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THOMAS J. LAUB
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Contents
Abbreviations and foreign words vi
List of gures and tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Map of Occupied France, 15 March 1941 xviii
Introduction 1
1. The Shocking Defeat 23
2. Rivals and Scavengers 49
3. Setting the Precedent 71
4. First Measures 89
5. Resistance and Reprisals 112
6. The End of Ambiguity 134
7. Transitions 168
8. Defamation, Discrimination, and Despoliation 194
9. Racial Deportations 220
10. Labor Deportations and Resistance 247
11. Invasion and Retreat 273
Bibliography 297
Index 315
Abbreviations and foreign words
Bibliographic abbreviations
ADAP Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik 19181945
BAK Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Koblenz
BALW Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Reich und DDR,
Lichterfelde-West, Berlin
BAMA Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Militararchiv, Frei-
burg im Breisgau
CCDR Commission Consultative des dommages et des
Reparations
DGFP Documents on German Foreign Policy
IMT Trial of major war criminals before the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal
MGFA Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
nfn No frame number
RG Record Group
USNA United States National Archive and Records
Administration, College Park, Maryland
Textual abbreviations
BdS Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des
SD. Representative of the Security Police and
SD in France. After the summer of 1942, the
title shifted to Befehlshaber or Commander of
the Security Police and SD
abbreviations and foreign words
vii
after the fall
viii
abbreviations and foreign words
ix
after the fall
x
abbreviations and foreign words
xi
after the fall
xii
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
Local, district, and regional branches of the Military Commander in
France c.15 March 1941 xviii
1.1 German plans to invade France in 1914, 1939, and 1940 27
1.2 The Norwegian Campaign, 1940 29
1.3 The Western Campaign, 1940 31
1.4 Adolf Hitler being greeted in the Compiegne forest 35
1.5 The German chain of command 42
1.6 The German Military Government in France 46
2.1 Gring, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis
listen as Hitler declares war on the United States, 11 December 1941 51
4.1 Crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 19401942 107
4.2 Serious crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 19401942 108
4.3 Daily life in Occupied France 110
5.1 General Otto von Stulpnagel consults Field Marshal Walter von
Brauchitsch in Paris, 21 May 1941 126
5.2 Helmut Knochen 131
6.1 The German chain of command in Nantes, 1941 152
6.2 Werner Best 153
6.3 Admiral Darlan, Marshal Petain, and Reichsmarschall Goring in
St. Florentin 156
7.1 The Nazis spring a trap, 1944 176
7.2 Prime Minister Laval and HSSuPF Oberg, 1 May 1943 185
8.1 Local, district, and regional authorities in occupied France, 1944 198
8.2 Aryanization in Marseilles. A Jewish business under new management 213
9.1 Reinhard Heydrich 229
9.2 Pithiviers internment camp c.1941 233
after the fall
Table
7.1 Arrests for serious resistance activity, October 1941May 1942 178
xiv
Acknowledgments
I could not have written this book on my own and would like thank all the
people who helped me navigate the research and writing process. A long
and distinguished list of family members, academic mentors, colleagues,
and friends provided considerable help during the course of this project. I
owe all of you a debt of gratitude and would like to express my sincere
thanks.
Grounded in business and nance, the Laub family always appreciated
the value of education but viewed my foray into graduate school with a
degree of skepticism. What can you do with a degree in history? Wouldnt
a business or a law degree be more rewarding? My father, George W.
Laub, set aside his initial doubts and supported my graduate education
through thick and thin. Persuaded in no small part by my fathers vocal
support, my mother Sandra, sister Lorinda, and brother George funded
my insatiable appetite for books, encouraged me to nish this manuscript,
and helped me overcome professional challenges. This book could not
have been written without the emotional and nancial support from the
entire Laub family. I must also thank the extended Bowles family for
providing moral support during the nal stages of the revision process.
Dean and Nancy Jo Cline welcomed me into their home. David and Shirly
Bowles listened to a frustrated academic with sympathy and patience. All
four exemplied southern hospitality and overlooked my Yankee heritage.
Last but certainly not least, Laura Bowles helped me overcome numerous
bureaucratic obstacles, edited portions of this manuscript, and helped me
recover from the writing process. Both families have my heartfelt thanks.
Educators in Europe and the United States contributed to this work
in many different ways. Led by Alan Draper, the faculty of the history
and government departments at St. Lawrence University introduced me to
the rigors of academic life. Richard Breitman, W. Scott Haine, and Mark
Masurovsky revealed the nuances of French and German historiography
at the American University. Damon Chetson, Will Hay, Erin Mahan,
Christof Morrissey, and Steve Norris brightened my days at the University
of Viginia. Stephen Schuker helped a green graduate student develop
after the fall
xvi
acknowledgments
January 2009
ThomasJLaub@aol.com
xvii
Local, district, and regional branches of the Military Commander in France
c.15 March 1941.
Introduction
Peter Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy. The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Philippe Bourdrel, LEpuration sauvage, 19441945 (Paris:
Perrin, 1988).
after the fall
live up to those that followed Napoleon IIIs 1851 coup detat or the
1871 Paris Commune. Although harsh during the months that immediately
followed the Liberation, French courts eventually accepted a rather narrow
denition of collaboration that, in many ways, let bygones be bygones.
The relatively moderate nature of purges may be connected to
widespread acceptance of arguments advanced by defendants during
postwar trials. In response to charges that he betrayed the Third Republic,
Marshal Henri Petain, the leader of the French state between 17 June 1940
and August 1944, testied that
I used my power as a shield to protect the French people . . . Every day, a dagger at
my throat, I struggled against the enemys demands. History will tell all that I spared
you, though my adversaries think only of reproaching me for the inevitable . . .
While General de Gaulle carried on the struggle outside our frontiers, I prepared
the way for liberation by preserving France, suffering but alive.
Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 19441958, translated by Godfrey Rogers (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 2942.
Proces du Marechal Petain (Paris: Editions Louis Pariente, 1945), pp. 1516; Jean-Marc Varaut,
Le Proces Petain, 19451995 (Paris: Perrin, 1995).
Varaut, Le Proces Petain, p. 381ff.
2
introduction
Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, translated by
Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 241251; Louis
Rougier, Les Accords PetainChurchill: Historie dune mission secrete (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1945);
Henri du Moulin de Labarthete, Le Temps des illusions: Souvenirs, juillet 1940avril 1942 (Geneva:
Editions du Cheval aile, 1946); Louis-Dominique Girard, Montoire, Verdun diplomatique: Le Secret
du Marechal (Paris: A. Bonne, 1948); Rene de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation,
19401944, translated by Philip W. Whitcomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957);
Paul Badouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement (Paris: Editions de la table ronde, 1948); Yves Bouthillier,
Le Drame de Vichy (Paris: Plon, 1950).
Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, p. 35.
Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, pp. 3243; Robert Aron, The Vichy Regime 19401944 (Paris:
Fayard, 1954); Pierre Laborie, LOpinion francaise sous Vichy (Paris: Editions du seuil, 1990).
Varraut, Le Proces Petain, p. 387; Fred Kupferman, Les Premiers beaux jours, 19441946 (Paris:
Calmann-Levy, 1985); Jean Cassou, La Memoire courte (Paris: Minuit, 1953), pp. 334; Charles
3
after the fall
Yet the dismay of the political left may have been disingenuous. Commu-
nists avoided a thorough discussion of the past because such an endeavor
might talk about the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, widespread public
apathy during the rst years of the Occupation, and other disconcerting
facts. With skeletons in almost every closet, neither right- nor left-wing
parties pushed for a thorough examination of the Vichy era. They both
accepted the sword and shield theory as the least-worst explanation of the
Occupation.
Robert Paxtons Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 19401944
forced many to revise their understanding of the Vichy era. Using German
sources, Paxton argued that
the shield theory hardly bears close examination. The armistice and the unoccupied
zone seemed at rst a cheap way out, but they could have bought some material
ease for the French population only if the war had soon ended. As the war dragged
on, German authorities asked no less of France than that of the totally occupied
countries. In the long run, Hitlers victims suffered in proportion to his need for
their goods or his ethnic feelings about them, not in proportion to their eagerness
to please. Vichy managed to win only paltry concessions: a few months of the releve
instead of a labor draft, exemption from the yellow star for Jews in the unoccupied
zone, slightly lower occupation costs between May 1941 and November 1942,
more weapons in exchange for keeping the Allies out of the empire. Judged by its
fruits, Vichy negotiation was barren.
Paxton examined the actions of the Vichy regime and found that Petain and
his lieutenants pushed their own agenda. In 1940 Petain asked Germany
for an armistice to prevent a left-wing revolution. After hostilities ceased
in June 1940, Laval and Darlan tried to exchange economic and military
collaboration in return for an easing of restrictions outlined in the Armistice
Agreement. Although fettered by the 1940 defeat and the occupation of
two-thirds of France, Petains lieutenants used whatever autonomy they
could muster to construct a new version of La Patrie. Instead of describing
Vichys program as something imposed by Hitler, Paxton characterized
Rist, Une Saison gatee. Journal de la guerre et de loccupation (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 40; Pierre
Guillain de Benouville Le Sacrice du matin (Paris: Lafont, 1946); Yves Farge, Rebelles, soldats et
citoyens (Paris: Grasset, 1946).
Stephan Courtois, Le PCF dans la guerre (Paris: Ramsay, 1980); Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du
parti communist francais (Paris: Fayard, 1965), vol. II.
Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 19401944 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 372.
4
introduction
Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, pp. 374, 3813.
John F. Sweets, Chaque livre un evenement: Robert Paxton and the French, from briseur de
glace to iconoclaste tranquille, in S. Fishman, L. Lee Downs, I. Sinanoglou et al. (eds.), France at
War: Vichy and the Historians, translated by David Lake (New York: Berg, 2000), pp. 2134,
303307; Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic
Books, 1981).
Eberhad Jackel, France dans LEurope de Hitler, translated by Alfred Grosser (Paris: Fayard,
1968), pp. 154179, 226258, 312326. First published as Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: Die deutsche
Frankreichpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966).
5
after the fall
just respond to German demands, and discounted the sword and shield
theory.
In the same year that Jackel published Frankreich in Hitlers Europa, Paxton
published his own doctoral dissertation entitled Parades and Politics at Vichy:
The French Ofcer Corps under Marshal Petain. While Vichy France analyzed
Petains general political program, Parades and Politics focused on the French
army as an institution. Soldiers and sailors played an important political
role throughout the Vichy era. General Maxime Weygand, the French
Commander in Chief in June 1940, refused to continue ghting Nazi
Germany from North Africa and demanded an armistice. Between July
1940 and November 1942, the French army supported Petains program
of domestic reform and, as an institution, made little effort to resist Nazi
Germany. While few professional ofcers volunteered to serve in the
German armed forces after the invasion of the Soviet Union, even fewer
joined Charles de Gaulle in London before November 1942. Although
Paxtons dissertation discussed one of the most signicant institutions in
French society, few Europeans recognized the importance of Parades and
Politics. The distinguished French historian Jean-Pierre Azema claimed
that specialists were familiar with Paxtons rst book, but their awareness
was not reected in contemporary scholarly journals. The Revue francaise
de science politique published an eight-line commentary that focused on
Paxtons sources, while the prestigious Revue dhistoire de la deuxieme guerre
mondiale merely listed Paxtons rst book under works received in April
1967. Both Jackels Frankreich in Hitlers Europa and Paxtons Parades and
Politics reached conclusions that atly contradicted the established sword
and shield theory articulated by Aron and others, but they passed without
comment in France.
Paxtons Vichy France essentially destroyed the sword and shield theory
and, in light of its detailed research, has discouraged others from writing
another history of the Vichy era from the top down. Academics have
continued to focus on issues of collaboration and resistance, but most have
Robert O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Ofcer Corps under Marshal Petain
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 624, 142, 934, 407.
Sweets, Chaque livre un evenement: Robert Paxton and the French, from briseur de glace to
iconoclaste tranquille, in France at War, p. 21.
6
introduction
studied the question from the bottom up. Some analyzed specic regions
of France during the war and largely conrmed Paxtons ndingsalbeit
with variations. John Sweets scrutinized the town of Clermont-Ferrand
and concluded few people actively supported Marshal Petains regime.
By the same token, few residents of Clermont-Ferrand took actions that
directly threatened Vichy politicians or their German sponsors. Studies
of women, children, the theater, religious groups, and big business have
supported similar conclusions. Specialists of the Vichy era studied France
from the bottom up and social history dominated the eld.
After the Liberation, prosecutors used a model of collaboration and
resistance to adjudicate treason cases. Defendants either collaborated with
Germany and were guilty of treason or supported the resistance and thus
were innocent. Scholars employed a similar dichotomy to explain the
actions of French social groups and institutions during World War II. What
did a group or institution do, and did its actions advance Hitlers cause?
If the last question can be answered in the afrmative, then the subject
was probably guilty of collaboration. Authors who employ the collabora-
tionresistance dichotomy can, because of the nature of the questions they
are asking, concentrate on the activities of French men and women with
little regard for other considerations.
John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France. The French under Nazi Occupation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994). Other regional studies include Alya Aglan, La Resistance sacriee:
Le Mouvement Liberation-Nord (Paris: Flammarion, 1994); Laurent Douzou, La Desobeissance:
Histoire dun mouvement et dun journal clandestin: Liberation-Sud (19401944) (Paris: Odile Jacob,
1995); H. R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 19421944
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Lynn Taylor, Between Resistance and Collaboration. Popular
Protest in Northern France, 19401945 (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000); Robert Zaretsky, Nmes
at War: Religion, Politics and Public Opinion in the Department of the Gard, 19381944 (Pennsylvania,
PA: Penn State Press, 1995).
Sarah Fishman, We will wait! The Wives of French Prisoners of War 19401945 (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Celia Bertin, Femmes sous loccupation (Paris: Stock, 1993); Hanna
Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France 19391948: Choices and Constraints (New
York: Longman, 1999); Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to
a Political Sociology of Gender, translated by Kathleen A. Johnson (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2001); W. D. Halls, The Youth of Vichy France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981);
Pierre Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunnesse sous Vichy (Paris: Perrin, 1991); Serge Added, Le Theatre
dans les annees Vichy (Paris: Ramsay, 1992); Jean-Pierre Bertin-Maghit, Le Cinema sous loccupation:
Le Monde du cinema francais de 19401946 (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1989); Jacques Duquesne,
Les Catholiques francais sous loccupation (Paris: Grasset, 1966); W. D. Halls, Politics, Society and
Christianity in Vichy France (Oxford and Providence, NH: Berg, 1995); Richard Vinen, The Politics
of French Business 19361945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
7
after the fall
Rejecting this binary model, Philippe Burrin has developed the notion of
accommodation to explain how people adapted to changing circumstances
between 1940 and 1944.
I have made use of the notion of accommodation so as to direct attention
beyond the commonly accepted idea of collaboration that is seen in an essentially
politico-ideological perspective. That perspective may be indispensable for giving
an account of the action of the Vichy leaders and the attitude of those of their
compatriotsthe collaborationistswho adopted a position favoring entente with
the conqueror; but it is unsuitable for a satisfactory understanding of the far more
numerous choices of adaptation made by French society as a whole.
Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, translated by Janet
Lloyd (New York: New Press, 1996), p. viii.
Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, pp. 177190, 250261,
291305. First published as La France a lheure allemande, 19401944 (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1993); Richard Cobb, French and Germans, Germans and French. A Personal Interpretation of France
under Two Occupations, 19141918/19401944 (Hanover, NH and London: University Press of
New England, 1983).
8
introduction
9
after the fall
Michael Geyer, Foreword, in Hamburg Institute for Social Research (ed.), The German
Army and Genocide: Crimes Against War Prisoners, Jews, and Other Civilians, 19391944, translated
by Scott Abbott (New York: New Press, 1999), pp. 79.
Manfred Messerschmidt, Vorwartsverteidigung: Die Denkschrift der Generale fr den
Nrnberger Gerichtshof, in Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 19411944, eds. Hannes
Heer and Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), pp. 531550; Rolf-Dieter
Mller and Gerd Ueberschar, Hitlers War in the East: A Critical Assessment, translated by Bruce
D. Little (New York: Berghahn, 2002).
B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: W. Morrow, 1948); Heinz
Guderian, Panzer Leader, translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Dutton, 1952); Erich
von Manstein, Lost Victories, translated by Anthony G. Powell (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982).
10
introduction
Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 16401945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955),
pp. 496503; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics,
19181945 (London: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 694700.
11
after the fall
General Ludwig Beck grasped the extent of Hitlers ambitions and began
to doubt his acumen. But ve years of Gleichschaltung (coordination or
Nazication) and a string of foreign policy successes allayed doubts and
prevented dissent from blossoming into opposition. The few ofcers who
understood the radical nature of the Nazi regime could not convince their
colleagues to depose the Fhrer.
Manfred Messerschmidts Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat appeared in the
same year as Das Heer und Hitler and reached similar conclusions. Messer-
schmidt explained how National-Socialist ideas penetrated the army during
the 1930s and permeated both the ofcer corps and enlisted ranks by
the end of the war. A wave of new recruits, many of whom were
imbued with Nazi ideology that they learned as members of the Hitler
Youth, diluted the inuence of the traditionally conservative ofcer corps
during the 1930s. Senior ofcers supported Nazi propaganda to for-
tify morale and prevent another outbreak of the disorder that appeared
in 1918. According to Messerschmidt, commanding ofcers did not
oppose and in some cases abetted the development of orders that vio-
lated the laws of war. He implicated junior and senior ofcers in the
execution of Russian prisoners, the extermination of Jews, and some
of the most unsavory policies of the Third Reich. Like Klaus-Jrgen
Mller, Messerschmidt characterized the Wehrmacht as Hitlers junior
partner.
Christian Streits Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen
Kriegsgefangenen 19411945 carried Mller and Messerschmidts revision
a step further. While continuing to study the Wehrmacht from the
top down, Streit accused senior army ofcers of embarking on a war
of extermination in the Soviet Union. The men in charge of OKW
and OKH helped Hitler formulate and implement the Kommissarbefehl
or Commissar Order that directed German troops to execute Red Army
political commissars and thus violated international agreements and German
military regulations. Senior German ofcers struck a Faustian bargain
with the Fhrer and did not oppose racial directives to demonstrate the
political reliability of the army. Furthermore, many ofcers believed the
Klaus-Jrgen Mller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime, 19331940
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969).
Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg:
R. v. Deckers Verlag, 1969), pp. 396422, 480491.
12
introduction
war against the Soviet Union would be short-lived and thus not very
incriminating. Staff ofcers who condemned the war of extermination did
so to preserve traditional military discipline and not because they truly
believed in the laws of war codied in the Hague Convention. By fully
implicating the German ofcer corps in Hitlers war of extermination,
Streit characterized the army as an equal and willing partner of the
National-Socialist regime.
Omer Bartovs studies of the German army complemented Streits work
by examining the German army from the bottom up. His rst book,
The Eastern Front, 194145: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare,
scrutinized three army divisions and concluded:
Under the circumstances described in this book it [the barbarization of warfare]
can be said to have been almost inevitable. For the men who were educated in
Hitlers Germany, indoctrinated in the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich and sent
into a war of unimaginable ferocity, barbarism was normality, humanism long
forgotten.
Like Streit, Bartov linked regular soldiers to crimes that preceding historians
and the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had attributed to
the SS. Bartovs second book, Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in
the Third Reich, provided a theoretical explanation of the barbarization
process. As casualties decimated front-line units and supplies became
scarce, most soldiers turned to Nazi ideology for spiritual support. Unlike
Streit, who argued that the German ofcer corps supported the goals
of National Socialism before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Bartov
believed that brutal conditions on the eastern front and military setbacks
during the winter of 19411942 transformed the Wehrmacht into Hitlers
army.
Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen,
19411945 (Bonn: J. W. H. Dietz, 1991), pp. 1316, 5061, 7682; Jrgen Forster, Operation
Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation, in Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
(hereafter abbreviated as MGFA), eds., Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV, The Attack on
the Soviet Union, translated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers, and Louise Willmont (Oxford:
Oxford University Press Press, 1998), pp. 491513; Theo Schulte, The German Army and Nazi
Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford: Berg, 1989), pp. 215224; Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich:
A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 513529.
Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 194145: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare
(London: Macmillan Press, 1985), p. 6.
Omer Bartov, Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
13
after the fall
No reputable historian denies widespread atrocities occured in the Soviet Union during
World War Two, but some suggest they may have been partially justied. See Andreas Hillgruber,
Zweierlei Untergang: die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europaischen Judentums
(Berlin: Siedler, 1986); Ernst Nolte, Der europaische Brgerkrieg, 19171945: Nationalsozialismus und
Bolschewismus (Berlin: Propylan Verlag, 1987); Richard J. Evans, In Hitlers Shadow: West German
Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon, 1989); and Forever
in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the
Singularity of the Holocaust, edited and translated and edited by James Knowlton and Truett Cates
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993).
For a range of opinions, see Heer and Naumann (eds.), Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der
Wehrmacht.
Hannes Heer, Die Logik des Vernichtungskrieges: Wehrmacht und Partisanenkampf, in
Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, pp. 104138.
Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2003).
14
introduction
of mistreating civilians and suggested that the army was not a reliable
supporter of the kind of ideological and racial warfare that Hitler had
ordered in Poland.
At rst glance, the good army, bad SS model seems to describe the Ger-
man army in occupied France. Before the 1940 Western campaign, OKW
ordered German soldiers to obey international agreements and respect
the rights of non-combatants in no uncertain terms. While hostilities
raged, German soldiers usually treated Caucasian opponents in accordance
with the rules of war. After France and Germany signed an armistice
on 22 June 1940, Hitler placed a military commander (Militarbefehlshaber
in Frankreich or MBF) in charge of occupied France. The MBF ordered
subordinates to obey the Hague Convention and insisted that [t]he best
propagandist for the German cause is the disciplined, correct appearance
of the German soldier. As an institution, the military government dis-
played little enthusiasm for Hitlers racial agenda. The MBF from October
1940 to February 1942, General Otto von Stlpnagel, resigned his com-
mission to protest draconian reprisals ordered by Berlin. His cousin and
successor, Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel, played a signicant role in the
20 July 1944 plot to overthrow the Nazi regime. With substantial help
from the French police, SS personnel oversaw the deportation of 75,000
French and foreign Jews who ultimately perished in Auschwitz. When
viewed from this perspective, the MBF functioned as Hitlers reluctant
executioner.
Helmut Krausnick, Hitler und die Morde in Polen: Ein Beitrag zum Konikt zwischen
Heer und SS um die Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete, Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 11
(1963), 196209; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1991), pp. 6972, 105108; Raffael Scheck,
Hitlers African Victims. The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 156.
U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C., Record Group 242 (Captured German Records),
Microlm Series T-77 (Records of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW)), Roll
1430, frames 291297. Hereafter referred to as USNA, followed by record group number,
microlm series or entry number (if applicable), folder number (if applicable) or microlm
reel, and page or frame number. For example, USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/291297. When
page or frame numbers are not available, author, date, title, original reference number, or
identifying characteristic will be placed in parenthesis after the abbreviation nfn (no frame
number).
Peter Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegsfhrung und Partisa-
nenbekampfung in Frankreich 194344 (Mnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), pp. 1520;
Scheck, Hitlers African Victims, pp. 3, 645; USNA, RG 242/T-501 (Records of German Field
Commands: Rear Areas, Occupied Territories, and Others)/143/465.
15
after the fall
16
introduction
17
after the fall
multiplied during the fall of 1941, SS ofcers urged the MBF to restore order
by liquidating racial enemies and solving the so-called Jewish question. If
he refused to implement the Nazi racial policy, the MBF had to consider
the possibility that Hitler would view his opposition as a sign of disloyalty
and place a steadfast Nazi in charge of France. The latter would dilute the
authority of the military administration, impede the Wehrmachts ability
to exploit French resources, and demonstrate the political unreliability of
the army. The MBF had to consider the wishes of other Nazi institutions
when formulating policy.
Although initially dominant, the German military government gradually
lost control of German policy because it could not reconcile a traditional
denition of military security with Nazi racial ideas. Hitler considered
World War Two to be a struggle between Aryans and Jews; he concluded
that liquidating racial opponents would eliminate resistance activity, ensure
order, and lead to victory. On the other hand, generals who served as MBF
and inuential gures within the military administration viewed World
War Two as a struggle between traditional nation-states. In order to secure
victory, they tried to maintain order, cultivate French support for the
German cause, and place French resources at the disposal of the German
war economy. While many senior ofcers who were attached to the
military administration viewed Hitlers racial agenda as a secondary mission
or an outright distraction, dedicated Nazis believed it to be the fundamental
point of the entire war. By characterizing the military administration as
being soft on Jews, Nazi paladins won Hitlers favor, secured inuential
roles in French affairs, and expanded their respective bureaucratic empires.
Efforts to dethrone the military administration began shortly after France
and Germany signed the 1940 Armistice Agreement. Alfred Rosenberg
and subordinates on his special action staff, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg,
conscated valuable art collections from afuent French Jews. With support
from Hermann Goring and the German embassy in Paris, Rosenbergs
minions underlined the ideological nature of the war, argued that Jews used
valuable works of art to nance resistance activity, and concluded that the
military administration had an obligation to seize artwork owned by Jews.
BAMA, RW 35/698/164173.
18
introduction
19
after the fall
20
introduction
ArmySS strife reached its zenith on the night of 20/21 July 1944.
After dissident army ofcers tried to assassinate the Fhrer, General Carl-
Heinrich von Stlpnagel arrested and prepared to execute SS personnel
who had committed war crimes. As the coup collapsed in Berlin, the MBF
and HSSuPF reversed course, began to work together, and covered up
the scope of the plot in Paris. Eager to disguise his own shortcomings,
Oberg launched a very delicate enquiry in conjunction with army ofcers
and asked questions that evoked answers which tted an improbable cover
story. Although dozens of military administration ofcers had participated
in the coup, only three perished as a result of Obergs cursory investigation.
Diplomats, soldiers, and Nazis often worked at cross-purposes as they vied
for control of occupied France, but they could achieve astonishing results
through accommodation.
Notions of collaboration and resistance, terms like good and bad, and
amboyant titles like Hitlers Willing Executioners all struggle to explain the
actions of French and German authorities in occupied France. Inuential
historians who study French society during the Occupation have already
recognized the shortcommings of such terms and adopted or adapted
Burrins notion of accommodation to suit their respective purposes.
Although designed to explain popular French reactions to the experience
of occupation, Burrins notion of accommodation can account for the
contradictory actions of the German military administration in Paris, clarify
the inner workings of the Nazi regime, and shed light on Franco-German
relations. Breaking with scholarly trends that favor social history from the
bottom up, this manuscript applies Burrins notion of accommodation to
the study of Occupied France from the top down. Focused primarily on the
military government, After the Fall studies the issues that preoccupied the
men in charge of the German military administration and the Vichy
regime between 1940 and 1944. Eschewing propaganda, prostitution, and
other topics that have been analyzed in the recent past, it examines the
Daniel Goldhagen, Hitlers Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and The Holocaust (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation 19401945 (New
York: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 113; Julian Jackson, France. The Dark Years 19401944 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 239245; Richard Vinen, The Unfree French: Life under the
Occupation (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2006).
Denis Peschanski, Vichy 19401944: Controle et exclusion (Brussels: Editions Complexe,
1997); Laurent Gervereau and Denis Peschanski, La Propagande sous Vichy 19401944 (Nanterre:
21
after the fall
economic, labor, military, political, racial, and security issues that consumed
the German military administration and leading gures of the Vichy regime
during World War Two.
22
1
The shocking defeat
Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company,
1969), p. 94; R. A. C. Parker, Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1920.
Guy Chapman, Why France Fell: The Defeat of the French Army in 1940 (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 5961; Hans Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western
Europe, in Germany and the Second World War, vol. II, Germanys Initial Conquests in Europe,
pp. 265271.
after the fall
divisions could not stop German forces that were equipped with modern
weapons. In a replay of Guernica in April 1937, German planes bombarded
Warsaw for ten days and the capital surrendered on 27 September 1939.
Rather than holding out until the spring of 1940 as General Gamelin
expected, Poland succumbed to the German onslaught in four short weeks.
The sudden defeat of Poland reinforced an image of German strength and
suggested the Allies had good reason to fear the Wehrmacht.
Despite their victory over Poland, German generals remained pessimistic.
After-action studies noted serious deciencies in the training, equipment,
discipline, and personnel of German formations. But Hitler saw things
differently. Citing advantageous political and military conditions, the Fhrer
ordered Army High Command (OKH) to prepare an immediate offensive
against Holland, Belgium, and northern France. The 9 October 1939
directive aimed to capture bases in the Low Countries for subsequent
operations against Great Britain and protect vital German industries in the
Ruhr. OKH quickly churned out an appropriate plan, dubbed Case Yellow
or Fall Gelb, but it did not inspire condence among eld commanders.
In a 24 September 1939 memorandum, the deputy chief of the Army
General Staff in charge of operations, Major-General Carl-Heinrich von
Stlpnagel, argued that Germany lacked the weapons and ammunition
necessary to breach fortications in France or Belgium. The chief of the
war economy staff added that the economy could not sustain the army in a
prolonged war.
After two days of discussions with senior eld commanders, Generals
Walter von Brauchitsch and Wilhelm Keitel, the heads of OKH and
Armed Forces High Command (OKW) respectively, met with Hitler on
5 November 1939. The 58-year-old Brauchitsch argued that the 1939
German army was in many ways inferior to the Imperial Army of 1914 and
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, LAbme, 19391945 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1982), pp. 2326;
Anna M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 19381939 (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1968), pp. 22437, 2445, 2589; Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to
Poland: A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Jon
Kimche, The Unfought Battle (New York: Stein & Day, 1968), p. 146.
Williamson Murray, The German response to victory in Poland: A case study in profes-
sionalism, Armed Forces and Society, 2 (winter 1981), pp. 28598; Documents on German Foreign
Policy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Ofce, 1954), ser. D., vol. VIII, pp. 248250
(hereafter abbreviated as DGFP).
Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe, pp. 23840, 2326.
24
the shocking defeat
could not withstand the rigors of an attack in the West without further
training and new equipment. Eager to attack, Hitler responded with a
tantrum. The Fhrer could not understand why his chief military advisor
worried about a little indiscipline, accused his generals of defeatism, and
stormed out of the meeting. Brauchitsch and Keitel lost on two fronts; they
failed to delay the invasion of France as their subordinates had demanded,
and damaged their relationship with the Fhrer.
Although they shared some common goals, Hitler and many German
generals did not enjoy a cordial relationship. The Fhrer believed that many
of his foreign policy victories had been attained despite military resistance.
Minister of War Werner von Blomberg had opposed the introduction of
conscription and the occupation of the Rhineland. Formal and widespread
disapproval of Hitlers plans for Czechoslovakia surfaced at a 5 November
1937 conference with the Foreign Minister and the three service chiefs.
After the January 1938 BlombergFritsch affair, Hitler replaced skeptical
generals with ofcers who would carry out orders without question.
The Fhrer removed senior generals who had questioned his plans for
expansion before the war, but discontent simmered just below the surface
of the German ofcer corps. From Hitlers perspective, opposition to his
plan for the immediate invasion of France appeared to be another skirmish
in his war against conservative generals.
Opposition to the original version of Fall Gelb emerged in two forms
during what General Erich von Manstein called the winter of discontent.
Educated in the tradition of the Imperial General Staff, ofcers like
Stlpnagel lacked faith in Hitlers political judgment and saw no military
way to defeat Allied armies. Many failed to realize the potential of tanks
and offensive tactics championed by General Hans von Seeckt during
the Weimar era. The original version of Fall Gelb would not defeat
France and postponed a decisive land battle until the summer of 1941 or
perhaps 1942. Not by accident, the latter date coincided with Stlpnagels
re-armament estimates. Staff ofcers like Stlpnagel believed that Germany
Walter Gorlitz (ed.), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, translated by David Irving (New
York: Stein and Day, 1966), pp. 101102.
Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 486495.
Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 127147; James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von
Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 199202.
25
after the fall
was not prepared for a long war and tried to delay major offensive
operations.
Younger ofcers like Manstein also questioned the merits of the orig-
inal version of Fall Gelb and searched for a military strategy to overcome
French defenses. Manstein proposed to shift the point of attack (Schw-
erpunkt) from Army Group B opposite Holland and Belgium to Army
Group A in the center of German lines opposite the Ardennes for-
est. General Gerd von Rundstedt would lead Army Group A across
the Meuse near Sedan, threaten the rear of the Maginot line, endanger
Paris, strike toward the English Channel, and cut off Allied forces in
Belgium. Mansteins new strategy had never been tried before, satised
Hitlers penchant for bold operations, and offered a chance to win a
decisive victory. With Hitlers support, Mansteins ideas eventually won
over some senior generals who had previously favored delay, discouraged
anti-Nazi conspiracies, and provided the basis for German operations in
May 1940.
While German generals developed a bold new plan of attack, Allied
leaders prepared to wage a long war of attrition. Citing a shortage of
modern equipment, French and British generals did not intend to invade
Germany proper in 1939 or 1940. Instead, they prepared to cut Germany off
from strategic raw materials by attacking the Soviet Union in the far north
and far south. After the Red Army invaded Finland on 30 November 1939,
French politicians wanted to land Allied troops in the Finnish town of
Petsamo, cut off Germany from vital nickel mines, and cripple German
armor production. Another proposal called for French forces in Syria to
advance toward Baku and destroy oil wells in southern Russia. In theory,
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol. XXVI (Nurem-
berg, 19471949), pp. 32736 (hereafter cited as IMT ); IMT , vol. XXXIV, pp. 2669; Manstein,
Lost Victories, pp. 94101; Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 108111; Liddell Hart, The German Generals
Talk, pp. 107111.
Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 111112; Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 119, 120126; F. W.
von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, translated by H. Betzler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956),
pp. 1415; Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, pp. 112117; Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitlers
Death. The Story of the German Resistance, translated by Bruce Little (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 1996), pp. 139144.
Martti Haikio, The race for northern Europe, September 1939June 1940, in Scandinavia
during the Second World War, ed. Henrik S. Nissen, translated by Thomas Munch-Petersen
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 6697.
26
Figure 1.1. German plans to invade France in 1914, 1939, and 1940.
after the fall
Jean-Pierre Azema, 1940: LAnnee terrible (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1990), pp. 557. Francois
Bedarida (ed.), La Strategie secrete de la drole de guerre (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1979), pp. 235243,
270276.
Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 114119.
28
Figure 1.2. The Norwegian Campaign, 1940.
Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy at West Point.
after the fall
France suggested that Allied leaders learned little from defeats in Poland,
Denmark, or Norway.
The invasion of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland on 10 May
1940 marked the beginning of the Western campaign. After learning that
German troops had crossed into the Low Countries, General Gamelin, com-
mander of Allied forces in France, immediately set the Dyle plan into oper-
ation. Based on the assumption that the German Schwerpunkt would strike
near Liege and then turn southwest toward Paris, the Dyle plan called for
mobile elements of the French army and British Expeditionary Force (BEF)
to rush north, link up with the Belgian army near Antwerp, and defend a line
running along the Dyle river, past Louvain, and ending in Belgian fortresses
near Namur. Gamelin hoped the Dyle plan would keep Belgium in the
war against Germany, shelter essential heavy industries in northeast France,
protect the Channel ports, and provide forward bases for the Royal Air
Force. The French commander ordered 30 divisions (including two of the
three armored, ve of the seven motorized, all three of the light mechanized
French divisions, and the BEF) to advance and support Belgian troops.
Although the Dyle plan might have countered the original version of
Fall Gelb, it proved to be a fatal blunder in the spring of 1940. Allied
forces advanced slowly over roads clogged by frightened refugees and faced
German troops from ill-prepared positions. Poor liaison between British,
French, and Belgian forces further undermined defensive efforts. The
German army also enjoyed several psychological advantages. It assumed the
offensive and launched commando operations whose success undermined
Allied morale. German paratroopers capture of the Belgian fortress Eben
Emael and seizure of vital bridges across the Maas river led many to
suspect that a fth column had aided the Nazi soldiers. English and French
newspapers began to speculate about secret weapons and nuns in hobnailed
shoes. The German juggernaut rolled slowly but surely through the Low
Countries despite facing the best divisions that the Allies had to offer.
Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe, p. 281; Azema, 1940: LAnnee
terrible, pp. 669.
Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 124132; Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 748; Umbreit, The
battle for hegemony in western Europe, pp. 265271.
Jeffery A. Gunsberg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the
West, 1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 140141, 215216, 267.
Louis De Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War, translated by C. M. Geyl
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 8081, 205206.
