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Now,
CO2 in the air is supposed to bring on a climate
catastrophe. Is global warming really a threat, are
the polar ice caps in danger of melting and are
coastal areas of habitation under threat of a
deluge?
Do we therefore need an energy-CO2 tax?
Introduction:
Global warming Fact and Fiction .......................................7
2. A Look Ahead -
Is The Future Ours to See? ...........................................31
1.
The next two important factors are size and chemical compo-
sition of the planet, and of its atmosphere in particular. Those two
factors are interrelated in a strange way in their importance to
climate: The planet's gravitational pull, i. e. its mass- attraction de-
pends on its size (or more precisely, mass). If a planet is so small
that its gravitational pull cannot hold an atmosphere, there would
not be any climate, because without an atmosphere there is no cli-
mate.
In fact, the ability of a planet to hold an atmosphere also de-
pends on its proximity to the sun, because even if a planet some
distance away from the sun is able to hold an atmosphere, it may
lose that ability closer to the sun since the increasing heat may
then cause the atmosphere to "evaporate" into space. On the other
hand, if that planet moved further away from the sun, its atmos-
phere might eventually freeze or condense onto the planet's sur-
face. All of this illustrates the importance of various astronomical
factors on the climate of a planet.
Mercury is an example of a planet too small and too hot
(because of its proximity to the sun) to hold an atmosphere. Venus,
about the size of the earth, but much closer to the sun, is much hot-
ter than the earth, partially because of its proximity to the sun and
partially because of the different chemical composition of its at-
mosphere.
Let us now assume that we have a planet Earth at its position in
the solar system with its given astronomical, physical and chemi-
cal properties. Science then gives us the tools to compute its temp-
erature simply from the solar energy-flux reaching it. The result is
that the average temperature of the planet would be a brisk 0° F,
certainly not enough to allow any life on earth the way we know it.
Now, the observed temperature on earth is about 60° F. That dif-
ference of 60°F is due to the fact that our planet has an atmos-
phere, and that this atmosphere has its current chemical com-
position. This ability of our atmosphere to warm up the climate is
due to the greenhouse effect.
The analogy to a greenhouse is drawn because, comparable to
the glass in a greenhouse, the atmosphere lets through the sun's
radiation, which warms up the earth's surface, and its atmosphere
inhibits the escape of this heat into space. This analogy is actually
not quite correct, and some scientists have qualms against using
it. But for our present discussion, it will serve in view of the fact
that it has gained such wide public recognition.
The actual magnitude of the greenhouse effect, i.e., the amount
THE REST OF THE STORY 11
You may ask right away, how does it happen that only the trace
constituents contribute to the greenhouse effect? What about the
other the major constituents of the earth's atmosphere, namely
nitrogen and oxygen: do they play a bigger role? (Table 1, Atmo-
spheric constituents)
To explain this, we have to take a quick look at the molecular
structure of the various gases in our atmosphere and their rela-
tionship to the inner mechanism of the greenhouse effect.
Every object gives off thermal radiation. The spectrum of that
radiation, i.e., the radiative energy given off at a particular wave-
length, is intimately related to the temperature of that object. The
wavelength at which the peak of this radiation occurs varies in-
versely with temperature: the hotter the object, the shorter the
wavelength. The radiation we receive from the sun is at relatively
short wavelengths, because the surface of the sun is very hot com-
pared to the earth's temperature and therefore the radiation ema-
nating from earth is at relatively long wavelengths.
Now, the radiation we receive from the sun at the earth's surface
and the radiation an observer from space observes emanating
from the earth and its atmosphere is modified by the atmosphere:
the molecules of the various gases which make up the earth's
atmosphere are in perpetual motion; they vibrate and rotate in a
way which is inextricably linked to their molecular structure.
They take the energy necessary for that motion out of the back-
ground thermal radiation field. The key point now is that each
molecule, owing to its properties, can only use the radiative
energy of one or several small, well defined spectral regions for
that motion. Molecules of a greenhouse gas will not use - absorb -
(to any significant extent) thermal radiation from the solar spec-
trum which is at shorter wavelengths, but instead the radiation
from the longer wavelengths which are more characteristic of
earth's temperature. By absorbing and re-radiating the thermal
GLOBAL WARMING
energy from earth, the greenhouse gases prevent the energy from
escaping into space - thereby giving rise to the greenhouse effect.
Nitrogen and oxygen molecules, which make up the bulk of our
atmosphere, do not have any significant spectral regions in the
long wavelenths to absorb the earth's - or terrestrial - radiation,
and therefore, they are not major greenhouse gases. The terrestrial
spectrum and the regions where various trace-gases are active is
shown in Fig. 1. There we can identify the extent to which our
atmosphere is transparent and the extent to which it is opaque to
radiation emanating from our planet. This figure then shows the
regions within the terrestrial spectrum where the natural green-
house effect, which created our current, hospitable conditions on
earth, occurs.
Before we get into the additional, man-made greenhouse effect,
there is one more point to mention, one which has some impor-
tance when analyzing the individual contribution of any trace-gas
to the greenhouse effect, man-made or natural. Owing to the
molecular structure of the greenhouse gases, there may be regions
in the spectrum where the molecules of different trace-gases are
THE REST OF THE STORY
13
active at the same time, causing some overlap which makes it hard
to define the greenhouse contribution of each individual com-
ponent.
This is particularly the case with water vapor. The concentration
of water vapor, by far the most important and most abundant
greenhouse gas, varies widely from place to place, season to
season, and even with altitude in the atmosphere. This is in stark
contrast to most other greenhouse gases, which are fairly well
mixed in the atmosphere and show very little spatial and short-
term variation over time.
Therefore, the degree of overlap between various greenhouse
gases and the magnitude of the natural greenhouse effect itself
should vary strongly with the concentration of water vapor. The ar-
gument would therefore be that the natural greenhouse effect is
most pronounced where we find the most water vapor in the
atmosphere, and least pronounced where we find the least amount.
This is exactly the case. In order to identify those regions on
earth where the water vapor concentrations are highest, let us also
consider that the amount of water vapor the atmosphere can hold
without condensing increases strongly with temperature (see Fig
2). As a rule of thumb, for each 20° F temperature rise, the amount
of water vapor the atmosphere can hold without condensing
roughly doubles.
Source: After Ramanathan et al., 1987; U.S. Dept. of Energy Report DOE/FE -164
14 GLOBAL WARMING
sunshine at two different locations, one being very dry, the other
being moist, we would notice a difference in the diurnal tempera-
ture variation. The dry location warms up about as much as the
moist one during the day, but during the night, the dry location
cools off much more than the moist one. The difference is due to
the greenhouse effect of water vapor, which, during the night, acts
as a "blanket" which is missing in the dry location. Therefore, ty-
pical day-to-night variations in temperature over Florida, for ex-
ample, are considerably less than over Arizona. The "blanket" of
the natural greenhouse effect prevents our planet from cooling off
too much and gives us our present climate.
But this blanket has a few holes in it, through which some ther-
mal radiation escapes from the earth - cooling it off in the process
and keeping its temperature at its present level. We can identify
those "holes" by the "gaps" in Fig. 1.
Enter the man-made greenhouse effect. Due to man's activities
(the famous line you may have heard before), certain trace-gases
are emitted into and build up in our atmosphere, which, as luck
would have it, and owing to their molecular properties, absorb
thermal radiation right in those areas of the blanket where the
holes are located. In other words, the trace-gases "plug those
holes" in the blanket and prevent radiation emanating from the
earth's surface and its atmosphere from escaping into space,
thereby causing it to remain with us instead. This leads to a
warming of the earth and its atmosphere. This, in a nutshell, is the
greenhouse theory.
The details, however, will become complicated. They depend on
the way the climatic system - the intertwined action of atmos-
phere, oceans, and icesphere - responds to an increase of down-
ward thermal radiation due to an enhanced greenhouse effect. We
will deal with the response of the climatic system to the increase
of the greenhouse effect at a later stage; suffice it to say at this
point that the increase in downward thermal radiation is subject
to considerable uncertainty itself, but it is still the best known var-
iable in the entire ball game.
The uncertainties arise mainly as a result of the overlap mentio-
ned above, which must obviously vary as a function of water
vapor concentration, and therefore as a function of geography,
season, and altitude in the atmosphere. But overlapping regions
16 GLOBAL WARMING
Let us now look at those gases and human activities which con-
tribute to "plugging the holes" in our atmospheric blanket. We
will do this in several steps:
Present rate 1.8 ppm 0.015 ppm 0.8 ppb 9.5 ppt 17 ppt
of annual increase (0.5 %) (0.9 %) (0.25 %) (4%) (4%)
Biosphere (De-fores-
tation/Land use
changes) 1.6 21 -
Sum 7.5 100
Figure 3. CO2-emissions from fossil fuel use and from land use changes be-
tween 1860 and 1980.
