Journey Under Surveillence Emigrantion Between Wars

Aleksandar R.
Miletic
Journey under Surveillance

Studies on South East Europe
edited by
Prof. Dr. Karl Kaser
(Graz)
vol. 11
LIT
Aleksandar R. Miletic
Journey under Surveillance

The Overseas Emigration Policy
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
in Global Context, 1918 1928
LIT
Cover Picture: Yugoslav Emigrants in Ljubljana before Departure
for South America (1927).
Source: HDA Fototeka Instituta za migracije i narodnosti (1610),
12/0113.
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Table of Contents
Introduction 7
Acknowledgements 15
I PART: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND GLOBAL EMIGRATION TENDENCIES

DURING THE 1920s 17
1.1 Disturbances in World Emigration as a Consequence of the War 18

1.1.1 Passportization 19141918 18
1.1.2 Control of labor migration during the war 20
1.1.3 Deportations and forced migrations 22
1.1.4 First World War and transatlantic migrations 25
1.2 Worldwide Emigration Restrictions in the 1920s: The End of the Global
Labor Market 29
1.2.1 US immigration policy during the war and throughout the 1920s 29
1.2.2 The introduction of the quota system and the Convergence Theory 32
1.2.3 Immigration restrictions in British Dominion countries 34
1.2.4 Migration restrictions and control imposed by European countries 37
1.2.5 Restrictions before worldwide restrictions: Polish territories, Serbia
and Bulgaria before 1914 42
1.3 Public Debates on Eugenics and Racial Criteria of the US Immigration Policy 48
1.3.1 The Immigration Restriction League and racial theories 48
1.3.2 Laughlin vs. Jennings: one debate among eugenicists 51
1.3.3 Racism, sociology and eugenics: The New Mercantilism 52
II PART: PATTERNS OF EMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION POLICY OF THE

KINGDOM OF SCS 55
2.1 Economic Underdevelopment The Ultimate Reason for Emigration? 55

2.1.1 Traditional society versus labor mobility 56
2.1.2 The Phylloxera disaster and emigration from Dalmatia 62
2.1.3 The land reform and emigration from the Northern Provinces 64
2.1.4 Should I stay or should I go? Yugoslav industrial labor conditions 65
2.2 Regulations and Effects of the Emigration Policy 68

2.2.1 Emigration affairs in Yugoslav provinces before 1918 69
2.2.2 Italian legislation as a model for Yugoslav lawmakers 74
2.2.3 Nationalization of emigration procedures 76
2.2.4 Administration of emigration affairs 77
2.2.5 Yugoslav diaspora 80
2.2.6 US restrictions and Yugoslav emigration policy 81
2.2.7 Worldwide restrictions and Yugoslav emigration policy 83
2.3 Emigration Affairs and Minority Policy of Yugoslavia 92

2.3.1 NonSlavic Emigrants 92
2.3.2 Passavants in emigration policy of Yugoslavia 96
2.3.3 Brazil as a preferred destination for unwanted minorities 97
2.3.4 Different strategies applied to different minority groups 100
2.3.5 The Muslim refugees question 101
2.4 Misconduct and Corruption of State Personnel 103

2.4.1 The Dragia Leovac Case 104
2.4.2 Kuzmanis report: an insight into the anatomy of corruption 109
2.4.3 The Medijator Agency Case 110
III PART: YUGOSLAV EMIGRANTS IN THE NEW WORLD 113
3.1 Emigrants on the Journey 113

3.1.1 Railway Convoys 114
3.1.2 The domestic railway and seaport infrastructure 114
3.1.3 The conditions on Dutch steamships 117
3.1.4 Steamship Races 118
3.1.5 Under the surveillance of US immigration authorities 120
3.1.6 Ellis Island procedure 121
3.2 Economic Performance of the Yugoslav Emigrants in the US, Canada and
Australia 124
3.2.1 Social background of emigrants 125
3.2.2 Emigrants traveling costs 127
3.2.3 Financial troubles: immediately upon arrival 129
3.2.4 Economic performance and some trends of emigration to US 131
3.2.5 Remittances from the US and the Yugoslav economy 133
3.2.6 Attitude towards immovable property ownership 136
3.2.7 Emigrant savings 137
3.2.8 Yugoslav emigrants and work 141
3.3 Yugoslav Emigrants in South American Countries 145
3.3.1 Brazil 146
3.3.2 Argentina 148
3.4 Some Insights on Yugoslav Women in Emigration 155
3.4.1 Prevalence of female emigrants immediately after war 156
3.4.2 Complications with arranged marriages 159
3.4.3 Cases of women trafficking in Canada 161
3.4.4 Emigrant women and citizenship right 163
3.4.5 The traditional role of women in emigrant families 166
Conclusions 167
Appendix 171
Sources 175
Literature 177
Journey under Surveillance 7
Introduction
Worldwide migration has been remarkably dynamic over the last two hundred
years. Throughout the 19th century and especially after 1846, global migration
helped harmonize the labor markets of Europe and the Americas1. The massive
supply of European laborers decreased the average wage disparity between the
Old and the New World. Owing to the massmigrations, average salaries in
Europe went up while on the other side of the Atlantic they were in decline.2 In
this way, global migration fueled the ongoing processes of globalization and
contributed to equalization of labor market conditions around the globe. In the
decades preceding the First World War, the system of global markets and
economies, at least within the range of the Atlantic economy, was inclined
towards a state of equilibrium. After the summer of 1914, however, the subtle
mechanism ensuring this balance suffered a set of serious disturbances.
The violence of the First World War and the subsequent government restric-
tions in the domain of interstate migrations had a considerable impact on
global migration. The almost complete and uncontrolled freedom of movement
and travel between Europe and the countries of emigration that had existed
until 1914 would never come again. A new age emerged, in which both coun-
tries of immigration and emigration began to establish restrictions and quotas
for migrants. Since these interstate migration limitations have survived until
today in different forms and extents, the First World War and (even more so)
the 1920s appear to be significant turning points in the European and world
history of migration.
The emergence of border controls and the introduction of passport and visa
requirements during the war and the postwar period underlined importance of
individuals citizenship as a new criterion for social exclusion and for the limi-
tation of opportunities in the world. From the liberal egalitarian perspective,
articulated by Joseph H. Carens, this particular implication of citizenship poli-
cies went quite far away from the basic premises of liberalism, an ideology
rooted in opposition to the system of social constraints and inequality of feudal
times. According to Carens, the citizenship limitations of the modern era have
much in common with the feudal restrictions over individuals social mobility.
Individuals are born with their citizenship the same way as the peasant or noble
status was inherited by blood. Within the system of migration controls, move-
1
Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Global Migration and the World Economy
(Cambridge: London: The MIT Press, 2006), 11025. The authors limit the effects of the con-
vergence mechanism to the socalled Atlantic economy. The European economic periphery
(such as Southern and Eastern Europe) is excluded.
2
Hatton and Williamson have described, quite convincingly, how this convergence mechanism
functioned and what brought it to an end. Their explanation is based on sophisticated economic
calculations on changes in labor supply and demand.
8 Journey under Surveillance
ment from an underdeveloped country (Bangladesh) to the United States or

Canada is restricted just as the transition from the peasantry to nobility was
restricted in the Middle Ages.3 Moreover, in our case, the global system of
control was not only limited to the right of rich countries to restrict entrance
but, as we will see in following chapters, it included also the right of traditional
emigration countries to impose control over emigration. The breakdown of
global labor market went hand in hand with these changes on level of state
policies and citizenship.
The first Yugoslav state was established in December 1918 in midst of these
tremendous changes in the regime of global migrations. This monograph will
examine whether the emigration policy of the newly created Kingdom of SCS
followed the fundamental changes that occurred on a global scale in the first
postwar decade, 19181928. It will shed light on the local particularities of
Yugoslavia within the global phenomenon of emigration, by covering a signifi-
cant period of administrative development of the Yugoslav emigration offices.
The time span covered by the monograph starts with creation of the state and
ends in 1928 because of some significant changes that occurred in both Yugo-
slavia and global scene the following year. On a global scale, 1929 connotes
the overwhelming impact of the Great Depression that shook the very funda-
ments of the world economy and everyday life. The global migrations which
were under a regime of constant surveillance and restrictions in the period be-
tween 1914 and 1929 came to a complete standstill during the 1930s. In the
history of interwar Yugoslavia, 1929 was a significant turning point in terms of
both the economic contractions (caused by the global depression) and the po-
litical changes that occurred in the country itself. Namely, on 6 January that
year, King Aleksandar Karaorevi dissolved Parliament, abolished the Con-
stitution and banned all political parties in the country. A new regime of per-
sonal rule was established in Yugoslavia and the country entered a new and
different chapter of its history.
The state policies of interwar Yugoslavia, particularly its emigration policy,
have been largely underresearched and neglected by the regional scholarship.
During the socialist period, the state policies of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
were not considered a recommendable topic for inquiry, since the state itself
had been condemned as nothing more than the Greater Serbian, chauvinist
and bourgeois formation. It is apparent also that the modern national histo-
riographies (such as Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian) in most cases at-
tempt to focus only on their national territories by ignoring the Yugoslav di-
mension of the studied phenomena. In modern Serbian historiography, several
important studies on the state policies of interwar Yugoslavia have been pro-
3
Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective. In: Free
Movement. Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, ed. Brian
Barry and Robert E. Goodin (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1992), 267.
duced recently (see below); however, many important elements of the issue
have yet to be seriously investigated. In the domain of migration issues, former
Yugoslav and modern national historiographies, have examined only particular
aspects of emigration, but there is no monograph on the general phenomena of
Yugoslav emigration policy in any given period of the states history4. More-
over, this is also the case with the more general issues of state migration poli-
cies and control over freedom of movement in modernera EastCentral and
Southeastern Europe.
Issues of Yugoslav state emigration policy cannot be found in books of
Croatian author Ivan izmi, one of the most prominent authors on the history
of emigration from Croatia and Yugoslavia5. izmi wrote on many important
aspects of Croatian and Yugoslav overseas emigration but not a single aspect of
state regulation and policy in this domain has been discussed. This is also true
of works by Vlado Gojni, who wrote a monograph on the emigration experi-
ence of Montenegrins who left for the United States during the 19th century and
the first decades of the 20th century6. From a technical point of view, Gojnis
monograph lacks a basic scientific apparatus, such as the identification of
sources or a chronological framework of the presented information. Since the
author did not use archival sources and did not offer much analysis, his book is
more a compendium of anecdotes than a serious analytical work. Radovan Kal-
abi published a compendium of essays on Serbian emigration; however, the
interwar period is only briefly mentioned7. Nevertheless, Kalabis final bibli-
ography on Serbian emigration newspapers for that period has proven quite
valuable.
Croatian historian Ljubomir Anti produced two relevant monographs of un-
even character and quality. The first deals with the role played by Yugoslav
emigrant organizations in South America in the efforts to create the first Yugo-
slav state in 1918.8 It is a very solid work based on reliable literature and archi-
val sources left by these organizations. In the introductory chapters, Anti ex-
plores the history of Croatian and Yugoslav emigration to South America and
the general economic and political conditions which caused it. Nevertheless, in
4
Colleague Vesna ikanovi of INIS is currently doing exhaustive research on the general issues
of Yugoslav emigration to US between 1918 and 1941.
5
Ivan izmi, Hrvati u ivotu Sjedinjenih Amerikih Drava: doprinos u ekonomskom,
politikom i kulturnom ivotu [Croats in capital Life of US: Their Contributions in Economic,
Political and Cultural Life] (Zagreb: Globus, Centar za povijesne znanosti, Odjel za hrvatsku
povijest, 1982); Ibid., Iz Dalmacije u Novi Zeland: povijest jugoslovenske naseobine na Novom
Zelandu [From Dalmatia to New Zealand: History of Yugoslav Settlements on New Zealand]
(Zagreb: Globus, Matica iseljenika Hrvatske, 1981).
6
Vlado Gojni, Crnogorci u Americi [Montenegrins in America] (Podgorica: CID, 2002).
7
Radovan Kalabi, Srpska emigracija [Serbian Emigration] (Belgrade: Samizdat, 1993).
8
Ljubomir Anti, Nae iseljenitvo u Junoj Americi i stvaranje jugoslavenske drave 1918 [Our
Emigration in South America and the Creation of the Yugoslav State] (Zagreb: kolska knjiga,
1987).
comparison with the broad examination of emigration in this monograph,

Antis book covers a relatively narrow time span and deals only with political
aspects and the implications on life in emigrant communities.
Antis second book is on Croatian emigration to America in the 19th and 20th
centuries9. Compared to the first Antis monograph, this one is less methodical
in approach and more popular in its style. It lacks many indications of sources
for the data employed. In writing this book, the author used many newspapers
and other publications of the time, but he did not consult many of the relevant
archival sources. Although it is more descriptive than analytical, one can find
much relevant, important and interesting information in this monograph. Ex-
ceptionally valuable are quotations taken from Croatian emigration newspapers
published in the Americas and Australia. Very often, I made use of this mate-
rial in an attempt to reconstruct the microenvironment of the everyday life of
people living in Yugoslav or Croatian communities overseas. The book is
highly enjoyable and interesting reading material yet contains very little infor-
mation on official Yugoslav state policy in the domain of emigration.
A short, concise and very useful outline on the overseas migrations of the
Yugoslav population in the interwar period is given in the article written by
Vesna Mika10. Using relevant official statistics from Yugoslavia and overseas
countries, Mika pointed out the broad trends and characteristics of Yugoslav
interwar emigration rates. Furthermore, she constructed quite a solid analytical
structure for the study, although she made use of only a limited number of
sources. This paper serves as an excellent starting point in approaching the
phenomenon.
Gerald Gilbert Govorchin, an American author of Slovenian origin, has written
probably the best monograph on the life of the Yugoslav emigrants in the
USA11. His book is both descriptive and analytical, and employs extensive
American archival sources. It offers excellent insight into the everyday life and
preoccupations of Yugoslav immigrants in the USA. In order to grasp the com-
plexity of the situation, Govorchin employed a wide analytical approach which
encompassed many different areas and aspects of immigrant life: social, eco-
nomic, political, cultural, linguistic, etc. Taking into account the high scholarly
standards attained by this monograph, it certainly presents one of the greatest
contributions in the field. Nevertheless, from the perspective of an examination
of the general phenomenon of Yugoslav emigration, the scope of Govorchins
monograph is limited. It only takes one country (the USA) into examination
and lacks a Yugoslav perspective, as he did not make use of Yugoslav sources
9
Ljubomir Anti, Croats and America (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveuilina naklada, 1997).
10
Vesna Mika, Overseas Migration of the Yugoslav Population in the Period between the Two
World Wars. In: Overseas Migration from EastCentral and Southeastern Europe 18801940,
ed. Julianna Pusks (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1990), 168190.
11
Gerald Govorchin, Yugoslavs in America (Gainesvile: University of Florida Press, 1961).
and archival materials. There is also no information on official Yugoslav emi-

gration policy in Govorchins book.
The following chapters are almost completely written on previously unexplored
archival sources on Yugoslav emigration found in the Belgrade and Zagreb
Archives.12 The most important documents were issued by the Belgrade and
Zagrebbased emigration offices and institutions subordinated to the Ministry
of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Social Policy of the
Kingdom SCS. They include various materials, ranging from official corre-
spondence, expertise and legislation drafts to the dramatic and picturesque re-
ports on the living conditions of Yugoslav emigrants abroad. In the Private
Archive of Ninko Peri in Belgrade, I found few important documents on the
particular phenomenon of corruption in the administration of emigration af-
fairs.
The collections of the Emigration Commissariat and Artur Benko Grado
Bojniki Legacy (Ostavtina Artura Benka Grada Bojnikog) of the Croatian
State Archive proved to be the most precious archival source for this mono-
graph. These collections contain various materials issued by the Zagreb Emi-
gration Commissariat a key institution in the administration of the emigration
policy of the Kingdom. Benko Bojniki was one of the best (if not the best)
Yugoslav experts on emigation affairs. The archival material left by him is of
great relevance since he held the highest posts in the Zagreb Commissariat
throughout the period under review. One particular problem I encountered in
Belgrades Archive of Yugoslavia was a shortage of essential archival material
originating from the Yugoslav interwar Ministry of Social Policy13. This came
as consequence of neglect and deliberate mistreatment of the archival sources
by the Yugoslav communist authorities after World War II14. Almost the entire
content of the Ministrys archive was simply recycled, as the newly established
regime needed paper for its publications. Because the general policy and ad-
ministration of emigration affairs in the Kingdom of SCS was concentrated in
the Ministry of Social Policy, deficiencies of its archival stocks represented a
huge problem for extensive research on the topic. For this reason, the examina-
tion of the emigration policy of the Kingdom of SCS presented in this mono-
graph could not be fully systematic and could not employ all relevant perspec-
tives on the issue.
12
These are Belgrades Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije AJ) and the Zagrebbased
Croatian State Archive (Hrvatski Dravni Arhiv HDA).
13
The official name of this archive, which stores the archival documents from central state
authorities and other institutions and organizations from interwar and socialist Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the state of Serbia and Montenegro, has been changed into
Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (Archive of Serbia and Montenegro). Since the dissolution of the state
of Serbia and Montenegro, a new name for the archive is under discussion.
14
See more in ore Stankovi and Ljubodrag Dimi, Istoriografija pod nadzorom
[Historiography under Surveillance] (Belgrade: Slubeni list, 1996), 1767.
In order to grasp the legal framework of emigration affairs, I used the official
publication Slubene novine Kraljevine SHS, which published all state laws,
decrees, regulations and orders of the time. Due to the lack of archival sources,
I was occasionally compelled to rely on journalistic accounts. Newspapers pub-
lished in Belgrade and Zagreb provided me with interesting insights into, and
important information on the particular problems of the Yugoslav emigration.
The reliability of the journalistic material can be questioned especially when
applied as the historical source. I am well aware of the limits as well as
methodological advantages which derive from this kind of source. Namely,
the employment of journalistic accounts has the advantage of filling several
gaps in my research that could not have been otherwise resolved.
Whenever it was permitted by the sources and information, I tried to apply a
transnational scale and comparative view to the study of state policies. When
examining legislation and concrete measures of the emigration policy, the
monograph focuses on the issue of transfer and the reception of wider Euro-
pean stateinterventionist models in the Yugoslav state policy during the pe-
riod. The Kingdom of SCS is the key focus of the study but its policy is ana-
lyzed and displayed within a broader European and global perspective. Use of
the term Yugoslav (for state policy, people, women, emigration or emigrants)
in this book is only made for sake of simplicity; it refers to either citizens or
territory, i.e. state jurisdiction of the Kingdom of SCS; it has nothing to do with
any political or ideological ground, such as that of the integral Yugoslavism.
Equal consideration has been devoted to the legal framework and regulations
issued by the authorities, and to the practical implementation of this policy.
General trends and developments in emigration have been analyzed by means
of available statistical data, and are presented in charts and tables. Besides
large, macroscale observations based on the general statistical data and the
material on state policy, I have also been concentrated on the microlevel of
the examined issue. While the study is strictly analytical, significant attention is
devoted to the everyday preoccupations of citizens and the impact of the emi-
gration on their lives. Moving beyond the statistics, this monograph will at-
tempt to capture and recreate the emotional energy of the ordinary individuals
and families who experienced this moment in history firsthand.
A word is needed to describe the structure and organization of the monograph.
It is composed of the three parts, each of which has different objectives and
examines a different aspect of the broader topic. The first part describes the
general tendencies of worldwide migration during and after the First World
War. Apart from a statistical overview of international emigration trends, it
provides specific information on the situation in the United States, the most
important destination for the Yugoslav migrants until 1921. Using relevant
American sources, the study revives the atmosphere of the public debates on
immigration policy held at the time. The debates involved sociological, eco-
nomic, legal, ethical and eugenic issues related to the implementation of a new
system of immigration quotas. The issue is of great importance to later chap-

ters, since it had a profound influence on Yugoslav emigration rates.
The second part of the monograph deals with the basic economic and social
features which affected emigration from Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1928. It
sheds light on the development and performance of Yugoslav emigration ad-
ministrative procedures by taking into consideration its official and unofficial,
institutional and extrainstitutional framework. This has permitted the author to
grasp some problems that otherwise would remain out of sight, such as the
widespread corruption in the administration of emigration procedures or the
hidden minority policy of the Kingdom of SCS. This part of the monograph
investigates the intertwined economic, social and political conditions that gen-
erated emigration from Yugoslavia. In the context of restrictions on emigration
imposed by the Yugoslav authorities and subsequent consequences of both
American and Yugoslav restrictions, the subject matter of the second part is
directly related to the issues discussed in the first part of the monograph.
The third part deals with the state policies and state facilitated surveillance over
transportation of emigrants and their life experience in the New World. It
points out the process through which emigrants moved from one system of
surveillance (in their home country) to another (in their destination country). It
explores, for instance, the general procedure of selection and classification at
the Ellis Island immigration station. The main focus, however, is on Yugoslav
state channels and its means of support for and influence over the diaspora.
Neither this part, nor the book in whole, attempts to recreate the whole com-
plexity of the life of Yugoslav diaspora. It will take under investigation only
those elements of everyday experience which were of interest to or somehow
connected with the state policy of Yugoslavia. Significant focus is concentrated
on emigrants economic performance in destination countries and one chapter
will estimate the impact the savings and remittances they sent back across the
Atlantic had on the monetary balance and stability of Yugoslavia. In order to
fully take into account the different legal systems and economic conditions of
South American countries, compared to the US, Canada and Australia, the ex-
periences of Yugoslav emigrants in these two regions is analyzed separately.
One chapter is dedicated specifically to the topic of female Yugoslav emigra-
tion and problems arising from the particular legal and family position of this
social group in both Yugoslavia and destination countries.
During the last two decades, much has been written on cultural and social
changes and state policies in the interwar Yugoslavia. In Serbian historiogra-
phy, the books of Ljubodrag Dimi15, Vladan Jovanovi16, Predrag Markovi17,
15
Ljubodrag Dimi, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije [The Cultural Policies of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia] vol. 13 (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996).
16
Vladan Jovanovi, Jugoslovenska drava i Juna Srbija 19181929: Makedonija, Sandak,
Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SCS [The Yugoslav State and South Serbia 19181929:
Goran Miloradovi18, Mile Bjelajac19, Zoran Janjetovi20, Ivan M. Beci21,

Bojan Simi22, Vladimir Cvetkovi23, Radina VuetiMladenovi24and Lji-
ljana Lazarevi25 who employed new methodology, illustrate the broadened
interest in, and research on these phenomena. Historical investigation has be-
come more focused on longlasting historical structures, cultural history, and
the history of private and everyday life in the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia.
Belgrade University professors Ljubodrag Dimi, Andrej Mitrovi, Milan
Ristovi and Miroslav Jovanovi contributed significantly to the development
of these new tendencies in Serbian historiography. Outside Serbia, it was the
German historian MarieJanin ali who wrote one of the best monographs on
the social history of Serbia, which also covers the interwar period26. Among
other important topics covered in the book, one can also find important analy-
ses and reflections on the migration history of Serbia. The monograph before
you is a small contribution to these studies and the broader scholarly effort.
Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija in the Kingdom of SHS] (Belgrade: INIS, 2002). In terms of
concept and methodology, Jovanovi presents what is probably the most thorough analysis and
one of the best if not the best Serbian monograph on the history of interwar Yugoslav society and
state institutions.
17
Predrag Markovi, Beograd i Evropa (1918941) [Belgrade and Europe, 1918941] (Bel-
grade: Savremena administracija, 1992).
18
Goran Miloradovi, Karantin za ideje. Logori za izolaciju sumnjivih elemenata u Kraljevini
Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1919922 [Quarantine for Ideas. The Camps for the Isolation of Sus-
picious Elements in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 191922] (Belgrade: Institut za
savremenu istoriju, 2004).
19
Mile Bjelajac, Jugoslovensko iskustvo sa multietnikom armijom 1918991 [Yugoslav
Experience with the Multiethnic Army 19181991] (Belgrade: UDI, 1999); Ibid., Vojska
Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije 19231935 [Army of the Kingdom of SCS] (Belgrade: INIS, 1994).
20
Zoran Janjetovi, Deca careva, pastorad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji. 1918
1941 [The Children of the Emperors, Stepchildren of the Kings. National Minorities in Yugosla-
via 19181941] (Belgrade: INIS, 2005).
21
Ivan M. Beci, Finansijska politika Kraljevine SHS 19181923 [Financial Policy of the King-
dom SCS 19181923] (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2003).
22
Propaganda Milana Stojadinovia [Milan Stojadinovis Propaganda] (Belgrade: INIS, 2007).
23
Ekonomski odnosi Jugoslavije i Francuske 19181941 [Economic Relations between Yugo-
slavia and France] (Belgrade: INIS, 2006).
24
Evropa na Kalemegdanu: Cvijeta Zuzori i kulturni ivot Beograda 1918941 [Europe at
the Kalemegdan. Cvijeta Zuzori and the Cultural Life of Belgrade 1918941] (Belgrade:
INIS, 2003).
25
Ljiljana Lazarevi, Vienje evropskog uticaja na porodine odnose u srpskoj tampi, 1919
1925 [European influences on Family Relations in the Serbian Press, 19191925], BA thesis
defended at the Belgrade University in 2002.
26
Marianin ali, Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815941 [Social History of Serbia] (Belgrade:
CLIO, 2004).
Acknowledgements
The research project and the monograph would not have been possible without
the institutional help and funding received from the Institute for the Recent
History of Serbia (Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije INIS) in Belgrade, and
from Central European University (CEU) in Budapest. This book developed
from my thesis, which was carried out as a part of the requirements on the one
year MA program of the Central European University in Budapest27. Before
and after the CEU masterstudies program, research on the topic was con-
ducted as a part of activities for the current project of the INIS Belgrade,
funded by the Serbian Ministry for Science. I wish to thank Momilo Mitrovi,
the INIS director, who supported the project and took care of my wellbeing
throughout my studies and research. I also have to mention the institutional
help and support of the European University Institute in Florence where I car-
ried out the concluding research and final shaping of the monograph. The gen-
erous support of these institutions was invaluable.
The crucial points of the project, however, were developed in the intellectual
milieu and excellent academic atmosphere of CEU in Budapest. I wish to thank
CEU Professors Constantin Iordachi, Balsz Trencsnyi and Arnd Bauerkm-
per for their help, suggestions and advice on how to take full advantage of the
analytical potential of my research topic. Professor Trencsnyis advice as well
as his critical comments and objections on my thesis helped me in improving
some of its weak points. My debt to Professor Constantin Iordachi is especially
deep since he did the lions share of supervising and assistance on my work
while it progressed. During the relatively short period assigned for writing my
thesis at CEU, Professor Iordachi sent me, day by day, and sometimes hour by
hour, emails with instructions and suggestions concerning improvements of
the text and strengthening the main lines of my argument. I have been excep-
tionally fortunate in receiving this kind of instruction and help which went
beyond mere supervision.
In the final phase of the work conducted in European University Institute in
Florence, I received much useful information on literature from economic his-
torian Professor Giovanni Federico, my present supervisor. I thank him here,
moreover, that this was only to some extent part of our work on my current
PhD project at EUI. Although it was a short period of the academic training at
EUI, I am indebted to Professor Federico for almost all of my knowledge on
the economic history applied in this monograph.
27
MAthesis entitled The Overseas Emigration and Emigration Policy of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 191828 was defended on 14. June 2006 in the History Department
of the CEU Budapest in front of the Commission consisted of Professors Constantin Iordachi
and Balasz Trenchenyi. The thesis is available in the library of the CEU.
At this point I have to mention Belgrade University Professor Ljubodrag Dimi

who gave me the first information and advice on how to approach the processes
and structures of 20th century Yugoslav history. During my graduate studies, he
introduced me to the secrets of the historians craft and the archival sources for
the history of the Yugoslavia. The great emphasis on empirical information that
I applied in writing this monograph is due to Professor Dimis firm attitude
that historiography can be built only on reliable and relevant archival data.
I have benefited greatly from the help and advice of many colleagues and
friends who have made insightful comments on my work or helped me in gath-
ering information on the topic. These are Bojan Simi of INIS, Gergely Galan-
tha of CEU, Kata Bohus of the University of Toronto, Vladimir Petrovi of the
Belgrade Institute for contemporary History (Institut za savremenu istoriju) and
CEU, Zoran Janjetovi of INIS, Vladan Jovanovi of INIS, Mihai Olaru of
CEU, Vesna ikanovi of INIS, Darko Karai and Slavka Otenaova of
CEU. I take this opportunity to thank all of them especially Bojan Simi who
has always been prepared to assist me with Serbian literature and sources while
I was abroad. Simi was also of great help in giving me valuable critical re-
marks on several important points of the monograph.
This research project and the resulting monograph would not be achieved with-
out the useful information and help I received from the personnel at both the
Zagreb and Belgrade Archives. I wish to express my particular gratitude to
Boris Suljagi and Ljiljana Cingulin of Croatian State Archive (Hrvatski
Dravni Arhiv) and Jovan Popovi Pop and Suzana Srndovi of the Archive
of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije) who have generously shared their informa-
tion and knowledge of sources.
I wish to express gratitude to the California Museum of Photography for per-
mitting me to publish striking photos of the Ellis Island immigration procedure
(part of KeystoneMast Collection, UCR). I take also the opportunity to thank
Belgrade attorney Nenad Peri for allowing me to investigate material in his
familys possession.
Finally, I wish to thank my dear colleague and friend Jonathan Crossen of CEU
and the University of Waterloo for his invaluable contributions and assistance
in the editing of the text. It was not only in domain of syntax and language
rules that Jonathan helped but he also gave many new ideas and advice on core
matters of the text.
Outside academia, I owe much gratitude to Ana, my parents, my sister and my
little nieces for providing me with constant support, motivation and encour-
agement for my work.
I PART: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND GLOBAL

EMIGRATION TENDENCIES DURING THE 1920s
The restrictions on freedom of movement and transportation that began during

the First World War continued in a milder form during the interwar period. The
first part of the monograph will explore the causal relation between state inter-
vention during chaotic war circumstances (Chapter 1.1) and the system of
stateimposed restrictions which remained by inertia after the war was over
(Chapter 1.2). State surveillance of and control over migration will be exam-
ined including both efforts designed to suppress migration and those intend to
stimulate it in order to illustrate the nature and extent of state interference
with the movement of people.
In addition to the interventionist policies of European countries, international
immigration was further complicated by prohibitive American immigration
quotas passed in 1921 and 1924. Immigration restrictions were also established
by British Dominion countries, and even by some South American countries.
European governments were effectively obliged to accept these changes and to
coordinate their emigration policies with the immigration authorities of destina-
tion countries. Since all these changes on the European and global levels had an
immediate impact on the emigration procedures and state policy of Yugoslavia,
an examination of these wider shifts is essential before approaching the specif-
ics of the Yugoslav case. Chapter 1.3 will shed light on the connection between
eugenic/racial theories, public sentiment and immigration policy in the United
States. Considering the importance of the American publics attitude towards
Eastern and Southern European immigrants (including those coming from the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), it is necessary to explore this issue as
well.
Apart from official US statistics and a few articles from US newspapers from
the time, all data and information used for this first part of the monograph
originates from secondary works on the issue28. Monographs by Timothy J.
Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, John Torpey, and Klaus Bade proved to be
particularly useful for empirical data, relevant examples, as well as the general
analytical framework for approaching the phenomenon of global migration.29
28
Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington D.C.: US Bu-
reau of The Census, 1960).
29
Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration (New York, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998); Ibid., Global Migration; John Torpey, The Invention of the
Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge, UK: New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000); Klaus Bade, Migration in European History (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2003).
1.1 Disturbances in world emigration as a consequence of the

war
Almost every war in the history of mankind has been followed by restrictions
on the freedom of movement of the citizens of the warring sides. When most
parts of the globe became engaged in warfare during the late summer of 1914,
these restrictions on migration developed into a worldwide system. Even after
the end of the war, the system continued by inertia. The state restrictions over
freedom of movement that were applied during the interwar period were essen-
tially a continuation of the general state of emergency created by the First
World War. In this chapter, I will elaborate on the formative period of this sys-
tem and give some relevant examples of state control over the movement of
populations between 1914 and 1918.
1.1.1 Passportization30 19141918
Until 1914, most Europeans had little notion of international border controls. In
a free travel area reminiscent of todays Schengen zone, one could travel from
Russian borders to Atlantic or from the Balkans to Scandinavia without holding
travel papers and without encountering any border controls or surveillance at
all. This system of freedom gained a firm basis in Central Europe when the
Prussianled NorthGerman Confederation accepted liberal passport legislation
in 1867.31 The nineteenthcentury restrictionfree travel area effectively in-
cluded even territories on other side of Atlantic since US immigration authori-
ties did not conduct any passport controls either. In his aforementioned mono-
graph, John Torpey gives an impressive analytical account of this and other
phenomenon related to documentbased controls over the movement of people
throughout history. This section will employ Torpeys data unless indicated
otherwise.
At the beginning of twentieth century, many European countries reserved the
right to introduce passport identification only in cases of emergency or crises.
In other countries, like Austria, passports were officially required, but in prac-
tice, these regulations were not enforced because there was no system of ad-
30
The term passportization has usually been used in Soviet studies in reference to the introduc-
tion of internal passports in the USSR under Stalin. While supervising my work, Professor Con-
stantin Iordachi suggested the application of the term to the global phenomenon of the reintro-
duction of visa and passport requirements during the First World War. The term will be used in
this latter context in this monograph.
31
On the development of passport regulations in Germany, France, Italy and US see in Torpey,
The invention of the passport.
ministrative border control32. In both Germany and AustriaHungary, control

was only organized along the Russian, and from time to time on Serbian and
Romanian borders as well. Aside from these exceptions, there was no expecta-
tion for citizens to carry passports. This unprecedented freedom of movement
came as a consequence of the dynamics of market competition and the search
for cheap labor within the global economy of the time. At the end of the nine-
teenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, passport and visa require-
ments remained in force only in the European economic periphery: Serbia and
Bulgaria created migration restrictions themselves, while German and Austro
Hungarian Empires imposed it to the migrants arriving from Russia and
neighboring Balkan countries33. The Italian case should be taken into account
separately; Italian Parliament enacted passport controls with 1901 legislation,
but according to Torpey, they were only introduced to ensure the legal protec-
tion of Italian emigrants in their destination countries. The Italian passport sys-
tem did not aim to control or restrict emigration; however, it did enable the
government to impose such measures later when the country entered the First
World War.34
Freedom of movement throughout most of the European continent continued
until July/August 1914 when arguments between AustriaHungary and Serbia
developed into global warfare. At the outbreak of the war, documentbased
border controls were immediately imposed by all European countries. It seems
that, early on, many people still considered the previous freedom and laissez
faire regime the norm; in Germany, the introduction of passport controls was
announced as simply a temporary measure35. This proved to be flawed predic-
tion since passport and visa requirements remained in force until the creation of
the modern Schengen system. The events of the First World War re
emphasized the distinction between the legal status of the citizen and the alien.
Before the war, only the economy mattered: labor mobility benefited the global
labor market, and all people, whether aliens or citizens, were free to travel
wherever they wanted. In 1914, in the course of only a few months, they all
came under suspicion.
During the war, a new system of surveillance and control was constructed.
Compulsory passport and visa procedures for those entering or leaving national
territories became the key instrument for state control over the movement of
people. The process of passportization enabled national governments to control
32
The countries constituting AustriaHungary had a separate body of legislation in this domain.
See more in: Jan Rychlk, Cestovn do ciziny v habsbursk monarchii a v eskosloven-
sku: pasov, vzov a vysthovaleck politika 18481989 (Prague: stav pro soudob djiny AV
R, 2007), 79.
33
For Bulgarian and Serbian passport requirements and the regime imposed on Polish migrants
before 1914 see sections 1.2.5 and 2.2.1.
34
Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 1035.
35
Ibid., 112.
population movement in accordance with a wide range of newly introduced

