instruments as
well as a site groundwater surface contour map. One reason these
observations were made is to address the issue of impact of groundwater flow
on either spillway. These results indicate that while some groundwater can
be stored in the bedrock, there does not appear to be rapid groundwater flow
connectivity along shears or other discontinuities. The overall groundwater
flow regime appears, as one might expect, to mimic the surface topography
and to be moving downslope toward the Feather River.
The BOC encourages the ongoing groundwater monitoring through the use
and maintenance of these instruments, especially as the wet season
approaches. It will be important to compare these initial "dry period" data
readings with those in the future that will be recorded when the reservoir is at
a higher stage or when the FCO chute experiences flows.
4. Piezometer Installations. The Design Team presented a plan showing the

locations of piezometers installed at the FCO spillway and in the vicinity of the
Emergency Spillway monoliths and secant pile cut-off wall. The purpose of
this instrumentation is to provide a baseline for assessing the ground water
conditions as the repair project is being completed. Piezometers installed
beneath of the FCO chute slab will provide evidence of the effectiveness of
the water stops and drainage system in preventing buildup of uplift pressures
under the FCO slab during spill conditions. Piezometers installed upstream
and downstream of the cutoff wall will provide evidence of the effectiveness of
the drainage openings between the cutoff wall panels in lowering the ground
water levels upstream of the secant pile cutoff wall.

DO NOT RELEASE 6
5. Emergency Spillway Weir Foundation: During the September 21 field visit,

the BOC viewed the foundation excavation for the Emergency Spillway Weir.
The original design specified that the subsurface portion be embedded
14 feet into the ground and founded on slightly weathered or fresh rock. The
contractor's initial excavation method used a trenching machine that was
unable to penetrate the bedrock. Subsequently, an excavator with a hoe ram
attachment was used to perform the foundation excavation. This resulted in a
wider than planned foundation (approximately 6 to 7 feet wide instead of 2
feet), but this method was also unable to penetrate to the full 14-foot depth
(measured from the top of the weir) with the current depth approximately 6
feet below the natural ground surface. The rock exposed in the foundation
bottom is predominately slightly weathered to fresh rock. It should be noted
that the current "ground surface" is itself an excavated surface that was
created during the original 1960's construction by excavating from 5 to 40
vertical feet of amphibolite rock, and re-contouring a hill to create the
approach for this part of the emergency spillway (see Figure 1). The BOC
believes that the bedrock currently exposed in this foundation is of sufficient
strength and quality to serve as an adequate foundation for the weir, and that
requiring the contractor to continue deepening this exaction would not be
meaningful.
[. 'r PLAN VIEW
- .~
- . ~
... ~
. . . . L ~:~--_-. -_.""7_,,,-.._
Area of Excavation
~ ...-J
......CROSSSECTIONViEW _ :,
..
::..:. . ..:-
- - ,-;-- "
't i
.
-l.
.-,,'- ....... -; j
'"
Figure 1. Plan and Section showing the original 1960's Emergency Spillway Excavation

DO NOT RELEASE 7
3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the hydraulic

modeling?
Response
1. On September 19, 2017, Eric Kollgaard, John Egbert and Paul Schweiger of
the BOC and Marc Fortner and Tom Molls of the Design Team visited the
Utah State University's Water Research Laboratory to observe the operation
of the physical model of the FCO Spillway. The model study is being
conducted under the direction of Dr. Michael Johnson. During the visit, Dr.
Johnson and his assistants operated the model for full-scale flows
representing various flows up to the maximum designed capacity of the
spillway. The first runs of the model were made simulating an aerated 30-
inch vertical step at Station 28+20. Then similar runs were made with the
model configured for a larger air slot further downstream of the chute. The
following observations were made by the BOC members who observed the
model:
a. Although the physical model provides valuable information on the flow

characteristics within the FCO spillway, it does not appear to
accurately replicate the actual behavior of aeration due to differences
in scale and similitude for the behavior of air. It is noted that the flow
velocities in the physical model are approximately one seventh of
those in the actual spillway. Self-aeration and aeration from the 30-
inch vertical step and air-slot further downstream are therefore
approximate and appear to underestimate the actual aeration that
occurs in the spillway. Self-aeration is clearly not replicated by the
model.
b. Air is definitely drawn into the underside of the flow at both the 30-inch
step and the aerator further downstream. How long the air remains
near the bottom boundary layer is uncertain. The observed air bubbles
in the flow appeared to rise to the surface relatively quickly in the
physical model, and none could be seen a short distance downstream
of the air slot.
c. The 30-inch step appears to function well at flows up to 150,000 cfs.

