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lntercultural Negotiation
269
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lntercultural Negotiation 271
Negotiating is a special communication task. It occurs when two or more parties have
common interests and therefore have a reason to work together, but who also have con-
flicts about their goals and how to accomplish them. Negotiation is the communication
that takes place in order to reach agreement about how to handle both co1IU11on and con-
flicting interests between two or more parties. Negotiation always has an element of per-
. suasion in it.
Negotiating "how-to" books abound. Some authorities on negotiation claim cultural
difference is only one of many factors and may boil down to being "simply differences in
style and language,"! But this view asswnes that negotiating skills are value-free and are the
same around the world, like the rules of chess for opening moves, middle game, and
endgame.
One interculturalist has this to say about negotiation: .
In the US A several books have appeared on the art of negotiation; it is a popular theme for train-
ing courses. Negotiation; have even been simulated in computer programs, which use a mathe-
matical theory of games to calculate the optimal choice in a negotiation situation. These
approaches are largely irrelevant.2
This critical view comes from the author's observation that the books and simulation
games are based on the asswnption that both sides have the values of the United States.
Raymond Cohen refers to the "instrumental and manipulative" style of negotiators from
the United States.3 . ...
Not only does this view mistakenly discount the role of culture;ii\iftaming the priori-
ties of negotiators, it also overlooks what happens when people from different cultures in-
teract. The interaction produces a communication situation that is the product of both
cultures and of the personalities of both teams, which in Chapter I we called transactional
culture.
Culture tells negotiators what is important and what they can block out because it
doesn't fit their shape of reality; culture enables them to assign meaning to the other
;in Chapter 9
side's communication and guess at the other side's motives. 4 Therefore, to nego
fectively, intercultural negotiators not only need special communication skills,
need to understand their own and the other team's culture. They need to be able to
from behavior they use in their own culture to the behavior that will be most ap.1)
for another culture.
The Chinese were painfully conscious of being perceived to be lagging behind in the
latest technology, and their sense ofnational honor made them determined to show China's
technological savvy. Thus, part of the Chinese objective was to learn more about the en-
gineering of the equipment so they could eventually copy the process and produce their
own, in a process known as reverse engineering.
, Once the negotiations were well under way, the Canadians focused on points of con-
tention that remained unresolved; the Chinese preferred to focus on what had already been
agreed. The Canadians found the Chinese slow and unwilling to be specific about the out-
standing problems; the Chinese found the Canadians assertive and too absorbed with the
negative, unresolved conflicts.
Chinese party secretary, who also had his own personal agenda to consider, sent Up; ',
provincial government a report on the manager's decision to buy the.Japanese eq - at
the lower price. This enhanced his personal standing as a shrewd negotiator. lie
mention the higher price of the pattern cylinders. .
Pattern cylinders were the costliest part ofthe equipment. Since Li wanted his firm duce
more than one pattern, his expense in the end was no lower than it would have been.-' the
Canadian product. (Subsequently Li felt he had not negotiated well with the Japan - cause
the pattern cylinders had to be replaced more frequently than originally piano
As for the maintenance issue, the Japanese firm was happy to supply someone to. _
th Cese .ho to maintain and troubleshoot the eqI?nt.. Tuey planned o keept
n:1mer m China ":1 order to learn about other i_narket possibilities. Ofcourse, the distance.
Jiangsu to Japan rs about one-fifteenth the distance to the Canwall head office. Tue
employee could go home frequently, whereas for a Canadian such travel would be very . ?
