CAREYSSA MAE I.

IPIL November 13, 2017

PALE 5:30 -7:00 (MW)

CLETO DOCENA vs ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON

[ A.C. No. 2387, September 10, 1998]

FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for
Forcible Entry.
While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eartern Samar, Branch
I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond
in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
On 1980, the CFI of Eastern Samar rendered a decision in favor of the Docena spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond
of P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent.
When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such
undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.
Respondent then contended that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for representing the
Docena spouses in their appeal.
But this self-serving allegation is belied by the letter of respondent himself demanding from the
Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the
execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to
return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never his,
and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is guilty on the grounds of malpractice, gross
misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath.

RULING:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is
not a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all
times in order to maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and honored fraternity.
Moreover, the court ruled that this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a craft but
a profession. Its basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its
aid. If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their live, accord continuing
fidelity to them. By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation,
respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and
most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded
the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of
his depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys.
He should be disbarred.
CAREYSSA MAE I. IPIL November 13, 2017
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SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. vs ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS

[ A.C. No. 4749, January 20, 2000 ]

FACTS:
A complaint letter was filed by Soliman M. Santos, also a member of the bar against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
Complainant alleged that for a number of years, he has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data in his pleadings and sometimes does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax, hence, he is no longer a member of the bar in good standing.
That since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that
he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation
is a farmer of which he is.
Moreover, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
Being thus exempt, he honestly believed in view of his detachment from a total practice of law,
but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar
is covered by such exemption.
Respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP
dues.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show
that respondent never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance
with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests,
charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his
IBP dues.
Respondent then moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in
a resolution

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent is exempt from the payment of IBP dues.
2. Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter.

RULING:
1. No, he is not exempted in paying his IBP Dues. The law provides that every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the court ruled that, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying
his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432,
grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
2. Yes, the law provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct, Canon 7 provides that, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar and Canon 10, a lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court and a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
In the case at bar, respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of
the law, we believe the penalty of 1 year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid
his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
CAREYSSA MAE I. IPIL November 13, 2017
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LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
[ B.M. No. 1370, May 09, 2005 ]

FACTS:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
Petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues. He alleged that after being admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until
1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the
year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working
in the Philippine Civil Service since the latter prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service.
IBP then commented that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that
a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member
of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined
by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court, that the validity of
imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption
from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the
IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar.
It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
Petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption
in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the
IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues.

RULING:
The court ruled in NEGATIVE. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Organized by or under the direction of the State,
an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues.
At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated
Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
CAREYSSA MAE I. IPIL November 13, 2017
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ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO vs ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA

[ A.C. No. 6296, November 22, 2005 ]

FACTS:
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo
Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into.
In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled
"Sumbong", to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija.
At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings, respondent, on the strength of a Special
Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter.
Complainant's objection to respondent's appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is
entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to
complainant's retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that
she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove
that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay,
acted as Inos Lorenzo's counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact.
Respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Punong
Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay
Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as
pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer
appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she
argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay
conciliation proceedings.

RULING:
Yes. Section 415 of the LGC of 1991, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides that
appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale
behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct
information about the facts and issues, the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents
are parties.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not,
to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not
apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who
thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that
complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay
justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since
the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings.
Section 412(a) the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the
lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two
parties.
CAREYSSA MAE I. IPIL November 13, 2017
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PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY, PETITIONER
[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

FACTS:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines?

RULING:
Yes, by way of an exception.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires
it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
Therefore, he may practice law in the Philippines, provided that he complies with the conditions
set forth by RA 9225.
CAREYSSA MAE I. IPIL November 13, 2017
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FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA

[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004]

FACTS:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own
cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January
14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by
Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his
behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention
to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance,
tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were uttered were
totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the
public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the
said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.