However, at a maximum flow of 270,000 cfs, backflow from the point of
jet impact was observed to partially fill the void area downstream of the

DO NOT RELEASE 8
step. It appeared that air flow was intermittently blocked from a portion
of the under nappe surface. The larger 9-foot air slot, placed at
approximate Station., was not similarly affected at the maximum
flow. If aeration is to be built into the final chute, it would appear that
the step should be greater than 30-inches unless it can be
demonstrated that adequate air supply is being provided.
d. The model configuration with the simulated 9-foot slot has a small
ramp built into the chute slope just at the start of the step, This
appeared to provide greater turbulence to the flow surface downstream
of the impact point of the jet, and appeared to provide a greater mixing
of air with the water. The flow downstream of the jet impact without
this ramp appeared to remain laminar in appearance.
e. The physical model does not provide evidence that a single air supply
slot near Station. would effectively aerate the flow to the end of
the chute where the velocity of the flow is greatest, and where the
beneficial effect of air entrainment is most needed,
f. It appears that final design of the air slot or slots, if aeration is decided
to be built into the permanent chute surface, should be based on 3D
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) analytical modeling with less
reliance on physical modeling using the current 1 to 50 scale model.
g, The 30-inch step to the RCC surface design should be provided for the
interim period of the 2017-2018 flood season. If no FCO Spillway
discharges for flood protection reasons have to be made, the BOC
would advocate a test operation at 50,000 cfs and 100,000 cfs for a
short period of time to verify the full-scale behavior of the flow in the
spillway with the 30-inch step. Drone imagery may be able to detect
any effect to flow of the aeration from the appearance of the surface,
h. The BOC is not convinced that additional aeration features are

essential for the permanent FCO Spillway chute configuration. The
BOC believes additional aeration may give added confidence that the
chute will not be damaged due to cavitation by flows approaching the
maximum discharge, if these are ever necessary. The BOC is
concerned that the provision for additional aeration could result in
excessive bulking of the flows and result in splash over the training

DO NOT RELEASE 9
Oroville Emergency Recovery ~ Spillways Ted Craddock
walls, The design and construction of aeration provisions also presents

added complication to the Contractor's construction schedule for 2018.
i. The design of the air slot should probably have a small ramp at the
takeoff point. The sloped chute surface and the landing area of the jet
impact point should be made to have as small an impact angle as
possible. Changes in slope from the run out surface to the 25 percent
chute slope should have a curved transition,
j. There was some discussion at the model laboratory of whether it might

be possible to obtain water samples from various depths within a
cross-section of actual flow to measure the air content. This does not
appear to be practicable.
k. Other points noted from the physical model performance include:
Similarly, no
spillway training
The outflows from the energy dissipater at the downstream end of

the FCO Spillway chute shows that erosion of the opposite river
bank could occur at high discharges approaching 270,000 cfs. The
confluence of the spillway flows into the river channel is nearly
perpendicular and produces upstream currents toward the dam.
Although the dam appears to be far enough upstream to not be
affected by these currents, the significance of these upstream flows
on the dam should be evaluated using a 2D or CFD model. It
would be of interest to the BOC to learn whether any problems from
flow near the toe of the dam or the tailrace were experienced during
prior high flow releases of the FCO spillway.
It is expected that the access road on the near river side below the
FCO Spillway energy dissipater will be removed before operation of
the spillway for the 2017-2018 season. A portion of the jet from the
energy dissipater was seen to impact the location of this lower
access road.

DO NOT RELEASE 10
Oroville Emergency Recovery ~ Spillways Ted Craddock
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the Forensic

