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Arangote v Maglunob


Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the
subject property. The Petition stems from a Complaint filed by petitioner and her husband against the
respondents for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and Possession, Damages with Preliminary
Injunction, and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC.

The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the subject property from her uncle Victorino Sorrosa by
virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement. The Complaint further stated that on 24 June 1985, Esperanza
executed a Last Will and Testament bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it
was never probated. On 9 June 1986, Esperanza executed another document, an Affidavit in which she
renounced, relinquished, waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and participation
whatsoever in the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband.

In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject property. However, respondents,
together with some hired persons, entered the subject property on 3 June 1994 and built a hollow block
wall behind and in front of petitioners house, which effectively blocked the entrance to its main door.

As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her husband were compelled to institute Civil Case. In their
Answer, respondents averred that they co-owned the subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and
her siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in equal shares, from their father Martin
Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance to
respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively. Hence, the subject property was co-owned by
Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and respondent Romeo, each holding a
one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not validly waive her rights and interest over
the entire subject property in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maglunob and other heirs are lawful owners and possessors of the whole subject

HELD: It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanzas exclusive share, but also
that of the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I. Though in the
Partition Agreement Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was doing so not only for
herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does not mean that Esperanza was already
the exclusive owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of
Martin I.

A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to be. Esperanzas Affidavit is,
in fact, a Donation. Esperanzas real intent in executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the
subject property to petitioner and her husband. As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and
her husband under the said Affidavit, the donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real
property covered by Article 749 of the Civil Code.

From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real
property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance
may be made either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the
same must be noted in both instruments.
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first requisite,
as it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid
second and third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her
husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance
made of the said donation, there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor,
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null
and void.

The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance dated 23 September 2000, as well as the notice of such
acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect.

4. Sale

Naranja v CA


Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Bacolod Cadastre, Lot 4. Roque was also
a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2, of the same subdivision plan, which he co-owned with his
brothers, Gabino and Placido Naranja. When Placido died, his one-third share was inherited by his
children. Roques copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-18762 were entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for
registration of the deed of sale and transfer of the titles to Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be
registered because Belardo did not have the money to pay for the registration fees.

Roque executed a deed of sale in favor of Dema-ala, covering his two properties in consideration of the
15,000.00 outstanding loan and an additional 15,000.00, for a total of 30,000.00. Dema-ala explained
that she wanted Roque to execute the deed of sale himself since the properties were still in his name.
Belardo merely acted as a witness. The titles to the properties were given to Dema-ala for safekeeping.

Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque died of influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used
for his treatment while the rest was spent for his burial.

In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the second deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the
certificates of title to Belardo, who, in turn, gave them back to Atty. Sanicas.

On June 23, 1992, Belardo, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Cordero, instituted a suit
for reconveyance with damages. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Belardo as
the sole legal owner of Lot No. 4, declaring null and void the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, and
TCT No. T-140184, and ordering petitioners to reconvey to her the subject property and to pay damages.
Subsequently, petitioners also filed a case against respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title
with damages, praying, among others, that judgment be rendered nullifying the Deed of Sale, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel the annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT No.

The trial court noted that the Deed of Sale was defective in form since it did not contain a technical
description of the subject properties but merely indicated that they were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T-
18764 consisting of 136 square meters, and one-third portion of Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762.
The trial court held that, being defective in form, the Deed of Sale did not vest title in private respondent.

The CA held that the unregisterability of a deed of sale will not undermine its validity and efficacy in
transferring ownership of the properties to private respondent. The CA noted that the records were devoid
of any proof evidencing the alleged vitiation of Roques consent to the sale; hence, there is no reason to
invalidate the sale.



To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a technical description of the subject property. Contracts
of sale of real property have no prescribed form for their validity; they follow the general rule on contracts
that they may be entered into in whatever form, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present. The requisites of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.

The failure of the parties to specify with absolute clarity the object of a contract by including its technical
description is of no moment. What is important is that there is, in fact, an object that is determinate or at
least determinable, as subject of the contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided in Section 127
of Act No. 496 is only a suggested form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly followed by the
parties to a contract.