30
the shocking defeat
The revised version of Fall Gelb called for two major attacks in the
spring of 1940. Army Group B carried out the rst assault and advanced
through the Low Countries toward Rotterdam and Antwerp. While
the success of this drive compromised Allied positions, a second attack
launched through the Ardennes forest by Army Group A delivered the
coup de grace. French and Belgian cavalry divisions in the Ardennes fell
back sooner than expected and compounded their dismal performance by
not providing senior commanders with an accurate picture of the strong
German formations approaching the Meuse river. Two German panzer
corps exited the dense Ardennes forest and attacked across the Meuse at
Sedan and Dinant on 13 May. Three of the initial six assaults launched by
Robert Allen Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT:
Archon Books, 1990), pp. 4653; Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 112113, 116117.
31
after the fall
one corps failed to reach the western bank of the river, but German generals
adapted to changing conditions and built on success. They attacked from
successful bridgeheads, dislodged remaining French defenders on 14 May,
and crossed the last major geographic barrier between them and the English
Channel. While Army Group B distracted elite French and British forces
in the Low Countries, Army Group A broke through a thinly defended
section of French lines. With their best divisions engaged in Belgium and
few units in reserve, the Allies could not plug the hole.
When the Western campaign began on 10 May, German and Allied forces
faced each other on essentially equal ground. German airpower offset Allied
advantages in both tank and infantry divisions. General Gamelin estimated
that the French lost 17 infantry, 6 motorized, 3 armored, 1 heavy armored,
and 2 cavalry divisions by the time German forces captured Dunkirk, but
Germany did not suffer comparable losses and began the second phase of the
Western campaign with a signicant advantage. Although outnumbered
and outclassed, French soldiers put up stiff resistance during the second
phase of the Western campaign that began on 5 June. Infantry divisions
arranged in a checkerboard pattern held their ground against German
armored forces, but losses incurred in May limited the depth of French
defenses. Once German tanks broke out of their initial bridgeheads along
the Somme river, the French army could not stop the German drive south.
The commander in chief of the French Army since 20 May, General
Maxime Weygand, announced that he would defend the French capital on
4 June, but ofcial reassurances deceived few. Clouds of smoke billowed
from government ofces as bureaucrats burned secret records. The French
government retreated to Tours on 10 June and a wave of civilians followed
their example the next day. Parisians joined Belgians and their fellow
countrymen from northern departements on roads heading south. With
only 10,000 troops and 30 tanks to defend the capital, General Weygand
announced the obvious on 13 June. Speaking through the American
Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 109123; Doughty, The Breaking Point, p. 164.
Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 170174; Doughty, The Breaking Point, pp. 266293.
Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe, pp. 2789; R. H. S. Stol,
Equipment for victory in France, 1940, History 55 (February 1970) 20, pp. 120; Ernest R.
May, Strange Victory: Hitlers Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 476480.
Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 5556; Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe,
p.295.
Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 246; Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 2356.
32
the shocking defeat
DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 5601; Azema, 1940: LAnnee terrible, pp. 100108; David
Pryce-Jones, Paris in the Third Reich. A History of the German Occupation, 19401944 (London:
William Collins and Sons, 1981), pp. 36.
Angelo Tasca, Les Communistes francais pendant la drole de guerre (Paris: Les Iles dOr, 1951);
Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, 19201972 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974);
Stephane Courtois, Le PCF dans la guerre (Paris: Ramsay, 1980).
Francois Bedarida, Huit mois dattente et dillusion: la drole de guerre, in La France des
annees noires, ed. Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), vol. I,
pp. 3767.
33
after the fall
north or south. Both proposals assumed that the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany were allied in a war against Britain and France. In retaliation
for not pursuing an aggressive military strategy and aiding Finland, Blums
Socialist Party declined to support the Daladier government in a vote
of condence on 20 March 1940. The following day, Edouard Daladier
tendered his resignation and Paul Reynaud became the French Prime
Minister.
The Reynaud government fared little better as the scope of Frances
defeat became apparent. While French and British troops retreated toward
Dunkirk, Reynaud invited Marshal Henri Petain to join his government
and fortify ministerial resolve. By 12 June, the French Commander in Chief
said that it was impossible to continue a coordinated defense of French
territory. Weygands appraisal left the government, for the moment in
Tours, with two choices: reach an agreement with Germany or abandon
metropolitan France and continue to ght from North Africa. Following
the strategy that brought him to power in March, Reynaud favored an
aggressive policy of continued resistance.
Political considerations drove others to favor an armistice with Germany.
On 13 June General Weygand told the cabinet that serious disturbances
have broken out in Paris and that (PCF leader Maurice) Thorez has installed
himself in the Elysee. The report proved to be false, but it conjured
memories of the 1870 Paris Commune and terried conservatives. With
support from General Weygand, Petain urged the government to accept
responsibility for defeat on behalf of the entire nation, called for negotiations
with Nazi Germany, and betrayed Prime Minister Reynaud. Unable to
settle on a common policy, the cabinet retreated from Tours to Bordeaux
on 14 June.
Once ensconced in Bordeaux, the French cabinet split into factions.
Petain, Weygand, Baudouin, Chautemps, and Ybarnegaray pressed for an
Bernd Stegemann, Politics and warfare in the rst phase of the German offensive, in
Germany and the Second World War, vol. II, Germanys Initial Conquests in Europe, pp. 1315;
Bedarida (ed.), La Strategie secrete de la drole de guerre, pp. 235243, 289293, 296301.
Azema, 1940: LAnnee terrible, pp. 569; Bedarida (ed.), La Strategie secrete de la drole de guerre,
pp. 2826.
Azema, 1940: LAnnee terrible, pp. 140141. Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight, 19301945,
translated by James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. 379380.
Reynaud, In the Thick of The Fight, pp. 484491.
Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 5689; Proces du Marechal Petain, pp. 2023; Philippe Simonnot,
Le Secret de larmistice 1940 (Paris: Plon, 1990), pp. 2236.
34
the shocking defeat
Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 568577; Henri Michel, Vichy annee 40 (Paris: Robert Lafont,
1966), pp. 316; Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, translated
by Jonathan Grifn and Richard Howard (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, 1998),
pp. 6480; Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel 18901944, translated by Patrick OBrian
(London: Collins Harvill, 1990), pp. 201207.
35
after the fall
36
the shocking defeat
A copy of the Armistice Agreement appears in DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 6719.
Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy, pp. 78, 121; George E. Melton, Darlan: Admiral and
Statesman of France, 18811942 (Westport, CT: Prager, 1998), pp. 747, 826.
Paul Auphin and Jacques Mordal, La Marine francaise dans la seconde guerre mondiale (Paris:
Empire-France, 1967), pp. 235, 3840; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 110111; Joachim Fest Hitler,
translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage, 1975), pp. 6346.
Duroselle, LAbme, pp. 390391.
37
after the fall
Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 107108, 110; Alan S. Milward, The New Order and
the French Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 4258; Norman Rich, Hitlers
War Aims, vol. II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), pp. 205207.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 6767.
USNA, RG 153 (Records of the Ofce of the Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army)/135
(JAG Law Library, 194449)/21/3135.
38
the shocking defeat
39
after the fall
and wanted to eliminate France as a great power. Although his plans for
France were less extreme than those being prepared for Poland or later the
Soviet Union, Hitler could not afford to reveal his intentions before a total
German victory. Disclosure would only encourage resistance.
The Vichy and Nazi regimes beneted from the Armistice Agreement.
The Vichy regime avoided the total occupation and won several apparent
concessions like the right to retain a small military organization. The
shock of defeat, domestic political considerations, German concessions, and
bleak prospects for an Allied victory made the Armistice Agreement seem
palatable to many Frenchmen. For his part, Hitler nullied the French eet
as a military force and turned an active belligerent into a helpful neutral that
later contributed to the German war effort. In return for vague promises
of benevolent treatment, Hitler won a substantial diplomatic victory that
complemented battleeld successes.
If defeat struck France as lightning strikes a tree, then many Germans
were startled by the thunder. Neither staff ofcers nor eld commanders
had much faith in the original version of Fall Gelb, and everyone except
Hitler viewed the revised plan as a desperate gamble. As a result, civil
and military leaders did not plan an elaborate occupation. Hitler issued a
two-page directive in November 1939 that placed the commander-in-chief
of the army in charge of all occupied territories in the West. He instructed
General von Brauchitsch to establish a military government, suppress talk
of territorial annexations, obey the Hague conventions, and place captive
economies at the disposal of the Reich. Political work-stoppages, passive
resistance, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare were to be suppressed with the
utmost severity. Finally, the Fhrerbefehl denied civilian and Nazi party
agencies access to conquered lands without explicit permission from senior
military authorities.
IMT , vol. XXXVII, pp. 218223; IMT vol. VI, pp. 427430; Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Reich
und DDR, Lichterfelde-West, Berlin; Bestandssignatur R 43 II (Reichskanzlei), Archivsignatur
675, pp. 1820. Hereafter abbreviated as BALW (Bundesarchiv Lichterfeld-West), followed by
Bestandssignatur, Archivsignatur, and page number. For example, BALW R 43 II/675/1820.
Rich, Hitlers War Aims, vol. II, pp. 197198. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph
Manheim (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifin Company, 1971), pp. 619620, 653, 674.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 6767; Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe,
pp. 313316.
Burrin, France Under the Germans, p. 5; May, Strange Victory, pp. 2678.
Lucien Steinberg and Jean-Marie Fitere, Les Allemands en France, 19401944 (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1980), p. 21; IMT vol. XXX, pp. 211220, 2326; Hans Umbreit, Towards continental
40
the shocking defeat
dominion, in Germany and the Second World War, vol. V, Organization and Mobilization of
the German Sphere of Power, part 1, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources
19391941, pp. 1121; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/296297.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/291295; USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/6770; USNA,
RG 338 (Records of the United States Army Commands, 1942)/Foreign Military Studies/P-033
(German Military Government, Volume I)/che 155/31; Steinberg and Fitere, Les Allemands en
France, pp. 213.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/93/78, 1922, 3739; Umbreit, Towards continental dominion,
pp. 728.
41
after the fall
42
the shocking defeat
43
after the fall
Richard Cavell Fattig, Reprisal: The German Army and the execution of hostages during
the Second World War (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1980),
pp. 3335; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2005), p. 21.
Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 4824. Klaus-Jurgen Mller, The Army, Politics and
Society in Germany, 19331945: Studies in the Armys Relation to Nazism (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1987).
USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/434, 442, 470. BAMA, RW 35/245/14.
44
the shocking defeat
45
after the fall
or RSHA) and volunteered for military service after the Polish campaign. At
37 years of age, he was too old for front-line service, but his legal training and
experience in RSHA qualied him to serve as the head of the government
subsection of the military administration. Active soldiers assigned to the
military government came from a similar background. Falkenhausen and
Streccius had been cashiered before the war and were recalled to active duty
after the invasion of Poland. Political disagreements with the Nazi regime
ensured that Hitler would never promote either Blaskowitz or Otto von
Stlpnagel. The head of the economic subsection noted that personnel were
carefully selected for important positions within the military administration,
but another ofcial remarked that unt administrators, particularly at the
Ulrich Herbert, Best. Biographische Studien ber Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft
19031989 (Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz, 1996), pp. 230237, 2556.
46
the shocking defeat
lower levels, often caused trouble. Some people assigned to the military
government had marginal prewar careers.
The military administration identied refugees as a serious problem in
need of immediate attention. Military kitchens and the relief train Bavaria
served 42.6 million meals between 6 June and 20 August, and army hospitals
treated 93,000 French patients. A few supply ofcers allowed refugees to
use military transportation while others doled out scarce gasoline to French
civilians. German troops restored essential public services and conjured
an illusion of benevolence by helping peasants bring in the harvest.
Under orders from Berlin, German soldiers helped French refugees return
home, but other measures exacerbated the refugee problem. To keep
plans for the invasion of England secret, eld commanders expelled enemy
citizens (Belgians, British citizens, etc.), people without citizenship (e.g.
Czechs and Poles), and racial enemies (gypsies and Jews) from nine French
departements along the Atlantic coast. To make matters worse, Hitler
placed Alsace and Lorraine in the hands of Robert Wagner and Joseph
Brckel on 2 August 1940. As they integrated both provinces back into
the Reich, the two district leaders (Gauleiters) dumped approximately
105,000 Jews and French nationalists in unoccupied France by the end
of 1940.
Large numbers of French and British prisoners of war created another
security problem. During the 1940 Western campaign, advancing German
soldiers frequently disarmed white prisoners and ordered them to march
toward the rear without escort. Although many obediently marched into
captivity, others simply melted into the countryside. The military govern-
ment spent considerable time rounding up French and particularly British
prisoners of war because they constituted a potential asset during peace
47
after the fall
48
2
Rivals and scavengers
After becoming the Chancellor of Germany, Hitler shared power with con-
servative and independent politicians. Within his rst cabinet, the Fhrer
could only rely on support from Hermann Goring (Minister without Port-
folio) and Wilhelm Frick (Minister of the Interior). While the departure
of Alfred Hugenberg (Minister of Agriculture and Economics) and Franz
von Papen (Vice-Chancellor) limited conservative inuence, Nazis did not
gain unfettered command of the government until Joachim Ribbentrop
replaced Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath as Foreign Minister and Hitler
assumed personal control of the Wehrmacht in 1938. Between 1933 and
1939, leading Nazis like Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Goring outma-
neuvered political rivals, seized the levers of power, developed extensive
bureaucratic empires, and occupied all available political Lebensraum or
living space. By 1939, Nazi paladins could only expand their respective
bailiwicks within Germany at the expense of other inuential Nazis.
Military victories gave ambitious Nazis another opportunity to expand
their bureaucratic satrapies. To capture a share of the spoils, Goring,
Himmler, and Ribbentrop had to play a part in the war effort and nd
a raison dtre in newly occupied territories. Conquests also offered people
like Alfred Rosenberg another chance to secure an inuential position. The
leader of the Nazi Party while Hitler languished in prison, Rosenberg did
not obtain a ministerial position after the Nazi seizure of power. Regarded
as an expert on race and foreign policy, he had reason to expect that a
Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the
Third Reich, translated by John W. Hiden (New York: Longman, 1981), pp. 2623, 270280.
after the fall
BAMA, RW 35/245/34.
BALW, R 19 (Ordnungspolizei)/401/8182; BAMA, RW 5 (Auslander Amt/Abwehr)/
318/50.
50
rivals and scavengers
Figure 2.1. Goring, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis
listen as Hitler declares War on the United States, 11 December 1941.
Photograph courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1987-0703-507.
out racial security missions that were beneath the Wehrmachts dignity.
By underestimating the importance of Hitlers radical security directives,
ofcers imbued with traditional military values allowed civilian rivals to
establish a substantial presence in occupied France.
In theory, the French government remained sovereign under terms of
the 1940 Armistice Agreement. Germany could exercise all the rights
of the occupying power but did not intend to burden itself with the
civilian administration of France. Gorings failure to crush Britain during
the fall of 1940 ensured that hostilities would continue for some time,
and Hitler refused to negotiate a peace agreement with France alone.
Orders dated 3 August and 20 November 1940 placed the Foreign Ofce
in charge of political discussions with the French government and left
DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 672, 677; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 7780.
51
after the fall
military affairs in the hands of the army. Directives from Berlin gave
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his representative in Paris,
Ambassador Abetz, permission to to manage diplomatic relations between
France and Germany.
Joachim von Ribbentrop joined the party in May 1932 and operated as
Hitlers personal diplomat after the Nazi seizure of power. He later served as
the Ambassador to the Court of St. James but failed to negotiate a political
agreement with Great Britain. In the aftermath of the BlombergFritsch
affair, Hitler placed Ribbentrop in charge of the Foreign Ministry to limit
conservative inuence. After negotiating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact on 24 August 1939, the Foreign Minister assured Hitler that Britain
would not support Poland. When the latter proved false, Ribbentrops rep-
utation declined precipitously. Throughout the Phony War, the Foreign
Minister bickered with Joseph Goebbels and smoothed feathers that had
been rufed by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. During the Nor-
wegian campaign, Ribbentrop bungled talks with King Haakon VII and
backed the unpopular Vidkun Quisling over other potential collaborators
who were more acceptable to the Norwegian public. In the aftermath of
the debacle, Hitler literally distanced himself from his Foreign Minister;
Ribbentrop observed the Western campaign several miles away from his
beloved Fhrer. The rst nine months of the war did not treat the former
spirits salesman well.
On the same day that German troops occupied Paris, Ribbentrop
selected Otto Abetz to represent the interests of the Foreign Ofce in
France. Born in 1903, Abetz was too young to serve in World War One.
During the Weimar era, he played a signicant role in youth organizations
that promoted better relations between France and Germany. Although
commonly described as a Francophile, Abetz had a lovehate relationship
with France. On the one hand, he raged against French pilots who
killed civilians during World War One bombing raids over Karlsruhe
DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 4078; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 6389.
Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (New York: Crown Publishers, 1992), pp. 236; John Weitz,
Hitlers Diplomat (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), pp. 140146; Gerhard L. Weinberg,
The Foreign Policy of Hitlers Germany: Starting World War II, 19371939 (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 457.
Bloch, Ribbentrop, pp. 251276; Gerhard Schreiber, Political and military developments in
the Mediterranean area, 19391940, in MGFA, ed., Germany and the Second World War, vol. III,
The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 19391941, pp. 925.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 1424, 159164, 1957, 2638; Bloch, Ribbentrop, pp. 278281.
52
rivals and scavengers
and fulminated against black soldiers sent to occupy the Rhineland. Yet
Abetz also supported the policies of rapprochement favored by Briand and
Stresemann during the Weimar era and appreciated European international
culture as expressed by Stefan George and Rainer Maria Rilke. He
may have resolved his contradictory attitude by blaming anti-German
sentiments on Jews and Freemasons. After the Nazi seizure of power,
Abetz set aside doubts about the Nazi regime and promoted amicable
relations between the two nations. He allayed French fears by arranging
cultural exchanges between French and German veterans associations and
expanding contacts with diverse intellectuals like Bertand de Jouvenel,
Jean Luchaire, and Jules Romains. Although not yet a member of the
Nazi party, Otto Abetz proved to be a useful tool and advanced the Nazi
agenda.
Service as Hitlers translator and modest success in fostering Franco-
German reconciliation brought Abetz to the attention of senior Nazi
leaders including Joachim von Ribbentrop. The latter asked Abetz to join
the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, a Nazi party organization that rivaled the ofcial
Foreign Ofce, and eventually placed him with the Deutsch-Franzosische
Gesellschaft, an organization that arranged cultural exchanges, promoted
international understanding, and distributed propaganda. Expelled from
France shortly before the invasion of Poland, Abetz received a promotion
and supervised the distribution of propaganda in western Europe during
the Phony War. Ribbentrop appointed Abetz to serve as Representative of
the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in France on 15 June
1940, and he acted as Germanys chief diplomat in France throughout the
Occupation.
Following instructions from Hitler and Ribbentrop, Abetz pursued
a general strategy of collaboration along three specic avenues. First,
he met with potential collaborators from across the political spectrum.
On 15 July he sent the military government a list of politicians and
political movements that are accessible to us. Old contacts from the
Deutsch-Franzosische Gesellschaft and new-found friends placed Abetz in
Otto Abetz, Das offene Problem: Ein Rckblich auf zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Frankreichpolitik
(Koln: Greven Verlag, 1951), pp. 1534; Barbara Lambauer, Otto Abetz et le Francais ou lenvers
de la collaboration (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 22, 5963.
Lambauer, Otto Abetz et le Francais, pp. 823, 925, 127; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 413,
108, 1325.
53
after the fall
touch with the Vichy regime and all major political parties of the
Third Republic. Second, the Paris embassy assumed direct control over
the newspaper LIllustration and placed sympathizers in charge of La
France au Travail, La Gerbe, and La Vie Nationale. The four papers
each courted a different segment of the political spectrum and operat-
ed as points around which public opinion could coalesce in favor of
the Reich. Abetzs propaganda efforts continued along the lines of the
old Deutsch-Franzosische Gesellschaft and tried to foster Franco-German
reconciliation.
Attacks on racial opponents formed the third component of Abetzs
policy. On 5 July 1940, Hitler ordered the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, a
small Nazi party organization with interests in foreign affairs, ideological
education, and Aryan culture, to search through state libraries, archives,
churches, and masonic lodges for evidence of anti-German conspiracies.
On his own initiative, Abetz supported the Einsatzstab Rosenberg as part
of his campaign to eliminate anti-German inuences. He expanded his
mission beyond the written materials targeted in Hitlers 5 July order and
pursued tapestries, sculptures, paintings, and other objets dart owned by
Jews. At various times, Abetz described seizures as a bargaining chip that
could be used during nal peace negotiations, an attempt to impoverish
French Jews, and an effort to protect cultural assets from the ravages of
war. Seizures of Jewish property, particularly objets dart, played a major
part in Abetzs campaign against anti-German elements within French
society.
After six weeks in France, Abetz discussed German policy with Hitler
in early August 1940. In hopes of fostering French support for the Vichy
regime and encouraging pro-German sentiments, Abetz asked the Fhrer
to liberate French prisoners of war and rescind travel restrictions between
occupied and unoccupied France. Angered by stories that French police had
mistreated German prisoners during the Western campaign, Hitler refused
both requests and ruled that [t]he treatment of the demarcation line
between the occupied and unoccupied parts of France must correspond
to the requirements of Germanys conduct of the war. The security of
DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 215217; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 6074, 8997.
BAMA, RW 35/698/1; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/627; see also Chapter 3 this volume.
Abetz, Das offene Problem, p. 137; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 657.
54
rivals and scavengers
military operations takes rst place. Hitler insisted that the French rst
prove themselves to be loyal allies before he would grant any concessions.
Hitlers refusal undermined Abetzs attempts to expand Franco-German
collaboration, but it did not apply to the military administration. If the
Vichy government allowed Germany to inuence the administration and
economy of France and the French empire beyond limits set forth in the
Armistice Agreement, then the MBF could relax the enforcement of exist-
ing travel and trade restrictions. The process also worked in reverse. After
Petain red Pierre Laval on 13 December 1940, the military administration
did not allow French civil servants to cross the demarcation line. Because
soldiers manned checkpoints and physically regulated trafc, the military
could exert inuence without making a rm commitment. Although vested
with comparable authority, the Foreign Ofce had less real power than the
MBF because the latter implemented German policy.
Abetz left his 3 August meeting with Hitler under the impression that the
Fhrer mistrusted the French but had not yet decided on a specic course of
action. He returned to Paris and carried out duties that included representing
the Nazi government, advising military authorities on political questions,
censoring the press and radio, and securing public artistic properties . . .
especially Jewish artistic properties in accordance with special directives
issued on that subject. The last mission alienated sympathetic Frenchmen
because Germany appeared to be robbing Frances artistic patrimony.
Citing changed circumstances, the ambassador eventually abandoned efforts
to seize objets dart from racial enemies to protect his fundamental goal of
Franco-German collaboration. When forced to make a choice, Abetz
favored collaboration over robbery.
Other diplomats supported Abetzs policy of Franco-German collabor-
ation. An ofcial in Ribbentrops entourage drafted a protocol that guar-
anteed France her rightful place in a reorganized Europe if the French
government helped Germany defeat Great Britain. A member of the
Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 100102; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 251, 468470;
Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 1414.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 20030/nfn (Der Chef der Militarbefehlshaber in Frank-
reich, Kommandostab Ia, Paris 11.8.40, Betr. Zusammenarbeit im Dienste der Militar-
verwaltung); Jackson, France. The Dark Years 19401944, pp. 1745.
Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 1414; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 407408.
Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 66; BAMA, RW 35/705/2728; BAMA, RW 35/712/131
133.
55
after the fall
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 346351; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 1637.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 354361, 385392; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler,
pp. 1637, 169176; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Francais, pp. 204209.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 892900; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 1423; Lambauer,
Otto Abetz et les Francais, pp. 329350; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 242251; Paxton,
Vichy France, pp. 116120.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 1439, 930934; ADAP, ser. E, vol. I, p. 173.
56
rivals and scavengers
Deloncle who would support the Nazi cause without asking for any
substantial concessions in return but had minimal support among the
French public.
Acting with Hitlers approval, Ribbentrop scotched the Protocols of
Paris on 16 July 1941. Two months later, Hitler once again met with
Abetz and characterized the French as a decent people who could nd
a place in his new order if they contributed to the German war effort
without reservation. While speaking with his ambassador, the Fhrer
claimed that his territorial ambitions were limited to Alsace, Lorraine, and
a special security arrangement for Calais. Limited annexations discussed
with Abetz contradict passages of Mein Kampf that describe France as
the mortal enemy. In a conversation on 31 January 1942, Hitler echoed
passages of his rst book and assumed a hard line against France. France
remains hostile to us. She contains, in addition to her Nordic blood, a
blood that will always be foreign to us. One month later, Hitler reconciled
the soft policy described to Abetz and the hard line set forth in Mein
Kampf :
Abetz is too exclusively keen on collaboration, to my taste. Unfortunately, I cant
tell him precisely what my objects are, for he has a wife. The fact is, I know of
a man who talks in his sleep, and I sometimes wonder whether Abetz doesnt do
the same. But hes intelligent at organizing resistance in Paris against Vichy, and
in this respect his wife is useful to him. Thus things take on a more innocent
character.
The Fhrer mistrusted France and his ambassador for similar reasons. Abetz
married a French woman and could not be trusted because he might
talk in his sleep. Frenchmen carried non-Aryan blood and might sabotage
Hitlers war against Jews. Neither could be trusted. While the war lasted,
the Fhrer used Abetz to pacify France with seductive words. Hitlers
long-term intentions toward France would resemble ideas in the Stuckart
Memoranda and Mein Kampf . Once victorious, Hitler probably planned to
Bertram M. Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Second World War (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 2741, 612; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Francais,
pp. 229231.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 518520.
Hitler, Mein Kampf , pp. 619, 624, 671, 674; H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitlers Table
Talk, 19411944, translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1953), pp. 2645, 3445.
57
after the fall
strip France of all territory lying north of a line that ran from Lake Geneva
in Switzerland to the Somme estuary on the Atlantic coast.
Events surrounding the end of World War One inspired Hitlers basic
policy toward France. The 1940 Armistice Agreement mimicked Woodrow
Wilsons Fourteen Points. Both ended hostilities and appeared benign but
exercised little inuence on subsequent events. Just as French troops seized
control of Alsace and Lorraine before either France or Germany had ratied
the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler ordered the same provinces reintegrated into
the Reich shortly after signing the 1940 Armistice Agreement. The Fhrer
signed the 1940 Armistice in Marshal Fochs railroad coach to humiliate
France, and the ceremony indicated the heading that Hitler would follow
after Germany won the wara course that included territorial annexations
and the destruction of France as a great power.
Hitler pursued a schizophrenic policy toward France throughout the
Occupation. During the October 1940 Montoire conference, he assured
Laval that Germany was not seeking a peace inspired by arrogance or
vengeance and suggested that France could avoid the suffering which
she herself had inicted on Germany in 1918. The Fhrer satiated French
opinion by making vague promises and returning the remains of Napoleons
son to Paris, but he refused to offer substantial concessions or limit his
postwar plans. After the war turned against Germany, Hitler would not
negotiate from a position of weakness. Passages from Mein Kampf and
conversations with trusted cronies suggest that Hitler had ominous long-
term plans for France. The Fhrer used Abetz as a pawn when collaboration
suited his interests but relied upon brute force to determine Franco-
German relations. Ambassador Abetz distracted the Vichy regime with
promises of benign treatment, but his words carried no weight. Without
Hitlers trust or the means to act independently, neither Ambassador
Abetz nor Foreign Minister Ribbentrop could determine German policy
in France.
Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe, pp. 3214; Lambauer, Otto Abetz
et les Francais, pp. 1757.
Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 19391941, translated by Fred Taylor (New York:
G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1983), p. 123; BALW, R 43 II/675/1820.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 356, 359; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 1746; DGFP, ser. D,
vol. XI, p. 866 note 2, 8918, 9512.
Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitlers Table Talk, p. 265; Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the
Second World War, pp. 2741, 612.
58
rivals and scavengers
Richard Overy, Goring: The Iron Man (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); Alfred
Kube, Hermann Goering: second man in the Third Reich, in Ronald Smelser and Rainer
Zitelmann, eds., The Nazi Elite (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 65.
Overy, Goering: The Iron Man, pp. 7680; Kube, Hermann Goering: second man in the
Third Reich, p. 67; Broszat, The Hitler State, pp. 300306.
Leonard Mosley, The Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering (New York: Doubleday
& Company, 1974), pp. 236245.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 24, 93, 115, 170173, 213215.
59
after the fall
led the entire commission while Hans Hemmen, a veteran diplomat, took
charge of the economic subsection. Goring won the right to approve
Hemmens appointment and formulate his instructions in conjunction with
the Foreign Ofce, but the victory proved hollow because the Armistice
Commission accrued little real power. With advance knowledge of French
bargaining positions, Hemmen ran his delegation with equanimity. Using
diplomatic means, Hemmen transferred the economic prerogatives of the
French state to OKW. Goring could inuence the French economy via
Hemmen and the economic subsection of the Armistice Commission.
A central purchasing ofce (Zentralauftragsstelle) under the joint control
of OKW and the Economic Affairs Ministry carried out most of the
detailed exploitation of the French economy. Headquartered in Paris,
the ofce drew personnel from all three branches of the armed services,
Gorings economic empire, and Fritz Todts Armaments and Munitions
Ministry. It approved all large German government contracts placed with
French concerns and distributed scarce raw materials. The Reichsmarschall
placed Major-General Bhrmann in charge of the ofce, but his inuence
proved to be short-lived as Bhrmann died shortly after arriving in France.
After a desultory exchange of letters, the Reichsmarschall allowed General
Georg Thomas, an ofcer currently in charge of the OKW Economy and
Armaments ofce (Wirtschafts- und Rstungsamt or OKW Wi. Ru. Amt),
to take over the central purchasing ofce.
The military administration economic section (Militarverwaltung Abteilung
Wirtschaft) ensured compliance with the Armistice Agreement and wielded
considerable inuence over economic planning and resource allocation in
occupied France. Dr. Elmar Michel, a veteran of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, ran the MVW economic section and cooperated with the OKWs
central purchasing ofce because he and many of his subordinates held
positions in both organizations. Their dual service allowed ofcers to don
mufti and travel through unoccupied France as arms control inspectors,
agents of the Economics Ministry, or representatives of the Four-Year
Plan. In conjunction with OKW, the economic section of the MVW
Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 489, 56; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X,
pp. 213215; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 107110.
BALW, R 43 II/675/1416; Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 659.
BALW, R 43 II/609/9, 12, 47; Georg Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und
Rstungswirtschaft (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1966), pp. 2216.
60
rivals and scavengers
rst restored French industrial capacity and then used French factories
to augment the German war effort. German agencies in command of
the French economy were able to coordinate their activities because
leading ofcials held multiple posts. Personal relations between inuential
bureaucrats and ofcers dictated relations between the MVW economic
section, OKW, the Ministry of Economics, and the Ofce of the Four
Year Plan.
Hitler granted the Reichsmarschall authority to settle all economic
disputes between civil and military agencies during the spring of 1941,
but Goring used that power sparingly. As the economic tsar of the
Third Reich, Goring could have played a leading part in removing Jewish
inuences from the French economya process Nazis called Arisierung,
or Aryanization. Just as he let OKW and the military administration
allocate raw materials and negotiate contracts, the Reichsmarschall allowed
the Foreign Ofce and Einsatzstab Rosenberg to identify, conscate, and
redistribute rms owned or controlled by Jews. He let others act in his
stead and played an indirect role in the so-called Aryanization process, but
he fought scrupulously for the right to enforce his will.
The Reichsmarschall played an active role in the conscation of works
of art owned by wealthy Jewsa task that Nazis regarded as a subsection
of economic Aryanization. Before her death, Gorings rst wife Carin
had taught her husband to appreciate Renaissance painters and the Dutch
school. Throughout his tenure in power, he followed the art market
and ordered staff members to search for bargains. Unlike Hitler, Goring
spent time enjoying collections displayed in his four mansions and a
hunting lodge outside Berlin. The conquest of western Europe created
new opportunities for the Reichsmarschall to expand his holdings by
creating a group of motivated sellerswealthy Jews trapped in conquered
territories. The Reichsmarschall instructed a subordinate on his staff to
forget about the racial background of the [art] dealers with whom you
come in contact and did not hesitate to exploit the misfortunes of
others. On occasion, Goring helped obliging Jewish art dealers escape
BAK, N 1023/1/19; BALW, R 43 II/623a/3; Milward, The New Order and the French
Economy, pp. 269297.
BAMA, RH 3/202/1018.
BAMA, RW 35/2/nfn (Abschrift, Der Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reiches,
Beauftragter fr den Vierjahresplan, Der zweite Staatsekretar; VP 19 002/5; Berlin 4.12.40).
BAMA, RW 35/712/83.
61
after the fall
Mosley, The Reich Marshal, pp. 2635; Jonathan Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third Reich
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 187195; Lynn H. Nicholas,
The Rape of Europa. The Fate of Europes Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 35, 107.
BAMA, RW 35/698/2223, 143.
BAMA, RW 35/1/47; BAMA, RW 35/712/109110; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/810;
Robert Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (London: B. T.
Batsford, 1972), pp. 159160; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/649651.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/347348.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 914927; BAMA, RW 35/542/7376.
62
rivals and scavengers
Hans Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit. Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1977), p. 105;
BAMA RW 35/826.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/438; BAMA N 5/24/2628.
Robert Lewis Koehl, The Black Corps. The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), pp. 2130; Bernd Wegner, The Waffen
SS. Organization, Ideology and Function, translated by Ronald Webster (Cambridge, MA: Basil
Blackwell Ltd, 1990), pp. 614.
63
after the fall
Koehl, The Black Corps, pp. 1415; Wegner, The Waffen SS, pp. 109119; Edward B.
Westermann, Hitlers Police Battalions. Enforcing Racial War in the East (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 3640, 557.
Breitman, Architect of Genocide, pp. 6772, 85104; Peter Padeld, Himmler: Reichsfhrer-SS
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), pp. 260262; Robert Proctor, Nazi Doctors
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland.
64
rivals and scavengers
Breitman, Architect of Genocide, pp. 105115; Mller, Das Heer und Hitler, pp. 458466.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proces Oberg-Knochen/67; Steinberg and Fitere, Les Allemands en
France, 19401944, pp. 3945.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich (Polizeidienststellen in Frankreich)/33/318; Helmut Knochen,
Reich Service VI in Paris, in de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation 19401944,
vol.III, pp. 16351644; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/422423; BAK, N 1023/1/20.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/33/45.
Although they were two separate organizations inside the Third Reich, the Sicherheitspolizei
(Sipo) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD) acted as a single organization in France until 1942. USNA, RG
242/T-501/196/655656.
65
after the fall
and conscate private property in occupied France, but the SS had some
leeway. They received their orders directly from RSHA and could not
be punished by military courts-martial. As a result, military authorities
could not discipline SS ofcers who violated the HimmlerBrauchitsch
agreement.
With ofcial permission in hand, Thomas and Knochen opened a
central ofce in Paris and branches in Bordeaux, Dijon, and Rouen.
By 1944, branches employed approximately 140 German men and 50
German women per ofce. Organized like RSHA in Berlin, SS ofces
worked alongside branches of the military government by the end of 1940.
Intelligence specialists continued their prewar efforts collecting information
and assessing the inuence of Jews. Racial experts oversaw and tried to
control the Aryanization of the French economy. Another contingent
searched for evidence of an anti-German conspiracy among Synagogue and
Masonic records. Others helped the Einsatzstab Rosenberg concentrate
Jewish possessions in the Louvre. In conjunction with Ambassador Abetz,
the SS dabbled in politics and championed Adrien Marquet and Eugene
Deloncle in an attempt to enlist ardent French collaborators in Hitlers
cause. The SS also established a direct link with the French government
through SS Hauptsturmfhrer Kurt Geissler in Vichy. The SS maintained
an innocuous prole while building a far-reaching organization.
Although Nazi ideology regarded the French Communist Party (Parti
Communist Francais or PCF) as a subversive organization that was under the
control of international Jewry, the SS spent little time persecuting French
communists. In response to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the
Daladier government outlawed the PCF and forced the party underground.
After the Armistice, PCF representatives asked SS ofcers to persuade the
Vichy regime to rescind the ban, but SS delegates claimed that they could
not interfere in internal French affairs and assumed a neutral stance. Before
negotiations could continue, French police arrested the communist agents.
When it suited their interests, the SS could eschew Nazi ideology and
66
rivals and scavengers
adopt a laissez faire attitude. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in
1941, the SS abandoned its neutral stance and, in conjunction with French
police, attacked the PCF with gusto.
During the rst year of the Occupation, the SS ofce in Paris established
itself as an expert on Jewish affairs and limited itself to research activities.