Report?
Response
1. The BOC appreciates the work of the Independent Forensic Team (1FT) and
the important information provided in both of their publications; (1) the May
5th , 2017 memorandum presenting their preliminary findings concerning
candidate physical factors potentially contributing to damage of the service
and emergency spillways, and (2) the September 5th , 2017 Interim Status
Memorandum. An assessment of the 1FT's September 5th Memorandum has
been documented in a Design Team Technical Memorandum (SRT-SPW-
DOC-08_REV2) that detailed the measures taken in the current design to
mitigate the physical factors identified by the 1FT as likely contributors to the
failure. The BOC reviewed the design and construction factors that the 1FT
believes likely caused the FCO Spillway chute failure and the Emergency
Spillway erosion, and believes that these factors have been satisfactorily
addressed by the Design Team in their current designs for both spillways.
5. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments from the site tour?
Response
1. During the site tour, the BOC observed the following:
a. cleaning of bedrock foundations,
b. placement of leveling concrete,
c. placement of RCC,
d. placement of drain material and drain pipes,
e. erection of steel reinforcement for spillway walls and slabs,
f. placement of conventional concrete for walls and slabs,
g. installation of the shotcrete lining on RCC gravity walls,
h. construction of the secant pile cutoff wall, and
i. relocation of the electrical power lines.
The aforementioned work observed by the BOC appeared to be in conformance
with the specifications and of high quality.
Response
1. The hydro testing performed on the sloped enriched RCC test section showed
that the enriched RCC provides a very durable surface and that the
application of a surface hardener to improve the durability of the surface did

DO NOT RELEASE 11
not demonstrate any noticeable improvement, and in the BOC's judgement

may not be needed. Based on the favorable results of the hydro testing, the
BOC agrees with the decision to not treat the entire surface of the RCG with a
surface hardener. Instead the local area of impact of the jet at the aeration
slot is proposed to be treated with the spray on surface hardener. The BOC
recommends treating a limited area of the RCC surface as proposed by the
Design Team.
2. The BOC noted during their tour of the FCO Spillway chute that the
downstream end of the existing chute slab at Station 20+30 where the
connection to the new constructed slabs will be made, has a number of areas
of spalled or broken concrete on the top edge. These must be repaired by
the best method of concrete patching. Photos showing the spalls along the
downstream end of the existing chute slab are provided in Figure 2.
3. The BOC previously recommended that measurement of flow from individual

chute under-drains be included in the surveillance and monitoring plan. The
usual means to best measure small amounts of flow from individual drains is
by timing the flow captured in a bucket. The configuration of the drain outflow
pipes exiting high on the spillway training walls may not allow the drain flow to
be easily measured using this technique as the drain pipe outlets are flush
with the wall and beyond easy manual reach. Assuming the 12-inch diameter
drain flow pipes have a 2 percent slope and a Manning's "n" of 0.010, a drain
flow depth of 0.5 and 1.0 inches would correspond to outflows of
approximately 4.5 and 27 gpm, respectively. The drains in the new chute will
likely flow less than 1/2-inch depth. An accurate method of measuring the
expected relatively low drain flows should be established. One approach that
could be considered is to lower the backfill height behind the spillway training
walls to expose the downstream end of the drain pipes and tap the pipes to
allow the flow to be measured.
4. The BOC recommends that the Design Team and the Contractor perform a
thorough and detailed inspection of the existing upper chute slab of the FCO
Spillway that will remain in place during the 2018 flood season. The
inspection should focus on any cracks, spalls, and previous repairs, to ensure
that the entire surface is adequately and robustly sealed to prevent infiltration
of water into the slab foundation. A detailed inspection of the existing drain
system should also be performed to confirm that it will serve its intended
function.

DO NOT RELEASE 12
Figure 2. Photos of the downstream end of the existing chute slab showing spalls.

DO NOT RELEASE 13
M12-1 The BOC recommends careful and continuous monitoring of the

progress of critical path construction items.
M12-2 The BOC endorses the Design Team's modifications to the secant
pile cutoff wall design and believes recognizing the favorable
bedrock conditions is appropriate and will improve the rate of
production of pile installation while satisfying the design intent.
M12-3 The BOC recommends not allowing excessive RCC aggregate

stockpile placement in the area of the RCC aggregate production
plant as an operational requirement so as not to induce new slope
movements at this location.
M12-4 The BOC recommends monitoring the proposed quarry slopes and
the rock crushing plant slopes with a slope monitoring system such
as the use of a ground-based L1DAR system.
M12-5 The BOC believes the bedrock currently exposed in the foundation
of the Emergency Spillway weir is of sufficient strength and quality
to serve as an adequate foundation for the cutoff weir.
M12-6 The BOC recommends ongoing groundwater monitoring, especially

as the wet season approaches. The BOC believes it will be
important to compare these initial "dry period" data readings with
those in the future that will be recorded when the reservoir is at a
higher stage or when the FCO Spillway chute experiences flows.
M12-7 If aeration is decided to be built into the permanent chute surface