criteria. In the extremely complex environment of the interwar period, the
states were able to place controls on migration in reaction to the perceived eco-
nomic, political and military needs of the country, and to support national,
demographic, eugenic or even racial policies. Much of this new way of think-
ing and its application in official state policy came as a consequence of the
harsh experience of the war and the enormous prerogatives assumed by states
during the period.
1.1.2 Control of labor migration during the war
The violence of the First World War destabilized migration trends even in
those countries that were not directly engaged in military operations. Countries
which were actively involved in the war and even those that simply expected
conflict prohibited the emigration of potential military recruits. Moreover, re-
strictions and controls were imposed on internal migration due to the necessi-
ties of planned war economies. As it soon became obvious that the war would
continue for some time, control over the movement and useful employment of
human resources turned out to be of the greatest importance. Let us now look
how these controls operated on the level of individual nation states.
During the war, French authorities established limitations for internal migration
when they realized that much of the nations available labor force had started to
move to Paris in search of betterpaid jobs. Special registration passes were
established for immigrant workers so that authorities had full control of their
workplaces and movement. An immigrant worker in France could not move to
another workplace without special authorization.36 Similar regulations were
imposed in Italy, where about 40 percent of labor force was officially mobi-
lized and required to wear uniforms. Interestingly, the introduction of compul-
sory labor assignments in Italy actually helped to raise the level of internal
labor force mobility.37
French and British authorities manipulated the allocation of recruited soldiers
in accordance with the development of the situation on the frontlines. If possi-
ble, they would release considerable contingents of soldiers and direct them for
work in domestic production or war industry. There are some peculiarities of
these militarylabor arrangements. As these soldierworkers were still subject
to military law, they were forced to accept their assignments without any de-
bate on working conditions, let alone any right to bargain or strike. The number
36
Bade, Migration in European History, 16970; Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 112.
37
Ian F. W. Becket, The Great War, 19141918 (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001),
263.
of the French and British soldiers released from frontline duty reached several
hundred thousand at different periods during the war.38
French authorities tried to improve the labor supply by opening their borders to
immigration. According to Patrick Fridenson, about 500,000 immigrants en-
tered the country during the war in addition to the approximately two million
immigrant workers already present in France in 1914. About 35 percent of the
wartime immigrants came from neutral Spain, while about one third originated
from China and French colonies.39 It is debatable whether this last group can
truly be considered voluntary immigrants. This issue will be discussed further
in the next section of this chapter.
German authorities carried out an impressive redirection of available labor
power for employment in armament production. Industrial workers moved
from the core locations of prewar industry to the newly created large military
industry centers such as Altenessen and Borbeck in Essen, or Postdam (Span-
dau). The populations of these towns increased during the war, in contrast to
the general trend throughout Germany of decreasing population. While the
population of Berlin decreased from about two million in 1910 to about 1.6
million in 1917, and that of Hamburg from 931,035 to 811,908, in the arma-
ment factories of Spandau, the number of industrial workers grew from
220,000 in 1913 to 343,000 in 1917.40
One piece of antiquated nineteenth century Prussian legislation, originally de-
signed for extraordinary states of affairs, served as the legal basis for the sys-
tem of overall control and mobilization of German society at the beginning of
the war. According to the provisions of the Prussian Law of Siege of 1851,
armydistricts commanders had quite wide authority over civil society. These
officers were empowered to provide for the maintenance of public safety
with special police prerogatives including the arrest of civilians, the imposition
of the censorship and the inspection of private mail. In addition, military com-
manders were allowed to interfere with any business and commercial activities
under their jurisdiction. This legislation was put in force at the beginning of the
general mobilization on August 1, 1914 and was accompanied later, in 1916,
with an even more ambitious Auxiliary Service Law. Altogether, at the end of
the war there were between 2.5 and 3 million workers employed in the German
military sector.41
38
See more in: Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, 2004), 16970.
39
Patrick Fridenson, The impact of the First World War on French workers. In: The Upheaval
of War. Family, Work and Welfare in Europe 19141918, ed. Jay Winter and Richard Wall
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 23548.
40
Richard Bessel, Mobilizing German Society for War. In Great War, Total War, ed. Roger
Chickering and Stig Frster (Cambridge: Washington: Cambridge University Press and German
Historical Institute, 2000), 4425.
41
Ibid.
Table 1: The Average Annual Emigration from Europe:
Period 190610 191115 191620 192130 193140
Average annual 1,400,000 1,350,000 431,000 700,000 120,000

emigration
% of 190610 total 100 96 31 50 8.5
Source: Bade, Migration in European History, 1845.
1.1.3 Deportations and forced migrations
Labor shortages compelled belligerent state authorities to make use of prisoners

of war, as well as all available human resources under their control. Entente
powers could count on vast work force reserves in their overseas colonies,
while the Germany, AustriaHungary and Bulgaria could only provide them-
selves with labor from the territories they occupied during the war. Most of the
immigrants who entered Germany during the war were prisoners of war or
civilians forcibly deported from the occupied territories. It is estimated that
there were about 62,000 Belgians and 7800,000 Poles engaged in compulsory
labor and about 2.5 million prisoners of war in Germany42. An interesting case
of compulsory Chinese immigration was also recorded; about 100,000 Chinese
laborers were recruited for all types of hard labor behind the British front lines
in northern France. Altogether, French authorities recruited about 225,000
workers from IndoChina and North African colonies. The labor conditions
and treatment of these people were so cruel that local French civilians report-
edly mistook them for prisoners of war.43
Forced migrations and deportations carried out during the war only foreshad-
owed what was to come. After the dissolution of multinational empires and
the establishment of new nation states, rivers of refugees rolled through
Europe. Probably the most drastic case was the socalled exchange of popula-
tion between Greece and Turkey. Actually, the Balkan population was the first
in the twentieth century Europe to experience largescale forced or semi
voluntary migrations. The refugee drama began with the very earliest military
operations during the Balkan wars (19121913) and then continued through the
involvement of Balkan countries in the First World War. Even after the global
warfare ended, Balkan conflicts were still not resolved. The Serbian army con-
42
Becket, The Great War, 261.
43
Bade, Migration in European History, 169. Also: Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, The Age of
Migration, International Population Movements in the Modern World (New York: Guilford
Publications, 2003), 63.
tinued to pacify local Albanians in KosovoMetohija, and the worst was to

come during and after the GreekTurkish war.
In the Balkans, the inhabitants of Macedonia suffered particularly during this
period. A highranking official of Greece engaged in refugee issues at the time
counted no less than seventeen great migratory waves that affected the popula-
tion of Macedonia between 1912 and 192444. In almost all cases, these popula-
tion transfers followed the advancement or retreat of their national armies. In at
least two cases, movements had been accompanied and/or arranged in bilateral
agreements on exchange of population. These were the GrecoBulgarian
convention of November 1919 and the famous GrecoTurkish convention of
January 1923. The latter convention prescribed compulsory migration while the
former allowed individuals to decide.45
One can find the same Balkan model applied on much larger scale in the terri-
tories of the rest of the continent. Apparently, the exchange of population, at
least on a semantic level, was not acceptable within the newly created system
of international law and official phraseology established by the League of Na-
tions. Emigration from ones country of origin was declared as a basic right,
not something to be imposed through coercion. It was institutionalized through
the procedure of the socalled right to opt that allowed national minorities to
freely opt for their national state at an individual level. This way, population
movements throughout Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War
might have been perceived as an exercise of individuals free will to choose
their citizenship. According to the spirit of the legal practice of the time, mar-
ried women were legally obliged to follow their husbands choice of citizen-
ship.46
This optionright legal principle was incorporated in the Peace Treaties im-
posed on Germany and Austria and Hungary in 19191921, and thus, became a
part of the body of international law monitored by the League of Nations. Con-
siderable population movements followed this legal framework, designed to
homogenize the newly created nation states. In the terms of overseas emigra-
tion from Europe, however, these population changes had only an indirect in-
fluence. A relevant example is the case of German overseas emigration, which
44
One of the migratory streams included exotic Caucasus Greek population (around 50,000) who
escaped the chaos of Bolshevik revolution and later were settled in the Greek part of Macedonia.
In: A. A. Pallis, Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 191224, The Geographical
Journal 66, No.4: 31531.
45
Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece (London:
Hurst & Co., 2002), 607. A detailed account on both treaties and its technical implementation
could be found in: Stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities. Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey
(New York: Macmillan, 1932).
46
See Articles 37, 85, 91, 106, 113 of the Versailles Treaty, Articles 7882 of the SaintGermain
Treaty, and Articles 616 of the Treaty of Trianon.
increased with the influx of the continental refugeemigrants from the former
German territories in Eastern Europe47.
Apart from the aforementioned controlled migrations based on bilateral or
multilateral interstate agreements, there were also many chaotic and rather
spontaneous refugee streams, such as those of Russians and Armenians. The
legal status of Russian refugees became particularly dubious after the final
victory of the Bolshevik Revolution. Both Armenian and Russian refugees lost
their citizenship status in their native countries and there was no official ar-
rangement which could give them legal protection. The greatest problem was
that, in the new era of widespread passportization, these stateless persons had
not been provided with passports or any other valid travel documents. Because
the problem could not have been solved at the national level, responsibility (for
a solution) was accepted by the newlycreated supranational League of Na-
tions, based in Geneva.48
On February 20, 1921, the President of the International Committee of the Red
Cross submitted an official request on the refugee issue to the Council of the
League of Nations. In the request, the League was designated as the only su-
pranational political authority capable of solving a problem which is beyond
the power of exclusively humanitarian organizations.49 The first concrete act
of the League of Nations in response to the request was to appoint Dr. Fridtjof
Nansen as High Commissioner for Russian Refugees in September 1921. Nan-
sen was entrusted with responsibility for both the legal status and the everyday
life necessities of Russian refugees. From a legal point of view, the most im-
portant measure undertaken was the introduction of a new Certificate of Iden-
tity designed for Russian refugees in July 1922. The certificate, which became
known as a Nansens Passport, was accepted by 52 countries as a valid travel
document. In May 1924, the right to be provided with a Nansens Passport was
given to Armenian refugees as well. This provision was approved by 38 states.
The approval of individual states was of crucial importance as the issuing of
the passports and full administration of procedure had been entrusted to na-
tional governments.50 In this domain, control over migration was carried out on
both the national level and by the League of Nations.
Claudena Skran claims that many of the complications with refugees during the
interwar period came as consequence of disturbances that emerged in the re-
gime of overseas emigration. The refugee problem would not have attracted so
47
Bade, Migration in European History, 186.
48
A detailed account on the issue could be found in: Louise W. Holborn, The League of Na-
tions and the Refugee Problem, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ences 203 (May 1939), 12435. Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Interwar Europe. The Emer-
gence of a Regime (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press,
1995).
49
Holborn, The League of Nation, 124.
50
Ibid., 1256.
much international concern if the traditional destination countries had main-

tained the pre1914 regime of unrestricted immigration.51 Instead, a new global
system of migration restrictions aggravated the problem of displaced people
and refugees in postwar Europe. The next section will elaborate on the begin-
nings of this system, and explain how overseas migration trends and difficulties
with emigration procedures were connected with the war.
1.1.4 First World War and transatlantic migrations
War had an immediate impact on the volume of migration to America. An arti-

cle published by the Bostonbased North Atlantic Review reported on the na-
ture of immigration to the United States during the second half of 1914.52 The
author of the article was George Harvey (18641928), a well known American
journalist, entrepreneur and diplomat. Harvey was actually the owner of the
North Atlantic Review, through which we trace his journalistic investigation
and some of his personal remarks on the issue53. He made use of official U.S.
statistics on migration for the period between July 1 and December 31, 1914,
and he pointed out the interesting changes that had occurred among the immi-
grant population.
According to the statistical data, during the first six months of the war, remark-
able differences developed between the immigration rates from the northern
(mainly Scandinavia) and southern (mainly Italy and Greece) European coun-
tries. While the volume of immigration from the North declined by about 17
percent, southern European immigration decreased by more than 55 percent, or
three times more than northern European did. Harvey explained that Italy and
Greece were probably three times more likely to enter the war than northern
European countries.
In accordance with the decline in emigration from the southern European coun-
tries, statistics showed an increase in the return migration or repatriation from
the United States that considerably surpassed the rate of immigration. While
51
Skran, Refugees in Interwar Europe, 219.
52
George Harvey, Effects of the War upon Immigration, North American Review 201, No. 1
(Jan/June1915): 66771.
53
After a career in journalism and insurance, he became involved in the construction and ad-
ministration of electric railroads, a venture that brought him a fortune. In 1899 he bought the
North American Review, and, with the backing of J. P. Morgan, he assumed control (1901) of
Harpers Weekly. Harvey retired (1913) from the editorship of Harpers Weekly but later (1918)
founded Harveys Weekly as a medium for virulent attacks on Woodrow Wilson (his former
friend and protg) and the peace negotiations. After the election of Warren G. Harding, Harvey
was appointed ambassador to Great Britain. His works include Women (1908) and Henry Clay
Frick, the Man (1928). In: The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th, ed. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 20017. www.bartleby.com/65/. (retrieved on February 12, 2008).
37,206 persons arrived from southern Europe, no less than 84,300 returned
home to Europe. In the case of immigrants from northern European countries,
the relation was 39,180 immigrants against 38,717 of repatriated persons. It is
important to note that the rate of returning migrants was usually higher for
those originating from more traditional peasant societies in Eastern Europe.
Even taking that into consideration, this was an unprecedented rate of return.
Harvey did not lament this development; on the contrary, he actually expressed
his satisfaction in a paragraph that reveals the racial attitude which was grow-
ing in American journalism during the war:
We shall not be convicted of invidious prejudice if we say
frankly that in these facts is cause for sincere satisfaction. It is
indisputable that immigrants from the northwestern countries
are decidedly preferable to those from southeastern. Their mor-
als are better. Their average of literacy and of general intelli-
gence is far higher. Their physical condition is much better.
Their pecuniary and other material resources are greater, and
their industrial potency is also greater.
This much respected and politically influential journalist continued by analyz-
ing one unpleasant characteristic of immigrants from Southern and Eastern
Europe; according to the author, they did not wish to become proper citizens
and, generally, did not consider America their future home. Allegedly, they only
wished to find employment for a certain period (sometimes measured by
months and at most by a few years), collect savings, and then return home.
There is some truth in Harveys words at least when it concerns some emigra-
tion patterns of people from Eastern and Southern Europe. For the purpose of
our study, however, the article is more important as an indication of the new
ways of perceiving immigration in US society. These sorts of stereotypes and
ethnoracial reasoning about immigration matters would become prevalent in
the United States during the 1920s and would serve as the ideological basis for
the introduction of the quota system. This issue will be explored further in the
following sections.
Official US statistics for the period 19141919 show that the annual immigra-
tion rate from Eastern and Southern Europe (ESE) decreased more sharply than
that of northwestern Europe (NWE), Germany included (see Figure 1). In 1915,
the number of NWE immigrants was only 43 percent of the referent 1913 con-
tingent. For ESE countries, the emigration rate that year was considerably
lower and totaled no more than 14 percent of the number from 1913. In 1919,
however, the number of immigrants coming from ESE countries was less then
one percent of the 1913 contingent.
The remarkable decrease in the number of immigrants from the ESE countries
was a consequence of war. This was especially the case for Imperial Russia,
whose citizens played a prominent role in European prewar emigration. Later,
the strict population policies of the Soviet authorities almost brought Russian
emigration to an end. During the period 19051913, the average annual contin-
gent of immigrants from Imperial Russia was about 192,000 persons, while in
the period between 1915 and 1920 this number dropped to about 9,00054. In the
Soviet era, in the period 19201928, the average annual contingent of emi-
grants to the USA was about 9,000 persons, the same as during the war. With
these particular statistics, however, we cannot know whether the indicated
number includes refugees who left Russia during the civil war 191721 and
then emigrated to the US from other countries.
Figure 1: Immigration from NWE55 and ESE56 countries to USA (1913=100):
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
NWE countries 90 43 28 21 7 10
ESE countries 102 14 11 11 2 0,7
Source: Historical Statistics, 569.
From the data displayed in the Figure 1, it is immediately apparent that the
worlds overseas emigration almost completely ceased during the war. The
considerable longterm war efforts and the desperate need for labor motivated
state authorities to impose strict control over the movement and transportation
of their citizens. Passportization became a general trend throughout the globe.
54
Historical Statistics, 569.
55
In this chart and subsequently in the text, NWE countries will refer to statistical data for
immigration to the USA from Great Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, Netherlands, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Switzerland, France and Germany taken and calculated from Ibid.
56
In this chart and subsequently, ESE countries will refer to statistical data on Russia, the
Baltic states, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. Statisti-
cal data on immigration from these countries to the USA is taken and calculated from Ibid.
Neither citizens nor aliens could travel abroad without encountering significant
administrative hurdles and sometimes an immense amount of paperwork from
the state administration. Moreover, some countries imposed control of the in-
ternal, domestic movement of available workers. In comparison with prewar
era of complete and unrestricted freedom of movement, these changes denote a
significant turning point.
Figure 2: Norway emigrants departing for USA from Christiana:
Courtesy, the KeystoneMast Collection, UCR, California Museum of Photography
Figure 3: Immigrants just arrived from foreign countries. Ellis Island, N.Y.:
Courtesy, the KeystoneMast Collection

1.2 Worldwide emigration restrictions in the 1920s: the end of

the global labor market
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States was the
most desirable destination for emigrants from all around the globe. After the
First World War, the limitations imposed on access to this country affected
state policies in countries of origin, including Yugoslavia. Potential immigrants
to the United States opted for other destinations, such as Australia or South
America; however, these countries and, at first, other British dominions, also
introduced legal restrictions on immigration. Significant changes were made to
state controls over the freedom of movement of people in European countries
as well. Given the particular importance of the changes in US immigration
policy, I will explore the reasons American lawmakers had for the introduction
of the quota system more systematically. An account of interventionist emigra-
tion policies will illustrate the deep impact that the First World War had on
global migration rates and on the global labor market which practically ceased
to exist during and after the war.
1.2.1 US immigration policy during the war and throughout the

1920s
There should be some immigration

of the right kind, but we, not Europe,
will say who shall come or we will
not let any come. The US secretary
of Labor, James J. Davis, 192457
Apart from the restrictions imposed on immigration from some Asian coun-
tries, US policymakers and authorities had, in general, been benevolent towards
immigration up until the First World War. There are only a few rather ridicu-
lous examples of intolerance towards immigrants in some American states.
Frances Kellor wrote on this subject in 1919 for the North American Review.
She wrote about the case of one state where it was forbidden for aliens (i.e.
immigrants) to own dogs, and another state, where aliens could not be em-
ployed as barbers. She also mentioned a state where aliens could not pray in a
foreign language (i.e. their native tongue).58
57
Quoted in: Roy L. Garis, Americas Immigration Policy, North American Review 220, No. 2
(September 1924): 77.
58
Frances A. Kellor, Immigration in Reconstruction, North American Review 209
(Jan/Jun1919): 2067.
Nonetheless, when reading accounts of American policymakers friendly and

tolerant attitudes towards immigrants, one should not underestimate the eco-
nomic interests and influence of pressure groups such as the American entre-
preneurs who benefited from the influx of cheap labor. The attitudes of these
interest groups towards immigrants had such deep roots and solid influence that
laws demanding literacy tests for immigrants were vetoed by President Cleve-
land in 1897, Taft in 1913 and Wilson in 1915.59 Nonetheless, American legis-
lators would vote again on this law and it was finally sanctioned in 1917, in
spite of President Wilsons opposition. After the First World War, US immi-
gration policy became more restrictive, responding to the growing labor prob-
lems affecting the American postwar economy. In the midst of temporary
economic crises that made the American economy highly vulnerable, US legis-
lators passed the Law on Immigration Quota on May 19, 192160. The legisla-
tion was designed and passed in a congressional rush and amid a rather tur-
bulent atmosphere when it became apparent that an enormous number of im-
migrants (about 700,000) would arrive in the US that year. The great number of
immigrants and the adoption of new legislation suggest the literacy test was not
an adequate barrier to newcomers from Eastern and Southern European coun-
tries61.
In his examination of the 1921 US immigration legislation, Harold Laski em-
phasized the role played by US trade unions in the fight against an uncontrolled
influx of immigrants. In doing so, trade unions hoped to prevent the existence
of a permanent reserve army of labor that employers could always use as
leverage against them.62 Likewise, these laborrelated issues were essential to
Hatton and Williamsons explanation of the introduction of the US immigration
restriction, which will be described in section 1.2.2.
The 1921 law prescribed a quota for all nationalities of three percent of the
total number of their conationals already enumerated in the 1910 US census.
At the time, Roy L. Garis, a professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University,
wrote that this legislation was widely accepted only as a makeshift, tempo-
rary, war measure to stem the tide of those unfortunates of Europe.63 Subse-
quent events proved Garis expectations wrong; on the contrary, even harsher
restrictions were introduced by new quota legislation in 1924.64 According to
59
See more in: Garis, Americas Immigration Policy, 634.
60
A shortlasting economic crisis, which occurred in the US at the beginning of the 1920s led to
rising unemployment: from 2.3 percent in 1919 to 4.0 percent in 1920 and 11.9 percent in 1921.
In: Historical Statistics, 73. It might have been in connection with demobilization of men who
returned home after war was over.
61
Hatton and Williamson, Global Migration, 1845.
62
Harold J. Laski, The American Democracy (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), 205.
63
Garis, Americas Immigration Policy, 71.
64
On the 1921 and 1924 US quotalegislations see in: Frank Freidel and Alan Brinkley, America
in the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 18991 and Bade, Migration in
European History, 1889.
this new law, the immigration quota was reduced to 2 percent of the co
nationals population and the 1890 census was used as the reference, instead of
that of 1910.
Why did US policymakers decide to use the nineteenthcentury census to de-
termine immigration quotas in the middle of the 1920s? The answer becomes
apparent if one takes into account the fact that, until 1890s, most immigrants to
the United States were of Germanic and Protestant origin. The 1924 legislation
aimed to change the ethnic composition of the country in favor of immigrants
coming from the NWE countries mentioned earlier in Harveys article. The
significant and immediate impact of this policy on the structure of US immigra-
tion is displayed in the Figure 4. In 1921, the year the new legislation was
passed, the number of immigrants from NWE countries was only 4 percent of
the number of immigrants from ESE countries. In 1922, the first year after the
enactment of the law, the numbers of immigrants from these two European
regions were almost equivalent. In 1924, the more than twice as many came
from NWE countries than from ESE ones. This disparity continued to grow
after the enactment of the 1924 legislation. In 1927, US statistics show five
times more immigrants from NWE countries than from ESE countries.
Figure 4: Effect of the quota legislation in 1921 and 1924 on the number of
immigrants coming to the USA:
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
ESE countries 341655 78950 90915 99487 13076 15979 25877 26400
NWE countries 13851 79437 156429203346125248126437126721116267
Asia 25034 14263 13705 22065 3578 3413 3669 3880
Source: Historical Statistics, 569.

The 1924 legislation seriously hampered immigration from those countries that
had supplied a significant number of immigrants after 1890. Such was the case
with Poland, from which the average annual immigration for the period 1921
24 was 46,102 people, but for the period 192528, declined to 7,608. Asian
immigration was reduced from the annual average of 18,766 people for the
period 192124, to 3,635 for the period 192528, after the enactment of the
restrictions (see Figure 4).65 The total volume of immigration to the USA
dropped from about 800,000 annually to 300,000 in response to the 1921 legis-
lation. After the 1924 legislation, the United States accepted no more than
about 164,000 immigrants per year66. Changes in US immigration policy
opened the door for immense internal migrations, particularly of African
American workers from the South in the period 1914195067.
1.2.2 The introduction of the quota system and the Convergence

Theory
The American people want restric-

tions, strict, severe restrictions. The
bars must be put up higher and more
scientifically. Roy L. Garis (on US
public opinion in 1924)
What was the main cause for an increasingly strict American immigration pol-
icy during the 1920s? Was it increasing xenophobia and racial attitudes to-
wards immigrants from nonNWE countries, newly developed eugenic reason-
ing, or the shortlived economic crises between 1920 and 1921?68 Does the
issue concern the sudden changes that occurred both in the economy and in
public opinion after the war, or the long lasting structural transformation that
developed behind the scenes? Economic historians Hatton and Williamson
offer a complex analytical approach and suggest interesting answers.69
According to their analysis, massmigrations could only contribute to the con-
vergence within the global labor market when limited to the countries of the
socalled Atlantic economy (comprised of OECD countries, as Hatton and
Williamson describe it). With this limit, the influx of newly arrived labor from
developed (or highwage) European countries constantly decreased wage
65
All data taken and calculated from: Historical Statistics, 569.
66
Freidel and Brinkley, America in the Twentieth Century, 190.
67
Castles and Miller, The Age of Migration, 63.
68
Many of these issues have been discussed in: S. Timmer, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Racism,
Xenophobia or Markets? The political Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties,
NBER Working Paper No. 5867, December 1996.
69
Hatton and Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration, 23652.
disparity between the Old and New World. Owing to massmigrations, average
salaries in advanced European countries went up, while on the other side of the
Atlantic, they were in decline. In this way, global migration fueled the ongoing
processes of globalization and contributed to the equalization of labor market
conditions within the system of the Atlantic economy.
This convergence mechanism described above could function only within the
range of the comparatively small wage differences that existed inside the At-
lantic economy. The arrival of a new type of immigrant after 1890 disturbed
this subtle mechanism. It was very difficult to integrate the labor force of the
underdeveloped, poor (lowwage) countries of Eastern Europe and the Bal-
kans into the global labor market system, at least without a number of un-
wanted consequences in the countries of immigration.
Timmer and Williamson particularly stress the negative impact that the mass
arrival of immigrants from ESE countries had on the stability of American
society. Namely, further decreases in the wages of unskilled workers increased
inequalities between them and the rest of American society. This was evident
even before the First World War; the stateappointed Dillingham Commission,
which investigated immigration issues in 19071910, had come to a similar
conclusion. 70 Therefore, Timmer and Williamson, and Hatton and Williamson,
claim that labor market issues were the principal cause of the restrictive policy
in the 1920s; war, xenophobia, and eugenics played only secondary roles.71
While emigration was decreasing the general level of social tensions and ine-
qualities in ESE countries, the resulting immigration had the opposite effect in
the New World: the Atlantic system could not integrate these late newcomers
into the global economy.
70
Timmer and Williamson, Racism, Xenophobia.
71
Roy L. Garis contemporary observations on the public opinion in the US towards the restric-
tions support TimmerWilliamsons proposal: When we had been made to realize that [the
immigrants] arrival was dangerous and fraught with injury to us, we objected to his coming and
took steps to prevent it. [] American people have opposed the coming of immigrants [] when
they had to associate with them and enter into competition with them. The author claims that the
US public opinion upheld a policy of increasing restrictions: The American people want
restriction, strict, severe restrictions. The bars must be put up higher and more scientifically.
Practical results are demanded. In: Garis, Americas Immigration Policy, 65, 72.
1.2.3 Immigration restrictions in British Dominion countries
The governments of Australia72, New Zealand73 and Canada introduced legal

obstacles in line with the American restrictions, whereas European states tried
to control migrations. There are many similarities between the development of
the US, Australian and New Zealand immigration policies. In the second half
of the nineteenth century, only the immigration of Chinese people was legally
restricted in these three countries. During the First World War, Australia and
New Zealand introduced general passport and control policies on White im-
migrants arriving from Europe for the first time. After the war, state policy
projects for the White Australia and White New Zealand were strengthened
even more; it was no longer enough to be White to be admitted to the countries.
New ethnoracial reasoning argued that only people from Great Britain and
Ireland were desirable or acceptable immigrants. According to New Zealands
1919 and 1920 legislation, no other category of immigrants could enter the
country without an official request to and approval from the authorities.
In Australia, a huge effort was made with two principle aims: first, to facilitate
desirable immigration (i.e. the British), and second, to prevent unwanted immi-
gration. The first aim was to be achieved through the coordination of the
Commonwealth institutions especially after enactment of the Empire Settlement
Act of 1922. At the same time, strict controls and many obstacles were imposed
upon socalled undesirable emigration. There was, however, one peculiarity in
the Australian approach. Instead of imposing unilateral measures against un-
wanted immigration, Australian authorities in 1924 reached unofficial gentle-
mens agreements with the governments of the several countries from central
and southern Europe. These governments agreed to control the newly estab-
lished quotas for immigration to Australia. In both Australia and NZ, these
immigration restrictions were introduced within a public atmosphere of in-
creased intolerance and xenophobia (see Figure 5). The NZ legal restrictions
remained in place until 1974.
In Canada, the war led to an increasingly strict immigration policy based on
1910 legislation74. According to this legislation, there was neither a prescribed
72
The data on Australia used in this section are taken from: G. L. Wood, Growth of Population
and Immigration Policy. An Economic Survey of Australia, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 158, No. 1 (1931 November): 917.
73
The data on the New Zeeland immigration policy are taken from: Ann Beaglehole. Immigra-
tion regulation, Te Ara The Encyclopedia of New Zeeland, updated 21Sep2007 URL:
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/NewZealanders/NewZealendPeoples/ImmigrationRegulation/en.
74
Data on Canada employed in this section derives from the paper: A. G. Green, D. A. Green,
The Economic Goals of Canadas Immigration Policy, Past and Present, Discussion Paper No.
9618, Department of Economics, The University of British Columbia: 1998, Vancouver, Can-
ada.
quota system nor any specific ethnogeographical criteria for the selection of
immigrants. The countrys executive, however, gained authority to prohibit the
landing of a broadly defined category of immigrants belonging to any race
deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada or of immigrants of
any specified class, occupation or character. In practice, the system was quite
flexible, enabling the government to control the influx of immigrants in accor-
dance with the current economic or political situation in the country. It also
avoided the complication of Parliamentary debate or exposure to Canadian
public opinion; the whole policy was carried out by government decree (an
OrderinCouncil within the executive branch of government.)
New Canadian legislation in 1919 introduced a literacy test as a new require-
ment. Apart from this exam, only few semantic changes were incorporated into
the text of the prewar 1910 Act. Most importantly, racial criteria would now
be accompanied by specific national criteria as well. This actually served as a
basis for a strict ethnogeographical division of preferred and non
preferred European source countries. Throughout the period 191923, deci-
sions on the status of particular country depended solely on the arbitrary judg-
ment of the Minister of the Department of Immigration and Colonization. In
1923, the division of countries into these two categories was formally estab-
lished by an OrderinCouncil. Immigration was open to British subjects (in-
cluding Dominions) and US citizens; European preferred countries included
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland,
Holland, Belgium and France.
The majority of Central and Eastern European countries (Austria, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia) were marked as nonpreferred according to the Canadian
1923 order75. Southern Europe was not even mentioned. Immigration proce-
dures were more demanding for the citizens of nonpreferred countries but
theoretically they were still eligible to enter Canada. This was not the case for
the citizens of other European countries who could enter Canada only as family
members of legal Canadian residents. Official legislation passed in 1923, made
the Chinese the only people completely prohibited from immigrating.
75
The list of preferred and nonpreferred European countries has been taken from the website of
Canadian Council for Refugees: http://www.ccrweb.ca/history.html retrieved on 21 January
2008.
Figure 5: New Zealand: Fears about Asian immigration:
Source: New Zealand Freelance (1920). Courtesy of Te Ara the Encyclopedia of New Zealand.
The actual status of the nonpreferred countries improved after 1924 when
new prospects opened for Canadian agricultural products. It was the huge de-
mand for Canadian wheat on the world market which softened immigration
restrictions. Canadian authorities started recruiting increasing numbers of agri-
cultural laborers and farmers from the nonpreferred countries, a practice
which lasted until the Depression. The whole procedure became more vigorous
and dynamic after the Railway Agreement of 1925 entrusted it to the great
railway companies: the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and the Canadian
National Railway (CNR). The Canadian model of discriminatory policy based
on ethnogeographical criteria remained in force until the early 1960s.
1.2.4 Migration restrictions and control imposed by European

countries
It was not only destination countries which imposed significant restrictions on

the freedom of movement. One can see similar trends in traditional source
countries on the other side of Atlantic as well. Among European countries, it
was the Soviet regime which imposed the most severe limitations on the free-
dom of movement. According to Yuri Felshtinsky, in most cases, the only way
to emigrate from USSR during the 1920s was to opt for foreign citizenship
through bilateral agreements concluded with foreign countries76. The author
claims that Soviet authorities often granted this right in exchange for some
economic or trade benefits gains. This was the case with an agreement con-
cluded with the Italian government in December 1921. The accord, which gave
the right to opt to citizens of the two countries, was accompanied with a trade
agreement and diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the Italian government.77
Even this form of emigration ceased to exist after 1927 when Stalins regime
applied fullscale control over the movement of people within the USSR. The
huge project of Soviet industrialization required all available manpower and an
absolute control over individuals. Ordinary Soviet citizens were required to
hold valid passports and approval from authorities even for domestic transpor-
tation, while there was no possibility for them to travel abroad. Interestingly, it
seems that Soviet authorities wanted to abolish the very term emigration;
Felshtinsky notes that it was omitted from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia
(Bolschaia Sovietskaya Enciklopediya edition of 195259).78
In interwar Italy, Fascist authorities maintained some of the extraordinary
measures introduced during the First World War. Among these measures was
the mandatory authorization of passports by the Emigration Commissariat. This
proved to be of the greatest importance in maintaining control over emigration
since no Italian could leave the country without this paper. Moreover, through-
out the period, passports could be issued only for one year and were only as-
signed for single specific destinations. In order to gain even more control over
emigration, Fascist authorities used a provision of the Public Security Law of
November 1926 to invalidate all Italian passports; Italian citizens were forced
to reapply if they required new passports.79 The Commissariat regularly in-
formed local authorities of the economic situation in countries of emigration so
76
Yuri Felshtinsky, The Legal Foundations of the Immigration and Emigration Policy of the
USSR, 191727, Soviet Studies 34, No. 3 (July 1982): 32748.
77
Ibid., 339.
78
Ibid., 343.
79
See more in: Carl Ipsen, The Organization of Demographic Totalitarianism: Early Population
Policy in Fascist Italy, Social Science History 17, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 7683.
they could suspend passports for undesirable destinations. One would expect
that all these measures would have had a huge negative impact on Italian emi-
gration rates; however, it was not the case, or at least not for the first period of
the Fascist emigration policy (192227). In this period, according to Canistraro
and Rosoli, the regime permitted emigration so long as it was monitored and
controlled by the totalitarian state apparatus80. In 1926, an report which referred
to Italian emigration policy in period 19241925, Mussolini defined this policy
as follows:
[O]ne can recognize, as I do, that emigration may be damaging
because it impoverishes our people of those active elements
which nourish the red corpuscles of anemic foreign countries.
On the other hand, emigration may be a lesser evil if it is care-
fully prepared, selected, financed, and rationalized: in a word,
organized. As such it will better utilize its strengths and weigh
more heavily in the scales of international values.81
Ironically, in spite of the large scale bureaucratization of emigration proce-
dures in Italy it became, in some respects, more liberal than it had been be-
fore the war82. Freedom of movement controlled and channeled by the Fascists
seems to have been freer than the uncontrolled freedom of the laissezfaire
regime.
Fascist policies changed in 1927 when serious restrictions were imposed on
emigration from the country. The massive amount of overseas emigration was
perceived as an embarrassment and a sign of weakness of the corporatist state.
Emigration was to be substituted by internal migrations, such as the coloniza-
tion of uncultivated lands in the South. State control proved to be efficient; the
number of Italian emigrants in 1928 was only about one half of that from 1926.
In this period of the new prohibitive measures, the Italian emigration problem
took on a particular semantic dimension. Like the Soviets and their encyclope-
dia project, the Fascist regime also tried to abolish the very term emigra-
tion83. One of high Fascist officials, Dino Grandi, claimed in 1927 that the
term emigrant was to be simply replaced by citizen, understood here as
nothing more than a [temporary] worker abroad84. No matter where or for
how long they were temporarily employed abroad, strong ties of the citizenship
should tie them to the motherland.
80
Phillip V. Cannistraro and Gianfausto Rosoli, Fascist Emigration Policy in the 1920s: An
Interpretative Framework, International Migration Review 13, No. 4 (Winter 1979): 678.
81
Quoted in Ibid., 686.
82
The passport legislation [of 21 January 1923 and of 18 March same year] actually made
emigration restrictions for men of military age more liberal than before the war. In: Ipsen, The
Organization of Demographic Totalitarianism, 77.
83
Richard J. B. Bosworth, Italy and the wider world, 18601960 (London: New York:
Routledge, 1996), 122.
84
Cannistraro and Rosoli, Fascist Emigration Policy, 687.
In its constitution, the German Weimar Republic proclaimed itself a country