J]:Zi
. , .
entertainment in order to give the Chinese a chance to share some experiences with :,
and chat informally. They want to cultivate a sense of friendship and, with it, obligatf
Then they wilJ pursue their goals by appealing to the obligation of friendship. : JJ
Relationships need a context in which to flourish, so the Chinese spent time givi jl
background information and reminding the Canadians of historical China-Canada ti"
Their valueof harmony in group interactions means they prefer to focus on the things ,
already have been agreed upon rather than on conflicts that remain unresolved. They/
careful to avoid displays of anger or express criticism that might cause loss of face: .
the other side. However, they are masterful at using shame, which only works when.e
side can be alleged to be guilty of misconduct that jeopardizes negotiations. Pointing,_
the inconsistencies in the specifications was a Wrrf of causing the Canadians shame(
thereby moving the Canadians to a weaker negotiating position. (The Canadians, how :
missed this maneuver, so it didn't produce shame or concessions.) ,= In
negotiations the Chinese often dwell at length on technical details. They want tot(I
derstand the technology; they also want to be sure they are being told the same thing.' ::
time. Since in general the Chinese do not use question asking as a primary lea
method the way Westerners do, they often ask questions in order to verify the accura t_
what they have been told, as much as to find out something they have not understood.At
lntercultural Negotiation 21'5
ing questions is also a way to get to know someone, to-develop an understanding of some-
one, and build a relationship.
The Chinese perform tasks simultaneously; a telephone call may be taken by some-
one on the negotiating team who disappears and then reappears without explanation. The
Canadians viewed this as a most unusual interruption-either a sign of their low status in the
eyes of the Chinese or, more probably, an indication of an emergency of grave impor- tance-
-but that is because Canadians tend to do tasks sequentially, devoting their entire attention
to only one thing at a time.
The Chinese have a preference for form in negotiations or, in other words, for follow-
ing a specific protocol. This usually means that the opening discussion will be very for-
mally conducted. The host side will first describe themselves-who they are and what they
do-with many statistics. Then they will expect the guests (in this case the Qanadians) to do
the same. None of this has any real relevance to the issue being negotiated/but this form is
important. The preference for form and correct manner-s-which preserves the harmony
mentioned earlier-provides the context within which the negotiations will take place.
The most important person on the negotiating team from the Chinese perspective is the
one who is most senior in age; this is a key, along with membership in the Chinese Com-
munist party, in the hierarchy of the Chinese workplace. This will probably be true of their
own team, although the key persons may not be much in evidence during the negotiations. It
will also be true of the Chinese perception'of your negotiating team.
Since access to authority is mediated in Chinese culture, the real decision-swaying
power may not be identifiable to a foreigner. The municipal party officials were the ones
who, while not determining the purchase of the wallpaper printing equipment, neverthe-
less were involved because their goodwill could be crucial to Manager Li. The peoplewith
the authority to make decisions-the manager, the powerful municipal officiab,.JlJlQJhe
most powerful people in the factory-were no doubt all Communist party ri1m!iyJ'SfJittj
network of obligations would also have played a role. . . . . . . . . . . .-. . -
Interdependence characterizes Chinese social organization,' and the merribers ot1:e
Chinese team are conscious of representing a larger collective. The employees of the fac-
tory, from the mariager down, will probably spend their entire working lives in that fac-
tory. The county officials may never change jobs either. Their work colleagues are also
their neighbors; many are even relatives. Even after retirement employees are still associ-
ated with their workplace, which provides housing, access to. food and other products,
health care, and many other services.
Since the Chinese value relationships and can accept failure in specific undertakings as
long as the relationships are intact, they can tolerate uncertainty about outcomes. If
success doesn't come this time, it may come the next. As long as the relationship has not
been ruptured, there is always a chance for future cooperation. The Canadians viewed the
loss of the sale as the end of their dealings with this factory.
Awareness of these cultural priorities can help Burton and Raines prepare for their next
Chinese sale and can help you too regardless of your own culture or the unfamiliar one
with which you want to negotiate. Neither side is right or wrong;just different, But as sell ers
in this case, the Canadians probably need to develop more understanding of cultural
priorities than the Chinese.
This chapter will now address the factors in. negotiations. They include exctations for
outcomes, the makeupof the team, the physical context of the negotiation, communica
tion, and style ofnegotiating. A discussion ofthe phases ofnegotiation follows the factors.
-76 Chapter 9
FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION
The remainder of this chapter looks at negotiating with these aspects in mind:
Expectations for negotiation outcomes.
Team members: makeup and motivation.
Physical factors.
Communication and negotiating style.