The BOC recommends that final design of the air slot or slots within
the FCO Spillway chute be based on 3D CFD analytical modeling
with less reliance on physical modeling.
M12-8 The BOC recommends that the 30-inch aeration step to the RCC
surface be provided for the interim period of the 2017-2018 flood
season.
M12-9 If no FCO Spillway discharges for flood protection reasons have to

be made during the 2017-2018 flood season, the BOC
recommends the aeration performance of the 30-inch step be

DO NOT RELEASE 14
tested at 50,000 cfs and 100,000 cfs, if possible, for a short period
of time to verify the full-scale behavior of the flow.
M12-10 The BOC recommends that the flows created by the FCO spillway
discharging normal to the Feather River be evaluated using 2D or
CFD modeling to determine their impact on the dam, if any.
M12-11 Based on the favorable results of the hydro testing of the slope-
enriched RCC test section, the BOC agrees with the decision not to
treat the entire surface of the RCC with a surface hardener.
Instead, a limited area at the local area of impact of the jet at the
3D-inch aeration step is proposed to be treated with the spray on
surface hardener. The BOC concurs with treating this limited area
of the RCC surface as proposed by the Design Team.
M12-12 The BOC recommends that the spalied areas along the
downstream end of the existing FCO chute slab at Station 20+30
(where the connection to the new constructed panels will be made)
be repaired by the best method of concrete patching.
M12-13 The BOC recommends that a reliable method of measuring the

drain flows from the FCO Spillway be established.
M12-14 The BOC recommends that a thorough and detailed inspection of

the existing upper chute slab and drain system of the FCO Spillway
that will remain in place during the 2017-2018 flood season be
performed to confirm that it will serve its intended function.
Eric B. Kollgaard
Ch,.(q'~
Faiz Makdisi
~W?
Kerry Cato

DO NOT RELEASE 15
Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 13 October 20, 2017

Summary & Response
Question 1
Question 1 relates to the construction schedule. The Board of Consultants (BOC) is acknowledging and
commending the Design Team and Contractor for the remarkable progress made and schedule
implemented to meet the November 1st deadline.
Question 2
The first part of question 2 relates to the secant wall which is being placed downstream of the
emergency spillway and beneath the ground. The wall is being placed by first drilling large diameter
holes, then filling the holes with concrete and steel in order to construct the wall beneath the ground.
The discussion is in regards to exploratory borings which are small diameter holes drilled into the
ground. These exploratory holes are investigated to understand and confirm that the wall will be placed
to solid rock.
The second part refers to groundwater conditions around the chute spillway. Instrumentation including
piezometers were previously installed around the chute spillway. Piezometers measure the water
pressure under the ground. The groundwater will continue to be studied. The purpose of studying the
groundwater, among other things, is to understand any potential future water pressures beneath the
chute spillway.
The third part of question 2 refers to a sophisticated monitoring program that is being used to measure
ground movements in and around the construction area. A slope inclinometer is an instrument that is
drilled into the ground to help understand if rock slopes are moving. This instrument is used in
conjunction with ground-based radar to understand all of the ground surface movement around the
site.
Question 3
Question 3 relates to the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) calculations currently being completed by
DWR consultants. PMF calculations are performed around the country and the world to estimate
extreme storms. The PMF is considered the maximum flood that could theoretically occur at a particular
site. These extreme storms are usually reserved for very large dams that have large populations
downstream. The results of the study are used to size spillways to ensure dams can safely pass these
theoretical extreme storms without adversely affecting the dam structure.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #13 | Released November 16, 2017

Question 4
Question 4 relates to a reservoir operation plan for the 2017/2018 flood season. Multipurpose dams
that have flood control as one of their purposes generally have operation requirements that dictate how
the reservoir would be operated during major storms (Water Control Manual). The entire chute spillway
could not be completely rebuilt in one flood season. Therefore, the chute spillway was designed to be
able to safely release 100,000 cfs in the lower part of the chute without any damage. In order to meet
this design requirement and limit flows below 100,000 cfs, an operation plan which includes maintaining
the reservoir lower than normally required is being developed. This plan is designed to maintain flows
less than 100,000 cfs even under the strongest storms that have historically occurred. The BOC has
reviewed the plan and agrees and compliments DWR and their consultant for the work that has been
completed.
Question 5
Self-Explanatory
Question 6
Question 6 is related to question 4 noted above. After reviewing all of the information and inspecting
the resulting chute spillway, the BOC agrees that the RCC spillway will perform better than was even
anticipated during original design. Although there is no intention to use the emergency spillway during
the 2017/2018 season, the BOC recognizes that when completed the construction of the secant wall and
RCC buttress will also probably exceed original design expectations.
BOC MEMO SUMMARY #13 | Released November 16, 2017