with unrestricted freedom of movement. This proved to be a serious obstacle to
the adoption of any new significantly interventionist policies. German authori-
ties, however, managed to impose measures and regulations aimed to control
both immigration and emigration. Controls over the immigration of seasonal
workers from Eastern Europe were maintained through the newly established
Emigration Office, in collaboration with a system of national labor exchange
offices. Only during a period of insufficient labor supply could anyone get
permission to enter Germany, and even then, only a restricted number of immi-
grants were allowed in. This policy apparently yielded results and Germany
gained almost complete control over immigration process.85 Germanys immi-
gration rate during the 1920s was quite meager (between about 48,000 in 1920
and about 109,000 in 1929) when compared with the approximately one mil-
lion labor immigrants recorded in 1907.86
On the other hand, due to the strict constitutional limitations, it was not possi-
ble to maintain such a successful command over emigration. The most that
German authorities could do was to impose a compulsory counseling appoint-
ment for all potential emigrants. This procedure was conducted in collaboration
with the national network of the labor exchange offices which were obliged to
provide potential emigrant with information on the available job positions in
the country. As the most of the counselling did not persuade emigrants to
stay in the country, the institution was later given the nickname Office of Lost
Words.87
Like Germany, the newly created Czechoslovak state also proclaimed unre-
stricted freedom of emigration; the only prerequisite was a valid passport.
Within the terms of global passportization at that time, it was not really consid-
ered a restriction at all. On the other hand, organized massemigration, espe-
cially in case of labor hiring from abroad, was strictly forbidden. The domestic
labor force was allowed to emigrate only with consent of the Minister of Social
Policy. Just like the case of German immigration policy, the whole procedure
was coordinated by a network of national labor exchange offices. Czechoslo-
vak authorities tried to maintain control over the process even beyond their
borders through collective labor contracts concluded with corresponding state
authorities or authorized agencies in countries of emigration. These contracts
guaranteed the salaries and the method of payments, and stipulated basic condi-
tions of work, even including a form of workers insurance. Czechoslovak state
officials reacted to violations of the prescribed contractual conditions. An even
more efficient method of control over the emigration rate was enabled through
binational agreements. Prior to 1925, the Czechoslovak state concluded three
85
Bade, Migration in European History, 188.
86
B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 17501970 (London: Macmillan, 1975), 142.
Castles, Miller, The Age of Migration, 65.
87
Bade, Migration in European History, 1878, 1913.
such agreements with France, Austria and Germany. The USSR was the only
destination country to which proclaimed freedom of emigration did not apply.
This special exception was established by confidential orders issued within the
Ministry of Interior.88
In interwar Poland, certain inconsistencies existed between official discourse
and actual administrative conduct, at least during the formative period of the
development of emigration offices. In official speeches, emigration was de-
clared evil and damaging to the national and economic interests of Poland, yet
no concrete measures were undertaken to prevent it throughout the 1920s.
Moreover, huge rates of unemployment, poor labor conditions and fear of pos-
sible social and political upheavals very soon compelled Polish authorities to
reconsider their attitude towards emigration. This change of heart produced
what Adam Walaszek has called a reluctant emigration policy89. According
to Anna Kicinger, the policy was paradoxical in that although emigration was
eased, controlled and supported, it was not encouraged officially by the Polish
government90. One of the few indications that the state actually favored emi-
gration can be found in fact that from 1925 on the Polish emigration passport
was being issued to the applicants without administrative fees or any other
cost91. Prolonged state of economic and political instability throughout 1920s
influenced Polish emigration policy which became ever more engaged in favor
of mass emigration. At the same time, efforts were made to hinder emigrants
from returning to Poland. From 1924 on, not only did emigration turn out to be
an acceptable way of decreasing social tensions within Poland but huge plans
of overseas colonization also appeared in public discourse of government
officials.92
A huge colonization movement of Polish settlers was planned for Brazil and
Peru, and corresponding contracts were concluded with these South American
states. Both projects were carried out by the state funded associations such as
Towarzystwo Kolonizacyjne and PolskoAmerykaski Syndykat Emigracyjny.
This emigration stream coincided with a new state policy of the regime
founded after coup dtat of May 1926. In general terms, only the seasonal
labor migrations were acceptable for the new sanacyjny regime from the point
of states national and economic interests. On the other hand, if longterm
88
Louis Varlez, Kontinentln vysthovaleck statistika v eskoslovensku (Prague: Ministerstvo
sociln pe, 1925); Jan Rychlk, Cestovn do ciziny, 126.
89
Adam Walaszek, Wychodcy, Emigrants or Poles? Fears and Hopes about Migration in Po-
land 18701939: 9. Lecture given on 2002 meeting of the Association of European Migrations
Institutions in Stavangeria, Norway. Available at www.utvandrersenteret.no/doc/Adam%20
Walaszek.PDF9 (retrieved on 30 April 2009).
90
Anna Kicinger 2005, Polityka Emigracyjna II Rzeczpospolitej, CEFMR (Working Paper
4/2005): 28. Available at: http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_200504.pdf (retrieved on 30
April 2009).
91
Ibid., 34.
92
Ibid., 608.
overseas emigration was inescapable, it should at least be directed toward for-

mation of strong Polish colonies abroad. Starting in 1926, the Polish Emigra-
tion Bureau was preparing plans and state projects for planned colonies in
France, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru.93
At the beginning of the interwar period, the demographic situation in France
was rather gloomy. The French economy was in great need of manpower as
about 1.4 million French soldiers had died and another 1.5 million had been
crippled during the war. According to Gary Cross, the government played a
decisive role in French immigration rates between 1919 and 192494. During
these five years, about one million immigrants entered the country. Only for a
short period after armistice were French borders closed due to the unstable
situation in the rest of Europe, and the country began receiving foreign laborers
no later than the spring of 1919. France urgently needed labor for postwar
reconstruction, as well as for certain economic sectors like agriculture, mining
and general lowpaying unattractive to domestic labor. In order to facilitate the
immigration of labor, France concluded bilateral treaties with Poland, Italy and
Czechoslovakia (see above) in 1919 and 1920. According to the treaties, bilat-
eral commissions were established to determine both the number of migrants
and recruitment criteria. This way, the representatives of the French govern-
ment in the Commissions could acquire the particular type of labor power they
needed.95
The French case does not fit perfectly into the model of ever growing influence
of the state in organizing immigration procedures during the 1920s. State influ-
ence was prevalent only during the reconstruction period when most of the
incentives and investments for public works came from the government. In
period after 1924, however, the organization of immigration procedures was
shifting from the State to private companies among which the most prominent
role was played by the Socit Gnrale dImmigration (SGI). The company
was founded in 1924 by the merger of a number of commercial agencies that
worked in the interest of coal and agricultural employers. The SGIs field of
recruitment was Eastern Europe where Poland proved to be a particularly rich
source of cheap labor. In Poland alone, the SGI had direct access to one hun-
dred local labor exchange offices which provided good access to information
and laborers. Aside from Poland, the SGI was recruiting workers in other East-
ern European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Lithua-
nia, and Hungary. Almost half of the immigrant labor influx in France between
1926 and 1929 came through the recruitment system and control of the SGI.96
93
Ibid., 623; Walaszek, Wychodcy, Emigrants or Poles?, 911.
94
Garry S. Cross, Immigrant Workers in Industrial France. The Making of a New Laboring
Class (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), 4953.
95
Ibid., 525.
96
Ibid., 5563.
Although the SGI achieved a lot and gained more influence than the state over
immigration, the general terms of French immigration policy were still far from
the laissezfaire. The states assistance and support remained essential and the
government still could influence and even control immigration, indirectly if not
directly. The SGI would not have been so successful without the institutional
backing provided by the state. Furthermore, the state coordinated labor re-
cruitment with the company through a strict visa policy. No immigrant could
enter the country without a visa and the visa could only be obtained after a
labor contract had been submitted. It was far too complicated for individual
applicants to complete the necessary paperwork on their own, so uneducated
agricultural or mine workers usually preferred to join the contingents of SGI
contract laborers.97
Due to the rigorous selection process, immigrations contribution to Frances
economy became more effective than it had been during the prewar laissez
faire period. The stream of new immigrants was continuous during the 1920s.
By 1931, 2.2 million foreign workers were recorded. From 1921 to 1931, im-
migration contributed 75 percent of the overall population growth in France.98
Similar to the Italian model, the impressive outcome of the French immigration
policy appears to be the result of largescale state support, supervision, control
and intervention. The peculiarity of the French case is that the state combined
its control with efficient management provided by commercial companies.
1.2.5 Restrictions before worldwide restrictions: Polish territories,

Serbia and Bulgaria before 1914
After a discussion of the general situation in prewar Europe and the changes
visvis freedom of movement that occurred as a result of the First World
War, this study will focus on countries and territories which do not fit into this
general scheme. This will include the migration restrictions applied both by and
for underdeveloped Balkan countries Serbia and Bulgaria as well for the Polish
borderline territories of German, Russian and AustroHungarian Empires.
These cases provide us with models of restrictive emigration regimes which
existed in Europe even before the First World War. While in the Polish case,
restrictive policies were imposed by the partition states for both economic and
political reasons, in Serbia and Bulgaria these policies were guided chiefly by
military concerns and desires for national security and demographic expansion.
The regime of passport requirements in Southeast Europe included also Hunga-
rian policy imposed for Serbian and Romanian citizens entering Hungarian
97
Ibid., 54.
98
Castles and Mires, The Age of Migration, 64.
soil. Namely, after liberal passport legislation had been enacted in Hungary
1903, passport requirement remained only for the citizens of the states desig-
nated by the executive authorities99. In case of Serbia passport obligation was
prolonged by a government decree in 1903 and existed up to 1910 when it was
finally abolished100. However, after it was abolished for Serbia passport re-
quirement was still in force for Romania. This was a rather illogical situation
especially taking into account recent hostilities expressed between Austria
Hungary and Serbia during the Annexation Crisis of 19081909. Hungarian
MP Copony Traugot stressed this issue on the Parliament session of 14 De-
cember 1910101.
The majority of territories in what would become Poland at the end of 1918
were acquired from the former Russian Empire and Austrian Galicia where
Poles had a long tradition of overseas emigration and continental migration to
the neighbouring German Empire. Emigrants from these territories were so
numerous that German authorities made an exception to their generally liberal
migration policies. In order to control the influx of Polish labor from Russia,
German authorities imposed passport controls on borders with Russia during
the 1890s. Theoretically, in case when domestic production did not require
additional labor, entrance to Germany could be denied. The laborers admitted
to Germany were supplied with temporary work permits at the border crossing
point. These documents expired in December each year obliging them to leave
99
[P]assport is not a requirement in general. [...] a passport is to be shown:1. by a Hungarian
citizen: a) intending to travel to states where it is required [...], b) with the aim of emigration 2.
by both Hungarian and foreign citizen[s]: when intending to cross a borderline or a part of the
state where passport obligation has been issued by the Ministry. Decree of the Royal Hungarian
Minister of Interior No. 1904/70000: Instruction on the Execution of Act No. 1903/VI. on
Passport Matters. In: Collection of Hungarian Decrees, No. 38, 1904. Budapest, 1904, 668
(translated by my friend Gergely Galantha of CEU).
100
[O]n the basis of the authorization by act No. 1903/VI. paragraph 2., the Royal Hungarian
Ministry ordains to sustain the passport obligation towards Romania and Serbia that has been so
far in effect. Budapest, July 17, 1904 (signed) Tisza Decree of the Royal Hungarian Ministry
No. 1904/3456. P.M. [Prime Minister] On Ordaining the Passport Obligation towards Romania
and Serbia. In: Collection of Hungarian Decrees, 38th, 1904. Budapest, 1904. Royal Hungarian
Ministry of Interior. No. 85. 604; On the basis of the authorization granted by act No. 1903/VI.
paragraph 2., the Royal Hungarian Ministry eliminates the passport obligation towards Serbia,
which has been in force so far and was formerly sustained by decree No. 1904/3456. P.M. [Prime
Minister] Budapest, October 1, 1910 (signed) Ct. KhuenHdervry Kroly. Decree of the
Royal Hungarian Ministry No. 1910/5380. P.M. [Prime Minister]: On the Elimination of
Passport Obligation toward Serbia. In: Collection of Hungarian Decrees, 44th, 1910. Budapest,
1910. Royal Hungarian Ministry of Interior. No. 113. 603. (Translation by Gergely Galantha).
101
Copony Traugott: And now that we have just eliminated this obligation with Serbia, a coun-
try with which we were almost waging war a short year ago [...] how much more desirable would
it be to eliminate the passport obligation and the offending procedure of the border police to-
wards Romania, a country with which we have been tied by honest and loyal friendship and
thousands of economic interests for decades. In: Interpellation of Copony Traugott on the aboli-
tion of passport obligation towards Romania, Lower House Diary 76. National Session No. 59,
Wednesday, December 14, 1910 (translated by Gergely Galantha).
the country during the winter. For this reason Klaus Bade noted that the Poles
who entered Germany were treated as seasonal workers, not permanent immi-
grants; they were not allowed to bring their families with them and their free-
dom of movement inside the Reich was restricted.102 The pattern of these re-
strictions corresponded to the types of controls on labor movement imposed in
the rest of Europe later during the interwar period. From this perspective, the
temporary work permits stamped into the holders passports appear as a coun-
terpart of later global visa system. This may also apply to the prewar Russian
passports which were issued to the Polish laborers for a limited period of only
eightmonth validity.
In spite of the controls, in the years preceding the war, there were about
380,000 Polish seasonal workers from Russia and about 200,000 from Austrian
Galicia. If, for some reason, Polish labor might have been unwanted in Germa-
ny prior to 1914 it became quite desirable when the war started: Polish seasonal
workers were not allowed to return to Russia while another 100,000 were forc-
ibly recruited on occupied territories.103
Let us now examine the migration restrictions that existed in Serbia and Bulga-
ria before and after the First World War. In these two countries, not only were
passports and visa requirements mandatory for overseas emigration but the fees
required to obtain them were quite high prior to 1914. The large sum demanded
from each emigrant proved to be the main tool of state control during that pe-
riod. In the case of prewar Serbia, an emigrant was expected to pay 250 Di-
nars or about $50 US, just to be provided with a valid passport for America. In
Bulgaria, control was more sophisticated. According to 1907 legislation, nu-
merous administrative steps and requirements were introduced for each appli-
cation. It was almost impossible for a physically fit adult man to leave the
country. The law forbade emigration to young men enrolled in the military and
those younger than 40 if they were listed as countrys army reserve. Since Bul-
garia had universal conscription, practically all ablebodied men fell into this
category.
According to the law, these men could only travel abroad with special permis-
sion and even then, only after paying a large security deposit to secure their
return. The sum was to be between 1,000 and 5,000 Leva ($2001,000 US$!)
102
Klaus J. Bade, German Emigration to the United States and Continental Immigration to
Germany in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Central European History 13,
No. 4 (Dec., 1980): 3734; Ralph Melville, Permanent Emigration and Temporary Transna-
tional Migration: Jewish, Polish and Russian Emigration from Tsarist Russia, 18611914. In:
Overseas Migration from EastCentral and Southeastern Europe 18801940, ed. Julianna
Pusks (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1990), 1367. Even the famous German sociologist Max
Weber publicly supported these restrictions for the sake of Germanys national state and eco-
nomic interest. See more in: Oliver Grant, Migration and Inequality in Germany 1870913 (New
York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2006), 1935.
103
Melville, Permanent Emigration, 138.
arbitrarily determined by local authorities for each individual case.104 Once

again it is necessary to stress that these severe, restrictive regulations existed
before 1914 at a time when throughout Europe and to America others could
travel freely without passports, let alone other forms of surveillance, controls or
paperwork. From this point of view, the underdeveloped Balkan countries and
the Central European Empires seem to have been a vanguard in the policies of
restriction and control over the freedom of movement, policies which would
later be imposed at the global level. To certain degree and for certain periods,
southern and eastern borderline of AustriaHungary and eastern frontier of
prewar Germany may be taken as a boundary of unrestricted freedom of
movement in prewar Europe. This line may also indicate furthermost limits of
the labor market of the Atlantic economic system.
Let us see now the course of development of the emigration policies of the old
and newly created countries alongside this borderline in the interwar period.
Some changes occurred in connection with the general monetary upheaval: the
public finances of European countries were characterized by hyper inflation
and monetary instability during the First World War and at the beginning of the
1920s. These problems affected Bulgaria and the newly created Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as well. It is apparent that huge monetary distur-
bances significantly influenced the restrictive passport regulations in both Ser-
bia (by then part of Yugoslavia) and Bulgaria. Since the required dues were not
revalued, the unfavourable gap between an average income and fee required for
travel documents decreased through inflation. The cost of a Bulgarian security
deposit, fixed by legislation in 1907, was not more than between $7 and $35
US in 1922 (for the affect of inflation on passport fees in Serbia, see 3.2.2).
This seems to have created, in effect, a certain liberalization of emigration pro-
cedures in both Serbia and Bulgaria after the war. On the other hand, even
these decreased amounts were still an enormous burden relative to average
daily salaries. For instance, a well paid industrial worker in Bulgaria in 1922
could expect no more than 40 Leva or around 28 US cents per day, meaning the
security deposit was equivalent to the wages for 25 to 125 days of work. The
average expenses required of a Bulgarian emigrant would also have included
additional administrative charges for obtaining travel documents and the cost of
journey itself. Apart from official fees, each applicant was obliged to provide
emigration authorities with documents issued by the local and army authorities,
police and judiciary. The documents were needed to prove that the applicants
had fulfilled all their duties and obligations (taxpayment, army service, finan-
cial support left for their families while they were abroad) and that there was no
trial pending against him in domestic tribunals. Only after completing these
bureaucratic formalities and paperwork could a Bulgarian emigrant travel over-
seas.
104
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the law. In: Zakon za emigratsiata, Drzhaven vestnik, No. 10,
1908.
The tradition of border controls continued in newly created Polish state. The
only difference is that by the interwar period it had already become a general
state of affairs throughout Europe. Like in other European countries, the main
controls over emigration process in newly created Polish state could have been
carried out through the passport application procedure. In domain of continen-
tal emigration, Polish authorities applied it systematically only in case of re-
strictive policy against emigration to Germany 19191926. After the emigra-
tion for Germany was officially abolished in 1919, applicants intending to work
in Germany were simply denied issuance of passport. However, even in this
case the control was quite inefficient which is evident in large numbers of
Polish seasonal workers in Germany throughout the period of official ban of
migration to Germany. According to German sources there was more than
100,000 illegal seasonal workers from Poland at average annual level in the
period.105
The US quota system and the restrictions in European countries left over after
the First World War contributed decisively to the low global migration rates in
the interwar period. Whether to restricted or supported emigration, European
governments gained critical control over the flow of people across their bor-
ders. For most European countries there was no returning to the prewar lais-
sezfaire migration policies. The standard regime of passportization enabled
national governments to regulate the interstate movement of people including
labor migration; they managed to introduce a variety of new criteria for restric-
tions on immigration to or emigration from their countries. Even a nominally
liberal state like France was very much involved in controlling the immigration
process. The most drastic cases of the newly established restrictions over free-
dom of movement can be found in two totalitarian states: the USSR and Italy.
In these two countries, almost every element of the migration process required
state approval. Bulgaria, which had a notable tradition of severe restrictions
even before the war, maintained these policies during the 1920s. It is apparent
that emigration flows from the backward ESE countries/populations did not fit
with the global patterns of labor migration during the first period of globaliza-
tion (18461914). Ironically, the only global system into which these countries
might have been fully integrated was the one of trade tariffs and restrictions on
the freedom of transport and movement, imposed in the rest of the world during
and after the First World War.
105
Anna Kicinger, Polityka Emigracyjna II Rzeczpospolitej, 16.
Figure 6: Immigrants just arriving from foreign countries. Ellis Island:
Figure 7: Italian emigrants for USA:

1.3 Public Debates on Eugenics and Racial Criteria of the US

Immigration Policy
A line drawn across the continent of

Europe from northeast to southwest,
[...] separates countries not only of
distinct races but also of distinct civi-
lizations. It separates Protestant
Europe from Catholic Europe, [...] it
separates Teutonic races from Latin,
Slav, Semitic, and Mongolian races.
J. Commons
If the first American quota legislation was motivated mainly by labor related
issues, the legislation passed in 1924 was based more on the racial and eugenic
beliefs held by some sections of the American public. During the 1920s, it be-
came fashionable in American journalistic circles to write about the superior-
ity of the Nordic (or Teutonic) race, the biological factors of inheritance or
the importance of the purification of American race. For about two decades
preceding the US quota legislation, a significant amount of scholarly produc-
tion had been produced in the fields of racial anthropology, the biological his-
tory of mankind, and eugenics. It is important to focus on this issue as it reveals
the attitudes that a significant number of American scholars and the public had
towards ESE and Yugoslav immigrants.
1.3.1 The Immigration Restriction League and racial theories
It is difficult to say if the US society has ever been completely tolerant or sym-
pathetic towards mass immigration. It is apparent, however, that negative sen-
timents towards the newcomers were articulated more frequently after a con-
siderable number of South and East European immigrants began to arrive to
America in last decade of nineteenth century. The Immigration Restriction
League (IRL) was one of the most significant public associations which pro-
moted antiimmigrant attitudes. Founded in 1894 with aim of influencing pub-
lic opinion and political decision makers in Washington, this organization ad-
vocated that a system of restrictions, controls and selection be applied to the
immigration process. The IRL Constitution states that the organization was not
against immigration in general; the suggested restrictions were intended only
for those immigrants denoted as unsuitable for citizenship and harmful for the
American national character106. Although the IRL had long been lobbying for
immigration restrictions, it was only during the First World War that legal
measures aimed against immigrants from ESE countries were first enacted by
US Congress.
During the war, feelings of ethnic intolerance gained a great deal of publicity in
political and scholarly circles, labor organizations, and among ordinary Ameri-
cans. In 1916, Madison Grant published his infamous book The Passing of the
Great Race, in which he developed the Nordic race theory and warned
American public on the danger that might come from the further mixing of
Nordic stock with other races. It seems that Grant became completely obsessed
with interracial miscegenation. The book features emotional descriptions which
claimed New York was becoming a cloaca gentium, a mixture of different
races and ethnicities. The author feared that the racial diversity would produce
many amazing racial hybrids and some ethnic horrors [...] beyond the powers
of future anthropologists to unravel107. Grant was particularly concerned about
US immigration policy at the time. If there was a way to preserve the pure
Nordic stock of the first settlers of America, it was by the means of immigra-
tion policy. His post as vicepresident of the IRL proves that he was very much
engaged with the issue of immigration. In his book, Grant warns readers of the
consequences of the massive influx of Jews and members of inferior Alpine
and Mediterranean races which had started after the end of the American Civil
War. Allegedly the newcomers were attracted by after war prosperity of Amer-
ica:
The transportation lines advertised America as a land flowing
with milk and honey, and the European governments took the
opportunity to unload upon careless, wealthy and hospitable
America the sweepings of their jails and asylums. The result
was that the new immigration, while it still included many
strong elements from the north of Europe, contained a large and
increasing number of the weak, the broken, and the mentally
crippled of all races drawn from the lowest stratum of the Medi-
terranean basin and the Balkans, together with hordes of the
wretched, submerged populations of the Polish Ghettos.108
106
The objects of this League shall be to advocate and work for the further judicious restriction
or stricter regulation of immigration, to issue documents and circulars, solicit facts and informa-
tion on that subject, hold public meetings, and to arouse public opinion to the necessity of a
further exclusion of elements undesirable for citizenship or injurious to our national character. It
is not an object of this League to advocate the exclusion of laborers or other immigrants of such
character and standards as fit them to become citizens. Article II of the Constitution of the IRL.
Available at the web site of the Harvard University Library: http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/
5233215?n=1&imagesize=1200&jp2Res=0.5 (retrieved on February 19, 2008).
107
Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race or the Racial Basis of European History (New
York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1916), 81.
108
Ibid., 7980.
Madisons Nordic race included inhabitants of Scandinavian countries, large

parts of the British Isles and the northern territories of France and Germany
territories which later would be privileged under the quota system. Madison
praises the physical and mental qualities of Nordic men. In the book, they are
portrayed as tall, blonde giants, religious and of high morals, born to conquer
and rule inferior races. Racial theories of this kind were not a novelty among
American scholars. The Madisons book echoed earlier racial doctrines in Wil-
liam Z. Ripleys 1898 book The Races of Europe and Jeremiah Jenks and
Daniel Folkmars Dictionary of Races, published in 1911. The latter was pub-
lished as official expert material by the Dillingham Commission summoned by
US Congress to investigate immigration issues. The negative racial sentiment
towards ESE immigrants presented in Jenks and Folkmars Dictionary was
often quoted by restrictionist pressure groups109.
John Commons book Race and immigrants in America, first published in
1907, was reprinted in a second edition in 1920. The author, who later became
a famous economist and one of the leading experts of the Roosevelts New
Deal program, articulated a great theory which divided Europe into two racial
entities and cultural civilizations. An excerpt from his book sheds light on the
attitudes towards ESE immigrants which prevailed among part of American
intellectual milieu during the 1920s:
A line drawn across the continent of Europe from northeast to
southwest, separating the Scandinavian Peninsula, the British
Isles, Germany, and France from Russia, AustriaHungary, It-
aly, and Turkey, separates countries not only of distinct races
but also of distinct civilizations. It separates Protestant Europe
from Catholic Europe; it separates countries of representative
institutions and popular government from monarchies; it sepa-
rates land where education is universal from lands where illiter-
acy predominates; it separates manufacturing countries, pro-
gressive agriculture, and skilled labor from primitive hand in-
dustries, backward agriculture, and unskilled labor; it separates
an educated, thrifty peasantry from a peasantry scarcely a single
generation removed from serfdom; it separates Teutonic races
from Latin, Slav, Semitic, and Mongolian races.110
Although his appraisal of the people of ESE region is harsh and degrading,
Commons line of thinking with regard to US immigration policy appears to
propose largely socioeconomic and cultural rather than racial criteria for ex-
clusion. One of the most distinguished American economists of his time,
109
Daniel J. Tichenor, The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 1301.
110
John R. Commons, Races and Immigrants in America (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Pub-
lishers, 1967), 69.
Commons dedicated considerable attention to the economic aspects of the is-

sue. His attention was drawn by some remarkable changes which occurred in
the hearts and minds of European laborers following the war. In the introduc-
tion to the second edition of the book (1920), Commons particularly stressed
the poor work ethic and the new ways of bargaining on labor issues that the
immigrants were bringing from revolutionary Europe.
It is apparent that both racial theories and related suggestions for US immigra-
tion policy existed for long before 1917; however, it was only with the advent
of the Great War that these ideas gained serious ground in actually affecting
federal immigration policy.
Figure 8: Americans of Tomorrow Immigrants on Deck of S.S. Amerika. New

York:
1.3.2 Laughlin vs. Jennings: one debate among eugenicists
An interesting debate among leading American eugenicists occurred while the

second quota legislation of 1924 was being prepared. The Congressional
Committee on Immigration had been summoned to investigate all aspects of
the issue. Harry H. Laughlin, a distinguished eugenicist and one of cofounders
of the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, took part in sessions as
an official Expert Eugenics Agent appointed by the Committee. He influ-
enced the Committee by providing scientific material that supported a restric-
tive policy against ESE immigrants with the northsouth and westeast criteria
for exclusion. According to Laughlin, the best hereditary material in Europe

was to be found in northern and western territories of European continent.111
Laughlins reasoning was contested by another eugenicist, Herbert Spencer
Jennings, who was invited to give his expert opinion before the Commission.
According to Barkan, Jennings criticism of Laughlin was still based in eugen-
ics112. He criticized Laughlins incorrect application of statistical methods, but
not the basic foundation of his approach: the importance of heredity factors.
One of the faults he found in Laughlins methodology was that recent immi-
grants of ESE countries were compared with those already accommodated to
the North American environment. Jennings completely rejected restrictions
based on the proposed ethnogeographic criteria, arguing instead that, contrary
to Laughlins assumptions, the greatest percentage of hereditary degenerations
could be found among Irish immigrants, while AustroHungarians had the
least. Jennings proposed the exclusion of Irish immigrants rather than those
from ESE countries, but, as Barkan notes, the concept of eugenics remained the
central approach to the issue.
1.3.3 Racism, sociology and eugenics: The New Mercantilism
There is significant evidence that American quota legislation adopted the ra-
cial, eugenic, and cultural criteria described in previous sections. The medical
examination of each individual immigrant provided additional assurance that
the genetic and biological health of the American nation would be maintained.
American sociologist Clifford Kirkpatrick described immigration policy as a
sort of modern era mercantilism.113 Whereas mercantilism was based on the
assumption that the fortune of a nation depended on the import of gold through
trade, immigration aimed to import the most mentally and physically capable
men. According to the author, a new age had arrived when human resources
became one of the most important international trading items.
111
Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1992), 196203.
112
Ibid., 195203.
113
Clifford Kirkpatrick, Selective Immigration: The New Mercantilism, Journal of Social
Forces 3, No. 3 (March 1925): 497503.
Figure 9: Immigrants Detained at Ellis Island, N.Y.:
Although Kirkpatrick opposed geographic or racial criteria for selection, he

was not against the basic principle of selection popular in American scholarly
circles at that time. He argued that sheep may not be separated efficiently from
the goats on the basis of geography and that the best individuals from southern
Europe had always been better than the worst from the North. In that context,
Kirkpatrick mentioned the famous Serbian scientist Michael (Serbian Miha-
jlo) Pupin who had launched a notable career in the United States and made
great contributions to American society, despite his origins in a racially and
eugenically inferior part of Europe.114 According to the author, the selection
process should have used exhaustive medical and psychological examinations
rather than racial or geographical criteria. Similar attitudes were advocated in
the same journal by American sociologist Howard B. Woolston115.
The First World War brought dramatic changes to US immigration policies.
Previously, they had only served to providing domestic industry with cheap
labor, but after 1917 they were transformed into a complicated system of
eugenic requirements which promised biological and social results. New immi-
gration from ESE countries was no longer wanted. The establishment of the
quota system in the US coincided with the overall system of emigration con-
114
Mihajlo Pupin was famous for his technical inventions and patents for improving longrange
telephone connections. He was a lecturer at Columbia University and well known for his public
lectures on physics. In 1924, the year the eugenics quota was enacted, he won a Pulitzer Prize for
his autobiography From Immigrant to Inventor. As a wellknown public personality, he was
much more famous than his contemporary, Nikola Tesla, another Serbian scientist.
115
Howard B. Woolston, Wanted: An Immigration Policy, Journal of Social Forces 2, No. 15
(1923/24): 66671.
trols and restrictions imposed in European countries. This was particularly the
case in the USSR, Bulgaria and Italy where the most drastic examples of these
policies can be found. The changes came as one consequence of the general
disturbances in global migration which occurred during the war. The impact of
the First World War can be detected even in the case of the US quota legisla-
tion, as it would not appear without the xenophobic atmosphere and economic
crises, which were generated by the war. The breakdown of the global labor
market that emerged during the war and continued in the interwar period was
one of the most remarkable features of the international economy until the
modern second globalization period.
II PART: PATTERNS OF EMIGRATION AND

EMIGRATION POLICY OF THE KINGDOM OF SCS
This part of the book describes the general characteristics of emigration from
the Kingdom of SCS and the main features of the countrys emigration policy
in the first postwar decade. Different aspects of the phenomenon will be ex-
plored, ranging from the basic economic, social and political conditions that
motivated emigration (Chapter 2.1), to the particular features of state policy
concerning emigration, and the technical details of the emigration procedure
(Chapter 2.2). This study of the development of the unified state emigration
service also includes a detailed account of the institutional development of
emigration policy and the conduct of emigration affairs in different Yugoslav
provinces in the pre1918 period. A particularly detailed discussion is centered
on the way Yugoslav authorities responded to restrictions on and changes in
their immigration regime imposed by destination countries. Chapter 2.3 will
analyze one specific feature of the Yugoslav emigration procedure, namely its
exploitation in order to further the states hidden national minority policy. In
Chapter 2.4, considerable concentration will be devoted to the problem of
abuses and corruption that occurred among state personnel in charge of the
administration of emigration affairs in the Kingdom of SCS. Based on new
archival findings, the study reveals the interdependencies and internal coordi-
nation of seemingly separate domains of state intervention into emigration af-
fairs. Moreover, the examination of the Yugoslav state policy is placed in a
comparative and transnational perspective related to the global changes that
occurred in the legislation on emigration, which have been described in the first
part of the monograph. In this way, the study attempts to present interdepen-
dences on both the micro and macro scale. Since many of above mentioned
issues and units of analysis have been either underresearched or completely
neglected in the related historiography, the study will contribute to important
fields of social history and history of institutions of the interwar Yugoslavia.
2.1 Economic Underdevelopment the Ultimate Reason for