The aim of this discussion is to show how culture affects negotiations. A mun.
books on how to negotiate exist in your own culture. Primarily, since this is a book'.
communication, we'll concentrate on the fourth item. But we'll examine all four of
negotiating, beginning with expectations for what the negotiations will accomplis"
Expectations for Outcomes
Different Goals _
Different sides of the negotiating table often seem to be after very different things. ,
may appear to be the result ofshrewd negotiating tactics-and maybe it isin which a
doesn't disclose openly what its goals are. You may decide the other team is craftily hi .
what it wants behind some other, seemingly unimportant aims. But another reason fol"'.
obliqueness may simply be that they want something different from what you think
want. People from different cultures often are looking for different outcomes. As fai;
possible, you need to identify ahead of time what the probable goals of the other side ,
For example, in case of the Chinese-Canadian negotiation the Chinese had four go
{ I ) to buy the best quality they could find at the very best world price, (2) to develop,
ongoing relationship with Canwall, and, importantly, (3) to learn as much as they co
about Canwall 's new technology. Had the contract been signed, the Chinese also wo
have expected (4) exclusive access to the Canadian equipment. The Canadians understc
only the first of the Chinese negotiation goals. The second goal may drive the opening ,
counters with high-context cultures.
For high-context negotiators, then, the initial concern is to exchange the sterility of the business
files that are tossed on their desks for a tangible sense of the humanity of the other side. 5
Fairness andAdvantage ,_ -c
As the case shows, the Chinese were interested in developing a relationship. Negotiating
teams from India, Korea, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore-as well as teams from Afri ::
Middle Eastern, Latin American, and southern European cultures-usually are too. A : ,.
lationship, as was discussed in Chapter 4, implies to most Asians a willingness to incur
debtedness. This may help explain the tendency among countries on the lower end of
technology scale, as illustrated in the opening case, to believe the wealthier, more
vanced side should give proportionately more than the less advanced, less wealthy co .
try. The less advanced team will thus be indebted to the other party in the relationship. Th _ ,
payback date, however, may be far into the future, since the collectivist view of relatio .
ships is they extend for generations. The Philippines and Indonesia are among the co
tries today that are looking to bridge the digital divide.
North Americans and Europeans are not usually happy with an agreement that giv
one side greater advantage than the other. They are accustomed to thinking of a "fair" s
lntercultura/ Negotiation 277
tlement as one that evenhandedly splits advantage between the two parties. But obviously the
50-50 ideal is not shared among all cultures. As some researchers point out, the use of the
English term fair play does not seem to be translatable into some other languages; if the term
does not exist, it is likely the identical concept does not exist either.6
Negotiation Outcomes: Winning, Losing, and Reaching a Stalemate
Competition cultures, especially those that put a strong priority on achievement, doing,
accomplishing goals through planning and taking control, and national or family honor
(powerful in Middle Eastern and Korean companies, for example), look upon negotiations as
situations to win.
Winning means not having to make concessions beyond the reserve point-the bar- _
gaining limit established by a negotiating team before the negotiations begin-in order to
gain the team's objectives. Winning can also mean you have achieved an agreement in
which the other side gives up more than you do.
In order to "win," a team may have to give up some wished-for things. Compromise is a
standard expectation in bargaining and negotiation in many Western countries (see also the
discussion on conflict resolution in Chapter 8). The notion of fairness in these cultures means
both sides have to give a bit, and the bits are equal. A good end is achieved when the
compromises made by each side are about the same size. However, you may need to be
careful about using the word compromise:
In some cultures, such as Iran, the term 'compromise' has moral connotations and implies a cor-
rupt betrayal of principle. So it has to be kept out of your vocabulary. 7
The presence of a high-level person on the team also signals the authority to make a
binding agreement. But some companies delegate that authority to other team members
when a high-status person is not part of the team. Negotiators from the United States, for
example, value efficiency-achieving goals with the smallest expenditure of time and
money-more than status. Consequently, they view as wasteful the practice of sending a
team to negotiate that has to keep going back to higher authorities at home for decisions.