DATE: October 20, 2017


INTRODUCTION
On Thursday October 19, 2017, the Independent Board of Consultants (BOC) met at the
Department of Water Resources (DWR) Oroville Field Division Office Main Conference
Room at 8:00 am for presentations made by DWR and their consultants for updates on
the following:
general construction progress;
roller-compacted concrete (RCC) construction;
geologic and groundwater investigations;
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) study; and
the 2017-2018 Flood Season Operations Plan.
At 12:30 pm the BOC toured the dam site to observe construction progress. The following
construction features were observed:
repairs to the concrete slabs of the FCO Spillway chute between Stations 13+00
and 20+30;
RCC and structural concrete placement within the FCO Spillway;
construction of the FCO Spillway slabs,
construction of the temporary FCO Spillway RCC gravity training walls including
the shotcrete treatment for the inside face of the RCC walls;

DO NOT RELEASE 1
Independent Board of Consultants Report No. 13 October 20, 2017
erection of the steel reinforcement and forms for segments of the permanent FCO
Spillway training walls;
construction of the upstream and downstream transitions between the
conventional reinforced concrete FCO Spillway chute and the RCC FCO Spillway
chute; and
start of excavation at the northern portion of the Emergency Spillway RCC apron.
Representatives from the DWR Engineering Division, the Division of Safety of Dams
(DSOD), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and industry consultants
working on the Oroville Spillway Recovery project attended the meeting and participated
in the tour of the dam site.
The BOC met on October 20, 2017 at 8:00 am to deliberate and prepare their report. A
reading of the BOCs draft report was made to representatives from DWR Engineering
Division, DSOD, FERC, and industry consultants working on the Oroville Spillway at
11:30 am. The meeting was adjourned at 12:00 noon.
Paul Schweiger.
1. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on construction

progress?
Response
The Contractor has made remarkable progress since the last BOC meeting held
on September 22, 2017, and is on schedule to complete construction of the
required FCO Spillway features by the November 1, 2017 deadline. The critical
construction work in the FCO Spillway chute including the RCC slab and walls,
shotcrete for the RCC walls, the structural slabs and walls, and repairs to sections
of the existing concrete slabs in the upper FCO spillway chute, is progressing at a
rate equal to or exceeding the production rates required for timely completion. The
structural wall concrete production increased significantly as the Contractor
mobilized additional experienced crews from another project. The Contractors
onsite personnel has been increased to 750 full-time staff to meet the
November 1st deadline.

DO NOT RELEASE 2
The remaining RCC work includes constructing transitions at Stations 28+00 and
39+00, and final chute cleanup and placement of the RCC overlay with the
enriched RCC mix (4,000 psi in 28 days). Subsequent to a 14-day water cure
period, a surface hardener will be applied to selected areas of the RCC overlay.
The BOC commends the Design Team and the Contractor for this significant
accomplishment. The degree of preplanning and scheduling directed by the
Contractor and Design Team toward completing the work in the FCO Spillway is
impressive and demonstrates the Contractors and Design Teams commitment to
completing the project on schedule.
2. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments regarding the

geology and groundwater monitoring update?
Response
The presentation covered more than site geology and groundwater. The BOC
comments address all subjects presented.
1. Secant Wall Installation. The BOC was given an update on the secant pile
cutoff wall installation at the Emergency Spillway. Along the axis of the cutoff
wall, 6 additional geotechnical exploratory borings have been obtained,
bringing the total along this alignment to 17 borings. The purpose of the borings
is to obtain samples for determining rock strength and to confirm rock
conditions at the planned secant pile tip depths. The rock testing work shows
the difficulty in assessing rock strength in rock that has pervasive
discontinuities. In the testing apparatus, the rock sample specimens were
observed to routinely fail along discontinuities.
The Contractor now has access to areas in the deep channel that were
previously inaccessible due to the transmission lines. The Contractors rate of
secant pile installation is acceptable. It appears that the secant wall will be
completed in late January, 2018.
2. Groundwater Monitoring: The BOC was given an update on the site

groundwater conditions in the FCO area. Results from existing instruments
were discussed in a presentation that included maps that showed groundwater
surface contours. The groundwater surface appears to represent a subdued
expression of the surface topography and shows that groundwater moves
downslope toward the Feather River. A map showing locations of 15 new open
pipe piezometers that are being installed near the FCO Spillway and onsite

