REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 254 OF 2002

State of Punjab Appellant

Versus

Sukhchain Singh & Anr. Respondents

with

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 587 OF 2002

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 254 OF 2002

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a Division Bench of the Punjab

and Haryana High Court upholding the acquittal of the respondents. The

responders were respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 537 DBA of 1997. The

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High Court heard four appeals but we are concerned with the two appeals only

i.e. Criminal appeal no. 537 DBA of 1997 and . Criminal appeal No. 170- DB

of 1997 (Paramjit Singh v. State of Punjab) and disposed the appeals along

with two other appeals. Respondents faced trial along with two others namely

Mohan Singh and Paramjit Singh for alleged commission of offences

punishable under Sections 148, 302,307,326,325,323/302 read with Section

149, 307 read with Section 149, 326/149, 325 read with Section 149 and

323/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1960 (in short the IPC). Another accused

Harbhajan Singh died during trial.

3. The trial court held that the accusations were not established so far as the

present respondents are concerned but found the two co-accused persons

Mohan Singh and Paramjit Singh guilty of various offences. Criminal Appeal

No. 537 DBA of 1997 was filed by the State questioning acquittal of the

respondents. The connected Criminal appeal No. 587 of 2002 has been filed by

the accused Paramjit Singh who was appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 170 DB

of 1997 before the High Court.

Prosecution version leading to the trial of the accused persons is as

follows:

On 6th September, 1987 at about 6.30 PM Jit Singh and Jaswant Singh

(both deceased) alongwith Nishan Singh (P.W.7), Ghula Singh (P.W.8),

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Swaran Singh and Bakhshish Singh were sitting near the office of the Truck

Union, Khanauri Mandi when accused Mohan Singh armed with a SBBL gun,

Paramjit Singh, Sukhchain Singh and Swaran Singh armed with gandasas and

Harbhajan Singh unarmed came to the spot in Truck No. HYA 6595, being

driven by Harbhajan Singh. After parking the truck at a distance of 6-7 kadams

from the Cabin, the accused got down and raised a lalkara that they would

teach them a lesson for being instrumental in making them lose the elections

held to the various offices of the Truck Union. Mohan Singh accused

thereupon fired two shots at Jit Singh Singh and Ghula singh. Harbhajan

Singh then snatched the gun from Mohan Singh and fired one shot hitting

Jaswant Singh on his arm and back. Swaran Singh, Paramjit Singh and

Sukhchain Singh accused also caused injuries to Swaran Singh, Nishan Singh

and Ghula Singh. All the accused thereafter re-boarded the truck and escaped

from the spot. Jit Singh and Jaswant Singh died almost immediately

whereas Ghula Singh, who was in a serious condition, was taken to the

Hospital by some persons who had come to the spot whereas Nishan Singh and

Swaran Singh left for Police Post, Khanauri. Along the way, however, they

came across a police party headed by ASI Shamsher Singh(P.W.12). Nishan

Singh made his statement to him at 8.00 P.M. and on its basis, the formal F.I.R

was registered at Police Station, Moonak, 25 kms away at 9.30 P.M.; with the

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special report being delivered to the Iliaqa Magistrate at Sunam at 2.30 AM on

September 7,1987. ASI Shamsher Singh (P.W.12) also went to the place of

occurrence and made the necessary inquiries and amongst other articles picked

up three spent cartridges cases of .12 bore. The accused were arrested on

12.9.1987 and Truck No. HYA-6595 belonging to Harbhajan Singh was taken

into possession. Mohan Singh accused also produced his .12 bore gun and two

live cartridges. The spent cartridges and the gun belonging to Mohan Singh

accused were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory and the Laboratory in its

report (Exh.PRR) opined that the said cartridges had been fired from the gun in

question. On the completion of the investigation, the accused were charged for

offences punishable under section 302 and other offences of IPC as noted

above and the Arms Act, 1959 (in short the Arms Act) and as they pleaded

not guilty, were brought to trial.

4. Before the High Court it was contended by accused, who were

convicted, that the FIR was lodged belatedly and on that basis the prosecution

version was vulnerable. There was no motive for five of the accused persons to

come to the spot fully armed and cause the death of two persons and injuries to

three persons. The State questioned correctness of acquittal on the ground that

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the conclusions of the trial court were erroneous, the acquitted persons

supported the acquittal.

5. High Court after noticing the argument came to the following

conclusions.