They want their negotiating team to be able to conclude an agreement on the spot. Kore
ans, with their Confacian value of respect for seniority, want their older and higher-status
authorities to exercise their judgment about agreements. If the senior person is in Korea
and the negotiations take place in another country, time has to be allowed for the senior
rson to be reached and the progress of the talks discussed.
The Translator
One of the most important people on the team is the translator. This role is discussed also
in Chapter 2. Many negotiating teams choose not to take their own translator but instead to
depend on the host country to supply a translator. This is usually a mistake. Obviously, a
translator's first loyalty is to his or her employer; the Chinese who supplied the transla- tor
to the Canadians in the case example could have asked the translator for daily reports on
what the Canadians said when they were alone with her. This would-have given the Chi nese
a great advantage in the negotiations. Similarly, a Chinese team in another country would
be wise to bring its own translator.
Having your own translator means you have an ear to hear what the other team says in
side conversations and comments among themselves. English-speaking teams frequently
rely on the widespread use of English around the globe; they assume it is possible to nego
tiate in English-and cheaper-if they don't have to take a translator with them. But they
miss out. They don't understand what the other team is saying when its members converse
in their own language. When the English-speaking team has a side conversation, however,
the other team's translator and English-speaking members can understand what is being said.
Another benefit of having your own translator is the translations by the other side's
translator can be heard and understood by yours. This means errors or omissions-which
are frequently unintentional-scan be corrected immediately. Translation is extremely hard
work and doesn't stop just because the formal session is over. At social gatherings the trans-
lators workjust as hard as they do at the meeting table. It is understandabI e that a tired trans-
lator may misunderstand or mistranslate. A second translator offers a check against errors.
280 Chapter 9
---------------------------------.-
1
2'k2 Chapter 9
with the result that the hosts control the order in which issues are addressed while giving the
appearance of concern for the guests' comfort. The order of the items discussed on the agenda
can have an impact on the outcome. If the two sides agree to one principle or goal, then
subsequent points may be presented as simply subsidiary to what has already been
agreed. If the decision has been made to use a particular supply source of a raw material in
a joint-venture manufacturing project, then the inclusion of a member ofthe supply or-
ganization on the board may seem a logical subsequent decision. But if the issue of mem-
bership on the board were addressedfirst, the decision might be different.
The power of the keeper ofthe agenda is considerable, determining when meetings take
place and what amount of time is allotted to discuss which issues. An issue that isn't on
the agenda may never be discussed. The visiting team has to be alert to its responsibility
to participate in setting the agenda, i;
Negotiators often also operate from a "hidden agenda" that is not shared with the other
side. The "open agenda" contains the agreed items for discussion; the "hidden agenda" is
the priorities a team has agreed upon privately.
Arab negotiators may have different ideas about how much sharing of priorities they
are willing to do compared with, say, British negotiators.
UseofTime
The use of time is related to the agenda. Monochronic cultures see time as moving
through the agenda in a linear pattern and excluding whatevris not scheduled. Poly
chronic cultures see time as allowing simultaneous activities thattake as long as they need to,
even if that means bending the schedule, and including whatever needs attention. (These
concepts were briefly introduced in Chapter 3.) When negotiators from mono chronic
cultures face polychronic negotiators, the guests have the greater responsibility to
accommodate to the hosts.
Russians often use time to their advantage as part of the nonverbal communication in
negotiations. For instance, they may delay negotiations in order to make the other side anx
ious. This behavior toward North Americans, for instance, is based on two assumptions:
they "regard compromise as both desirable and inevitable, and . . . Americans feel frus-
tration and failure when agreements are not reached promptly."13
. ,. . --.. ......-_
!X.la4 . Chapter 9
Negotiators from the United States are well known for their impatience. Timothy::,
nett, a United States trade negotiator to Mexico, characterizes his countrymen and;
trywomen as thinking that some solution is better than no solution, which leads .
compromise more than their Mexican counterparts.14 Decades ofnegotiations have. the
Japanese that Westerners, especially delegates from the United States, are not
If the Japanese prolong the negotiations sufficiently, the Westerners will probably to
whatever the Japanese want In Japan, however, to take time is to show maturi
wisdom. Haste shows poor judgment and lack of genuine commitment. Foreign n
tors who go to the Middle East often complain that they don't get meetings. Forei
gotiators who go to Latin America complain that they have Jo wait. In Asia fo
negotiators complain they do too much sight-seeing and not enough negotiating.