DO NOT RELEASE 3
borrow area was presented. These piezometers are being installed in areas
near the FCO chute to gain a better understanding of how groundwater moves
through the rock foundation. Being able to compare current baseline data
readings with those when the FCO Spillway chute experiences flows is
important. The BOC believes the current and planned monitoring program is
prudent. Further, the BOC continues to interpret this rock foundation as being
relatively tight in regard to groundwater flow interaction between surface flow
and groundwater flow. Exceptions may exist in local areas where fractured
rock or shears exist.
3. Slope Monitoring and Radar: The BOC was given an update on the current
slope monitoring and the plan of using ground-based radar scanning to monitor
surface movement. A slope inclinometer in the rock processing plant area
shows minor slope movement (on the order of 0.5 inch). While this movement
is minor, the rock processing plant is a critical component to RCC production.
To enhance monitoring, a ground-based radar scanning unit will be installed to
obtain real-time movements of the ground surface. Areas of interest to be
monitored include the rock processing plant, the slopes of the new onsite
borrow areas, and the slopes of the arena cut area on the right side of the FCO
Spillway chute. The BOC endorses this monitoring plan and looks forward to
future updates.
Figure 1. Photograph showing area of project site that will be monitored using radar.

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3. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the PMF

update?
Response
Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) studies for Oroville Dam have been reviewed and
revised several times since the dam was designed in 1965 due to enhanced
understanding of atmospheric conditions that lead to the probable maximum
precipitation (PMP), improved hydrometeorological monitoring, improved
watershed rainfall-runoff-routing model capabilities, and changed atmospheric,
hydrologic, hydraulic, or operational conditions. DWR, acting on the
recommendation of the FERC Part 12 BOC, authorized their consultant to re-
estimate the PMF in 2016, just before the spillway incident occurred. To support
design of the restored spillways, work on the PMF estimation was accelerated.
The procedure used to update the PMF along with the results of the updated PMF
study, were presented to the BOC.
The procedure to update the PMF included:
1. developing an HEC-HMS model of the Feather River watershed above Lake

Oroville;
2. calibrating the model to four historical events with snow accumulation and
melt included in the analysis;
3. developing the final HEC-HMS model parameter set;
4. verifying the HEC-HMS model using a fifth storm event;
5. computing PMP depth using Hydrometeorological Report No. 59 (HMR 59)
methods (NWS 1999);
6. developing 72-hour storms using the computed PMP and various historical
and synthetic storm patterns;
7. developing antecedent snow conditions and air temperature boundary
conditions to simulate snow accumulation and melt during the PMP storms;
8. configuring the HEC-HMS simulations using the calibrated and verified
model, PMP boundary conditions, air temperature boundary conditions, and
antecedent snow conditions described above;
9. simulating PMF runoff for each storm scenario and computing inflow to Lake
Oroville;
10. routing each inflow hydrograph through Lake Oroville by simulating reservoir
operations using an established HEC-ResSim model of the lake and dam;
11. reviewing results and adopting a PMF inflow hydrograph that results in the
highest maximum reservoir pool elevation to use for continued design and
analyses; and

DO NOT RELEASE 5
12. computing wind-wave setup and run-up potential.
The adopted PMF inflow hydrograph has a peak of 743,800 cubic feet per
second (cfs). Routing this flow through the reservoir using the recently updated
outlet rating curves results in a maximum pool elevation within the existing
freeboard of the dam, even when the reservoir routing is performed assuming a
full pool El. of 901 feet at the start of the PMF event. Wind-wave setup and run-
up potential was assessed as not being a significant factor during large winter
storms such as the PMF.
The BOC believes the PMF update study is thorough and the level of detail is
appropriate for a dam of such significance. The BOC is in agreement with the
approach used to update the PMF and believes the findings of the study are
reasonable and conservative. The BOC commends DWRs consultant for their
effort and the quality of the analyses.
4. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the 2017/18