Source World Resources Institute, 1991.
THE REST OF THE STORY 21
Figure 4. Trends of C02 emissions from fossil fuel use by major geographic
region (1 Gt = 1 billion metric tons).
Source: US: Department of Energy, Report DOE/FE-0164.
Sum CO2 55
Methane (CH4) 15
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 6
CFCs 24
Total 100
has been reached in many areas, which considerably limits the po-
tential of further increases in energy use and CO2 emissions.
This is certainly not the case in the NICs and LDCs, where per
capita use of (fossil) energy is only a small fraction of its counter-
part in the industrialized countries. But it is catching up rapidly.
Not only that, in contrast to the industrialized countries, where
population is fairly stable, population in the LDCs is growing at a
staggering rate. Those two factors combined, rapid population
growth and growth in energy use in the LDCs and newly in-
dustrialized countries, compared to relatively stable population
and saturation in energy use in the ICs, explain most of the
relative decline of the industrialized countries' share of fossil fuel
use and CO2 emissions in recent decades.
This trend is expected to continue in the future; and indeed,
since most of the concern about trace-gas emissions and climatic
changes is concern about future emission increases, energy use and
CO2 emission patterns in fast growing areas of the world will as-
sume a key role in coming decades. Furthermore, since energy use
is largely, but not completely, tied to economic activity, the CO2
emission pattern will behave in a way very similar to the changing
pattern of economic activity, which changed dramatically after
THE REST OF THE STORY 23
WW II. The once dominant economic powerhouse USA saw its rel-
ative share of world gross domestic product (GDP) slowly erode,
first at the expense of other industrialized countries which were
rebuilding their war torn economies, and now increasingly to the
NICs and LDCs, a trend which is likely to continue in the future.
The widespread stagnation of energy use in the industrialized
countries after the two oil shocks of the 70s can furthermore be
interpreted as a frantic attempt to lessen the dependence on
foreign oil. In the '70s, energy conservation measures were insti-
tuted in almost every industrialized country, and did indeed bear
some fruit. However, the turmoil initially suffered within the in-
dustrialized countries as their economies shifted to a more energy
efficient (and less oil dependant) mode was considerable: The two
severe recessions experienced in 1974 and 1980-1982 were largely
due to the drastic oil price hikes. Once oil consumption declined,
however, and especially after market share drifted away from the
OPEC countries, the full benefits of energy use reduction became
apparent. There are some inherent dangers in this very rosy pic-
ture which we are going to discuss in more detail in the section
dealing with future trends: First, due to increased consumption,
prices may rise again drastically, possibly leading to another sup-
ply shock, which may again bring us the deleterious economic
consequences we witnessed in the 70s; and secondly, the restorat-
ion of OPEC's power subsequent to Operation Desert Storm.
In addition to increasing energy efficiency and saturation in
energy use, there is one more fundamental factor responsible for
the slow rise in energy use in the industrialized countries over the
last 15 years: the structural shifts within our economies. The US
has been in the middle of a transformation from a manufacturing
economy, which is energy intensive, to a service economy, which
is decidedly less energy intensive. This industrial policy is expec-
ted to continue in coming decades.
Example: If one creates a certain amount of GDP by producing
steel, a lot more energy is used than by creating the same GDP
through financial services or the production of computers.
Let us now look at the various activities of mankind which con-
tribute to the emission of CO2 on a global scale. It should be noted
that large differences might exist from country to country and
from region to region (see table 4). For example, in the US, auto-
mobile driving contributes 29 percent to CO2 emissions, com-
pared to 13 percent globally. Obviously, there is no "prime", or
overriding worldwide activity which is the CO2 and greenhouse
24 GLOBAL WARING
Methane
The next gas in our category of natural constituents is methane,
CH4, with an estimated greenhouse contribution of 15 percent.
Methane is emitted largely by natural sources such as swamps,
marshes, rice fields, termites and ruminants (see table 5). Its at-
mospheric concentration is much lower than that of CO2, but it is
growing at a much faster pace -1.0 percent per year - and in add-
ition is a much more powerful greenhouse gas. One kg of methane
has the greenhouse power of about 58 kg of CO2 (see Tab. 2).
Science is somewhat at a loss to explain methane's rapid rise
Source
Natural Wetlands
(bogs, swamps tundra, etc) 115 100-200
Rice Paddies 110 25-170
Enteric Fermentation (animals) 80 65-100
Gas Drilling,
Venting, Transmission 45 25-50
Biomass Burning 40 20-80
Termites 40 10-100
Landfills 40 20-70
Coal Mining 35 19-50
Oceans 10 5-20
Freshwaters 5 1-25
H4 Hydrate Destabilization S 0-100
Sink
Removal by soils 30 15-45
Reaction with OH in the atmosphere 500 400-600
Atmospheric Increase 44 40-48
Sink
Removal by soils ?
Photolysis in the Stratosphere 7-13
Atmospheric Increase 3- 4
Ozone
The changing concentration of atmospheric ozone is further-
26 GLOBAL WARMING
2. Industrial trace-gases
CFCs
sphere, the atmosphere's lower level. But the theory also postula-
tes that temperatures in the stratosphere should then go down.
However, that would favor the formation of the PSCs, which form
only when temperatures are below a certain threshold value. Con-
sequently, if temperatures decline in the antarctic stratosphere as
a result of the greenhouse effect, we should expect more frequent
occurrences of ozone holes in the future if the CFC release con-
tinues.
Unfortunately, that is only one half of the story. To make matters
even more complicated, scientists have also found out that lower
temperatures in the stratosphere - as a result of the greenhouse-
effect - will slow down and ameliorate the process of long-term
ozone depletion (the one taking place on a 50 to 100 year time
scale). Therefore, the greenhouse effect may have a "healing"
effect on the long-term ozone depletion and may in fact be bene-
ficial in that sense - but detrimentral with respect to the short-term
"ozone holes".
There have been reports recently of "mini ozone holes" over the
Arctic. However, these are much smaller features of a decidedly
more transient nature and should not in any way be compared to
the massive and large-scale ozone destruction which has taken
place over Antarctica, other than that the underlying chemistry is
essentially the same. But there is no reason to think that those
small holes will grow larger, and one day even assume antarctic
proportions. The differences between arctic and antarctic atmo-
spheric circulation patterns are too substantial for that.
The implications of a longer term decline of a stratospheric
ozone decrease may involve an increase in ultraviolet radiation at
the earth's surface, which is thought to be harmful to the bios-
phere and to man. The current debate is over whether a decrease
of ozone has already taken place; but apart from high latitudes of
the Southern Hemisphere (SH), no significant decreases beyond
the level of natural variability appear to have taken place
anywhere else.
In addition, ultraviolet radiation measured at different sites in
the US over the last 15 years has, if anything, decreased - therefore
giving no hint in favor of the postulated ozone decrease and the
expected UV increase. Furthermore, some scientists question the
seriousness of the implications of a 10 to 20 percent UV increase
on the biosphere, since - as they argue - natural UV levels increase
by a factor of three or four as one moves from higher latitudes to-
wards the equator, and if there is a moderate ozone depletion, one
30 GLOBAL WARMING
Let us first direct our attention to CO2, which plays a central role
in the greenhouse debate, and which has been the subject of a
large number of studies, all of them attempting to elucidate the
way in which CO2 emissions might relate to various future trends.
Since CO2 is released largely in energy generating ventures, the
debate in the past has been, and in the future will be centered on
32 GLOBAL WARMING
• Population growth
• Economic growth
• Energy use growth
• Energy use patterns
THE REST OF THE STORY 33
per year. This is a very moderate figure, but a reasonable one, be-
cause it is less than the heady growth rates of the post war years,
but more than during the tough economic times of the 70s and
'80s. Under such assumptions, CO2 emissions will more than
double, also assuming no change in fuel use.
As we have already seen (page 19-21), however, economic
growth and energy use have begun to become decoupled in the
wake of the traumatic experiences of the energy crises of the '70s.
Today, less energy, notably fossil energy, is used to produce a unit
of GDP than was needed in the early 70s. This fact is aptly
demonstrated in Table 7, which shows the increase in levels of
efficiency of energy use in various countries, where — is it any
surprise? — Japan again takes the lead. But the other industrial-
ized countries did not fare so badly, either.