United 'States foreign negotiators often feel rushed.
Host Hospitality
. "[In Hungary] we drink palinka, a plum or cherry brandy. It's 200 proof. When we start, the
Americans are already drunk. The Hungarians aren't We're seasoned. In Hungary, the HWlgari- ans
use this. They try to influence Americans with good drink to sign a favorable contract It's
instrument to oil the wheels.". . . A foreign man who can't hold his liquor is probably discarded as
a potential business associate . . . [It is] reason to break off negotiations."
Most negotiating involves somesocializing. This may be a way to initiate the negotiif
and establish some advantage for the host. Sometimes when negotiations ate stuck, a:
together or an evening out can be a good strategy for refocusing the agenda. Often s
izing is done at the end, after negotiations have been concluded favorably. The C -
team was treated to a farewell banquet; in China, as in other Asian countries such
rea andVietnam, the toasts that are made at banquets carry messages about what ite
particularly important to those negotiators.16 In all cultures, socializing provides ..
portunity to get to know the other party better and build relationships with its rnem
However, the food, beverages, and beds in which visitors sleep may be unfamiliar;"
jet lag and
unfamiliar food may come digestive and sleep disorders, and the visiting']
may suffer a loss ofphysical well-being. .
Differences in Focus
Focus may be positive or negative, explicit or implicit, general or specific. Cultures that
emphasize communication as a tool for articulating specific goals in order to accomplish
them tend to look upon negotiations as a series of points to "settle." Their language in ne-
gotiations is explicit and zeros in on what has yet to be agreed. These explicit statements
may in fact be questions and emphasize negative points of disagreement, such as, "What
do you still not like about this detail ofproduct design?" Americans prefer this direct ap-
proach because their aim is to clarify and resolve an issue.
But cultures that use communication to encourage harmony, preserve face, and develop
long-term relationships are not comfortable with direct and explicit talk. For instance, in
Japan getting straight to some point about which agreement has yet to be reached may re
sult in confrontation and emotions=-even anger. Someone may lose face. Tht},Ja,nese,
like negotiators from other Asian cultures, prefer to emphasize the positive pok>:'"Pf:agree
ment. They begin with general terms and seek agreement from the other side about gen
eral goals. 'Then regardless of the remaining details, the general agreement holds the two
sides together in a relationship. They do not ask-and do not enjoy being asked=-pointed
questions. They want to develop relationships because once a relationship exists, each side
has an obligation to consider the needs of the other, so the issue resolves itself.
The Chinese military strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu (pronounced "swin zuh"),
writing in -the third century B.C., described the inexhaustibility of indirect tactics as un-
ending as the rivers and as recurring as the seasons.18 Potential conflicts cart be diffused
by indirectness. In more modern times indirect "many-layered" negotiation with the Chi-
nese has been compared to
courtyards in the Forbidden City, each leading to a deeper recess distinguishedfrom the others
only by slight changes in proportion, with ultimate meaning residing in a totality that only long
reflection can grasp.19 .
The metaphor of many-layered courtyards is an apt one to describe the way tlie negotia-
tions proceed.
The approach that focuses on particulars, especially unresolved ones, is typically West-
ern. Negotiators look at the unsettled issues and one by one address them. That approach is
logical for the Western problem-solving mind. But it isn't shared by all cultures.In Asia, un-
resolved issues are part ofthe whole web ofthe relationship being woven by the negotiation
'is6 Chapter 9
Fyodorovitch Melnikov is the son of Fyodor; his married sister is Irina Fyedorovna
Dunayeva. A naming system that incorporates one's mother's family name is used by Mex-
icans and other Latin Americans to varying degrees {see Chapter 4).