Before the 20 January 1942 Wannsee conference, such activities caused only
minor irritation among military circles in Paris. After the invasion of the
Soviet Union, Stalins Communist International (Comintern) ordered the
PCF to attack Germany and sabotage Hitlers war effort. Nazi ideology
assumed that Jews controlled the PCF and were implacable enemies of the
Third Reich. With several years of experience studying Jewish groups, the
Black Corps stood ready to lead the ght against resistance organizations.
The radicalization of the German war effort favored the Black Corps in
its struggle for power and inuence, and unlike Ribbentrop and Goring,
Himmler eventually seized a position of considerable inuence inside
occupied France.
Alfred Rosenberg joined the Nazi party in 1919 and assumed control
of the organization while Hitler served time in Landsberg prison, but he
failed to secure an inuential job after the Nazi seizure of power. Although
he edited the Nazi party newspaper, he remained a step below Goring,
Himmler, and Ribbentrop in terms of power and inuence. Despite his
relatively inconsequential status, Rosenberg played an important role in the
occupation of France during World War Two. The organization that he led
there, the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, deed military authorities,
secured a degree of autonomy, and set an important precedent. Rosenberg
failed to capitalize on his initial success, but Himmler used Rosenbergs
precedent to build a bureaucratic empire that operated beyond military
control.
The son of a successful Baltic artisan turned businessman, Rosenberg
studied in Riga and Moscow before returning home to Reval in 1918 with
a diploma in architecture. That same year he moved to Munich but pursued
his chosen profession with little enthusiasm. Instead, the 25-year-old turned
his energies toward the formulation of an all-encompassing ideology. After
Maurice Agulhon, The French Republic, 18791992, translated by Antonia Nevill (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995), pp. 290292; Tasca, Les Communistes francais pendant la drole de guerre,
pp. 322336.
Jackson, France. The Dark Years 19401944, pp. 4235.
67
after the fall
joining the party, he began to write full-time for the party newspaper, the
Volkischer Beobachter, and became the editor two years later. Crude social
Darwinism, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism served as the basis for
much of his early work, summed up in his 1930 book The Myth of the
Twentieth Century in which Rosenberg contended that pernicious Jewish
inuences stood behind the decline of ancient Greece, the Fall of the
Roman Empire, and the destruction of the Romanov dynasty in Russia.
Turning toward the future, he argued that Germany, perhaps in an alliance
with Great Britain, should invade the Soviet Union, destroy the alleged
Jewish menace that supposedly controlled the Soviet government, and seize
living space for the so-called Aryan race. Publication of The Myth of the
Twentieth Century in 1930 cemented Rosenbergs position as the ideological
leader of the Nazi party.
Rosenberg met Hitler in 1919 and joined the NSDAP toward the end
of that year with party number 623. In the chaotic aftermath of the 1923
Beer Hall Putsch, Rosenberg took charge of the Nazi party while Hitler
served time in prison but failed to control party factions. The Fhrer
sharply criticized Rosenbergs leadership and relations between the two
remained strained thereafter. After his release in late 1924, Hitler rebuilt the
Nazi party and reappointed Rosenberg managing editor of the Volkischer
Beobachter but demoted him to publisher after a 1937 quarrel with
Goebbels. Fancying himself to be an intellectual, Rosenberg organized the
Fighting League for German Culture and attended anti-Semitic congresses
in 1927 and 1928. After the September 1930 elections, he served on the
Reichstag foreign policy committee. Hitler later awarded Rosenberg the
title of Reichsleiter, Leader of the Foreign Policy Ofce of the Nazi party,
and the Fhrers Commissioner for the supervision of all intellectual and
ideological education and training in the NSDAP. As the ideological leader
of the Nazi movement, Rosenberg occupied a tenuous position within a
party that valued instinct and action over philosophy.
Rivals such as Goebbels and Ribbentrop limited the positions available
to Rosenberg. Joseph Goebbels became Minister of Propaganda after the
68
rivals and scavengers
Nazi seizure of power and assumed control of the press. Hitler demoted
Rosenberg from managing editor to editor in 1937 because the ideological
leader of the Nazi party would not follow Goebbels editorial policy in
the pages of the Volkischer Beobachter. Based on his service as the Nazi
delegate to the Reichstag foreign policy committee, his writings on race
and foreign policy, and his experience as head of the partys foreign
policy ofce, Rosenberg also coveted the Foreign Ministry after the Nazi
seizure of power. Neurath served as Hitlers Foreign Minister until 1938 to
placate conservative interests, and then the post passed to the more pliant
Ribbentrop in order to concentrate power in the hands of the Fhrer.
Positions of inuence in the Foreign and Propaganda Ministries remained
just beyond the Reichsleiters grasp.
Rosenberg eventually carved out a satrapy in the eld of education.
Hitler signed a decree on 29 January 1940 that enabled the Reichsleiter
to organize a central point for National Socialist research, doctrine, and
education. Although Hitler forbade construction until the end of the
war, Rosenberg planned to establish ten branches of what can best be
described as the Nazi party analog to military staff colleges. Schools,
complete with libraries, would be established inside existing universities to
train the next generation of party leaders. The Fhrer later authorized
the formation of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, a small group under the
direct control of Rosenberg, to advance behind victorious German armies
and collect educational materials from state archives, libraries, church
ofces, and Masonic lodges that pertained to Germany and anti-German
conspiracies. The 5 July 1940 directive allowed the Einsatzstab Rosenberg
to set up shop in occupied France and operate outside of military control.
Although it seemed inconsequential, the order established an important
precedent.
Himmler, Ribbentrop, Goring, and Rosenberg all had representatives
in Paris shortly after German troops entered the City of Light, but their
organizations faced a comparatively better-organized military government
that did not appreciate civilian interference. All four paladins searched for a
69
after the fall
way to secure a share of the spoils of victory, but rst they needed an appro-
priate mission. Oddly enough, the brouhaha over conscated Jewish art
provided the pretext that they needed. Himmler, Ribbentrop, and Goring
established a bureaucratic presence in France in order to help the Ein-
satzstab Rosenberg collect educational materials. Working together, they
carved out a position for their respective satrapies, broke the Wehrmachts
monopoly of power, and undermined the rational exploitation of occupied
France. Although largely irrelevant to a general history of occupied France,
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg set a critical precedent.
70
3
Setting the precedent
Throughout World War Two, Hitler periodically issued orders that under-
mined the war effort but advanced the ideological goals of National
Socialism. For example, Ambassador Abetz and General von Stlpnagel
advised Hitler to rescind travel and trade restrictions that divided occupied
France, unoccupied France, and the two northern departments of Pas
de Calais and Nord to facilitate industrial production and, by extension,
Frances contribution to the German war effort. Citing security concerns,
Hitler refused to lift the restrictions. While generals favored a policy of
ruthless economic exploitation that would contribute to military victory,
the Fhrer pushed an agenda driven by race and considered the ght
against Jews to be a fundamental part of his strategy. Unwilling or unable to
appreciate the Fhrers thinking, some German ofcers ignored orders that,
in their opinion, did not contribute to the war effort. In France, directives
calling for the conscation of Jewish assets, particularly works of art, were
often viewed as an unwelcome distraction.
OKW issued detailed orders that governed the sort of property soldiers
could seize and described how conscations should be carried out by
troops. Signed by General Keitel, the rst directive complied with German
law and the Hague Convention. After the conquest of France, however,
Hitler ordered branches of the German government and Nazi party to seize
property in a fashion that violated Keitels original regulations. Two ethical
DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 238242, 468470; Milward, The New Order and the French
Economy, pp. 523; BAMA, RW 35/708/4.
after the fall
codes emerged during the ensuing debate over conscations. Most army
ofcers did not hesitate to exploit French resources, but they did so within
the bounds of custom, German law, and international agreements. Personnel
shortages also made the military commander in France (Militarbefehlshaber
in Frankreich or MBF) rather dependent on French support and sensitive
to French objections. Adhering to an older tradition, Hitler, Rosenberg,
Himmler, and Goring disregarded Gallic sensibilities and argued that the
spoils of war belonged to the victor.
Debate over German conscation policy had signicant political impli-
cations. By opposing Hitlers wishes, generals in France proved themselves
to be, in the eyes of the Fhrer, dangerous reactionaries. Since they were
out of step with Hitlers new order, conservative generals had to be pushed
aside. To advance the ideological goals of the Nazi regime, Hitler placed
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg beyond military control and ordered the Nazi
party organization to conscate Jewish property in occupied France. In a
narrow sense, the ruling had little signicance: it did not dramatically alter
the course of the war or lead to moral outrages characteristic of the Nazi
regime in the East, but it diluted the authority of the MBF and set an
important precedent that the SS used to secure its own freedom of action.
Once free from military oversight and armed with executive authority, the
SS could resolve the so-called Jewish Question to Hitlers satisfaction.
German conscation policy also affected Franco-German relations. Dur-
ing the summer of 1940, the Vichy regime tried to preempt German
conscations by launching an equivalent program in order to preserve
the principle of French sovereignty. Once this tactic failed, French of-
cials complained to the military administration, but to no avail. The
MBF could not explain Rosenbergs conscation program to the Vichy
regime because it was classied top secret and, as a political matter, fell
outside his purview. Disregarding advice from the MBF, Hitler ignored
French protests, allowed the pillage to continue, and demonstrated his utter
contempt for France.
Debate surrounding German conscation policy also revealed differences
in the way Germans in Paris and Nazis in Berlin regarded the Vichy regime.
Ambassador Abetz eventually realized that expropriations strained Franco-
German relations, joined forces with the MBF, and tried to rein in
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. Both the German embassy and the military
administration appreciated the value of French cooperation and acted
72
setting the precedent
73
after the fall
demonology placed Jews in the center of this alleged plot, but the 5 July
order did not explicitly mention Jews, Jewish organizations, or synagogues.
The text of Keitels order noted that inspiration for the conscation project
came from Rosenberg but corresponded to the will of the Fhrer, who
may have wanted to proceed with caution while the Battle of Britain
remained undecided. OKW sent copies of the conscation order to senior
military commanders throughout western Europe.
Rather than distributing a copy of Keitels secret decree to subordinates,
the MBF published his own version in the ofcial gazette of the MBF.
Junior ofcers in charge of local and regional branches of the military
administration remained unaware of Keitels original decree. The MBFs
15 July 1940 directive emphasized that conscations could only be car-
ried out with explicit authorization from the MBF or members of his
staff. Those who violated the directive could be ned and/or imprisoned.
To carry out this ordinance, the MBF created an art group inside the
government subsection of the MVW under the command of Franz Graf
Wolff Metternich, a scion of the famous Austrian diplomat and a dis-
tinguished art historian in his own right. During the last months of the
war, a senior MVW ofcial described the art groups mission as having
two parts: helping the French government store objets dart (e.g. paint-
ings and sculptures) and ensuring that collections remained away from
military installations and combat operations. Metternich embodied these
lofty ideals and was eventually red in 1942reportedly on Hitlers
express ordersas a result of his intransigence. Metternich evinced little
enthusiasm for pillage.
Rival groups quickly joined the race for control of French art treasures.
Joseph Goebbels, the dominant force in cultural politics before the war,
appeared to hold an early lead. Before the war, the Minister of Propaganda
had ordered two art historians to examine French archives and compile a list
of works of art and valuable objects which since 1500 have been transferred
to foreign ownership, either without our consent or by questionable legal
transactions. After reading the 300-page report, Dr. Otto Kmmel, the
Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 64. The art group (Gruppe Kunstschutz) stood subordinate
to Bests government subsection (Abteilung Verwaltung), itself a division of Schmids military
administration staff (Militarverwaltungsstab), underneath the MBF.
BAMA, RW 35/712/7173; Nicholas, Rape of Europa, p. 119; Petropolous, Art as Politics
in the Third Reich, p. 129; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1598/folder 4/nfn (Verordnungsblatt fr die
franzosischen Gebiete, Nr. 3, 15 Juli 1940).
74
setting the precedent
75
after the fall
76
setting the precedent
77
after the fall
embassy in Paris, but the MVW art group blocked diplomatic conscations
by the end of August. As Metternich struggled against Abetz and Knsberg,
Rosenberg built a small but effective organization in Paris. Dr. Ebert
initially ran Rosenbergs operation in western Europe but was replaced by
Gerhard Utikal in 1941. Baron Kurt von Behr took charge of the Paris
ofce. By September 1940 the Einsatzstab Rosenberg stood ready to carry
out the Fhrers orders.
Initial conversations between the MVW and Einsatzstab Rosenberg
proceeded without a hitch. Speaking for the MVW on 28 August, Werner
Best emphasized that conscations could not take place without the
approval of the MVW because only the military government had executive
authority. Agents of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg agreed to respect private
property laws but stated their intention to register Jewish valuables. They
described the registration of art as a measure comparable to military decrees
ordering Frenchmen to register arms that could be used in a future conict.
Both sides spoke past one another, but they struck an amicable tone. In
a letter that began Dear Party-comrade Rosenberg further explained his
mission to Best on 5 September 1940. The Reichsleiter stated that Hitlers
order authorized him to search libraries, archives, and Masonic lodges for
evidence of anti-German conspiracies, but he promised to deal exclusively
with abandoned (herrenloser) Jewish property for the present. Furthermore,
he agreed to provide the MVW with a list of all items shipped to Germany.
Rosenberg argued that these items needed to be protected from robbery,
destruction, or damage and told Best that Hitler would decide the fate
of conscated goods. In a memorandum attached to Rosenbergs letter,
Best remarked that unauthorized conscations, including the seizure of
archives or libraries, would discredit the MVW and had to be prevented.
He concluded that the commander of the army would have to issue new
orders to avoid an incident.
The incident that Best feared unfolded on 7 September. Without
warning, Rosenbergs agents broke into the Turgenev and Polish libraries
that had been sealed by the MVW and, with assistance from Knsberg,
began shipping both collections back to Germany. The Polish library
in Paris held the largest collection of Polish-language works outside of
78
setting the precedent
79
after the fall
80
setting the precedent
81
after the fall
Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 7071; BAMA, RW 35/705/123; Umbreit, Der Militar-
befehlshaber in Frankreich, p. 191.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/11; BAMA, RW 35/1/1217.
82
setting the precedent
rst noted that German troops had conscated works of art in Austria so
that assets could not be misused by enemies of the regime. He described
conscations in France as analogous to preceding events in Austria and
ignored the fact that the 1940 Armistice Agreement guaranteed French
sovereignty. Lammers declared that the German government did not care
who actually seized objets dart, but he argued that German directives
always took precedence over French laws. He concluded by denying that
Hitler had authorized any expropriations and noted that the Fhrer merely
determined the fate of works that others had seized. A Nazi rst and a
lawyer second, Lammers disregarded legal arguments raised by eld ofcers.
His letter may have been a feeble attempt to obscure Hitlers role in the
affair, but it revealed that the MBF could not count on support from the
state bureaucracy.
Despite the forces arrayed against them, the MBF and subordinates in
the MVW continued to gripe. They raised a series of legal objections to
Goring when he visited Paris in November 1940. The Reichsmarschall
declared himself to be the supreme legal authority in the Third Reich
and summarily dismissed all objections. Continued opposition to the
Einsatzstab Rosenberg did produce one concrete result. To silence military
opposition, the Reichsmarschall issued a written order that released the
military administration from tenets of the Hague Convention that protect-
ed private property. The decree quelled arguments voiced by military
ofcers that were based on legal grounds, but the debate did not end.
Instead, it shifted to address the question of how to respond to French
protests.
Frenchmen had reason to condemn German seizures. Reichsmarschall
Goring hitched two wagons full of objets dart to his personal train when
he left Paris in February 1941. By September, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg
had shipped fty-two boxcars of objets dart that were seized from mostly
Jewish residences back to Germany. Expropriations worth an estimated
one billion Reichsmarks soon exhausted the supply of artistic treasures, but
the Einsatzstab did not relent. Instead, it began to conscate furniture and
household goods for distribution among Germans made homeless by Allied
bombing raids. By 1943, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg sent 8,642 boxcars
BAMA, RW 35/698/106.
Herbert, Best, p. 261. Goring declared Der hochste Jurist im Staate bin Ich.
BAMA, RW 35/712/121124; BAMA, RW 35/705/8788.
83
after the fall
to the Reich. Sales in Germany generated a tidy prot that was divided
between the Ministry of Finance and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
The Vichy regime did not stand by while the Einsatzstab Rosenberg
robbed France blind. Nine days after the MBF published his 15 July con-
scation decree, the Vichy regime passed a comparable law that allowed
French ofcials to take control of abandoned assets as part of a general policy
to assert French sovereignty throughout the Hexagon. On 10 September
1940 the government went a step further and allowed ofcials to conscate
the property of denaturalized Jews. Using the 24 July and 10 Septem-
ber 1940 regulations, the French government tried to preempt German
conscations and preserve the illusion of sovereignty. In many ways, this
strategy played into Germanys hands by providing the appearance of due
process. German authorities in Bordeaux reported that friction between
the two governments developed as a result of competing conscation
policies. Germany ultimately prevailed, but not before generating much
ill-will.
Raphael Alibert, the Minister of Justice between July 1940 and February
1941, condemned German conscations during a 21 October 1940 conver-
sation with the MBF. Alibert noted that France had lost the war, deserved
to pay a penalty, and believed that Germany had a right to receive a share
of any prots generated by the sale of expropriated property. The Minister
did not oppose the conscation of Jewish property in principle, but he
insisted that all seizures should be carried out by French authorities in
accordance with French law. A second protest arrived on 18 December in
the form of a verbal note. The message continued to accept the fundamen-
tal legitimacy of expropriations but argued for a share of the spoils. The
Vichy regime wanted to alleviate widespread shortages by selling seized
Jewish property and using the proceeds to fund a winter relief program,
84
setting the precedent
the Secours National. The French delegation that was responsible for the sale
of conscated property wanted to catalog art that Rosenberg had concen-
trated in the Louvre and Musee du Jeu de Paume. In closing, the French
communique asked Otto von Stlpnagel, the MBF since 25 October 1940,
to grant French ofcials access to both museums and release any proceeds
generated by the sale of expropriated art. When the German government
failed to respond to Aliberts 21 October comments or the 18 December
1940 verbal note, the French government delivered a third protest to the
MBF on 27 January 1941. It covered much of the same ground and asked
German authorities to establish a system for handling similar conicts in
the future.
The French government assumed that the German army stood behind the
seizure of French art collections and directed their complaints to the MBF
and, later, the German embassy in Paris. They remained unaware of inter-
agency struggles and did not negotiate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg
directly. The MBF could not answer French protests because Keitels
17 September regulation remained secret. The military administration
shouldered the blame for the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
Werner Best met with members of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, the SS, and
subordinates in the justice and art divisions of the military administration
to decide on a course of action. Almost one month after receiving the rst
French verbal note, the committee advised Otto von Stlpnagel to pass the
question to Berlin.
The Einsatzstab Rosenberg viewed French complaints as evidence that
the anti-German conspiracy was stronger than ever. In a 24 January 1941
analysis sent to Best, two senior Einsatzstab ofcials argued that Jews and
Freemasons had stood behind the 1914 assassination of Franz Ferdinand,
built the ignominious World War One memorial at Compiegne, and
arranged a boycott of German goods after the Nazi seizure of power.
The memorandum described Jews as implacable enemies of the German
people who would ght the Reich with every available weapon. They
were related by blood and tactics to the Belgian partisans of World War
One and Polish bandits who supposedly instigated the current struggle.
The Einsatzstab argued that Jews used objets dart to nance attacks against
85
after the fall
86
setting the precedent
aux questions juives (CGQJ) also tried to resolve the problem by speaking
with Werner Best. Taken as a group, the letters indicate the Vichy
governments view of the conscations.
French protests eventually reached the ears of Abetz. The ambassador
asked the MBF for a summary of correspondence that pertained to the
conscation of Jewish art in February 1941 and pondered the matter
for another eight months before proposing a solution. He met with his
former nemesis in the MVW art group, Count Metternich, on 17 October
1941 and suggested that a commission of French and German ofcials
be established to catalog items seized by German authorities. The value
of items conscated by Germany, less the amount given back to Vichy
for the Secours National, would then be subtracted from any reparations
included in a Franco-German peace treaty signed at the end of hostilities.
Abetzs plan sought to place conscations on a legal footing and thus
placate the French government without costing Germany any real money
or returning conscated objects. Ofcers in Paris supported the plan, but
military superiors in Berlin claimed that it was a political matter and thus
not the responsibility of military authorities. Senior ofcials in Berlin once
again ignored the issue, and Abetzs proposal fell by the wayside.
Hitler ended the conscation debate by issuing an order to all branch-
es of the party, army, and state bureaucracy on 1 March 1942. The
Fhrer declared that attacks against Jews, Freemasons, and their allies were
essential to the German war effort. He granted Reichsleiter Rosenberg
the right to dispose of Jewish property, goods of uncertain ownership,
and abandoned possessions. The Fhrer ordered OKW to cooperate with
Rosenberg against Jews and other ideological opponents of the regime.
Hitler signed the Fhrerbefehl and no longer bothered to conceal his role in
the seizures. His personal intervention, in conjunction with the advent
of armed resistance movements in France and ghting on the Eastern
Front, pressed conscations into the background. Resistance, reprisals, and
hostage executions overshadowed expropriations in the fall of 1941.
Before the 1940 Western campaign, Hitler and Keitel expected to ght
a long war and proceeded with a degree of caution. After defeating France,
87
after the fall
88
4
First measures
Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 151, 187191; Geoffrey Best, Humanity in
Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 151.
90
first measures
That the employment of such arms would, therefore be contrary to the laws of
humanity.
Attempts to recast vague military traditions did not always succeed. Diplo-
mats, lawyers, and soldiers from fteen countries failed to reach an
agreement during the 1874 Brussels conference, but the desire to co-
dify the laws and customs of war remained popular among the European
public.
In 1898, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed another
meeting to consider a possible reduction of the excessive armaments
which weigh upon all nations. At the conference, Colonel Gross von
Schwarzhoff, a member of the German delegation and informal spokesman
for all opponents of arms control agreements, replied that the German
people were not crushed beneath the weight of armament expenditures
and, with the support of American and British ofcers, blocked further
attempts to restrict military spending. Yet the meeting did not end in total
failure. Participants signed treaties concerning belligerency, prisoners of
war, and military authority over hostile territory. They also prohibited the
use of expanding (dum-dum) bullets and banned the use of projectiles
the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.
Twenty-six nations eventually ratied what eventually became known as
the 1899 Hague Convention.
With support from American President Theodore Roosevelt, Tsar
Nicholas II convened another major international conference at The
Hague in 1906. Forty-four states revised the 1899 accords and passed a total
of fourteen conventions but broke little new ground. Section III of the
Laws and Customs of War on Land provoked considerable debate. Some
participants argued that local inhabitants had a right to resist an invading
army, while others believed that such resistance merely prolonged the war
and confused otherwise clear distinctions between soldiers and civilians.
91
after the fall
Adam Roberts, Land warfare: from Hague to Nuremberg, in Michael Howard, George
J. Andreopolos, and Mark R. Schulman (eds.), The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the
Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 1213.
Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 308323; Manual of Military Law (London:
His Majestys Stationery Ofce, 1914), chapter XIV; BAK, All. Proz. 21/208/3543; Lieb,
Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 233258.
USNA, RG 153 (Records of the Ofce of the Judge Advocate GeneralArmy)/entry
135/91/folder L-512/28126.
92
first measures
93
after the fall
Named in honor of the jurist who advised the Tsar during the 1899 and
1907 conferences, the Martens clause admonished participants to adhere
to the unwritten traditions of warfare and let historical precedent shape
military conduct. In so doing, it opened up a Pandoras box of both good
and bad historical precedents that belligerents could use to support almost
any policy.
European soldiers had developed an elaborate code of conduct during
the early modern era. Detailed but largely unwritten rules governing
the capitulation of fortresses supplemented the earlier code of chivalry.
Townsmen who refused to surrender might be put to the sword, but
citizens who capitulated before a breach in the defenses had been effected
could expect to pay a ne and escape with their lives. Similar traditions
facilitated the exchange of prisoners and protected eld hospitals in the
94
first measures
B. H. Liddell Hart, Revolution in Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947),
pp. 3895; Geoffrey Parker, Early modern Europe in Howard et al., The Laws of War: Constraints
on Warfare in the Western World, pp. 4058. Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A
General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Sydney Seymour Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France: A Study in French Diplomacy
during the War of the First Coalition, 17921797 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957),
pp. 245, 94.
Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen-Soldiers to Instrument of
Power, translated by R. R. Palmer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 1536,
856; Alan Forest, The nation in arms I: the French wars, in Charles Townsend (ed.), The
Oxford History of Modern War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 5966.
Best, Humanity in Warfare, pp. 80, 115118; Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution,
pp. 1445, 286291; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (London:
B. T. Batsford, 1977), pp. 857.
95
after the fall
Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 17701870, (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1982), pp. 168183; Jan Read, War in the Peninsula (London: Faber and Faber, 1977),
pp. 169181.
Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 18701871 (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), pp. 250256, 377381; Francois Roth, La Guerre de
1870 (Paris: Fayard, 1990), pp. 372410; BAMA, RW 35/231.
96
first measures
Helen McPhail, The Long Silence: Civilian Life under the German Occupation of Northern France,
19141918 (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2001); John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities,
1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 74; Alan Kramer,
Dynamic of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), pp. 668.
Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cam-
bridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2005), pp. 148150.
Roberts, Land warfare, from Hague to Nuremberg, pp. 1236; James F. Willis, Prologue to
Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, p. 542.
97
after the fall
ambitious generals used loopholes in the Hague laws to salve their own
consciences and gain an advantage.
The rst article of the 1907 Hague Convention bound signators to issue
instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the
regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Instructions
embodied in the manuals of military law of Britain, France, Germany,
and the United States, explain how each country planned to honor treaty
obligations and reveal a common interpretation of international law. In
many ways, the 1929 British Manual of Military Law is representative. British
regulations made a clear distinction between non-combatant civilians and
belligerent soldiers, and they depended upon this distinction in order to
function properly. The Hague denition of a lawful combatant, repeated
verbatim in the British manual, protected volunteers and militias in addition
to professional soldiers. Once an area fell under enemy occupation, civilians
owed a degree of loyalty to an occupying army. Citizens who disobeyed
the army of occupation could be found guilty of war rebellion or war
treason and punished accordingly.
While they did not have to swear an oath of loyalty or provide
information, residents could not revolt and expect to be treated as lawful
combatants. The 1929 edition of the British Manual of Military Law expected
the inhabitants of an occupied territory to
behave in an absolutely peaceful manner, . . . to in no way take part in the
hostilities, to refrain from every injury to the troops of the occupant, and from any
act prejudicial to their operations, and to render obedience to the ofcials of the
occupant. Any violation of this duty is punishable by the occupant.
(Chapter XIV, article 384)
Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, translated by Deborah Lucas Schnei-
der (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 129130; Manfred Messerschmidt,
Forward defence: the Memorandum of the Generals for the Nuremberg Court in Hannes
Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), War of Extermination (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000),
pp. 389396.
Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 308323; Manual of Military Law, chapter XIV;
BAK/All. Proz 21/208/3543.
98
first measures
Manual of Military Law, pp. 2923, 302307; BAK, All. Proz. 21/208/3543.
BAMA, RW 35/542/2425; BAK, All. Proz. 21/218/45.
Stanislas Jeannesson, Poincare et la Ruhr, 19221924: Histoire dune occupation (Strasbourg:
Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1997), pp. 168171, 187 note 58, 194, 201205.
J. M. Spaight, War Rights on Land (London: Macmillan and Co., 1911), pp. 3334; Robert
Jacomet, Les Lois de la guerre continental (Paris: L. Fournier, 1913), chapter 3, article 93.
99
after the fall
Edward H. Young, Law of belligerent Occupation, Text No. 11 (Ann Arbor, 1944),
pp. 111126. Appears in USNA, RG 153/135/91/folder L-512; Basic Field Manual FM 2710,
Rules of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: United States Printing Ofce, 1940), pp. 859.
James Garner, International Law and the World War, vol. II (London: Longmans, Green,
1920), pp. 925; BAK, All. Proz. 21/40/nfn (Abschrift, Dr. Victor Knipp, Deportation als
Kriegsverbrechen).
USNA, RG 153/135/6/116/23 (Ofce of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis
Branch, R & A number 2500.18, German Military Government Over Europe: Military and
Police Tribunals in Occupied Europe, dated 22 December 1944).
100
first measures
101
after the fall
102
first measures
all accepted collective reprisals and hostage seizures in principle, but only
German regulations translated this principle into practice.
Hitler encouraged subordinates to put Nazi legal doctrines into practice.
On the eve of the 1940 Western Campaign, the Fhrer directed military
forces to obey provisions of the Hague Convention but he added that
(h)ostile acts by the population will be suppressed with the utmost severity.
He employed an expansive denition of hostile acts that included passive
resistance and stopping work as a political demonstration. In accordance
with Hitlers wishes, General Alfred Streccius, the MBF between 30 June
and 25 October 1940, issued anti-sabotage regulations on 12 September.
Entitled Measures to Prevent Sabotage, Strecciuss regulation described
four methods that could be used to suppress dangerous resistance activity.
First, local commanders could force local residents to guard railroad tracks,
factories, bridges, telegraph cables, and military installations. People who
failed to fulll their responsibilities could face prison, hard labor, or
even death. Second, local German authorities could impose curfews,
enact sumptuary laws like the prohibition of alcohol, and close restaurants,
theaters, and public markets. Third, the MBF allowed regional commanders
to collect a security deposit from a community that could be conscated
in the event of unsatisfactory behavior. To circumvent Hague rules that
forbade extraordinary taxes and maintain the appearance of legality, the
MBF ordered subordinates to call the collected funds forced contributions
(Zwangsauagen). All of Strecciuss Measures rested on the concept of
collective responsibility but did not create a reign of arbitrary punishment
and terror.
With the greatest reserve, the MBF allowed regional commanders to
arrest hostages:
Hostages are local residents who will pay with their lives if the public does not
behave awlessly. Therefore the responsibility for their fate lies in the hands of
their fellow countrymen. The population must be publicly warned that hostages
will be liable for the hostile acts of individuals.
Streccius recognized that seizing hostages carried grave risks and limited
the autonomy of his subordinates. Only regional commanders (Bezirkchefs)
could arrest hostages, and they could do so only after careful consideration
of the circumstances, in response to serious acts of violence (schweren
103
after the fall
Gary Gordon describes how the process unfolded on the eastern front in Soviet partisan
warfare, 19411944: the German perspective (Ph.D. diss., Iowa University, 1972), pp. 3031:
Several German or other Axis soldiers would be captured, mutilated, and killed. Their bodies
would then be left in a place where the Germans would surely nd them, often next to villages
sympathetic to the invaders or neutral in their political sympathies. When the bodies were found,
German security troops would take revenge on all the villages in the area by killing everyone
they saw, by conscating all cattle and crops, and by devastating entire sections of land. The
survivors ed to the forests where they would be met by partisans who would sympathize with
them and offer help.
USNA, T-501/166/7182.
104
first measures
With regard to seizing hostages, the MBF offered the following advice:
Hostages should only be taken with great restraint (Zurckhaltung). At the moment
of the arrest, it can never be foreseen whether the later execution of the hostages is
undesirable and should remain undone for political reasons. However, respect for
the military government will be shaken and the taking of hostages made pointless
if executions are not carried out once new hostile acts have been committed. The
efcacy of the taking of hostages for the prevention of hostile acts is questionable if
an especially close bond does not exist between the perpetrator and the hostages.
Fanatics and criminals have no regard for the lives of hostages. Thus hostages are
to be arrested only if serious crimes have been committed and there are no other
suitable means available.
105
after the fall
106
first measures
20,000
Serious crimes
Administrative arrest
18,000 Traffic infraction
Blackout violation
Curfew violation
16,000 Venereal disease
Traffic accident
Slandering or disdaining the German army
14,000 Larceny (minor robbery)
Unauthorized possession of a firearm
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
Oct1940
Nov1940
Dec1940
Jan1941
Feb1941
Mar1941
Apr1941
May1941
Jun1941
Jul1941
Aug1941
Sep1941
Oct1941
Nov1941
Dec1941
Jan1942
Feb1942
Mar1942
Apr1942
May1942
Figure 4.1. Crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 19401942.
for most of the increase in the crime rate during the early months of the
Occupation.
The total number of offenses investigated by the MVW began to drop
in January 1941 and continued to decline until the MBF lost control of
police forces in May 1942. German policemen may have overlooked minor
transgressions and allowed some to perpetrators to escape with a warning.
For their part, Frenchmen may have learned to hide their contempt for
le boche because agrant deance could lead to charges of slandering the
German army. Statistical data do not explain why the incidence of trafc
infractions, price control violations, and other petty crimes decreased in
1941, but the drop suggests an increase in law and order, a decline in
enforcement, and a degree of Franco-German accommodation.
107
after the fall
600
400
200
0
Oct1940
Nov1940
Dec1940
Jan1941
Feb1941
Mar1941
Apr1941
May1941
Jun1941
Jul1941
Aug1941
Sep1941
Oct1941
Nov1941
Dec1941
Jan1942
Feb1942
Mar1942
Apr1942
May1942
Figure 4.2. Serious crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 19401942.
108
first measures
Figures do not include some Frenchmen executed as hostages between September 1941 and
January 1942. Prisoners convicted of non-political crimes and sentenced to prison could later be
executed as hostages and counted as reprisals. Numbers cited above are not comprehensive, but
they do suggest that executions, both criminal and hostage, increased after the invasion of the
Soviet Union. BAMA, RW 35/542; BAMA, RW 35/543.
109
after the fall
The invasion of the Soviet Union may not have signaled the start of (what
Germany regarded as) a new crime wave, but it did mark the beginning
of harsh repression based on an increase in the number of executions.
Taken as a whole, crime statistics and subjective security reports suggest
that German police did not encounter dangerous resistance activity while
they remained in charge of German security policy. The incidence of
murder, espionage, and sabotage all followed a downward trend through
the spring of 1942. German policemen had enough time to pursue trafc
scofaws and conscate shortwave radios. Resistance activity did not force
the MBF to adopt bloody reprisals.
International agreements in force during World War Two provided scant
protection for civilians in occupied territories, and European armies exploit-
ed this weakness throughout the modern era. British soldiers employed
collective reprisals during the Boer War and French troops seized German
hostages during the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr. During the Franco-
Prussian War, German forces had employed tactics that were comparable
110
first measures
111
5
Resistance and reprisals
Duroselle, LAbme, pp. 324, 3843; Journal ofciel, number 11770, dated 27 September
1939.
BAMA, RW 36 (Kommandanturen der Militarverwaltung)/97/124; Lambauer, Otto Abetz
et le Francais, pp. 1434.
resistance and reprisals
that vilied Nazi Germany and celebrated the Soviet Union began to
appear in markets throughout Paris. Taking an optimistic tone, some
began to compare the current situation with that of 1812. The military
administration suspected that the propaganda came from Britain, but the
production of leaets dropped from 12,000 to 400 sheets per week after
French police seized covert printing presses in September 1941. Despite
the increase in anti-German propaganda during the summer, the military
commander in France (Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich or MBF) believed
that French opinion showed faint sympathy for Great Britain, the Soviet
Union, or Nazi Germany.
Eight days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Keitel allowed the
MBF to punish sabotage and guerrilla activity with the death penalty if
necessary, but he did not order a new terror campaign. His note of 30 June
1941 told the MBF to inform Berlin of incidents that might inuence
Franco-German relations so that Hitler, OKW, and the Foreign Ofce
could review sensitive cases and, if necessary, adjust the response. Keitels
relatively mild decree corresponded to the will of the Fhrer and granted
Stlpnagel a free hand with regard to French resistance activity. General
von Stlpnagel continued to follow his own policy. Jonathan Schmid, the
head of the entire military administration, encouraged the Vichy regime to
redouble its efforts against the PCF and directed SS police and intelligence
agencies to assist French efforts. The MBF supervised the arrest of suspected
communists and anarchists, but the entire campaign was carried out by
French gendarmes. Stlpnagel warned subordinates not to create martyrs
and preferred to let the Vichy government act in his stead. For the moment,
the military government operated in the background.
The MBF abandoned his pretense of neutrality and outlawed the PCF on
14 August. Publicized through radio announcements, newspaper articles,
and posters, his decree threatened to punish communist activity with death
and the distribution of anti-German leaets with fteen years in a German
prison. Although the Daladier government had outlawed the PCF in 1939
and subsequent French administrations had pursued communist militants
113
after the fall
114
resistance and reprisals
Jackson, France. The Dark Years 19401944, p. 275; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II,
p. 20; and USNA, RG 242/T-501/143. The suspected intent of the alleged assailants determined
the German response. BAMA, RW 35/308/110111 and BAMA, RW 35/542/68.