Despite the growth in the economies of the industrialized coun-
tries of 60 percent there was no corresponding increase in energy
consumption due to increased energy efficiency and the structural
changes toward the service economy, not only in the U.S.
In other words, we now emit only 20 percent more CO2 than in
the early 70s, although GDP has grown by roughly 60 percent. If
we now assume that the industrialized countries will be able to
maintain that pace in energy efficiency increase over the next 50
years, as difficult and as questionable as that may be, because we
are now in a less favorable position in the learning curve, CO2
emissions in our 2 percent economic growth scenario would in-
crease at approximately 0.7 percent per year and by a total of
about 40 percent, despite a concurrent two and a half fold increase
in GDP.
Let us now furthermore assume that some, but not all of that
energy efficiency increase will be implemented in the faster grow-
ing LDC economies, which should be given more latitude in
energy use because they are starting from a lower level. If we take
the fraction of efficiency increase to be one third of the economic
growth rate of 3 percent, i.e. 1.0 percent, CO2 emissions would
grow at 2.0 percent, and then go up two and a half fold in 50 years.
We thus partition the efficieny increase in the following crude
manner: there is no efficiency increase in the first 25 years, i.e.,
CO2 emissions would grow at the economic growth rate, which
makes some sense, because during the first stages of industria-
lization, there is a tendency to use more energy per unit of GDP
than during pre-industrialization. In the later stages of industrial-
ization, CO2 emissions are assumed to grow at one third the eco-
THE REST OF THE STORY 35
ures along with possible ways to achieve this now, but leave the
discussion of that for a later chapter.
In any case, we have analyzed a possible scenario of future fos-
sil fuel use, which yielded future emission rates right in the
middle of a variety of diverse scenarios. This scenario may there-
fore be considered a middle-of-the-road-most-likely and non-ex-
treme projection. It leads us to a probable or most likely average
CO2 emission growth rate of 1 to 1.5 percent per year over the next
50 years.
It should be remembered that this estimate already incorporates
a good margin of increased efficiency of energy use, which was
forced upon us, at high social costs, by two energy crises in the
1970s, and which has essentially been extrapolated 50 years into
the future. This scenario may therefore be somewhat biased to-
wards the low end, since average growth rates in the 1970s and
1980s were somewhat higher, even if we include the "slow" per-
iod of the two energy crises. Even then, it only serves to empha-
size a point made above: even if we adopt a cautious scenario
about future economic and population growth, CO2 emissions -
barring some major unforeseen events - could easily double with-
in the next 50 years. This assessment is underlined by the fact that
CO2 emissions went up by 20 percent since the last world-wide
recession in 1982 alone.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) arri-
ved at a similar conclusion in their "Business as usual" (BaU)
scenarios, which assume a CO2 growth rate of about 1.8 per cent
per year (see Fig. 6). Our emissions estimate therefore falls about
halfway between the BaU and the increased energy efficiency "B"
scenario and might thus not be too unrealistic.
pheric CO2 load. If, on the other hand, attempts to curb defore-
station are succesful, atmospheric CO2 increases could certainly
be reduced.
This would particularly be true if some recent suggestions turn
out to be correct, that the tropical biospheric source might be of
the order of 4 Gt, and that a CO2 sink of similar magnitude exists
in mid-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. In that case, cessa-
tion of biomass burning would reduce the emissions by 4 Gt. That
would enable the mid-latitude sink of 4 Gt and an additional sink
in the tropics, due to re-growth there, to act on fossil fuel CO2
emissions, thereby significantly reducing the speed of an atmos-
pheric CO2 increase. Even under a scenario of a smaller and pos-
sibly more realistic mid-latitude biospheric sink of about 2 Gt, and
less release in the tropics, cessation of biomass burning would in-
deed make a very significant contribution to lowering the rate of
atmospheric CO2 increase.
sent existing technology is able to extract the fuel from the earth.
In addition, there are those "resources" which geologists
"think", "expect" or somehow "estimate" to be there on the basis
of a variety of factors, such as geology similar to known deposits.
Those resources are obviously much more speculative in nature
and amount to 2000 billion tons or thereabouts. The geological de-
posits of fossil fuel are several times larger than even this figure,
but the trouble is that they cannot be extracted from the earth by
known technological means at a reasonable cost.
Now, the atmospheric content of carbon dioxide is 350ppm (see
table 1), which, in tons of carbon, is about 720 billion tons. So, at
first sight it looks easy to double the atmospheric content even if
only the proved recoverable reserves are used. But there is a dif-
ference between what we emit into the atmosphere and what re-
mains in it as atmospheric concentration.
This fraction, called the airborne fraction, has only been in the
neighborhood of 50 percent of the amount released by fossil fuel
burning over the last few decades. Since the clearing of forests
added another 1.5-2 billion tons of carbon to total emissions, the
actual airborne fraction is accordingly even lower than that. In
other words, less than half of what we put into the atmosphere
remains there. One way or the other, the rest is incorporated into
various compartments of the so-called global carbon cycle, which
plays a very important role for life on earth, and which we will
analyze in more detail later on. At this point, suffice it to say that
the "missing carbon" is taken up by (1) the oceans and (2) the ter-
restrial biosphere.
Therefore, even if we burned all the known "proven recoverable
reserves" of fossil fuels, we would not be able to double the at-
mospheric CO2 content, since one half of 750 is 375, which would
then only be enough to increase the atmospheric CO2 content by
50 percent or so.
Only if we resort to the "additional estimated resources" will we
be able to double the atmosphere's CO2 hands down. But again,
that assumption involves considerable uncertainty as to when
and under which economic and technological conditions the re-
covery of these additional estimated resources will be attempted.
If it is more expensive to dig that fuel out of the earth than to use
alternative energy sources, such as solar energy, nobody will at-
tempt to recover these fossil fuels anymore.
This may easily be the case in a few decades from now when the
recovery of the additional resources may become necessary to
THE REST OF THE STORY 41
We next take a look at methane. The reasons for its increase are
somewhat obscure, as we pointed out above. Its increase appears
to show a fairly close correlation with the overall increase in world
population. For lack of a better estimate, most scientists continue
to link it to the growth in population, which has been and will
probably continue to be about 1.5 percent a year. In 50 years then,
the atmospheric concentration of methane would roughly double
and reach 3.2 ppm. This corresponds very closely to the the IPCC
BaU-scenario (see Fig. 6). Therefore, the relative importance of
methane as a greenhouse gas will continue to grow.
Next: N2O
which is not yet fully understood. All that we can say at present
is that, in all likelihood, a reduction of nitrous oxide emissions
from fossil fuel burning may curb a global ozone increase. But in
most of the industrialized countries, laws already exist to limit
nitrous oxide emissions from a variety of sources. It is therefore
rather difficult to assess future trends of ozone, only that it ap-
pears to be less than a suspected 50 percent increase over the next
50 years.
This assessment is supported by recent model calculations,
which arrive at a global tropospheric ozone increase of only 10-20
percent by 2020, making an increase of only 30 percent over a 50
year period more likely. We therefore tentatively assign an in-
crease of 30 percent to the next five decades, keeeping in mind that
no sufficiently sound scientific basis currently exists to justify eith-
er a number of 50 percent or, say, 10 percent; so we should tenta-
tively stick to model calculations which appear to be at least
somehwat reasonable.
Ozone essentially represents a riddle yet to be solved, and it
would not be surprising if those numbers changed drastically in
the years ahead.
This completes the first round of crystal ball gazing — on a
somewhat unsatisfactory final note.
decades and a growth rate of near zero - or less than zero - in the
later ones. This scenario would then be between "B" and "C,D" of
the IPCC (see Fig.6).
We are now in a position to give a tentative trace-gas scenario
for the next 50 years, which, like any other scenario, has to be
taken with a fair amount of caution; nonetheless, a good case can
be made that it represents a reasonable consensus view, which
avoids extremes in either direction:
We note that for CO2 the rate of increase is given for emissions,
while for the other trace-gases, it is given in actual atmospheric
concentration, for the following reason. As we shall see shortly,
the actual rate of atmospheric increase of CO2, the most important
greenhouse gas, depends on various interactions within the car-
bon cycle, which we will investigate prior to assigning a likely at-
mospheric rate of increase for CO2. We also note that the rate of
increase of the CFCs, the second most important greenhouse gas,
has been trimmed from 3-5 percent to 1.5 percent.