It is true that there appears to be some delay in the lodging of the

FIR as the special report had been delivered to the Illaqa
Magistrate at Sunam almost 6-7 hours after its registration. We
are, however, of the opinion that in the light of the fact that there
were three injured eye witnesses including Nishan Singh and
Ghula Singh, the fact that there was some delay in the lodging of
the FIR can be over-looked. These two eye witnesses had clearly
stated to the motive far the offence and detailed the actual
incident. It has come in their evidence that Bhupinder Singh and
Harbhajan Singh had fought the elections to the Truck Union and
the complainant party was helping Bhupinder Singh whereas the
accused were in favour of Harbhajan Singh. The fact that the
election were held and Harbhajan Singh and Bhupinder Singh
were the candidates has not been denied. We also find that the
members of the accused party were closely related to the each
other and it was on this account that they had come together to
Khanauri Mandi to avenge a perceived insult. The trial court itself
had been conscious of the fact that there were two stamped
witnesses who had suffered serious injuries on their person, but in
view of the fact that there was some delay in the lodging of the

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 FIR. , it had chosen to acquit Swaran Singh and Sukhchain Singh
accused. We have also considered Mr. Narulas argument with
regard to the culpability of Paramjit Singh. As per the evidence of
Nishan Singh(P.W.-7), accused Paramjit Singh, who was armed
with a Gandasa, had given a blow hitting Swaran Singh on his left
arm. It is true that Swaran Singh has not been examined as a
witness but from the eye witness account as also the statement of
Dr. Gurcharan Singh (P.W.-5), it is clear that there was one incised
wound measuring 3.5cm x 1 cm and one contusion 2 cm wide on
the lateral aspect of the abdominal wall on his person Dr.
H.L.Garg (DW 2), had also X/rayed the injuries of Swaran Singh
but no bone injury had been detected. We find that the injuries
suffered by Swaran Singh have been reflected in the medical
report. We therefore find that the involvement of Paramjit Singh
clearly stands established.

6. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the trial court and the High

Court clearly lost sight of the relevant facts and therefore the judgment is

vulnerable.

7. In Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2002, learned counsel for the accused

Paramjit Singh submitted that when co-accused have been acquitted there is no

reason for the high Court to uphold the conviction so far as Paramjit Singh is

concerned.

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8. In response learned counsel for the respondents-State submitted that the

High Court was justified in upholding the conviction of the appellant.

9. It would be appropriate to consider and clarify the legal position first.

Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter referred to as the Code) deals with appeals. Section 372

expressly declares that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a

criminal court except as provided by the Code or by any other law for the time

being in force. Section 373 provides for filing of appeals in certain cases.

Section 374 allows appeals from convictions. Section 375 bars appeals in cases

where the accused pleads guilty. Likewise, no appeal is maintainable in petty

cases (Section 376). Section 377 permits appeals by the State for enhancement

of sentence. Section 378 confers power on the State to present an appeal to the

High Court from an order of acquittal. The said section is material and may be

quoted in extenso:

378. Appeal in case of acquittal.(1) Save as otherwise

provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of
sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any
case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the
High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal
passed by any court other than a High Court, or an order of
acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which
the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police

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 Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency
empowered to make investigation into an offence under any
Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may
also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject
to the provisions of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the
order of acquittal.
(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be
entertained except with the leave of the High Court.
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted
upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to
it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to
appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present
such an appeal to the High Court.
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained
by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the
complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other
case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.
(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the
grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is
refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under
sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).

Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of appeals, other Sections

lay down procedure to be followed by appellate courts.

10. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the old Code)

which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judicial

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Committee of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the present

appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of the power of

an appellate court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we have confined

ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.

11. Bare reading of Section 378 of the Code (appeal in case of acquittal)

quoted above, makes it clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the

legislature on the powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against

acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to

reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which

the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such

evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the

High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.

12. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double

presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is

available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that

every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty

by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal,

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the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced,

reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

13. Though the above principles are well established, a different note was

struck in several decisions by various High Courts and even by this Court. It is,

therefore, appropriate if we consider some of the leading decisions on the

point.

14. The first important decision was rendered by the Judicial Committee of

the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor (1934) 61 IA 398). In Sheo

Swarup the accused were acquitted by the trial court and the local Government

directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an

order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code (similar to Section 378 of

the Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before the High Court, it was

contended on behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an order of acquittal,

it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with the findings of fact

recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could not have been reached by

him had there not been some perversity or incompetence on his part. The High

Court, however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no condition was

imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It accordingly reviewed all the

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evidence in the case and having formed an opinion of its weight and reliability

different from that of the trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A

petition was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the

ground that conflicting views had been expressed by the High Courts in

different parts of India upon the question whether in an appeal from an order of

acquittal, an appellate court had the power to interfere with the findings of fact

recorded by the trial Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal

position and accordingly upon the humble advice of their Lordships, leave

was granted by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued. The Committee

considered the scheme and interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code)

observed that there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or

restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers as an Appellate Tribunal.

The Code also made no distinction as regards powers of the High Court in

dealing with an appeal against acquittal and an appeal against conviction.

Though several authorities were cited revealing different views by the High

Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal, the Committee did not

think it proper to discuss all the cases.

15. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:

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 There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view,
apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in India,
that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to reverse an
order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in cases in which
the lower court has obstinately blundered, or has through
incompetence, stupidity or perversity reached such distorted
conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice, or
has in some other way so conducted or misconducted itself as
to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked
by the defence so as to produce a similar result.

16. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)

Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court
full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order
of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon
that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No
limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found
expressly stated in the Code.

17. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts and stated: (IA

p.404)

But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before

reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and
will always give proper weight and consideration to such
matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of
the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact
that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the
accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an

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 appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a
judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state
this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct
of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and
principles well known and recognised in the administration of
justice.
(emphasis supplied)

18. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the Committee reiterated

the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra) and held that in an appeal against

acquittal, the High Court has full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.

19. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first decision on the point

was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36) (though the case was decided on 14-3-

1950, it was reported only in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by

the trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal which was

allowed and the accused was convicted for offences punishable under Sections

302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for convicting the accused, placed reliance

on certain eyewitnesses.

20. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following the proposition

of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Judge Bench held as follows:

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 6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot
support the view which has been expressed in several cases
that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal
Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the
judgment is perverse or the subordinate court has in some way
or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of
justice.
(emphasis supplied)

21. In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a two-Judge Bench observed

that it was well established that in an appeal under Section 417 of the (old)

Code, the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon which the

order of acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the

presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal

by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of

seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence could be reversed only for very

substantial and compelling reasons.

22. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418) the accused was

acquitted by the trial court but was convicted by the High Court in an appeal

against acquittal filed by the State. The aggrieved accused approached this

Court. It was contended by him that there were no compelling reasons for

setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight had not been

given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial court as regards the

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credibility of witnesses seen and examined. It was also commented that the

High Court committed an error of law in observing that when a strong prima

facie case is made out against an accused person it is his duty to explain the

circumstances appearing in evidence against him and he cannot take shelter

behind the presumption of innocence and cannot state that the law entitles him

to keep his lips sealed.

23. Upholding the contention, this Court said:

We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of

acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is
further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial
courts decision can be reversed not on the ground that the
accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing
against him but only for very substantial and compelling
reasons.

(emphasis supplied)

24. In Atley v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court said:

In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate

court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code
came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under
appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High
Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the

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 entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption
of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened
by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had
the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose
evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide

powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an
order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of
conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of
innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial
court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the
appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the
trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those

principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated.
(emphasis supplied)

25. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 SCR 1285) the

accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by

the trial court but convicted by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the

High Court against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority

(2:1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1) It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not

enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must

also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was

wrong.

(emphasis supplied)

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26. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120, a three-Judge

Bench considered almost all leading decisions on the point and observed that

there was no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by the Privy

Council and accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that

appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding the scope of the

words substantial and compelling reasons used in certain decisions. It was

observed inter-alia as follows:

This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition to
Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words were
intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not only
shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy
Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the
conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong.

The Court concluded as follows:

9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1)

an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid
down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the
appellate courts approach to a case in disposing of such an
appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments
of this Court, such as, (i) substantial and compelling reasons,
(ii) good and sufficiently cogent reasons, and (iii) strong
reasons are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the
entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing
so it should not only consider every matter on record having a

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 bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the
court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at
a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those
reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal
was not justified.

27. Again, in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405, the

point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note of

earlier decisions, it was observed as follows:

17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however,

in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach
in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that
the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of
acquittal and so, the findings of the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence
can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling
reasons: vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193).
Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it
was observed that the interference of the High Court in an
appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if
there are very substantial and compelling reasons to do so. In
some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of
acquittal can be reversed only for good and sufficiently cogent
reasons or for strong reasons. In appreciating the effect of
these observations, it must be remembered that these
observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible
rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in
appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should
not be read to have intended to introduce an additional
condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that
the said observations are intended to emphasize is that the
approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against
acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell
observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused is not certainly weakened by the fact

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 that he has been acquitted at his trial. Therefore, the test
suggested by the expression substantial and compelling
reasons should not be construed as a formula which has to be
rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent
decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State
of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp
1 SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a
judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily
characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse.

(emphasis supplied)

28. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of

Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that in India, there is no

jurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate court. In law there are no

fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence

on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to

scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty

thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been

converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual

liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very

convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration.

29. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of individual liberty

and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court observed as follows:

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6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary
social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from
insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated
devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social
defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are
always good regardless of justice to the victim and the
community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary
context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument
has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden
thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro the
web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace
every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive
solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men
may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false
dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused.
Otherwise any practical system of justice will then breakdown
and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting
a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville
Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much
beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone
unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend
to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads
to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted persons and more severe punishment of those who
are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may
lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial
protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say,
with Viscount Simon, that a miscarriage of justice may arise
from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction
of the innocent.... In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for
presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need
to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to
be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough
to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of
preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.