BAMA, RW 35/308/122; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Fernmndlich von
Kapt. Lt. Lang, 22.8.41, Betr. Erschiessung Moser); USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn
(Der MBF, Kommandostab Abt VOVF, An den Herrn Chef des Generalstabes, Betr. Moser,
Paris 1.9.41, Vortrag bei Komm. Adm. am 1.9 11 Uhr); BAMA, RW 35/542/1617.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/165/371374.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Delegation Generale du Gouvernement
Francais dans les Territoires Occupes, Attentat contre un ofcier de Marine Allemand: Position
du gouvernement Francais, 22 August).
115
after the fall
for the Minister of the Interior in the Occupied Territories) assured Major
Walter Beumelburg (the MVWs liaison with the French government in
Paris) that all six communists would be found guilty and sentenced to
death. Furthermore, Brinon and Ingrand promised to bring the guillotine
out of retirement and execute all six prisoners in public to demonstrate
Vichys resolve with a gruesome ourish.
The German government answered the French message on 22 August.
The reply expressed satisfaction with the French measures but insisted upon
several changes. First, the Germans wanted the Sections speciales to meet
behind closed doors. Second, they asked for some inuence over suspects
brought before the court. In a rare show of decorum, the German reply
requested that executions not be held in public, but it demanded that all
sentences be carried out by 28 August, or one week after the murder of
Cadet Moser. Finally, the German communique observed that the French
actions did not release Vichy from her obligation to aggressively investigate,
prosecute, and punish future attacks.
Brinon and Ingrand summed up the French position during a 23 August
meeting with Major Beumelburg. Brinon informed his German counter-
part that the Vichy government had formally created the Sections speciales
as promised and would begin to prosecute the Moser case on 26 August.
Ingrand had already met with prosecutors and made sure that they appre-
ciated the political importance of the cases. He told Beumelburg that
the Sections speciales would follow Vichys revolutionary legal reasoning
and fulll ofcial responsibilities to Germanys satisfaction. Adhering
to Germanys schedule, the Sections speciales convened on 26 August
and adjudicated eleven cases in three days. The court sentenced three
accused communists to death, six to terms of forced labor, and two to
short prison sentences and a ne. The Vichy government carried out
the death sentences immediately. Beumelburg concluded that the Vichy
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Der MBF, Kdo Stab Abt VOVF, 22.8.41,
Betr. Attentat gegen einen deutschen Marineofzier, Bezug: Mndliche Besprechung am 22.8
zwischen Botschafter de Brinon, Staatsrat Ingrand, Handelsrat Wilhelm, Mj. Beumelburg, und Lt.
Dr. Roesch); Joseph Barthelemy, Ministre de la Justice, Vichy 19411943: Memoires (Paris: Editions
Pygmalion/Gerard Watelet, 1989), p. 574ff.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (VOVF, 22.8.41, Betr. Attentat gegen den
deutschen Wehrmachtsangehorigen Moser am 21.8.41, Erklarung des VOVF gegenber dem
Generalbevollmachtigten der franz. Regierung).
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF, Kdo. Stab. Abt. VOVF, 23 August 1941,
Betr. Attentat am 21.8 und Ausnahmegesetz vom 23.8).
116
resistance and reprisals
117
after the fall
administration to hold the Vichy government to its word and pressed for
three more executions.
The Chief of the MBF command staff, Colonel Hans Speidel, passed
along the navys complaint to ambassador de Brinon in a 3 September letter.
He expressed his deep disappointment that the French government had
not honored verbal assurances to execute six communists and added that it
was in the interests of the French people and Vichy government to fully
redeem such assurances in the shortest amount of time. Secretary Ingrand
gave the Ministry of Interiors preliminary response to Major Beumelburg.
He told the liaison ofcer that Germany could wait until the French
government fullled its promises or seize and execute communists on its
own. An hour after their rst meeting, Ingrand returned to Beumelburgs
ofce with a rather different message. He apologized for the delay, remarked
that the original promise to execute six communists was an oral agreement,
and observed that the Vichy government had to preserve the appearance of
judicial independence. Paris courts condemned another three communists
to death on 20 September, and the sentences were executed immediately.
The MBF informed the Kriegesmarine of the additional reprisals and laid the
Moser affair to rest in late September.
While the military administration, Vichy government, and German navy
argued over how to handle the Moser assassination, the resistance struck
again. On 3 September, two young men shot Sergeant Ernst Hoffmann as
he entered the Terminus Hotel near the Gare de lEst in Paris. After a brief
investigation, police somehow concluded that communists had carried out
the attack. In accordance with his 22 August announcement, General
von Stlpnagel ordered three hostage executions or, in the language of
the military administration, sabotage countermeasures. Acting upon advice
from Lieutenant-General Schaumburg and SS Brigadefhrer Dr. Thomas,
118
resistance and reprisals
the Commandant of greater Paris and the head of the SS/SD in France
respectively, the MBF selected three Jewish communists who had already
been convicted of non-capital crimes by German military courts. The
executions took place on 6 Septemberthree days after the Hoffmann
attack.
Although he followed contingency plans laid out in 1940, Stlpnagels
anti-partisan strategy came under re once again. This time, the trouble
came from Berlin. General Eduard Wagner, the quartermaster of the army
(OKH Generalquartiermeister), forwarded Hitlers view of the Hoffmann
affair to General von Stlpnagel on 7 September. The Fhrer complained
that a German soldier is worth more than three communists, believed the
MBFs response was much too mild, and considered the three executions
to only be a preliminary measure. If the authorities did not capture the
perpetrators in the immediate future, Hitler advised his eld commander
to execute another fty communists, and he added that they had to be
leading communists because Frenchmen, particularly French communists,
were worth much less than a single Aryan. The Fhrer urged Stlpnagel to
arrest another 300 hostages and execute 100 of them immediately after the
next assassination. In closing, Hitler demanded a telegraphic report on the
entire matter.
Strategic questions may have forestalled Hitlers intervention during the
Moser affair in the latter half of August. As General von Stlpnagel
responded to the Moser assassination, the Fhrer refereed a squabble
between his leading generals on the eastern front. The argument came
to a head during a 23 August 1941 meeting between General Guderian,
the leading proponent of a direct attack on Moscow, and more cautious
generals who favored an advance into the Ukraine. During the relative
calm of early September, Hitler had time to learn about and comment on
the Hoffmann case. Pressing events in the Soviet Union again diverted
Hitlers attention in the latter half of September and allowed Stlpnagel to
delay his reply to the 7 September Hitler/Wagner message. Although often
distracted by events on the eastern front, Hitler could exercise a decisive
119
after the fall
inuence over French affairs when a bit of news caught his interest and
tted his agenda.
Complaints about the handling of the Hoffmann attack lost their salience
as new problems overshadowed previous concerns. Before General von
Stlpnagel replied to the 7 September Wagner note, resistance groups
launched three more attacks. On 6 September, unidentied cyclists shot
at but missed a German corporal. Four days later, partisans shot a German
sailor in the leg. Finally, on 12 September, someone hit a German
paymaster over the head with a blackjack. None of the assaults proved
to be fatal, but General von Stlpnagel chose to respond to all three
attacks by executing ten hostages. While Hitlers 7 September comments
did not change Germanys response to the Hoffmann attack, they may
have pushed the MBF toward a more strident response to subsequent
assaults.
The Commandant of greater Paris went even further than General
von Stlpnagel. In a 19 September announcement, Lieutenant-General
Schaumburg complained that Frenchmen had not helped the police catch
perpetrators who had carried out the September attacks. To punish the
population, Schaumburg imposed a curfew for the entire Seine region
between 20 and 23 September. All restaurants, theaters, and bars had to
close by eight oclock, and the public had to be off the streets one hour
later. Those who violated the curfew, the message warned, would be
arrested by German police and could serve as hostages in the event of
another assassination. Simple mistakes could lead to a prison sentence,
and all prisoners could, in turn, serve as hostages. Even the most apolitical
Frenchman could not afford to ignore German regulations.
Although much less common, acts of resistance were not limited to
Paris. On 18 September, partisans sabotaged the CourbonMontigny
Veauxhaulles railroad line in northeastern France. Both the MBF and
generals in Berlin regarded railroad sabotage as a very serious threat that
directly undermined the German war effort. In this case, they responded
by executing two hostages on 23 September. The MBF approved an
extremely slight number of hostage executions because a French railroad
worker had spotted the sabotage before any real damage had occurred.
120
resistance and reprisals
121
after the fall
122
resistance and reprisals
mass movement, uniformly directed by Moscow which must be charged with the
responsibility even for separate incidents of seemingly minor importance in areas
heretofore quiet . . . One must also expect nationalistic and other circles to exploit
this opportunity in order to create difculties for the German occupying power by
joining the communist uprising . . . In every case of rebellion against the German
occupying power, no matter what the individual circumstances may be, communist
origins must be assumed to be present.
Unlike General von Stlpnagel, Hitler assumed that communists carried out
or coordinated all attacks against Germany. Resistance had to be treated
with the same methods in each area under German control because it
emanated from the same source: Moscow. These fundamental assumptions
precluded the need to tailor German tactics to particular local conditions.
In the same 16 September 1941 directive quoted above, the Fhrer
denounced Stlpnagels policy of relatively mild punishments and outlined
an appropriate response to resistance activity:
In order to nip agitation in the bud the harshest measures must be employed
immediately at the rst occasion, so as to make the authority of the occupying power
prevail and prevent any further spread [of resistance activity] . . . [H]uman life is
often considered to be of no value in the countries concerned, and a deterrent
effect can be attained only through unusual severity. In these cases in general
the death penalty for 50 to 100 communists must be considered an appropriate
atonement for the life of a single German soldier . . . The only real deterrent here
is the death penalty. In particular, acts of sabotage, acts of espionage and attempts
to enter foreign armed forces must be punished with death as a matter of principle.
Hitler and Keitel broke with traditional conceptions of law and justice by
placing no value on human life and establishing punishments that were
not proportional to the original crime. In doing so, the National Socialist
regime entered legal territory that had not been explored for hundreds of
years.
To further complicate matters, Nazi legal theory demanded a swift and
immediate response to each and every crime. A memo sent to all regimental
commanders in France summed up the principle with the phrase swift
justice is good justice. All sentences had to be immediate and harsh
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 5413; Fattig, Reprisal, pp. 616; Philip W. Blood, Hitlers
Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe (Washington, DC: Potomac Books,
2008), pp. 635.
BAMA, RW 35/209/211, 259260.
123
after the fall
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1626/folder 01/nfn (Der MBF Kommandostab Abt. III, Tgb Nr.
164/41 geh., Paris 28 September 1941, Zu allen Gerichten im Bereich des MBF).
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1626/folder 01/nfn (Der MBF Kommandostab Abt. III, Tgb Nr.
164/41 geh., Paris 28 September 1941, Zu allen Gerichten im Bereich des MBF). Emphasis in
the original.
Rab Bennett, Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and
Collaboration in Hitlers Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 99103, argues that military
governments and the SS carried out reprisals according to predetermined quotas: 10 Frenchmen,
100 Poles, or 500 Slavs would be executed for each German soldier killed. Bennett cites Fattig,
Reprisal, p. 159; Fattig makes no such claim. Orders from Keitel and Hitler give no indication
that they wanted French resistance groups to be treated differently from their counterparts in
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.
For Hitlers ideas on the relationship between anti-Semitism and Marxism, see Ian Kershaw,
Hitler, 18891936: Hubris (New York: Norton, 1998), pp. 243250; and Philippe Burrin, Hitler
and the Jews: The Genesis of the Holocaust, translated by Patsy Southgate (London: Edward Arnold,
1994), pp. 2439.
124
resistance and reprisals
125
after the fall
Figure 5.1. General Otto von Stlpnagel (right) consults Field Marshal Walter
von Brauchitsch in Paris, 21 May 1941.
Photograph courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H29377.
BAMA, RW 35/46/66.
126
resistance and reprisals
BAMA, RW 35/536/13.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/1069; Fattig, Reprisal, pp. 618.
127
after the fall
similar attacks to Berlin immediately. The MBF also reported that over
4,000 Frenchmen who came from every walk of life and shade of the
political spectrum were being held in German prison camps and had been
designated as hostages. He saw no need to arrest additional hostages and
implied that Hitler did not really understand the situation in France.
Without mincing words, Stlpnagel then argued that three hostage
executions were indeed an appropriate response to the Hoffmann attack. He
lauded French anti-terrorist efforts and insisted that bloody reprisals would
undermine German allies throughout the Hexagon. The MBF wanted
to gradually increase his response to resistance activity and specically
rejected a schematic or predetermined solution to any particular attack.
Mass executions, Stlpnagel explained, might encourage passive resistance
among French workers and endanger German troops who depended on
French supplies. More than his colleagues in Berlin, the MBF understood
the scope and value of French collaboration.
To further strengthen his case, Stlpnagel pointed out that Ambas-
sador Abetz shared the MBFs interpretation of events. Apparently Hitler
did not discuss the question of reprisals during a 16 September 1941
meeting with the ambassador, but Abetz did oppose reprisals that were
carried out toward the end of October because they turned the French
public against Germany. The Paris embassy often criticized Stlpnagel
and coveted the authority of the military administration. During the
fall of 1941, the ambassador tried to control the selection of hostages,
but he was rebuffed by military leaders in Berlin. With regard to
reprisals, Abetz set his ambition aside and tried to help the MBF moderate
Hitlers reprisal policy in order to advance his policy of Franco-German
collaboration.
The nal paragraph of Stlpnagels 11 October letter to OKH described
the current situation as unbearable. The MBF believed that mass execu-
tions ran counter to the basic political guidelines issued before and after
the Armistice Agreement. He requested a new statement of Germanys
objectives and asked for an immediate recall if compelled to obey the 7 and
16 September orders. The MBF demanded some room to maneuver and
backed it up with an offer to resign. Stlpnagels demarche arrived during
BAMA, RW 35/543/2325.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 518520, 6825; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Francais, p. 429.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/354.
128
resistance and reprisals
the climax of one of the great encirclement battles of World War Two:
Operation Typhoon. His vitriolic reply must have seemed insignicant
when compared to news that German troops had surrounded over 660,000
Soviet soldiers near Vyazma. Favorable news from the eastern front
probably took the sting out of Stlpnagels protest, but the fundamental
disagreement remained.
Assassinations carried out by resistance groups in August and September
1941 reveal a difference of opinion within the German military hierarchy.
As he responded to the Moser, Hoffman, and Scheben attacks, the MBF
tried to focus reprisals on bona de opponents and followed traditional Ger-
man military doctrine, but his response did not satisfy Nazis in Berlin. Hitler
rejected Stlpnagels reprisals because they did not reect Nazi racial ideas.
Although he initially allowed the MBF to act as he saw t, Keitel lived up
to his nickname Lakaitel (an amalgamation of his surname and the German
word Lakai, meaning lackey), embraced Hitlers point of view, abandoned
his subordinate, and ordered the execution of 50100 Frenchmen for
each German killed by resistance groups. Senior generals in Berlin quickly
followed suit, repeated Hitlers formula, and denounced Stlpnagels meth-
ods. Critiques advanced by Keitel, Warlimont, and Wagner reveal Hitlers
inuence over his military coterie. Pressure generated by French resistance
activity divided political generals in Berlin from eld commanders in Paris.
While the MBF bickered with superiors in Berlin, the Paris branch of the
SS/SD chose to act. In the fall of 1941, Eugene Deloncle, a veteran of the
Cagoule and founder of the ultra-fascist Mouvement Social Revolutionnaire,
asked his SS/SD patrons to help him avenge assassination attempts against
Pierre Laval and Marcel Deat that were carried out on 27 August. With
Heydrich and Knochens approval, SS Major (Sturmbannfhrer) Sommer
procured explosives from Berlin and, on the afternoon of 2 October,
distributed twelve bombs to four of Deloncles followers. Later that night,
the men drove around Paris and bombed seven synagogues. One of the
explosives proved to be a dud, but the remaining eleven damaged six
temples, shattered nearby windows, and wounded two soldiers who were
guarding an adjacent German dormitory.
129
after the fall
130
resistance and reprisals
the attacks back to the SS. When questioned by military police, Sommer
accused the naval ofcer of being drunk and denied any part in the seven
bombings, but only six attacks had been reported in the press because one
of the charges had not detonated. Sommers mistake incriminated the SS,
and his subsequent denial linked Knochen to the affair.
131
after the fall
132
resistance and reprisals
133
6
The end of ambiguity
Eric Roussel, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), pp. 2324; Laborie, LOpinion
francaise sous Vichy, pp. 266274.
the end of ambiguity
none of these actions could defeat Nazi Germany on their own. Some
factions within left-wing resistance groups chose to go one step further.
Based on their rst-hand experiences with Nazi methods, some immigrants
from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and other eastern European nations
joined a faction of the PCF known as the Main-duvre immigree (MOI)
and pushed for more direct action. Veterans of the Spanish Civil War
and a number of young left-wing zealots rejected the PCFs temperate
approach and chose to attack Germany directly. In Paris, MOI militants
coalesced around Albert Ouzoulias and Pierre Georges (aka Fredo and
later Colonel Fabien). Together, they formed what later became known
as the bataillons de la jeunesse and embarked on a campaign of sabotage and
assassination.
During August and September, the bataillons de la jeunesse conned their
activities to the Paris region. Their efforts resulted in the Moser, Hoffmann,
and Scheben assassinations. Around 15 October, Ouzoulias and Georges
dispatched three incendiary groups (groupes de brlots) to provincial centers.
Maurice Le Berre and Jacques dAndurain traveled to Rouen and, with
help from a local resistance group, destroyed a section of the RouenLe
Havre railroad line on 19 October. Gilbert Brustlein and Guisco Spartaco
assassinated a German ofcer in Nantes on the very next day. Pierre
Rebiere met French and Spanish resistance ghters in Bordeaux and killed
a German ofcial on 21 October. Although the railroad sabotage in Rouen
did not pass unnoticed, assassinations in Nantes and Bordeaux provoked
massive German reprisals and accelerated the spiral of violence that had
begun in August with the Moser assassination.
Assassinations carried out by the groupes de brlots transformed three
critical relationships in France during World War Two. First, they strained
Franco-German relations. Subsequent German reprisals dispelled the neutral
or, in some cases, positive image of the German occupiers and pushed
some Frenchmen toward resistance. Cordial collaboration devolved into
begrudging acquiescence. Second, assassinations and reprisals divided the
military administration in Paris from superiors in Berlin. While Stlpnagel
Taylor, Between Resistance and Collaboration, pp. 612; Albert Ouzoulias, Les Bataillons de la
jeunesse (Paris: Editions sociales, 1967); Courtois et al., Le Sang de letranger, pp. 1234; Oury, Rue
du Roi-Albert, pp. 615.
Ouzoulias, Les Fils de la Nuit, pp. 177185; Nogueres, Histoire de la Resistance en France,
vol. II, pp. 147152.
135
after the fall
136
the end of ambiguity
BAMA, RW 35/542/4849.
Elisabeth Wagner (ed.), Der Generalquartiermeister: Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des
Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres (Mnchen and Wien: Gnter Olzog Verlag, 1963), pp. 208211.
137
after the fall
hostages be executed on 23 October unless the men who killed Hotz were
brought to justice. Hitler casually shifted blame from British agents to
communist youths, demanded immediate reprisals without regard for the
actual perpetrators, and used assassinations to justify the execution of Jews
and communists.
Major Crome, the MBFs chief intelligence ofcer, ordered Captain
Schrader, the head of military intelligence for the southwest region,
to prepare a list of hostages. After consulting with the local military
administration in Nantes, the SD in Rennes, and the Abwehr in Brest,
Schrader worked throughout the night of 20/21 October to assemble a
tally. He placed anti-German militants, enemies of French civilization,
and other convicts from the Nantes area at the top of his roster, but
this approach yielded only sixty-eight names. Since he could not nd
100 people who had been convicted by local German courts, Schrader
searched for another source of hostages. He found his answer in the town
of Chateaubriant (Loire-Inferieur), where the military government oversaw
a French prison that was lled with communists who had been arrested by
the Vichy government. Although many of the prisoners had played a role
in the PCF before World War Two, others, like 17-year-old Guy Moquet,
had been imprisoned simply because his father had been a communist
deputy. To ll his quota, Schrader selected another thirty-two prisoners
who were somehow connected to the outlawed PCF.
Under considerable pressure from superiors in Paris and Berlin, Captain
Schrader selected 100 hostages in 10 hours. In theory, he should have
prepared an index of potential hostages according to instructions issued
by the MBF in September, but the captain had not taken the MBFs
September directive seriously and had to work all night to assemble the
requisite list. Apparently Schrader had either not read or disregarded
Keitels 16 September order about Communist Insurrections in Occupied
Areas that recommended that 50 or 100 hostages be executed for each
German soldier killed by partisans. He later claimed that nobody could
be prepared for a list of 100. On the morning of 21 October, Schrader
sent his inventory of 100 names to Kriegesverwaltungschef Dr. Medicus,
138
the end of ambiguity
139
after the fall
USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711716.
Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister, p. 211; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/5052; BAMA,
RW 35/542/6369.
Elke Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels (Mnchen: K. G. Sauer, 1996), vol. II,
part 2, pp. 160, 168, entries dated 23 and 24 October 1941.
140
the end of ambiguity
141
after the fall
When communicating with the MBF, the marshal used conciliatory lan-
guage to construct pragmatic arguments against mass reprisals. Speaking
with Hitler, Petain adopted a subservient tone, laced his messages with
attery, and did not even dare to mention the hostage executions. Perhaps
because he feared Hitler more than French public opinion, Petain explicitly
condemned assassinations when addressing compatriots over the radio.
Petain and Darlan began to lobby the German government immediately
after the Nantes assassination on 20 October, but they failed to stop the
execution of either the rst Nantes or Bordeaux contingents on 22 and
24 October respectively. On 24 October, Vichys Minister of the Interior,
USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/768.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 6734. The noble gesture that Petain referred to alludes to
the return of the body of Napoleon Is son, the Duke of Reichstadt, in December 1940.
BAMA, RW 35/308/158159.
Jean-Claude Barbas (ed.), Discours aux Francais, 17 juin 194010 aot 1944 (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1989), pp. 203204.
142
the end of ambiguity
BAMA, RW 35/46/82.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1588/folder 01/14; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 6825; USNA,
RG 242/T-120/685/25918788; Nogueres, Histoire de la Resistance en France, vol. 2, pp. 1535.
Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 2433.
143
after the fall
would create a constitutional problem for the Vichy regime and have
incalculable political consequences. Darlan and Pucheu appealed to the
marshals sense of duty, scotched the plan, and saved Germany from having
to reject the offer. Even though they opposed Petains scheme, Darlan
and Pucheu tried to use it to extract concessions from the MBF. During
an afternoon meeting with Benoist-Mechin and Stlpnagel, Pucheu told
the MBF that Petain might still offer himself as a hostage unless Germany
declined to execute the second contingents of hostages for the Nantes and
Bordeaux attacks. Vichys Interior Minister observed that Petains initiative
could conrm the impracticability of collaboration and transform Franco-
German relations. Stlpnagel took their threats seriously and immediately
telegraphed a summary of the 24 October meeting to Berlin.
As General von Stlpnagel had predicted, draconian reprisals damaged
Germanys reputation. Diplomats from several south and central Amer-
ican countries supported Vichys request for leniency. In a t of pique,
Ribbentrop ignored their complaints and refused to speak with those
who questioned Hitlers methods. The President of the United States,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, condemned hostage executions in sweeping terms:
The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated
attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world
already inured to suffering and brutality. Civilized peoples long ago adopted the
basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed of another. Unable
to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks the Nazis characteristically
slaughter fty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would collaborate with
Hitler or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning . . . These are the
acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win.
BAMA, RW 35/542/6769; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 6845; Aron, The Vichy Regime,
pp. 4589.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/10961098.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711716; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, p. 277.
FDR on the Execution of Hostages by the Nazis in Department of State Bulletin,
25 October 1941. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411025a.html Checked 12 March 2008.
Mr. Churchill on a Foretaste , The Times, 27 October 1941, p. 4.
144
the end of ambiguity
Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, pp. 305315; Roussel, Charles de Gaulle, pp. 2439.
Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. I (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 1223.
Charles De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 2624; Lacouture,
De Gaulle: The Rebel, pp. 369378.
145
after the fall
USNA, T-77/1588/folder 001/910; DGFP, ser D., vol. XIII, pp. 6845; BAMA, RW
35/542/69; BAMA, RW 35/308/149150; Hans Luther, Der franzosische Widerstand gegen die
deutsche Besatzungsmacht und seine Bekampfung (Tbingen: Institut fr Bestazungsfragen, 1957),
pp. 202213.
Oury, Rue du Roi-Albert, pp. 98, 99, 102; Gildea, Marianne in Chains, pp. 2434, 250,
2568.
146
the end of ambiguity
German reprisals, but he added that the basis of ofcial French support
varied dramatically.
Abetz also discounted Petains offer to serve as a hostage. He described
the marshals proposal as the result of cabinet intrigue engineered by the
chief of the marshals civil cabinet, Moulin de Labarthete. According to
Abetz, the latter tried to get rid of Petain just as he successfully ousted Laval
on 13 December 1940. If imprisoned as a hostage, Petain could not dismiss
General Weygand, the Commissioner of French colonial possessions in
North Africa who allegedly favored the Allies. Aside from Darlan and
Pucheu, the German ambassador had little condence in the people around
Marshal Petain. The Paris embassy casually dismissed Petains offer to serve
as a hostage and discounted concerns raised by the military administration.
Furthermore, Abetz suggested that German reprisals had a salutary effect
on French policemen. Although he had no ofcial contact with police
ofcials, the ambassador claimed that French policemen had not fully
cooperated with German authorities during previous investigations. Like
most of the public, Vichy policemen were alarmed by the executions
and would now do all that is humanly possible . . . to avoid further
executions. In the ambassadors opinion, draconian reprisals improved
Franco-German collaboration. In this respect, the ambassadors observations
matched Hitlers expectations.
Playing both sides of the eld, the ambassador described public opinion
as markedly different from ofcial attitudes:
[T]he attitude of the French population does not provide any prerequisite for these
assassinations of members of the Wehrmacht; indeed, in recent weeks there has
been a noticeable improvement among the masses in the attitude toward Germany
. . . The French public is uniform in condemning the murders and the treacherous
manner of their execution. If the remaining 100 hostages are executed, however,
there exists the danger that the indignation of the people about the assassinations
will be transformed into indignation at the reprisals which are disproportionately
high according to local opinion.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 6825. DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 730732.
DGFP, ser. D, vol XIII, p. 684. DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, p. 685.
147
after the fall
that had already been carried out but advised his superiors to spare the
remaining hostages. In other words, the ambassador fecklessly straddled the
fence.
While sections of his 25 October report were ambiguous, Abetz did not
miss a chance to attack the military administration. He told his superiors in
Berlin that
I have personally expressed the view to the military authorities that the reprisals
ordered were entirely appropriate if the situation reports on France sent to the
Fhrers Headquarters by almost all the German ofcers in Paris, in contrast to those
of the Embassy for the past year and a half, were true, that is, if the overwhelming
majority of the population were actually de Gaullist and anti-German.
The MBF had made no such claims. A situation report sent to Berlin
for the months of August and September 1941 characterized the French
position as attentiste. According to the military administration, French
public opinion followed the lead of the Vichy regime and adopted a
wait-and-see stance toward Germany in the fall of 1941. The vast majority
of Frenchmen condemned resistance assassinations and German reprisals.
From the perspective of the military administration in the Hotel Majestic,
only a small minority of Frenchmen favored de Gaulle or supported
resistance activity.
The ambassador described the Vichy regime as a small group of sincere
collaborators who were surrounded by a large number of anti-German
conspirators. Abetz distorted the views of the military administration and
condemned the MBFs response to the Nantes and Bordeaux assassinations
in an attempt to gain an advantage within the German hierarchy. He implied
the military administration did not really understand French politics and
suggested that the Paris embassy could better manage the selection of
French hostages. However, even the ambassadors tortured prose could not
obscure the fact that both the Paris embassy and the military administration
needed to limit bloody German reprisals. By 7 December, the Paris embassy
had stopped attacking the MBF for the way that he had handled reprisals.
In a telex on 7 December to the Foreign Ofce in Berlin, Abetz asked his
superiors to support General von Stlpnagels request for a free hand so
that the MBF could respond to resistance activity on a case-by-case basis.
148
the end of ambiguity
The ambassador nally recognized that a hard and fast policy of draconian
reprisals could not benet the German embassy in Paris or its French
clients.
In addition to pressure from Vichy and Ambassador Abetz, the MBF also
had to contend with Joseph Goebbels. The Propaganda Minister believed
that the MBF did not understand Clausewitzs description of war as an
extension of politics and described General von Stlpnagel as politically
nave. He lobbied OKW to impose harsh reprisals and confessed a desire
to control German policy in Belgium, Holland, and occupied France.
Goebbels interpreted the Moser assassination as a simple test of German
authority. If the military administration imposed harsh reprisals at the
rst sign of resistance, he thought Germanys opponents would quickly
acquiesce.
(W)hat prevents us from arresting about three hundred leading communists,
publishing a list of those prisoners, and explaining that, after each new assassination,
fteen communist leaders at the top of the list will be executed? The communists
would protect themselves and prevent further stupid youthful pranks. But our
military commanders in western Europe follow an exact scheme. Nothing gets
through to them. They only appeal to force, and not very cleverly or with great
intelligence.
149
after the fall
The Fhrer thought that even the most doubtful cases of sabotage and
assassination should be answered with draconian punishments, but he
did not mention specic numbers. Goebbels may have concluded that
his suggestion of 10 to 15 reprisal executions matched Hitlers concept of
draconian. The two also discussed the replacement of General von Falken-
hausen, the military commander Belgium, with a civilian commissioner,
but Hitler postponed a nal decision. Three weeks later, the Minister
of Propaganda told the MBF that he still opposed mass shootings and
simply wanted to institute timely and psychologically appropriate punish-
ments. With Hitlers apparent support, Stlpnagels apparent obedience,
and decreasing resistance activity, Goebbels had reason to feel optimistic.
Assassinations in Nantes and Bordeaux dispelled any false condence and,
along with German reprisals, may have caught the Minister of Propaganda
off guard. At rst, Goebbels attributed the MBFs harsh response to
inuence exerted by his ministry. Since the MBF had failed to nip
resistance in the bud after the Moser and Hoffmann attacks in August and
September, Goebbels thought that the MBF had no choice but to execute
fty hostages in October. In Paris, the Ministry of Propaganda spread
rumors that the attacks had been carried out by English spies even though it
had no evidence to support this claim. Three days after the Nantes attack,
Stlpnagel told General Wagner that he had consulted with Goebbels and
claimed that the latter also opposed mass shootings. Unfortunately for
General von Stlpnagel, the Propaganda Minsters support proved to be
ephemeral.
Before the Nantes assassination, Goebbels had argued that the execution
of ten or fteen hostages would be an appropriate response for each
attack on a German soldier. Immediately after Nantes, Goebbels shifted
his position to accommodate Hitlers demand for draconian reprisals. In a
diary entry dated 24 October, he argued that an act of mercy would make
the Reich look soft and encourage resistance activity. When Hitler rst
postponed and later suspended the execution of the second Nantes and
Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 1, p. 485; vol. II, part 2,
p. 130. Entries dated 24 September and 17 October 1941.
Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, pp. 144, 160, 168, entries
dated 20, 23 and 24 October 1941.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711712.
Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, pp. 168, 175, entries dated
24 and 25 October 1941.
150
the end of ambiguity
Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, pp. 180, 201, entries dated
26 and 29 October 1941.
Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, p. 217, entry dated
1 November 1941.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/382393.
151
after the fall
the head of the Reich Chancellery, began to push for the recall of
Generals von Falkenhausen and von Stlpnagel. They urged Hitler to
replace military governments with civil governments under the control of
Nazi party loyalists. In a gurative sense, the groupes de brlots provided
Goebbels with an opportunity to expand his inuence and wounded both
Falkenhausen and Stlpnagel.
In addition to complaints from Abetz, Goebbels, and Hitler, Stlpnagel
had to contend with internal dissent. The MBFs headquarters included
an administration staff (Verwaltungsstab) and command staff (Kommandostab)
manned by regular army ofcers. The latter collected intelligence, main-
tained public order, and guarded against invasion. It played a subordinate
role in everyday affairs but had almost unlimited power in an emergency.
Consisting of civilian ofcials with temporary rank, limited authority, and a
unique uniform, the military administration staff oversaw the French econ-
omy and supervised the French government. The head of the government
subsection (Verwaltungsstab Abteilung Verwaltung), Werner Best, accused
the command staff (Kommandostab) of unilaterally selecting hostages and
implied that they had made poor choices. He tried to seize control of
Militrbefehlshaber in Frankreich
General Otto von Stlpnagel
Ic des MBF
Major Crome
USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/392; Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebcher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II,
part 2, p. 285, entry dated 14 November 1941; DGFP, ser. D vol. XII, pp. 6723.
152
the end of ambiguity
German reprisal policy and aggravated latent divisions within the MBFs
command.
According to orders issued by the MBF on 26 March and 28 September
1941, members of the command staff were supposed to consult counterparts
on the military administration when they designed and implemented
German reprisals. As soon as they learned of the Nantes assassination,
members of the regional (Bezirk) command staff drove to Nantes and, in
conjunction with local command staff and military administration ofcials
(Feldkommandant), began to select hostages. The regional ofce of the
153
after the fall
154
the end of ambiguity
complaining that he had been excluded from the hostage process weeks
after the fact, Best alienated regular military ofcers who had initially
overlooked his SS background. Far from being the eminence grise behind
German reprisal policy, Werner Best stood on uncertain ground within the
military administration.
Given time, the MBF might have been able to resolve disagreements
within his own ofce and shore up relations with Hitler, Goebbels, Keitel,
and Wagner in Berlin, but communist resistance groups did not relent.
Acting under the direction of Albert Ouzoulias, groupes de brlots launched
another series of attacks in Paris. On 21 November, partisans bombed
a book store that sold National Socialist literature and had connections
with the German embassy. One week later, guerrillas lobbed two grenades
into the bar of the Hotel du Midi and killed three German soldiers.
In light of General von Stlpnagels general policy of gradually increasing
reprisals, Hitlers consistent demand for hostage executions, and Nantes and
Bordeaux precedents, the bombings should have provoked an immediate,
deadly reaction.
Pressure from Berlin once again forced the MBF to temper his response.
On 18 November, Goring arranged a meeting with Petain at Saint Flo-
rentin. The two marshals planned to discuss pressing military and political
issues, and both sides wanted the negotiations to proceed without a hitch.
Goring needed French support to expedite the ow of supplies to the
German Africa Corps, and Petain wanted to win the release of French
prisoners of war and ameliorate German economic demands. To ensure
that negotiations did not get sidetracked, Goring asked the MBF to suspend
hostage executions until 10 December. Once talks began on 1 Decem-
ber, Petain asked for economic, political, and military concessions that
would substantiate benevolent intentions voiced by Hitler at Montoire.
Goring immediately rejected Petains proposals, condemned French impu-
dence, repeated Hitlers favorite list of French transgressions, and demanded
immediate, unreserved collaboration. To make matters worse, the Reichs-
marschall skipped a dinner hosted by the Paris embassy, organized his own
party at the Aero-Club, and scrupulously avoided French ofcials after
155
after the fall
business hours. Like the Protocols of Paris, the Saint Florentin talks col-
lapsed because each side refused to grant concessions before rst receiving
concessions from the other.
While the Saint Florentin negotiations continued, the MBF levied
nes, imposed curfews, and threatened dire reprisals. Limitations imposed
by Berlin undermined General von Stlpnagels efforts to follow a con-
sistent policy, but they gave policemen time to investigate attacks and
identify suspects. Subsequent inquiries failed to identify perpetrators of
the 28 November hotel bombing that killed three German soldiers, and
Stlpnagel asked Berlin for permission to shoot 50 hostages, ne Parisian
Jews, and deport an additional 1,000 Jews and criminals with Jewish con-
nections on 1 Decemberthe same day that Goring met Petain at Saint
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 930934, 914927; Jacques Benoist-Mechin, De la Defaite au
desastre, vol. I (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), pp. 317327.
156
the end of ambiguity
The Nacht und Nebel Erlass once again directed senior military commanders
and military courts to punish espionage, sabotage, communist activity,
and other serious crimes with death; in that respect it contained nothing
new. However, it also allowed military commanders and their subordinate
courts-martial to send prisoners to the Reich and decreed that the entire
process, as well as the ultimate fate of the accused, would remain secret.
Keitels covering letter explained that deportation was equivalent to a
death sentence. Because prisoners would be handed over to the SD for
deportation, the directive also created a new task for the SD, and this, in
157
after the fall
USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/407416.
Kershaw, Hitler, 19361945: Nemesis, pp. 492, 965 note 156.