To get a feeling for the importance of that modification, let us
consider the total change in concentration after 50 years. In a 4
percent scenario, it would be over seven times of what it is today,
whereas in the 1.5 percent scenario it would roughly double.
Obviously, the regulatory action taken against the CFCs because
of their suspected role in ozone depletion will also have a pro-
nounced impact on their role as greenhouse gases, and therefore
constitutes a major move to thwart the greenhouse effect as well.
It appears then as if the time-table of all those dire predictions has
been moved farther into the future by quite a few years.
Is there some relief from the sweat box after all?
3.
sil fuel burning will continue to grow, the likelihood of a rapid and
dramatic CO2 build-up is smaller than previously thought, parti-
cularly if biomass burning has been a relatively large source in the
past and will be curbed in the future: a conclusion, which has ob-
vious ramifications concerning the time frame and the magnitude
of a possible greenhouse warming. We recall that the magnitude
and time frame of a greenhouse warming had to be altered once
before by the less than expected rate of increase of the second most
important greenhouse gases, the CFCs. Recalling the IPCC scenar-
ios, where we would now be closer to "B" on CO2, between "B"
and "C, D" on the CFCs and on "A" with Methane plus a small
contribution from Ozone, we might expect to end up closer to "B"
than to "A" as a rough estimate (see Fig. 6).
This is because CO2 will remain the predominent greenhouse
gas and large increases of methane will be balanced somewhat by
smaller increases of the CFCs, which are potentially more power-
ful greenhouse gases.
We may then ask again: Could it be that all those horrific im-
pacts on climate which we still have to assess, if they really occur
at all, would not occur as soon as a lot of people claim, but much
THE REST OF THE STORY 51
farther down the line, possibly giving us much more time to eith-
er combat them or adjust to them, and thereby take the tone of ur-
gency out of the voiced concerns? According to everything we
have heard so far, the answer can only be yes.
Let us now return to CO2 and analyze one aspect of an atmo-
spheric CO2 increase which is frequently overlooked altogether or
only dealt with in passing, but which we have briefly touched on
a little earlier, namely the impact on the biosphere.
CO2 does assume a special role indeed, since, in contrast to all
other trace-gases emitted from fossil fuel burning, it is not a pol-
lutant with potential detrimental effects on the biosphere such as
SO2 or acid rain, or photochemical oxidants, but a gas essential
and beneficial to the thriving of our biosphere.
Therefore, by emitting CO2 into the environment, man is not
harming it, but rather benefitting it, certainly over any CO2 range
that might possibly occur as a result of continuing fossil fuel bur-
ning.
This is a fact which many people have a hard time grappling
with, especially since it has been engrained in people's minds that
man's actions could only harm the environment. This one-sided
doomsday view of the world is particularly prevalent among
those who, because of their ideological position, maintain that any
change, as long as it is man induced, is bad per se and ought to be
resisted. Surely, this is a philosophical point and has nothing
whatsoever to do with the relevant science. Since we are concern-
ed with the scientific basis of the greenhouse effect and matters
related to it, we will not dwell on those philosophical aspects but
rather return to science and present an image of the biosphere the
way it may evolve under increasing CO2 concentrations.
There are in fact a large number of studies which have attemp-
ted to evaluate the possible impact of an enhanced CO2 level on a
variety of plants, both natural and cultivated.
The general conclusion of those studies is overwhelmingly pos-
itive on CO2 and may be summarized as follows:
Increasing CO2 levels lead to increases in photosynthesis, plant
weight, plant branch numbers, fruit numbers, fruit size, plant tol-
erance of atmospheric pollution and plant water use efficiency.
While the first factors simply reflect CO2's role as a fertilizer, the
last two factors are related to the way a plant operates. It breathes
through tiny openings in its leaves, called the stomatae, which
may open or close depending on the environmental conditions.
Increased CO2 acts as an anti-transpirant, causing the stomata
52 GLOBAL WARMING
openings to close partly and take in less air pollutants and lose
less water through transpiration, factors which may be important
under drier, but CO2 enriched conditions.
Those positive effects may not be as large though, if other nu-
trients such as nitrogen or phosphorous are in insufficient supply.
But curiously enough, nitrogen has not been a limiting factor in
recent decades - at least not in the more industralized regions of
the Northern Hemisphere. This is because nitrogen emissions are
another by-product of fossil fuel burning; and even though nitro-
gen emissions are considered air pollutants, they do have a ferti-
lizing effect on plants, and therefore add to the general stimulus
given to plants by the increasing level of CO2.
Some scientists claim that weeds may grow better under a high
CO2 scenario at the expense of agricultural plants, thereby nullify-
ing - at least partly - the expected positive impact on plant growth.
The final vote on this has not yet been cast, but as far as trees are
concerned, there is growing evidence that they tend to reap a par-
ticularly rich CO2-bonus, since they accumulate carbon and grow
bigger year after year - which weeds do not do, since they are
mostly annuals.
Furthermore, when the additional impact of higher tempera-
tures is taken into account, which is expected to occur as a result
of an increase in the greenhouse effect, it is sometimes claimed
that plant diseases may increase and adversely affect any
potential gain from a CO2 enriched atmosphere.
Here, another factor comes on stage, namely the impact of hig-
her temperatures on plant growth. We are not yet in a position to
determine exactly what higher temperatures may result from the
additional greenhouse effect, but we may take a quick glance at
existing experimental work that has been conducted to investi-
gate relationships between plant growth at high CO2 scenarios as
a function of temperature (see Fig. 9). Does it really come as a sur-
prise that the higher the temperatures, the higher the growth ben-
efits, at least over the range of temperatures observed on earth.
Remarkably, this is even true for tropical temperatures and it part-
ially reflects the fact that the species variety of the biosphere in-
creases as temperature and moisture increase. This point will be
taken up later on, when we assess the possible impact of a climate
change on nature, the environment, and human activities.
After examining possible future trace-gas scenarios and various
ways carbon dioxide may interact with our natural chemical and
biological cycles, and trying to determine how soon a dramatic
THE REST OF THE STORY 53
Computer Wonderland:
Welcome To The World Of Climate Modeling
not only for the next weekend but straight out for the next 30 or
50 years.
Let us digress for a moment and define what "climate" is. Cli-
mate is the average state of the atmosphere and of such parameters
as temperature or precipitation, but also the variability and the
range of those parameters over an extended period of time. It can
be defined for any given location or larger geographical areas. The
time period chosen for defining those averages is usually 30 years,
but no less than 20 years. When using the term "climate", it is im-
plicitly assumed that climate does not change very much from one
30-year-period to the next, in other words, climate is somewhat of
a constant. This in itself is an assumption of limited validity, as we
will see later on, because climate thus defined is indeed conti-
nuously changing at time scales ranging from several decades to
centuries and millenia.
Figure 10. Climate model projections for a CO2 doubling. Shown is the geo-
graphic distribution of temperature changes computed by three leading cli-
mate modeling groups (GFDL, GISS, and NCAR, see text for further details).
(in °C;1°C = 1.8° F).
doubling of CO2.
From this we can only conclude that, on the basis of current
model forecasts for the locations considered here, there will be no
significant precipitation changes during the summer months.
Looking at winter precipitation, the situation is somewhat diffe-
62 GLOBAL WARMING
W inter Summer
GPDL GISS NCAR Mean GFDL GISS NCAR Mean
Example:
Figure 11. Climate model projections for a CO2 doubling. Shown is the geo-
graphic distribution of precipitation changes computed by three leading cli-
mate modeling groups. (GFDL, GISS and NCAR, see text for further details).
(in mm per day; 1mm = .04in).
Figure 12. Simulation of global warming between 1850 and 1990 thought to
have resulted from the observed trace gas increase and projection to the year
2100 using the IPCC "BaU" trace gas scenario.
Source: IPCC, 1990.
Figure 13. Geographical distribution of a climate stress index over the U.S.
The index is defined such that high values indicate low stress whereas low va-
lues indicate high stress. Low values over the northern U.S. are a result of cold
winter weather and low values over the southern U.S. are caused by hot sum-
mer weather.
Source: R.E. Munn, Biometeorological Methods, 1970.
Let us first differentiate between the two polar ice caps on earth,
i.e., the one in the Arctic and the one in the Antarctic.
The arctic "ice-cap" is an ocean which is frozen over and which
is surrounded by the land masses of the North American and Eu-
rasian continents. The northpolar ice-cap is sea ice which is float-
ing on the ocean.