Emigration?
Apart from political reasons, poor economic development of the region has
always been one of the major causes for overseas emigration from the Balkans.
In the case of the interwar Yugoslavia, broad generalizations are hampered by
the diversity of regional and provincial economic conditions and social cir-
cumstances. The Kingdom of SCS was composed of the territories of the pre
war Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and those AustroHungarian prov-
inces inhabited mainly by South Slav populations. Thus, significant differences

existed between the economies and legal systems of provinces coming from the
different states and even between former Hungarian (e.g. CroatiaSlavonia and
Vojvodina), and Austrian provinces (e.g. Dalmatia and Slovenia) of the Dual
Monarchy116. Some of the basic laws such as civil codes, criminal laws and
state citizenship regulations had not been unified even ten years after the crea-
tion of the Yugoslav state. In the case of civil codes of law, unification was not
carried out until the communist revolutionary reforms after the Second World
War.
Interwar Yugoslavia was a mosaic of different societies, cultures and ethno
confessional communities living side by side. The clumsy centralist policy of
the Serbdominated central authorities of interwar Yugoslavia did not accom-
plish much in the domain of cultural unification or economic modernization.
Any inquiry into the economic and social dimensions of the Yugoslav emigra-
tion must take into account the different traditions of emigration and other par-
ticularities in various provinces. Since the Yugoslav society was, by and large a
traditional rural society, it is first necessary to elaborate on the peasantrys tra-
ditional attitude toward emigration.
2.1.1 Traditional society versus labor mobility
The issue of the origins and social implications of economic underdevelopment

in Eastern Europe has been amply debated by academic scholarship on the
region. Some authors go as far as to claim that the main causes for the 19th cen-
tury economic backwardness of the Eastern European societies can be traced
back to the medieval period. Eugene Hamel and Adanir Fikret stated that, even
before the Ottoman conquest in the 15th century, Balkan societies had a differ-
ent family structure and ownership system than Western European countries,
based on extended rather than nuclear families117.
In 1965, the economic historian John Hajnal claimed that in preindustrial and
industrial eras, the European continent was divided into two areas characterized
116
Slovenia had not been an administrative unit in the Habsburg Empire but for the sake of
simplicity, the name is used here for those former territories of Austria, which were populated by
Slovenes and were put together to form Slovenia in the Kingdom of SCS. Vojvodina here
refers to the territory under control of the provisory Provincial government for Baka, Banat and
Baranja. The territory of Srem in modern Vojvodina was part of CroatiaSlavonia.
117
Eugene A Hammel, Some Mediaeval Evidence on the Serbian Zadruga: A Preliminary
Analysis of the Chrysobulls of Decani, Revue des Etudes SudEst Europeennes 14 (1976): 449
63; Adanir Fikret, Tradition and Rural Change in Southeastern Europe During Ottoman Rule.
In: The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe, ed. Daniel Chirot (BerkeleyLos Angeles:
University of California Press, 1989), 13176.
by different patterns of marriage.118 This dividing line subsequently called the

Hajnal line which divides these two areas, allegedly links Sankt Petersburg
and Trieste. North and west of this line, the average age at marriage was rela-
tively high; east of this line, marriage was almost universal among the adult
population and began earlier in life. Examining official statistical data on Eu-
ropean (represented by Belgium and Sweden) and Eastern European
(represented by Serbia and Bulgaria) marriage patterns in 1900, Hajnal came
up with astonishing results. While within European pattern around three
quarters of women of age between 20 and 24 were single, in Eastern European
pattern one can find the complete opposite situation. Namely, the correspond-
ing data for Serbia and Bulgaria show that about three quarters of the women of
the same age were married. Actually, the precise data for Serbia shows that no
less than 84 percent of women in that age category were married. According to
the 1910 Bosnian census, the corresponding marriage rate for women age be-
tween 21 and 24 was 77 percent.119
The traditional custom of early marriages in the Balkans proved to be one of
the main obstacles towards modernization of peasant societies. The potential
labor force of young men and women could not be usefully employed, as they
were committed to their family duties and fastened to a traditional life style.
This way they were restrained from full participation in the labor market while
at their physical and mental peak. While the overall conclusions and implica-
tion of the Hajnal model of interpretation are debatable, his perspective nev-
ertheless illuminates the demographic pressures in rural Eastern European so-
cieties which should have stimulated emigration. At the same time, the conser-
vatism of traditional society prevented people from emigrating, creating a ten-
sion between pro and antiemigration factors. Underdeveloped regions of
Serbia and other Yugoslav provinces in interwar period are among the most
appropriate historical examples for this dichotomy. A contemporary social
scientist D. J. Tasis use of statistical data from the 1931 census on the mobili-
ty of Yugoslav citizens provides us with insight into the phenomenon120. Tasi
established that 76.4 percent of population continued to live in the same town
or village where they were born; 83.4 percent within the same broader local
community (srez), and 92.4 in the same province (banovina)121. This data cor-
118
Hajnal John, European marriage patterns in perspective. In: Population in History, ed. D. V.
Glass and D.E.C Eversley (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), 10140.
119
Ibid., 1013.
120
D. J. Tasi, Socijalno demografska slika Jugoslavije, Socijalni arhiv, No. 46 (April/July
1940): 67. Quoted in Dimi, Kulturna politika (I), 56.
121
After Yugoslav King Aleksandar Karadjordjevi dismissed Parliament and introduced a sort
of personal regime, the country was divided into nine administrative units (pl. banovine. sg.
banovina). Banovine were bigger than previous districts (oblasti). In accordance with newly
established ideology of integral Yugoslavism, banovines territories did not follow the border-
lines of former historical provinces.
responds with the small increase in the percentage of the population employed
in industry and crafts which will be displayed in next section.
Figure 10: The number of emigrants from Yugoslav Northern provinces (Slove-
nia, CroatiaSlavonia and Vojvodina), Balkan provinces (Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Montenegro) and Dalmatia:
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Northem provinces 11306 4591 8858 14564 12790 12479 15707 15995
Balkan provinces 842 745 1239 1792 1672 2617 2617 2285
Dalmatia 817 750 1376 3219 3181 3134 3652 3509
Source: AJ, 1436112 (Yugoslav Emigration statistics).
In the case of Serbia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Macedonia and Montene-
gro there is one more element of traditional society that must be taken into
consideration: the surviving remnants of the patriarchal extended family with
its peculiar concept of land ownership. The South Slavic complex family,
called zadruga, had an eminent role in the preservation of the traditional way of
life in early modern Balkan societies. It continued to exist in the underdeve-
loped areas of the aforementioned provinces even after the final liberation from
Ottoman rule. Sometimes, the number of family members in the extended za-
druga household could amount to more than 50.122 This large family unit was
ruled by one of the older family members who controlled the financial savings
122
For more on zadruga, see: Joel M. Halpern and Anderson David, The Zadruga, a Century of
Change, Anthropologica 12, No. 1 (1970): 8397. Karl Kazer, Porodica i srodstvo na Balkanu.
Analiza jedne kulture koja nestaje [Family and Kinship in the Balkans. An Analyzis of a
Disappearing Culture] (Belgrade: UDI, 2002).
and delegated the daily chores of family members. It is noteworthy that this
traditional institution was incorporated and legally sanctioned by the Serbian
Civil Code that was in use from the 1844 until 1945.123 In the most underdeve-
loped mountainous regions of Yugoslavia, zadruga extended families survived
until 1950s. The existence of such a strong institution of traditional society was
a great obstacle to the mobility of the labor force in these areas.
In Yugoslavia, the interwar period was marked by the continued dissolution of
zadrugas, indicated by a significant rise in the number of individual house-
holds. In Serbia between 1921 and 1931, the increase was 20 percent. In spite
of this social trend, a considerable share of population (between 30 and 35 per-
cent) in Primorska (Dalmatia), Vardarska (Macedonia and KosovoMetohija),
Drinska (Eastern Bosnia and Western Serbia) and Zetska (Montenegro and
Herzegovina) banovinas still lived in large families of more than seven family
members124. In general, these large family units were to provide for themselves
on quite small estates.
The legal protection of small estates (up to about 3 hectares of the arable land)
in the 19th century Serbian legislature proved to be an additional obstacle in the
modernization of the Serbian society. First introduced by Prince Milo
Obrenovi in 1836, this legal institution survived until the end of the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia. According to the regulation, Serbian peasants could not borrow
money on mortgage on the security of that land. The legal protection of small
estates prevented both the formation and consolidation of large estates, and
economic enterprise and initiative based on credit. The result of this policy was
a surplus of labor in peasant areas and less productive use of labor power. Pea-
sants, tied to their small autarchic household economy, lacked initiative to mi-
grate to towns to labor in the market economy.125 Not only did this legal institu-
tion survive in Serbia during the interwar period but there were also serious
initiatives to apply it in other Yugoslav provinces after 1918126.
Due to its historical role among all ethnic Serbs and its large supply virgin land
(at least in the first half of 19th century), Serbia was principally a country of
immigration, while overseas emigration was virtually nonexistent. Ever since
the First Serbian Insurrection against Ottoman rule in 1804, liberated Serbia
had been the most desirable destination of the main migratory movements on
the Balkans. Both ethnic Serbs and other immigrants were arriving not only
from Montenegro and Ottoman provinces but also from AustriaHungary.
123
Marianin ali, Socijalna istorija Srbije 18151941 [Social History of Serbia 18151941]
(Belgrade: CLIO, 2004), 368.
124
Dimi, Kulturna politika (I), 54.
125
ali, Socijalna istorija, 3643.
126
Ibid., 42. The Serbian historian Sran Miloevi used term umadinization to define this
concept in his study on the broader perspective of the ideological fundaments of the land reform
in interwar Yugoslavia. In: S. Miloevi, Ideoloke osnove agrarne reforme u Kraljevini SHS.
BAthesis defended at Belgrade University in July 2007.
While the immigrants from Montenegro and Turkey contributed largely in nu-
meric terms to the demographic expansion of Serbia, those from Austria
Hungary, who were usually professionals or educated people in search for posts
in Serbias administration, contributed more to Serbias technical and financial
advancement. There were also many entrepreneurs, both Serb and nonSerbs,
who came as immigrants from AustriaHungary. On the other hand, there was
no established tradition of overseas emigration from the prewar Kingdom of
Serbia. Apart from the social, historical and cultural reasons for staying de-
scribed above, there were also passport requirements and high dues imposed by
the 1911 legislation on each emigrant to America. This issue will be thoroughly
discussed in section 2.2.1.
Figure 11: Number of emigrants per 10,000 inhabitants (according to the 1921
census):
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Northern provinces 21,99 8,93 17,22 28,32 24,87 24,27 30,55 31,11
Balkan provinces 1,35 1,19 1,99 2,88 2,69 4,2 4,2 3,67
Dalmatia 13,16 12,09 22,17 51,88 51,27 50,51 58,86 56,56
Source: Yugoslav Emigration Statistics and Definitivni popis stanovnitva.
All these historical and social conditions contributed to the limited mobility of
the labor force in prewar Serbia, thus accounting for the extremely low na-
tional emigration. The situation remained the same throughout the period being
examined, 191828. According to the official data issued by the Yugoslav
emigration offices, emigrants from Serbia could not fulfill even the reduced
quota of few hundred positions assigned to Serbia in 1922127 (see Table 2).
MarieJanine ali has already described, in general terms, some of the rele-
vant features of the issue in her outstanding book on the social history of Ser-
127
In: GEC, Numeric Account on Issued Passports of 6 January 1923. In: HDA Ostavtina
Artura Benka Grada [Collection of ABG] (OABG), box (b.) 7, fascicle (f.) 4.
bia128. Emigration from other Balkan provinces such as Macedonia, Monte-

negro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Figure 10) features similar characte-
ristics129. In these provinces one can see the same pattern of prevailing small
land estates, underdeveloped economy, remnants of traditional mentality, and a
significant surplus of labor.
The low emigration rates of the Balkan provinces (BPs) becomes particularly
notable when compared with those of the Yugoslav Northern provinces
(NPs) (Slovenia, CroatiaSlavonia and Vojvodina) or Dalmatia (see Figures 10
and 11). Statistics reveal the significant contribution of the NPs to the countrys
total emigration rate. In 1921, emigrants from the NPs totaled 87.20 percent of
all emigrants from Yugoslavia. In 1925, they represented 72.4 percent, and in
1928, 73.4 percent. On the other hand, if the number of emigrants is expressed
in relation to the number of inhabitants in the respective regions, a particular
role of Dalmatia appears to be important (Figure 11). The annual average num-
ber of emigrants per 10,000 residents in Dalmatia in period 192128 was
39.56, while for the NPs, it was 23.40 and for the BPs, only 2.77. The per capi-
ta emigration from the BPs is so modest that it is questionable whether its par-
ticular features can even be usefully compared to the general trends of the emi-
gration of Yugoslavia at the time.
Table 2: Fulfillment of the Yugoslav Immigration Quota for the USA in 1922:
CroatiaSlavonia
Herzegovina
Montenegro
Vojvodina
Dalmatia
Slovenia
Bosnia
Serbia
Total
Quota 700 2300 200 500 200 1000 700 5600
Issued passports 313 2503 143 1369 164 860 674 6026
Source: HDAOABG, b. 7, f. 4.
128
ali, Socijalna istorija, 1918.
129
The division, applied here, between the Balkan provinces, Northern provinces, and Dal-
matia indicates three regions of Yugoslavia which differed significantly in patterns of emigration
and basic economic terms, as described above.
2.1.2 The Phylloxera disaster and emigration from Dalmatia
Why did Dalmatia supply the greatest per capita contribution to the Yugoslav
emigration contingents during the 1920s? Overpopulation and labor surplus
problems are among longterm historical handicaps of this province. Apart
from these reasons, particularly in Dalmatia, the great influx of emigration
occurred in the years before and after the First World War because of the disas-
trous attacks on grapecrops by phylloxera, small insects, which feed grapevine
roots and cause infections which devastate European species of wine grapes.
On the island of Korula, the blight helped convince about 1,500 emigrants to
leave for Sao Paolo in 1925. I will focus on this case, elaborated in Zvonimir
eparovis book, as it reveals the nature and circumstances of the emigration
from this part of the country.130
Viticulture was the most important economic activity on Korula, supple-
mented only by small grain harvest and one little company for fish conserva-
tion. Almost the entire income of the islands population originated from the
sale of wine. During the war, however, phylloxera destroyed all the local vine-
yards. Inhabitants of the village of Blato wrote a dramatic petition to the Minis-
try of Land Reform in January 1923; in desperate terms, they asked govern-
mental permission to colonize Macedonia or Kosovo:
[D]uring the war, the entire labor force was mobilized for mili-
tary service. [...] Phylloxera came and destroyed the wine
grape, the only product of this poor land. [] Since there was
no labor force, it was impossible to shift planting and cultiva-
tion to the [phylloxeraresistant] American type of wine grape.
Only after our peasant returned home from the military service
could he begin the gigantic effort of cultivating the American
wine grape. Since it will bear fruit only after a few years, he
could not compensate for the fatal losses brought by the de-
struction of the old grape vines. [] In order to emphasize the
miserable condition of this population, it is enough if I mention
that for the 8,000 people, the main and almost entire income
[now] consists of 6,000 hl of the vine, and before war, the an-
nual average was about 50,000 hl.131
If the petition is to be believed, after the catastrophe of phylloxera, the island-
ers were left with less than 1/8 of their prewar income. To take advantage of
this situation, agents of Brazilian landowners came to the region and offered
130
Zvonimir eparovi, Od Sydneya do San Francisca. Dijaspora ili rasutost mjetana Blata na
Koruli diljem svijeta [From Sydney to San Francisco. Diaspora or Dispersal of the Inhabitants
of Blato on Korula throughout the World] (akovec: Zrinski, 1982), 245.
131
Ibid., 245.
locals free emigration voyages to Brazil, seducing them with stories about the
richness and prosperity of their country. In this way, most of the desperate peo-
ple ended up in South America; however, a small number of them were indeed
colonized in Macedonia, as they requested. According to an article written by
ore Krsti, the Chief State Commissionaire for Agrarian Affairs, a small
group of Korula inhabitants was settled in the southernmost part of Mace-
donia, in the border area with Greece. Krsti also stated that a few colonies of
people from Dalmatia existed in the Macedonian towns Bitolj and Prilep in
1927.132
Although Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia were the planned destinations for
prospective colonization, these Yugoslav provinces were themselves a source
of immense emigration and had a long history of economic migration. Serbian
historian Vladan Jovanovi found a report from Prizren (Metohija) in the
interwar period, in which one contemporary commented that the whole district
population, both Serbs and Albanians, would leave for America if only they
could get passports.133 In this particular case, internal migrations could com-
pensate for the lack of ability to travel abroad or overseas. Probably the most
relevant account is of the socalled pealbari (sg. pealbar: one who seeks the
profit) of Macedonia. Coming from the most backward regions of Macedonia,
they traveled around Serbia and Bulgaria in search of work. Some estimates
suggest as many as 50,000 pealbari were engaged in seasonal migrations
within the region134. The pechalbari migration is probably the most remarkable
feature of labor mobility among the populations of Yugoslavias Balkan prov-
inces.
Figure 12: Type of Immigrant. Slav. Ellis Island:
132
ore Krsti, Juna Srbija i iseljeniki problem, [South Serbia and the Emigration
Problem] Izseljeniki magazin, 1927 (November): 18.
133
Jovanovi, Jugoslovenska drava, 52.
2.1.3 The land reform and emigration from the Northern

Provinces
The issue of emigration from the northern Yugoslav provinces (Vojvodina,

CroatiaSlavonia, Slovenia) must take into account the particular context of the
land reform which was carried out in the newly created Yugoslav state. Consi-
derably better economic conditions existed in the Northern provinces of the
Kingdom than in the rest of the country. These provinces were inherited from
AustriaHungary, and were characterized by higher levels of agricultural and
industrial production. Nonetheless, after the land reform was carried out in
Vojvodina, Baranja and Slavonija, a new social problem emerged. The dissolu-
tion of the great land estate led to the loss of permanent jobs for a great number
of landless agricultural laborers. This was especially the case for members of
the Hungarian and German national minorities, who represented a significant
share of landless agricultural poor but did not benefit from the nationally in-
clined land reform. In Baka (Vojvodinas region) for instance, Hungarians
consisted 41.41 percent and Germans 18.18 percent of all the landless
agricultural families at the beginning of the 1920s135. As we will see, a signifi-
cant number of the officially recorded Yugoslav emigrants were recruited
from among these people.
According to the official data from the Kingdom SCS statistics services, almost
50 percent of all emigrants from the Kingdom in 1924 and 1925 were of Hun-
garian and German origin, although these groups only represented about 6 to 8
percent of the total population. Serbian historian Zoran Janjetovi has pointed
out this disproportion which he explains from a longterm historical
perspective. According to Janjetovi, Germans and Hungarians comprised the
majority of the overseas emigration from Vojvodina and Slavonia even before
1914. For instance, in period between 1900 and 1910, there were about three
times (2.96 times precisely) more Germans and Hungarians than Slavic emi-
grants from Vojvodina. At the same time, according to the data of the much
contested Hungarian 1910 census, these two ethnic groups were almost equally
represented in Vojvodina: 819,225 Slavic nationals versus 812,007 Germans
and Hungarians.136 Janjetovi has also taken socio/cultural issues into account,
particularly when it comes to Germans. Traditionally, Germans were more
mobile and open to the changes in the labor market; consequently, they were
134
Ibid., 2656.
135
For more, see: Slavko eerov, Socijalno agrarni odnosi u Bakoj pred izvoenje agrarne
reforme [Social and Agrarian Situation in Baka before the Land Reform] (Sremski Karlovci:
Srpska manastirska tamparija, 1929), 119, 125.
136
Janjetovi, Deca careva, 66, 72.
more willing to emigrate than other national groups.137 Further ethno/political

and economic implications of the issue will be explored later, in Chapter 2.3.
2.1.4 Should I stay or should I go? Yugoslav industrial labor

conditions
Taking into account the general economic situation in the Kingdom of SCS, the
reasons for emigration seem to be obvious, even for those who had already
escaped the overpopulated agrarian regions and found some employment in the
Yugoslav towns. According to the data presented by Yugoslav tradeunion
organ, Organizovani radnik, the average daily salary in Belgrade in December
1921 varied from 25 to (in some exceptional cases of highly qualified profes-
sionals) 40 dinars138. Calculated in US dollars, this amounted to only $ 23 per
week, whereas the US minimum wage salary that year, usually applied only for
female laborers, was about $16 per week: eight times higher. According to the
US statistical data for 1922, about 61 percent of workers in California earned
more than $16 per week139.
Even taking into consideration the differences in buying power between Yu-
goslav and American salaries, the wage discrepancy is rather astonishing. The
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) given by Agnus Maddison is the
best approximation we have of relative income adjusted for purchasing power
in the two countries. According to Maddison, in 1921, the GDP (PPP) in US
was equivalent to 5,323 GearyKhamis 1,990 dollars, whereas Yugoslavias
was worth only 1,041140. This refers to the whole population, so one can rough-
ly assume that an average income in Yugoslavia was less than a fifth of the US
one. This means that the goods and services the average Yugoslav could buy
with his yearly income were worth less than 1/5 of what the average American
could purchase. Given these facts, HattonWilliamsons reasoning on the struc-
tural difficulties in integrating ESE countries into the global economic system
seems justified. This data is even more relevant regarding immigration after
1921, the year restrictive US immigration legislation was introduced.
The disastrous consequences of the war, the lack of substantial investments and
the deflationary policies in the second half of 1920s hampered modernization
and urbanization processes within Yugoslav society. Only a small percentage
137
Ibid., 726.
138
Calculated from the data presented in Organizovani radnik, 15, 18, 22 December 1921.
139
For more on the issue see: Rudolf Broda, Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States,
Revue International du Travaille, 17, No. 1 (January 1928): 2450.
140
Data on GDP (PPP) is available on the Angus Maddison home page: http://www.ggdc.net/
Maddison/, retrieved on 23 January 2008.
of the Yugoslav labor force was employed in industry and handicrafts (9.91
percent of all employed persons in 1921 and 11.0 percent in 1931141). If urbani-
zation in the Kingdom of SCS is examined only in terms of the growth of the
urban population, the numerical changes between the censuses of 1921 and
1931 suggest it had a long way to go. During these ten years, the share of the
nonagricultural population only rose by approximately 4 percent (from 19.63
percent) to 23.70 percent. Urban dwellers were estimated to account for a simi-
lar percentage of the population of the Italian part of the Roman Empire in the
second century AD, for example, or of the whole of Europe, Russia excluded,
at the beginning of the nineteenth century.142 Moreover, less than half of these
urban dwellers in Yugoslavia were employed in industry and handicrafts.
Not only did the overwhelming majority of people still live in the countryside,
but the way they cultivated land and the effectiveness of their work was infe-
rior to anything found in the West. The time and energy of whole generations
was wasted in the overpopulated agrarian regions of Yugoslavia. The large
agricultural labor surplus in Yugoslavia is probably one of the most obvious
indicators of its economic underdevelopment. According to historian Jozo To-
masevich, there was a 44.4 percent surplus of agricultural labor in Yugoslavia
in 1938. Taken separately, the data differs from one region to another; the
greatest share of the surplus was in Dalmatia (68.1 percent), the smallest in
Vojvodina (only 2.4 percent)143. Nineteenth century Germany provides us with
a nice model of industrialization under the labor surplus conditions.144 The
Kingdom of Yugoslavia and other Balkan societies during this period appear to
be an interesting case of the economic stagnation in spite of the labor surplus
condition. Let us observe now the Yugoslav GDP performance from a compar-
ative perspective.
The general economic performance of Yugoslavia was humble not only when
compared with highly developed countries, but also in comparison with Central
European countries. For instance, the Yugoslav GDP per capita amounted to
only 1920 percent of the analogous US GDP for 1925 and 1928 (see the Fig-
ure 13), and was around 4145 percent of the corresponding GDPs of Czechos-
lovakia or Austria. Moreover, statistical data shows that the average annual
growth in the Yugoslav GDP per capita lagged behind these latter two coun-
tries between 1921 and 1928 (see the Figure 14). While in Yugoslavia annual
141
Dimi, Kulturna politika (I), 81.
142
See in: Paolo Malanima: Urbanization and the Italian Economy During the Last Millenium,
European Review of Economic History 9 (2004), 9722; P. Bairoch et al.1988: La population des
villes europennes 800850 (Geneva: Centre d'histoire conomique internationale, Universit de
Genve, 1988), 2535.
143
Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, politics, and economic change in Yugoslavia (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1955), 3223. On agricultural overpopulation in Serbia in
interwar period, see: ali, Socijalna istorija, 2267.
144
Oliver Grant, Migration and Inequality in Germany 18701913 (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press Inc., 2006).
growth was about 3 percent, in Austria it was 5.2 percent, and in Czechoslova-
kia 5.4 percent. The average GDP growth of approximately 1.50 percent an-
nually in entire interwar period could not hope to compensate for the inherited
lack of basic economic infrastructure and underdevelopment of society in most
of the Kingdom.145
It can thus be safely concluded that a significant share of population in all Yu-
goslav provinces in the first post1918 decade was underemployed and disad-
vantaged. To what extent these unfavorable basic conditions could stimulate
emigration, depended on the particular circumstances which varied from region
to region, and from province to province. Easy access to the seaports and the
tradition of navigation from the coasts of Dalmatia and Montenegro facilitated
emigration, a phenomenon that increased dramatically after phylloxera ruined
the main source of income. Surprisingly low emigration rates and the general
lack of labor force mobility in Serbia and BosniaHerzegovina was a conse-
quence of the deeply rooted elements of traditional society combined, in Ser-
bia, with a restrictive emigration policy. The emigration of members of Hunga-
rian and German national minority can be explained by both economic and
political reasons.
Figure 13: GDP per capita (1990 International GearyKhamis dollars):
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Ge rma- Cz echo- Yugo-
US France Austria Hungary Bulgaria Gre e ce
ny slovakia slavia
GDP 1925 6282 4166 3532 3367 2606 2279 1198 922 2140
GDP 1928 6569 4431 4090 3657 2977 2415 1314 1219 2234
Source: Angus Maddison http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/, retrieved on 23 January 2008.
145
The annual growth is calculated according to Agnus Maddisons estimations. For a detailed
discussion on general economic trends in interwar Yugoslavia, see: Goran Nikoli, Kurs dinara i
devizna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 19181941 (Dinars Exchange Rate and the Monetary
Policy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 19181941) (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2003), 4858.
Figure 14: Annual growth in GDP per capita (logarithmic change) 1920
1928:
0,12
0,1
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0
-0,02
-0,04
-0,06
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Austria 0,0941 0,0822 -0,0122 0,107 0,0625 0,0136 0,0266 0,0425
Yugoslavia 0,0097 0,0153 0,0362 0,055 0,034 0,0528 -0,0305 0,0701
Czechoslovakia 0,0757 -0,0386 0,0698 0,0898 0,1021 -0,012 0,0665 0,0786
Greece 0,0232 0,0127 0,0341 0,0396 0,0185 0,0182 0,0063
Source: Angus Maddison http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/, retrieved on 23 January 2008.
2.2 Regulations and Effects of the Emigration Policy
As has already been pointed out, the newly created Kingdom of SCS was com-
posed of provinces which had previously belonged to different state and legal
systems: Austrian (for Dalmatia and Slovenia); Hungarian (for Banat, Baka
and Baranja); CroatiaSlavonian; BosniaHerzegovinian; Serbian and Monte-
negrin. Each of these legal systems had different regulations and experience in
emigration affairs. This chapter traces the development of a unified Yugoslav
emigration policy and highlights the interconnectedness of the global, transna-
tional and national trends. Special attention is devoted to the particular Italian
influence in the creation of Yugoslavias emigration service and legislation.
This chapter examines the process which built up domestic institutions and
procedures as well as the material infrastructure of emigration policy and ex-
plores the immediate effects on emigration affairs and emigration rates in the
Kingdom SCS during the interwar period.
2.2.1 Emigration affairs in Yugoslav provinces before 1918
The first Yugoslav state was proclaimed as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes on December 1, 1918. Some of its provinces (CroatiaSlavonia, Dal-
matia, and Montenegro) had notable traditions of mass emigration in the period
before the First World War. Although the streams of overseas emigration re-
vived after the war, the central authorities of the newly created Kingdom of
SCS did not immediately focus their attention on the issue. It was only in the
third year of its existence that the Yugoslav government issued the Decree on
Emigration on May 21, 1921. Previously, emigration policies varied under the
jurisdictions of the different provincial governments.146 Among them, only the
Emigration Department of the Commissariat for the Social Care of the Provin-
cial Government of CroatiaSlavonia (Povjerenitvo za socijalnu skrb Pokra-
jinske uprave za Hrvatsku i Slavoniju) had experience in dealing with mass
emigration and the administration of emigration affairs.
Some of the high officials at the Zagrebbased Emigration Department were
well educated and maintained what might be called the good tradition of Aus-
triaHungarian bureaucracy. Between 1920 and 1922, the institution was under
the expert guidance and able administration of Artur Benko Grado Bojniki. A
Croat, born in Ogulin and educated in Zagreb, Vienna, and Paris, Bojniki be-
came one of the most eminent specialists on matters of emigration in the newly
created Yugoslav state. His detailed report on the History of our state emigra-
tion service from its foundation in 1901 until the formation of the Emigration
Commissariat in 1923 provides us with a good insight into the early history of
the codifications and regulations of emigration in one of the Yugoslav territo-
ries, Croatia and Slavonia147.
According to Bojniki, prior to 1918, only the Hungarian part of the Dual
Monarchy had systematic emigration regulations, these stemming from legisla-
tion passed in 1909. In Austria, there was no such body of law until the dissolu-
tion of the Empire. Due its large number of emigrants, the Kingdom of Croa-
tiaSlavonia which was part of Hungary but enjoyed certain rights of auton-
omy within Hungary and had its own diet, the Sabor stipulated its own legis-
lation (created between 1901 and 1909) in the domain of emigration policy.
Another territory of what was to become Yugoslavia, the Vojvodina (Banat,
Baka and Baranja), was an integral part of the lands of the Hungarian crown
146
The provincial governments for BosniaHerzegovina, CroatiaSlavonia, Dalmatia and
Slovenia, which were leftovers from Habsburg rule, continued functioning even after the new
Yugoslav state was created. Some of these governments or their departments survived until 1924.
147
Historija nae dravne iseljenike slube od njezina osnutka 1901 do obrazovanja
Iseljenikog komesarijata 1923 [History of Our Emigration Office, from its foundation 1901 up
to establishment of the Emigration Commissariat 1923] written by Benko Bojniki. In: HDA
OABG, b. 7.
and, therefore, in terms of emigration policy under the authority of Budapest

based institutions that conducted emigration affairs. The entire administrative
procedure for emigration in the Hungarian Kingdom was concentrated in Bu-
dapest, whereas FiumeRijeka served as the emigration seaport.
It seems that the Hungarian authorities were not particularly troubled by the
high rate of ethnic nonHungarian emigration from the country. About 74 per-
cent of emigrants from Hungary during the period 18991913 were ethnic non
Hungarians.148 No matter whether it came as a consequence of deliberate state
policy or not, one can accept that there was almost complete freedom of emi-
gration from both Dalmatia (then part of Austria, where emigration was hardly
regulated at all) and CroatiaSlavonia during the last decades of the Monarchy.
According to Yugoslav sources, prior to 1914, there were no procedural re-
quirements imposed by central authorities to be fulfilled; no papers, no re-
quests, no administration, allegedly not even passports were required for over-
seas emigration.149 A steamship ticket was practically the only paper needed to
make this journey.
Contrary to this almost ideal picture of a laissezfaire regime in the domain of
emigration, in Serbia one would find quite a different situation. In this country,
as well in neighbouring Bulgaria, controls over emigration were imposed even
before 1914. The requirement of high fees to be paid or deposited for traveling
papers was the main tool of state control in these countries. According to the
1911 legislation, an emigrant from Serbia was supposed to pay 250 dinars
(equivalent to about $50 US) just to be provided with a valid passport for
America150. Considering the additional travel costs and an average daily salary
of about three dinars, one can easily understand why it was so difficult for an
ordinary Serbian citizen to travel overseas (see Figures 17 and 18).
In terms of continental migrations, however, Serbia might be considered part of
the European labor market after 1891, when interstate border controls were
abolished between Serbia and AustriaHungary. The agreement was initiated
by the Serbian government and it was limited to the northern borderline on the
Sava and Danube rivers. Border controls were still in place at border crossings
between Serbia and the territory of BosniaHerzegovina (whose political status
would not be settled until its official annexation by AustriaHungary in
1908).151 However, according to Hungarian sources, the interstate agreement
148
Julianna Pusks, From Hungary to the United States (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado,1982), 28.
149
Izvetaj o radu Iseljenikog komesarijata u Zagrebu za razdoblje od 1. januara 1925 do 30.
januara 1926 [The Report on the activities of the Emigration Commissariat in Zagreb for the
Period between 1 January 1925 to 30 January 1926]. In: , Collection of the Ministry of Social
Policy (39)926.
150
Boidar Puri, Nai iseljenici [Our Emigrants]. (Beograd: Izdanje Knjiarnice S. B.
Cvijanovia, 1929), 69.
151
Raspis svima okrunim naelstvima i upravama varoi Beograda i Nia [Circular order to
all district authorities and magistrates of the towns of Belgrade and Ni] of 18. February 1891.
was interrupted later on, between 1904 and 1910, when the passport require-
ments were reestablished for Serbians entering Hungary (see more in 1.2.5).
The prewar Kingdom of Serbia had neither specific laws nor systematic emi-
gration legislation. The 1911 requirement of passport fees was not created as
part of an organized body of law to regulate emigration affairs; it appeared as a
seemingly insignificant point on the list of items in the Law on Administrative
Dues (Zakon o taksama) of the same year. The legislation was put in place by
the ruling party, the Peoples Radical Party of Serbia. Although it introduced
heavy fees on emigration, the draft did not provoke any significant confronta-
tions in Parliament. The only official objection came from the socialist MP,
Tria Kaclerovi, who demanded the provision to be completely removed from
the draft. Paradoxically, a socialist MP was demanding full freedom of move-
ment while the liberal government was enforcing restrictions which expanded
the powers of the Serbian state for the control of migration to a level not com-
mon at that time. Minister of finance Stojan Proti replied the objections, and
advocated the provision as a necessary measure against maltreatment of Ser-
bian citizens who became victims of speculation. Proti further underlined its
importance from the point of countrys national interests:
[T]herefore we who are situated in such an exposed place, as
a nation which does not have too large a number of people and
which has a great need to take care of its interests and to pre-
serve its [very] existence from the great number of different en-
emy influences are taking in our hands all measures and
means. And one of these measures is this [passport] charge.152
Minister Protis argument that the charge of 250 dinars would protect emi-
grants from misuse and exploitation by the steamship agents seems rather il-
logical. How could the state protect emigrants finances by raising the basic
amount of expenses? It is apparent that the provision had an entirely different
aim, namely, to prohibit legal means of emigration to America. It was enacted
in the midst of preparations for the approaching Balkan war against Turkey.
Under the circumstances it is much more probable that Serbias national and
military interests were of a much greater concern for legislators than the wel-
fare of potential emigrants.
A new system of compulsory passportization of both continental and overseas
migration to and from Yugoslav territories was introduced at the beginning of
the First World War. It is not surprising that the greatest controls over the
movement of people were imposed on occupied enemy territory. In occupied
Serbia between 1916 and 1918, Serbian citizens could not leave the territory of
In: Zbornik zakona i uredaba u Kraljevini Srbiji, (Belgrade: Kraljevskosrpska dravna

