Joaquin v.

Reyes
G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004

FACTS:

Respondents filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
containing the following allegations:

a. Lourdes P. Reyes was the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981.
b. Respondents Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. were the legitimate children of respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and
the deceasedRodolfo A. Reyes;

c. That 4 years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino and such
relationship bore children

d. Before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income of
P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on September 30, 1980, received from said company benefits and emoluments in the
amount of P315,011.79; that respondent wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.

e. On July 12, 1979, a Deed of Sale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila was
executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino

f. The funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as
executive of Warner Barnes and Company as petitioner Joaquin was without the means to pay for the same;

g. Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property in order to pay the
balance of the purchase price;

h. Petitioner alleges that she purchased the real property in question with her own exclusive funds and it wasonly for
convenience that the late Rodolfo facilitated the mortgage over the same;

The CA affirmed the RTC when it ruled that the house and lot had been paid in full out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes
since there was no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially capable of buying the disputex property or that she had actually
contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for it. Hence, such property should be surrendered to the estates of the spouses.

ISSUE: WON the findings of CA that the property subject of this case are CONJUGAL property of lawfully wedded Rodolfo and
Lourdes?

RULING: YES. The CA is correct.

Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains
(CPG) is created upon marriage.and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial
separation of property.Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and wife.

On the other hand, Article 144[16] of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman who are living together
but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be
incapacitated to contract marriage such as the facts in this case. Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to
marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be
owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.

Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes, using
his salaries and earnings. By substantial evidence, respondents showed the following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed
as comptroller at Warner, Barnes and Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon which he received a sizeable
retirement package;[22] 2) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly purchased, [23] he applied for a mortgage
loan[24] -- intended for housing[25] -- from the Commonwealth Insurance Company;3) that he secured the loan with a real estate
mortgage[26] over the same property; 4) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the loan [27] as well as the semi-annual
premiums[28] for a Philam Life insurance policy, which he was required to take as additional security; and 5) that with the proceeds
of his life insurance policy, the balance of the loan was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company. [29]

All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives
rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo
were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds
under the Civil Code.

Moreover, the contention of the petitioner that the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in petitioners name
was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was
void, because it was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.

The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory
heirs of ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely on
the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate
of title.[39]

QUIAO V. QUIAO

G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties
shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term
Net Profits Earned.

RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolutionof conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in
this case. Art 129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO.

3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits
earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies
in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership
of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the ConjugalPartnership of Gains,
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by
the husband and wife.

While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded
in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in
her complaint that all of the conjugalproperties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant
to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage
(except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples properties. And when the
couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally
or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate
properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of
Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The
law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing
to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since
the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which
may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.