The GCM model results, in a 2-times-CO2 scenario, expect this
sea ice to melt somewhat and to retreat polewards by about 200
miles, but never to melt substantially or even completely.
What would the implications of that melting be then for the sea
level? Exactly none.
This is simply because, as the floating ice melts, it only takes back
the sea water volume it displaced when it was floating on the
water as ice. You don't believe it?
Pour yourself two fingers of sour mash, on the rocks, fill it up
with soda until the ice cubes completely float, (For the ladies: It
works on Daiquiries too) and then, even though it breaks your
heart, don't drink it, but let it sit until the ice has completely melt-
ed, and watch the waterline in the glass over time.
You will notice that even though you had a substantial amount
of ice in your highball glass, the water level after the ice has melt-
ed remains the same.
Now you may enjoy your drink, if you can stand it stale.
In principle, the same thing would happen to the floating sea ice
and sea levels in a global warming scenario.
The situation would be somewhat different, however, in the
Southern Hemisphere, because there the ice cap sits on a continent
which is surrounded by the oceans. The waters surrounding Ant-
arctica also freeze over and, as in the Northern Hemisphere, the
models expect some melting of that sea ice as well, pushing the ice
line back towards Antarctica. In terms of sea level rise, we know
by now what is (not) going to happen.
You may ask, why is there no more melting? Simply because the
warming envisioned by the models to result from a CO2 doubling
is not large enough to melt more.
Let us assume the wintertime greenhouse warming over an area
of Arctic and Antarctic ice is 20°F. During the winter, the actual
temperature over most iced-up areas is substantially below 0° F.
In other words, even if the temperature rose by as much as 20° F,
we would still be very much below the melting point of 32° F.
Furthermore, the large warming expected by most models in
high latitudes must not be viewed as the cause of the ice melt but
THE REST OF THE STORY 71
The American corn belt is not only the bread basket of America,
74 GLOBAL WARMING
W ell, now it's finally curtain time! Now we can finally find
out whether we have been in the land of make-believe
or in the land of reality, whether our method was
science or science-fiction, whether we should really head for high
ground, move north, sell land in the corn belt, or whether it all was
a figment of our imagination, a gigantic ooops!, in other words,
the real rest of the story. Back to the bare facts. We have just been
on a journey through computer wonderland. We have taken a
look into the future and tried to get an idea of what our climatic
future might be like if trace-gases built up as rapidly as some peo-
ple believe, and if the climate really changed the way our best
available computer models see it changing.
We already had to modify the first if — i.e., we could see some
promising signs that the trace-gas build-up might not progress as
rapidly as some people fear.
Furthermore, our look at the computer-generated future cli-
mate was a mixed bag at worst, and certainly no doomsday tale
in the balance. Contrary to many public declarations that there
would only be losers in a trace-gas induced climate change — al-
though politically quite understandable - it is quite obvious that
areas in the mid- and higher latitudes only stand to gain from a
climate change as projected by the models; this is particularly true
when the beneficial effects of an increased CO2 level on the bios-
phere are factored in.
However, there can be no doubt that the possible adverse im-
pacts in other areas of the world warrant serious consideration of
remedial and/or preventive measures against such a change — if
it will really occur.
The scope of the envisioned changes, but also the scope of the
remedial measures are horrendous. It would in fact change the
basic frameworks of our societies either if those climate changes
really occurred, or some of the proposed measures had to be ad-
opted. It is absolutely necessary at this point to critically examine
those model forecasts before a decision can be made on any course
THE REST OF THE STORY 77
Figure 14. Simulation of global mean temperature rise between 1850 and 1990
thought to have resulted from the observed trace gas increase.
After IPCC, 1990.
count for the additional trace-gases which have built up in our at-
mosphere - or they could also be run in a mode where trace gases
are continuously added to the atmosphere - thereby simulating
real life events. Those models are called "transient response"
models.
After carrying out those calculations, the result is that there
should have been an "equilibrium warming" of more than 2° F.
We remember that the equilibrium warming is the warming
reached after the greenhouse effect has worked its way through
all compartments of the - modeled - climate system and after all
feedback mechanisms have acted.
Enter the oceans one more time. As we saw before, the oceans
have a very important function as a sink for atmospheric carbon
dioxide and may act as a retardant large enough to delay a doub-
ling of CO2 into the 22nd or even 23rd century. But not only do
they act as a sink for carbon dioxide - they are also a sink for heat.
Some of the heat generated in the atmosphere by the green-
THE REST OF THE STORY 79
Thus, the temperatures over water and the SSTs have increased
by about half the amount for temperatures over land. Other re-
search groups have even concluded that there has been no warm-
ing at all over the oceans since the middle of last century, and in-
stead a very slight cooling (see Fig. 17). If their estimates are cor-
rect, there has been no global warming at all if oceans and conti-
nents are considered together.
But let us stick to the former estimates, which are probably
more widely accepted - rightly or wrongly we cannot decide. If we
now appropriately weigh those figures according to the fraction
of the earth covered by land and sea in both hemispheres, and cal-
culate a "true global" temperature change which is climatically
meaningful and takes account of the trend over land and sea, and
which we can therefore compare with the modeled trend, we ar-
rive at a value of about 0.5°-0.6° F.
Figure 17. Temperature trends over the oceans of the Northern and Southern
Hemisphere since 1870 according to a study by Oort et al. (1987).
Source: Oort et al., Climate Dymamics, 1987.
86 GLOBAL WARMING
Figure 18. Global temperature trend since 1850 according to IPCC (averaged
over oceans and continents).
Source: After IPCC, 1990.
Wrong Timing
that the very largest part of the increase of 1.3° must have been
caused by natural fluctuations in the climate system, the causes of
which we do not know yet, but which we will try to analyze later
on.
The temperature increase in the first part of this century, which
was as large as the one predicted to occur from the trace-gas in-
crease up into the 1980s, could therefore not have been caused by
a trace-gas build-up, because that build-up did not occur until
after WW II. And everyone would probably agree that we cannot
explain a temperature rise before 1940 by a trace-gas increase after
1940: that would be sheer nonsense.
We now continue our journey through time and must bedaz-
zledly realize that as trace-gases build up in the atmosphere and
the greenhouse curve (Fig. 14) goes up as well, observed tempe-
ratures go down (Figs. 15 and 16). 'Well, why shouldn't they?', we
ask, because they went up before 1940, obviously due to natural
causes, why shouldn't they go down - also due to natural causes.
Temperatures went down about 0.4° until the mid-1970s, whereas
the greenhouse should have warmed us by about 0.9° during that
time.
The first symptoms of an attenuated greenhouse theory appear.
If we wanted to explain the observations in terms of the green-
house theory, there should have been a natural cooling - without
the greenhouse effect - on the order of 0.4 + 0.9° = 1.3°F.
This cooling, due to natural factors over only 30 years, would
have been quite large by historical standards, particularly since,
as we will see a little later, we can not identify any natural factors
which might have caused it.
You will notice that it is somewhat difficult to analyze how the
greenhouse effect may have acted and is now acting, since we can-
not assess how the natural climatic system would behave without
trace-gases being present. Clearly, greenhouse proponents could
always respond to claims that the warming observed over the last
decades is significantly less than predicted by making the coun-
terclaim that there was a natural cooling present in the climatic sy-
stem - veiling the greenhouse effect. While this is theoretically
possible, it is nonetheless highly speculative reasoning, and it also
seems to contradict what we know about other factors influencing
the climatic system over the last 140 years: Most of those factors
point to a warming and not to a cooling. Moreover, the hypothe-
tical cooling invoked is slowly but surely becoming improbably
large.
THE REST OF THE STORY 89
that warm water, intense flows of heat and moisture into the at-
mosphere set in, causing rains in the wrong places and shifts in
wind patterns almost everywhere around the world. One partic-
ular phenomenon is the spread of warmth around the tropical
belt; that means not only that an El Nino year is a warm year over
the tropical Pacific, but also over the entire tropics. The tropics
themselves, however, if counted out to latitude 30°, comprise fully
half of the surface area of the world. In other words, if it gets warm
in the tropics, the rest of the world may stay normal, or even col-
der than normal, but it may still be warmer than normal on a-
"global" average. This is precisely what happened the last 10 to 15
years.