Danes, by comparison, use informal address, speaking to each other with the familiar pro- noun
du. They follow the Jantelov; the "Law of Jante," in social interactions. This egalitarian principle
says one shouldn't try to be "above" someone else. Modest about putting themselves forward,
Danes are not hierarchical, and they observe little protocol in negotiation situations. However,
they are monochronic and expect punctuality. Negotiations with Danes proceed without
20
interruption. Denmark provides a contrast withArab,Asian, and Latin cultures, and
points out how important it is to know the culture on the other side of the negotiating table.
Emotion
In some high-context cultures, public display of emotion is a sign of immaturity and a po-
tential cause of shame to the group. Japanese negotiators will close their eyes, or look
down, or rest their heads against their hands and shade their eyes in order to conceal an
emotion such as anger. Similarly, Thais have learned to keep potentially disruptive emo-
tions from showing on their faces. Koreans, Taiwanese, and other Asians along with
Japanese and Thais have earned the descriptor inscrutable from Westerners because of
their learned cultural practice of avoiding a facial display of strong and disruptive emo-
tion. High-context cultures value harmony in human encounters, and their members avoid
sending any nonverbal messages that could destroy harmony. Other high-context cultures,
for example in the Middle East, put a high priority on displays of emotion (although not
anger) to emphasize the sincerity of the position being put forward.
In low-context cultures, the deliberate concealment of emotion is-considered to be insin-
cere. Members oflow-context cultures have learned a large vocabulary offacial expressions
that signal the emotions a speaker feels. When they see none of the expected indicators of
emotion on the faces of negotiators on the opposite side of the table, they assume that fill
emotion is not present. If this assumption is discovered to be wrong and the speaker is in-
deed feeling an emotion such as anger, the members ofthe low-context-culture feel deceived.
Silence
Similarly, silence as a nonverbal communication tool can be very effective in negotiations.
As was discussed in Chapter 6, & low-context cultures where ideas are explicitly encoded
into words and unspoken ideas are more difficult to respond to, silence makes negotiators
uneasy. Silence often means unhappiness in low-context cultures. Even when no message
about unhappiness is intended, silence in low-context cultures indicates a rupture has oc-
curred, a break in the process of communicating. For these reasons, negotiators from low-
context cultures generally are uncomfortable with silence. Tuey often feel responsible for
starting a conversation or keeping it going. .
Japanese speakers are comfortable with silence in negotiations and do not hurry to fill
it up with speech. After a speaker from one side speaks, Japanese listeners pause in silence
to reflect on what has been said and consider the speaker's feelings and point of view. This is
how Japanese show consideration for others in oral interpersonal communication, as we have
seen in Chapter 6. Similarly, to interrupt a negotiator who is speaking is to show dis- respect
Because of this protocol-and the Japanese value of silence-negotiators with Japanese
counterparts must be careful not to speak too hastily or too much.
THE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION
The foregoing aspects of communication style are employed. in specific phases of Ii \f
ation. .Exchanges proceed according to four phases ofnegotiation in all cultures;21
phasis and the time spent on any one phase are what differ:
Development of a Relationship . .
Cultural priorities differ about how much time is spent on each phase; for ex.ample,
nese spend much longer on phases I and 2, while Canadians want to get to phase 3
quickly. ,
In the first phase, where the relationship between negotiating teams is being estab .,
trust is the critical factor. In cultures where relationships have high priority, timernay be.: in
nonbusiness activities so the negotiators can get to know each other. Sight-seeing,_
welcome banquet are two typical activities in Chinese business interactions with forei
In Argentina the visiting team may be treated to an elaborate cocktail party in som
home or to a barbecue, called a parri/la, in a home or restaurant; again, at the successful
clusion ofnegotiations, the teams may enjoy a celebratory meal, usually less .formal ind
One way to establish a relationship is to identify the common goal both sides ha .
reaching an agreement. Once the desire or need for the other side to come to an agree.
is on the table-in words-along with your desire, you can both refer openly to the .
mon goal. _
In order to develop trust, you need to have openness in your communication and t<>;
perience openness from the other side. This usually involves some gentle questioning
each side to see how willing the others are to reveal themselves. Often the answers
already known to the questioners, and the probes are not so much for gathering info
tion as for testing the openness of the other side, Usually each side displays apparent
dor in these exchanges; whether it can be trusted or not is what each side
determine.