Flood Season Operation Plan?
Response
The proposed plan outlines operations from November 1, 2017 through April 30,
2018 that limit the interim preferred FCO spillway design release to 100,000 cfs
while ensuring downstream flood protection meets the existing US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) flood control requirements set forth in the 1970 water control
manual (WCM) for Lake Oroville. The Plan provides a strategy that guides
operations through approximately 99.5% of anticipated hydrology and an
emergency contingency plan that guides operations for rare flood events. The
primary objectives of the plan include:
1. providing equal or greater flood protection for the downstream entities;
2. safely passing the standard project flood (SPF) from the 1970 USACE
WCM developed for Oroville Dam and Reservoir without activating the
Emergency Spillway;
3. avoiding gated FCO releases greater than the interim preferred design
outflow objective of 100,000 cfs; and
4. not increasing the frequency at which critical pool elevations, releases or

downstream flow levels are exceeded; and

DO NOT RELEASE 6
5. operating Lake Oroville to accommodate an early start to the 2018

construction season.
Using a detailed iterative modeling approach, an interim flood management

pool volume of 1.35 million acre-feet was selected that corresponds to an
enhanced flood pool target of 800.0 feet for the months of November 2017
through March 2018. This elevation provides an additional 48.5 feet of vacant
flood control storage adding about 600,000 acre-feet to the current required
750,000 acre-feet of total flood control storage for that period.
The proposed operations strategy was tested using 59 historical ensemble

traces for the operating period of October 5, 2017 through April 30, 2018,
following the Plan Operations Strategy with satisfactory outcomes.
The BOC understands that the outflows detailed in the Operations Plan do not
exceed the following downstream flow rates established in the 1970 Water
Control Manual:
maximum target flow at Marysville and Yuba City of 180,000 cfs;

maximum target flow at confluence of the Feather River and Yuba
Rivers of 300,000 cfs; and
maximum target flow at Nicolaus, just downstream of the confluence of
the Feather River and Bear Rivers, of 320,000 cfs.
The BOC recognizes that significant effort and careful deliberation went into
developing the proposed interim Flood Season Operation Plan. The BOC
believes the plan will meet the primary objectives, maintain dam safety, and
provide the required flood control benefits for the period of November 2017 to
May 2018. The BOC compliments DWR and their consultant for developing a
thoughtful plan that demonstrates their commitment to public safety.
5. Does the BOC have any recommendations or comments on the site visit?
Response
1. During the site tour, the BOC observed the following:
a. repair of reinforced concrete FCO upper chute slabs;
b. placement of RCC;
c. erection of steel reinforcement for spillway walls and slabs;
d. placement of conventional concrete for walls and slabs;

DO NOT RELEASE 7
e. installation of the shotcrete lining on RCC gravity training walls; and

f. start of excavation at the northern portion of the Emergency Spillway
RCC apron.
The BOC took note of the intense effort under way on the structural concrete slab
transitions at Station 20+00 and Station 39+00 along with the 8 transitions in the
structural concrete walls.
The aforementioned work observed by the BOC appeared to be in conformance
with the specifications and of high quality. Select photographs of observed work
are provided in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Response
As stated in Appendix F, Extreme Hydrology Contingency Planning for the Lake
Oroville 2017/2018 Flood Control Season Operations Plan, a storm event with a
0.2% to 0.5% chance of occurring could potentially trigger an outflow exceeding
the interim FCO Spillway design capacity of 100,000 cfs. The BOC agrees with the
Design Teams assessment that the partially reconstructed FCO spillway,
including the 1,100-foot-long RCC chute, can physically pass an outflow of
150,000 cfs. Conceivably, a 0.2% probability extreme hydrological event could
require use of the emergency spillway to avoid flows greater than 150,000 cfs
through the FCO Spillway.
Mitigation measures are underway to allow safe operation of the Emergency

Spillway for flows up to 30,000 cfs in the interim period. The BOC agrees that the
construction of the secant pile cutoff wall together with the RCC buttressing of the
emergency spillway weir and slope paving downstream adequately protects the
integrity of the Emergency Spillway against flows up to the selected interim
discharge of 30,000 cfs, and probably much greater. The BOC understands the
DWR will be conducting an assessment of the conveyance of the Emergency
Spillway flows downstream of the secant pile cutoff wall to the Feather River, and
in particular estimating the anticipated extent of erosion of the overburden and
weathered rock material within this zone due to various flood events up to the PMF.
The BOC looks forward to reviewing this assessment and learning if actions are
needed to mitigate this potential for erosion.