In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies the subject properties by indicating their respective
lot numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering them. Resort can always be made to the
technical description as stated in the certificates of title covering the two properties.

On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show
that Roque executed the deed of sale under the undue influence of Belardo or that the deed of sale was
simulated or without consideration.1avvphi1

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,
and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. It
must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete,
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects provided by law

Claudel V CA


Claudel, acquired from the Bureau of Lands, Lot No. 1230 of the Muntinlupa Estate Subdivision, located
in the poblacion of Muntinlupa, Rizal.

The same piece of land purchased by Cecilio would, however, become the subject of protracted litigation
thirty-nine years after his death.

Two branches of Cecilio's family contested the ownership over the land-on one hand the children of
Cecilio and their children and descendants, now the herein petitioners, and on the other, the brother and
sisters of Cecilio and their children and descendants, now the herein private respondents.

In 1972, the HEIRS OF CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves and obtained the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title on their shares. Four years later, on December 7, 1976, private respondents
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, filed Civil Case with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a "Complaint for
Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with Damages," alleging that 46 years earlier, or sometime in
1930, their parents had purchased from the late Cecilio Claudel several portions of Lot No. 1230 for the
sum of P30.00. They admitted that the transaction was verbal. However, as proof of the sale, the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO presented a subdivision plan of the said land, dated March 25, 1930, indicating
the portions allegedly sold to the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.


Whether or not a contract of sale of land may be proven orally


The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may have
been entered into.11 For nowhere does law or jurisprudence prescribe that the contract of sale be put in
writing before such contract can validly cede or transmit rights over a certain real property between the
parties themselves.

However, in the event that a third party, as in this case, disputes the ownership of the property, the
person against whom that claim is brought can not present any proof of such sale and hence has no
means to enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of Frauds was precisely devised to protect the parties in
a contract of sale of real property so that no such contract is enforceable unless certain requisites, for
purposes of proof, are met.

Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases,
an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its

The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated
contracts and transactions to be evidenced in Writing

Therefore, except under the conditions provided by the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the contract of
sale made by Cecilio with his siblings can not be proved.


Bienvenido V Gabriel


Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada,
Municipality of Taguig. Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriels own daughter,
Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son,
Eliseo Sulit who was Florencias husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag,
father of petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale. As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was
sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed.

Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2
through their caretaker Juana Quinones; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the
During the cadastral survey conducted in 1976, they had both lots surveyed in preparation for their
consolidation under one tax declaration. However, they did not succeed in registering the consolidated
lots as they discovered that there was another tax declaration covering the same properties and these
were applied for titling under the name of Jose Gabriel sometime in 1978 or 1980


whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription


Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of
time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful
and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name of
Araceli Tanyag, which tax declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. 42 It is settled
that tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for
which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership.43 Petitioners caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since lived in a
nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended a piggery on the land. Aside from paying taxes due on the
property, petitioners also exercised other acts of ownership such as selling the 468-square meter portion
to Sta. Barbara who had constructed thereon a nine-door apartment building.

It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the property by securing a tax
declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998,
they finally obtained an original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square meters which included
Lot 1. Did these acts of respondents effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners for purposes of

We answer in the negative. Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial
character of civil interruption.1wphi1 For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have
received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed
by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt
respondents possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption.

From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have been in
continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the
property for the period and in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be
defeated by respondents acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a
Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.
Sps Aguirre v Villanueva


Private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children and grandson of the late spouses Lucas
Villanueva and Regina Tupas Villanueva; that during the lifetime of Lucas Villanueva, he owned a parcel
of residential land at Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan and declared for taxation purposes under his
name; that spouses Villanueva possessed the subject parcel of land during their lifetime openly, publicly
and continuously in the concept of an owner and after their death, they were succeeded by their children;
that sometime in August 1997, petitioners and their hired laborers fenced the whole land in question
without the knowledge and consent of private respondents; that when confronted by private respondents
concerning the fencing of the land, petitioners alleged that they acquired the same through inheritance
from their father, Eutiquiano Salazar, who in turn purchased the land from the late Ciriaco H. Tirol by
virtue of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property.