(emphasis supplied)

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30. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the Court was

considering the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal under

Section 378 of the Code. After considering the relevant decisions on the point

it was stated as follows:

9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was

thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for
substantial and compelling reasons only and courts used to
launch on a search to discover those substantial and
compelling reasons. However, the formulae of substantial
and compelling reasons, good and sufficiently cogent
reasons and strong reasons and the search for them were
abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in
Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120. In
Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back to the principles
enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor
and reaffirmed those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of
Rajasthan this Court has consistently recognised the right of
the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to
its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations
mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup case.
Occasionally phrases like manifestly illegal, grossly unjust,
have been used to describe the orders of acquittal which
warrant interference. But, such expressions have been used
more as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of
the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to
curtail the power of the appellate court to review the entire
evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases
(Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460)
Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC
286), it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat
Singh case may be added the further principle that if two
reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the

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 evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of the trial court. This, of course, is not a new
principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our
criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit
of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly
balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must
necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But,
fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To
entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from
the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour
of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that
against him. If the preponderance of probability is all one way,
a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to
claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that
any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be
reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused
person may claim, must be reasonable.

(emphasis supplied)

31. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225, this

Court said:

While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate

court is first required to seek an answer to the question
whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong,
manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the
appellate court answers the above question in the negative the
order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the
appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the
order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of
the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the
evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.

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32. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3 SCC 57, referring

to earlier decisions, the Court stated:

7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to

avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which
may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the
conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has
taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis and not on
the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes
of ascertaining as to whether the accused has committed any
offence or not. Probable view taken by the trial court which
may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view which is
based upon legal and admissible evidence. Only because the
accused has been acquitted by the trial court, cannot be made a
basis to urge that the High Court under all circumstances
should not disturb such a finding.

33. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85, the trial court

acquitted the accused but the High Court convicted them. Negativing the

contention of the appellants that the High Court could not have disturbed the

findings of fact of the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court

observed:

7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned

counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not disturb the
finding of facts of the trial court even if it found that the view
taken by the trial court was not proper. On the basis of the
pronouncements of this Court, the settled position of law
regarding the powers of the High Court in an appeal against an

23
 order of acquittal is that the Court has full powers to review the
evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based and
generally it will not interfere with the order of acquittal
because by passing an order of acquittal the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced. The golden
thread which runs through the web of administration of justice
in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the
evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a
jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but judge-made
guidelines for circumspection. The paramount consideration of
the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of the
guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a
case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the
admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes
of ascertaining as to whether all or any of the accused has
committed any offence or not.

34. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2002)

6 SCC 470, this Court said:

12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an

order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has
full power to review the evidence to reach its own
independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an
order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is
possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets
reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be
justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely because it
feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to
record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while

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 reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the
reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then
to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such
an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity.

35. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12 SCC 606, this Court

observed:

21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the

evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally,
the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the
presumption of innocence of the accused is further
strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is
that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the
case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to
his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is
to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage
of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the
appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the
accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as
to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not.

36. Again in Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313, this Court stated:

8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the

appellate court is no less than the power exercised while
hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals,
the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one
significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be

25
 interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of
the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is
reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the
trial court merely because a different view is possible. The
appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the
accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it
decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with
the decision of the trial court.

(emphasis supplied)

37. From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of

Karnataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general principles regarding

powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of

acquittal were culled out:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and

reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,

restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on

the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of

fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling

reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances,

distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtail

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 extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such

phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to

emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal

than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to

its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of

acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the

presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental

principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to

be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.

Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his

innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial

court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the

evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal recorded by the trial court.

38. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an

offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond

reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however,

27
no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to proof is an

exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of evidence

and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, a learned author says

[see The Mathematics of Proof II: Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review,

1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)]:

The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate

pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent
when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such
events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case,
different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the
defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of
mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether
to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt
from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is
generally guilty rather than innocent people who make
confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run
away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one
piece of evidence may confirm the other.

39. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for

abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To

constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response.

Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused

persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere

vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a

28
merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.

It must grow out of the evidence in the case.

40. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be

expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of

such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable

subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the

quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a

robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.

While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not

to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would

make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. This position was

illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State

of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal (1988 (4) SCC 302).

41. The above position was highlighted in State of U.P. v. Awdhesh (2008

(9) JT 591).

42. Therefore on considering the reasonings recorded by the trial court and

High Court we find no scope for interference with the order of acquittal passed

by the trial court which was affirmed by the High Court.

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43. Coming to the appeal filed by the accused Paramjit Singh, we find that

the High Court has indicated the reasons as to why he stood on a different

footing and how accusations have been fully established so far as he is

concerned.

44. We find no infirmity in the view of the High Court to warrant

interference with the impugned judgment.

45. Both the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.

J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

J.
(C.K. THAKKER)

J.
(LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)
New Delhi:
November 7, 2008

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