RULING:
The court ruled in NEGATIVE.
We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not amount to a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial
court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance,
inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer. Such
single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension
or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account
for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way
is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
Moreover, the court added that all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of
the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar
imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyers language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum
CAREYSSA MAE I. IPIL November 13, 2017
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NELIA A. ZIGA vs. JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003]
FACTS:
Complainant Nelia A. Ziga filed a case against Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), Daet, Camarines Norte, for appearing as counsel in a land registration case
without permission from the Supreme Court and asking for attorneys fees for his legal services.
Nelia Arejola-Ziga and Judge Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By virtue
of inheritance, they and eight others became owners in fee simple of a 19,664 sq. m. land in
Calauag, Naga City owned by Fabiana. On 1995, while respondent was employed as an attorney
in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in behalf of his co-heirs, an
application for registration of title of the lot.
RTC granted the petition and ordered the imperfect title of the heirs to the property confirmed
and registered in the name of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola.
On June 9, 1997, respondent was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. He
took his oath on August 1, 1997.
Despite his appointment, respondent Judge continued to appear in the land registration case.
The court then asked him to submit his authority as approved by the Supreme Court.
Complainant alleges that respondent should be disciplined for appearing before a court as
counsel without securing the permission of the Supreme Court and for asking contingent
attorneys fees and agents commission.
Respondent argues: He does not need to ask permission from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO)
or from the Supreme Court since he has every right to appear before the lower court as co-heir.
He has been appearing in the land registration case as representative of the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola and not as counsel. He filed the application for the confirmation of land title in his own
behalf and in representation of his co-heirs. Respondent further explains that since he alone
actively participated in the case, he has every right to demand contribution from the other heirs
who benefited from his work, to be taken from the proceeds of the sale of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Ramon A. Arejola be found guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:
YES. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in
court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, giving advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments
and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions
and special proceedings.
His rationalization that he represented the heirs as a co-heir and not as counsel is hair-splitting.
The respondents act of writing pleadings and defending the rights of his co-heirs amounts to private
practice of law. The tenor of the letters and pleadings, taken with his acts of appearing, representing
and defending the rights of the heirs over the property, show that respondent, as representative of
the heirs, was defending the latters rights over the disputed property, and these constituted private
practice of law.
It should be clarified that prohibited private practice of a profession is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.[32] It is evident that the
instances when respondent appeared and represented his co-heirs are not isolated, thus,
constituting the private practice of the law profession as contemplated by law.
Under Rule 138, Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from engaging
in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. This is reiterated in Canon 5
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins members of the bench to regulate their extra-judicial
activities to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the Code in
particular states:
A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or
law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.
This aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent
them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral
decency and desire to promote the public interest.
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ROMULO M. VILLA vs. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA
[B.M. No. 674. June 14, 2005]

FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition filed on April 13, 2005 by Junel Anthony D. Ama, a successful
1992 Bar Examinee, praying that he be admitted to the Philippine Bar, be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
The petitioner, along with other members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity of the Ateneo de Manila
School of Law, was implicated and criminally charged for the death of Jose Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa. An Amended Information for serious physical injuries was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 53, against the petitioner. Another criminal
Information for Homicide, in relation to the death of Villa, was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City.
Romulo Villa, the victim's father, filed a petition with the Court praying that the petitioner be
disallowed from taking the Lawyer's Oath and from signing the Roll of Attorneys pending final
judgment in the criminal cases filed against him.
MTC rendered its decision and acquitted the petitioner. On the other hand, the RTC, found the
petitioner guilty of homicide through conspiracy.
Petitioner then appealed the decision to CA and the latter set aside the lower courts decision
rendering him guilty on slight physical injuries. And instead of serving the sentence, he applied
for probation which granted him and terminated the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Romulo Villa be allowed to take oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:
YES. The court ruled that petitioner be allowed to take the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys, citing the cases of In Re: Al Argosino[5]cralaw and In Re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. both
involving bar passers who were convicted of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
but after serving their respective sentences, were nevertheless allowed by the Court to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was also pointed out that in Bar Matter No. 832,
the Court allowed Antonio M. Tuliao, convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
(which arose out of the same incident as that of Argosino and Cuevas, Jr.,) to take the Lawyer's
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
The court ruled that crime for which the petitioner was convicted - slight physical injuries - is after
all, a light offense, and cannot be considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the
community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility, or revenge; certainly not a crime involving
moral turpitude
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ARTEMIO ENDAYA vs. ATTY. WILFREDO OCA
[A.C. No. 3967. September 3, 2003]

FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition filed on April 13, 2005 by Junel Anthony D. Ama, a successful
1992 Bar Examinee, praying that he be admitted to the Philippine Bar, be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
The petitioner, along with other members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity of the Ateneo de Manila
School of Law, was implicated and criminally charged for the death of Jose Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa. An Amended Information for serious physical injuries was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 53, against the petitioner. Another criminal
Information for Homicide, in relation to the death of Villa, was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City.
Romulo Villa, the victim's father, filed a petition with the Court praying that the petitioner be
disallowed from taking the Lawyer's Oath and from signing the Roll of Attorneys pending final
judgment in the criminal cases filed against him.
MTC rendered its decision and acquitted the petitioner. On the other hand, the RTC, found the
petitioner guilty of homicide through conspiracy.
Petitioner then appealed the decision to CA and the latter set aside the lower courts decision
rendering him guilty on slight physical injuries. And instead of serving the sentence, he applied
for probation which granted him and terminated the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Romulo Villa be allowed to take oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:
YES. The court ruled that petitioner be allowed to take the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys, citing the cases of In Re: Al Argosino[5]cralaw and In Re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. both
involving bar passers who were convicted of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
but after serving their respective sentences, were nevertheless allowed by the Court to take the
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was also pointed out that in Bar Matter No. 832,
the Court allowed Antonio M. Tuliao, convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
(which arose out of the same incident as that of Argosino and Cuevas, Jr.,) to take the Lawyer's
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.
The court ruled that crime for which the petitioner was convicted - slight physical injuries - is after
all, a light offense, and cannot be considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the
community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility, or revenge; certainly not a crime involving
moral turpitude