The trial court noted that the tax declarations in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and the survey plan did
not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and possessor of the land in question, thus, he has no
right to transfer ownership of the same to Eutiquiano Salazar; that petitioners were not possessors in
good faith since they knew as early as 1954 that private respondents were in possession of the land; that
petitioners did not acquire the land via extraordinary acquisitive prescription considering that their
possession only lasted for 26 years from 1971 up to 1997 when private respondents first instituted the



Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the
lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should
be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is
either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and
with just title for 10 years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.

Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be for at least 10 years, in good faith
and with just title. Possession is "in good faith" when there is a reasonable belief that the person from
whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his ownership. There
is "just title" when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is neither the owner
nor in a position to transmit the right.

In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to support petitioners claim that the requirements for
ordinary prescription are present.

The trial court found that petitioners possession was for more than 10 years and with just title. The trial
courts finding that petitioner Anita Aguirre was not a possessor in good faith since she knew as early as
1954 that private respondents were in possession of the disputed land has no basis. Anita Aguirre
testified that Magdalena Tupas built a house in the controverted property in 1957 with the permission of
Bernardo Escalante, the administrator of the Tirols. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership
through prescription.
Records also show that Lucas Villanueva, private respondents predecessor-in-interest, did not actually
possess the subject property during his lifetime. Private respondent Delia Villanueva Dela Torre, testified
that her parents while still alive resided in Sitio Din-iwid, Balabag, Malay, Aklan, about less than a
kilometer away from the land in question. Neither did any of the private respondents ever reside therein.
On the other hand, after buying the property in 1971, petitioners possessed the same in the concept of an
owner. They peacefully occupied it, built fences, planted plants and used the same as ingress and egress
towards their cottages. Having been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed land in
good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997, petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by ordinary
acquisitive prescription.

Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v Ranon


Agrifina Raon, her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and
ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had
built a house on the subject property where she and her family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when
her family was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless,
they continued to visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon. However, in
August of 1986, her daughter, Zosie Raon, discovered that the subject property was already in the name
of the spouses Montemayor under Tax Declaration No. 0010563 which was purportedly issued in their
favor by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor executed
themselves. The Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Raons title and ownership
over the subject property.

Hence, Agrifina Raon sought a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Montemayor
commanding them to cease and desist from further exercising any right of ownership or possession over
the subject property. She further prayed that she be finally declared the true and lawful owner of the
subject property.

The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from
Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous owners for a consideration
of P100,000.00.

The MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina Raon on the subject lot against the spouses
Alcantara may have started in 1962, this adverse possession was interrupted in the year 1977 due to the
filing of an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo with the Office of the Assessor. In
1977, the tax declaration in the name of Valentin Raon, Agrifina Raons husband, was cancelled and a
new tax declaration was issued in Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologos name. The MCTC said that the period
of possession of the spouses Raon in the concept of an owner from 1962 to 1977 did not ripen into
ownership because their occupation was in bad faith. The Civil Code requires, for acquisitive prescription
of real property, 30 years of uninterrupted possession if the same is wanting in good faith and without a
just title.

The RTC declared that the respondent Raons who are heirs of the original plaintiff had acquired the
subject property by virtue of acquisitive prescription, and therefore adjudged respondents to be the
absolute owners thereof


1. Whether respondents had acquired ownership over the subject property through uninterrupted and
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith
2.Whether or not the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an effective interruption since
1962 of respondents possession of the subject property


1. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law; without good faith
and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character. Regarding real or immovable
property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession of ten years, while
extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years.

The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property for a
period of more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners ownership had been established. During such
length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in
their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession.They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by
the tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership

2. The answer is in the negative.

Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the
possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to
when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to
wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or
should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption.
For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in
the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than
a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents possession. Such a notice could not have
produced civil interruption.

Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription begun to run against petitioners and was not in any
way interrupted from their mere execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim since the notice of adverse
claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under
the law. And even if We are to eliminate the question of good faith in determining the prescriptive period,
evidence are (sic) still abundant to substantiate respondents thirty years of possession in the concept of
owner commencing from 1962 until 1995 when the complaint below was filed.