tamparija, 1892) vol 47.
152
Stenografske beleke Narodne skuptine Kraljevine Srbije XCIX redovni sastanak od 10
marta 1911 (Belgrade: Narodna skuptina, 1911), 910.
their district without a passport issued for a limited period by district authori-
ties. Even within their district, civilians could travel only with special travel
papers which also had a limited period of validity. Both the passports and travel
documents were to be kept by the district authorities after the expiry of the
period.153
Much more traumatic were the experiences of Serbian prisoners of war and
civilians who were deported to labor camps throughout AustriaHungary and
Bulgaria. Although the entire population of the Central Powers suffered from a
general state of scarcity and hunger, the situation of these prisoners and deport-
ees was by far the worst. Hunger, disease and exhaustion from forced labor
were among the most common causes for death of Serbian deportees noted in
Serbian sources. The number of related Serbian casualties has not yet been
established; however, estimates range from 40,000 and to as many as 80,000
civilian deportees154.
During the war, the Serbian state also had to deal with significant numbers of
prisoners of war. After successful defensive campaigns (Battles on Cer and on
Kolubara River) against AustriaHungary in 1914, Serbia had between 60 and
80 thousands POWs. While visiting Serbia as a member of Londonbased Ser-
bian Relief Fund, British historian George M. Trevelyan witnessed that some
of them were engaged in road constructions in Northern Serbia in January
1915155. The Serbian military again came into possession of a considerable
number of POWs at the end of war after a huge success on the Thessalonica
front in September 1918. German, AustroHungarian and Bulgarian
POWs/detainees were employed on the reconstruction of the ruined country,
but also for some other purposes. Bulgarian POWs proved to be a particularly
useful tool to secure the timely implementation of the provisions of the Neuilly
Peace Treaty signed with the Bulgarian government. According to the treaty,
the Bulgarian state was obliged to compensate Yugoslavia for damage inflicted
during the war. The reparations were to include certain quantities of goods,
most importantly coal and livestock. Since Bulgarians usually did not manage
to carry out the agreed dynamics of deliveries, Yugoslav authorities looked for
ways to encourage their neighbors to keep their promises. Whenever a new
Bulgarian government requested the release of Bulgarian POWs remaining in
Yugoslav detention, Yugoslav authorities would link the destiny of these cap-
tives with the strict completion of Bulgarian obligations. It was more than three
153
Ljubodrag Popovi, Prilozi za istoriju upe u Prvom svetskom ratu. upski zbornik, No. 1
(2006): 2145.
154
Vladimir Stojanevi, Srbija i srpski narod za vreme rata i okupacije [Serbia and the Serbian
Nation during the War and Occupation] (Leskovac: Biblioteka Narodnog Muzeja u Leskovcu,
1988), 923.
155
George M. Trevelyan, Serbia revisited. Contemporary review 107 (1915/JanuaryJune):
277.
years after the war was over, and only as a result of international political pres-
sure, that the POWs were set free in November 1920.156
The treatment of former AustroHungarian POWs arriving from revolutionary
Russia to Yugoslavia provides us with one more example of young states
noteworthy practices regarding control over the freedom of movement. Serbian
historian Goran Miloradovi wrote an excellent monograph dedicated to the
issue157. According to Miloradovi, the repatriated POWs were, under the pre-
text of health and sanitation controls, detained in barracks isolated by barbwire
and secured by military guards. Inmates held there, soon realized that it was not
concern for their health condition that bothered Yugoslav authorities but wor-
ries about the ideas they might have brought with them from revolutionary
Russia. Detainees were subjected to a rigorous interrogation and a short course
of antiBolshevik reeducation accompanied with sometimes violent physical
coercion. Each individual treatment lasted up to one month. The camps were
in place between 1919 and 1922.
It is apparent that, from its early days, the Yugoslav state did not lack the will
or the ability to manage surveillance and controls over the movement of peo-
ple. Yet there were only a few regulations on the issues of migration policy; as
indicated above, this is particularly true in the domain of emigration affairs
conducted in different Yugoslav provinces. In Bojnikis aforementioned
summary of pre1918 emigration, he emphasizes that Serbia, Montenegro, and
BosniaHerzegovina, as well as the Austrian provinces of Slovenia and Dalma-
tia, had neither separate regulations nor administrations for emigration except
for police regulations on the procedures and requirements for issuing pass-
ports.158 Furthermore, these provinces lacked administrative personnel experi-
enced in such matters. For this reason, the Zagrebbased emigration offices and
personnel were to have a principal role in creating Yugoslav emigration policy.
156
Desanka Todorovi, Jugoslavija i balkanske drave 19181923 [Yugoslavia and the Balkan
states] (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1979), 98.
157
Goran Miloradovi, Karantin za ideje. Logori za izolaciju sumnjivih elemenata u
Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 19191922 [Quarantine for Ideas. The Camps for the Isola-
tion of Suspicious Elements in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 191922] (Bel-
grade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004).
158
On the early history of the codifications and regulations of the emigrational matters in the
Yugoslav provinces see in the detailed text Historija. In: HDAOABG, b. 7, f. 4.
2.2.2 Italian legislation as a model for Yugoslav lawmakers
There is much archival material on the interministerial commission which

drafted the first Yugoslav decree on emigration in 1921.159 The Zagrebbased
Emigration Department contributed with precious expertise, instructions, and
proposals in the process. The draft was prepared in consultation and collabora-
tion of the central governments Ministries of Social Policy, Foreign Affairs,
and the Interior. Yugoslav experts were provided with corresponding legisla-
tion from Italy, Austria, Greece, Germany, and France. These materials were
obtained through diplomatic channels from the embassies of the Kingdom of
SCS in those countries. After a scrupulous comparison and analysis, the Italian
legislation of 1918 in particular was taken as a model for Yugoslav lawmakers.
Italian authorities had great experience with the issue of regulating emigration
since a large number of Italian citizens emigrated to overseas countries every
year160. The interministerial commission decided to acquire Italian regulations
which strictly prescribed sanitary and technical requirements for all steamships
engaged in the transportation of emigrants. Yugoslav experts emphasized the
fact that all Italian emigration was directed through domestic seaports, which
enabled the whole business of emigration to become nationalized, i.e. organ-
ized within the framework of national regulations, companies, and infrastruc-
ture. In this way, the state maintained full control over emigration affairs and
privileged domestic steamship companies. Even without largescale state in-
tervention, emigrants would benefit from the fact that they could buy tickets
with cheap, domestic currency. The Yugoslav attempt to nationalize emigra-
tion performance according to the Italian model will be thoroughly examined in
next section.
Articles 1013 of the Yugoslav emigration legislation followed the strict Italian
regulations in the domain of requirements imposed on steamship companies.
According to the Italian legislation, representatives of these companies were
only allowed to conduct their business if they had special approval from state
authorities. The same rule existed for steamship companies in Yugoslavia,
which could not transport emigrants or sell tickets without state approval in-
cluding the payment of a certain sum of money. The prices of tickets were to be
approved by state authorities. Steamship companies were obliged to pay differ-
ent taxes and they had to deposit a certain amount of money as security for the
good conduct of the company. Italian legislation also prescribed mandatory and
159
Priprema projekta Uredbe o emigraciji [Preparation of the Decree on Emigration Materi-
als sent from the Ministry of Social Policy to the Ministry of Interior on the 9th May 1921]. In:
A, Collection of the Ministry of Interior (14)34104.
160
In the period between 1871 and 1914, about 14 million emigrants left Italy. About 7.3 million
left for the overseas countries. See more in: Bade, Migration in European History, 1125.
free of charge repatriation for all emigrants refused by the country of immigra-
tion. Technically, this meant that the steamship company had the obligation to
return the emigrants at its own expense. Article 19 of the Yugoslav law incor-
porated this regulation, which proved to be one of the key provisions for the
protection of the emigrants. In addition, the Italian state enforced efficient con-
trols over the activities of steamship agents to prevent them from exploiting the
emigrants lack of information by imposing high commissions for their ser-
vices.
In Italy, an Emigration Fund was established for all administrative expenses of
emigration affairs. It had its own revenues collected from the special taxes im-
posed on the steamship agencies and the headtax that every emigrant was
obliged to pay. This income proved to be the basis of the financial independ-
ence of the Italian emigration service. The General Emigrational Commissariat
governed the Emigration Fund, under the surveillance of three respected sena-
tors and three MPs.
Figure 15: Seaport of Split, interwar period:
Source: Private Collection of the author.

2.2.3 Nationalization of emigration procedures
The Yugoslav Decree on Emigration of 1921 and later the Law on Emigration
(in the Articles 8, 10, 11, 15) of the same year followed the Italian model in all
points of the prescribed nationalization of emigration procedure161. There were,
however, some technical problems in carrying it out in practice. First, the
Kingdom of SCS lacked appropriate transport and boarding facilities at its sea-
ports. At that time, only Dubrovniks seaport, Gru, had railway connection
with the interior of the country. It was a narrow gauge railroad, quite uncom-
fortable and inadequate as it passed through the isolated territories of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.162 The ports of Split (up to 1925) and ibenik had no railway
connection with the rest of the country whereas the Suak seaport, with a nor-
mal gauge connection with the rest of the country, was under Italian occupation
until February 1924163. In fact, there were many reasons, apart from inadequate
or nonexistent railway connections, why emigration procedures could not be
carried out through domestic harbors. Yugoslav seaports had no technical in-
frastructure to accept and facilitate large steamships for transoceanic naviga-
tion. There were neither adequate boarding facilities, nor clinics for the neces-
sary medical examinations of the emigrants. Yet in spite of these facts, Article
8 of the 1921 decree prescribed that all emigrants had to leave the country only
through domestic ports, but five days after its publication, a subsequent order
was issued to revoke this provision164. When the provision reappeared in the
Law on Emigration (Article 10) from December 30, 1921, it too was soon an-
nulled by a regulation decreed by the government165. As a result, only a small
minority of Yugoslav emigrants left the country from domestic ports.
The issue of the nationalization of the emigration process was discussed
again during the conference on emigration organized in Zagreb from 1618
November 1924.166 The conclusion was reached that, given the existing condi-
tions of the Yugoslav seaport infrastructure and the decreasing number of emi-
161
See the Appendix of the monograph.
162
More on the Yugoslav transportation infrastructure and facilities immediately after the First
World War see in Aleksandar R. Mileti, Unutranja trgovina u Kraljevini SHS 1919, Tokovi
istorije, No. 34 (2003): 720.
163
Lucijan Kos, Rijeka kao slobodna luka u razdoblju od 17191939, [Rijeka as a Free Port
between 1719 and 1939] Anali Jadranskog instituta 4 (1967): 34951. Suak was the southern
outskirt of RijekaFiume, later on the borderline between Italy and the Kingdom SCS, see the
Figure 16.
164
Naredba o stupanju u dejstvo Uredbe od 21. maja 1921, [Order on Enforcement of the
Regulation from 21. May 1921] Slubene novine KSHS, 14 July 1921.
165
Zakon o iseljavanju od 30. decembra 1921, Slubene novine KSHS, 21. February 1922.
Pravilnik o izvrenju ..., Slubene novine KSHS, 1 September 1922.
166
Stenogram Ankete o iseljavanju, odrane 1618 septembra 1924 [Stenographic Record of
the Conference on Emigration, held 1618 September 1924]. In: HADOABG, b. 7, f. 4.
grants (due to the US immigration quota), there was no hope for the nationali-
zation of the domestic emigration procedure. Nevertheless, the program of
nationalization of emigration would not actually be implemented during the
interwar Yugoslavia.
Figure 16: Borderline (on the bridge) between Fiume (Italy) and Suak (King-
dom of SCS):
Source: Postcard, Private collection of the author.
2.2.4 Administration of emigration affairs
Responsibility for the administration of Yugoslav emigration was shared by at

least three institutions. General emigrational policy and the most important
tasks in the administration of emigration affairs were under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Social Policy. According to Yugoslav regulations, the Ministry
of the Interior with its local branches was to provide technical services, such as
the verification of identities and personal characteristics of emigrants, and issue
passports. On the other hand, the Zagrebbased Emigration Department also
played a key role in controlling Yugoslav emigration from the very beginning
of the newly created Kingdom.
The Zagrebbased Emigration Department remained under the jurisdiction of
the CroatianSlavonian provincial government until November 1922, when the
provincial government was terminated following the enactment of the provi-
sions of the new Yugoslav constitution of 1921. The central government essen-
tially renamed the institution and placed it under its direct control. The depart-
ments prerogatives were transferred to the General Emigrational Commissariat

(Generalni iseljeniki komisarijat, GEC), which was to have the same person-
nel as the previous institution and to be likewise situated in Zagreb. The GEC
was placed under the jurisdiction of the central governments Ministry of So-
cial Policy.167 Fedor Aranicki became head of the newly created GEC replacing
Bojniki, who was in turn appointed head of the Information Section of the
Commissariat. Later, Bojniki served the Commissariat as expertconsultant on
emigration matters.
Zagreb was chosen to be the centre of the state emigration office not only be-
cause of its experienced personnel and the fact that the greatest number of emi-
grants in the previous decades had come from Croatia and Slavonia (see the
Figures 17 and 18), but also for reasons of communication. As the great major-
ity of the Yugoslav emigrants used German and French ports for emigration,
they travelled through Zagreb, making it a suitable place for issuing all the
papers and conducting final administrative procedures for the emigrants. In
addition, there was a state boarding house in Zagreb with a clinic for the emi-
grants and all steamship companies had branch offices there.
The last reorganization of the emigration administration during this period oc-
curred in March 1923. It seems that the Radical Party, which dominated the
central government of Nikola Pai, wanted to gain even more control over
emigrational affairs. It transferred some important powers (such as decisions on
issuing passports to emigrants) from the Commissariat in Zagreb to the newly
created Emigration Department of the Ministry of Social Policy in Belgrade.
From that time, the Zagrebbased General Emigration Commissariat continued
to exist as the Emigration Commissariat (EC) under the authority of the Emi-
gration Department in Belgrade.
One of the tasks of the Commissariat in Zagreb was to defend the interests of
emigrants. Some of these cases dated from the period of the former Austro
Hungarian Empire. The case for the compensation of the families of 26 citizens
of AustriaHungary who perished on the Titanic in 1912 was probably one of
the most notable. The victims had been living in territories which would be
included in the Kingdom of SCS in 1918. As the legal representative of the
interests of their families, the Zagrebbased Emigration Commissariat insisted
on compensation from insurance companies in Vienna. Compensation from the
American Steamship Company White Star Line was sent to the beneficiaries in
several installments between 1914 and 1916. The problem occurred with the
last installment which was expected to arrive at the end of 1916.
Yugoslav authorities had considerable problems investigating the issue, as it
required exploring documents held by the Austrian consular authorities who
were in charge with the affair. The difficulties came from the fact that, after the
167
Historija. In: HDAOABG, b. 7.
Americans entered the war on side of the Entente Powers, AustriaHungary

could no longer retain its diplomatic missions in the United States. Consular
services for AustroHungarian citizens were provided by the Swedish Consu-
late in New York. Through diplomatic channels, Yugoslav authorities got in
touch with the Swedish Consulate from whom they received documents about
the missing indemnity payment. The money was actually sent to Vienna in
October 1916 but later withheld by the AustroHungarian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In following years, the authorities of the new Austrian state would not
permit the transfer of any money as long as there were unsettled issues in the
legal succession between AustriaHungary and the Kingdom of SCS. The case
was brought to a close in 1930 when Austria and Yugoslavia concluded The
Hague Accord which regulated general issue of interstate administrative
debts.168 Unfortunately for the members of the families, according to the Arti-
cle 3 of the accord they could no longer claim any indemnity installment. A
huge administrative effort from Yugoslavia had led to a final failure eighteen
years after Titanic catastrophe.
Figure 17: Emigration and repatriation from the USA in 1911:
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
Serbs and Croats and Dalmatians
Total
Montenegrins Slovenes and B.-H.
emigration 1363 42499 4520 48382
repatriation 2028 10209 849 13836
Source: Izvjetaj. In: HDAOABG, b. 3, f. 10 (according to US statistics).
168
The documents related to the issue can be found in: HDAFond Iseljenikog komesarijata
[Collection of the Emmigration Commissariate] (1071), b. 573.
Figure 18: Emigration and repatriation from the USA in 1913:
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Serbs and Croats and Dalmatians
Total
Montenegrins Slovenes and B.-H.
emigration 1638 20385 4577 26600
repatriation 1305 17473 1513 20291
Source: Izvjetaj. In: HDAOABG, b. 3, f. 10.
2.2.5 Yugoslav diaspora
Emigration authorities of the Kingdom of SCS were not only responsible for
control of the migration procedures and rates; they were also required to main-
tain relations with Yugoslav citizens and ethnic Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
living abroad. Estimates by the Yugoslav emigration authorities of the number
of Yugoslavs in overseas countries, can be found in the official correspondence
sent from EC in Zagreb to the Secretary General of the Yugoslav Labor Cham-
ber Dr ivko Topalovi in May 1925169.
According to this estimation, the Yugoslav diaspora was 743,000 people, or
about 7 percent of all ethnic Yugoslavs, 5 percent of all Yugoslav citizens, 2
percent of all Serbs, 12 percent of all Croats and 15 percent of all Slovenes.
The diaspora consisted of 233,734 (28 percent) Serbs, 370,980 (50 percent)
Croats, and 150,525 (22 percent) Slovenes. In terms of distribution, the greatest
number of Yugoslav emigrants (600,000 or 82.70 percent) was believed to live
169
In: HDAOABG, b. 10, f. 24.
in the USA, while the rest (about 240,000) were spread all around the globe
(see the Table 3). When describing the statistical estimations listed above, the
author notes that the data included only the bloodrelated Yugoslavs, since
the nonYugoslav emigrants [...] severed all contacts they had with their old
country. When compared to the US statistical data, the numbers above appear
to be exaggerated. While officials at the Zagrebbased EC in 1925 estimated
600,000 Yugoslavs living in the United States, the official US data listed only
211,416 in 1930170. One of the problems with the US statistics is that most of
the Yugoslav emigrants who left for America from the territory of Austria
Hungary before 1918 were registered as Austrians or Hungarians.
Table 3: Number and percentage share of Yugoslav emigrants in main coun-

tries of emigration in 1925:
Country Number of
emigrants and (%)
USA 600,000 (82%)
Canada 30,000 (4%)
Australia 3,000 (0.4%)
New Zealand 1,300 (0.18%)
South Africa 400
Argentina 30,000 (4%)
Brazil 15,000 (2%)
Chile 500
Uruguay 3,000 (0.4%)
Paraguay 800
Peru 750
Bolivia 400
Mexico 500
The rest of the 50,000 (6.7%)
world171
Source: HDAOABG, b. 10, f. 24.
2.2.6 US restrictions and Yugoslav emigration policy
The introduction of the emigration quota in the USA, the restrictions imposed
by the British Dominion countries, and the unfavorable living conditions in
170
Historical Statistics, 66.
171
The author pointed out that this figure referred mainly to Turkey. In: HDAOABG, b. 10, f.
24.
South American countries significantly decreased Yugoslav emigration after

the First World War. According to data cited by Artur Benko Bojniki at a
1924 conference on emigration, a total of 34,700 emigrants left the Kingdom
between 1918 and 1923, while at the same time 43,048 persons returned from
overseas countries. Bojniki pointed out the remarkable change that had oc-
curred in the emigration rates of Yugoslav provinces since the pre1914 pe-
riod:
Before the war, it was quite a different situation. [...] in only
one year, we had more emigrants from Croatia and Slavonia
who left for the USA than in [the past] 5 years from the whole
Kingdom to the whole world.172
A great number of repatriated emigrants proved to be a kind of Yugoslav or
Eastern European peculiarity, when compared to other European emigration
countries. Since the number of repatriated persons in the period 19181923
was greater than the number of those who moved abroad, Benko Bojniki
concluded that emigration had actually ceased to be a problem of state pol-
icy.173 Much of this positive emigration balance came as an immediate con-
sequence of the restrictive US immigration policy. The control over emigra-
tion to the United States was brought about through the combined efforts of
both countries state personnel; in connection with the establishment of the US
quota system, Yugoslav authorities were obliged to control the fulfillment of
this quota for the Kingdom SCS. Yugoslav emigration services coordinated
their actions and followed instructions from the local American consular au-
thorities.
The results of the policy can be easily detected in the official US statistics
which suggest that emigration from the Kingdom SCS to the United States
followed the general trend of Eastern and South European countries in the
period under review (see Figure 19). After the introduction of the first quota
regulation in 1921, the contingent of Yugoslav emigrants was reduced by
more than 50 percent. While in 1921 there were 12,461 immigrants from the
Kingdom of SCS to the United States, in 1922 there were only 5,436 (the an-
nual national quota was 5,600). According to the official Yugoslav statistics,
the establishment of an even more restrictive quota in 1924 did not affect the
national emigration contingent, which remained steady at about 10 percent of
the prewar level. Actually, the Yugoslav quota and annual emigration de-
creased (to only 671 persons annually), but was supplemented with US citi-
zens of Yugoslav origin who were exempted from quota regulations but
counted in Yugoslav statistics.
172
Stenogram Ankete. In: HDAOABG, b. 7.
173
Ibid.
Figure 19: Annual number of immigrants coming to US from the Kingdom of

SCS, NWE and ESE countries (annual average for 190713=100):
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1907-
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
13
Kingdom S CS 100 30 13 10 9 9 11 11 11
NWE countries 100 7 43 84 109 67 68 68 62
ES E countries 100 65 17 16 20 3 4 5 5
Sources: Historical Statistics, 569 and HADOABG, b. 3, f. 10.
2.2.7 Worldwide restrictions and Yugoslav emigration policy
The US immigration policy was followed by similar policies in other countries

of immigration throughout the world during 1920s. Yugoslav emigration au-
thorities were to provide potential emigrants with necessary information, and to
coordinate procedures and technical details with these countries. If judged only
by the enormous amount of material left by the Zagreb emigration office, it
seems that Yugoslav authorities tried hard to manage and coordinate this com-
plex affair. We will see now how Yugoslav emigration functioned in connec-
tion with Canada, Australia, and some South American countries.
Yugoslav emigration rates to Australia were determined by an annual and
monthly quota system. The monthly contingents for period 192426 consisted
usually of 100 persons; if the number was exceeded in one month, the quota
was compensated by decreasing it in following monthly contingents174. The

Yugoslav states conduct and procedure were to be coordinated with the Aus-
tralian consular authorities. Each emigrant was required to be literate and to
fulfill medical prerequisites175. Persons with symptoms of tuberculosis, bron-
chitis, cancer, epilepsy, any sort of skin or venereal diseases were not eligible
to enter Australia. Apart from this, an emigrant for Australia was to have
amount of 40 pounds sterling and a valid British visa at the time of entry to the
country. The certainty of the annual cycle of both the Australian and US quota
system eased the job of Yugoslav emigration officials. In Canada, however,
where the rhythm of emigration depended on arbitrary decisions by the gov-
ernment, this was not the case.
The Kingdom of SCS was listed among nonpreferred emigration countries
according to the Canadian Orderincouncil of 1924. It was the same year,
however, that the Canadian wheat became very much in demand on the world
market (see in section 1.2.3). Throughout the period 19241929, agricultural
labor from nonpreferred countries turned out to be quite suitable for the
purposes of developing vast territories in the Canadian west into farmland.
Canadian Immigration authorities were strict in their insistence that only bona
fide farmers or agricultural and forest laborers could enter the country. It was
noted by Yugoslav officials in 1924 that the Canadian immigration inspectors
even examined the hands and physical appearance of arriving immigrants, try-
ing to detect if they suited their alleged agricultural background.176
A particular problem occurred with former sailors from Dalmatia who wanted
to emigrate for Canada. Most of them had previously served on Austro
Hungarian or Italian ships and lost their jobs during or after the war. According
to Yugoslav sources about 86 percent of the AustroHungarian naval fleet
from which around 80 percent of personnel were of Yugoslav origin was
taken by Italy after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy177. In the years after
the war, they were still marked as sailors in their personal documents despite
that, for a quite some time, they had gone back to agriculture work as the only
way they could support themselves. Yugoslav authorities faced a problem
when some of these people were denied entrance to Canada. For that reason a
circular order was sent by the chief of the Yugoslav EC to the subordinate per-
sonnel to take care while verifying emigrants personal data.178
174
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Emigration Commissariat, No. 1264, of 28 February 1925.
In: HDA1071, b. 559.
175
According to Yugoslav sources, an Australian immigration official would dictate 50 words to
the emigrant in any European language. The latter was to write them down. In: EC: An Infor-
mation for the Emigrants; sent to district authorities on 26. July 1926 in: HDA1071, b. 556.
176
Circular message issued by Emigration Commissariat, No. 5837, 23. April 1924. In: HDA
1071, b. 560.
177
Franjo Stoji, Poloaj Pomoraca, [Seamen's Situation] Socijalni preporoaj, 1921 (Octo-
ber).
178
EC (circular message) No. 5026/1924 of 22 March 1924. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
According to the Yugoslav sources, the mechanics of the Canadian immigra-

tion procedure underwent considerable changes in the period under review. At
the beginning of 1924, it was provided that most Canadian immigration proce-
dures would be carried out on European soil. A seat of the Canadian immigra-
tion Commissioner, who had arbitrary power to make decisions on individual
applications coming from Yugoslavia, was located in Antwerp. It was arranged
with Yugoslav authorities that a potential emigrant could be supplied with
passport in Yugoslavia only after receiving guarantee papers, issued by the
commissioner, which secured the emigrants employment after they arrived to
Canada. To receive the guarantee paper, Yugoslav emigrants were subjected to
a detailed medical examination in Antwerp and their papers required verifica-
tion. According to Yugoslav regulations, concession steamship agencies were
held responsible if anything went wrong during the procedure. If an emigrant
was rejected entrance to Canada, they were to return him to Yugoslavia free of
charge.179
Figure 20: Artur Benko Grado Bojniki:
Source: HDA Fototeka Instituta za migracije i narodnosti (1610), 40/0957.
There was, however, a bit of inconsistency in the system; while Canadian au-
thorities conducted the controls on immigrations, the private companies were to
179
EC (circular message) No. 2017/1924 of 11 February 1924 and EC (circular message) No.
1552 of 6. February 1924. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
pay costs if the prospective immigrants turned out to be unsuitable180. Probably

for this reason, the system was changed. Throughout 1924 and 1925, private
steamship companies were gaining ever more control and influence over immi-
gration procedures. According to Yugoslav emigration authorities, an important
modification occurred in April 1924 when the companies were authorized to
carry out medical examinations and to issue the guarantee paper themselves181.
In 1925, Canadian authorities finally decided to leave the whole procedure in
hands of the two big Canadian railway companies. According to the provisions
of the Railway Agreement, immigration management was entrusted to the Ca-
nadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and Canadian National Railway (CNR).
Both companies had quite a considerable profit to gain; they could count on
steady income from the charges and revenues collected from train tickets and
steamship companies. Moreover, they were to profit by the very settlement of
the new immigrants as much of the property being sold for farmland was their
own.182 The CPR and CNR were in possession of vast territories in Western
Canada, most of which were still not cultivated. The vital interest of the com-
panies was to colonize these territories. This is probably an explanation for the
high efficiency of immigration procedures and the farmers settlement program
in the period 192429. In the Yugoslav case, it is apparent that new sorts of
ethnic/racial and eugenic criteria were imposed during the period. Not only was
Yugoslavia as whole considered as nonpreferred country, certain regions or
races of the Kingdom were favored while others were declared unsuitable.
The first time these new criteria of immigration policy were spelled out, it was
Canadian Deputy Minister of Immigration and Colonization W. J. Egan who
expressed his dissatisfaction with Dalmatian immigrants. During a meeting he
had with a Yugoslav consul Aleksandar Seferovi in 1925, he spelled out the
reasons. Allegedly, Dalmatians were not genuine farmers; what is more, they
supposedly could not adapt to the Canadian climate conditions. On the other
hand, Egan was satisfied with Croatians (from CroatiaSlavonia) and regarded
them as the only true farmertype of Yugoslav population.183
180
The following steamship companies were granted concession by Yugoslav authorities: Cana-
dian Pacific, Cunard Line, Red Star Line, White Star Line, Norddeutscher Lloyd, Holand Amer-
ica Line and Royal Mail. In: EC (circular message) No. 1552 of 6 February 1924 HDA1071, b.
560.
181
EC (circular letter) No. 5837 of 23. April 1924. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
182
Green and Green, The Economic Goals.
183
Official letter of Mr. Seferovi, General Consul of the KSCS in Montreal to the Ministry of
Social Policy in Belgrade, No. 2146, of 28 July 1925. In: HDA1071, b. 560. Seferovi gave
information on conversation he had with Canadian deputy minister Egan.
Figure 21: Fedor Aranicki:
In following months, new undesired regions and unwanted cultural subtypes

appeared on the list. Montenegrins, SouthSerbs, and, in particular, Muslim
immigrants (as polygamist), joined Dalmatians as noneligible for Canada184.
These categories were consistently excluded from immigration by Canadian
authorities in the period 192529. In addition to the ethno/geographical or cul-
turally based criteria, the Canadians later applied some clearly racial criteria. At
the end of 1920s, Yugoslav emigration officials learned about the sensitivity
their Canadian colleagues had about the skin color of immigrants. An excerpt
from the circular letter sent by Fedor Aranicki to the Yugoslav branches of the
concession steamship companies on 6 April 1928 reveals the details of this new
requirement:
According to the information [obtained] from the part of the
Canadian railway commissionaires, they will not accept immi-
grants coming from any place of Yugoslavia outside Dalmatia,
Montenegro and South Serbia185, if they are of dark skin (i.e.
very pigmented). They will not be allowed to embark even if
they had a guarantee paper. [...]
184
Circular letter issued by EC No. 19385, of 25 September 1925, and particularly for Muslims
again in No. 5500 of 25 February 1928. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
185
Immigrants from these regions had already been established as undesirable.
Therefore, I request from the aforementioned [concession

steamship companies] that each applicant should be warned by
striking underlined letters [...] that he will not be permitted to
Canada if his body skin is of brown (dark) color (sunburned
face will not cause problem).
The same way, the aforementioned [companies] should instruct
those who have a doubt regarding their skin color to come to
their Zagreb branches where they will be subjected to physical
examination which will determine on their skin color.186
During this period, South American countries also imposed new requirements
and conditions for Yugoslav immigrants. In 1925, the Argentinean government
opened three consulates (in Belgrade, Zagreb and Split) to conduct procedures
for migration from the Kingdom of SCS.187 Immigrants were required to have
three basic documents to apply for an Argentine visa: a health certificate (Certi-
ficado medico), a criminal record (Certificado penal), and a proof of profession
(Certificado de la profesion)188. The health proof was to provide evidence of
immigrants mental and physical abilities. The paper proved that in each indi-
vidual case there were no symptoms of epilepsy, mental disorder, physical de-
fects, contagious diseases, tuberculosis, trachoma or other eyerelated diseases.
Figure 22: Office of the Yugoslav Consulate in Vancouver, Canada (1926):
186
EC to all branches of Concession Steamship Companies, No. 10440/1928 of 6 April 1928.
In: HDA1071, b. 560.
187
EC circular letter No. 538 of 22. January 1926. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
188
The three bilingual (Serbian/Croatian and Spanish) questionnaires can be found in: HDA
1071, b. 556.
The criminal record issued by Yugoslav local police authorities confirmed that a
wouldbe immigrant had not been condemned for any crime in previous five
year period. This paper also contained a political requirement for immigration to
Argentina; it was to prove that the immigrant does not and did not belong to
any kind of anarchist or communist societies. According to the Yugoslav emi-
gration officials, Argentinean authorities and employers paid great attention to
this paper, upon which they would provide an immigrant with an identity card
(cdula de identidad). For this reason, Argentinean consul suggested to Yugo-
slav emigration authorities that they should add further information and basic
personal data to the document. In response to the appeal, Fedor Aranicki issued
a corresponding order to the concession steamship companies who were in
charge of the business.189
The division of businesses on emigration procedure between the private steam-
ship companies and state authorities could cause some mistakes and even
abuses. In September 1926, Fedor Aranicki warned of recorded cases of bigamy
among Yugoslav emigrants in South America arising from such administrative
deficiencies190. It seems an immigrant, wanting to escape his wife or family
duties, could falsely describe his family status during the emigration procedure
in Yugoslavia. In South America, he would be issued an identity card that (in-
correctly) stated he was unwed enabling him to marry again. Aranicki requested
that all subjects involved in the administration of emigration affairs should ver-
ify all the personal data given by applicants.
Like the Argentineans, Brazilian authorities required these three papers from
those who applied to enter the country191. On an operational level, the dynamics
and rate of immigration to this country was coordinated between Brazilian con-
sular and Yugoslav emigration authorities. If the transit and accommodation
facilities in Brazil grew overcrowded, immigration would be stopped for a cer-
tain period192. No formal regulations existed; the whole procedure depended
upon the arbitrary decisions of the Brazilian authorities. One unique feature of
Brazilian immigration policy was the creation of programs for statefunded
immigration subsidies. In almost all cases, Yugoslav sources indicate that
Yugoslav immigrants to Brazil arrived through these programs. The sources
also describe the Brazilian state of Sao Paolo as the only destination for Yugo-
slav immigration to Brazil.
The emigrants who traveled to work on the coffee plantations of Sao Paolo
came under special regulations of the Brazilian state. In 1927, only peasant
families ready to engage in agricultural work were to be accepted in Sao Paolo.
189
EC circular letter No. 33462 of 22 December 1926. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
190
No. 2425 21 September 1926. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
191
EC circular letter, No. 18585, of 30 July 1926. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
192
Delay of issuing passports for Sao Paolo, EC to the Ministry of Social Policy of 6 March
1926 and EC to concession steamship companies, No. 14579 of 11 June 1926. In: HDA1071, b.
556.
A family was defined as a production unit which was to consist of not less than
three persons of the age between 14 and 50 years, and able to work. In case one
of the parents was older than 50, there should be two children (unmarried and
older than 14) in the family to compensate. In case both parents were older than
50, Sao Paolos regulations required three unmarried children over 14 years of
age to be in the family.193 Migration to Brazil from Yugoslavia was complicated
by the latter countrys unofficial national policy. State policy provided two dif-
ferent procedures: one for the emigration of a national element, another in
case of a nonnational element (both of which will be thoroughly explained in
chapter 2.4). Apart from all requirements and restrictions from Brazilian au-
thorities, Yugoslav emigration officials had to deal these domestic double stan-
dards and complications as well.
Immigration regulations in Chile became more exact and extensive after legisla-
tion was passed in December 1918. According to the new law, immigrants
could be denied access to the country on the grounds of their health, criminal
records or political convictions related to the alteration of the public order
through violence. The same grounds could also justify their expulsion from the
country, an option within the jurisdiction of district authorities. According to the
letter sent by Zagrebbased Chilean Consulate to the Yugoslav Emigration
Commissariat in February 1924, much of the administration and procedure con-
cerning each individual emigrant was to be conducted in the consulate itself.194
For instance, the medical examination was to be carried out and the corre-
sponding certificate of health was to be issued by a Chilean physician at the
consulate. Future emigrants were also to be fingerprinted there in order to be
provided with a Chilean personal ID card. According to the letter, the Chilean
state administration had only recently adopted mandatory ID registration based
on the Vucetich model of fingerprint and the Bertallon model of anthropomet-
ric record files195. The fingerprint registration was obligatory for all residents
of Chile, both citizens and immigrants/aliens. The system, originally intended to
help with criminal investigations, eventually became quite functional for
broader state control over individuals identities. In this case, we can see from
193
Information on Sao Paolo immigration regulations, EC to local authorities of Sopje
(Slatina), No. 16777, of 12 July 1927. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
194
Chilean Consulate to EC, No. 32/E of 17 February 1925. In: HDA1071, b. 556. The letter
was supplemented with the attached text of the immigration legislation of 12 December 1918.
195
Juan Vucetich [Ivan Vueti] (18581925) was a Croat born in Dalmatia. At the age of 26, he
emigrated to Argentina. One of the pioneers in applying fingerprint identification techniques in
criminology, he was the first to create a fingerprint record bureau (in the Argentinian state of La
Plata 1891) and the first to apply the method in solving a murder case in 1892. His system of
fingerprint registration was later accepted by many South American and European countries. In:
Luis Reyna Almandos, Identification in the Argentine Republic, Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 24, No. 6 (MarApr 1934): 1098101. J. Edgar Hoover, Criminal identification,
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 146 (Nov 1929): 20513. Cyril
J. Polson, Finger Prints and Finger Printing, An Historical Study, Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 41, No. 5 (JanFeb 1951): 609704.
the letter that emigrants would be registered in the Chilean public register even
before they started their Atlantic voyage.
There are some serious shortcomings in a general statistical account of the over-
all emigration rates of Yugoslavia, (i.e. Yugoslav provinces) before 1918. There
are no exact statistics nor is there an official estimation of the total overseas
emigration from the Yugoslav provinces before the First World War. Even tak-
ing into account only the available data on emigration to the United States, the
decrease in numbers after the First World War, seems considerable. For in-
stance, in 1922, the total amount of Yugoslav emigration (for all overseas coun-
tries) was only 15 percent of the annual average number of Yugoslav immi-
grants to the United States in the period 190713. This change might have been
a consequence not only of the US quota but also of restrictions on the issuing of
passports imposed by Yugoslav authorities. But was there a legal basis for the
imposition of restrictions on emigration from the country? It should be pointed
out that the newly established Kingdom of SCS did not continue the previous
Serbian policy of high fees demanded for issuing passports. On the contrary,
while the nominal amount in dinars remained the same, its real value was im-
mensely reduced by significant postwar inflation. In this respect, there was a
certain liberalization of emigration procedures compared to the situation in Ser-
bia before the war. This was also manifest in Article 6 of the Yugoslav Law on
Emigration, which guaranteed the freedom of movement and emigration of
Yugoslav citizens. On the other hand, it also authorized the Minister of Social
Policy to impose limitations on emigration or to stop it completely196. In the
period under review, this provision was never exercised within the given legal
framework; however, it was carried out unofficially through confidential in-
structions sent to the administrative personnel. The mechanism of these unoffi-
cial restrictions will be discussed in the Chapter 2.3.
From 1921 on, Yugoslav emigration procedure was integrated into a unified
system based in Zagreb emigration offices. In connection with the establishment
of the American and Australian quota systems, Yugoslav authorities were
obliged to control the fulfillment of quotas for the Kingdom SCS. Apart from
this limitation, no formal restrictions existed in Yugoslav emigration affairs.
Yugoslav decrees, laws and regulations guaranteed citizens an unrestricted free-
dom of movement. Limitations on this freedom were imposed, however,
through confidential and extrainstitutional orders that circulated among the
state personnel in charge of emigration affairs. As a direct consequence of this
policy, the Yugoslav emigration rate in this period was quite low. In comparison
with the prewar volume of emigration, it was almost negligible.
196
Article 10 of the Law on Emigration, see the Appendix 1.
2.3 Emigration Affairs and Minority Policy of Yugoslavia
The population of the Kingdom of SCS included a great proportion of ethnic