It is no surprise anymore to learn that the "unusually warm
years" of 1983,1987, and 1988 were years in which the El Nino was
in effect. If we now look at the temperature distribution in the
Northern Hemisphere between 1976 and 1990, differentiated by
tropics (0°-30°) and extratropics (30°-90°), and if we consider a
composite temperature trend over land and oceans, we find that
the extratropics have been below normal almost every year. This is
particularly visible in 1987, one of the record warm years (see
Table 9). This is not as visible if we only consider land-based tem-
peratures. Here there was warming even in mid-latitudes (see Fig.
19) - counterbalanced by cooling over the oceans. Once again we
realize how important it is to look at the entire temperature re-
cord, land and oceans, if we wish to arrive at an observational re-
cord which can be used for comparisons with greenhouse predic-
ted temperature changes. In the Southern Hemisphere however,
there has been a more uniform warming, so that in reality we have
quately account for the recent warm spells as a lawful result of the
El Nino phenomenon without resorting to them, and there is cur-
rently no theory which could relate an increase in occurence of the
El Nino to a greenhouse effect.
Moreover, we recall from Chapter 1 that the additional, man-
made greenhouse effect should be least effective in the tropics be-
cause of the large overlap between water vapor and carbon dio-
xide there, which is why we expect the smallest warming in the
tropics - at least in lower atmospheric layers. This might not be the
case with other greenhouse gases, however, which are active in
different spectral regions, and in upper tropospheric regions in
the tropics.
Therefore, summing up, unless we are prepared to believe that
the most recent warming is a greenhouse warming essentially re-
stricted to the tropics, which appears to be in clear contradiction
to the model predictions, we must reject the claim that the warmth
of the 1980s is a proof of the greenhouse theory, or at best a strong
piece of circumstantial evidence in its favor, for the following reas-
ons:
1. On a formal basis, a spike in the temperature curve is no proof
of a climatic change.
2. The pattern of the warming is completely different from that
predicted by the models, unless the warming pattern of the
transient response is very much different from the eqilibrium
response.
3. More fundamentally, the warming must very likely be attribu-
ted to causes other than the greenhouse effect.
Figure 21. Temperature trends over the continents of the Northern Hemis-
phere since 1850, differentiated by season. The smoothed line shows 10-year
averaged values.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Report DOE/ER-0235,1985.
Now let us direct our attention to the third claim, the one that
really had a big impact on public debate in the US: The drought of
1988. There have been a number of claims that the drought of '88
was, if not the final proof, then a very strong piece of circumstan-
tial evidence in favor of the greenhouse theory, much like the
warming of the '80s. To make one thing clear right away: to every-
body who could read a climatological data table, let alone clima-
tologists themselves, this was a hair-raising statement, and clima-
tologists did not know whether to laugh or to disbelievingly bury
their faces in their hands - but the public and media alike loved it
anyway.
Now let us find out why this was probably the climatological
"Edsel" of '88. First of all, we return to our central hypothesis of
what climate is: Namely the long-term average of a climatic para-
meter, and climatic change is the long-term, lasting change of a cli-
matic parameter. A run of cold years, hot years, dry years is a
short-term climate variation, and not a long-term climatic change.
This alone would almost be sufficient to refute the claim that the
drought of '88 was due to the greenhouse effect.
THE REST OF THE STORY 97
Figure 22. Climate trends over the USA since 1895. The figure shows mean an-
nual values of temperature and precipitation.
Source: Karl, Climate Change, 1988.
98 GLOBAL WARMING
Figure 23. Climate trends over the USA since 1895. The figure shows mean
seasonal values of temperature and precipitation.
Source: Karl, Climate Change, 1988.
Figure 25. Northern limit of the West African monsoon between the early
1950's and the early 1970's.
Source: After Bryson, 1974, and Lamb, 1988.
3. Extreme Events
One favorite sport of the media and greenhouse proponents
alike is to link the occurrence of extreme weather and climate
events to the greenhouse effect.
In fact, it appears to be standard procedure now-a-days, that
whenever some extraordinary event occurs, it is immediately
blamed on the greenhouse effect.
In doing so, a screening procedure is usually applied, which
picks out only those extremes which fit the greenhouse bill, while
the others are left out.
The same goes, by the way, for a number of scientific publicati-
ons, all designed to "prove" the greenhouse effect, thereby falling
victim to what is called "scenario fulfillment"; i.e. "the inadver-
tant distortion of data flow in a subconscious attempt to make
them fit a preconceived scenario".
Needless to say, this is highly unscientific. But obviously, some
researchers fail to realize that the point at issue is not whether data
can be explained by - or is not contradictory to - the greenhouse
theory, but rather to ask if that is the only and the best possible ex-
planation, because we are justified in speaking of a relationship
between some observed phenomenon and the greenhouse effect
only if other explanations can be excluded, or rendered unlikely.
Here is an area where an upgrading of proper and defensible
scientific attitude is badly needed, not to mention the media's at-
titude.
THE REST OF THE STORY 107
if the colder episodes in former centuries were the ones with many
more extremes in climate, while the relatively warm climate of the
20th century has been mostly benign.
Time Out I
The line of argument then continues with the claim that we can-
not afford to wait long enough to see evidence of the greenhouse
effect, because when we finally have proof, it would be too late.
Therefore, we have to act now.
Before we go into an analysis of this proposition, let us examine
the role natural factors might have played in causing the warming
- or the proposed hypothetical cooling - of the last 100 years. We
will also see whether there were warm climatic periods in earlier
centuries and millenia - obviously due to natural causes at those
times. In addition, we will also attempt to estimate what a warm-
er or a colder climate than today meant then to nature and human
activities. The historic precedent may give us some clues for what
to expect from a warmer climate. Will it be "better" or "worse"?
5.
Figure 27. Observed changes in the transparency of the atmosphere since 1882.
Two recent major volcanic eruptions - Mount Agung in 1963 and El Chichon in
1982 - can be identified as marked peaks in this curve. Previously, volcanic ac-
tivity was suppressed since about 1920.
Source: George C. Marhall Institute, Washington D.C., 1990.
during the first half of this century - at a time when it could not
have been caused by a trace-gas increase.
This conclusion comes on top of our earlier realization that the
temperature increase this century was also accompanied by a lull
in volcanic activity, which further reduces the possible role the
greenhouse effect might have had.
Clearly then, it now appears foolish to believe (and to claim)
that the warming we have experienced over the last 100 years has
largely or even entirely been caused by the greenhouse effect.
Greenhouse activists may take some additional (cold) comfort
from the fact that the years 1989 and 1990 were years with some
of the highest sunspot numbers ever (and the period 1950-1989
was the 40 year period with the largest number ever since records
began) - putting a further damper on their claims that the 1980s
were the decade when we finally saw the greenhouse effect. When
considering annual averages of tropospheric temperatures, as we
did before in Fig. 19, temperatures in the mid-latitudes of the
Northern Hemisphere seem to have closely followed solar
activity since the 1960s, which is when this data-set began (see Fig.
28b). Therefore, possible solar-climate-relationships should not be
so easily dismissed.
116 GLOBAL WARMING
Time Out II
1. The oceans
We saw earlier that the oceans assume a key role in both the car-
bon cycle affecting the atmospheric concentration of the most im-
portant greenhouse gas, CO2, and climate by acting as a sink and
transfer medium for heat.
A significant part of the poleward heat transfer from equatorial
regions is carried out by ocean currents. In the Northern Hemis-
phere, those currents have been estimated to effect up to 40 per-
124 GLOBAL WARMING
Figure 31. Model calculations of globally averaged surface air temperature em-
ploying the IPCC scenarios "A" (business as usual), - A (LSG) and "D" (CO"
reduction to 50% of 1985 level by 2050) - D (LSG) and instantaneous CO"
doubling (2 x C02 (LSG)) in the Max Planck - Institute of Meteorology, transi-
ent coupled ocean atmosphere GCM. According to this model, temperatures in
coming decades will rise significantly less than projected by the IPCC calcula-
tions.
Source: Max-Planck -Institute of Meteorology, Hamburg, Germany, 1991.
2. The clouds
The same can certainly also be said when considering the im-
pact of modeling clouds in climate model forcasts. Here, climate
modelers have to cope with a variety of factors which can either
increase or decrease cloudiness, change cloud physical properties
and cloud type, which, in turn, can lead either to a decrease or in-
crease in global temperatures in response to a trace-gas increase.
Why clouds are cloudy business indeed is shown by an estimate
that an error of about 2 percent in model-predicted cloud cover
may cause an error in temperature as large as the envisioned
126 GLOBAL WARMING
A Changing Perspective
Taking Stock
they are quite active making their opinion known to Congress, and
to the public.