BAMA, RW 35/708/4; BALW, NS 19/2774/che 1/1; Christian Gerlach, Die Wannsee-
Konferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grundsatzentscheidung, alle
Juden Europas zu ermorden, Werkstattgeschichte, 18 (1997), pp. 744, especially 22; BAMA, RW
35/542/7882.
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 318.
158
the end of ambiguity
USNA, RG 242/143/1238; BAMA, RW 35/542/83. The former spells the victims name
Winiger, the latter Winkler.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/12401241; USNA, RG 242/T-78/32/706154; USNA, RG
242/T-501/196/1141.
159
after the fall
USNA, RG 242/T-78/32/706178.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/11381144.
Stlpnagels use of the term work duty (Arbeitsmassig) suggests that the MBF may have
conveniently forgotten the lethal nature of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, which Keitel explicitly
described in his cover letter to Hitlers order.
160
the end of ambiguity
Without mincing any words, General Otto von Stlpnagel rejected Hitlers
anti-partisan policy and drew a line in the sand.
Subordinates on the command staff and military administration backed
up General von Stlpnagel. In its report to Berlin, sent once every
two months, the military administration claimed that the Frenchmen
passionately opposed hostage executions. In conjunction with food and
fuel shortages, German reprisals undermined support for collaboration and
threatened to turn the local population against Nazi Germany. The military
administration also minimized the threat posed by resistance activity and
noted a decrease in the incidence of sabotage and assassination. As usual,
the political section of the report concluded that [a]t the present time,
internal security is not threatened.
Colonel Hans Speidel, the head of the command staff, went one step
further than his civilian colleagues in the military administration. He
characterized German policy as punishment without reward and argued
for concessions to complement German reprisals. Going into further detail,
Speidel observed that some other dramatic step like the start of Franco-
German peace negotiations might induce the Vichy regime and the French
161
after the fall
162
the end of ambiguity
After consulting with Hitler and his staff, Keitel ordered General Wagner
to reply to Stlpnagels demarche on 2 February 1942:
Field Marshal Keitel does not reject the (MBFs) proposal for exclusive and
nal control over reprisals for assassinations and bombing attacks, so long as
the proposed reprisals agree in type and scope with the Fhrers basic attitude.
Attacks and bombings reported since 15 January that have not been solved must
be answered with sharp deterrents including the execution of a large number of
imprisoned communists, Jews, or people who carried out previous attacks, and the
arrest of at least 1,000 Jews or communist for later evacuation. Field Marshal Keitel
expects a corresponding instruction for submission to the Fhrer.
163
after the fall
foresaw his place in history and refused to carry out orders that disagreed
with his conscience. In the nal paragraphs of his ofcial resignation to
OKW, Stlpnagel complained that
without this trust and freedom of action, the position of the MBF in the
occupied area becomes more difcult, leads to weighty conicts of conscience, and
undermines my energy, self-condence, and determination . . . I can withdraw
to private life with clear conscience, condent in the knowledge that I served
my people, country, and opponents with complete unselshness and fullled my
duties to the best of my ability.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/433440.
164
the end of ambiguity
165
after the fall
166
the end of ambiguity
167
7
Transitions
During the nal months of 1941, political and military elites in Berlin
compelled the MBF to follow a reprisal policy that liquidated Jews and
terrorized opponents. After a protracted but futile struggle against Polish
methods, Otto von Stlpnagel retired with his wife in Berlin. In his stead,
OKW appointed General Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel, Ottos amiable
cousin, to serve as the next Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich. The new MBF
assumed command on 16 February 1942, revised German reprisal policy,
and began to reshape the military administration. Like his predecessor,
Carl-Heinrich rejected the methods and goals of the Nazi regime, but he
expressed his opposition in a very different fashion. Rather than denouncing
ideological directives, the new MBF simply followed orders while plotting
against the Nazi regime.
While Carl-Heinrich remained in charge, the military administration
used creative accounting methods to reduce the number of hostage
executions but carried out Hitlers basic policy without complaint. Despite
the conciliatory tone of the new MBF and a continued decline in the
incidence of sabotage, espionage, and murder, Hitler installed a Senior SS
and Police Leader (Hoherer SS- und Polizeifhrer or HSSuPF) in France. On
1 June 1942, Carl Oberg took over German and French police forces in
occupied France. The SS nally won autonomy and executive authority
or the right to make arrests and seize property.
The new HSSuPF assumed control of the military administrations police
records and card-les, along with a large portion of its police ofcers and
transitions
169
after the fall
von Stlpnagel, advised Generals von Seeckt and Schleicher during the
1920s and may have helped Carl-Heinrich survive personnel cutbacks
mandated by the Versailles Treaty. After the war, Stlpnagel helped
organize the Black Reichswehr in Silesia and the Ruhr before commanding
small infantry units and holding a range of staff positions. As he slowly
ascended the ranks, Carl-Heinrich met and impressed future leaders of
the Wehrmacht, including Fedor von Bock, Walter von Brauchitsch,
Ferdinand von Bredow, Ludwig Beck, Erwin Rommel, and Walther von
Reichenau. Just before the Nazi seizure of power, he attained the rank of
colonel and took charge of the general staff section that studied Germanys
western neighbors.
According to his son Joachim, murders carried out during the Rohm
purge turned Carl-Heinrich against the Nazi regime, but he continued
to enjoy the privileges of a rising ofcer. Foreign policy goals that Hitler
articulated in a staff conference on 5 November 1937 and that Colonel
Hobach recorded in his famous memorandum troubled Stlpnagel, but
promotions and foreign policy successes like the 1938 Munich Agreement
mufed serious opposition inside OKW and OKH. When war nally
broke out in September 1939, Major-General von Stlpnagel worked as the
deputy chief of the Army General Staff for operations (Oberquartiermeister I)
and served as Brauchitschs direct subordinate. After the end of the Polish
campaign, he visited the major eld commands on Germanys western
border and tried to stir up opposition against the Nazi regime while
planning logistical support for the invasion of France. In the winter of
1939/1940, Stlpnagel completed his logistical plan and directed a series of
crucial map exercises that tested Mansteins variant of Fall Gelb. Frustrated
by his inability to organize resistance to Hitlers plans and drained by ofcial
F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918 to 1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
Joachim le rouge von Stlpnagel (because of his support for a citizens army) should not
be confused with either Otto der Schwarze von Stlpnagel (for his staunch conservatism)
or Carl-Heinrich der blonde von Stulpnagel (because of his reddish blonde hair). Bargatzky,
Hotel Majestic, pp. 524; Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitlers High Command (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 2000), pp. 1415.
Heinrich Bcheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel: SoldatPhilosophVerschworer (Berlin:
Verlag Ullstein, 1989), pp. 3045, 7087, 94118. An abbreviated history of the entire
Stlpnagel family can be found in BAMA, N 5/26/142.
Bcheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel, pp. 128135, 137158; Mller, Das Heer und Hitler,
pp. 210, 232.
Umbreit, The battle for hegemony in western Europe, pp. 2358.
170
transitions
171
after the fall
for unexceptional military skills. Personal charm and a reputation for being
a timid leader suggested that Carl-Heinrich would not cause trouble and
may have helped him secure his post.
In order to keep his position as Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich, Carl-
Heinrich would need all of his diplomatic skills and a measure of luck.
Before he assumed command on 16 February 1942, Carl-Heinrich spoke
to his cousin Otto, and he certainly understood the situation that he
would have to master. Personnel reductions forced the MBF to rely on
the cooperation of the Vichy government. On the other hand, Hitler did
not withdraw his demand for staunch reprisals that upset the Vichy regime.
However, the new MBF also had several factors working in his favor.
First, the 19411942 Soviet winter offensive distracted Hitler. If OKW
and the Fhrer did not hear about a particular attack, they could not order
draconian reprisals. Second, Pierre Lavals return as Prime Minister of the
Vichy regime on 26 April 1942 heralded a compliant French government
that would negotiate but not impede Nazi Germany. Finally, the incidence
of sabotage, espionage, and murder continued to decrease in the rst ve
months of 1942. When he became MBF, Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel
faced a difcult but not hopeless situation.
Resistance groups tested Carl-Heinrich a mere week after he became
the MBF. In broad daylight, the Leon Lioust group of the bataillons de
la jeunesse threw a grenade at a group of German soldiers who were
marching across la place de lArsenal in Le Havre on 23 February 1942.
After consulting with naval authorities, the MBF proposed the immediate
execution of ve hostages because up to now, French authorities and the
population of Le Havre have worked together with Germany awlessly.
The German navy supported a muted response because draconian reprisals
might alienate French workers who serviced German U-boats in Atlantic
ports. Despite agreement between the MBF and navy, Hitler rejected the
mild reprisals that had been proposed by Carl-Heinrich and ordered the
execution of thirty hostages. The Fhrer dismissed fears that his sanctions
would alienate French workers because they targeted separate, alien people:
Jews. In Hitlers opinion, regular French workers would not identify with
or protest against the death of foreigners.
BAMA, N 5/24/142; Bargatzsky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 525, and Ernst Jnger, Strahlungen
(Tbingen: Heliopolis, 1955), pp. 812, 89, 108110, 119120.
BAMA, RW 35/542/9091; Nogueres, Histoire de la Resistance en France, vol. II, p. 354.
172
transitions
173
after the fall
nor OKW were paying attention, the MBF could declare the French to be
properly chastened and pardon the second hostage contingent.
Both Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel also disqualied a number
of hostages on technical grounds shortly before they were scheduled to face
a ring squad. After the Nantes reprisals, Werner Best, German diplomats,
and British propaganda all criticized the military administration for placing
a disabled World War One veteran on the hostage list. German military
courts did not hesitate to condemn any suspected criminals or their associates
to death, but Hitler encouraged subordinates to commute the sentences of
women and children to life in a German prison for propaganda reasons.
After the Nantes reprisals, Otto von Stlpnagel issued new guidelines that
disqualied women, children under the age of 18, and disabled or blind
veterans from hostage lists. Carl-Heinrich also used technical reasons
to spare twenty-three lives in eight of the eighteen reprisal cases that he
adjudicated as the chief legal military authority in France.
While they used a variety of stratagems to reduce the number of hostage
executions, both Otto and Carl-Heinrich authorized the deportation of
substantial numbers of Jews and communists. Acting on orders from
Berlin, Otto von Stlpnagel deported 1,500 Jews and communists in
December 1941. His cousin sent another 3,600 Jews and communists to
the east in response to eight different incidents. In 1942, 43 transports
carried 41,951 Jews and communists to death camps in eastern Europe.
Deportations ordered by the MBF5,100 in alllled the rst ve trains
to Auschwitz. Both Otto and Carl Heinrich von Stlpnagel played a part
in the Final Solution.
Most leading gures within the military administration understood the
deadly consequences of deportation. In his letter of resignation, Otto von
Stlpnagel questioned the wisdom of sending young Jews and communists
to the east for work duty (Arbeitsmassig) because he feared that prisoners
might escape and create security problems. He could only maintain this
USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/400.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1634/nfn (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, 14 n 16 WR
(I/3)/351/41 g; Berlin den 8.5.41). Hitlers restraint was limited to western Europe; see BALW,
NS 19/2175/12.
BAMA, RW 35/308/3034, 46.
BAMA, RW 35/542/7382, 9495, 100104, 106109, 111114, 116117.
Serge Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz: Le Role de Vichy dans la solution nale de la question juive en
France1942 (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 41.
174
transitions
175
after the fall
some connection to the PCF, many were associated with the bataillons de la
jeunesse, and some had committed multiple acts of resistance. The capture,
trial, and execution of militant communists during the rst half of 1942
retarded some of the most dynamic resistance groups.
German authorities used trials to demonstrate that foreigners and Jews
stood behind most resistance activity, and the facts of all three cases
supported their contention. The German interpretation failed to resonate
with the bulk of the French public because the brief duration of all
three trials obscured evidence that supported Germanys interpretation
of events. Cameramen lmed the proceedings and newspapers carried
detailed accounts of all three cases. The MBFs propaganda division never
released footage of the proceedings, and the verdicts only encouraged Jews,
particularly those from Eastern Europe, to resist Nazi Germany because they
176
transitions
had nothing to lose. In the short run, the military administration eliminated
several important resistance leaders and validated Otto von Stlpnagels
orthodox anti-partisan policy. From a longer-term perspective, German
political leaders ultimately mishandled the proceedings. Abbreviated judicial
proceedings appeared unconvincing and German reprisals seemed brutal
and unjustied. Trials were a tactical victory but, at the same time, a
strategic defeat.
Statistical evidence collected by branches of the military administra-
tion continued to suggest a drop in serious resistance activity. While
Carl-Heinrich remained in charge of security, the incidence of mur-
der, espionage, sabotage, and illegal possession of a rearm continued to
decline. Some of the dips may be linked to a decrease in the number
of German policemen. As German forces became bogged down on the
eastern front, the MBF had to dispatch elements of the military administra-
tionincluding GFP ofcersto the eastern front. German police forces
stationed in France never surpassed 3,000 men and were dwarfed by 47,000
Frenchmen in the Gendarmerie alone. German policemen only accounted
for a fraction of the law enforcement community in France.
French police ofcers worked well with their German counterparts and,
according to the MBF, provided invaluable assistance. The capture and
execution of a few extraordinarily active militants probably also played an
important part in reducing the overall incidence of serious resistance activity
in 1942. Until labor deportations stirred up additional unrest, the ranks
of major resistance groups would remain depleted. While Carl-Heinrich
remained in charge of German police forces, resistance activity did not
seriously impair the German army or the Nazi regime.
Although he carried out orders without complaint and enjoyed some suc-
cess, Stlpnagel lost control of German police forces on 1 June 1942. Hitler
and Goebbels discussed the replacement of General von Falkenhausen, the
Jacques Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution: Communal Response and Internal
Conicts, 19401944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 165, 188195; Courtois et al.,
Le Sang de letranger, pp. 1258, 143170; Renee Poznaski, La Resistance juive en France, Revue
dhistoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale et des conits contemporains, 137 (January 1985), 332.
USNA, RG 242/T-120/3/396397; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/714; USNA, RG
242/T-501/157/744757; and USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/10451083.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/65, 7273, 185189; Bernd Kasten, Gute Franzosen. Die
franzosische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungsmacht im besetzten Frankreich 19401944 (Sigmaringen:
Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1993); Maurice Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy: les forces de lordre francaises au
service de la Gestapo, 1940/1944 (Paris: Le Cherche-Midi editeur, 1995), pp. 217261.
177
after the fall
Table 7.1 Arrests for serious resistance activity, October 1941May 1942
178
transitions
Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Antatomy
of the SS State, translated by Richard Barry, Marian Jackson, and Dorothy Long (New York:
Walker and Company, 1968), pp. 213214; Ruth Bettina Birn, Die Hoheren SS- und Polizeifuhrer:
Himmlers Vetreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten (Dsseldorf: Droste, 1986), pp 186206.
Birn, Die Hoheren SS und Polizeifhrer, pp. 206230, 238249; Christopher Browning,
Wehrmacht reprisal policy and the murder of the male Jews in Serbia in Christopher Browning,
Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New York: Homes & Meier, 1985),
pp. 3956; Walter Manoschek, The extermination of the Jews in Serbia, in Ulrich Herbert
(ed.), National Socialist Extermination Policies, pp. 163185.
179
after the fall
USNA, RG 242/T-501/172/482484; Birn, Die Hoheren SS- und Polizeifhrer, pp. 18, 23,
106112.
Birn, Die Hoheren SS und Polizeifhrer, p. 250; BAMA, RW 5/690/3943, 4648; BAK,
All. Proz. 21/Proces Oberg-Knochen/20; USNA, RG 242/T-175/140/26683402668345.
BAMA, RW 5/690/2123; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1513/635639.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1513/555569; BAMA, RW 5/690/5867, 7780.
180
transitions
Birn, Die Hoheren SS- und Polizeifuhrer, p. 341; USNA, RG 153/144 (War Crimes
Branch)/Box 5/Folder 100197/nfn (Obergs P.I.R. le); Ulrich Lappenkper, Der Schlachter
von Paris: Carl-Albrecht Oberg als Hoherer SS- und Polizeifhrer in Frankreich 19421944,
in Stefan Martens and Maurice Vasse (eds.), Frankreich und Deutschland im Krieg (Novem-
ber 1942Herbst 1944): Okkupation, Kollaboration, Resistance (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2000),
pp. 129143.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/5356.
181
after the fall
182
transitions
organize the local population into guard detachments that would protect
lines of communication and patrol the border between unoccupied France
and Francos Spain. Both Oberg and Stlpnagel expected the military
administration and SS to work together with regard to mundane security
matters, but the SS retained exclusive control of the French police and
oversaw major investigations. The HSSuPF realized that he did not have
the resources to fulll all of his missions on his own, and gradually ceded
control of minor security concerns back to the military administration.
To further extend his authority and overcome personnel shortages,
Oberg tried to issue orders directly to GFP and Abwehr units that were
already assigned to the military administration. Admiral Canaris, the man
ultimately in charge of the Abwehr and GFP, refused to place military per-
sonnel under SS jurisdiction. From his ofce in Berlin, Canaris effectively
blocked Obergs incursion and avoided a precedent that could endanger the
independence of the entire Wehrmacht. Keitel supported Canariss general
strategy but did not dare to agrantly oppose Himmler. He eventually
negotiated an agreement with the SS that disbanded most GFP groups in
France. The SS, in turn, immediately drafted the demobilized members of
the GFP into the Black Corps. Younger agents were sent to the eastern
front while older policemen returned to France for service in the Sicherheit-
spolizei under the command of Helmut Knochen. Few escaped the clutches
of the SS.
General Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel and SS-Brigadefhrer Oberg
worked well together and forged a series of agreements that established the
respective tasks and responsibilities of the SS and military administration
before the HSSuPF formally assumed his post. During this delicate pro-
cess, neither referred a dispute to higher authorities in Berlin. After the
October 1941 synagogue bombings, Otto von Stlpnagel banned all SS
personnel from the Hotel Majestic. In contrast, Oberg frequently visited
Carl-Heinrich and coordinated policy with the military administration
whenever circumstances dictated. The two men had served in the same
USNA, RG 242/T-501/172/482484.
UNSA, RG 242/T-77/1634/folder 12/nfn (MBF VerwaltungsstabAbt. Verwaltung,
31Mai 1942, Az. V in 100/1/1400/42g.); BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/14.
BALW, R 58/861/che 2/5455; USNA, RG 338/Foreign Military Studies/Fiche
0027/FMS number C-029, The secret eld police by Wilhelm Kirchbaum; Klaus Gess-
ner, Geheime Feldpolizei (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1986),
pp. 659.
183
after the fall
regiment during World War One, and this common bond may have helped
them maintain cordial relations during the Occupation.
Hitlers 9 March 1942 directive allowed Oberg to issue instructions to
various branches of the French police forces, but the Fhrer did not dene
the precise relationship between the Vichy regime and the HSSuPF. In
order to clarify matters, Oberg won the right to negotiate directly with
Vichy. He did not have to work through the German embassy in Paris
or a military liaison ofcer. With an open channel to the very highest
echelons of the French government and almost unlimited power as the
head of German security forces in France, Oberg could play a decisive role
in Franco-German relations.
The Vichy government heard about Obergs appointment in April
1942. On 5 May, Reinhard Heydrich ew to Paris and introduced the
new HSSuPF to French ofcials. On the same day that they arrived, Oberg
and Heydrich spoke with Fernand de Brinon, Vichys representative in
Paris, and Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, the new Commissioner-General
for Jewish Affairs (Commissaire-general aux questions juives or CGQJ) in SS
ofces on lavenue Foch. Leaders of the military administration met Oberg
at a dinner held in the Ritz hotel that same night, and Rene Bousquet
discussed police business with the two senior SS ofcers the next morning:
6 May 1942. The meeting with Bousquet, who Laval had appointed the
Secretary-General of the Police (Secretariat-general a la Police) in the Ministry
of the Interior, lasted over two hours and explored how French and
German policemen would work together.
Hitlers 9 March 1942 order installing an HSSuPF in France allowed
Oberg to supervise and issue instructions to French authorities and police
forces. He is responsible for the employment of the French police in
the occupied zone. In other words, the Fhrer granted Oberg con-
trol of French police forces in occupied France. Since the Occupation
Wilhelm von Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, translated by R. T. Clark (New York:
Scribner and Sons, 1956), pp. 125, 143, 169; BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proces Oberg-Knochen/33, 35.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/folder 3/4548; USNA, RG 242/T-120/2398/E209343
E290347.
Corinna Franz, Fernand de Brinon und die deutschfranzoesischen Beziehungen, 19181945
(Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2000); Gilbert Joseph, Fernand de Brinon: LAristocrate de la collaboration
(Paris: Albin Michel, 2002); Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 283293.
Pascale Froment, Rene Bousquet (Paris: Stock, 1994), pp. 200204, 207213.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/5356.
184
transitions
Figure 7.2. Prime Minister Laval (left) and HSSuPF Oberg (centre), 1 May 1943.
Photograph courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H25719.
had begun in 1940, the Vichy regime consistently tried to preserve the
principle of French sovereignty by using French authorities to carry
out German policies. Both Laval and Admiral Darlan tried to reinforce
the precedent that French bureaucrats and the Vichy government ruled
France. By doing so, they hoped to block German penetration of the
French bureaucracy and prevent the gradual break-up of France. The
arrival of Oberg and his mandate to supervise French police endangered
Vichys control over its own police force and, by extension, French sove-
reignty.
Secretary-General Bousquet certainly understood the basic policy of the
Vichy government. During his meeting with Oberg and Heydrich on
6 May, Bousquet tried to persuade Himmlers lieutenants to stop reprisal
executions, preserve Vichys sovereignty, and get all German policemen to
work with French counterparts through ofcial channels. Like Laval, the
Secretary-General of French Police wanted to keep ultra-collaborationists
such as Marcel Deat out of the ofcial decision-making process and block
185
after the fall
Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 7071; Froment, Rene Bousquet, pp. 1623, 174188, 205.
BALW, R 19 (Ordnungspolizei)/97/55.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/455457; Luther, Der franzosische Widerstand, p. 214.
Froment, Rene Bousquet, pp. 205, 214217; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 6973.
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 209213; Obergs congratulations probably referred
to the Vel dHiv round-ups carried out by the French police in the middle of July. Bousquet and
Laval may have authorized the raids to demonstrate French reliability.
USNA, RG 242/T-120/2398/E209364E209367; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, p. 72.
186
transitions
specify the duties and responsibilities of the French police. He once again
offered to pursue anarchists, terrorists, and communists because all three
groups jeopardized order and endangered Germany. Bousquet volunteered
to hunt down Vichys opponents and did not mind collaborating with
German forces against common enemies, but he did not want to give the
HSSuPF a blank check to use the French police however he wished. In
Bousquets opinion, Franco-German collaboration should be limited to
civil matters revolving around the maintenance of order. He did not want
to get the French involved in purely military affairs that were the exclusive
domain of the HSSuPF.
Oberg unveiled his nal offer during a lunch meeting on 8 August
1942 in his private apartment on the boulevard Lannes. Before a small
group of prefects and senior police ofcials, the HSSuPF promised to issue
instructions through the French administration and preserve the illusion
of French sovereignty. He also agreed to leave the French police out of
the reprisal process and assured the assembled ofcials that people arrested
by them [the French police] would not be the object of reprisals ordered
by German authorities. In return, the French would have to cooperate in
the repression of the Reichs enemies and specically listed communists,
terrorists, and saboteurs. In the mind of every dedicated SS ofcer,
these latter three groups certainly included racial opponents of the Nazi
regime.
The French delegation retired to ofces on the rue de Monceau to review
the HSSuPFs offer. Unfamiliar with SS duplicity, Bousquet told colleagues
that the accord was a binding declaration that limited German demands
and French collaboration. He believed that the agreement allowed the
French considerable autonomy and stopped French participation in German
reprisals. After some discussion, the rest of the French delegation concurred.
Oberg viewed the accord in a rather different light. He later described the
ObergBousquet accords as an unsigned gentlemans agreement that
outlined Franco-German collaboration. Articles of the ObergBousquet
accord obliged French policemen to support and protect the German army
but placed few limits on the demands that Germany could make in return.
Exploiting Bousquets navete, Oberg expanded the scope of collaboration
187
after the fall
to include the deportation of Jews and pushed France further down the
slippery slope of collaboration.
Behind closed doors, Oberg outlined comparatively moderate security
policies to Secretary-General Bousquet and representatives of the Vichy
regime. In public, however, the new HSSuPF described a different course.
On 10 July, posters throughout Paris congratulated the majority of French-
men and women who continued to go about their daily business despite
assassinations, sabotage, and other provocations carried out by English and
Soviet agents. As a reward, Oberg guaranteed peace and quiet to the
populace. Toward this end, he announced a new policy of repression that
was aimed at the relatives of resistance ghters. If families did not turn in
relatives who had attacked the German army within ten days of the original
crime, the HSSuPF threatened to execute all siblings and cousins over 18
years of age. Female relatives would be deported to Germany for an unde-
termined sentence of forced labor, and children would be sent to reform
schools. While reprisals ordered by the MBF tried to target ideological
fellow-travelers and criminal associates, the HSSuPF embraced a policy of
blatant terror by striking at the family members of resistance ghters.
The German embassy in Paris did not oppose the method outlined in
Obergs 10 July announcement, and distributed versions of his policy to
the French press. It considered the people who stood behind sabotage and
assassinations to be ruthless and undeserving of mercy. Initial assassinations
carried out by resistance groups violated the laws of war and warranted Ger-
man reprisals. A diplomat attached to the embassy argued that destruction
of an insidious adversary must be the only principle guiding German coun-
termeasures. Both the embassy and the HSSuPF judged Allied protests that
were based on humanitarian phraseology to be the height of hypocrisy.
They considered Germany to be just as brutal as their Allied opponents,
but took solace in the honesty of the Reichs candor.
Two well-known attacks forced the HSSuPF to reconcile public threats
with private assurances made to Bousquet. On 5 August 1942, unknown
terrorists tossed hand grenades at a group of German airmen jogging
around a Parisian athletic eld. Goring and Hugo Sperrle, the local Luftwaffe
commander, immediately demanded sharp reprisals. Under considerable
Froment, Rene Bousquet, pp. 217221; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 713; Paxton, Vichy
France, pp. 1315; BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/407.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/465. USNA, RG 242/T-120/2398/E209360E209363.
188
transitions
189
after the fall
Between 1 June 1942 and the liberation of France in the fall of 1944, the
HSSuPF executed 254 hostages in response to 3 dramatic assassinations.
In contrast, Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel ordered the execution
of 471 hostages while they served as the MBF. Statistics suggest that
the HSSuPF followed a more moderate reprisal policy than his military
counterparts, but these numbers are deceptive: several factors belie alleged
SS moderation.
First, the MBF controlled all hostage executions, recorded the entire
hostage process, and publicized reprisals in order to teach Frenchmen
that resistance did not pay. Neither methodical nor exacting, the HSSuPF
allowed local and regional subordinates to carry out reprisals on their own
accord and preferred not to leave a paper trail. Oberg did not know about
all reprisal actions carried out by subordinates and did not report every
incident to superiors in Berlin. While the MBF used reprisals to impress the
folly of resistance upon the French public, the SS used hostage executions
to liquidate enemies. By design, the HSSuPF did not control, record, or
publicize hostage executions.
Second, the HSSuPF had more reprisal options than either of his
military counterparts. In addition to reprisal executions, the HSSuPF could
arrest hostages under the Nacht und Nebel Erlass and count the subsequent
deportations as equivalent to hostage executions. Keitel issued the Nacht
und Nebel Erlass on 7 December 1941 while Otto von Stlpnagel remained
in charge of the military administration, but the MBF could not take
advantage of the alternative policy. Transportation shortages aggravated by
the Soviet winter offensive and troop movements prevented the deportation
of substantial numbers of Frenchmen that would be necessary to satisfy
Hitler. Obergs arrival coincided with an improvement in the transportation
situation. The HSSuPF could substitute deportations for hostage executions,
but the former could be just as deadly as the latter and, when carried out
in accordance with Hitlers wishes, targeted the same people: Jews. During
For the third case, the assassination of Julius Ritter on 10 September 1943, see Luther,
Der franzosische Widerstand, pp. 219220 and Froment, Rene Bousquet, p. 415. For the total
number of hostage executions carried out by the HSSuPF, see Luther, Der franzosische Widerstand,
pp.269274; Umbreit, Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich 19401944, pp. 140146.
BAMA, RW 35/542/120.
Birn, Die Hoheren SS- und Polizeifhrur, pp. 913, 106131; IMT , vol. VI, pp. 3834.
Nogueres, Histoire de la Resistance en France, vols. 3 and 4 mention additional reprisal executions
that are not described by Luther, HSSuPF records, or military archives.
190
transitions
191
after the fall
that was bound to satisfy both Himmler and Hitler; they also provided a
fourth way to liquidate alleged terrorists away from the public eye.
Fifth, the Reichsfhrer-SS and his lieutenants did not have a zealous
rival driving them toward extreme measures. While the MBF remained
in charge of security and reprisals during the rst half of the Occupation,
SS critics in Paris and Nazis in Berlin condemned the MBFs moderation.
Who would dare accuse the head of the SS of being soft on enemies of
the Reich? Certainly not Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel or Wilhelm Keitel.
Like his military predecessors, Himmler depended upon support from the
French police and could not afford to shoot thousands of Frenchmen
after the death of a few German soldiers. Without a deadly political rival
standing over his shoulder, Oberg enjoyed more leeway than his military
predecessors.
Hitler specically ordered hostage executions in at least seven of the
thirty major sabotage and assassination cases that were handled by the
military administration. After the 5 August 1942 grenade attack, Himm-
lernot Hitlerordered Oberg to shoot ninety-three hostages. With the
trustworthy Reichsfhrer-SS in charge of sabotage countermeasures, Hitler
may not have felt compelled to monitor resistance activity or German
reprisals. The Fhrer allowed Himmler and the SS a degree of latitude that
would never have been awarded to an army ofcer. Himmler functioned as
a buffer between the HSSuPF and the Fhrer. Oberg further reduced the
need for executions by not reporting every incident of sabotage to superiors
in Berlin. If Hitler and Himmler did not know about a particular attack,
they could not order draconian reprisals.
After the liberation of France, the French government estimated that
29,660 Frenchmen had been shot as hostages during World War Two, but
the French government used an expansive denition of hostage (otage) and
included people shot by the regular army and SS units as Germany retreated
in the fall of 1944. Statistics compiled by the MBF and HSSuPF indicate
that German police forces executed about 725 French hostages, but German
data does not include thousands of prisoners deported under the Nacht und
BALW, R 58/642/19; Wllner, Die NS-Militarjustiz und das Elend der Geschichtsschreibung,
pp. 2989.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/10451083, especially p. 1070.
BAMA, RW 35/542/40120, particularly cases 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16, and 19; Birn, Die Hoheren
SS- und Polizeifhrer, p. 256; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 2824.
192
transitions
193
8
Defamation, discrimination,
and despoliation
Before 1942, the fortunes of war clearly favored the Axis powers on
the continent of Europe. German victories in Poland (September 1939),
Norway (April 1940), France (June 1940), Yugoslavia (April 1941), Greece
(April 1941), and Crete (May 1941) overshadowed the miracle at Dunkirk
and Britains successful defense of the skies over London. Winston Churchill
recognized Great Britains grim situation when he exclaimed that [w]ars
are not won by evacuations. The 22 June 1941 invasion of the Soviet
Union inaugurated another round of Axis triumphs. German soldiers
captured 324,000 Soviet troops around Minsk (9 July), 310,000 near
Smolensk (5 August), 665,000 in Kiev (26 September), and 663,000 in
Vyazma/Bryansk (10 October). Allied troops fared somewhat better in
North Africa. Italian forces occupied sections of northwestern Egypt
in September 1940, but Mussolinis success evaporated after British forces
liberated Egypt, captured 130,000 prisoners, and seized portions of Italian
Libya by February 1941. In conjunction with Italian troops, the newly
arrived German Africa Corps invaded Egypt during the spring and summer
of 1941, but Axis forces were themselves forced to retreat in January 1942.
Allied defensive stands in late 1941 marked the end of the beginning
of World War Twoa stage punctuated by dramatic Axis victories and
humiliating Allied retreatsand introduced a period during which both
sides experienced mixed results. Hitler responded to new conditions with
characteristic aggression. After learning about the 7 December 1941 Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fhrer rushed back to Berlin and declared war
on the United States because a great power does not allow itself to be
declared war upon; it declares war on others. Hitler could embark on a
policy of total war without fear of political repercussions because all of the
Great Powers had joined either the Axis or the Allied cause.
In response to the December 1941 Soviet counter-offensive, Hitler
red dozens of generals, reorganized the German chain of command,
and adopted new policies. During the height of the Soviet attack, both
eld commanders and Army High Command asked Hitler, the head of
Armed Forces High Command (OKW) since 1938, for permission to
retreat. Characterizing such requests as defeatist, the Fhrer replaced Gerd
von Rundstedt, Fedor von Bock, and other pessimistic generals with
reliable Nazis like Walther von Reichenau or opportunistic commanders
such as Hans Gnther von Kluge. Second, Hitler accepted Field Mar-
shal von Brauchitschs resignation on 19 December 1941 and assumed
direct control of Army High Command (OKH). The Fhrer replaced
doubters with obedient soldiers and concentrated power in his own
hands.
In addition to personnel changes, Hitler instituted new policies to deal
with changing circumstances. As German forces became bogged down on
the eastern front, the Fhrer ordered a ruthless crackdown on all resistance
activity. OKWs 16 September 1941 directive ordered military commanders
to answer sabotage and espionage with death. The 7 December 1941 Night
and Fog decree (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) meted out special treatment to
real and imagined partisans, Jews, and communists. Toward the end of
1942, Hitler instructed the army to offer no quarter to commandos, even
when unconventional soldiers qualied as lawful combatants according to
the laws of war. By 1945, OKW considered renouncing the Hague and
Geneva conventions so that Germany could ght without any sense of
Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II (New York: Cambridge, 1995),
pp. 194204. Ribbentrop uttered the quote, but it certainly reected Hitlers point of view.
Megargee, Inside Hitlers High Command, pp. 142169, 160161.
195
after the fall
196
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
Samuel W. Mitcham, Hitlers Legions: The German Army Order of Battle in World War II (New
York: Stein & Day, 1985), pp. 4946; Umbreit, Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich 19401944,
pp. 627, 97106.
Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 3357, 343361; USNA, RG 242/T-501/121/
441444.
197
after the fall
Figure 8.1. Local, district, and regional authorities in occupied France, 1944.
198
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
1 April 1933. Six days later, the regime barred Jews from select professions.
Decrees issued in the wake of the 1938 annexation of Austria added
despoliation and forcible emigration to the list of Jewish tribulations. A few
days after the Anschluss, Adolf Eichmann arrived in Vienna and created a
bureaucratic system to oblige Jewish emigration under the watchful eyes
of the SD. Promulgated on 14 June, the third Nuremberg Law dened
Jewish businesses and established a system of despoliation that amounted to
state-sponsored robbery. As the Nazi regime settled into power, German
Jews faced gradually increasing pressure from Nazi militants and, later, state
bureaucrats. After the 1940 Armistice, a similar process unfolded in the
Hexagon.
German institutions participated in the defamationdiscriminationde-
spoliation process with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The German embassy
in Paris dispersed virulent anti-Semitic propaganda in an attempt to dampen
anti-German sentiments and foster Franco-German reconciliation. The
military administration perceived Jews as a security threat and evicted
them from provinces along the English Channel. Under direct orders
from Berlin, the MBF also participated in the Aryanization (Arisierung)
or de-Judaicization (Entjudung) of the French economy. The Einsatzstab
Rosenberg considered the expropriation of Jewish art collections to be a
subset of economic Aryanization and began to steal paintings from wealthy
Jews in the fall of 1940. Following methods pioneered in eastern Europe, SS
ofcers created a council (Judenrat) to exploit the entire Jewish community.
In an attempt to satisfy latent anti-Semitic tendencies within French
society, the Vichy regime launched its own campaign against Jews which
followed a similar pattern of defamation, discrimination, and despoliation.
Acting on its own accord, the French government encouraged anti-Semitic
propaganda by rescinding the 1881 Marchandeau Law and passed the
Statut des Juifs which dened Jews and barred them from practicing select
professions. In conjunction with the German military administration, the
French government conscated Jewish businesses and Aryanized the French
economy. Admiral Francois Darlan established the General Commissariat
for Jewish Affairs (Commissariat-general aux questions juives or CGQJ) to
coordinate French anti-Semitic initiatives. French politicians, bureaucrats,
Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 19321945, translated by Ina Friedman
and Haya Galai (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 6067, 104108.
199
after the fall
200
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
Vichy regime defamed and discriminated against Jews of its own accord.