minorities. According to the 1921 census, the constituent nationalities of the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes made up 82.86 percent of the population, while the
most numerous national minority groups were Germans (4.22 percent), Hun-
garians (3.90 percent) and Albanians (3.67 percent) 197. According to Ivo Ba-
nac, the share of the constituent nationalities should be reduced to account for
the number of Macedonians (4.87 percent) and Slavic Muslims (6.05 percent)
in 1918198. The Yugoslav emigration policy towards the members of the Ger-
man, Hungarian, Macedonian (Bulgarophil), and Muslim minorities pos-
sessed revealing particularities.
The minority issue became a matter of international concern after the enact-
ment of the 19191920 Paris Peace Conference treaties which obliged the sig-
natory states to protect minorities. The most important provisions on minority
protection in Yugoslavia were included in the peace treaty signed with Austria
(SaintGermaine Treaty) in 1919. Since the Yugoslav authorities wanted to
liberate themselves of this burden, emigration appeared as an ideal opportunity
to decrease the number of ethnic minorities. With this goal in mind, Yugosla-
vias emigration policy was tailored to produce disproportionately high rates of
emigration from the countrys minority groups.
2.3.1 NonSlavic Emigrants
According to official Yugoslav statistics (see Table 4 and Figure 23), members
of the Hungarian and German national minorities made up a large percentage
of all emigrants who left the Kingdom of SCS during the 1920s. The extent of
this emigration is striking considering that these ethnic groups, as minorities,
made up a relatively small percentage of the countrys total population. Na-
tional minorities that made up only 7 to 8 percent of the national population
provided almost 50 percent of all Yugoslav emigrants in 1924 and 1925. If
the numbers of emigrants of different ethnic groups is expressed in relation to
their overall number in the country, the prominence of German and Hungarian
emigrants appears to be even greater (Figure 23). The annual average number
197
Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovnitva od 31. januara 1921 [Definite Results of the Census
of 31 January 1921] (Sarajevo: Dravna tamparija, 1932). Quoted in: Richard and Ben Cramp-
ton, Atlas of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1996), 124.
198
Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca and Lon-
don: Cornell University Press, 1984), 58.
of emigrants per 10,000 residents for these ethnic groups in period 192128
was 47.08, while for the state constitutive nations, it was no more than 9.59: a
ratio of almost 5 to 1 in favor of German and Hungarian emigration. In 1924,
the ratio was more than 10 to 1 in favor of the same ethnic groups. Let us first
describe the emigration of the German national minority from Yugoslavia.
Table 4: National structure of the emigrants from the Kingdom of SCS:
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Germans and
3,294 1,019 3,491 8,457 6,774 4,234 5,318 4,077
Hungarians (25,40%) (16,91%) (37,25%) (49,06%) (45,14%) (26,92%) (24,20%) (18,71%)
(total and %)
Serbs, Croats
9,516 4,880 5,698 8,525 7,824 11,044 13,775 14,939
and Slovenes (73,40%) (80,98%) (60,81%) (49,45%) (52,14%) (70,23%) (62,68%) (68,56%)
(total and %)
Total number of
the emigrants 12,965 6,026 9,370 17,238 15,005 15,726 21,976 21,789
from the KSCS
Source: Yugoslav Emigration Statistics.
Figure 23: Number of emigrants per 10,000 inhabitants (according to the 1921
census):
100
80
60
40
20
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
S erbs, Croats and S lovenes 9,58 4,91 5,74 8,58 7,88 11,12 13,87 15,04
Germans and Hungarians 33,83 10,46 35,86 86,88 69,59 43,49 54,63 41,88
In an article written by Bojniki on the general points of the emigration policy

of the Kingdom of SCS in 1924, only praise and compliments can be found for
the members of the German national minority199. The article was published in
the official periodical of the Ministry of Social Policy (Socijalni preporoaj)
and had a strongly negative undertone directed at those who were encouraging
the emigration of Germans from the country. Bojniki praised Germans as a
hardworking people, which represented by its industrial property, [...] ad-
vanced production technique, discipline, and obedience, an element of the or-
der in the country, whose emigration should not be favored. Furthermore, the
author argued that many regions of our country owe their progress only to
their [the Germans] long and painstaking work as pioneers.200
Apart from these favorable words, it is apparent from the text that actually
there were people in the Yugoslav administration who did not share Bojnikis
attitude and who thought that the emigration of the Germans should be encour-
aged. To what extent this attitude was institutionalized or imposed from above
upon the subordinate personnel, can be assessed only through confidential ma-
terials that circulated in the Yugoslav administration. The subject was too sen-
sitive to be included in the provisions of official orders or regulations, much
less announced publicly. The document quoted below is a confidential order
that circulated between the Ministries of Interior, Social Policy, and Foreign
Affairs during the preparation of the Decree on Emigration of 1921:
A principle which will be accepted in carrying out the police
measures is as follows: to make difficult the procedure of issuing
passports in a material and formal way. This is the command of
our states military, economic, and political conditions. The emi-
grants own interests concerning the present situation in America
also demand it201. The decree prescribes even the order of the
Ministry of social policy by which the emigration can be can-
celled completely for a while. [...]
By the provision of the order and the Decree of Emigration, we
want to make procedural difficulties in obtaining passports.
Namely, we will remove from power those authorities that are
customarily authorized to issue passports [i.e. the local authori-
ties] and we will reserve this authority for the provincial gov-
ernments in the cases of the families of overseas emigrants and
nonSlavic emigrants; for all other [citizens] this right will be re-
served for the central government.202
199
Artur BenkoBojniki, Koje bi smjernice trebalo dati naoj emigracionoj politici, [Which
Directions should be given to our Emigration Policy] Socijalni preporoa, No. 5 (1925): 215.
Italics mine.
200
Ibid.
201
The document refers to the shortlived economic crisis, which occurred in the US at the
beginning of the 1920s explained in 1.2.1.
202
In: A, 1434104. (Materials sent from the Ministry of Social Policy to the Ministry of
Interior on the 9th May 1921).
Thus, within the new system of imposed limitations, no one could get a pass-
port from the local authorities, but nonSlavic emigrants and the family
members of overseas emigrants could be issued passports on first demand by
provincial governments. For all other citizens, passports were to be issued by
central authorities. This institutional mechanism was covered by an instruction
of the Ministry for Social Policy from July 19, 1921, which prescribed that a
decision on the issuance of a passport could be made at one of two levels, ei-
ther by provincial governments or the Ministry of the Interior203. When the
provincial governments were terminated under the provisions of the new Yugo-
slav constitution, its prerogatives in the domain of emigration were taken over
by district authorities. The confidential document quoted above suggests that
applications for passports submitted by Germans and Hungarians were solved
immediately in the first administrative instance, while the applications of other
citizens were delayed by transferring them to the uncertainty of arbitrary deci-
sions by central authorities.
These double standards in emigration policy could not have been kept secret
for long among the citizens of the Kingdom of SCS. In 1925, the Croatian
newspaper Hrvatski list reported on the situation in Slavonia:
Recently, some agents have appeared who tried to convince
people to leave for Brazil. [...] One hundred families are prepar-
ing themselves for emigration. It is interesting that these agents
address only the Germans and Hungarians. We hear but we still
do not believe that these emigrants, who report to these agents,
get their passports in Belgrade with no subsequent delay or in-
vestigation.204
In a 1925 report by the Zagrebbased Emigration Commissariat, satisfaction
was expressed about the fact that only 7,824 out of 15,005 emigrants from the
Kingdom were ethnic Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The rest of the emigration
contingent that year consisted of the socalled nonnational element mostly
members of the German and Hungarian national minorities. Emphasis in the
report was placed on how to prevent their return to the country.205 Large num-
bers of the Hungarian and German emigrants from Yugoslavia consisted of
landless agricultural laborers. As discussed in section 2.1.3, their social position
became more difficult after the land reform was carried out in Vojvodina and
Slavonia. Upon arriving in the overseas countries, Germans usually severed all
relations with Yugoslav authorities. They became a part of overseas German
203
Naredba ministra socijalne politike sporazumno sa ministrom unutranjih poslova, Slubene
novine KSHS, August 1, 1921.
204
Hrvatski list, 23.X 1925.
205
We should do everything that these emigrants, when they have already left our country, do
not return. In: Izvetaj o radu Iseljenikog komesarijata 192526. In: , 39926.
diaspora that was under special care and concern of the Weimar Republic au-
thorities.
One note sent by Fedor Aranicki, chief of the Zagrebbased Emigration Com-
missariat, to the Minister of Social Policy in March 1926 reveals the zeal and
eagerness Yugoslav emigration authorities had in carrying out the state minority
policy206. Aranicki reported on one unpleasant occurrence he had noticed
within the general emigration movement of German national minority: a large
number of German emigrants who left the Kingdom with aim not to return,
had changed their minds and returned. Not only did they want to return but they
started to address Yugoslav consular authorities for material help. Such a thing
was unimaginable in previous period when Yugoslav Germans showed no inter-
est in their country of origin. Aranicki found explanation in inadequate activity
of the German and Austrian overseas associations and an almost incredible idea
occurred to him; he requested financial support from the Ministry of Social
Policy, as the superior institution, for an official trip to Austria where he was to
inform representatives of German associations about the issue. This way he
would undertake action in favor of both the overseas Germandom and the
Yugoslav national policy. No response from the Ministry could be found among
archival material, so it is not clear whether Aranicki actually undertook this
unique journey or not.
2.3.2 Passavants in emigration policy of Yugoslavia
A special feature of the minority issue in Yugoslavia came from the uncertain
legal status of the members of those ethnic groups who gained the right to
opt according to Versailles, SaintGermain and Trianon peace treaties. Since
they had not yet chosen their nationality status, they could not be considered
full legal citizens of the Kingdom SCS. For that reason, Hungarians and Ger-
mans who represented the most numerous national groups of the socalled
optants (optanti) in the country were denied the right to vote in the first parlia-
mentary elections held in 1920207. Many of them could not be provided with
valid passports, resulting in not only serious problems for the emigrants but
also in a major obstacle to Yugoslav emigration objectives. In view of the fact
that the state emigration authorities wanted to get rid of the minorities, a quick
solution had to be found. Instead of regular passports the emigrants were pro-
vided with passavants, a sort of traveling document which could be issued to a
person with uncertain citizenship status. The passavant was valid only for a
oneway journey; technically one could only exit the country with this docu-
206
The document was dated on 23 March 1926. In: HDAOABG, b. 10, f. 24.
207
Janjetovi, Deca careva, 1767.
ment. According to Yugoslav regulations, the emigrant could be provided with

another new passavant in order to return to the country, but there was no guar-
antee available to them.208
From the point of view of Yugoslavias national policy, this seems to be an
even better solution than a regular passport procedure. A Hungarian or a Ger-
man with a passavant was less likely to return to the country than one provided
with the regular passport. Problems appeared, however, when Canada, Argen-
tina and Brazil started to deny entrance to immigrants with passavants in
1927209. Regarding the issue Fedor Aranicki, the EC director, sent an official
note to the Yugoslav Consul in Montreal Aleksandar Seferovi. In the note he
underlined the core of the problem:
As you know, many of our Germans and Hungarians and mem-
bers of other national minorities have not yet opted either for
our or some other state. In case they wished to emigrate, they
could not be provided with a regular passport but only a passa-
vant. [...]
The principle of our emigration policy, as you know Mr. Con-
sule, is to favor the emigration of nonnational emigrants but
now, due to instructions by the Canadian authorities, many of
these emigrants will not emigrate to Canada.210
Aranicki asked Seferovi to try to convince Canadians to accept Yugoslav pas-
savants as regular travel documents. When his effort met with no success,
Aranicki wrote to his administrative superiors from the Ministry of Social Pol-
icy in Belgrade. Arguing that the possession of passport does not imply [rec-
ognition of ones] citizenship he proposed that the emigrants should be pro-
vided with passports. The issue was of such great concern that it was investi-
gated by the Interministerial Advisory Council which responded negatively to
the proposal.211
2.3.3 Brazil as a preferred destination for unwanted minorities
In the period between November 1924 and December 1926, Yugoslav emigra-
tion authorities issued at least four confidential orders regarding the national
criteria for issuing individual passports. These were the orders issued 1 No-
vember 1924 (order A), 2 November 1925 (B), 3 February 1926 (C) and 31
208
Articles 3438 Pravilnik o izdavanju i viziranju putnih isprava za graane Kraljevine SHS
[Regulation on Issuing and Visaing Passports for the Citizens of the Kingdom of SCS]. In:
Slubene novine No. 85 of 14 April 1924.
209
EC (circular letter), No. 5809 of 17 March 1927. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
210
Aranicki to Seferovi, No. 856 of 13 January 1927. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
211
Aranicki to Seferovi, No. 9575 of 30 April 1927. In: HDA1071, b. 560.
December 1926 (D). Original copies of the first two orders could not be found
but their content was alluded to in the fourth one. Specifically, the order A was
described in order B which was later quoted in order D. This last order rein-
forced the passport policy towards Yugoslav citizens of Czech and Polish na-
tionality which had already been defined by order B. An excerpt of confidential
circular letter (B) sent by the Ministry of Social Policy to all authorities [that
were] in charge of issuing passports is quoted below.
Due to the stipulation of point 3 of the confidential order No.
296/24 of 1. November 1924, the above entitled authorities [dis-
trict authorities and EC officials] cannot issue passports for
Brazil to our citizens of Polish and Czechoslovak nationality
without approval of the Ministry [of Social Policy]. [...]
According to the aforementioned [confidential order], Czecho-
slovak and Polish nationals of our citizenship are to be treated
equally to our [national] element, and therefore they are to
come under the power of point 3 of the 1924 confidential order
which forbids the emigration of families to any country; for
Brazil, emigration is forbidden even for individuals.212
From this quotation, it is apparent that Yugoslav authorities continuously
maintained this hidden national policy in emigration affairs during the 1920s.
The confidential orders of 1920, 1924, 1925, and 1926 supported a basic seg-
regation between Slavic and nonSlavic people. In 1924, it was established
that members of state constitutive nations could not emigrate anywhere abroad
in family units without a special permission issued by the Ministry of Social
Policy. In 1925, this provision was extended to ethnic Czechs, Slovaks and
Poles if they were citizens of Yugoslavia. In particular, emigration to Brazil
was forbidden for the members of national elements of Yugoslavia; not
even lone individuals could go to Brazil without the special permission of the
Ministry. Fedor Aranicki underlined importance of this special permission
in the confidential order (C) of 3 February 1926, stating that the passports of
the national elements were to be supplied with a special clause of approval
otherwise they would be considered invalid213.
How did Brazil come to occupy such an important place in Yugoslavias emi-
gration policy? Yugoslav officials were very well informed on the poor eco-
nomic situation and the civil war which was going on in some parts of Brazil
that time. They also knew of shoddy treatment of immigrants by authorities
and employers in Brazil214. Thus, it is not strange that Yugoslav emigration
authorities tried to prevent national elements from emigrating to what they
212
Quoted in: EC confidential order No. 2604 of 31. December 1926. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
213
Klauziranje pasoa [Clause of Approval], EC circular letter No.26396 of 3 February 1926.
In: HDA1071, b. 556.
214
See more in section 3.3.1.
considered a dangerous country. But, in the case of nonnational elements,

no such concerns existed, so overseas passports for Brazil were effectively
reserved for Germans and Hungarians. The Slavic population of Yugoslavia
could emigrate there only as an exception and after complicated administrative
procedures. An exact numerical account on the issue cannot be established as
Yugoslav emigration statistics did not list the nationality of emigrants by
country of destination.
It seems that Yugoslavia was not the only country to have such a plan for
emigration to Brazil; in 1927, Fedor Aranicki received a confidential report
from Jovo N. Mareti Yugoslav Emigration Envoy for South America, on a
similar emigration policy applied by Poland and Romania at that time215. In a
circular letter, Aranicki informed Yugoslav district authorities about the
news216. Allegedly, that year the Polish envoy, a certain Mr. Gawronski, had
concluded an agreement on emigration from Poland to Brazil and Uruguay
with the authorities of these South American countries. According to Mar-
etis description, the key objective of the Polish agreement was to facilitate
emigration of members of the Russian (i.e. Byelorussian and Ukrainian) mi-
nority; Brazil was to accept 16,000 immigrant families, and Uruguay 2,000
families. As far as Romanian emigration policy was concerned, Mareti indi-
cates only that the plans were much less extensive and focused on the emigra-
tion of members of the Hungarian national minority.
There was much hypocrisy in Maretis report. In the introduction, he ex-
plained the huge problems that emigrants faced in South American countries,
particularly in Brazil. He continued by suggesting that the only way of solving
these problem was through the combined action of all emigration countries. If
they had hampered emigration completely, the authorities of the South Ameri-
can countries would have been compelled to provide better conditions for new
immigrants. Mareti insisted, however, that this was impossible to carry out
because of unilateral actions such as those of Polish and Romanian govern-
ment. In this way, Mareti identified those responsible for the poor condi-
tions provided for emigrants in South America, and acknowledged the strong
position these countries had while negotiating with European source
countries. Yet Mareti forgot to reconsider his own responsibility and that of
Yugoslavias emigration policy; or, perhaps, he just envied Poles and Roma-
nians for all those thousands of families of minorities prepared to be exported
to Brazil.
215
On the institution of the Yugoslav emigration envoy see in 3.3.2.
216
Circular letter, EC to the district authorities, No. 26156 of 7 December 1927. In: HDA1071,
b. 558.
2.3.4 Different strategies applied to different minority groups
Let us now examine the different strategies of emigration policy recommended

for the different national minorities. Information is provided by a document
written in 1925 by Bojniki while he was working as an expert for the Emigra-
tion Commissariat. Bojniki wrote the report on how to treat the representatives
of the different national minorities such as Germans, Hungarians, and socalled
Bulgarophiles (Bugarai) from Macedonia throughout the emigration proce-
dure. In this document, written for internal use of the administration, he reiter-
ated his attitude towards the Germans. His praise for German virtues and their
loyalty to the Yugoslav state was even more pronounced than in his article
mentioned above. Bojniki stated that the Germans emigration should not be
encouraged, but in case they really wanted to leave the country, there should be
no obstacles from the part of the authorities. As he summarized at the end of
the report, policy concerning German emigration should be one of laissez
passer.
A particular strategy was to be applied in the case of the Bulgarophiles (pro
Bulgarian Slavs) from Macedonia. The position of the Slavic population of
Macedonia was not perceived as a minority problem by Yugoslavias official
discourse or policy because they were considered Serbs, or, at most, South
Serbians. Throughout the interwar period, paramilitary units and branches of
the violent Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) were
dangerous inside and outside Yugoslavia. In the domain of emigration policy,
specifically the procedure of issuing passports, Bojniki suggested that local
authorities should consider every individual application seperately:
Since it is one turbulent element [i.e. Bulgarophile Macedoni-
ans] inclined towards the revolutionary ideas and terrorist
methods, only local authorities, who have the best knowledge
of individuals in each local community, can judge on whether
these individuals are more dangerous for the state at home or in
emigration. Otherwise, it would be difficult to generalize on
this matter. If the Bulgarophile organization is more vigorous
in America than here, it is better to keep them at home and vice
versa.217
The only negative attitude in Bojnikis report was that displayed towards
Hungarians, whose emigration he felt should be supported and favored. Inter-
estingly, he did not even try to explain his staunchly negative opinion. One can
217
Miljenje eksperta Iseljenikog Komesarijata Artura B. Bojnikog Predmet: Emigraciona
politika prema narodnosnim manjinama, [Opinion of Artur B. Bojniki, Expert of the EC
Case: Emigration Policy towards National Minorities], in Zagreb, 7 April 1925. In: HDA
OABG, b. 9, f. 24.
speculate that there must have been a kind of consensus among Yugoslav poli-
cymakers concerning this minority group which made any further explanation
needless.
So far, the description of Yugoslavias emigration policy towards members of
the German and Hungarian national minorities might leave some doubt as to
whether it can be safely portrayed as a case of state repression. Taking into
account what were generally poor prospects for the economy and for employ-
ment in the overpopulated rural areas of the Kingdom of SCS, one could claim
that these populations were, in fact, privileged over the members of the states
constitutive nations who also wanted to emigrate. This would only be true, of
course, if the nationally biased project of the Yugoslav land reform, which
contributed to these minorities desire to leave the country, were ignored. Tak-
ing this additional dimension into account, the two policies of land reform and
emigration appear causally connected.
2.3.5 The Muslim refugees question
The emigration of the Muslim population from the provinces of Macedonia,

KosovoMetohija, Sandak, and BosniaHerzegovina to Turkey remains one
of the great controversies of Yugoslav interwar emigration. This emigration
pattern was a continuation of the migration process that had started during and
after the Balkan Wars of 19123. There are some serious obstacles to the ex-
ploration of these phenomena, at least when it concerns Yugoslav statistical
data. Namely, in spite of the largescale nature of emigration among the Mus-
lim population of the Kingdom of SCS, it had never been included in the offi-
cial state emigration statistics. Benko Bojniki, as an expert of the Emigration
Commissariat, raised this question in 1925 in his official correspondence with
Fedor Aranicki, the director of the institution. He warned Aranicki that the
neglect of the issue of Muslim emigrants in official documents had been a seri-
ous violation of the existing regulations on the matter.218
Perhaps as a consequence of this exchange of opinions and Benkos warnings,
the special issue of the Muslim emigration was briefly mentioned in the 1925
Report of the EC to parliament, signed by Fedor Aranicki: I underline that
about 4,000 Turks have left our country (Kosovo and Kumanovo region) and
emigrated for Turkey.219 This figure, however, did not enter the official statis-
tics, although there was a section for the religious denomination of the emi-
218
Memorandum eksperta iseljenikog komesarijata Artura Benka Bojnikog Predmet:
Iseljavanje Muslimana, [Memorandum by Expert of the EC, Artura Benka Bojnikog Case:
Muslims Emigration], of 15 March 1925. In: HDAOABG, b. 10, f. 24.
219
Izvetaj Iseljenikog komesarijata za 1925/26 godinu. In: , 39926.
grants. In the official statistics, one can find only eleven emigrants of Islamic
faith in 1925. For the whole period 192128, official Yugoslav recorded only
166 Muslim emigrants. Muslim emigration for Turkey appeared in neither the
overseas emigration statistics, nor the continental emigration statistics (re-
corded by the Ministry of Social Policy after January 1927). This policy was
justified by the fact that this emigration was motivated not by economic but by
political and religious motives220.
One can presume that the Yugoslav authorities were quite content with this
particular emigration stream. It corresponded with the state project of national
colonization of socalled South Serbia. In an article written by ore Krsti,
the chief state Commissionaire for Agrarian Affairs, published in the review
Izseljeniki magazin (Emigrant Magazine) in 1927, one can find precise data
on the financial aid provided for the purpose of purchasing Muslim property in
the South Serbian provinces of KosovoMetohija and Macedonia221. It is
rather surprising that Krsti wrote openly in a periodical on such sensitive mat-
ters; one would suspect it to be kept in high secrecy as a hidden policy agenda,
yet he wrote with full patriotic vigor and enthusiasm about the statedesigned
program of colonization. According to Krsti, the market price of the Turkish
immovable property was between 1,200 and 1,500 dinars per hectare. He
claimed that the state supported bank Hipotekarna banka was ready to provide
colonizers with an immediate loan of 2,000 dinars per hectare of Muslim prop-
erty they wished to purchase.
Let us return to the statistical data on the proportion of national minorities in
the Yugoslav emigration. If one adds the at least 4,000 Muslim emigrants (as
estimated by Aranicki) to the number of the German and Hungarian emigrants
in 1925, the total comes to 10,774 minority emigrants, or 58 percent of the
total, against 7,824 (42 percent) ethnic Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrants.
Although the economic reasons for leaving Yugoslavia were obvious, this high
proportion of emigrants from national minorities was also connected to politi-
cal reasons.
220
Vladan Jovanovi, Iseljavanje muslimana iz Vardarske banovine: izmeu stihije i dravne
akcije [Emigration of Muslims from Vardar Banovina: Between the Chaotic Circumstances and
State Action] in Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije: vienje srpskog faktora, ed. Mile Bjelajac (Belgrade:
INIS, 2007), 7999.
221
Krsti, Juna Srbija i iseljeniki problem, 18.
2.4 Misconduct and Corruption of the State Personnel
I could help you to get your pass-

port [...] with a special organization I
have inside the Ministry, if you send
me [...] for my expenses and my la-
bor: 1000 dinars. D. Leovac, 1923
A general increase in corruption in public administration was one of the lega-
cies left after the Great War. The unprecedented hardships of daily life and
the general impoverishment affected all strata of European societies during the
war. This was particularly true for the territories under the control of the Cen-
tral Powers which were cut off from their traditional sources of raw materials
and food during the war. The misery of malnutrition and disease reduced hu-
man preoccupations to concerns for essential biological needs and mere sur-
vival. In many ways, this led to the erosion of basic presumptions of honesty
and morality among the general public level, and state personnel were not im-
mune from this general trend. On the contrary, their position became compli-
cated because of the new roles assumed by the state for the control over the
wartime economy and society. The numerous new responsibilities and areas of
influence demanded that state officials at all echelons of the administration be
entrusted with expanded powers. On the other hand, their average real income
was declining ever more from its prewar level. The lowpaid national bureauc-
racies deviated greatly from the ideal rational bureaucracy imagined by Max
Weber. Historical studies on corruption in Germany, Italy and Yugoslavia indi-
cate that the First World War and the inflationary years at the beginning of
1920s was the peak of the phenomenon.
In the German case, statistics on the number of delivered sentences for admin-
istrative offenses during the period 19141920 point to a constant rise of cor-
ruption; in 1920, there were twice as many sentences as in 1914222. More im-
portantly, the purchasing power of state employees was lagging behind that of
manual and skilled labor223. David Roberts wrote about the connection between
the decrease in the living standards and social prestige of the socalled human-
istic petty bourgeoisie (school teachers, lower government officials, etc.) and
the rise of fascism in Italy after the First World War.224 According to the re-
search of Yugoslav/Croatian economist Mijo Mirkovi, during the period
222
Bernd Wunder, La Corruption dans ladministration Allemande. In: History of Corruption
in Central Government: Cahier d'Histoire de l'Administration No. 7, ed. Tihonen Seppo (Am-
sterdam: IOS Press, 2003): 1256.
223
On the decrease of the purchasing power of the state administration personnel wages see:
Salaires et dure du travail, Revue Internationale du Travail 8, No. 1 (July 1923): 828.
224
David D. Roberts, Petty Bourgeois Fascism in Italy: Form and Content. In: Who were the
Fascists, ed. Stein Ugelvik et al. (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 33747.
between 1913 and 1925, food prices increased by 2450 percent; housing rent
by 4680 percent; clothing by 2940 percent; whereas the salaries of state
employees increased by only 1200 percent225. To what extent did this long
term degradation affect the moral infrastructure of Yugoslav state personnel?
What was the level of the administrative performance and efficiency that might
have been expected from lowpaid personnel?
The following chapter will try to answer these questions. It explores the general
system of misconduct and corruption that occurred in the administration of
emigration affairs in the Kingdom of SCS. A proper investigation of these is-
sues seems necessary since a study of the legal framework on emigration would
be incomplete without a look into the mechanisms and techniques used to im-
plement or even abuse its spirit in practice. To a degree, the phenomenon is
connected with states hidden minority policy; namely, the central govern-
ments policy of issuing emigration passports to only a limited number of eth-
nic Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene citizens proved to be a window of opportu-
nity for largescale corruption and the mistreatment of the applicants by the
administration. The Serbian historian Goran Antoni has already written on
many important aspects of the issue, and his 2006 article serves as an excellent
introduction into the phenomenon226.
Lowlevel corruption and abuses started to appear as state officials gained the
right to make arbitrary decisions on each individual application. We have al-
ready seen that a similar phenomenon was recorded in other European coun-
tries but in the Kingdom of SCS, it had some additional political implications
and consequences. In the domain of emigration affairs, a majority of the mal-
treated applicants were from Dalmatia and CroatiaSlavonia, the region with
the largest number of national emigrants. Since the personnel engaged in
such misconduct were usually Serbs working in the Belgradebased institution
after March 1923 (when the procedure of issuing passports was relocated to
Belgrade), the whole case acquired broader ethnic/national connotations, linked
to nationalist tensions.
2.4.1 The Dragia Leovac Case
The definition of corruption in John Blacks Oxford Dictionary of Economics

presupposes a rather passive role played by civil servants in the very act of
corruption. According to the definition, state officials can be bribed, they
225
Mijo Mirkovi, Ekonomska struktura Jugoslavije 19181941 [Economic structure of
Yugoslavia 19181941] (Zagreb: Naklodni zavod Hrvatske, 1915), 25.
226
Goran Antoni, Afera sa izdavanjem pasoa, [The Passport Affaire]. In: Korupcija i razvoj
moderna srpske drave, ed. Aleksandra Bulatovi and Sran Kora (Beograd, Centar za
menadment i Institut za kriminoloka istraivanja, 2006), 859.
are bribed, and they may have to be bribed to do things they are legally
supposed to do anyway.227 In French economic terminology, this assumption
is quite explicit. The term corruption is differentiated there between corruption
active (on part of one who bribes official) and corruption passive (on part of a
state official who is bribed)228. This French linguistic representation can also be
found as terminus technicus in much of the AngloSaxon scholarship on cor-
ruption. For the purpose of our study, however, this particular terminology and
associated perception of corruption would be a bit inappropriate. As we will
see in this chapter, civil servants in interwar Yugoslavia demonstrated their
sense of agency in the domain of corruption in emigration affairs, as they were
much more engaged and enterprising than those who eventually bribed them.
Almost in all cases found, it was state officials who actually initiated the extra
institutional deal, while those who paid were only to agree to it.
Let us begin with a document found in the private archive of Ninko Peri, an
original note sent to Peri, Minister of Social Policy, from the Presidency of the
Provincial Government for the province of CroatiaSlavonia on July 28,
1923229. The note commented on the mistreatment and exploitation of the prov-
inces applicants. The Presidency sent Peri a certified copy of a letter mailed
from Belgrade lawyer Dragia Leovac to Ivan Lovreni, an applicant interested
in emigrating to Canada, who lived in Crkvenica on the Croatian coastline. The
Lovreni case provides an excellent illustration of the type of corruption found
at the newly created Emigration Department in the Ministry of Social Policy
situated in Belgrade. As mentioned above, this institution had been established
in March of that year and taken over the competencies of the Zagrebbased
General Emigration Commissariat. Interestingly, Peris decision to move the
institution to Belgrade was motivated by the alleged eagerness of the central
authorities to prevent misconduct and bribery, which had occurred in the Gen-
eral Emigration Commissariat230. Apart from the Emigration Department, a
Counseling Board was also established and presided over by the Deputy Minis-
ter of Social Policy, Petar Proti. The Board was asked to give its opinion on
the general policy concerning emigration as well as on each individual passport
application. There is reasonable evidence of direct involvement of this institu-
227
Corruption. In: John Black, A Dictionary of Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002). Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. European University Institute Library.
22 November 2008.
228
The Oxford business French dictionary [electronic resource]: FrenchEnglish, English
French, edited by Marianne Chalmers, Martine Pierquin (Imprint Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002). Through: European University Institute Library. 22 November 2008.
229
For more on Peris private archive, his biography and his experience within the overwhelm-
ing atmosphere of corruption in the Kingdom of SCS see in: Aleksandar R. Mileti, Iz Memoara
Dr Ninka Peria. [Excerpts from the Memoires of Ninko Peri] Tokovi istorije, No. 12 (2003).
230
Order of the Minister of Social Policy (issued on March 28, 1923) on the liquidation of the
GEC in Zagreb by transferring its competencies to the Emigration Department of the Ministry.
In: Slubene novine KSHS, No. 75, 3 April 1923.
tion in the kind of abuses mentioned above. Let us return now to Dragia Le-
ovacs incriminating letter, dated July 10, 1923, and sent to Lovreni but also
to many other applicants. Leovac was so confident in his position that he in-
cluded precise contact information for his Belgrade attorneys office located in
the city centre:
Very respected Mr Lovreni,
I found out that you intend to travel for Canada this very month
in order to take advantage of the prospects for good earnings
during this years harvest. As you probably know, the procedure
for issuing passports lasts for several months, so you would
miss the term for travel to Canada. I can help you to get your
passports by the 23rd of this month by a special organization I
have inside the Ministry, if you send me the following informa-
tion:
1) First name and family name
2) Home village, community, district, province
3) Date when you submitted your application
4) Place where you submitted your application?
5) Send to my address, for my expenses and my labor: 1000 Din.
If you fulfill the abovementioned requirements, you will be informed
of the place where you can collect your passport by the 23rd of this
month.
With best regards,
Dragia Leovac,
Lawyer, Belgrade, Kralja Milana Sreet 32
In his official note to Peri, the Chief of the Department of the Interior of the
Provincial Government of CroatiaSlavonia warned of negative, antistate and
antiSerb feelings that had been provoked by this affair, especially as
Lovrenis application was not the only such case under investigation. Accord-
ing to documents from the Croatian Department of Interior, similar offers were
sent to many other applicants who were waiting to be issued a passport by the
Ministry. In the note, Minister Peri was informed of some reactions and sub-
sequent speculation on the issue from the Croatian public and media:
[I]t was not a long time ago when the Zagrebbased GEC was
cancelled and its competencies, especially in the range of issu-
ing passports, were transferred to the Belgrade Ministry. This
order was followed by emotional commentaries in all our press,
especially that of the Croatian Coalition. Many articles empha-
sized that the only purpose for doing so is to provide Belgrade
lawyers with the possibility to intervene in the procedure of is-
suing passports and to exploit the emigrants who could previ-