However, it is more the bark of their opinion than the bite of
scientific evidence that has the public's ear, because, as we have
seen, their views can be refuted, which is why their opinion is not
shared by large segments of the scientific community, which takes
a more cautious stance, such as we have expressed it here. Still
other members of the scientific community think - although very
few dare to say so publicly - that even a warming as large as that
predicted by the models is good for all of us, a position pointed
out here to show the range of opinion within the scientific com-
munity.
Most of this debate remains hidden from the public view and
the majority of scientists remain quiet. The stage then belongs to
those who are sometimes called the "greenhouse alarmists".
And the media are always up for it: Sci-fi and horror stories are
good box office, bad news is always better than good news, the
audience loves it and it's not the media's task to inform the public,
but to make money and secure a market share. So there is certainly
no reason for the media not to push the greenhouse effect, because
here they have a sure-fire winner for some time to come, and the
worse the horror stories get, the better.
However, one day the party will be over; at the very latest,
when demands are presented to the public to contain a greenhouse
effect we have seen will not occur in the predicted manner; when
demands which cut so deeply into the American way of life, into
the prosperity Americans worked so hard to achieve are presen-
ted to combat in essence a figment of the imagination, then, at the
very latest, the public will start asking questions in the same way we
have asked them here. And scientists and politicians alike had
better be prepared to answer them.
derived from coal. But at present, there does not seem to be a via-
ble alternative to fossil fuels in many areas, and unless we want to
go back to a 17th century lifestyle, or spend half of our pay-check
on so-called alternative energy, all we can do to lessen the pres-
sure on the global resource base is to save energy.
Go Nuke!
Renewable Energy:
Welcome To Alice's Wonderland
The best way to fight the greenhouse effect - and solve the
world's energy supply problems - is a shift of the world's energy
base to so-called renewables or alternative energies: wind, solar,
hydropower.
Of those three, hydropower is indeed a proven resource of elec-
tricity generation, and, where available, a widely used source of
energy.
But the other two candidates, wind and solar, largely represent
a pipe dream when it comes to large scale generation of power
necessary to fullfill the world's energy needs. Why? Even though
they are technologically possible, they are more expensive by a
factor of five to ten than power generation by means of either a
fossil or a nuclear power plant. Energy experts are therefore quite
certain that in the foreseeable future, meaning the next decades,
the role of renewables will remain quite small and restricted to a
few, special applications. Nonetheless, research in those areas is
being intensified, and who knows, maybe ten or 20 years from
now, some smart scientist might come up with a way to manu-
facture solar cells at a fraction of today's costs and, all of a sudden,
our greenhouse and energy worries will be over once and for all.
But as of now, the potential of "alternative fuels" can be summed
up briefly: Technologically: Yes, in some respects. Economically:
No, in almost all respects.
heating fuel price hike, you decide not to freeze or run around
your home in a blanket; you pay the higher price for fuel instead.
In both cases, it is obvious that the poor suffer the most under
such tax'em-to-death proposals, because they lack the financial
muscle to either pay the higher price or make up for the additio-
nal money spent on fuel by reduced spending in other areas. To
them, and to most of us, the need to use energy assumes a central
role in life.
Consider an example where such a taxing strategy might work
and why it might work:
If the price of such non-essential commodities such as sugar or
coffee goes up, you might indeed decide to forego sugar or coffee
for a while in order to dodge the price hike. You can do that, be-
cause sugar and coffee are not as essential to our lives as the use
of energy.
Therefore, there is a much higher elasticity in the price-demand
relationship of those non-essential commodities; and taxation, in
other words steering demand through the price, will probably
work.
But as far as the more essential use of fuel is concerned, your
more likely reaction to higher prices will be to grudgingly pay
them and to make up for the money thus lost by spending less in
non-essential areas - such as travel, restaurants, reading material,
luxury goods. Therefore, the additional money spent on energy
will be subtracted from money spent in other sectors of the econ-
omy judged to be less essential, which may lead, or contribute, to
an economic downturn such as the ones we have witnessed in the
1970s and early 1980s. But fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions will
not be reduced in the process.
One good example why a "quasi tax hike" did not result in
decreased consumption of energy comes from Germany again.
Between 1973 and 1981, gasoline prices, as a result of two oil cri-
ses, went up two and a half fold, mimicking as stiff a tax increase
as is imaginable.
Yet, and this must be a surprise to all ecologists and tax hike
proponents, total gasoline consumption went up 30 percent and
CO2 emissions with them, mostly as a result of an ever increasing
number of automobiles.
But that is not all. One would have thought that at least speci-
fic gas consumption went down (gas milage increased), but no, it
even went up slightly (gas milage decreased) (see Fig. 32).
Conventional wisdom has it that at least gas milage should
146 GLOBAL WARMING
have improved under the impact of so steep a gas price hike. But
this did not happen either. Apparently, the response to higher gas
prices has been to continue to drive - and to drive relatively large
cars. The higher cost of driving must then have been compensa-
ted for by reduced spending in other areas. Obviously, no CO2
emissions were reduced despite the dramatically higher prices.
And to finally give the the tax fanatics something to think about,
let us look at the absolute gasoline price level in the US and in Ger-
many. A gallon of gasoline in Germany goes for $2.40 and in the
US for about $1.10. Out of those $2.40, total taxes amount to $1.60,
substantially in excess of US taxes and even substantially in excess
of what dyed-in-the-wool environmentalists are proposing in the
US.
But now, fleet average gas milage in the US stands at 20 and in
Germany at 23 mpg (see Fig. 33). In other words, despite the hor-
rendous tax level in Germany, there is about the same efficiency
there as in the US. More remarkably, efficiency in the US has in-
creased by about 50 per cent between 1974 and 1988 - despite the
drastically lower price level in the US (see Fig. 33). The new-car-
fleet gas mileage moreover is quite comparable in both countries
and stands at about 28 mpg. Do you still believe in higher taxes as
a means to increase energy efficiency? There are better ways.
This exercise could be carried out for other sectors of the econ-
omy as well. Data from the manufacturing sector of the German
economy do not show any convincing relationship between the
energy price level and energy efficiency (see Fig. 34). In fact, the
largest efficiency gains were achieved in the 1950s and 1960s
when energy prices adjusted for inflation were falling. Even in
percentage terms, the efficiency gains were not larger under the
high energy prices of the '70s and '80s. However, there are nota-
ble differences from one country to an other, and in the US econ-
omy, significant improvements in energy efficiency did not set in
until after the first oil crisis in 1973.
In any case, there are substantial pitfalls in an "energy must be
more expensive to reflect its real costs" and the resulting tax'em-
to-death approach, which must be known to the people advoca-
ting it; but apparently, the opinion "if it feels bad, do it" prevails
as the leitmotif among those who are promulgating those strate-
gies and one wonders if they really are designed to counter the
greenhouse effect or more to fullfill some sadistic desire to inflict
pain.
Moreover, the notion of "environmental costs of fossil fuel use"
THE REST OF THE STORY 147
Figure 32. Trends of gasoline prices and specific gasoline consumption in Ger-
many since 1966 (adjusted for inflation). The figure plots fuel consumption of
the passenger car fleet in Germany (Liters/100 km) and fuel prices (in constant
1980 DM per liter).
1.00 DM per liter corresponds to US$ 2.10 per US gallon (in 1980 US$).
Source: The German Federal Ministry of Transport; BP, various years.
Figure 33. Trends of energy prices and energy efficiency within the manufac-
turing sector of the German economy between 1950 and 1988 in Kg of ce per
1000 DM of goods produced with crude oil prices in DM per ton at constant
1980 prices (adjusted for inflation).
Source: Data after Vereinigung Industrielle Krafrwirtschaft, various years; BP, 1990.
Before we get into the CO2 and energy side of the coin, let us first
take a quick look at the second most important greenhouse gas,
the CFCs, of which the Toronto conference demanded a complete
phase out because of their role in ozone destruction.
As we saw on page 27, a phase out of CFCs would not only be
a measure against the greenhouse effect, but also against stratos-
pheric ozone depletion, and may therefore not only be a prudent,
but very cost-effective strategy as well, in view of the fact that
CFCs contribute between 20 and 25 per cent to the greenhouse ef-
fect at present emission rates, comparable to the entire, world-
wide contribution of fossil fuel use in transportation and residen-
tial heating.
It may be considerably easier and less disruptive of human ac-
tivities to think of some ways to replace CFCs than to think of new
ways to heat homes or propel automobiles.