Face is an important consideration- in developing a relationship with someone fro-.
high-context culture, especially someone from Asia:
Face may be lost as a result ofmany developments: a premature or overeager overture that t ,
buffed by one's opponent; exposure to personal insult, in the form of either a hurtful remark or ;
disregard for one's status; being forced to give up a cherished value or to make a concession tha( will
be viewed by the domestic audience as unnecessary; a snub; failure to achieve predeter- ,: mined
goals; the revelation of personal inadequacy; damage to a valued relationship. The list is : endless,
for in the give-and-take of a complicated negotiation on a loaded subject, anything can : happen. 22
Since face can be lost even without the awareness of the other party, negotiators UJ+
to take care. Asking questions that seem designed to expose weakness, or making c,(,.
fntercultural Negotiation 289
ments that assume familiarity, or giving responses with the wrong degree of coolness can all
lead to loss of face for the other party and, with it, loss of trust.
Persuasion
This brings us to the third communication phase: persuasion. At this point you have es-
tablished what you need to focus on in order to reach an agreement. In other words, you
have a clear idea where the conflicts lie as well as the concord. Now you will attempt to
persuade your counterparts to accept a settlement that ensures you what you need and per-
haps more. They will do the same.
290 Chapter 9
up phrases and sheer volume, can affect people and that literal, face-value meanings may not
be intended.
People from cultures that prefer explicit communication that is direct and to the point
tend to persuade with facts (see Chapter 5). This is true of businesses in the United
States, for example, where arguments that are based on fact have greater credibility than
arguments that are based on opinion or inference. Facts just are; they do not need to be
proven. So strong is the attitude that facts count that using a number of facts often seems to
make an argument irrefutable. Statistics can make a business decision seem sound. But
statistics can be used to say anything. Of course, people can also be mistaken and get
facts wrong.
Some prefer arguments based on inference, which is a conclusion based on fact but not
proven. Inferences are assumptions. Some believe inferences generated from facts are
more powerful than the facts themselves. When a negotiator suggests that the plan her op-
. posite party has to create new jobs will actually threaten the environment, the negotiator
is inferring consequences.
Inferred consequences are the stuff of advertisements. Ads infer that a consumer will
benefit in some way by purchasing the advertised goods. For example, drinking a certain
beer will connect you to a more glamorous social circle; driving a certain car will put you in.
the company of professional racing drivers; using a certain credit card will enable you to
join in fun international travel. Your response to these appeals is emotional: desire or
perhaps disgust (the advertisers hope it's desire).
Asian negotiators often use inference when they refer to history. Asians, Europeans,
Latin Americans; Middle Easterners, and Africans tend to take a long view of current ac-
tivity, placing it in the context of a history reaching back far, but still having a very real
meaning for the present. This enables them to take a long view of the future as well. Amer-
icans, Canadians, New Zealanders, Australians, most Argentines, and others have a short
history, and even that seems remote and unconnected to the present. They often could use
their historical contacts as a persuasive tool but instead overlook them.
Others prefer arguments based on opinion. Opinions cannot be proven to be true or
false. They are usually also emotional. For some, emotion means genuine involvement on
the part of the persuader. Without emotion an argument lacks heart and conviction and is
simply cold and impersonal.
Obviously, when someone who shuns emotion in favor of facts encounters another per-
son who prefers emotion and finds facts alone unconvincing, the result can be miscom-
munication that results in a failure to reach an agreement. Some observers have noted this
problem in Arab-Israeli negotiations: Arabs prefer argument based on a mixture of opin- ion
and emotion with some fact and inference; Israelis prefer an argument based on fact and
inference with Iittle opinion and emotion.
The sequence in which items are discussed is often a critical communication factor
in negotiations. Research has shown that skilled Western negotiators are more flexible
in the sequence in which they communicate about factors than average Western nego-
tiators who stick to a planned sequence. 24 The average negotiator treats items inde-
pendently, while the skilled negotiator is able to link items, This is called "enlarging the
pie"; the negotiator adds issues so the pie is larger and therefore everyone can have a
larger piece.