Anti-Semitism and economic nationalism later encouraged the regime to
participate in Germanys despoliation program. Xenophobia drove early
French denaturalization efforts and German diplomatic pressure accelerated
this process in 1942. As German control over the French polity increased
during the course of the Occupation, so did German inuence over French
anti-Semitic policy. Vichys anti-Semitic campaign began as an indige-
nous French movement, turned into a bargaining chip that Laval tried
to exchange for broad political concessions, and eventually devolved into
ignominious accommodation.
The Vichy regime inaugurated its defamation campaign on 27 August
1940. The Third Republic passed the Marchandeau Law in 1881, which
banned press attacks toward a group of persons who belong by origin
to a particular race or religion when it is intended to arouse hatred
among citizens or residents, and elected a Jewish Prime Minister in
1936. At the same time, a large segment of French society celebrated
determined anti-Semites such as Edouard Drumont, Charles Maurras, and
Robert Brassillach. Profoundly reactionary attitudes continued to survive
and thrive inside the liberal Republic. After they eviscerated the Third
Republic, leaders of the Vichy regime repealed the Marchandeau Law and
unleashed a wave of anti-Semitic propaganda in the press.
Forthright discrimination antedated repeal of the Marchandeau Law.
During the height of an economic boom that followed World War
One, the French government reformed immigration laws to accommodate
desperately needed eastern European workers. Changes encouraged an
inux of immigrants in the latter half of the 1920s, but these same
workers became a source of bitter contention with the onset of the Great
Depression and mass unemployment. Eager to resolve unnished business
from the interwar era, the Vichy regime created a commission to review
recent applications for French citizenship on 7 August 1940. The committee
examined naturalization applications submitted since 1927 and denaturalized
those judged unable to assimilate into French society. Orthodox Jews who
had emigrated from eastern Europe often fell into the latter category. After
the French government stripped Jews of their French citizenship, they
Mission detude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Persecution des juifs de France,
19401944, et le retablissement de la legalite republicaine (Paris: La Documentation francaise, 2000),
p. 87; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 35, 3444.
201
after the fall
became stateless and could be sent to the east without offending Gallic
amour propre. During the Occupation, approximately 15,000 peoplea
number that included at least 7,000 Jewslost their French citizenship and
ultimately perished in this fashion.
Vichys enthusiasm for denaturalization had limits. As trains bound for
Auschwitz reduced the number of stateless Jews in 1942, Helmut Knochen
urged Prime Minister Laval to automatically denaturalize all Jews who had
acquired French citizenship since 1927. Citing protests led by prominent
French Catholics including Cardinal Gerlier, Laval claimed that he could
not deliver Jews like goods from a supermarket and pleaded for additional
time. The head of the CGQJ, Darquier de Pellepoix, drafted a law that
denaturalized all Jews who had obtained French citizenship since 1927,
spouses who had acquired French citizenship by marrying naturalized
French Jews, and the children of naturalized Jews on 31 December 1942.
The Secretary-General of the Police, Rene Bousquet, proposed a similar
law that denaturalized Jews who had gained French citizenship since 1932,
and his proposal included an exemption for Jews related to prisoners of
war. SS criticism obliged Bousquet to change the date of denaturalization
from 1932 to 1927, but the revised legislation still exempted the relatives of
Jewish prisoners of war. Darquier rejoined the debate by submitting a fourth
version that exempted Aryans who were married to Jews but included
children resulting from mixed marriages. Pierre Laval and Maurice Gabolde,
the Guardian of the Seal, signed Bousquets second draft on 10 June 1943
and Darquiers second version on 20 and 22 June respectively.
The Allied conquest of Sicily and Mussolinis arrest on 25 July 1943
may have encouraged Prime Minister Laval to reconsider his position
with regard to collaboration in general and denaturalization in particular.
Although both denaturalization bills had been signed by the Prime Minister
and Guardian of the Seal, neither measure had been published in the
Journal ofciel and thus did not carry the force of law. A senior SS ofcial
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 35; Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust
in France, pp. 356369; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 16.
Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 6512; Serge Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, volume
III, Le calendrier de la persecution des Juifs de France, septembre 1942aot 1944 (Paris: Fayard, 2001),
pp. 10335. Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 35; Weisberg, Vichy Law and the
Holocaust in France, pp. 356369; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 16.
Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 355365; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France,
vol. III, pp. 13023, 14746, 15223, 15456, 16111614.
202
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 3659; Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum,
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 338341; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol.
III, pp. 1610, 16161619; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/28; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/4647.
Mission detude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Persecution des juifs de France
19401944, pp. 435; Philippe Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy: laryanisation des entreprises
juives (Paris: Perrin, 1999), p. 24; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 176181; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy
France and the Jews, p. 8; de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation, vol. I, pp. 3034,
98100, vol. II, pp. 626636; Baudouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement, p. 341.
Mission detude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Persecution des juifs de France
19401944, p. 88; Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy, pp. 2334; Jean-Marc Dreyfus, Pillages
sur ordonnances: aryanisation et restitution des banques en France 19401953 (Paris: Fayard, 2003),
pp.6670.
203
after the fall
204
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
measures usually began in the occupied zone and spread slowly or were
implemented with less enthusiasm in the unoccupied or, after November
1942, newly occupied portion of the Hexagon. Working through the
CGQJ, the Vichy regime established a comprehensive system of legal
discrimination and despoliation.
Why did the French government create the CGQJ in early 1941?
After the December 1940 fall of the Laval government, German ofcials
refused to discuss important questions such as a reduction in occupation
payments, the repatriation of French prisoners of war, or a return of the
French government to Paris with their French counterparts. By creating the
CGQJ, Darlan tried to demonstrate Frances commitment to a central tenet
of Hitlers new order and resuscitate Franco-German negotiations. His
efforts forestalled the installation of a comparable German agency, preserved
the illusion of French sovereignty, and satised radical anti-Semites who
had accused the Vichy regime of being soft on Jews. Although German
pressure undoubtedly inuenced Darlans judgment, economic and political
factors also informed the Admirals decision to create the CGQJ.
Admiral Darlan placed Xavier Vallat, a fervent nationalist and devout
Catholic, in charge of the CGQJ. Born in 1891, Vallat lost both an arm and
an eye during World War One. While serving as a deputy from Ardeche
in 19191924 and 19281940, he associated with the moderate Federation
Republicaine and right-wing movements such as the Action Francaise, George
Valoiss Faisceau movement, and Colonel de la Rocques Croix de Feu. The
latter groups certainly inuenced Vallats opinion of Jews. Throughout his
career, Vallat dened Jews by a combination of race, religion, and culture.
He argued that France could indeed absorb a small number of Jews who
had embraced French culture and tried to protect Jews who had served the
French state with distinction. During the Occupation, Vallat continued to
dene a Jew in terms of race and culture and exempted some assimilated
French Jews from various anti-Semitic measures. By appointing Vallat to
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 4379; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/35; Dreyfus, Pillages sur
ordonnances, p. 118.
Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Francais, pp. 279296, 305, 311318; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI,
pp. 10556, 1169; Fred Kupferman, Laval (Paris: Balland, 1987), pp. 2578; BAMA, RW
35/2/7.
Coutau-Begarie and Huan, Darlan, pp. 387395, 506508; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France
and the Jews, pp. 827; Cohen, Persecutions et sauvetages, pp. 127136; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII,
pp. 2278; Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy, pp. 4041.
205
after the fall
lead the CGQJ, Darlan signaled both his independence from Germany and
his support for many anti-Semitic measures favored by the Reich.
Vallats independence created friction with the German embassy and
SS. Otto Abetz, the German ambassador in Paris, considered Vallat to
be dangerous because the latter had served as head of a French veterans
group in 1940. The SS questioned Vallats heretical brand of anti-Semitism
because it did not focus exclusively upon race. Werner Best formally
requested Vallats dismissal on 2 March 1942, and Louis Darquier de
Pellepoix assumed control of the CGQJ two months later. The change in
leadership coincided with the advent of the Final Solution in France and
reected the increasing power of the SS.
Under Darquiers command, the CGQJ became an SS appendage.
Darquier passed condential papers to SS ofcials, eliminated exemptions
for assimilated French Jews, extended anti-Semitic measures into the
unoccupied zone, and acquired his own police unit. As the CGQJ adopted
SS policies, its prestige within French ofcial and public circles dropped.
While Vallat often dined with Petain and could be described as a part
of the conservative establishment, Darquier only met with Laval once or
twice each month. Trumping Lavals indifference, Marshal Petain referred
to Darquier as Monsieur le tortionnaire. Darquiers greatest strengthhis
willingness to obey SS directivesalso made him an ineffective tool because
he could not rally widespread support for Hitlers Final Solution. Unable
to impose his will on the French government and eventually abandoned
by his SS sponsors, Darquier resigned his post on 26 February 1944.
Charles Mercier du Paty de Clam, a scion of the commandant who had
arrested Captain Dreyfus in 1894, succeeded Darquier. [L]argely indifferent
to the commissariat and its goals, du Paty went on indenite leave in May
and was eventually replaced by Joseph Atignac. As the probability of an
Allied invasion increased, the CGQJ became lethargic and irrelevant. The
SS turned to the Milice, a French paramilitary group under the command of
Joseph Darnand, for support and assistance. On a national scale, coordinated
anti-Semitic measures ground to a halt as Allied armies liberated France
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/2/136137; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews,
pp. 8795; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/913; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/31/5564.
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 889, 118; BALW, R 70 Frank-
reich/32/1420; Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 5051.
Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 191202; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews,
pp. 283293; USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/203.
206
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
during the summer of 1944. Only a few dedicated CGQJ ofcials carried
out their mandate to the bitter end.
French enthusiasm for anti-Semitic measures can be linked to German
prospects for victory and the power of the SS. As an observer, the SS
could not control French anti-Semitic policy during the early stages of
the Occupation. Admiral Darlan placed Vallat in charge of the organiza-
tion. Vallat pursued a unique agenda, exempting some assimilated French
Jews from Vichys anti-Semitic measures but pursuing foreign Jews with
remarkable enthusiasm and developing an extensive program of defama-
tion, discrimination, despoliation, and denaturalization. In response to
military setbacks, Hitler ceded additional powers to the SS and added
extermination to the aforementioned list of anti-Semitic measures. Unable
to suffer Vallats independence, the SS engineered his dismissal, support-
ed the rise of Darquier de Pellepoix, and began to transport Jews from
France to Auschwitz. After the fall of Mussolini, Laval belatedly overcame
the shock of defeat and recognized that further accommodation would
not yield any substantial concessions, but the Prime Minister could not
reverse course and expect to survive. During the nal two years of the
Occupation, Vichy resistance amounted to little more than a refusal
to extend ofcial accommodation beyond limits established during the
summer of 1942. The Vichy government developed a comprehensive
campaign of defamation, discrimination, despoliation, and denaturaliza-
tion of its own accord. Although they did not explicitly endorse the
outright murder of all Jews, the CGQJ and French police forces played
an integral role in the deportation process during the latter stages of the
Occupation.
The Germany embassy in Paris failed to play a major role in Germanys
campaign against Jews, though not because of a lack of effort. Basic
instructions from the Foreign Ministry directed Ambassador Abetz to
take charge of all political questions in occupied and unoccupied France.
Specic guidelines authorized the ambassador to represent German interests,
supervise German propaganda, direct the seizure and securing of . . .
private and especially Jewish artistic properties, and advise the military
administration, Secret Military Police (GFP), and the Gestapo. In theory,
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 3339, quote p. 336.
DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 407408.
207
after the fall
BAMA, RW 35/712/6783.
DGFP ser. D, vol. X, p. 513; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 18; Henri Monneray
(ed.), La Persecution des juifs en France et dans les autres pays de louest presentee par la France a Nuremberg
(Paris: Editions du centre, 1947), pp. 834; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Francais, pp. 299301;
Umbreit, Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich, pp. 2612.
208
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
Since German diplomats could not force the MBF to take vigorous action
against Jews, they chose to act in conjunction with the Vichy regime.
Less than one month after he raised the issue of a Jewish ofce with
Darlan, Abetz reported creation of the CGQJ to superiors in Berlin. He
assigned Counselor of Legation Karl-Theodor Zeitschel to serve as his
liaison to the CGQJ and allowed the French government to act as his
proxy against the so-called Jewish conspiracy. German diplomats could
not discriminate against Jews on their own and failed to secure substantial
help from the military administration, but the Vichy government proved
more obliging.
Throughout the Occupation, the German embassy used propaganda
to defame Jews and divide Frenchmen. Beginning in October 1940,
the embassy supported a series of exhibitions with titles like European
France, The Jew and France, and Bolshevism against Europe. Millions
of Frenchmen viewed embassy-sponsored exhibitions that directed popular
animosity away from occupiers and toward allegedly subversive groups
such as communists, Freemasons, and Jews. The embassy also subsidized
a broad range of newspapers aimed at a variety of different social groups.
Billig, Le Commissariat general aux questions juives, vol. III, pp. 625; BAMA, RW 35/712/81.
Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, pp. 1489;
DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 2278, 4379.
209
after the fall
Burrin, France under the Germans, pp. 2928; Jackson, France. The Dark Years, pp. 198204;
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/1821; Rita Thalmann, La mise au pas. Ideologie et strategie securitaire
dans la France occupee (Paris: Fayard, 1991), pp. 202206; Renee Poznanski, Jews in France during
World War II, translated by Nathan Bracher (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England,
2001), pp. 377380.
Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 309326; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 311334;
ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 301310; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 817.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/216/145; de Chambrun (ed.), France During the German Occupation,
vol. III, pp. 16111613.
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 7882; BAK, All. Proz. 21/233/45.
210
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/291297; DGFP, ser D, vol. IX, pp. 300301; DGFP, ser. D,
vol. X, pp. 128130, 407408.
Mission detude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Persecution des juifs de France
19401944, pp. 435, 513. Billig, Le Commissariat general aux questions juives, vol. III, p. 71.
211
after the fall
BAMA, RW 35/255/4849, 23; Mission detude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La
Persecution des juifs de France 19401944, pp. 978.
Billig, Le Commissariat general aux questions juives, vol. III, p. 75; Weisberg, Vichy Law and
the Holocaust in France, pp. 2512.
Adam Rayski, The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and Resistance, translated
by Will Sayers (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 478; Billig, Le
Commissariat general aux questions juives, vol. I, pp. 13, 22; Wolfgang Seibel, A market for mass
crime? Inter-institutional competition and the initiation of the Holocaust in France, 19401942,
in International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior 5 (2002), 219257.
212
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
In a 3 December 1940 report, the MBF told superiors that the military
administration had laid the legal foundation for economic Aryanization.
Using French police data, the military administration counted 149,734 Jews,
7,737 Jewish businesses (Einzelunternehmen), and 3,456 Jewish enterprises
(Gesellschaften) in the greater Paris region. While discussing efforts to
Aryanize the French economy, the MBF expressed concerns about anti-
Semitic measures in general. He warned that Aryanization would take years
to complete, disrupt industrial production, and reduce Frances contribution
to the German war effort. According to the military administration, the
French public was surprised by the number of Jewish businesses and
welcomed the elimination of foreign Jews, but regarded discrimination
213
after the fall
214
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
were eliminated and the personnel sent to the east. Transfers decimated
the military administration and intensied fears of a French relapse. The
MBF told superiors in Berlin that personal supervision has been replaced
by hasty surveys. Despite the Vichy regimes questionable dedication, the
MBF reduced the Aryanization ofce.
Stlpnagel probably used troop transfers to minimize an unpopular
program. In January 1941, he told Field Marshal von Brauchitsch that
Aryanization should not proceed beyond the registration of Jewish property
because there was no legal precedent for such a policy. Moving beyond
registration, Stlpnagel explained, would undermine respect for the leaders
of the German state in the eyes of the public at home and in the judgment
of the world. He claimed that he would have nothing to do with the
conscation process when he took command of the military administration,
would not reduce [his] personal responsibility by acting jointly with
another German agency, and advised his boss to take a similar position.
Stlpnagels advice undoubtedly referred both to the conscation of Jewish
art and the Aryanization of the French economy. Though Stlpnagel
could not extricate himself or his staff from the Aryanization process
without disobeying orders, he tried to limit the MVWs involvement and
encouraged the French government to act in his stead.
With considerable assistance from French bureaucrats, a small group of
German ofcials identied 42,739 Jewish businesses during the Occupation.
By August of 1944, they had Aryanized 18,227 of these concerns by selling
them to certied Aryans, liquidating businesses, or by transforming them
into piecework operations that could not be controlled by the owner.
After the liberation of Paris but before the end of World War Two, a
veteran of the military administration estimated that German and French
ofcials had Aryanized approximately 43 per cent of Jewish businesses and
could have completed their task in another twelve to eighteen months.
The military administration played an important role in the Aryanization
process by prodding the French government to act. With substantial French
215
after the fall
216
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
On the basis of this pressure, French police sent the so-called billet vert
(green ticket) via mail to 6,500 Austrian, Czech, and Polish Jews living in
Paris. The message ordered recipients to show up at a local police ofce
with a friend or family member on 14 May. Those who did were promptly
arrested while the companion returned home and packed a bag for the hap-
less victim. The scheme yielded 3,747 prisoners or 60 per cent of the people
originally notied by the French police. At the end of May 1941, the MVW
expressed satisfaction with Vallat and believed that he would contribute
decisively to a radical solution of the Jewish question in France.
The invasion of the Soviet Union triggered a second round of anti-
German demonstrations. In response to a protest on 13 August, French
and German police arrested two anti-German activists and proscribed the
French Communist Party on 15 August. Four days later, German ring
squads executed two militants thought to be responsible for the 13 August
protest. The detention of 4,000 Jews at a 20 August demonstration, as
well as the arrest of 3,477 Jews for possession of illegal rearms, leaets,
and other contraband in August and September 1941, seemed to conrm
the belief that Jews were implacable enemies of the Reich. Leaders of
the military administration undoubtedly considered Jews to be a genuine
security threat.
Early regulations written by the military administration directed com-
manders to prepare lists of potential hostages that included communists,
anarchists, Anglophiles, Gaullists, and nationalists. The MBF considered all
to be potential security threats. Assassinations carried out during the fall
of 1941 led the MBF to revise his understanding of likely partisans. The
regional commander (Bezirkchef ) of southwest France noted that resistance
cells associated with the PCF had become more active and had begun to
cooperate with the followers of Charles de Gaulle in September. Rumors
linked Gaullists to October 1941 assassinations and seemed to conrm the
existence of a centralized conspiracy against Nazi Germany.
Andre Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant loccupation (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991), pp. 212214;
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 1519; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/855857; Rajsfus, La
Police de Vichy, pp. 6971.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1051, 10961099; Meyer, LOccupation allemande en France,
pp. 7074.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/491; USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/9198.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 9/nfn (MVW Bezirk B, Kdo.St. Ia Br B Nr 3508/41,
Angers 19.9.41, Betr. Lagebericht der Abt Ia fr die Zeit vom 20.7.41 bis 19.9.41); USNA, RG
242/T-77/1588/folder 1/17.
217
after the fall
218
defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
219
9
Racial deportations
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 6502 (France), pp. 636645 (Belgium),
pp. 600628 (the Netherlands), and pp. 738755 (Greece), 1321; Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Dimension
des Volkermords: Die Zahl der jdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus (Munich: R. Oldenbourg
Verlag, 1991).
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 600601, 636.
racial deportations
dispersement may have helped some French Jews and endangered their
Dutch counterparts, but neither factor can explain the high mortality rate
in Yugoslavia. A general explanation for varying survival rates must lie
elsewhere.
Diplomatic considerations may have inuenced the deportation process
in nations that contributed to the Axis war effort. After signing an armistice
with Germany, the Vichy regime functioned as a friendly neutral and
reluctantly supported the German war effort. Perhaps Frances valuable
economic assets allowed the Vichy regime to shield Jews from Himmlers
depredations. This strategy yielded favorable results in Italy, where 75 per
cent of the Jewish population survived both Mussolinis Fascist regime
and the subsequent German occupation. Hungary also offered substantial
assistance to the Third Reich, but at least 550,000 or 69 per cent of the
approximately 795,000 people who were regarded as Jews inside of greater
Hungary did not survive World War Two. An alliance with Hitlers
regime might delay large-scale deportations, but the Hungarian example
suggests that collaboration offered very little protection in the long run.
Diplomatic considerations may have inuenced but did not determine
varying survival rates.
Recent scholarship suggests that governmental structures may explain
higher survival rates in some European nations. As German armies marched
across Europe, Hitler integrated regions such as DanzigWest Prussia and
Lorraine directly into the Reich. Civilian administrators governed potential
colonies in Poland and friendly races in Denmark and Norway. Military
governments controlled portions of France, Belgium, and Greece for the
duration of World War Two. Wolfgang Seibel argues that territorial
administrative structures shaped the course of the Final Solution. He links
the low survival rate in the Netherlands to the civilian administration
and attributes higher survival rates in Belgium and France to military
Yahil, The Holocaust, pp. 349352, 4916; Manoschek, The extermination of the Jews in
Serbia, pp. 163185.
Liliana Picciotto Fargion, Italien in Benz (ed.) Dimension des Volkermords, pp. 199228.
Laszlo Varga, Ungarn in Benz (ed.) Dimension des Volkermords, pp. 331351.
Hans Umbreit, German rule in the occupied territories 19421945, in MGFA (ed.),
Germany and the Second World War, vol. V, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power, part 2, Wartime administration, economy, and manpower resources, 19421944/5, translated by
Derry Cook-Radmore, Ewald Osers, Barry Smerin, and Barbara Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2003), pp. 912.
221
after the fall
222
racial deportations
223
after the fall
Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 105115; Mller, Das Heer und Hitler, pp. 458466.
Steinberg and Fitere, Les Allemands en France, 19401944, pp. 3945.
Once vested with executive authority in 1942, the Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei
und SD became Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und SD. The abbreviation, BdS, remained the
same.
224
racial deportations
on 4 October 1940. Members of the Black Corps could wear their black
uniform but could not arrest suspects or conscate property on their own.
SS ofcers monitored the activity of Jews, foreigners, Freemasons, com-
munists, and clerics; located and secured valuable documents and records
in state libraries, Masonic lodges, and religious institutions; and investigated
anti-German conspiracies. In return, the SS had to inform the MBF of their
strength and activity. Finally, Himmler promised to tell the army high com-
mand and General von Stlpnagel about any change in the SSs mission.
To carry out his duties, Thomas established a central bureau in Paris that,
in terms of structure, mimicked Reich Security Main Ofce (Reichssicher-
heitshauptamt or RSHA) in Berlin. By 1942, the Paris headquarters had
seven sections focused on personnel, nance and industry, liaison with the
French government, anti-German groups, criminal police (Kriminalpolizei
or Kripo), intelligence, and cultural affairs. SS branch ofces stood beside
regional commands of the military administration in Bordeaux, Rouen,
and Dijon. Thomass second-in-command, Knochen, served as the SS
liaison with the MBF. SS Sturmbannfhrer Herbert Hagen arrived with the
very rst group of SS operatives, opened the branch ofce in Bordeaux,
and supervised the collection of foreign intelligence as head of section VI.
After HSSuPF Oberg arrived in 1942, Hagen moved to Paris and served as
Obergs Chief of Staff and representative (personal Referent). One of Hagens
colleagues, SS Sturmbannfhrer Kurt Lischka, ran the Paris ofce and served
as Knochens agent (standiger Vertreter) when the BdS was unavailable. Both
Lischka and Hagen had worked with Adolf Eichmann before the war and
juggled several jobs within the SS apparatus. A convoluted SS hierarchy
and blurred lines of jurisdiction between various German agencies often
confused outsiders.
Because they had limited powers, SS men spent much of their time
collecting anecdotal information and sending eclectic reports to superiors
in Berlin. An intelligence summary of 14 December 1940 focused on dis-
gruntled workers, characterized the atmosphere of Paris as revolutionary,
USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655656.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proces Oberg-Knochen/1213, 3943; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/
1/621; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/4/542.
Joseph Billig, La Solution nale de la question juive. Essai sur ses principes dans le III Reich
et en France sous loccupation (Paris: Centre de Documentation Juive Contremporaine, 1977),
pp. 169178, 192, 8890, 1978; BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proces Oberg-Knochen/35; BALW, R 70
Frankreich/4/7.
225
after the fall
and conjured images of 1870. The MBFs December 1940 report noted
a deterioration in public morale but added that subversive groups were
being carefully monitored and concluded that the safety of the occupation
is nowhere endangered. SS reports focused on Jews and communists,
exaggerated racial threats, and highlighted the need for racial vigilance
in the Hexagon. Unlike comprehensive accounts written by the military
administration, SS briefs did not assess the overall popularity of resistance
groups or place resistance activity within the larger context of French
society.
While Knochen sent dubious reports to Berlin, Theodor Dannecker
prepared the ground for the Final Solution. Born in 1913, Dannecker
joined the SS in June of 1932 and enrolled in the Nazi party six weeks
later. After the Nazi seizure of power, he served in an SS Verfgungstruppe
before transferring to Columbia-Haus in Berlin, where he gained a rst-hand
knowledge of the Nazi concentration camp system. Dannecker secured a
position as a Jewish affairs expert in the SD Main Ofce (SD Hauptamt)
in 1937 and worked closely with Eichmann, Hagen, Lischka and, to a
lesser extent, Reinhard Heydrich. Eichmann relocated to Austria after the
March 1938 Anschluss and trusted Dannecker enough to leave him in
charge of the Berlin ofce during his absence. Toward the end of 1939,
Himmler integrated the SD Hauptamt into RSHA. Along with Eichmann,
Dannecker joined section IV D 4 (Gestapo Jewish affairs, later renamed IV
B 4) under the command of Heinrich Mller. Before World War Two,
Dannecker had won the trust of inuential SS leaders who would later
shape the Final Solution.
Dannecker arrived in France on 5 September 1940 and took charge of
subsection J (Jewish affairs), in section IV (anti-German groups) on the staff
of the BdS. Although nominally a part of Thomass team, he usually received
his orders from and reported directly to Eichmann in Berlin. Despite
a modest rank that was equivalent to an army lieutenant, 27-year-old
SS-Obersturmfhrer Dannecker played a pivotal role in the Final Solution.
Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, pp. 1267;
USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/557; Germaine Willard, Roger Bourderon, and Gilbert Badia (eds.),
La Gestapo contre le parti communiste: rapports sur lactivite du PCF (Paris: Editions Messidor, 1984).
Claudia Steur, Theodor Dannecker: ein Funktionar der Endlosung (Essen: Klartext Verlag,
1977), pp. 1629, 4042; Krausnick et al., Anatomy of the SS State, pp. 163187.
Steur, Theodor Dannecker, pp. 4591. Dannecker was promoted to Hauptsturmfhrer or
captain by April 1941.
226
racial deportations
Yahil, The Holocaust, pp. 104106, 115122, 146150, 1768; Steur, Theodor Dannecker,
pp. 4853.
Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 578; Steur, Theodor Dannecker, p. 52;
Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 8083; Billig, Commissariat general aux questions
juives, vol. I, p. 27.
Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 5780.
227
after the fall
groups through the UGIF and to the CGQJ via the French government.
He compensated for the small number of SS personnel under his direct
command by creating a network of French and Jewish proxies.
With his administrative apparatus taking shape, Dannecker began to
experiment with deportations but, without the power to make arrests,
could not act unilaterally. Dannecker, Ambassador Abetz, the MBF,
and Werner Best all asked Xavier Vallat, the newly appointed head of
the CGQJ, to demonstrate Frances commitment to racial ideals and
arrest politically unpleasant Jews during a series of meetings held on
3 and 4 April 1941. Six weeks later, French police sent out 6,500 bil-
lets verts and arrested 3,747 Polish, Czech, and Austrian Jews. Playing
on fears of increased communist activity, Dannecker persuaded the MBF
to launch a second round-up on 20 August 1941. After meeting with
junior army ofcials, 2,400 French policemen sealed the 11th arrondissement
and detained both French and foreign Jews without informing superi-
ors in Vichy until after the fact. By the end of the four-day operation,
French police had seized 4,232 Jews in 16 different sections of the French
capital. In response to a series of attacks carried out between 2 and
6 December, 260 French and 200 German policemen seized 743 French
Jews during a third round-up. Dannecker characterized the 1941 raids as
restrained, but added that they did indeed address the so-called Jewish
Question.
French police sent prisoners seized by the 1941 round-ups to concentra-
tion camps in Pithiviers, Beaune-la-Rolande (Loiret), and Drancy that were
run by French policemen under German supervision. Drancy served as a
source of hostages and, later, the anteroom of Auschwitz. Round-ups car-
ried out in 1941 lled all three camps well beyond their capacity. Appalled
by conditions in Drancy, a German military commission ordered the
release of approximately 900 sick and dying prisoners in October 1941. On
Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, pp. 1489;
Billig, La Solution nale de la question juive, p. 120; Rayski, The Choice of the Jews under Vichy,
pp. 224.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/35; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/913; Kaspi, Les Juifs
pendant loccupation, pp. 212214; Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 6771. Kasten, Gute Franzosen,
p. 96, note 302, argues that the SS instigated the 14 May raids.
Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. I, pp. 2832; vol. 2, pp. 183199; Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant
loccupation, pp. 214215; Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 713.
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 323; Monneray (ed.), La Persecution des juifs en France,
pp. 117121; Steur, Theodor Dannecker, pp. 558.
228
racial deportations
BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/99100; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 2515;
Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 3940; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/8.
229
after the fall
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 5963, 1969; Monneray (ed.), La Persecution des juifs
en France, pp. 1245; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/1417.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/131133; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 434.
Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. I, p. 205; BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/131133, 149; USNA,
RG 242/T-501/172/441.
230
racial deportations
231
after the fall
Jean-Paul Cointet, Pierre Laval (Paris: Fayard, 1993), pp. 398400; Klarsfeld, VichyAusch-
witz, 1942, pp. 196, 221, 227232.
Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 445451, 593.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/149153, 139141; Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 238240;
Monneray (ed.), La Persecution des juifs en France, pp. 148151.
232
racial deportations
the SS captain reported his ndings to superiors and, in light of the paltry
results of the Vel dHiv round-up, began to press for the deportation
of foreign Jews in unoccupied France. Dannecker asked Knochen to
discuss the matter with Bousquet, and SS Lieutenant (Obersturmfhrer)
Heinz Rothke, Danneckers eventual successor, made the same request
to Leguay during a conference on 27 July. Leguay may have anticipated
Rothkes appeal, because he immediately agreed to turn over foreign Jews
interned by the French government in southern France. The next morning,
Leguay ordered four transports to Drancy that would begin on 7 August
1942.
Leguays transports moved 3,429 Jewish prisoners from various camps in
southern France to Drancy between 7 and 14 August. After a short stay in
Drancy, most continued to Auschwitz, and most perished shortly after they
233
after the fall
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 1467; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 5958,
6023.
Monneray (ed.), La Persecution des juifs en France, pp. 1513; Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz,
1942, pp. 1589, 3378, 3734, 377; Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant loccupation, pp. 1357.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/189191; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, pp. 506507.
234
racial deportations
235
after the fall
diplomats, the general public in neutral countries, and even some Axis
allies. Furthermore, cooperation yielded no appreciable concessions from
the Reich. During a meeting with Hagen on 25 August 1942, Bousquet
argued that he had to proceed with caution because of protests from
Cardinal Gerlier and the Archbishop of Toulouse. Religious, popular,
and international condemnation of the deportation of foreign Jews and
especially Jewish children forced Vichy to reconsider cooperation with
regard to deportations.
Laval expressed a new-found reluctance at a dinner hosted by Ambassador
de Brinon on 2 September. The Prime Minister told Oberg and Abetz that
opposition from Cardinal Gerlier made further deportations difcult. He
offered to deliver German, Austrian, Czech, Polish, and Hungarian Jews
to the SS and insinuated that Belgian, Dutch, and some naturalized French
Jews could be added to the list, but only after initial categories of deportees
had been exhausted. Mindful of public opinion, Laval tried to proceed
with caution. One week later, Leguay reiterated why French police could
not make additional arrests and asked Rothke to suspend deportations until
the middle of October. Opposition from the Catholic Church made
Laval, Bousquet, and Leguay reluctant to proceed with further arrests and
deportations.
Eichmann and Rothke pressed for a substantial increase in the deporta-
tion rate that would necessitate further arrests. The Vichy regime feared the
political consequences of another major round-up. Oberg and Knochen
stood in the middle with the power to set German policy in the Hexagon.
SS Major-General (Brigadefhrer) Oberg answered to Himmler and did
not have to follow orders from RSHA or Eichmann. The HSSuPF dis-
cussed accelerated deportations with his boss, and the two agreed not
to arrest French Jews. SS Colonel (Standartenfhrer) Knochen outranked
SS Lieutenant-Colonel (Obersturmbannfhrer) Eichmann and could, with
some risk, defy RSHA staff ofcers. To protect himself from recrimina-
tion, Knochen informed Eichmann that the arrest of French Jews would
disrupt the general political situation and threaten Prime Minister Laval.
Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant loccupation, pp. 2414; Cohen, Persecutions et sauvetages, pp. 300316;
ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 419420, 425; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 8634.
Cointet, Pierre Laval, pp. 398403, 4257; Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 1942, pp. 407409,
419420.
236
racial deportations
237
after the fall
the UGIF to provide food for prisoners and shelter for children orphaned
by the deportation process. Eichmann supplied transportation. Oberg and
Knochen delivered French cooperation. The SS oversaw every stage of the
deportation process and drove the entire operation forward.
Convoys to Auschwitz ceased between 11 November 1942 and 8 Febru-
ary 1943. During the pause, Germany responded to the Allied invasion of
North Africa by occupying southern France in November 1942. Himmler
extended the HSSuPFs brief to include the newly occupied zone, and addi-
tional anti-Semitic measures followed in the wake of Germanys advance.
Expansion into southern France spread SS resources over a wider area, and
neither OKW nor RSHA could provide substantial reinforcements. With
approximately 2,200 SS policemen at their disposal, SS leaders had to rely
on French support that would only be forthcoming if the Black Corps
accommodated some French concerns. SS ofcials viewed the stateless
Jews in newly occupied France as both a security threat and a pool of
potential deportees who could ll trains bound for Auschwitz. The new
year brought the SS both opportunities for more arrests and risks stemming
from their dependence on French support.
Despite increasing French lassitude and a dearth of reliable security
forces, Heinrich Himmler outlined an ambitious plan for France. In his
18 December 1942 letter to Martin Bormann, the Reichsfhrer called
for a radical ght against communists and all of their helpers and the
evacuation of Jews. After Himmler learned about four bombings in
Marseille, the Reichsfhrer decided to make an example of Frances second
largest city. On the night of 22/23 January, French and German police
spread through the streets of Marseille and began to check identity cards.
Under the direct supervision of Oberg and Bousquet, French and German
police arrested 5,956 people, including about 800 Jews. The two-day
round-up culminated in the physical destruction of the old-port quarter
of Marseille, which some regarded as an insalubrious den of criminals.
238
racial deportations
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Jan-43
Feb
March
April
May
June
July
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan-44
Feb
March
April
May
June
July
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Figure 9.3. Racial deportations, 19431944.
Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. III, pp. 1311, 13591360, 13634, 13745; Kaspi, Les
Juifs pendant loccupation, p. 248.
239
after the fall
two trains. Five days later, regional and local SD commanders received
orders to send all Jews in their custody to Drancy. SS Lieutenant Rothke
added a third train and scheduled deportations from Drancy to Auschwitz
on 9, 11, and 13 February. Speaking through a subordinate, Bousquet
warned Rothke that French police would not guard trains carrying French
Jews to Auschwitz. Despite these threats, French gendarmes escorted
the 13 February 1943 convoy and subsequent transports that carried
some French Jews to the German border without incident. Beginning in
February, trains left Drancy on a more or less regular basis. Seventeen trains
carried 17,069 Jews to Auschwitz and Sobibor during 1943, but only 466
of the Jewish passengers returned to France after the war.
Modest round-ups failed to satisfy RSHA. During an 11 February 1943
visit to Paris, Eichmann pressed for a maximalist evacuation program that
would include French Jews. Knochen immediately discounted Eichmanns
scheme in a letter to Heinrich Mller (of the Gestapo), but Rothke began
to prepare for 810,000 deportations per week. In order to obtain the
necessary victims, Rothke understood that he would need to negotiate
with the French and Italian governments. Throughout the spring and
summer of 1943, German ofcials lobbied the Vichy regime to strip French
citizenship from Jews naturalized since 1927, but the plan ultimately
collapsed when Prime Minister Laval refused to promulgate the necessary
legislation in August of 1943. In order to facilitate the identication of
potential victims, SS ofcials also tried to persuade the French government
to pass legislation that forced Jews to wear the Star of David. Marshal
Petain blocked the appropriate French legislation and forced the MBF to
impose the Jewish Star by decree: this regulation only applied to occupied
France. The highest levels of the Vichy regime balked at new anti-Semitic
measures that would feed the deportation process.