DO NOT RELEASE 8
Figure 2. Photograph from the upper FCO Spillway looking downstream. Replacement of
the permanent FCO structural concrete walls and chute slab is about complete
with all of the floor slabs and all but 8 of the wall sections installed.
Figure 3. Photograph showing remaining section of the FCO chute to be infilled with RCC
(shown at the left) of the main scour hole with the permanent portion of the FCO
structural portion shown on the right.

DO NOT RELEASE 9
Figure 4. Photograph looking upstream in the FCO Spillway chute at the transition from
the permanent structural concrete chute walls and floor slabs (foreground) to the
completed RCC sections. The RCC was placed in the areas of the two big scour
holes; the RCC filling of the upper scour hole is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 5. Photograph showing the two concrete slabs that remain to be completed in the
replaced lower section of the FCO chute spillway.

DO NOT RELEASE 10
The BOC had no recommendations.

DO NOT RELEASE 11

Lake Oroville BOC Reports 1 Through 13 (Searchable Text Version)

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Lake Oroville Spillways Emergency Recovery

Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 1 March 10, 2017

Summary & Response

Issues Noted for Consideration

BOC MEMO SUMMARY #1 | RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

BOC MEMO SUMMARY #1 | RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

TO: Mr. Ted Craddock, Project Manager

FROM: Independent Board of Consultants for

SUBJECT: Memorandum No. 1 - Orientation Meeting March 1 & 3, Site Visit

INITIAL INTRODUCTORY MEETING AND ORIENTATION

FIELD TRIP TO INSPECT SPILLWAY DAMAGE

ISSUES NOTED BY THE BOC FOR CONSIDERATION, DURING RESTORATION

RESTORATION DESIGN MEETING MARCH 10, 2017

QUESTIONS FOR THE BOC

1. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations regarding the

Additional aspects of the short-term mitigation consist of the cyclopean backfill

of the depressions to obtain a level surface to place Roller Compacted Concrete

3. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations on the Design

The presented design criteria for spillway flows are as follows:

Gated Spillway peak design outflow of 277,000 cfs

Operational maximum release goals are as follows:

Operate the reservoir to limit the Gated Spillway maximum design

4. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations on the preliminary

5. Does the BOC have any other comments, advice, recommendations, or

Planned Geologic Investigation. The BOC believes the planned geologic

BOC RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY (COMPILED BY STEPHEN W. VERIGIN)

MO 1.3 The BOC concurs that restoration of the service spillway to

Emergency Site Repairs, Question 1:

M1 1.1 One aspect of the short-term Emergency Spillway plan is to

M1 1.3 It is imperative that the Emergency Spillway not receive additional

Preliminary Design Concepts for Gated and Emergency Spillway, Question 2:

M1 2.4 Another alternative for repair of this upper chute section is to

Design Teams Intended Approach for Developing Design Criteria, Question 3:

M1 3.1 It is the BOCs understanding that design criteria will be developed

Preliminary Schedule, Question 4:

Advice, Recommendations, Questions for Design Team, Question 5:

M1 5.2 The BOC believes the planned geologic investigation is warranted

John J. Cassidy Eric B. Kollgaard Faiz Makdisi Kerry Cato

Date: Friday, 3/10/2017

Questions for the Board

9:00 9:15 Welcome, introductions Ted Craddock

Present, did not sign in

Lewis, Liz GEi

Lindell, James MWH Stantec

MacArthur, Robert MWH Stantec

Nichols, Holly DWR

Pandey, Ganesh DWR

Putnam, Jim GEi

Rogers, Mike MWH Stantec

Royer, Joe DWR

Todarro, Sal USACE

Torres, Ralph DWR

Verigin, Steve GEi

Wagner, Annie DWR

White, Molly DWR

Summary & Response

BOC MEMO SUMMARY #2 | RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

BOC MEMO SUMMARY #2 | RELEASED APRIL 24, 2017

DATE: Friday, 3/17/2017

FROM: Independent Board of Consultants for

SUBJECT: Memorandum No. 2

QUESTIONS FOR THE BOC

1. Does the BOC have any comments or recommendations pertaining to the