Therefore, any sensible strategy to counter the greenhouse ef-
fect would, for reasons of cost effectiveness and in order to disrupt
human activities as little as possible, first and foremost address
the CFCs.
We recall, however, that this is already being done; at present,
out of concern over the ozone layer, but with the side benefit of
also warding off the greenhouse effect.
We already considered this in our conclusion that any possible
future warming due to the greenhouse effect would not proceed as
rapidly as has been thought; therefore, one key element in staving off
the greenhouse effect has already been implemented - though
some would like to see the CFC phase out much sooner. No-
netheless, it appears as if the importance of the CFC phase-out in
scaling down the greenhouse effect in coming decades has not yet
fully permeated the minds of most greenhouse thinkers who con-
tinue to hammer on CO2 and energy use as the one and only
greenhouse gas and greenhouse activity. They give their secret
away too easily: the name of the game is not concern about
climate, but concern about energy use.
THE REST OF THE STORY 151
Try Technology
tion look even better. We know from (page 48-49) that the oceans
would be capable of swallowing a substantial portion of the emit-
ted CO2 if the emissions growth rate is relatively small. However,
we must realize that once the CO2 is in the oceans, it is basically
lost to any future use. Since we have now found out we can use
CO2 to grow trees, which are themselves a resource, would it not
be a waste to let the CO2 disappear in the oceans? Wouldn't it be
better to consider atmospheric CO2 a resource instead of a waste
product, and transform this resource into usable carbon - putting
trees to work? If we made it available to the biosphere by growing
trees, we make it available for future generations. In other words,
if we grew enough trees so they can capture CO2 before it is ab-
sorbed up by the oceans, not only would we be fighting a hypo-
thetical greenhouse effect, but we would recover a waste product
- CO2 - and use it to rebuild our stock of natural resources - es-
sentially free of charge: Because for all practical purposes, trees
grow by themselves. Furthermore, we would be beautifying our
natural surroundings - reversing the trend of tearing up our land.
Therefore, re-greening the earth is a formula for solving a
plethora of problems all at once - and essentially free of charge:
1. Combating a hypothetical greenhouse effect
2. Using a waste product to rebuild our stock of natural resources
free of charge
3. Beautify our natural environment
160 GLOBAL WARMING
name of the game is not climate, it's living standards in the ICs
and their attempts to change those life-styles.
We now conclude the section devoted to "CO2 reduction stra-
tegies" and focus our attention on the remaining major three gre-
enhouse gases namely CH4, N2O and O3.
tely 8-10 per cent each to average annual emissions (see Table 5).
CH4 emissions from coal mining operations can be - and are -
partially used for energy generation: They are burned. In terms of
the greenhouse problem, burning of CH4 has obvious benefits, be-
cause burning of one molecule of methane produces one molecule
of CO2. Since one Kg of methane has the greenhouse power of 58
Kg of carbon dioxide, burning off CH4 would reduce the green-
house effectiveness of methane to 1/58th of its original value.
In coal mining operations, there are certain technical and oper-
ational limits to the use of methane which may restrict the amount
of methane used - and not given off to the atmosphere - to roughly
20 per cent.
In other words, there may be some, but not very much merit in
using methane emitted from coal mining operations. In any case,
the more pertinent question would probably be whether it is eco-
nomically viable to invest in some methane retaining technology,
assuming it existed or could be developed, if the investment does
not pay for itself, i.e., saving other types of energy by burning met-
hane.
If this is not the case, we would clearly be violating our rule one
again, namely that the costs of an investment should always be re-
covered by the energy saved.
A similar case can be made for natural gas: The costs to avert
the leakages that currently occur may be so astronomical that they
will never be recovered by the re-captured natural gas (=met-
hane).
We must therefore conclude that methane probably is the most
intractable of the greenhouse gases, and that the prospects to re-
duce future increases look fairly bleak. Like it or not, there does
not seem to be much we can do about it at present. On a less lu-
gubrious note however, we should always remember that we are
talking about hypothetical options which we might have at our dis-
posal should there be a dramatic warm up. But luckily, we know
by now that this is very unlikely to happen, which is why we
should not lose too much sleep over it. We should keep the rice
paddies wet.
Ozone
els predict, let alone the more realistic view presented here.
Assuming there was some way to enforce global implementa-
tion, which at this point appears somewhat questionable, the we-
stern ICs are technologically and financially in a much better po-
sition to implement them than the former USSR and China, not to
mention the LDCs.
Any international debate about "restricting fossil fuel use" will
become a war of each against all of the countries involved, either
with respect to their degree of dependence on fossil fuels, their
technological and financial ability to implement energy saving
technology, or simply with respect to their level of economic de-
velopment. Some countries will have to use more fossil fuel in the
future than in the past to further their economic development - to
which they are as entitled as any of the developed countries be-
fore them. The most pressing problems are supplying their popu-
lation with sufficient amounts of energy at the lowest possible
cost.
One of those countries is China. The PRC will probably defy
any calls to reduce the use of fossil fuel, simply because its main
concern is to hurry along economic growth; it does not have any
resources to squander, either technologically or financially, on
state of the art environmental technology imported from the West,
let alone developing it domestically. Laying emphasis both on in-
creasing energy production and energy conservation is seen as a
means to meet the country's energy needs. China's main energy
source is coal. The country is very richly endowed with coal - and
it will make use of it. Over the past 40 years China's coal product-
ion grew by a staggering rate of close to nine per cent per year, and
presently stands at over one billion tons. Even if that growth rate
was slashed in half over the next 15 years, China's coal produc-
tion would still double, sending up worldwide CO2 emissions by
12 per cent from 1990 levels. So much for the Toronto demands.
China's main concern is to supply sufficient energy to a relent-
lessly growing population. To economize on energy consumption
is a means for the Chinese to provide more energy to more peo-
ple. A possible climate change may not be very high on their list
of concerns.
The same goes for the former USSR. Any future economic de-
velopment, sorely needed, will be heavily dependent on the do-
mestic resource base of fossil fuels. Energy experts from the repu-
blics quite openly admit that they cannot at all follow western
concerns about the greenhouse effect. It may not be too unrealistic
168 GLOBAL WARMING
to assume that the former USSR will put its main emphasis on eco-
nomic development and only in the second place on environ-
mental compatibility, although the environment in general is gai-
ning ground in Moscow and in other republics as it already has in
the former East Germany. Like China, the first concern is with pro-
viding sufficient energy. Advancing technology is seen as a means
to increase energy efficiency needed to meet growing energy re-
quirements in the face of a growing world population. The green-
house effect is not seen as a problem. As far as climate is concern-
ed, it is fair to assume that the USSR would only stand to gain
from a global warming, even if it were as large as climate models
expect, a view openly expressed by M. Budyko, and in all like-
lihood shared in leading circles not just of the former USSR, but of
other East European countries as well. In the wake of the political
THE REST OF THE STORY
169
Media 1, Science 0
Greenhouse Summary
You will notice that in this plan none of the points - other than
the last - is specifically designed to counter a perceived threat to
the climate - for the reasons you know by now. However, they do
have the added benefit of reducing a trace-gas build-up in the at-
mosphere and thereby countering the greenhouse effect up to the
point at which those measures can be implemented at no net cost;
in other words, the economic benefits of energy saving measures
or afforestation programs should be larger than the costs they
incur.
And this is exactly where this plan differs from omnibus re-
duction demands, which were based on untenable model project-
ions in the first place.
If we briefly review the points, we see the necessity to intensify
climate research to develope a causal, physical explanation of
what makes the climate system tick - considering all factors and
not just trace-gases.
In the field of climate modeling, the primary task is an upgrad-
ing of existing computer modeling, for which increased number
crunching power is sorely needed, plus a full-fledged attempt to
better understand the underlying physics of the atmosphere.
Some experts feel that a research program over a 5 year period
should be capable of producing tangible results that would pro-
vide a firmer footing for decision makers to rely on. That is a time
frame we could certainly afford, in view of the fact that a warmer
climate would be the better one, even if a warming occurred dur-
ing those 5-10 years as large as current models predict. But we
know by now that this is very unlikely. The costs of such a rese-
arch program would be small compared to those incurred by
needlessly embarking on a large scale trace-gas reduction scheme.
The option to achieve CO2 reductions by a tax should be reject-
ed for the following reasons:
• Social inequalities will be exacerbated
• Harm will be done to the national economy by shifting funds
away from the efficient to the inefficient sector of the economy.
• CO2 emissions will not be reduced in the end because of inelas-
ticities in the energy price-demand relationship.
178 GLOBAL WARMING
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