Rothkes second source of Jews lived under the protection of the Italian
government in southern France. Following the Allied invasion of North
Africa, Italian forces seized control of seven French departements east of the
240
racial deportations
Rhone river and protected the 25,000 Jews within their jurisdiction. The
Italian Consul General in Nice, Alberto Calisse, blocked French efforts
to mark the identity papers of French or foreign Jews on 27 December
1942, and the Italian Foreign Ofce supported the consuls stance two days
later. Knochen detailed Italian obstruction in two reports sent to RSHA
on 13 January and 2 February 1943. Schleier described similar problems to
the Foreign Ofce in Berlin and concluded that the Final Solution could
only be carried out in the Italian zone after Germany and Italy resolved
their differing views on the so-called Jewish Question. Himmler raised
the matter with Ribbentrop during a meeting on 29 January, and the Nazi
Foreign Minister directed the German Ambassador in Rome, Hans Georg
von Mackenson, to personally discuss the problem with Mussolini.
On 7 April, Knochen informed RSHA that Italian ofcials continued to
block French and German anti-Semitic measures. The BdS informed his
superiors that the Italian commandant in Valence (Drome) would not allow
Vichy ofcials to deport twenty-nine foreign Jews. Citing several examples
of obstruction, Knochen claimed Italian ofcials made the Final Solution
impossible in the Italian zone. Ribbentrops diplomatic intervention and
lower-level contacts in Paris and southern France all failed to produce
results. The Italian example encouraged French resistance and limited
deportations throughout southern France. Knochen argued that Jews in the
Cote dAzur posed a serious danger to the security of German forces and
begged RSHA to do something.
Mussolinis arrest on the morning of 25 July 1943 further discouraged
Italian cooperation. Italian ofcers who controlled the southeastern corner
of France had little incentive to cooperate with the SS while a new
government under Marshal Pietro Badoglio negotiated a surrender with
the Allies. Jews gathered in the Italian zone to escape persecution at the
hands of French and German police. Because of Italian obstruction,
(Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 1994); Jonathan Steinberg, All or Nothing: The Axis
and the Holocaust, 19411943 (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 105130, 157164.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/2630; BALW, NS 19/3402/che 2/7677.
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 19431944, pp. 1967, 202203; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France,
vol. III, pp. 131213, 13371347; ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 98, 1323.
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 19431944, pp. 2257; BALW, NS 19/3402/che 2/7677;
ADAP, ser. E, vol V, 368373.
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 19431944, p. 264.
Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini: A Biography (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), pp. 2949;
Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 595601; ADAP, ser. E, vol. 6, pp. 2556.
241
after the fall
neither French nor German police forces could arrest Jews in provinces
east of the Rhone river before Italian troops left.
Failed diplomacy precluded the large scale round-ups imagined by
Eichmann and Rothke at the start of 1943. German pressure could not
force Laval to change French denaturalization laws or elicit Italian support
in southern France. A substantial report written by the Germany embassy in
Paris and dated 27 July 1943 described the impotence of French authorities
in that city. Supply shortages, Allied advances, and German setbacks helped
many Frenchmen to recover from the shock of the 1940 defeat and begin
to question an inevitable German victory. Although Laval continued to
serve German interests, he could not impose his will upon the entire
French bureaucracy. Junior French policemen began to prepare for an
Allied invasion and a possible change in government. An intelligence
brief dated July 1943 claimed that French policemen in Toulouse would
arrest fanatical supporters of the Vichy regime in the event of an Allied
invasion, and similar reports from Orleans, Lyon, and Marseille followed
in subsequent months. Regulations formulated in 1943 and rened in
1944 allowed French bureaucrats to prepare for the end of the Vichy
regime.
A determined but pragmatic anti-Semite, Knochen adapted this policy to
suit new political circumstances. According to a report forwarded to Berlin
by the BdS, French police continued to make an essential contribution
in the ght against communism but would not expose themselves to
advance German interests. The SS expected French police to remain
neutral during the initial stages of an Allied landing; as soon as Axis or
Allied forces gained an advantage, Knochen assumed French police would
support the likely victor. Knochen advised superiors to limit the weapons
available to French policemen and promised to monitor the situation with
care. The BdS continued to appreciate the value of Vichys cooperation,
but he acknowledged the limited scope and declining value of French
support.
Specic round-ups carried out in 1943 followed the course predicted
by the BdS; massive raids gave way to routine police work and small-
scale arrests. French police checked the papers of 130,000 people every
242
racial deportations
two weeks, and their efforts yielded enough prisoners to maintain the
concentration camp population and fulll regular deportations. Between
28 April and 6 May, German police combed trains in southwest France and
arrested all who qualied as Jews. Once Italian troops nally abandoned
their zone of occupation in southeastern France, German troops and an
SS commando under the command of Alois Brunner began to arrest
French and foreign Jews around Nice. Aided by a small number of Jewish
informants, Brunners small commando caught 1,819 Jews between 10 and
14 September. By the end of 1943, they had seized less than 10 per cent
of the estimated 25,000 Jews in the area. The legacy of Italian resistance
degraded subsequent German round-ups.
A shortage of reliable SS agents, uncooperative French authorities, and
a sympathetic local population helped many Jews evade the Nice round-
up and set the pattern for 1944. French police seized 48 per cent of
the registered Jews in Bordeaux and Dijon during 1011 January and
24 February 1944 raids. The SS commander in Poitiers launched a surprise
round-up on 30 January and reported the arrest of 76 per cent of registered
Jews in the region. German and joint Franco-German roundups in the
occupied zone could be successful as late as February 1944, but sweeps
carried out in southern France often yielded meager results.
German police found their French counterparts to be most accommodat-
ing in the occupied zone. Under strong German pressure, Vichy authorities
had purged Jews, Freemasons, communists, and other unreliable elements
from the French police force during the rst two years of the Occupation,
and their efforts yielded a dividend of continued cooperation in its nal
months. The presence of German troops and/or a strong communist threat
also encouraged effective accommodation in coastal and industrialized dis-
tricts. French authorities proved less amenable as the threat of an Allied
invasion increased and when German threats could not backed up by force.
During the nal year of the Occupation, French police cooperation ranged
from cordial if unenthusiastic in the occupied zone to non-existent in the
newly occupied zone.
Poznanski, Jews in France during World War Two, pp. 327, 3747.
Rayski, The Choice of the Jews under Vichy, pp. 201203; Cohen, Persecutions et sauvetages,
pp. 449462.
Poznanski, Jews in France during World War II, pp. 390393; Kasten, Gute Franzosen,
pp. 1725.
USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1061; USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1061.
243
after the fall
Vries, Sonderstab Musik, pp. 85101; Ally, Hitlers Beneciaries, pp. 144152, 280293;
ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, p. 484; BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/263275; Jacques Delperrie de Bayac,
Histoire de la Milice, 19181945 (Paris: Fayard, 1994).
Klarsfeld, VichyAuschwitz, 19431944, p. 393.
244
racial deportations
out the Final Solution but had to rely on French assistance because of
personnel shortages. Acting on its own accord, the French government
defamed, discriminated against, and despoiled Jews. The Darlan and Laval
administrations extended anti-immigrant measures initiated by the Daladier
government and furnished Germany with policemen to round up foreign
Jews. Laval sanctioned the incarceration of French Jews when arrests could
be characterized as reprisals, but he refused to expand the deportation
process to include assimilated French Jews because it alienated segments of
the French populace and did not yield diplomatic concessions. The Prime
Minister did not object to deportations on principled grounds.
Once enmeshed in petty discrimination, despoliation, and the deporta-
tion of foreign Jews, Laval and the Vichy government could not reverse
course and expect to survive. In for a penny, in for a pound. During a
monologue on 5 January 1942, Hitler explained the crux of his strategy
to his entourage. The French who have compromised themselves with us
will nd it to their own interest that we should remain in Paris as long
as possible. Almost a year later, the Fhrer repeated the same point to
General Jodl:
The [French] police are hated more than anything else in the country and seek
support from a stronger authority than their own government; thats us. It will
come to a point where the police will beg us not to leave the country.
245
after the fall
246
10
Labor deportations and resistance
Labor shortages plagued the German economy long before the onslaught of
World War Two. Armaments spending and massive public works projects
reduced the number of unemployed workers from approximately 6 million
in 1933 to 1 million in 1936, and the latter included unemployed seasonal
laborers, people unable to work because of raw material shortages, and Jews
barred from practicing various professions. Toward the end of the decade,
employers raised wages to attract workers, and skilled workers gradually
improved their standard of living. Mobilization subtracted millions of
soldiers from the workforce, aggravated labor shortages, and forced wages
upward, but Hitler refused to curtail the manufacture of consumer goods,
shift workers into the defense economy, and risk popular discontent
stemming from the ensuing shortages. With some difculty, the German
economy managed to produce both guns and butter during brief military
campaigns in 1939 and 1940.
The rapid defeat of France allowed Hitler to postpone difcult economic
choices. Because it lasted only six weeks, the 1940 Western campaign did
not consume a great deal of war material or produce a large number of
casualties that could only be replaced by drafting additional workers into the
armed forces. Late in the summer, Hitler scaled back military production
and released a limited number of soldiers from military service. Army
ofcials set French prisoners of war to work on German farms and factories
Rolf-Dieter Mller, The Mobilization of the German Economy for Hitlers War Aims, in
MGFA (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, vol. V/1, Organization and Mobilization of the
German Sphere of Power, pp. 407563.
after the fall
Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 4651, 67; Herbert, Hitlers Foreign
Workers, pp. 957; Hans Umbreit, Exploitation of the occupied lands, in MGFA (ed.), Germany
and the Second World War, vol. V/1, pp. 265284; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/461462,
806.
Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 659; Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen
Wehr- und Rstungswirtschaft, pp. 2746; BALW, R 43 II/675/1416.
Bartov, Hitlers Army, pp. 3745.
Rolf-Dieter Mller, The failure of the economic blitzkrieg strategy , in MGFA (ed.),
Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, pp. 1081, 1097;
Bernhard R. Kroener, The manpower resources of the Third Reich in the area of conict
between Wehrmacht, bureaucracy, and war economy, 19391942, in MGFA (ed.), Germany
and the Second World War, vol. V/1, pp. 868886, 10091028.
248
labor deportations and resistance
The Fhrers sweeping edict gave Sauckel control of French workers who
were employed in Speers industrial network and created another Nazi
paladin who could tamper with German policy in the Hexagon.
The military administration recruited French labor during the rst twenty
months of the Occupation. Sauckel took over the military administrations
operation and, after negotiating an agreement with Pierre Laval, established
the Releve program which furloughed one French prisoner of war in
Jost Dlffer, Albert Speer: cultural and economic management, in Smelser and Zitelmann
(eds.), The Nazi Elite, pp. 212223; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Collier
Books, 1970), pp. 1918.
Peter W. Becker, Fritz Sauckel Plenipotentiary for the Mobilisation of Labour, in Smelser
and Zitelmann (eds.), The Nazi Elite, pp. 194201; IMT , vol. V, pp. 4401.
249
after the fall
exchange for every three skilled laborers that went to work in Germany.
When his initial efforts failed to satisfy Germanys escalating needs, the
Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor persuaded Vichy to establish
a system of forced labor. Known as the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO),
the coercive program supplied French workers to German factories in
early 1943, but it alienated French workers. Recalcitrant laborers known
as refractaires formed marauding bands that wandered through the French
countryside in search of food and shelter, and some eventually joined
resistance groups. Wags began to talk about the Armee Sauckel, an ironic
reference to the Armee Secrete. Sauckels labor programs created thousands
of potential resistance ghters during the nal year of the Occupation.
Heinrich Himmler adopted a preemptive strategy against refractaires
and Jews. Although the incidence of resistance remained constant and
labor deportations increased during the rst three months of 1943, the
Reichsfhrer SS used exemplary violence to solve racial, labor, and security
problems in one fell swoop. Beginning in January 1943, thousands of French
and German policemen and SS troops began to arrest all who looked askance
at the ofcers, sent Jews to concentration camps, dispatched eligible French
workers to factories in Germany, and intimidated neutral Frenchmen. The
ght against Jews and alleged terrorists eventually subsumed the deportation
of French labor. The military administration could only watch as Sauckels
labor program and indiscriminate SS security measures alienated French
society. Repression fostered resistance, which begot reprisals, which in turn
inspired more resistance.
German economic policy toward France amounted to little more than
loosely organized pillage during the summer of 1940. In early August, the
military administration curtailed requisitions in favor of indirect exploita-
tion. Under military supervision, the French government established comites
dorganisation that controlled the distribution of raw materials. Committees
supplied French factories that were working for Germany with scarce com-
modities and allowed non-essential businesses to wither away because of
raw material shortages. Using funds that the French government had paid to
Germany in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, the German gov-
ernment bought whatever they needed from French suppliers. Although
Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 4650, 678; USNA, RG 242/T-
501/166/6166.
250
labor deportations and resistance
Burrin, France under the Germans, p. 138; Jacques Evrard, La Deportation des travailleurs francais
dans le IIIe Reich (Paris: Fayard, 1972), p. 25.
BAMA, RW 35/1150/nfn (Der MBF, VerwaltungsstabWirtschaftsabteilung, Wi VII/741
a/41, Paris, 30.10.41, Richtlinien fr den Einsatz von unter deutscher Leitung stehenden Gefolg-
schaften oder Gruppen von Arbeitskraften aus Frankreich nach Deutschland); Monographie
D. P. 1: Exploitation de la main duvre francaise par lAllemagne, in Commission Consultative
des Dommages et des Reparations, Dommages subis par la France et lunion francaise du fait de la
guerre et de loccupation ennemie, 19391945, vol. IX (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), pp. 636.
Hereafter abbreviated as Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France.
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, p. 68; Burrin, France
Under the Germans, pp. 2834.
Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, p. 320. Figures in the paragraph and chart below can be
found in Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, p. 68; J. Quellien,
Les Travailleurs forces en Allemagne. Essai dapproche statistique, in Bernard Garnier and Jean
Quellien (eds.), La Main doeuvre francaise exploitee par le IIIe Reich (Caen: Centre de recherche
dhistoire quantitative 2003), pp. 6784.
251
after the fall
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
40
D 0
Ja 0
Fe 1
M 1
Ap 1
M 1
Ju 1
1
Au 1
Se 1
O 1
N 1
D 1
Ja 1
Fe 2
M 2
Ap 2
M 2
42
4
4
n4
b4
4
r4
4
n4
l4
g4
p4
4
4
4
n4
b4
4
r4
ct
ov
ec
ar
ay
ct
ov
ec
ar
ay
Ju
O
N
German war effort, but it could not satiate Germanys appetite for labor.
After Fritz Todts death, the military administrations recruiting program
fell under Fritz Sauckels control.
Sauckel discussed the labor situation with the Fhrer and Field Marshal
Keitel shortly before becoming the Plenipotentiary of the Mobilization of
Labor. Keitel observed that the French armaments industry was fullling
contracts that were worth 3 billion reichsmarks but suspected that the
French textile industry included many underemployed workers. Hitler
and Sauckel agreed that France could afford to send 350,000 laborers to
Germany and military authorities in Berlin promised to transport 10,000
workers per day from France to Germany. To secure French support
for German labor drives, the MBF and German embassy in Paris asked
Hitler to adjust the status of French prisoners and offer benets to former
prisoners of war who enlisted as volunteer laborers, but Hitler refused to
grant concessions while prospects for victory remained bright.
Laval may have learned about Sauckels plans through unofcial channels.
By chance or design, the French Prime Minister sent a letter to Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop on 12 May 1942 that promised to support Germanys
ght against Bolshevism. In detailed negotiations with Hans Hemmen,
252
labor deportations and resistance
253
after the fall
being held as prisoners of war after France sent 150,000 skilled workers to
work in Germany. Laval thanked Sauckel for the generous offer and tried
to transform talks into a general discussion of Franco-German relations.
Sauckel parried Lavals proposal by stating that he could only discuss
technical matters and advised the French Prime Minister to raise political
issues with the Foreign Minister. During their second talk, Sauckel and
Laval outlined their respective bargaining positions but failed to agree on
specic terms.
Negotiations came to a head during a meeting on 15 June. Laval tried to
link the delivery of French workers with the release of French prisoners of
war. Sauckel countered with threats to requisition French labor and implied
that Germany would stop delivering coal and lubricants to France if the
Vichy government did not satisfy German demands. Stunned by Sauckels
hard line, Laval described German proposals as contrary to the Armistice
Agreement and threatened to resign. During a break in negotiations,
Sauckel spoke with Hitler over the telephone and received permission to
furlough (not release or liberate) 50,000 French prisoners of war if France
sent 150,000 skilled workers to Germany. They agreed to exchange one
French prisoner of war for every three skilled workers that arrived in
Germany.
Laval announced the so-called Releve program on 22 June 1942 and
told Frenchmen that they had the key to the [POW] camps. Hoping to
enlist at least 250,000 skilled workers for service in Germany, the Vichy
government described the voluntary program as a patriotic duty. In return
for accepting the one POW for three skilled workers ratio, Vichy shielded
some French laborers from a few of the more coercive aspects of Sauckels
rst labor drive and preserved Vichys sovereign image. Laval hoped the
Releve would demonstrate French loyalty for Germanys cause and win
over the French public by securing the release of French POWs.
From both the French and German perspectives, the Releve turned
out to be a failure. On 11 August 1942, Laval greeted the rst train of
returning POWs released under the exchange agreement, but the return
ADAP, ser. E, vol. II, pp. 3934; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 36.
ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 337; Edward L. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 180182; IMT , vol. XV, pp. 4950.
IMT , vol. XV, pp. 4751; Kupferman, Laval, pp. 3334; Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR,
Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 6875.
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 1824; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 3678.
254
labor deportations and resistance
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
June July August September October November December
of some POWs did not translate into increased support for Vichy or Laval.
Resistance propaganda proclaimed that the workers do not march and
condemned the Prime Minister as a slave merchant. German authorities
were not satised with the number of volunteers in June (12,000) or July
(23,000). At that initial rate of enlistment, German demands for 250,000
workers would not be satised until the middle of 1943. To make matters
worse, volunteers recruited by the military administration in late 1940 and
early 1941 began to return home as their employment contracts expired.
By July 1942, over 80,000 volunteers had returned to France and spread
reports of dismal working conditions in the Reich. Two months after Laval
announced the Releve, Sauckel began to reconsider voluntary recruiting
programs.
Viewed in its entirety, Sauckels rst recruiting campaign, which ended
in July 1942, turned out to be very successful. The Plenipotentiary for the
Mobilization of Labor surpassed his quota of 1.6 million recruits by 39,794
workers. The vast majority of laborers had been recruited from eastern
Europe and POW camps that held Soviet prisoners. Western Europe
yielded far fewer recruits, but many of the latter were skilled laborers that
German authorities considered more valuable. In France, the Releve failed
255
after the fall
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 1359, 178182. The gures used to construct
Figure 10.3 appear in Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX,
pp. 68, 85.
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 139141.
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 1823; IMT , vol. V, pp. 4845.
ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 386391, 402403, 4556.
256
labor deportations and resistance
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 1823; Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR,
Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 7780, 85; ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, p. 36.
ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 101103; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 4556.
ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 357.
257
after the fall
between the beginning of June and the end of August 1942; another 186,000
French laborers went to work in Germany between 1 September 1942 and
1 January 1943. Based on statistics collected by the French government
immediately after the war, a total of 292,000 French laborers joined millions
of French prisoners of war working in German farms and factories during
1942. Prisoners of war furloughed under the Releve could be re-interned
whenever necessary. Coercive labor decrees issued by the Vichy regime
on 4 September 1942 applied only to the occupied zone, but they were
extended throughout the Hexagon in November. The French government
cooperated with Sauckel and supplied the Reich with a substantial number
of workers but received almost nothing in return.
German defeats triggered additional austerity measures in 1943. Allied
invasions of North Africa and the Italian peninsula forced German com-
manders to occupy southern France and disperse the remaining troops
over a wider area. The surrender of German forces in Russia and North
Africa subtracted more divisions from the German order of battle. Hitler
authorized radical measures to raise additional manpower, and the German
embassy in Paris passed along new labor demands to Prime Minister Laval
in December 1942. The Reich expected France to supply Germany with
another 250,000 French workers by 1 May 1943. The number included
37,000 skilled workers who would depart for Germany by 25 January. In
order to fulll German demands, Sauckels representative in Paris, Julius
Ritter, suggested the mobilization of all 2023-year-old men. Laval agreed
to the measure in principle and promised to support the ght against
Bolshevism as best he could, but in order to sell the program to the French
nation, he asked Ritter for political concessions including the release of
two French prisoners for every three workers sent to Germany.
Sauckel arrived in Paris on 10 January 1943 and negotiated with Laval
in person. Hitler had already granted Sauckel the power to recruit both
skilled and unskilled labor with pressure and more severe measures if talks
collapsed. For his part, Laval had to agree to German demands or risk
severe measures comparable to those imposed in Belgium. After difcult
discussions that Laval tried to drag out by introducing political demands,
Sauckel got his way. Laval agreed to send an additional 150,000 skilled
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 68, 85, 157.
Kershaw, Hitler, 19361945: Nemesis, pp. 5678; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 252264;
ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 604605; ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, p. 6.
258
labor deportations and resistance
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 8992; IMT vol.
V, pp. 4867; Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 186; ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 6770.
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 925.
ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 6770; Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la
France, vol. IX, pp. 101, 126.
259
after the fall
12,0000
10,0000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
y
ry
ch
ril
ay
ne
ly
er
r
us
be
be
be
ar
Ju
Ap
ua
ob
M
ar
Ju
g
nu
em
em
Au
br
ct
te
Ja
ov
ec
Fe
p
Se
D
N
Figure 10.4. French workers departing for Germany, 1943.
workers each month. Laval welcomed the proposed respite but neither
endorsed nor rejected German plans. He emphasized the need to build
popular support for the German labor program and suggested negotiations
to discuss potential concessions.
Although both the MBF and Paris embassy supported concessions,
neither a pause nor high-level negotiations followed the 5 March 1943
meeting. Hitler recalled Abetz in response to the invasion of North Africa
and serious political negotiations could not proceed until Abetz returned
to France almost a year later. Sauckels lieutenants scaled back but did
not suspend recruiting efforts. When Sauckel met with Laval on 9 April,
he demanded 120,000 workers by the end of May and another 100,000
before July 1943. Sauckel told Laval that German troops were protecting
Europe from the Bolshevik menace and brushed aside all complaints. The
Reich needed another 220,000 workers. To meet Sauckels demands,
Laval expanded the STO to cover the entire 1942 draft class and eliminated
exemptions for agricultural workers and students.
Renewal of the ObergBousquet agreement on 16 April 1943 ensured
cooperation between French and German police forces. The Vichy
government issued a decree on 12 June 1943 that punished refractaires
ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 667, 348352. Figure 10.4 is based on statitistics in Monographie
D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 101, 126.
Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 283285, 292. ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 557564.
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/1/2526; Froment, Rene Bousquet, pp. 2234.
260
labor deportations and resistance
with heavy nes and internment. French and German police cracked
down on refractaires during the summer and sent more workers to the
Reich in June and July, but the increase proved temporary. With sup-
port from much of the French public, thousands of youths ed to the
countryside and the number of labor deportations plummeted as fall
approached. On 14 August 1943, Sauckel tried to circumvent resistance
among the French bureaucracy by placing Nazi district leaders (Gauleit-
ers) in charge of French departments. Labor ofcials from each German
Gau would supervise the allocation of labor in the departments that they
controlled. Gau ofcials extracted additional manpower, but they often
used French workers to satisfy local needs and neglected the German
war effort.
Sauckel claimed that the last third of his 1943 recruiting plan had
been wrecked by uncooperative French bureaucrats and businessmen.
Neither French nor German rhetoric could overcome the fundamental
unpopularity of the Service du Travail Obligatoire and increase the number of
people being sent to Germany. As the prospects of German victory began
to fade, few French workers wanted to endure Allied bombing attacks in
a German factory. With the majority of German troops tied down on the
eastern front, the Reich could not enforce compliance. As the fortunes of
war turned against the Reich, the risks of service in Germany began to
outweigh the dangers of life underground.
Sauckel compensated for the shortfall by transforming French POWs
into voluntary workers. At the end of 1942, Germany held over 1
million French soldiers in prison camps throughout the Reich. The
majority worked on farms andcontrary to the Geneva Conventionin
armaments factories. In exchange for a brief furlough in France, improved
wages, and the same rights as voluntary French workers, POWs could
renounce their status of prisoners and forsake the security of international
agreements that protected the rights of POWs. In 1943, 197,000 French
POWs accepted Sauckels deal and became voluntary laborers. Despite
a sharp decline in the numbers of volunteers and draftees, the 1943
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 115117.
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 189190; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 767.
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, p. 116; IMT ,
vol. XV, 7780; IMT , vol. XXVII, p. 114.
IMT , vol. V, pp. 4923; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VII, pp. 2647; BAMA, RH 36/146.
261
after the fall
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
January February March April May June July August
Sauckel Action injected 638,000 French laborers into the German economy.
His labor program proved to be, in the words of one historian, highly
successful.
Because of his success in transforming French POWs into voluntary
workers, Sauckel did not press the French government to fulll the last third
of the 1943 labor drive. Hitler approved of Sauckels restraint in October
but planned to resume massive labor deportations in the opening months
of 1944. At a conference on 4 January 1944, military and economic
planners estimated that Germany would need to dragoon between 2.5 and
3 million foreign workers during the new year. Albert Speer thought that
his ofce would require an additional 1.3 million foreign workers to meet
his production schedule in occupied territories. The group, which included
Hitler, Himmler, Speer, Sauckel, Keitel, Milch, and Lammers, expected
France to supply 1 million workers in 1944. To meet their quota, Vichy
and German authorities in France would have to send 91,000 Frenchmen
to the Reich each and every month.
Sauckel told Himmler that his 1944 program would depend on the
number of German police put at his disposal. If he had to rely on the
indigenous police his project could not be carried out. In response,
Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 105110;
Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 1934.
ADAP, ser. E, vol. VII, p. 74.
IMT , vol. V, pp. 4934; IMT , vol. III, pp. 478480; IMT , vol. XI, pp. 1301. The
statistics in Figure 10.5 can be found in Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la
France, vol. IX, pp. 144, 157.
262
labor deportations and resistance
Himmler stated that the executive agents put at his disposal are extremely
few, but he promised to exhort his subordinates in France to work harder.
The Reichsfhrer SS offered Sauckel cold comfort and focused his limited
resources on the Final Solution. In response, the Plenipotentiary for the
Mobilization of Labor created his own paramilitary force to catch refractaires
and dragoon idle workers. Sauckels minions offered bounties to people
who delivered French workers. For its part, Vichy issued decrees that
closed superuous businesses and expanded eligibility requirements for
the STO. Laval acknowledged the unreliability of French police forces
during negotiations with Germany, but he eventually acceded to Sauckels
wishes and imposed the death penalty on those who impeded or avoided
Germanys labor program. Despite French acquiescence, the 1944 Sauckel
Action proved to be a dismal failure. French and German police dragooned
a total of 31,610 workers during the nal 7 months of the Occupation.
In light of the imminent Allied invasion and the absence of German
concessions, the failure of French and German recruiting efforts in 1944
should come as no surprise.
Labor drives carried out by the military administration, French govern-
ment, and Sauckels organization supplied the Reich with at least 850,000
French workers desperately needed by the German economy. By way of
comparison, the SS could only deport 75,000 Jews from the Hexagon.
Although a majority of Frenchmen disliked both labor and racial depor-
tations, Sauckel dragooned ten times more workers than Himmler could
Jews. How can we explain this disparity? Sauckels agents cooperated
with German diplomats and military counterparts. The MBF and MVW
ofcials understood that French labor contributed to the war effort and
helped Sauckel whenever possible. The German embassy in Paris supported
Sauckel through diplomatic channels. Second, the Plenipotentiary for the
Mobilization of Labor negotiated with the French government and mixed
ominous threats with token concessions. He accommodated some French
concerns by returning a few POWs and excluding select groups like farmers
and policemen from his programs. Labor deportations may have been as or
263
after the fall
even more unpopular than racial deportations, but they succeeded because
Sauckel tried to accommodate the concerns of other French and German
institutions. With a brief limited to security, the SS could offer nothing in
return for cooperation with racial deportations.
The military administration and Sauckel pressed the Vichy regime
to supply Germany with additional workers, and the pressure increased
as the need became desperate. Coercive labor laws that were enacted
at Germanys behest discredited the Vichy regime, created refractaires, and
eventually encouraged resistance. The last development did not catch senior
Nazis by surprise. The acting head of RSHAs Foreign Intelligence Service
(Amt VI), Walter Schellenberg, reported that pro-Allied circles around
Marshal Petain negated pro-German inuences surrounding Prime Minister
Laval on 15 November 1942. Discouraged by the STO, most Frenchmen
no longer cooperated with enthusiasm. Acting in part on analysis from
RSHA, Himmler discussed the situation with Hitler in December 1942.
After meeting with the Fhrer, Himmler told Martin Bormann about a
scheme that would counter French attentisme, supply Sauckels organization
with additional labor, catch Jews, and destroy French resistance all at the
same time.
The Reichsfhrer planned to counter attentisme by purging unreli-
able elements from the French police and rewarding French policemen
who carried out their duties to Germanys satisfaction. Second, Himm-
ler planned to deliver 5600,000 Italian anti-fascists and 3400,000 Red
Spaniards who sought refuge in France before World War Two to Sauckel.
Arrests would reduce the pool of potential opponents and solve Vichys
nagging refugee problem. Himmler also planned to incarcerate British
and American citizens, Jews, and former leaders of the Third Republic
who were part of the alleged anti-German conspiracy. Last but not least,
Himmler anticipated a radical ght against the communists that would
include large-scale round-ups in cities and anti-partisan sweeps through
rural areas.
The Reichsfhrer SS translated his plan into action by ordering HSSuPF
to carry out a radical crackdown in Marseille. After criticizing Oberg for
not taking charge of the operation in person, Himmler told his HSSuPF
264
labor deportations and resistance
265
after the fall
prison camp for sorting. Jews were sent to Compiegne while the remainder
traveled to a French military camp in Frejus (in the Var departement).
The total number of prisoners fell far short of the 100,000 expected by
Himmler and did not ll the thirty trains that had been commandeered
by Oberg. In a nal display of raw power, German engineers began to
systematically destroy the old quarter of Marseille on 1 February. By the
time Operation Tiger ended, they had reduced forty hectares of Marseille
to rubble.
The Marseille operation marked the advent of large-scale sweeps that
detained all who looked askance. German intelligence sources identied
three resistance groups, the largest of which had an estimated 6001,000
members, operating in Correze, Puy-de-Dome, and Rhone. In conjunction
with the SD, French police launched a sweep through south-central France
on 8 May 1943. Rudolf Schleier, the Minister of the Paris embassy,
detected an ominous degree of cooperation among partisans and reported
that one resistance group had warned other bands about the impending
operation.
During initial sweeps through rural areas, army, SS, and French police
forces usually seized prisoners and did not resort to burning villages or
shooting women and children. The SS ofce in Limoges launched a major
operation in Correze near the village of Donzenac in November 1943. After
a three-hour ght, the SS Police regiment Todt seized one machine gun,
twenty-four automatic pistols, a few hand grenades, and some ammunition.
They killed seventeen terrorists and took four prisoners but could not
prevent the escape of another fteen or twenty partisans. Sweeps carried
out in southern France tried to destroy resistance groups, round up Jews,
and collect refractaires for Sauckels labor organization. During the last
quarter of 1943, police actions seized approximately 15,000 prisoners, many
of whom eventually wound up in Sauckels hands. Manpower shortages
limited the utility of German operations and allowed resistance groups to
ourish in remote portions of southern France that did not have a strong,
enduring German presence. Some SS commanders wanted to eschew
Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille, pp. 1817; Froment, Rene Bousquet,
pp. 376391, 397; BALW, NS 19/3402/che 2/76.
Nestler and Schulz (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, 19401944,
pp. 2645; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 51; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg,
pp. 303307.
266
labor deportations and resistance
267
after the fall
the crossre], but that is exclusively the fault of the terrorists. Once
the shooting stopped, Sperrle directed soldiers to arrest everybody in the
area and burn down nearby houses. After those initial countermeasures
had been carried out, the Field Marshal ordered soldiers to contact the
MBF and SD for further instructions. Sperrle threatened to prosecute
weak and irresolute commanders who did not carry out instructions and
assured subordinates that nobody would be punished for over-zealousness.
Although he had no experience on the eastern front, Sperrle issued orders
that fullled the spirit of Hitlers anti-partisan policy.
Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel distributed Sperrles Order for Fighting
Partisans to subordinates on 12 February 1944 and augmented the regu-
lation with classic Nazi rhetoric. According to the MBF, respect for the
German armed forces must be preserved and insubordination fought from
the start. His language echoed Hitlers 16 September 1941 order to nip
resistance in the bud by using the sharpest means. As he conspired to
overthrow the Nazi regime, von Stlpnagel adorned his orders with Nazi
terminology and played a double game.
A top-secret order from Keitel conrmed Sperrles directive. Released
on 4 March 1944 and entitled Fighting Terrorism, the OKW regulation
characterized resistance as an increasing nuisance and identied guerilla
activity and railroad sabotage as especially dangerous threats. Hitlers chief
military advisor ordered troops to nish off (erledigen) partisans in the
eld. According to OKW, commanders did not need to convene a trial as
described in the military penal code (Militargesetzbuch) or employ truncated
legal procedures outlined in the Decree concerning Military Jurisdiction
during War and Special Operations (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung or KStVO).
Keitels directive underlined the Third Reichs disdain for the rule of law,
allowed subordinates to liquidate opponents in the eld, and completed a
process that began in 1938.
The MBF did not wholeheartedly accept anti-partisan policies released
by superiors in OKW and OB West. Colonel von Linstow, a member
of Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagels staff, tried to soften OB Wests reprisal
Luther, Der franzosische Widerstand, p. 239; BAK, All. Proz. 21/213/7781; Lieb, Konven-
tioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 2616.
BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/175; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/4649; USNA, RG 242/T-
501/97/368370.
Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, p. 268; BAMA, RW 35/551/19.
See also Chapter 4, p. 100.
268
labor deportations and resistance
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/51.
Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 309321; Meyer, LOccupation
allemande en France, pp. 159160, 1637.
269
after the fall
270
labor deportations and resistance
271
after the fall
272
11
Invasion and retreat
Burleigh, The Third Reich, pp. 40, 55; Hitler, Mein Kampf , Chapter 9, Section 2, The
expedition to Coburg in October 1922; Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and
the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 324333.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/168170, 176182; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-
Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 314; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1429/245257.
274
invasion and retreat
up the only French dry dock that could repair large German warships and
limited the battleship Tirpitz to Norwegian waters. Designed in part to
test the feasibility of a large-scale invasion, the 19 August 1942 Dieppe
raid involved approximately 6,000 uniformed soldiers but proved to be a
asco. Commando operations alarmed German commanders and provoked
Hitler to release the so-called Commando Order on 18 October 1942. The
directive ordered all German troops to refuse the surrender of commandos
and hand over mistakenly captured commandos to the SD. Armed or
unarmed, dressed in mufti or military uniform, whether encountered in
combat, in ight, or while trying to surrender, all commandos were to
be annihilated (niederzumachen). Since they were inserted behind enemy
lines, the 3 divisions of Allied paratroopers, 2,000 British commandos from
the Special Air Service, and American Jedburgh teams deployed during the
1944 invasion could all be described as commandos and thus subject to
Hitlers Commando Order.
OKW insisted that the Commando Order remain in force after the Allied
invasion of France. On 26 June 1944, Keitel informed senior commanders
in western Europe that all troops inserted outside the Normandy combat
zone must be destroyed as hostile terrorist troops or turned over to the SD
for execution after interrogation. Toward the end of July, Hitler reiterated
his basic anti-partisan strategy and directed German troops to execute
all non-Germans suspected of terrorism. With unagging support from
OKW, Hitler championed the immediate execution of commandos and
alleged terrorists; leaders of the Nazi regime did not inch as the prospect
of defeat loomed large.
Five days after D-Day, Ob West directed subordinate commanders
to treat all French civilians who resisted German authority as guerrillas.
Wounded resistance ghters and French partisans who wore a uniform
or other distinguishing mark (beret, armband, etc.) would be treated as
terrorists and shot out of hand. American and British paratroopers dropped
behind enemy lines might also qualify as guerrillas and be eligible for special
treatment if found beyond the ill-dened Normandy combat zone. Even
General Johannes Blaskowitz, a vocal critic of German atrocities in Poland
Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 360, 367; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschau-
ungskrieg, pp. 317, 1417; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/168170.