ously obtain their passports in Zagreb without commission or
intervention231. [...] Newspapers reported that, out of about
7,000 applications that were submitted in Zagreb district [u-
panija] only 400 were approved and even in these cases, alleg-
edly, only by the subsequent intervention of these lawyers.
The quoted excerpt is the only source found during the research for this study
which provides an estimation of the number of submitted/rejected applications
for passports in any of Yugoslav provinces. Not a single official document re-
ferred to this issue has been discovered. Supposing that the above quoted fig-
ures correspond, at least to some degree, to real state of affairs they point out a
significant degree of state interference (on part of both Yugoslavia and destina-
tion countries) with peoples freedom of movement. On the issue of corruption,
such a huge number of applications must have been an enormous temptation for
the lowpaid state personnel in the Yugoslav capital. The corrupt officials, it
seems, could not resist the lure of the enterprise especially when many of them
had access to applicants personal data. As a result, the applications sent to the
official state institutions were answered by Dragia Leovac, a private citizen
who offered an extrainstitutional service and mediation. Submitted at the ap-
plicants home towns in Croatia, these applications received replies from an
unauthorized person in Belgrade.
The affair was taking place in turbulent atmosphere of national tensions, and
ever rising mistrust and political confrontations between Serbs and Croats, the
two main ethnic groups in the country. Prior to 1925 the most influential Croa-
tian political party, led by Stjepan Radi, refused to recognize even the very
constitutional basis of the newly created Yugoslav state. Protesting against im-
posed parliamentary rules, MPs of Radis Croatian Republican Peasant Party
did not participate in the parliamentary enactment of the first Yugoslav constitu-
tion of 1921. Afterwards the party remained decisively against centralism and
the dissolution of the historical provinces of Dalmatia and CroatiaSlavonia
which were designed by the constitution. The party did not take part in Yugo-
slav central executive power until 1925, and even then, it was only for a short
period and only symbolically. In the everyday political commentary of Croatia,
Belgrade was accused for economic exploitation of and political violence
against Croatians. Whether or not the accusations were always objective or well
grounded, under the circumstances, a corruption scandal as like the Leovac case
could only raise political tensions and harden the job for those in Zagreb who
231
This is not completely correct as I found documents on at least one case of corruption and
misconduct at the Zagrebbased GEC: Report on the case of maltreatment and exploitation of
Mrs. Lucija Ljuti, dated on July 1922. Mrs Ljuti stated before the court that she gave 600
dinars to a clerk of the Department as he promissed to intervene in her favor to get travel papers.
She declared also that this was a common practice in Zagreb emigration offices. In: HDA
OABG, b. 6, f. 8.
remained loyal to the Serbdominated authorities in Belgrade. This danger is

emphasized as the letter to Peri continues:
The case should be treated very seriously as it might have
some unpleasant political consequences. [...] Municipal au-
thorities in Crikvenica have informed us of the negative influ-
ence these letters have on the population. Radi supporters
make use of these letters for antiSerb agitation. [...] The au-
thorities ... must suppress these cases unconditionally; other-
wise, the people will lose all its trust in the honesty of the es-
tablishment and will join the Radi Party followers. [...] There-
fore, it is my honor to ask you, Minister, to dedicate all your
attention to the matter and to prevent damaging activities of the
lawyer Dragia Leovac, his special organization, and similar
criminal enterprises, whose work is damaging the reputation of
the authorities and serves as powerful agitation material
against the present regime.
Zagreb, July 28, 1923
Chief of the Department of the Interior
(Signature)
How did Minister Peri react? He delivered a press release concerning the
issue in which applicants were warned not to fall into the trap of criminals
who were trying hard to exploit them232. There was also information on the
criminal investigation of certain perpetrators, without mentioning their names.
As far as could be confirmed from Belgrade newspapers of that time, Leovacs
name was not mentioned in connection with the case. Later he appeared as a
Member of Parliament of the ruling Peoples Radical Party, specifically, as
one of the distinguished representatives of the socalled Paievci [proPai]
faction of the Party233. He was even a member of the Parliamentary Commis-
sion established to investigate the responsibility of Minister Edo Lukini in
the famous ThurnTaxis corruption affair!234
232
Ministarstvo socijalne politike: Panja iseljenicima, [Ministry of Social Police: Warning to
the Immigrants] Cicvariev beogradski dnevnik, 2 August 1923.
233
Nadeda Jovanovi, Politiki sukobi u Jugoslaviji 19251928 [Political Conflicts in
Yugoslavia 19251928], (Belgrade: Rad, 1974), 145.
234
See more in: Aleksandar R. Mileti, Iz Memoara dr. Ninka Peria, [Excerpts from the
Memoires of Ninko Peri]. Tokovi istorije, No. 12 (2003) and Ibid., Afera TurnTaxis,
[ThurnThaxis Affair] in: Korupcija i razvoj moderne srpske drave, ed. Aleksandra Bulatovi
and Sran Kora [Corruption and the Development of the Modern Serbian State] (Beograd,
Centar za menadment i Institut za kriminoloka istraivanja, 2006): 8993.
2.4.2 Kuzmanis report: an insight into the anatomy of corruption
An even better source that provides insight into the details of corruption among
the state personnel of the Kingdom of SCS is a report written by Milan
Kuzmani, secretary of the Emigration Department of the Ministry of Social
Policy. The report was typed on three pages and was submitted to the Minister
in August 1923.235 Kuzmani warned the Minister of the privileged status of
the Hamburger Line company acquired in transporting Yugoslav emigrants,
and informed him of a system of misconduct and extortion of emigration pass-
port applicants. According to official Yugoslav regulations, the system of con-
cessions for steamship companies for the transportation of emigrants was de-
signed as the key mechanism for the protection of emigrants from excessive
commissions on the steamship tickets. Let me first describe the case of Ham-
burger Line and the general system of concessions for companies in the King-
dom SCS.
The state was to be the only legal intermediary between a potential passenger
and a steamship company. State authorities would provide legal protection to
emigrants, and were obligated to regulate the conditions of travel, and to ensure
that emigrants received all necessary paperwork and paid the lowest possible
price for their tickets. At least, this is how the system was supposed to function.
The reality, however, was quite different, as made clear by Kuzmanis report.
Kuzmani pointed out the unacceptable familiarity that existed between the
chief of the branch agency of the Hamburger Line, a certain Mr. Petrovi, and
the head of the Emigration Department of the Ministry of Social Policy, Dr.
Nestorovi. Nestorovi was allowing the former unrestricted entrance into de-
partmental offices. Moreover, Petrovi had access to the lists and files of the
passport applicants, which facilitated extrainstitutional arrangements and fi-
nancial extortion. In this way, the states careful legislative efforts to protect
emigrants were being ruined by the irresponsibility of one official.
Emigration affairs at the Ministry of Social Policy in Belgrade were in such a
mess that even lower clerks came into possession of individual applicants case
files. They were taking home these files and then exploiting the applicants by
promising intervention with authorities. This bureaucratic misconduct and ir-
responsibility resulted in complete administrative chaos. The embittered
Kuzmani wrote a detailed and striking description of these problems:
There is neither evidence of the applications sent by the district
authorities, nor of approved applications, so that one cannot
check either how many or which passports were sent to the dis-
235
Izvetaj Milana Kuzmania sekretara. [Report of the secretary Milan Kuzmani]. In: ,
1434105.
trict authorities in order to be issued to emigrants. Even with the

subsequent procedure for delivery, traveling papers which have
already been approved are still kept back [in the Department] in
order to exploit their holders on the nearby streets. [] Of
course, there are cases in which the reports on the issued travel-
ing papers do not match with approvals of the Counseling
Board. Moreover, within all this mess, how can anyone guaran-
tee that passports have not been issued without any considera-
tion from the Board?
In the report, Kuzmani informs his superiors that within the department, there
were clerks who were still active in their administrative positions despite the
fact that they were under prosecution on bribery allegations. When he warned
departmental chief Nestorovi of the unsuitability of one of these employees,
the latter assigned the clerk to a separate office in order to keep him out of
control. The clerk was actually given better place for his work, while Dep-
uty Minister Proti rewarded Kuzmani for his devotion with a transfer to
another department of the ministry. Nothing changed after Kuzmanis report
to Peri. Kuzmani was later reproached angrily by the Deputy Minister Proti
for having made this report complaint at all. The deputy minister told
Kuzmani that he was the real head of the ministry and that there was no rea-
son to go to the minister. Ninko Peri later left his position as the Minister of
Social Policy for a more prestigious post but still nothing changed in the Minis-
trys administrative practices. Archival sources and the study by Antoni men-
tioned earlier both reveal more cases of abuse in this period; following the pat-
tern of the time, the perpetrators of corruption were usually lowranked
clerks236.
2.4.3 The Medijator Agency Case
The large advertising sign of the Medijator Agency could serve as a metaphor
and one of the most striking symbols of the corruption of the Yugoslav state
personnel. The agency was located on Kraljice Natalije Street in Belgrade, just
beside the building of the Ministry of Social Policy. The sign outside its office
offered mediation for almost all sorts of businesses that one might have with
state authorities, from employment in the state administration or compensation
for war damage to prolongation of the validity of visas and the issuing pass-
236
For instance, Josip Taler, an applicant from Sisak (Croatia) spent about 14 days in Belgrade
in November 1923 trying desperately to intervene for his application. In the end, a lowranked
clerk extracted from him the sum of 1,000 dinars with a promise of help. Iskaz Josipa Talera.
In: , 1434105.
ports. The agency, however, did not only attempt to attract clients with simple
signage; Medijator was kind enough to contact its potential clients personally,
sending material to their home addresses. Not by coincidence, those that re-
ceived these letters happened to be already engaged in some business with the
state.237
Once again, the direct connection between mediators and applicants was
facilitated by corrupt bureaucrats who neglected the basic principal of the con-
fidentiality for the personal data of applicants. The archive in the Ministry was
effectively open to all personnel at all levels. Any clerk could gain possession
of individual case files and contact the applicant promising conditional help.
Instead of serving and protecting the interests of citizens, the poorly paid ad-
ministrative personnel in Belgrade tried to improve their own material position
by abusing their powers. State competencies were not only violated but they
also ended up serving the private interests of state employees. In view of this
outcome, one wonders whether citizens might not have been better off if the
state had not intervened in emigration matters at all238.
If not at official level, then in practice, Yugoslav emigration policy followed
global trends by imposing control and restrictions on the freedom of movement
of its citizens. Due to legal limitations and a discriminatory policy against na-
tional minorities in Yugoslavia, these restrictions were not always officially
spelled out, but were conducted nevertheless, through confidential and extra
institutional orders that circulated among state personnel. The procedure of
issuing passports became utterly complicated; only members of German and
Hungarian national minority groups were able to get all necessary papers
quickly. Furthermore, the discretionary rights given to officials opened the door
for corruption and financial exploitation of applicants. Together, these policies
account for the low rates of Yugoslav emigration and the large proportion of
nonSlavic minorities in the annual contingents of Yugoslav emigrants.
237
Provincial government for Croatia and Slavonia to the Ministry of Interior (Department for
State Security), Zagreb, December 10, 1923. Among the documentation, one can find also the
advertisement sign of the Agency Medijator. In: , 1437114.
238
More on corruption in the state administrative employees of the Kingdom SCS see in:
Aleksandar R. Mileti, inovnika korupcija u Kraljevini SHS, [Corruption in the Public
Service of the Kingdom SCS] in Korupcija i razvoj moderna srpske drave, ed. Aleksandra
Bulatovi and Sran Kora (Beograd, Centar za menadment i Institut za kriminoloka
istraivanja, 2006), 93100.
III PART: YUGOSLAV EMIGRANTS IN THE NEW

WORLD
This part of the monograph focuses on the final phase of the emigration proc-
ess: the journey of emigrants from Yugoslavia, their first impressions of their
new countries and their first contacts with authorities. In keeping with the cen-
tral approach of the monograph, special attention is devoted to the role that
Yugoslav state policy and emigration authorities continued to play in the lives
of this new diaspora. Neither the monograph, nor this part tries to reveal the
totality of the life of Yugoslav diaspora. The occasional broad examination of
emigrants daily routines and conditions in destination countries is only given
to provide for a more thorough explanation of the role of the Yugoslav state.
Chapter 3.1 describes the emigrants journey and provides details on the proce-
dure organized by US immigration authorities on the Ellis Island. An indepth
analysis of the economic performance of the Yugoslav emigrants will uncover
the everyday troubles they had in their new countries. Since the countries of
Latin America differed from the US, Canada and Australia in their level of
economic development and standard of living, I decided to separate the exami-
nations of the economic performance of Yugoslav immigrants in each of these
economic regions into chapters 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. These chapters pro-
vide a detailed account of the social and professional background of Yugoslav
emigrants, as well as on the nature and peculiarities of Yugoslav emigration.
Chapter 3.4 will shed light on the special circumstances encountered by women
who emigrated from the Kingdom of SCS, particularly the stipulations on
womens rights to citizenship as related to their marriage and emigrant status.
The description of the legal constraints on female emigrants position will add
to our knowledge of the transnational scale of genderbased official policies,
societal notions and legal terms of the time.
3.1 Emigrants on the Journey
They had better nutrition on the

boats than they had it in their
own homes. A. B. Bojniki,
1924
The journey is an integral component of the emigration process. In the follow-
ing chapter, focus will be put on the regulations and technical details of emi-
grants journeys, and the development of Yugoslav seaport and transportation
infrastructure in the ten years after 1918. The description will follow the emi-
grants on Eastern and Central European railway convoys as they make their
way to major European harbors, and their oceanic journey to overseas destina-
tions.
3.1.1 Railway Convoys
The poor transportation infrastructure in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs,

Croats, and Slovenes has already been described in detail above. In 1922, only
257 out of all 6,086 (4.22 percent) Yugoslav overseas emigrants left the coun-
try from domestic seaports: 234 passengers from Dubrovniks harbour Gru, 18
from Bakar, and only 5 from Split. Most Yugoslav emigrants traveled by train
to European harbors such as Cherbourg (1,573 Yugoslav emigrants), Hamburg
(1,250), or Le Havre (1,050), where they embarked on their overseas jour-
ney.239 In 1921, according to Emigration Commissariat sources, an arrangement
was concluded with the concession steamship companies that Yugoslav emi-
grants would be included into the railway convoys of Eastern and Central
European emigrants in the following years.240 Yugoslav emigrants were to be
gathered in Zagreb and than travel to Prague where they would join a convoy
which would bring them to European harbors. The emigrants in these convoys
were placed in special railway cars separate from the general public and ac-
companied by steamship company officials. This division was designed to pro-
tect them from theft, robbery as well as from the maltreatment of police or bor-
der guard personnel of the countries through which traveled.
3.1.2 The domestic railway and seaport infrastructure
Domestic railway connections to the Adriatic seaports were improved only

after the Italian army withdrew completely from the territory of the northern
Dalmatia and the Croatian coastline in 192324, and new railroads were con-
structed in 1925. The withdrawal of Italian forces permitted transportation
along the standard gauge railway between Zagreb and the seaport of Suak (on
the southern outskirts of the FiumeRijeka). At the time, this was the only
Yugoslav seaharbor connected with the rest of the country by a standard
gauge railway. Soon after the Italians left and the city was put under the author-
ity of the Kingdom of SCS, the first Yugoslav steamship company for the
transportation of emigrants, Vesna, was established in Suak.
239
Yugoslav Emigration Statistics: AJ, 1436112.
240
For more on the arrangement, see the Report of the Director of the Emigration Department
Artur Benko Bojniki, from April 18, 1922. In: HDAOABG, b. 4, f. 9.
Figure 24: The number of Yugoslav emigrants by port of departure in 1925:
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Cher- Ham- Bre- Le Trie- Ant- Amst- Rotter- Other
S plit Genoa
bourg burg men Havre ste werp erdam dam s
1925 5331 3383 723 1037 1871 194 1590 1041 1522 313 474
In 1924, Vesna operated with two steamships rented from an Italian company.
Vesnas owners tried to obtain an exclusive state concession, a request which
they justified by the need to nationalize the entire emigration process in the
Kingdom of SCS241. Had they been granted the monopoly, the basic stipula-
tions of the Law on Emigration (Article 10) would all have been achieved, at
least on a nominal level. According to the documentation gathered by the offi-
cials of the EC, however, the company did not have enough capital to ensure
the steamship voyage standards required by US immigration regulations.
Moreover, the seaport Suak did not have the technical infrustructure required
for the docking of large transoceanic ships. For these reasons, the expert of the
Emigration Commissariat, Artur Benko Bojniki, was decisively against grant-
ing a monopoly to the Vesna steamship company. He was convinced that,
given the conditions of the Yugoslav seaport infrastructure, the nationalization
objective would take up to a decade to be fulfilled.242 Aside from its seaports,
the kingdoms inadequate railway infrastructure was another major obstacle to
that objective.
Two important railway connections were provided with the Adriatic seaports in
1925. One connected Split and Zagreb (across the Lika region) with standard
gauge railroads; the other linked Dubrovniks harbor Gru with Uice in Serbia
241
On the nationalization of emigration procedures, see section 2.2.3.
242
On this case, see the documents in: HDAOABG, b. 10, f. 24.
(across the picturesque landscape of Herzegovina, Eastern Bosnia and Uice).

Importantly, the connection with Uice facilitated the emigration of Macedoni-
ans from socalled Juna Srbija (literally Southern Serbia, a technical term
used by the Yugoslav authorities for provinces of KosovoMetohija, Sandak
and Macedonia). According to official Yugoslav statistics, 1,797 emigrants left
the country from Split in 1925 the year when the town gained railway access
to Zagreb (see the Figure 24). That year, Split ranked third among seaports in
terms of outbound Yugoslav emigration, after French Cherbourg (with 4,303
Yugoslav emigrants), and German Hamburg (with 2,643)243.
The successful performance of Split harbor can be explained by the fact that all
emigrants who departed from there left for countries in Central and South
America in which authorities placed no special conditions regarding the hy-
giene or technical facilities for the ships or ports of departure. Due to the im-
portant role Split played in Yugoslav emigration affairs, a new Emigration
Boarding House was opened in 1925; full comfort was thus provided to emi-
grants waiting for their departure from Split, similar to that offered by the
boarding facilities in major European harbors.244
Figure 25: Yugoslav Emigrants in Ljubljana before departure for South Amer-
ica (1927):
243
Yugoslav Emigration Statistics: AJ, 1436112.
244
3.1.3 The conditions on Dutch steamships
Let us now enter the steamships inner space by examining the conditions and
everyday routine on one particular steamship. Our source is a detailed report
written in 1923 by an EC inspector, a certain Zlatko ulenti. According to the
document, the best onboard conditions for emigrants were provided by Dutch
steamship companies.245 Alegedly, travel conditions on these boats were so
good that many Frenchmen used their services in spite of the fact that they had
their own easily accessible national steamship companies. Specifically, ulen-
ti wrote on conditions he personally inspected and experienced on the Royal
Dutch Lloyd Company boats. The company had four steamships, each with
capacity for about 800 to 1,000 emigrants. The interior of the boats was divided
into compartments designed as well aired dormitories which were furnished
with 6080 beds. Separate dormitories were provided for the women, and oth-
ers still for mothers with children. In addition, the company provided physi-
cians and a clinic supplied with medicine; medical care and medication were
free of charge. ulenti described the daily routine on the steamship which was
prescribed by an exact timetable:
At 7:30 AM, emigrants are to leave their dormitories and, if the
weather conditions allows it, to spend some time on the deck
of the ship. Next to each dormitory are sinks and a few bath-
rooms with hot water showers. This is the meal schedule:
At 7:30 A.M.: coffee, bread with butter, and herring or cheese.
At noon: potato soup, meat with cooked vegetables or plums,
and .5 liters of Spanish or Portuguese wine mixed with the wa-
ter. At 3:00 PM: tea with biscuits. At 6:00 PM: a warm meal
with meat (Goulash), coffee with milk and .5 liters of wine.
Apart from the meals offered on the daily menu, there was a small shop where
emigrants could buy food according to their preferences. According to ulenti,
however, the prices in the shop were relatively expensive because of the high
exchange rate of the Dutch florin. Unlike Italian and French steamships, Dutch
boats were highly clean and hygienic. The dormitories were cleaned a few times
every day. Nonetheless, some problems did occur as a result of the material
culture and hygiene habits of the passengers:
The travelers of all nationalities praise Dutch ships as the best
and the cleanest. [...] There are many complains on the hygiene
of the French and Italian steamships. [...] It is not strange that
the cleanliness [on Dutch ships] cannot be maintained in the
245
Referat o putovanju na brodu from May 1, 1923, written in Santos, Brazil. In: HDA
OABG, b. 7, f. 14.
ideal sense as the emigrants themselves are not used to it.

There is no way to teach them not to throw the refuse from
eaten fruit or food on the floor.
Figure 26: Ellis Island, interwar period:
The report, submitted to the Emigration Commissariat in Zagreb by the Com-

pagnie Gnral Transatlantique, reveals data on emigrants personal luggage.
According to the source, each passenger could bring quite a large amount of
personal luggage, namely 150 kg per adult. Children were entitled to half of
this weight. Emmigrants were obliged to pay an extra twentyfive cents for
each additional 10 kg.246
3.1.4 Steamship Races
A steamship journey to the United States lasted between six and twelve days.
After the immigration quota was first introduced in 1921, US authorities could
refuse entrance to immigrants once the quota for their country had been ful-
filled. The annual quota of immigrants was divided into 12 monthly quotas in
order to make the arrival of immigrants steady throughout the year. Problems
246
occurred, however, because of poor controls and administration in the countries

of origin247.
According to the American regulations, if monthly or annual quotas were al-
ready filled when their boat arrived to the United States, steamship companies
were obliged to return all excluded immigrants to their country of origin. A
number of controversial episodes arose in cases when the quota was about to be
filled. The Yugoslav consul in Washington reported to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the steamship race that took place just outside of New Yorks
harbor in October 1921:
Two Greek boats with emigrants left the Greece almost at the
same moment. When they reached a short distance from the
New York, the captains of these two steamships were informed
by the wireless telegraph that the quota for Greek emigrants
had almost expired, and that it would be hardly possible to ac-
cept emigrants from one of these two ships that were the prop-
erty of two different companies. For this reason, the genuine
race occurred between these two steamships which tried to get
to the port before the other.248
Roy L. Garis wrote in 1924 that the racing of steamships into the ports of en-
try became a kind of custom that went over on the first day of each month,
(i.e. the time when monthly quotas were to be concluded) 249. Thus, bureau-
cratic controls over entrance to the United States resulted in a striking monthly
display for New Yorkers.
Figure 27: Newly arrived immigrants on Ellis Island:
247
On problems that constantly appeared due to the misconduct of procedure on the part of both
domestic authorities (Belgrade, Zagreb, Warsaw, Bucharest) and the US consular personnel, see:
Frances Kellor, Humanizing the Immigration Law, North American Review 217 (Jan/Jun1923):
7757.
248
Legacy of the Kingdom of SCS in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 2178.
In: , 1435108.
In the ten years following the end of First World War, the technical conditions
of the steamship journey from Yugoslavia to the United States came almost
entirely under control of the state authorities. Due to the strict requirements of
both the Yugoslav and American authorities, the emigrants had, at least, a safe
and relatively comfortable journey. With respect to the basic living conditions
provided for the Yugoslav emigrants on the steamships, Benko Bojniki as-
serted that emigrants had better nutrition on the boats than they had it in their
own homes250. This is true, especially if one takes into account fact that, in the
backward regions of that time Yugoslavia, people were usually undernourished
and consumed meat only a few times per year. In some cases, during the two
weeks journey on a Dutch steamship, a Yugoslav immigrant might well con-
sume a larger amount of the meat than he had throughout his entire previous
year at home.
3.1.5 Under the surveillance of US immigration authorities
Let us now investigate the procedure carried out on steamships after they ar-
rived in New York harbor. Most immigrants, whether or not they had relatives
in the United States (see the Figure 30) spent their first days in the United
States on the famous immigration station of Ellis Island (see the Figures 22, 23,
24). In 1923, Iseljenike vijesti the official organ of the Zagrebbased EC de-
tailed the procedure followed upon arrival251. This description of the immigra-
tion procedure corresponds closely to those portrayed in John Bermans book
on Ellis Island252. Both sources show that the immigration procedure for first
and secondclass passengers started on board the ships once they were docked
on the piers of Hudson or East River. Immigration authorities considered these
passengers less likely to become a public charge and more capable of providing
for themselves since they could afford an expensive ship ticket. A similar atti-
tude can be found among Yugoslav emigration officials who commonly ap-
plied the very term emigrant (iseljenik) only to thirdclass boat passengers.
Because only this group of passengers was considered to be at risk, only they
were provided with special legal protection and state assistance.
The onboard procedure was conducted in order to enable the first and sec-
ondclass passengers to disembark as quickly as possible. Officials of the US
Health Department and immigration inspectors checked their documents and
health conditions after which they could leave the boat. In the cases where
249
Garis, Americas Immigration Policy, 77.
250
251
SDA razne informacije za doseljenike, Iseljenike vijesti, No. 45 (1923): 425.
252
John S. Berman, Ellis Island (New York: Barnes & Noble Publishing, 2003).
some of these passengers did not fulfill US authorities rigorous health or legal
requirements, they were to join the third class passengers on the Ellis Island;
from the pier, they were transported by a small ferryboat to the Ellis Island
Immigration Station.253
3.1.6 Ellis Island procedure
On Ellis Island, immigrants were subjected to a thorough medical examination

and rigorous checking of their travel documents and legal status. If certain dis-
abilities or symptoms of one of the approximately 60 contagious diseases listed
by US immigration authorities were noted during the medical exam, the immi-
grant was to be directed to the Ellis Island Hospital254. The Serbian emigrants
newspaper Ameriki Srbobran warned new immigrants about a strict American
procedure applied to socalled contract workers immigrants, i.e. those immi-
grants who came to the US with labor and salary contract already arranged with
American employer. Actually, this was quite common, as contracts were usu-
ally concluded with the mediation of relatives or friends who were already in
the United States. American authorities, however, did not like this practice
since it had generally negative influence on labor salaries. By accepting under-
paid jobs in advance, foreign contract laborers were unknowingly undercutting
the average level of US salaries255. During the inspection procedure on the Ellis
Island, anyone that admitted that having already found a job or concluded a
contract would be immediately refused entrance to the United States. Instead,
Ameriki Srbobran advised newly arrived immigrants to pretend that they were
coming to America in the hope of finding work only after they arrived.
253
http://www.ellisisland.org/genealogy/ellis_island_history.asp retrieved on 25 August 2008
and Berman, Ellis Island, 29, 40.
254
Berman, Ellis Island, 627.
255
In: Kontraktni radnici [Contract workers], Ameriki Srbobran, 1923, No. 235. On the
official website of the Ellis Island Immigration Museum, one can find more details on the issue:
The Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 also excluded all immigrants who took a job in ex-
change for passage. Together these laws presented the immigrant with a delicate task of convinc-
ing the legal inspectors that they were strong, intelligent, and resourceful enough to find work
easily, without admitting that a relative had a job waiting for them. Available at www.elisisland
.com (retrieved on 4 June 2006).
Figure 28: Inspectors examining the eyes of immigrants, Ellis Island, N.Y.:
Courtesy KeystoneMast
Figure 29: Doctors conducting medical examination of immigrants of Ellis

Island:
Courtesy KeystoneMast
After the introduction of a literacy test for immigrants in 1917, every newly
arrived immigrant had to read out a text that consisted of forty words on his or
her native language. For Christian nations, it was a custom to read out the ex-
cerpts from the Bible256. Although the Yugoslav immigrants were warned in
advance of this requirement, there were still cases of men who were rejected
entrance to the United States in 1921 because they were illiterate257. Immi-
grants who passed successfully through all stages of the immigration procedure
were finally placed on a small ferryboat that transported them to the state au-
thoritys office in southern Manhattan. There they would meet an official guide
who helped them with orientation in the city and in buying train tickets to their
desired destination in the United States. This was deemed necessary because, in
the past, unscrupulous locals had often exploited newly arrived immigrants,
still inexperienced and confused.
Accounts of the typical Yugoslav emigrants journey serve to demonstrate
some of the positive effects of statecontrolled emigration. The total volume of
immigration decreased during the 1920s, but the general standards of travel
improved considerably over the same period, at least on the steamships under
supervision of US immigration authorities. Those Yugoslav emigrants who
managed to get all papers required for travel and to fit into the prescribed US
quotas were rewarded with a successful journey (and considering the average
standards of housing and nutrition in Yugoslavia, perhaps even a luxurious
one).
In the terms of state imposed controls over the voyage to the United States, one
cannot clearly identify the moment when emigrants passed from the area of
state surveillance of their old country to that of their new one. While emigrants
were aboard, these areas overlapped due to the fact that steamship companies
were to follow both American and Yugoslav regulations. In theory, this meant
that the emigrants were never left alone without the support and care of state
appointed institutions and officials. Regrettably, however, many cases of abuse
and corruption by authorities damaged the reputation of the Yugoslav and, in
particular, the Belgrade administration, and discredited the noble cause of car-
ing for those unfortunates who were compelled to emigrate overseas to find
work.
256
Serbs were to read this excerpt from the New Testament: Istrunu vae bogatstvo i moljci
izjedoe vae haljne, zara vae zlato i srebro, i ra njihova bie svedoanstvo protiv vas i
prodree telesa vaa kao oganj. James (5:2,3). [Your riches have rotted and your garments
have become motheaten. Your gold and your silver have rusted; and their rust will be a witness
against you and will consume your flesh like fire.].
257
See the correspondence between the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs on March
1921. In: , 1435108.
Figure 30: Number of Yugoslav emigrants with relatives in their destination

countries:
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
had relatives 10930 5700 8991 10596 7263 7997 8685 11861
did not have any 2035 386 2482 8979 10380 10233 13291 9928
relatives
3.2 Economic Performance of the Yugoslav Emigrants in the

US, Canada and Australia
You should wait few days until

someone gets hurt or dies, then you
will get job. A mine owner to a
Croatian emigrant in Australia
The economic aspects of emigration must be considered both from the point of
view and interest of the Yugoslav state, and from that of the emigrants them-
selves. This chapter will examine the financial side of emigration, from the
journey itself to the economic prospects to be found in new countries. The
chapter begins with a general, statistical overview of trends in Yugoslav emi-
gration and the economic performance of that emigration. Then, moving be-
yond statistics, it will attempt to capture and recreate the emotional energy of
the ordinary individuals and families who actually migrated. Particular empha-
sis is placed on the preindustrial habits and the traditional mindset that contin-
ued to influence the everyday life of Yugoslav emigrants for a long period after
they found themselves in the most technologically advanced country of the
time.
3.2.1 Social background of emigrants
Yugoslav emigration statistics, kept and published regularly from 1921 on-
ward, provide us with relevant material on the social composition, property
ownership and professional skills of emigrants. Statistics (from 1921 to 1928)
on the emigrants immovable property reveal that emigrating property owners
were not usually willing to sell their property in Yugoslavia (see Figure 31).
Among propertied emigrants, only 13 percent decided to sell their immovable
property while 87 percent chose to keep their property in Yugoslavia. From this
data, we can speculate that most propertied emigrants still felt strong ties to
their motherland. They emigrated but they always had safe place to return. On
the other hand, more than half of all emigrants (56 percent) who left the coun-
try during this period owned no immovable property at the moment of emigra-
tion.
One of the most common ways of facilitating emigration is through a network
of relatives, friends and compatriots already living in the destination country.
These people could provide initial help, shelter and financial means for the
newcomers. In the Yugoslav case, within the 192128 emigrant contingent,
55.51 percent emigrants had relatives in destination countries (see Figure 30).
Very often they would even provide funds for the steamship ticket a principal
investment which was generally difficult to afford; however, only for about 1/7
of this emigrant contingent had their steamship tickets purchased for them at
the expense of their relatives or friends in emigration countries. According to
Yugoslav emigration statistics (Figure 32), most emigrants paid for their own
tickets (65.42 percent) and more than 10 percent of them traveled at the ex-
pense of Brazilian state of Sao Paolo.
Important data on emigrants family status (i.e. whether they emigrated alone
or with their families) is available only for 1928 onward. Previously this infor-
mation had not been included in official statistics. According to the source,
only a small minority of emigrants left the country with their families in 1928.
On the whole, there were 2033 emigrating families (with 5,386 members)
while 16,403 emigrants traveled alone. In 1928, 90.3 percent of emigrants from
Serbia traveled alone, while 9.7 were accompanied by their families. In follow-
ing year there were only 96 families emigrating from Serbia out of total of
1034 families emigrating from Yugoslavia. According to Marie Janin ali,
this data should be taken as proof of poor labor mobility and undeveloped pat-
tern of migration. Allegedly, during this formative period, overseas emigration
depends on rare individuals who decide to take a chance and set sail for the
New World. Usually they go only for a short period, after which they return
home. In this formative period, people do not bring their families with them.
The migration of whole families is only common with societies completely
integrated into the world labor market. According to the statistical data on fam-
ily structure in 1929, Serbian society was only at the beginning of its integra-
tion into the global labor market.258
alis observations certainly hold true for Serbia and much of Yugoslavia
during the period under review, yet one has to take into account also the sig-
nificant impact Yugoslav emigration restrictions had on given rates. We have
already seen in section 2.3.3 that Yugoslav authorities were generally against
the idea of emigration by national elements, and particularly against their
emigration with entire family groups. This means that passports would have
been given to individuals rather than to families. For these reasons, statistics
should be taken to reflect, to certain extent, the effects of the emigration policy,
rather than taken alone to provide for some general conclusions on the nature
and specific patterns of Yugoslav emigration per se.
Figure 31: Property status of the Yugoslav emigrants:
15000
10000
5000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
with no property 5105 2038 3577 7505 7948 8506 12895 11225
property sold 167 78 735 2219 691 65 583 1510
still possesing property 3097 2970 5093 4603 4382 7242 5782 6755
at home
258
ali, Socijalna politika Srbije, 1956.
Figure 32: Source of financial means for emigrants steamship ticket:
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
relative s or frie nds from 7999 1903 2360 2949 2199 2882 3136 3749
the country of e migration
e migrant himse lf 4966 4183 9103 1662 7843 12703 16578 18040
State Sao Paolo 7592 2645 2262
3.2.2 Emigrants traveling costs
Given the fact that most Yugoslav emigrants were poor, one basic obstacle to
immigration was the money needed to cover travel costs. Some were compelled
to sell their immovable property (see the Figure 31) or to ask for a loan. In
view of the fact that the banking system in the country was underdeveloped,
very often credit could only be obtained from local usurers, under extremely
unfavorable conditions. Emigrants were thus burdened with enormous interest
rate obligations. In the official Report of the Emigration Commissariat for
1925, one can find the case of an emigrant who borrowed 12,000 dinars to
cover the cost of travel to Canada259. He was obliged to repay a local usurer not
less than 18,000 dinars in six months or 24,000 (100 percent interest rate) in
one year. He left his house and land as collateral.
According to Yugoslav regulations, concession steamship companies were
obliged to submit precise data on immigrants travel costs to the state emigra-
tion authorities. A considerable collection of these reports is kept in the Croa-
tian State Archive260. According to the information submitted by the Cunard
Line on 21 October 1921, the price for a thirdclass steamship ticket linking
259
260
Cherbourg and New York was 26 pounds and 6 shillings (about 102 US dol-
lars). The French company Compagnie Gnrale Transatlantique transported
thirdclass passengers for 1,300 and 1,400 French Franks, equivalent to about
97 US dollars. Therefore, we can estimate that the average thirdclass ticket for
transport between European harbors and New York cost about $100. Yet there
were, of course, additional costs associated with emigrants journey.
The passport administrative charge did not add much to an emigrants total
expenses. Because of sharp inflation, the enormous prewar charge for issuing
passport (250 dinars) was relatively small after the war. In 1921, it amounted to
not more than about three US dollars. A Yugoslav emigrant needed to pay for a
railway ticket to the harbor of departure as well as living expenses abroad
while waiting the departure date. One document from the Benko Bojniki
Collection provides us with precise information on the price of these services in
1921. The document refers to the unauthorized emigration affairs of the Bel-
gradebased D. Marinkovi and [] Company. This company charged 1,915
Yugoslav dinars for travel costs between BelgradeZagrebHavre (including
12 days quarantine in Havre), while the average cost for this route was only
4,055 Yugoslav kruna or about 1,000 dinars261. This companys commission
almost doubled the emigrants travel cost. In 1921, for instance, the cheapest
train ticket from Zagreb to the French port of Havre was 2,020 Yugoslav kruna
or about 500 dinars. The twelve days of compulsory accommodation in the
Havre emigrants quarantine added an additional cost of 1820 K or about 450
dinars.262 Altogether, the travel costs before the steamship journey could have
been as low as 950 dinars or approximately US$12. Considering the often ines-
capable cost of bribes for state personnel and commissions for steamship
agents, the total sum was likely even higher. By comparing this data with the
average salaries in the country, it becomes clear how difficult it was for Yugo-
slav men and women to afford to emigrate. That year the average salary in the
Kingdom was between 25 and 40 dinars per day or 23 US dollars per week
(See the section 2.1.4).
On the other hand, the cost of travel does not seem so great when compared
with the average weekly salaries of Yugoslav workers in the United States.
According to the data and estimations presented by Yugoslav emigration offi-
cials at a conference held in 1924, these workers were earning between 15 and
30 US dollars per week.263 While in the Kingdom of SCS, someone would have
to work a whole year or more in order to collect the money required for the
trip, in America, he could earn this money after only one or two months of
261
In the Kingdom of SCS there were, until FebruaryMarch 1920, two official currencies:
Serbian, i.e. Yugoslav dinars and Austrian/Yugoslav kruna (crowns). The exchange between
these two currencies in the document was fixed at 1:4 in favor of the dinar.
262
In: Marinkovi and Comp. neovlateno otpremanje iseljenika za Ameriku, of May 28,
1921. HDAOABG, b. 6, f. 2.
263
regular employment (see the Table 5). This calculation does not, however, take
into account living costs, which were very high in the United States. I will
elaborate on the issue of Yugoslav emigrants savings, in sections 3.2.4 and
3.2.5 of this chapter. Generally one can assume that it was not easy for Yugo-
slav emigrants to pay off their principal investment in travel costs, even with a
US salary.
Table 5: Comparison of some prices and parameters between the Kingdom of