.L.':U. c.naprer!J
Many experienced negotiators warn that you can't come back and ask for a countercon-
cession after a concess_ion has been granted to the other side and the discussion has
. moved on to another issue. Once you agree without conditions or "if," the issue is settled.
... You attempt to reopen it at the risk of losing what agreements-and trust-you have al
ready gained.
. Sometimes the final agreement arrives more quickly than you expect. Many Chinese
negotiations, for example, consist of probing the other side's position, testing for firm-
ness and the other sides final position. Then, suddenly, you may find the Chinese ide
offers a final agreement that solves many of the issues raised without the need to ijag
gle and bargain or persuade. When this is the case, it probablyisn 't a good idea t0 of;,.
fer too many counterproposals or alternatives, because that weakens your positiea,
However, advice to Chinese negotiators is to hold back from commitment to uaatnac
tive points to see if the other side will offer counterproposals or if it is really fim.
Western negotiators are known to be under pressure from their own culturalpriorities,
They want to achieve an agreement; in some cases they seem to feel any agreement
better than no agreement They can be impatient, but they also can be imaginative a
solutions.
Some negotiating teams can live with an agreement that at least gives them the ap-
pearance of having done well. Cohen quotes an Egyptian proverb:
26
Make your harvest look big lest your enemies rejoice.
It is important for negotiators to under-stand their counterparts and balance the need
.enforceable agreements on the one hand with the need for nurturing trusting relations
on the other hand. Agreements do not all look alike. Time magazine, nearly two deca_
ago, ran this statement:
The successful negotiation between Japanese and Western businessmen usually ends up looking"
very much like one between two Japanese.28
That is still true today. Sensitivity to the other culture, and satisfying the needs ofyour
are both needed in the 21st century.
Summary This chapter has shown how cultural priorities affect specific communication tasks, in
case the task of business negotiations.
The experience of Canwall in China illustrates cultural priorities and shows an outco,,
that was not what the Canadians had expected.
What really happened involved the way culture affects communication. Chinese :
tural dimensions (see Chapters 3 and 4) include relationships, expectations about . .
and efficiency, the way obligation is perceived, the value of harmony, the meth
learning, the performance of tasks simultaneously, a preference for protocol andfa
seniority and hierarchy, mediated access to authority, interdependence, and toleranc
uncertainty.
. ..... .. . - - ---------- -
lntercultural Negotiation 295
Expectations for outcomes is one way cultures differ at the negotiating table. Cultures .
may have . .
Different goals.
Different views of advantage or disadvantage.
A preference for one of the four outcomes of negotiation: compromise, win-lose,
win-win, or stalemate.
The makeup ofthe negotiating teams may also differ, but teams usually include
Members with high status.
Members with special expertise.
A translator.
Physical aspects ofthe negotiations also can affect the outcomes:
Site and space.
Schedule and agenda.
Use of time.
Host hospitality.
Byfar the most important differences are in communication styles:
The focus may be on what has already been agreed or on what remains in dispute.
Some teams negotiate for the honor of their country or firm.
Some teams prefer the observance of more form and specific protocol than others.
Some show emotion and even make a deliberate display of'ernotion, while others show
little emotion.
Some teams use silence, while others are uncomfortable with silence.
Negotiation has four phases:
Development of a relationship with the other side.
Exchange of information and positions.
Persuasion and argumentation.
Concessions and agreement.
5 1. William Zartman and Maureen Berman; quoted in Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across Cultures
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1991 ), pp. I 6 ff.
2. Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 225.
3. Cohen, pp. 31-32.
4. Glen Fisher, I:Z.ternational Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural
Press, 1980). .
5. Cohen, p. 51.
6. Robert T. Moran and William G. Stripp, Dynamics of Successful International Business Negotia-
tions (Houston: Gulf, 1991), p. 84.
7. Richard Mead, Cross-Cultural Management. Communication (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1990), p. 203.
8. Yale Richmond, From Nyet to Da: Understanding the Russians (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press,
1992), p. 141.