USNA, RG 242/T-77/1428/794795; BAK, All. Proz. 21/213/277.
BAMA, RW 35/551/24.
275
after the fall
276
invasion and retreat
BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/54.
Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 144154; BAMA, RW
35/551/5556; Max Hastings, Das Reich. The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), Chapters 46, 810; Sarah Farmer, Martyred
Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1999); Robin Mackness, Oradour: Massacre & Aftermath (London: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 1988).
277
Figure 11.1. Forty-four French hostages shot in Premilhat, near Montlucon, on
14 August 1944.
Photograph courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
invasion and retreat
279
after the fall
Allied investigators concluded that some German forces carried out Hitlers
orders with considerable enthusiasm. Regular Wehrmacht troops comprised
the bulk of German forces in France, and they probably carried out many
reprisals or, in German parlance, sabotage countermeasures. Although one
Allied investigator detected some reluctance to carry out atrocities, it was
probably the rapid Allied advance rather than any special regard for the
rules of war that limited the scope of reprisals. Cautionary orders from the
military administration in Paris did not inuence the behavior of many
German soldiers.
Advancing Allied soldiers eventually obtained a copy of Hitlers Com-
mando Order, which General Eisenhower pointedly referred to in a solemn
warning that he transmitted to OKW. The Supreme Commander of Allied
Expeditionary Forces promised to prosecute Wehrmacht and SS ofcers
who shot Allied paratroopers. Designed to protect Allied soldiers, Eisen-
howers warning did not cover French resistance groups, innocent civilians,
and other alleged terrorists. Unlike their German counterparts, Allied lead-
ers favored deliberate prosecution over immediate reprisals carried out in
the eld. Eisenhowers reaction suggests that Hitlers Commando Order
posed a real danger to Allied personnel that had to be countered with threat
of prosecution.
After the war, the French government estimated that 29,660 French
citizens had been shot during the Occupation. Anecdotal evidence col-
lected by Allied investigators indicates that calls for moderation expressed
by dissidents within the military administration had little inuence. As they
retreated toward Germany, soldiers followed a shoot rst, ask questions
280
invasion and retreat
Bcheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel, pp. 108114, 1357; BAMA, N 5/24/25; Peter Hoff-
mann, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945, translated by Richard Barry (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 128144.
Bcheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel, pp. 2445, 275287; Gerd van Roon, German
Resistance to Hitler: Count von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle, translated by Peter Ludlow (London:
Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971), pp. 167175, 211.
281
after the fall
with Claus von Stauffenberg before the war and served as Ob Wests
Deputy Chief of Staff in 1944. Stauffenbergs cousin, Caser von Hofacker,
served on the MBFs staff and played an active role in the anti-Nazi
conspiracy. Finckh, Hofacker, and Stlpnagel developed plans to arrest
supporters of the Nazi regime in Paris, brought additional ofcers into
the conspiracy, and coordinated their efforts with confederates in Berlin.
When Stauffenberg launched his assassination attempt, the three main
conspirators in Paris could rely on assistance from, among others, Colonel
Hans Otfried von Linstow, Stlpnagels Chief of Staff; Elmar Michel, the
head of the MVW; Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Bargatzky, an MVW legal
advisor; Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich Freiherr von Teuchert, an MVW
ofcial in the government subsection; Lieutenant-General Freiherr Hans
von Boineburg-Lengsfeld, Commandant of Greater Paris; Major-General
Brehmer, Deputy Governor of Paris; Colonel Karl von Unger, Boineburg-
Lengsfelds Chief of Staff; and Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt von Kraewel, the
commander of the garrison regiment in Paris. Stlpnagel, Finckh, and
Hofacker developed a substantial network and made contact with dissidents
in Ob West.
On the night of 19 July 1944, Hofacker told some of his fellow
conspirators that a coup was imminent. The next morning, Colonel Finckh
heard similar news from condants in Berlin. There had already been
two false alarms during the previous fortnight, so many plotters remained
apprehensive. On 20 July, Stlpnagel followed his normal routine and
lunched in the Hotel Raphael with Ernst Jnger, but the conversation
seemed constrained. At a neighboring table, Bargatzky discussed plans to
prosecute SS ofcers while other patrons greeted one another with Heil
Hitler. Sometime after 2:00 p.m., Finckh received a second telephone call
from Berlin and learned that the exercise was nished. He immediately
traveled to Ob West and told General Blumentritt that the Gestapo
had assassinated Hitler and launched a putsch. Around three or four in
Robert B. Kane, Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 19181945 (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland & Company, 2002), pp. 207211; Gerd R. Ueberschar, Casar von Hofacker und
der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler in Paris, in Martens and Vasse (eds.), Frankreich und
Deutschland im Krieg, pp. 621631.
Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 210211; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler,
pp. 4734.
Hoffman, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945, pp. 470471; Bcheler, Carl-
Heinrich von Stlpnagel, p. 302; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 132.
282
invasion and retreat
Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 237, 38; Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk,
pp. 2613.
Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945, p. 471; Mitcham, Hitlers Legions,
p. 222; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, p. 40.
Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945, pp. 4723.
283
after the fall
Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, pp. 2614; Hoffmann, The History of the German
Resistance, 19331945, pp. 4745; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 4465.
Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 6670.
284
invasion and retreat
Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 1335; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 936.
Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945, pp. 4767.
Fest, Plotting Hitlers Death, pp. 2847; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 100101.
Abetz, Das offene Probleme, p. 290; Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945,
p. 478.
285
after the fall
exercise carried out under false orders from Berlin and let bygones by
bygones.
The preposterous tale proved to be too much for Admiral Krancke.
The commander of German naval forces in the West erupted in a tirade
about Stlpnagel, treason, and perdy before storming out of the
room. With Krancke out of the way, Blumentritt followed Abetzs lead
and began to talk about mistakes and false alarms. Under the inuence
of champagne, Oberg, Knochen, Abetz, and the military administration
agreed to work in unison for the rst and last time. They conjured up an
implausible explanation of the evenings events and doggedly adhered to
the party line of an exercise ordered by Berlin. Oberg and sympathetic
army ofcers controlled the inquiry and allowed the cover-up to succeed
beyond reasonable expectations. The ensuing investigation revealed only a
handful of conspirators in Paris.
Acting on Kluges account of events in Paris, Keitel ordered Stlpnagel
to report to Berlin on the morning of 21 July. After a brief round of
goodbyes, Carl-Heinrich left Paris and traveled by car toward Germany.
Along the way, he stopped by an old battleeld near Verdun and attempted
suicide. After hearing a shot, Stlpnagels driver found the General lying
in a canal with a single wound to the head. Unaware of the MBFs role
in the previous days events, the driver assumed that partisans had attacked
Stlpnagel and drove his commanding ofcer to a hospital in Verdun.
Oberg visited his former regimental comrade while he recovered, but the
contents of their conversation remain unknown. Stlpnagel made no
attempt to escape punishment but did not turn in comrades. Blinded by his
suicide attempt, Stlpnagel eventually returned to Berlin, faced a summary
trial before the Peoples Court, and was executed in Plotzensee prison on
30 August 1944.
Back in Paris, Oberg conducted a lackadaisical investigation. The
HSSuPF usually questioned suspects in the presence of a senior army
ofcer (often Blumentritt) and never resorted to the third degree. Obergs
lackluster attitude could not obscure the activities of Linstow, Hofacker,
Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, p. 264; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp.
101105; Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 19331945, p. 478.
Fest, Plotting Hitlers Death, p. 285; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 109111;
Abetz, Das offene Probleme, p. 136.
Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 120121, 1267, 169170; BAMA, N 5/24/26.
286
invasion and retreat
Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 1725; Hoffmann, The History of the German
Resistance, 19331945, pp. 517518, 529; Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, pp. 2667; BAMA,
N 5/24/1113.
Birn, Die Hoheren SS- und Polizeifhrer, pp. 2559, 341; Lappenkper, Der Schlachter von
Paris.
USNA, RG 242/T-175/65/25805622580563; Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is
Paris Burning? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), pp. 336, 468.
287
after the fall
Jackson, France. The Dark Years 19401944, p. 561; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/33/7; BAK
All. Proz. 21/209/3941.
BAMA, RH 19 IV/141/che 2/94; Jackson, France. The Dark Years, 19401944, pp. 5619.
BAMA, RH 3/206/30, 5759, 66, 95, 99; Jackel, France dans lEurope de Hitler, pp. 508,
520.
BAMA, RW 35/244247.
288
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289
after the fall
290
invasion and retreat
291
after the fall
preserve French sovereignty, the Vichy regime surpassed terms of the 1940
Armistice Agreement in an attempt to curry German favor, demonstrate
French loyalty, and secure a place in Hitlers new order. In return, the
Fhrer gave France the ashes of Napoleon Bonapartes son and four long
years of cold, hunger, and oppression.
The Vichy regime and, by extension, the French public, may not have
had any other realistic choice. Foreign communists associated with the
Main-duvre immigree answered Stalins call for resistance and carried out a
series of dramatic assassinations in 1941, but most French communists stuck
to propaganda and sabotage. Deadly German reprisals forced Charles de
Gaulle to back down in 1941 and underscored the folly of armed resistance
while German soldiers stood at the gates of Moscow. With few weapons
at their disposal, resistance forces could not attack Germany directly and
focused their ire on French collaborators in 1943 and 1944. Resistance
groups and the French public had to accommodate overwhelming German
repower.
Hitlers strategy succeeded in so far as it ran parallel to traditional goals,
long-standing prejudices, and popular stereotypes. Eager to avenge the
Versailles Agreement, many German ofcers overlooked unpalatable facets
of the Nazi regime, supported rearmament in the 1930s, and acquiesced
in aggressive foreign policy initiatives that culminated in World War
Two. Playing upon an institutional fear of partisans who operated behind
German lines, Hitler secured military support for an expanded denition
of reprisals that included racial opponents of the Nazi regime. Although
the scale and scope of cooperation between the Nazi party and German
army remains a controversial topic of historical inquiry, both Hitler and the
army shared some common goals. Despite the occasional pinch, Hitlers
Nazi glove usually t the Wehrmachts iron st quite well. Ofcers may
have complained about and bristled under Hitlers leadership on occasion,
but they endured ve long years of war before mounting a serious attempt
to overthrow the Nazi regime. By satisfying the armys desire for revenge
and manipulating a widespread fear of partisans, Hitler maintained control
over most of the Wehrmacht until the bitter end.
The French and Nazi governments, as well as the German military
administration, all accepted the fundamental legitimacy of the so-called
Jewish Question but could not agree upon a common answer to the alleged
problem. In a plebeian attempt to satisfy latent French anti-Semitism and
292
invasion and retreat
curry favor with the Nazi regime, the Vichy government inaugurated a
campaign against Jews in the press, stripped Jewish immigrants of their
French citizenship, and allowed prefects to imprison foreign Jews. Prime
Minister Laval created a temporary administration agency (SCAP) to take
over Jewish businesses and Aryanize the French economy. Admiral
Darlan created the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs (CGQJ) to
coordinate French anti-Semitic initiatives. Aggravating traditional anti-
Semitic prejudices that survived throughout Europe, Hitler enlisted French
support in comprehensive defamation, discrimination, and despoliation
campaigns.
Perceiving Jews as a security threat, the military administration deported
Jews from coastal provinces and ordered Jews to register with local police.
Playing upon widespread guerillaphobia within the German army, Hitler
also tried to enlist the MBF in the Final Solution via hostage executions.
Characterizing Otto von Stlpnagels response to resistance as much too
mild, the Fhrer directed the MBF to execute 50 to 100 hostages after
every resistance attack. Upping the ante in December 1941, Hitler allowed
military commanders to exchange hundreds of hostage executions for
thousands of deportations by way of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, and
ancillary documents reveal deportation as equivalent to death. In any case,
both hostages and deportees would be drawn from anti-German groups
that were, in Hitlers mind, invariably led by Jews and Jewish stooges. By
demanding immediate reprisals, Hitler guaranteed that investigators would
not have time to catch bona de perpetrators and ensured that reprisals
would fall squarely on the usual suspects: Jews. Otto von Stlpnagel
protested against Hitlers reprisal policy, resigned his command, and proved
that neither he nor the military administration could be relied upon
to wage Hitlers deadly war against the so-called international Jewish
conspiracy under the guise of reprisals.
Opposition to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and a lack of enthusiasm for
deadly reprisals discredited the MBF in the Fhrers eyes. In response,
Hitler placed French and German police forces in the hands of a man who
accepted his broad denition of security. Obergs appointment signaled
another major defeat for the military administration and provides further
Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitlers Second Book, translated by Krista Smith (New York: Enigma
Books, 2003), pp. 229234.
293
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294
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295
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Bibliography
ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS
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RH 36: Kommandanturen der Militarverwaltung.
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Record Group 242, Captured German Records.
T-77: Records of the Headquarters, German Armed Forces High Command
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T-78: Records of the German Army High Command (OKH).
T-120: Records of the German Foreign Ofce, 18871920 and 19201945.
after the fall
T-175: Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of German Police.
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Index
Abetz, Otto 528, 63, 66, 71, 72, 758, 88, 102, 113, 133, 137, 149, 157, 158,
79, 87, 112, 128, 142, 143, 1469, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169,
152, 164, 206, 207, 20810, 227, 228, 170, 171, 172, 174, 180, 195, 197, 198,
236, 253, 257, 260, 274, 2857, 295 218, 224, 238, 2689, 275, 280, 281,
Abwehr 65, 138, 158, 160, 180 294
Action Francaise 205 Aryan race and culture 54, 68, 119, 124,
Aero-Club 155 212, 215, 244
Africa corps 56 Aryanization process 61, 66, 180, 21116,
Ain (Swiss border) 269, 270 219; see also French economy
Alibert, Raphael 84, 86 Atignac, Joseph 206
Alliance Israelite Universelle 80 attentisme, see France; Vichy regime
Allied forces 25, 26, 28, 302, 122, 191, Auphan, Admiral Paul 5
195, 196, 197, 242, 274, 275 Auschwitz concentration camp, see
and bombing raids 83, 244, 261, 289 concentration camps
conquest of Sicily 202 Austria 11, 59, 83, 135, 226, 227
in North Africa 194; see also North German annexation of (Anschluss) 43,
Africa 199, 226
and prospects for victory 40, 167 see also Jews
and World War One 97 Axis powers 28, 39, 194, 195, 197, 221,
see also Allies, the; British forces; D-Day; 236, 242, 273
France; Normandy; United States retreat of the (1942) 194
Allies, the 1, 4, 17, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 39,
56, 147, 188, 241, 248, 27381, 2878 Badoglio, Marshal Pietro 241
Alsace 39, 47, 57, 58 Bahnke, Dr. 79
German annexation of 106, 291 Baku 26, 33
American Civil War 99 Balz, Rudolf 105
Andurain, Jacques d 135 Barbie, Klaus 239
Anglophiles 217 Bargatzky, Walter 276, 282, 284, 287
Anglo-Saxon hegemony 210 Bartov, Omer 1314
Anschluss, see Austria Battle of Britain 62, 74
anti-German activity by French resistance Baudouin, Paul 34, 39
groups 65, 122, 1345, 148, 173, 216, Baumettes prison camp 2656
217, 218, 293 Bavaria (relief train) 47
anti-Semitism 16, 19, 50, 68, 111, 196, Beck, General Ludwig 12, 170, 281, 283
199200, 20910; see also Final Beer Hall Putsch (1923) 59, 68
Solution to the Jewish Question; Behr, Baron Kurt von 78
France; Hitler; Jews; SS; Vichy regime Belgium 30, 41, 44, 111, 149, 150, 151, 178,
Arc de Triomphe 65 221, 223, 230, 257, 258
Ardennes 26, 31, 39 German invasion of (1940) 24, 26, 302
Argonne 39 and World War One 85, 97, 111
Armee Secrete (Armee Sauckel) 250 see also Jews
Armed Forces High Command Benoist-Mechin, Jacques 144
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or Berlin 21, 23, 41, 48, 50, 56, 61, 65, 66, 72,
OKW) 12, 15, 24, 41, 60, 71, 74, 87, 73, 79, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 97, 111,
index
316
index
317
index
Dunkirk 34, 194 in France 20, 90, 1978, 200, 206, 211,
British escape from 62, 274 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, 226, 227,
German capture of (1940) 32 230, 235, 245, 263, 293, 294
Dyle plan 30 in the Italian zone 241
Finckh, Colonel Eberhard 2812, 287
Eastern Front, ghting on the 86, 87, 109, Finland 26, 34
119, 129, 159, 165, 166, 177, 190, 195, Soviet invasion of (1939) 26, 33
196, 229, 248 Flanders 39
Eben Emael (Belgian fortress) 30 Foch, Marshal Ferdinand 36, 58
Ebert, Dr. Georg 778 Fort de lEst and Fresne military prison 284
Ecole Rabbinique 80 France 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20,
Egypt 194 24, 25, 28, 334, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44,
Eichmann, Adolf 199, 225, 226, 22930, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64,
2345, 236, 237, 238, 240, 242, 83, 84, 95, 98, 128, 133, 134, 135, 143,
290 148, 149, 151, 160, 167, 169, 178, 197,
Einsatzstab Rosenberg 18, 19, 20, 54, 61, 237
62, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 7688, 130, agreement with Italy (1940) 36
165, 199, 200, 208, 291, 293 Allied invasion of 206, 242, 243, 263,
and anti-German conspiracies 70, 73, 78, 267, 27395
80, 85, 130, 218, 225, 264 anti-Semitism in 199201, 205, 206,
Eisenhower, General Dwight D. 277, 280, 217, 222, 227
288 and the attentiste (wait and see)
England 38 attitude 36, 134, 148, 167, 203,
German planned invasion of 47, 216 264
English Channel 26, 32, 199, 200, 211, civilian crimes in 10611
216, 219 declaration of war against Great Britain
Europe 1, 11, 44, 95, 122, 132, 166, 180, and the United States 56
194, 196, 197 German anti-partisan policy in 89, 106,
conquest of Western 61, 64, 179 119, 122, 1245, 157, 161, 165, 177,
Eastern 9, 59, 135, 158, 216 180, 193, 196, 244, 270, 271, 2734
European France exhibition 209 German conscation policy in 7188
executions 279 German invasion of (1940) 24, 25, 28,
hostage 173, 174, 186, 189, 190, 1923, 30, 313, 166, 170, 194, 247
217, 270, 274, 290 German occupation of southern
mass 141, 163, 165, 166, 169 (1942) 238
see also French resistance; Hitler, Adolf; the HSSuPF in 17893, 197, 224, 236,
Jews 238
and immigration 201
Liberation of (1944) 1, 2, 7, 190, 192,
Falkenhausen, General Alexander von 41, 193, 206, 272, 27395
44, 46, 150, 151, 152, 178 politics in 3, 5, 33
fascism 33, 112; see also Mussolini, Benito rearmament of 33, 36
Federation Republicaine 205 SS court in 1912
Ferdinand, Franz, assassination of (1914) 85 Second Empire (1870) 96
Fighting League for German Culture 68 sword and shield theory in 24
Final Solution to the Jewish Question 11, Third Republic 2, 54, 201, 264
18, 72, 1245, 1323, 158, 166, 174, unoccupied 47, 48, 54, 60, 71, 183, 205,
17980, 196, 198, 200, 217, 221, 222, 206, 207, 220, 231, 232, 233, 234,
226, 228, 230, 235 259, 290
318
index
and World War One 97 French communists 4, 36, 65, 66, 104, 112,
see also Final Solution to the Jewish 113, 115, 125, 134, 149, 169, 176, 186,
Question; Vichy regime; 195, 209, 210, 217, 225, 226, 243, 288,
occupation, French 292
Franco, General Francisco 183 deportation of 160, 1578, 165, 169,
Franco-German accommodation 9, 107, 174
291 execution of 138, 146, 149, 159, 163,
Franco-German Armistice Agreement 173, 176, 189, 289
(1940) 4, 6, 9, 17, 18, 33, 3540, 48, persecution of 11319, 121, 123, 124,
50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66, 88, 112, 134, 149, 180, 187, 218, 238, 242
128, 134, 142, 164, 199, 203, 211, 221, French economy 38, 45, 50, 55, 5961,
246, 250, 254, 292 130, 152, 203, 221, 249, 251, 259
Franco-German Armistice Commission 38, Aryanization (arisierung) of 66, 130,
56, 5960, 77, 86, 171, 253, 281 199200, 203, 21116, 219, 293
Franco-German collaboration 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, French government, see Vichy regime
9, 534, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 66, 77, 89, French law 83, 84
106, 128, 136, 141, 146, 147, 161, 187, French liberals 112
188, 199, 202, 203, 207, 222, 223, 243, French Ministries:
272 of Finance 204
economic 17, 378, 88, 162, 223, 290 of the Interior 184
and resistance 6, 7, 8, 21, 134, 167; see of Justice 114
also French resistance French National Assembly 143
see also Franco-German relations 1875 Constitution 143
Franco-German peace settlement 87, 141, French nationalists 134, 217
161 French navy 37, 39, 40
Franco-German relations 5, 19, 21, 367, French police 15, 20, 54, 67, 112, 113, 114,
38, 52, 53, 58, 62, 63, 72, 113, 135, 117, 122, 130, 137, 147, 160, 1689,
140, 144, 184, 223, 254; see also 173, 1779, 182, 1848, 192, 200,
Franco-German collaboration 207, 211, 216, 217, 219, 220, 223, 224,
Franco-Prussian War 96, 110, 274 227, 2301, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237,
Francs Tireurs et Partisans/ Mouvement 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 250,
Ouvrier International (FTP/ MOI) 189 2601, 263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 271,
Frank, Hans 179 279, 288, 289, 291, 293, 294
Freemasons 53, 85, 87, 209, 210, 243 French resistance 3, 6, 8, 9, 1718, 19, 34,
French anarchists 104, 11314, 187, 217 67, 77, 80, 87, 89, 90, 95, 105, 106,
French army 6, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 58, 110, 11233, 1345, 145, 148, 149,
95, 112, 167 155, 1567, 160, 161, 166, 167, 172,
Spanish campaign (1808) 956 176, 177, 18892, 200, 216, 21719,
French business and industry 38, 50, 61, 222, 223, 226, 2389, 241, 24772,
158, 2034, 211, 24853, 294 275, 276, 279, 280, 288, 2901, 292
French Communist Party (Parti Communist and German reprisal policy 1357, 168,
Francais or PCF) 3, 33, 34, 667, 112, 172, 175, 177, 180, 187, 188, 190,
11314, 117, 1345, 138, 162, 175, 192, 193, 21718, 2389, 276, 279
217, 218 and suspected British activity 137, 138,
bataillons de la jeunesse 135, 172, 1756 141, 150, 188
groupes de brulots 135, 139, 152, 155, 157, propaganda for leaets and newspapers
160 distributed by resistance groups 50,
Main-doeuvre immigree (MOI) 135, 292 112, 173, 255
and policy of resistance 134, 140, 155 trials of members of the 1757, 191
see also French communists French Revolution 95, 96
319
index
French workers 9, 127, 128, 160, 169, 172, German forces 1, 6, 23, 32, 43, 48, 83, 102,
253, 287; see also deportations, labor 109, 110, 112, 122, 128, 129, 159, 162,
Frejus (Var department) 266 195, 197, 241, 243, 258, 259, 261, 268,
Frick, Wilhelm 49 269, 271, 275, 277, 280, 287
Fromm, General Friedrich 283 German Foreign Ministry 52, 69, 207, 235,
Fuhrerbefehl 11, 40, 87 237
German Foreign Ofce 9, 51, 52, 53, 55,
Gabolde, Maurice 202 59, 60, 61, 75, 79, 86, 113, 136, 148,
Gamelin, General Maurice 23, 24, 30, 32 222, 241
Gaulle, General Charles de 2, 3, 6, 35, 134, German Imperial Army 245, 50, 100,
146, 217, 279, 288 196
and the Free French movement 145 German law 71, 72, 73
and the French National Committee German military administration 16, 17, 18,
(CNF) 145 19, 20, 212, 55, 72, 108, 115,
and the French people 148 11718, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 140,
and German reprisals 145, 292 142, 147, 148, 149, 161, 173, 183, 199,
and the sword and shield theory 2, 3, 200, 204, 211, 216, 217, 224, 248, 250,
143 251, 252, 264, 276, 288, 289, 291, 293,
Gaullists 137, 148, 217 294
Geissler, Kurt (SS Hauptsturmfuhrer) 66 German Ministries:
Geneva Convention 1, 73, 195, 261, 294 of Armaments and Munitions 60
rst (1864) 90 of Economics 601
second (1929) 934, 96, 97 of Finance 84
genocide 9, 158, 165, 218 of the Interior 45
George, Stefan 53 of Propaganda 69, 77, 140, 150
Georges, Pierre (aka Fredo and later see also German Foreign Ministry
Colonel Fabien) 135 German navy 172
Gerlier, Cardinal Pierre-Marie 202, 236 German police 1067, 108, 110, 120, 122,
German Africa Corps 155, 194 160, 168, 173, 1778, 182, 184, 191,
German army 914, 15, 16, 20, 24, 30, 38, 193, 217, 220, 223, 224, 228, 232, 234,
44, 50, 76, 79, 85, 86, 104, 107, 108, 241, 242, 243, 250, 257, 2601, 262,
122, 126, 136, 177, 187, 192, 193, 200, 263, 265, 269, 271, 279, 290, 293
211, 220, 221, 222, 224, 273, 279, 292 German U-boats 172
civilian attacks against the 104, 107, 108, German war economy 16, 18, 24, 28, 38,
109, 114, 127; see also French 45, 160, 223, 2479, 262, 263
resistance German war effort 8, 33, 38, 40, 49, 57, 61,
see also German forces; Luftwaffe; 67, 71, 81, 87, 105, 112, 120, 127, 162,
Wehrmacht 169, 200, 211, 213, 216, 221, 252, 263,
German Army Groups 26, 312, 171, 197, 286, 294
198, 276 Germany 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 23, 26, 28, 30, 35,
German Army High Command 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 49, 50, 55, 56, 58,
(Oberkommando des Heeres or 59, 63, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
OKH) 10, 12, 24, 41, 48, 50, 65, 76, 81, 84, 86, 87, 96, 98, 110, 116, 117,
81, 86, 88, 119, 128, 132, 137, 145, 118, 122, 123, 125, 128, 134, 140, 141,
159, 162, 170, 171, 175, 195, 197, 198, 142, 143, 144, 151, 160, 162, 167, 170,
203, 224, 273 173, 180, 187, 193, 1956, 206, 211,
German consumer market 17, 2478 214, 221, 237, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253,
German farms and factories 2478, 250, 254, 256, 257, 258, 261, 264, 265, 269,
258, 261 279, 280, 286, 288, 292, 295
320
index
321
index
322
index
extermination of 12, 158, 168, 179, 220, Kohl, Lieutenant-General Otto 230
227, 289 Kraewel, Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt
foreign 8, 9, 15, 204, 207, 213, 227, 228, von 282, 287
230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, Krakow 14
237, 239, 241, 243, 245 Krancke, Admiral Theodor 2856
French 8, 15, 20, 54, 66, 67, 80, 106, Kubler, Dr. 154
117, 130, 132, 2013, 204, 205, Kuchler, General Georg von 64
206, 207, 209, 214, 216, 218, Kummel, Dr. Otto 745
22046, 265, 289, 291, 293 Kunsberg, Baron Eberhard von 75, 789,
German 232, 236 208
Greek 220, 237
Hungarian 220, 221, 236 LIllustration 54
Italian 221, 222, 235 La France au Travail 54
Lithuanian 237 La Gerbe 54
Polish 217, 228, 232, 236 La Patrie 4, 23
Portuguese 235 La Roche-Guyon 283, 284, 285
Rumanian 237 La Roziere, Frederic de 140
Russian 232 La Vie Nationale 54
Serbian 179, 223 labor, forced 16, 257; see also deportations,
Spanish 235 labor
and the Star of David 240 labor camps 244; see also deportations,
stateless 202, 232, 238 labor
sterilization of 196 Lammers, Dr. Hans 823, 86, 125, 1512,
Swiss 235 178, 262
Yugoslav 221, 237 Lao-Tzu 43
see also anti-Semitism; Final solution to Laval, Pierre 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 37, 55, 56, 58,
the Jewish Question 62, 106, 129, 147, 1667, 172, 1846,
Jodl, General Alfred 10, 166, 245, 288, 201, 2034, 205, 206, 207, 210, 212,
290 219, 231, 234, 236, 240, 242, 249,
Jouvenel, Bertrand de 53 2525, 257, 25861, 263, 264, 289,
Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy 136, 158, 218 290, 291, 293
Junger, Ernst 282 Laval governments:
Jura 270 rst 204
second 167, 172, 245
Kaiserreich 11, 44, 101 Le Berre, Maurice 135
Kalbhenn, First Lieutenant 136 Le Havre 271
Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm 10, 24, 25, attack (1942) 1723
41, 48, 64, 71, 734, 76, 77, 7982, Lebrun, President 35
85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 113, 122, 123, 125, Leclerc, General 288
126, 127, 129, 137, 138, 155, 157, Free French forces 277, 288
159, 1623, 164, 165, 166, 179, 180, Leeb, General Wilhelm 64
181, 183, 190, 192, 196, 218, 252, Leguay, Jean 2301, 233, 236
262, 268, 274, 275, 276, 286, 288, Leipzig 97
289 Lequerica, Senor de 35
King Haakon VII 52 Librairie Lipschutz 80
Kluge, Hans Gunther von 195, 2836 Libya 194
Knochen, Helmut 65, 66, 117, 129, 130, Lietzmann, Admiral Joachim 115
132, 182, 183, 202, 203, 212, 224, 225, Limoges 197, 266
226, 229, 231, 232, 233, 23442, 244, Linstow, Colonel Hans Otfried von 196,
257, 267, 274, 2846, 290, 295 2689, 2826
323
index
Lioust, Leon 172 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
Lischka, Kurt 225, 226, 232, 235 1035, 1067, 108, 110, 113, 115,
Lloyd George, David 97 117, 11928, 130, 132, 133, 137, 138,
London 2, 6, 23, 134, 145, 194 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 149,
Long March, Maos 44 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158,
Lorraine 39, 47, 57, 58 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 177, 178, 181,
German annexation of 106, 221, 291 182, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 196,
Louvre, the 62, 66, 75, 81, 85 197, 198, 199, 200, 208, 209, 210, 211,
Low Countries 24, 62, 220 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 223,
German invasion of the (1940) 302 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 237, 240, 244,
Luchaire, Jean 53 245, 251, 252, 257, 260, 263, 267, 268,
Luftwaffe 28, 62, 82, 157, 165, 189, 230, 269, 271, 273, 274, 2767, 280, 281,
239, 285 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290,
Luxembourg, German invasion of 293, 294
(1940) 30 command staff (Kommandostab) 44, 45,
Lyon 197, 216, 239, 242 118, 127, 136, 152, 153
military administration staff
Mackensen, General August von 14 (Militarverwaltungstab or
Mackenson, Hans Georg von 241 MVW) 447, 50, 601, 73, 746,
Mandel, Georges 35 7883, 87, 1067, 109, 112, 114,
Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von 10, 25, 152, 186, 208, 212, 214, 215, 217,
26, 97, 170 218, 227, 251, 256, 257, 263, 282,
Mao Zedong 44 288
Marin, Louis 35 Militargesetzbuch (military penal code) 191,
Marquet, Adrien 66 268, 276
Marrus, Michael 5, 222; see also Paxton, military doctrine:
Robert American 99100, 102
Marseille 197, 216, 242, 2647 British 98, 100, 102
German round-up in 2389 French 99, 100, 102
see also Operation Tiger German 1003, 122, 129; see also Decree
Masonic lodges, archives and libraries 66, concerning Military
73, 77, 78, 80, 225 Jurisdiction . . . ; Decree concerning
Maurras, Charles 201 Special Military Crimes . . .
Maxims (Paris restaurant) 63 Miller, Captain Perry 279
Medicus, Dr. Franz Albrecht 13840, 154 Moltke, Helmuth James Graf von 281
Messerschmidt, Manfred 12, 14 Montoire agreement 139
Metternich, Franz Graf Wolff 746, 789, Montoire conference (1940) 56, 58, 142,
82, 87, 208 155
Meuse river 26, 31 Montpellier 197
Michel, Elmar 60, 212, 256, 2823, 287, Moquet, Guy 138
295 Moravia 249
Milch, Erhard 262 German occupation of (1939) 33, 36
Milice (French paramilitary group) 206, Moscow 119, 123, 127, 292
244, 269, 271 Moscow Conference (1943) 1
Militarbefehlshaber in Belgien und nordwest Moscow Declaration (1943) 277
Frankfreich (MBB) 41, 151, 162, 178, Moser, assassination of Alfons (Moser
197 affair) 11418, 119, 121, 127, 129,
Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF) 15, 132, 135, 141, 145, 149, 150, 289
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 413, 44, 48, Moulin de Labarthete, Henri du 143,
50, 55, 62, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 147
324
index
325
index
326
index
327
index
Spartaco, Guisco 135, 136 plot against the Nazi regime 15, 168,
Speer, Albert 249, 262 170, 268, 274, 2817, 294
Speidel, Colonel Hans 62, 118, 1612, see also Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich
196, 216, 283 (MBF)
Sperrle, Hugo 189, 2678, 271 Stulpnagel, Joachim 16970
SS (Schutzstaffeln) 9, 1011, 13, 14, 15, 16, Stulpnagel, Joachim (C.-H. Stulpnagels
1718, 19, 20, 21, 42, 45, 637, 72, son) 170
73, 76, 80, 85, 89, 113, 119, 130, 131, Stulpnagel, General Otto von (MBF) 15,
132, 133, 136, 155, 158, 162, 166, 168, 16, 17, 19, 43, 46, 63, 71, 76, 85, 86,
171, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 88, 1046, 111, 113, 115, 11723,
187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 196, 203, 207, 125, 1269, 130, 132, 133, 1356,
210, 225, 242, 250, 266, 26971, 274, 137, 13940, 141, 144, 145, 146,
279, 2805, 287, 288, 290, 291, 294 14850, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 158,
and anti-German conspiracies 70, 73, 78, 159, 1601, 162, 163, 168, 169, 171,
80, 85, 130, 218, 225, 264 172, 174, 177, 179, 180, 183, 190, 208,
anti-Semitic activity 200, 202, 206, 218, 211, 213, 215, 218, 225, 237, 257, 281,
219, 222, 223, 2268, 230, 236, 2901, 294
237, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 250, resignation of 1636, 175, 293
263, 264 see also Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich
Einsatzgruppen 14, 42, 64, 224 (MBF)
Judenrat 199, 227 Supreme Allied War Council 28
and the life unworthy of living Supreme command for German forces in
(lebensunwertes Leben) program 64 the West (Oberbefehlshaber West or Ob
see also Black Corps West) 197, 198, 259, 267, 26871,
SS-Abwehrs ten commandments (zehn 2757, 2814, 2878
Gebote) 180, 182 Sweden 220, 222
SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or Sweets, John 7
SD) 64, 65, 77, 115, 117, 119, 129, sword and shield theory 26, 143
136, 138, 157, 158, 160, 166, 183, 191, synagogues 19, 66, 74, 80; see also Paris
199, 224, 226, 266, 268, 275, 276 Syria 26, 56
Stalin, Joseph 28, 33, 67, 112, 292
Stauffenberg, Claus von 2824 Taoism 43
Stauffenberg family 281, 287 Tardif, Raymond 173
Stauffenbergs plot against Hitler (20 July Teuchert, Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich
coup), see Hitler, Adolf Freiherr von 282, 284, 287
Stieff, Major-General Helmuth 283 Third Reich 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 28, 33,
Strasser, Gregor 63 37, 39, 40, 47, 48, 54, 56, 58, 59, 62,
Streccius, General Alfred 43, 46, 65, 88, 63, 65, 67, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 100, 106,
103, 106, 211, 267 133, 140, 141, 143, 150, 157, 164, 179,
Measures to Prevent Sabotage 1034, 180, 182, 187, 188, 192, 196, 198, 206,
111, 122 214, 217, 221, 231, 236, 244, 248, 249,
Streit, Christian 12, 13, 14 251, 253, 255, 257, 258, 259, 261, 268,
Stresemann, Gustav 53 291
Stulpnagel, Carl-Heinrich von (MBF) 15, Thomas, General Georg 60
16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 59, 16878, 181, Thomas, Dr. Max (SS Brigadefuhrer) 65, 66,
182, 1834, 190, 192, 196, 197, 257, 73, 118, 132, 2245, 226, 291
268, 281, 286, 290, 294 Thorez, Maurice 34, 112
and deportations 1745, 218 Thuringia 249
execution of (August 1944) 286 Todt, Fritz 60, 249, 252
328
index
329
index
330