SCS and the USA in 1921s:
KSCS USA
GDP p.c.(1990 International GearyKhamis $) 1041 5323
The average weekly salary (in US$) 23 1530
Travel cost ($120) expressed in working days 240360 2448
Sources: see in 3.2.2 of the monograph
Figure 33: Examining baggage. Ellis Island, N.Y.:
3.2.3 Financial troubles: immediately upon arrival
It was no easy task for newcomers to find their way through the skyscrapers
and urban chaos of New York. This was especially case for those who came
alone and those who had no friends or relatives to help them. During the jour-
ney and for the period spent at the Ellis Island Immigration Station, they were
protected by strict US regulations. Gerald Govorchin wrote on problems that
could follow:
Trouble for the immigrant began immediately upon his arrival.
His helplessness made him an easy prey for cheaters and ex-
ploiters, who attacked in force as soon as he left the paternal
care of Ellis Island. Swooping down on the unfortunate victim
were boardinghouse runners, shady employment agents, sell-
ers of shoddy wares, extortionate hack drivers, and express-
men, all of whom aimed at taking away his money. Were the
woes of the alien over once he had successfully run this gantlet
of sharks, perhaps his lot would not have been such a bad
one.264
In the Yugoslav Emigration Commissions Iseljenike vijesti, one can find
illustrative stories on how Yugoslav emigrants were exploited during the first
moments they spent in the new and strange world. One story is about a newly
arrived Yugoslav immigrant who wanted to travel to Kansas after he left Ellis
Island. Shortly after he found himself alone in New York, a stranger who spoke
his native language approached him. The immigrant was relieved to learn that
this man wanted to help him buy his train ticket to Kansas. Completely unin-
formed about the price, the newcomer gave the man $140 for the ticket. His
new friend bought him the ticket and they parted ways. Before long, he realized
he had been defrauded: the train ticket was valid only to the Bronx and cost no
more than 5 cents.265
Figure 34: Immigrants Purchasing Tickets to Various Points in the U.S. Ellis
Island:
264
Govorchin, Yugoslavs in America, 171.
265
Iseljenike vijesti, No. 4/5 (1923): 468.
For this reason, in 1923, US authorities began to require all new immigrants to
report themselves to the New York harbor police authorities. There they were
helped to get in contact with their relatives or friends with whom they planned
to reside. Immigrants were to be accompanied with a guide who would help
them with buying tickets and choosing the proper method of transportation.
Throughout the journey, the immigrant was under protection and surveillance
of Travelers Aid Society volunteers. The prescribed measures were even
stricter in cases when the immigrant was an unaccompanied woman. I will
elaborate on this issue later in Chapter 3.4.
3.2.4 Economic performance and some trends of emigration to US
America is not what it used to be,

Yugoslavia is our America now,
Yugoslav returnees, 1920
There was a sudden disturbance in the Yugoslav emigration that happened even
before US authorities introduced first restrictions in 1921. Namely, a great
number of migrants returned from the United States in 1920. The Belgrade
daily newspaper Politika detailed the temporary economic crises in the USA,
which had helped force 17,255 Yugoslav emigrants to return home that year.
The information presented by the journalist was obtained from the General
Consulate of the Kingdom of SCS in the United States. According to the arti-
cle, Yugoslav emigrants were guided by both panic and reasonable fears after
the first signs of recession and unemployment appeared266. Primarily, they were
afraid for their savings. They feared that they would have to spend all of their
painstakingly saved money if the downturn continued.267
Returning home before they had planned and obliged to manage additional
expenses, most of those who went back to Yugoslavia were very disappointed.
The journalist quoted emigrants remarking that America is not what it used to
be, Yugoslavia is our America now. This wave of returnees continued not
only the warrelated decrease in emigration between 1914 and 1918, but also
the steady prewar trend of repatriation of emigrants from CroatiaSlavonia. In
a May 1921 report sent from the GEC to the Provincial Commissariat of the
Interior for CroatiaSlavonia, Yugoslav emigration was characterized, in gen-
eral, as temporary and reversible:
From the strict legal point of view, the Germans, Irishmen and
Russian Jews are the only European emigrants. Our people
266
On the shortlived economic crisis at the beginning of the 1920s, see section 1.2.1.
267
Povratak iz Amerike, [Return from America] Politika, 27 February, 1921.
have never given up of their right to return. In most cases, only

the heads of the families emigrate. Our people are always trav-
elling: they leave the country and come back. There are many
emigrants who have already been in America seven times.268
According to the overall statistical data on the period under review, however,
the higher rate of migration returning to the Kingdom of SCS was a general
trend only during the period between 1918 and 1922 (see the Figure 35); from
1923 on, this rate decreased, and henceforth, fluctuated between 26 and 38
percent of the annual emigration. Neither does the other observation quoted in
the GEC report (regarding the frequent trips by migrants) apply during the dec-
ade following the war. According to the Yugoslav emigration statistics for
19211928, the proportion of Yugoslav emigrants who were leaving the coun-
try for the first time in their life was an overwhelmingly majority (see the Fig-
ure 36). It ranged from 73 percent of the emigrants who left the country in 1921
to 86 percent in 1927 and 90 percent in 1924. The proportion of migrants mak-
ing frequent trips back and forth was insignificant throughout the period under
review.
Figure 35: Emigration and returned emigration (repatriation) of the Kingdom

of SCS 191828:
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1918-
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
23
returned emigration 43048 5159 5691 5554 5753 5827
emig ration 34700 17238 15005 18230 21976 21789
268
GEC to the Provincial Commissariat of the Interior for CroatiaSlavonia of 19 May, 1921.
Figure 36: Frequency of Emigration of the Yugoslav Emigrants 192128:
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
1st time 9465 4914 8801 17673 15126 15242 18953 18964
2nd time 2918 833 2543 1711 2339 2808 2876 2677
3rd time 544 263 97 153 129 149 102 121
4th time 31 57 20 30 31 22 34 14
more than 4 7 19 7 8 18 9 11 13
3.2.5 Remittances from the US and the Yugoslav economy
You cant eat the pudding and have

it [too].
A. B. Bojniki, 1920
In spite of the fact that they did little to help emigrants with their endeavors,
authorities of the newly formed Yugoslav state had, from early on, an eye on
the economic importance of remittances sent from the United States by emi-
grants and the savings brought back to the country by returnees. Bojniki esti-
mated the total amount of remittances sent from emigrants in the United States
between 1919 and 1923 at 2627 million US dollars. Calculated in domestic
currency, it amounted to 10.2 billion Yugoslav dinars, an enormous sum com-
pared to the countrys fiscal performance at the time. For example, the total
revenue projected in the Yugoslav state budget for 1924/25 was just slightly
higher, at 10.4 billion dinars.269 There is no doubt that this influx of hard cur-
rency helped to ameliorate the monetary situation of Yugoslavia during the first
few years of its existence. Later, when the dinar was stabilized, the incoming
269
Bojniki, Smjernice emigracione politike, [Direction of Emigration Policy] Socijalni
preporoaj, 1925, No. 12: 356.
US dollars played an important role in maintaining the trade balance (see Fig-
ure 37). Dr. Ivo Bilin, a collaborator of the journal Revue conomique de Bel-
grad, noted that in 1927, the amount of emigration savings and remittances sent
to the country (800 million dinars) was equivalent to the foreign trade deficit of
the country that year270. The author emphasized the importance this money
played for assuring the bare survival of those living in the poor regions of Lika,
Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro.
During the second half of the 1920s, it was often commented that the Yugoslav
national currency was based on a wooden standard referring to the great
share that the lumber industry had in the export earnings of Yugoslavia. Given
the numbers mentioned above, one could argue that the Yugoslav dinar also
had a solid basis in the economic performance of Yugoslav emigrants abroad.
Yugoslav authorities were very much aware of this fact. In 1920, Benko Bo-
jniki wrote authorities had to choose whether to pressure emigrants to return
home and bring all their savings with them, or to stay in America and continu-
ously send small remittances to their family members. Bojniki pointed out the
dilemma with an English saying: You cant eat the pudding and have it
[too].271
In order to secure an uninterrupted flow of hard currency, Yugoslav authorities
provided help in negotiations between American and Canadian postal authori-
ties and the Belgradebased Yugoslav Potanska tedionica (Post bank). In a
newspaper article, Milorad Nedeljkovi, head director of the Potanska tedi-
onica, explained how the system of money transfers worked. According to him,
the contract concluded between the three national postal companies enabled
Yugoslav emigrants to send their remittances from any post office in these
North American countries. The procedure was quite simple as the emigrant
only had to write down the exact address of the postal destination in Yugosla-
via. Nedeljkovi explained the technical details of the arrangement:
The Head Post Office in America collects together all these
remittances and at least once a week they send them to the
General Office of the Belgradebased Potanska tedionica,
which changes the dollars to the corresponding value in dinar
banknotes. With no commission or charge, this amount is de-
livered to the addressee at his own house with a confirmation
of acceptance to be signed. Through the Potanska tedionica
and US postal authorities, this confirmation proof is delivered
270
In Dr Bilins article on emigration which was prepared for publication in the Revue economi-
que de Belgrad, AJ, Collection of Dobrivoje Stoovi (81)13.
271
Organizacija iseljenke slube u Kraljevini SHS [Organization of Emigration Service in the
Kingdom of SCS] of 15 August 1920. In: HDAOABG, b. 3, f. 10.
to the emigrant in order to assure him that money ended up at

the right address.272
Much has been written on the ambiguous economic effect of remittances in
developing countries. An excellent article by W. R. Bhning summarizes both
the positive and negative implications associated with this phenomenon273. The
author points out the fact that most of the money sent from abroad usually ends
up in the extended consumption of the individuals who receive it. It is hardly
ever employed for capital investments in individual or family enterprises. From
the point of view of the state, a considerable influx hard currency might en-
able the nations economic agents to import capital goods and raw materials to
strengthen the productive capacity, as well as to import basic consumer goods.
On the other hand, it might provoke some problems. The greatest problem with
remittances, according to Bhning, is that socalled developing countries can
easily become economically dependant on remittances, which might be inter-
rupted for various unpredicted reasons. A further problem is the socalled brain
drain emigration of educated or qualified specialists. For these reasons, Bh-
ning insists that sending people abroad to improve the trade balance or the
monetary situation of the state through remittances is a poor strategy for state
development.
The case of interwar Yugoslavia fits almost perfectly into Bhnings model of
dependency. The question remains, however, as to what might have been a
better choice for the Yugoslav society, had emigration (and remittances from
abroad) been restricted. Given the fact that the Yugoslav economy did not pos-
sess the capacity to absorb the superfluous labor supply of the country, it is
difficult to envision an alternate solution. For Yugoslav state officials involved
in the matter, the only important question was how to employ the remittances
in a more useful way. This question was discussed by Yugoslav emigration
representatives and policymakers at their 1924 Zagreb Conference with refer-
ence to some of the undesirable effects related to remittances274. The partici-
pants of the conference were unanimous in pointing out that almost all of the
money that came from this source had been invested either in personal con-
sumption or in the improvement of private housing. A few speakers suggested
measures which would facilitate a more active role for the National Bank of the
Kingdom of SCS (Narodna Banka Kraljevine SHS) in the management of the
financial aspects of emigration affairs. They argued that the central bank should
not have been limited only to the conversion of emigrants remittances (as any
272
Milorad Nedeljkovi, Iseljenike utede, [Emigration Savings] Izseljeniki magazin, 1927
(November): 1920.
273
W. R. Bhning, Elements of a Theory of International Economic Migration to Industrial
Nation States. In: Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Popula-
tion Movements (edited by Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely and Silvano M. Tomasi ) (Staten
Island, New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981): 3942.
274
Stenogram Ankete. In: HADOABG, b. 7.
other financial institution could do this); rather, it should have engaged in a

more ambitious project of establishing an American branch to collect all emi-
grants savings and remittances in one place. Only in this way could the huge
potential of emigrant finances be used for largescale investment projects in
Yugoslavia. At any rate, nothing of this initiative came into practice during the
period under review.
Figure 37: Trade balance and remittances of the Kingdom of SCS (in million
dinars):
1000
500
-500
-1000
-1500
1926 1927 1928 1929
trade balance 186 -886 -1390 327
remittances 631 662 695 766
Source: Nikoli, Kurs dinar, 1535.
3.2.6 Attitude towards immovable property ownership
The first generation of the American immigrants of Slavic origin retained their
traditional, rural attitudes on the importance of private property, more precisely
that of immovable property. Most, therefore, strove to become the owners of
small land estates, flats or houses. Statistical data from the American census of
1940 reveals that 198,880 Yugoslavs (51.8 percent of the total number in the
country) lived in homes that they owned275. Compared to other immigrant
groups in country, they had high rates of immovable property ownership. There
275
were, in fact, places where Serb and Croat immigrants had higher rates of own-
ership of flats and houses than the nativeborn American population276.
One might assume that this behavior would prove to be an advantage even if it
derived from the premodern Balkan habits transplanted to American soil. Yet,
when disconnected from its roots in Yugoslavia, this custom could impart some
serious limitations on immigrants. Attachment to property bound people to a
fixed place, greatly reducing their mobility in laborrelated maters. Once set-
tled in a house, immigrants had only limited choices in terms of the type and
conditions of their employment. Another cost to owning property was the infe-
rior quality of affordable housing compared to that which could be rented277.
Back in Yugoslavia, the mental heritage of a premodern society had limited
the economic prospects and labor mobility of these people; and it would con-
tinue to do so, even once they moved to the most technological advanced soci-
ety in the world.
Table 6: Number of members associated with the national organizations of the

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the USA, and amount of their capital assets:
Serbs Croats Slovens
Number of members 20,000 84,000 124,000
Capital assets ($) 345,000 4,000,000 5,500,000
Source: Govorchin, 118.
3.2.7 Emigrant savings
Another habit brought to the Americas from the Eastern European pre
industrial societies was the widespread practice of unwavering frugality of the
immigrants in order to save some money. As we will see, the roots and mani-
festation of the phenomenon in the countries under review were quite firm, and
the Ford Motor Company would design a specific sociologicalwelfare
business enterprise of in order to suppress it.
It was possible for Eastern European immigrants to save a substantial amount
of their earnings as most of these people came to the New World with no ex-
276
John Bodnar, Immigration and Modernization: The Case of Slavic Peasants in Industrial
America, Journal of Social History 10, No. 1 (1976 Fall): 50.
277
Ibid., 4951.
perience or expectation of decent housing conditions or even proper basic nu-

trition, let alone the extravagancies of bodily hygiene or consumerism. As
described in section 3.2.6, Yugoslav emigrants usually lived in worse condi-
tions than their nativeborn neighbors, and often, their standard of living was
inferior to what they had had back in Yugoslavia all in order to save as much
money as possible.
Given this willingness to live in voluntary privation, the prospects for the ac-
cumulation of savings in the United States were fairly decent. The Revue Inter-
national du Travaille provides detailed information on the cost of living for
minimum wage salary earners in the Massachusetts Paper Box industry in
1920278. This information gives insight into both the composition of workers
average expenditures and the amount left over for possible savings. The estima-
tion was calculated by an officially appointed board which took into account
the average expenditure of nativeborn Americans.
One can see that even among nativeborn Americans, who were used to a cer-
tain level of comfort, some amount of money could have been put aside. For
instance, a worker who had deprived himself of newspapers, vacations and
recreation (see the Table 7) and who limited his spending on board and lodg-
ings, clothing and laundry, could expect to save $2 per week or about $8 per
month. This made almost $100 in savings per year the amount estimated by
the Yugoslav emigration authorities as the minimum annual savings of Yugo-
slav emigrants in the US.
The Table 6 shows considerable amounts of savings invested in national or-
ganizations of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the United States. Much of
these savings came as a result of the rigorous selfdiscipline and Spartan depri-
vation from material comforts throughout the period spent abroad. In the next
few paragraphs, we will see how the Sociological Department of the Ford Mo-
tor Company tried to eradicate this custom by incentives offered for increased
level of consumption.
A sociologicalwelfarebusiness project of the Americanization of the huge
community of the immigrants employed by Ford started in January 1914 with
the launch of the Ford Profit Sharing Plan (FPSP). Historian Stephen Meyer
has produced an exhaustive examination of the plan279. The information and
analytical framework of Meyers excellent article include several aspects of the
plan directly related to our examination of Yugoslav savings.
278
Broda, Minimum Wage Legislation, 33.
279
Stephen Meyer, Adapting the Immigrant to the Line: Americanization in the Ford Factory,
191421, Journal of Social History 14, No. 1 (1980 Fall): 6782.
Table 7: Items of expenditure of the minimum wagesalary in Massachusetts in

1920:
Items Per week

(in $)
1. Board and lodging 9.00
2. Clothing 3.25
3. Laundry 0.60
4. Doctor and dentist 0.50
5. Church 0.15
6. Newspapers and magazines 0.25
7. Vacation (2 weeks) 0.50
8. Recreation and selfimprovement 0.50
9. Insurance 0.10
10. Contingent fund 0.40
11. Incidentals 0.25
Total 15.50
Source: Broda, Minimum Wage, 33.
The FPSP was popularly known as the Five Dollar Day, referring to a five dol-
lar daily salary, which included both the basic wage and a share of the com-
panys profit. These two shares of the salary were equal when the FPSP was
first launched. In order to alter the social customs and behavior of their workers
in both the factory and their homes and families, the company used the salary
plan to reward appropriate behavior. While everyone received their basic
wage, a full share of profits was only extended to those workers who had been
achieved the standard of an American way of life:
Employees should live in clean, wellconducted homes, in
rooms that are well lighted and ventilated. Avoid congested
parts of the city. The company will not approve, as profit shar-
ers, men who herd themselves into overcrowded boarding
houses which are menaces to their health.280
280
Quoted in Ibid., 70.
Not only were employees to wear clean and tidy clothes, but their physical and
moral cleanliness was mandatory as well. Marriage and a decent family life
were considered crucial requirements. The whole program was closely watched
by Fords Sociological Department inspectors who investigated each em-
ployees family life and household conditions. For instance, if the inspector
found a woman living with an employee, he would ask for proof that they were
legally married. If the inspection revealed any sort of unsatisfactory conditions,
the profit share was deducted from the employees salary. If he did not improve
his household and family conditions within a sixmonth period, he was dis-
charged from his job.
This sort of conditional profitsharing project was fairly successful at eradicat-
ing the determined frugality of emigrants. An increase in salary was only al-
lowed on the condition that the money would be actually spent rather than
saved. As Meyer points out, personal expenditures were encouraged in the
textbook prepared for immigrants in the Ford English School. Some of the les-
son titles are quite indicative: Pay Day, Going to the Bank, Shining
Shoes, Buying a Lot, Building a House. Thus, newly arrived immigrants
were motivated rather than forced to integrate into the market economy and
industrial society of the United States. This interesting example of intertwined
business, welfare and sociological enterprise survived until 1921, when the
company disbanded it due to its financial troubles and the temporary recession
after the the First World War.
Figure 38: Immigrants at the money exchange:

Figure 39: Admitted immigrants leaving Ellis Island for the New York
City ferryboat:
Courtesy, KeystoneMast Collection
3.2.8 Yugoslav emigrants and work
However impressive the million dollars earned and saved by Yugoslav emi-
grants might seem, their lives in the United States were usually quite harsh. In
1921, most of them worked in the most difficult jobs: 57 percent in mines, 6.5
percent in the lumber industry, and 6 percent in stockyards. Interestingly, only
3 percent of them were employed in agriculture281. Officials at Yugoslav emi-
gration services hoped that their country would benefit from the knowledge
that the large numbers of returning emigrants brought back to Yugoslavia (see
Figure 35). Specifically, they expected returnees to bring industrial and techni-
cal skills from America and thus improve the quality of labor supply in Yugo-
slavia. The odds seemed in their favour; throughout the period between 1921
and 1928, only 4.25 percent of female and 8.37 percent of male emigrants from
Yugoslavia were skilled workers. Taking into account the economic milieu of
most Yugoslav emigrants, it would be reasonable to assume that the country
could only have gained from return emigration (see Figure 40 and 41). Yet
Yugoslav authorities would be disappointed. One official from the Chicago
based General Consulate of the Kingdom of SCS in the United States explained
why their expectations were not fulfilled. The report, quoted below, discloses
the gloomy side of the everyday life of the Yugoslav emigrants in America:
281
Our emigrant should learn something in America and with that

knowledge and experience he should help his country when he
returns. Unfortunately, this is another misconception, since
most of our emigrants have access only to a very narrow circle
of 2030 workers. Moreover, they do not learn or read any-
thing and do not take part in the public life of the community,
the county or the state. Usually, in this ocean of people and
work, they become lonelier than they had been in their village.
Very often they come back [to Yugoslavia] less cultured than
they were before. Since they are too weak to compete with
Americans in skilled labor and industry, they can find em-
ployment only as unskilled laborers for the most difficult jobs.
[...] The very small number of successful emigrants who learn
some skills usually become American citizens and do not think
about going back home.282
Figure 40: Professional background of female emigrants from Yugoslavia:
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
skilled 142 41 86 139 177 329 390 515
unskilled 3626 228 1713 1050 1023 1105 1003 1146
agriculture 850 2045 1428 2787 2723 1773 2277 1996
liberal professions 7 96 347 156 208 148 110 22
without occupation 3238 761 896 2453 2078 1203 1344 1068
Source: Yugoslav emigration statistics.
282
Izvetaj iz Kraljevskog Generalnog Konzulata u ikagu, [Report from the Royal General
Consulate in Chicago] of 10 November 1922. In: HDAOABG, b. 7, f. 4.
Figure 41: Professional background of male emigrants from Yugoslavia:
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
skille d 356 403 910 882 791 1072 1237 1602
unskille d 2477 152 1703 1761 1224 1624 1302 1331
agriculture 837 1404 3053 7301 6676 9578 12798 12467
libe ral profe ssions 74 75 210 251 199 174 143 208
without occupation 1358 680 1127 2795 2544 1224 1372 1251
The official depicted a rather pessimistic account for the interests of both the
state and emigrants. Returnees were usually those who dropped out of the sys-
tem, those who could not adapt themselves to the American way of life and
work. Immigrants who acquired some knowledge were usually among those
who decided to stay in America. This report suggests that, from point of view
of Yugoslav authorities, the naturalization of their compatriots in America was
the worst possible outcome of emigration. The most educated emigrants and
the most skilled laborers were lost, along with their potential to contribute to
the countrys advancement. According to Gerald Govorchin, Dalmatians and
Slovenes were the most likely to be lost to assimilation and naturalization:
The relatively easy assimilability of the Dalmatians is ex-
plained by the fact that they came to America with traditions of
individual initiative in enterprise and trade, and that their mi-
gration was not a mass movement but a slow and continual
flow of individuals. Added to these forces are the cosmopol-
itanism and linguistic talents of the people. In favor of Slo-
venes, it can be said that they entered the country more west-
ernized and with more advantages in the way of education,
which accelerated their admission into business and profes-
sional occupations.283
283
According to US data for 1920, presented by Govorchin, a quarter of all Yugo-

slav immigrants had been granted American citizenship. By 1930, this quotient
had risen to 46 percent probably due to the considerable decline in newcom-
ers284. Because the acquisition of US citizenship came only after a required
period of residence, and years of painstaking work and social and cultural ad-
aptation, lower numbers of newcomers increased the percentage of naturalized
citizens among the total of Yugoslav immigrant community.
The lives of Yugoslav emigrants in Australia were filled with hardship and the
mistrust of the local population. According to a 1925 report written by orije
Jovanovi, an emigrant from Montenegro, Australian labor organizations and
their press were bitterly opposed to immigration from Yugoslavia. Their main
complaint was the same one heard in the United States: newcomers worked for
less money and usually did not join trade unions. These actions were undermin-
ing the domestic labor movements basic achievements. Jovanovi wrote about
a huge strike that occurred when few Yugoslavs happened to be employed in
one Sydney factory. The strike lasted until these immigrants were fired285.
Zvonimir eparovi, in his book about Korula emigrants, presented several
examples of the cruel reality of the Dalmatian emigrants everyday life. He
wrote about a man, Janko Santul, who was in search for a job in a mine in Aus-
tralia. The owner told him that unfortunately he could not hire him, but sug-
gested he should wait a few days until someone gets hurt or dies at which
point, he would get a job. The author claims that he heard the same story from
few other emigrants. In the same book, the author presents an anecdote about
another man, Ivan Bai, which reveals the laborious existence of Croatian
emigrants in Australia in interwar period:
The first day when he arrived to Australia he met his brother in
law, Markota who invited him for lunch. Markota cooked rice
but it was so thick and hard that my late father asked him why
he was preparing it that way. Markota answered him: Wait
and you will see. After a while, he saw: when Markota re-
moved the dish from the fire, he poured the cold water into the
rice and told him: There is no time to wait for it to get cold.
One has to go to work.286
Not only grownup people suffered from these labor conditions; Yugoslav
immigrants often expected their children to work following the old custom of
the traditional rural economy, only now the children were employed in facto-
ries. According to the findings of the US Immigration Commission from 1911,
284
Ibid., 212.
285
orije Jovanovi to Minister of Social Policy, 3. February 1925. In: HDA1071, b. 559.
286
eparovi, Od Sydneya do San Francisca, 75.
this was a widespread phenomenon among Serbs and other Eastern European
immigrants287.
In spite of the harshness of the immigrant life, those that arrived in USA and
the British Dominion countries with relatively small contingents of Yugoslav
emigrants during the 1920s might be considered fortunate. Their journey was
under the surveillance and strict provisions of the authorities. They were given
the greatest possible care by the immigration authorities in the first days after
arrival. In a single generation some of them successfully managed to leap
across the incredible lifestyle differences found in their homeland and those in
the New World. Many others made their live by persisting in habits of pre
modern society. The Yugoslav authorities early plans to make use of returnees
trained in new and advanced technologies proved to be unrealistic. It was
highly unlikely that any trained, successful and affluent emigrant would return
home to take part in a national project to develop the Yugoslav domestic econ-
omy. In the United States, authorities (and even the private sector) used their
power and wealth to care for immigrants, but also to encourage assimilation.
Yugoslav authorities were perhaps more concerned with securing the maxi-
mum financial benefit from emigrants: the pudding in Bojnikis metaphor.
As long as they could find employment, they could earn significant sums of
money, some of which might make its way back to Yugoslavia. As we will see
in the following chapter, the chances for such success were far poorer among
their compatriots who migrated to the countries of Central and South America.
3.3 Yugoslav Emigrants in South American Countries
[T]he conditions in our country are

not so miserable as to forget our na-
tional pride and to go into Brazilian
slavery. A. B. Bojniki, 1925
Yugoslav emigration to South American countries, quite rare before the intro-
duction of the quota system in the United States, became, unexpectedly, the
most common destination throughout the 1920s (see the Figure 42). Despite the
continuous warnings and appeals by Yugoslav authorities against emigration to
these countries, a quite significant number of Yugoslav emigrants found them-
selves there during the decade following the First World War. This chapter will
describe the economic situation and general living conditions of Yugoslav emi-
grants in the two most frequent destination countries: Brazil and Argentina.
287
In Pittsburghs South Side thousands of young Serbs spent their adolescent years working in
glass factories until they could enter the steel mills. In Scranton 35% of Polish family income in
1911 was earned by children. In: Bodnar, Immigration and Modernization, 46.
A particular methodological problem encountered with regard to South Ameri-

can emigration is the fact that collected Yugoslav emigration statistics do not
include the ethnonational composition of emigration to different countries.
For this reason, it is not possible to make a full account of the nationality aspect
of the issue, the complexity of which can only be presumed. In all available
accounts and documents, however, both German and Hungarian emigration
were mentioned almost exclusively in the context of South American destina-
tion countries. The peak of Yugoslav emigration to these countries (in 1924
and 1925) coincides with the period when Germans and Hungarians predomi-
nated among emigrants from the Kingdom of SCS. While this might help ex-
plain why so many Yugoslav emigrants ended up in these countries despite
the controls imposed on the issuing of passports by Yugoslav authorities, a
conclusive statistical validation of this hypothesis is not possible.
Figure 42: Percentage share of South American countries (SA) in the total of
the Yugoslav emigration 192128:
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
(%)SA/Total 2,4 6,5 46,7 64,9 66,7 38,4 54,6 47,3
3.3.1 Brazil
Yugoslav emigration authorities regularly estimated that, in the terms of legal

protection, and living and labor conditions, Brazil was the least desirable over-
seas destination. In spite of the abundant legislation for the legal protection of
immigrants in this country, everyday life was often harsh for them.288 The con-
ditions were especially harsh on coffee plantations. In such a huge country with
an inadequate state apparatus, one could always find places where peasants
were left at the mercy of landowners. Yugoslav emigration inspector ulenti
noticed in a report from Brazil that the economic prospects of individual agri-
cultural laborers very often depended on their proximity to a railway. In fact,
even under an unfavorable leasing system, farmers might prosper if they had
access to the market via the railway, yet one can suppose that it was not always
the case.
Radical deterioration of the overall situation in Brazil followed the revolution-
ary revolt of captain Luis Carlos Prestes in 1924. Prestes guerilla fighting and
revolutionary ideas affected considerable parts of Brazil. Internal disorder and
turmoil caused by this movement lasted until 1927, when Preset and many of
his followers fled to Bolivia289. Yugoslav authorities were quite aware of de-
velopments in the situation in Brazil during this period, and recognized the
problems emigrants would encounter in this country. For that reason, in Febru-
ary 1925, Fedor Aranicki (Chief of the Yugoslav Emigration Commissariat)
issued an official memorandum to the editorial boards of all Yugoslav newspa-
pers containing a digest account of the situation in South America and, in par-
ticular, Brazil. He asked the editors to present this information to domestic
labor through their media and to dissuade them from emigrating to these unsta-
ble countries.290 The fact that so many emigrants ended up nonetheless in Bra-
zil is likely a result of the hidden minority policy described earlier in the
monograph.
According to the estimates of Yugoslav emigration authorities, about 90 per-
cent of all Yugoslav emigrants in South American countries were engaged in
agriculture and this held true in Brazil as well291. The worst conditions experi-
enced were usually connected to the remnants of feudal customs in the Brazil-
ian agricultural sector. Brazils great landowners of the time, known as
fazeinders, were infamous for their alleged cruelty and their exploitation of
their tenant farmers. Within the frame of the socalled truck system, in force in
some parts of the country, newly arrived immigranttenants were contractually
obliged to buy food and other necessities exclusively from their landowner as
had been custom in feudal Europe. Undoubtedly, prices were most often set to
the advantage of landowners. There were some reports on forced child labor on
288
According to the Yugoslav emigration authorities, until 1909 there were 91 laws and regula-
tions on immigration matters in the Brazilian state of Sao Paolo alone. In: Documents and ex-
pertise on emigration to Brazil sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1920. In: HDA
OABG, b. 3, f. 10.
289
Ernest A. Duff, Prestes and the Revolution of 1924, LusoBrazilian Review 4, No. 1: 316.
290
EC No. 3002/1925 of 24 February 1925. In: HDA1071, b. 558.
291
HDAOABG, b.10, f. 24.
plantations as well.292 Benko Bojniki in the article published in Socijalni

preporoaj, compared the status of the Yugoslav immigrants with that of the
feudal serfs or slaves:
Taking everything [mentioned above] into consideration, there
is no doubt that the coffee plantations in the state of Sao Paolo
are absolutely inappropriate as a destination for our national
emigration. Moreover, the conditions in our country are not so
miserable as to forget our national pride and to go into Brazil-
ian slavery.293
One more peculiarity of the situation in Brazil, at least according to Yugoslav
sources, was a specific citizenship regulation, designed to encourage the inte-
gration of newlyarrived immigrant families into the community. According to
the information and expertise of the Yugoslav EC officials, immigrants to Bra-
zil were obtaining citizenship through an interesting combination of both jus
soli and jus sanguinis legal principles. Not only was it prescribed that a child
born in Brazil would automatically obtain Brazilian citizenship by the fact they
were born on Brazilian territory (jus soli), but that the citizenship right would
also be automatically inherited by the childs parents (jus sanguinis). The
Yugoslav state had only limited powers to intervene or protect their citizens
once they had obtained Brazilian citizenship, i.e. if they had children born in
Brazil.294
3.3.2 Argentina
What were newly arrived emigrants from Yugoslavia to expect upon their arri-
val to Argentina? A document issued by the Yugoslav EC in May 1925 pro-
vides us with basic facts about the procedure conducted by Argentina immigra-
tion authorities295. First, before setting sail, all emigrants needed the required
personal documents which included three official certificates (as described in
section 2.2.7) and a Yugoslav passport with a valid Argentinean visa. Only
with these documents could an emigrant be admitted to the country. According
to immigration regulations, all newcomers had the right to be accommodated,
292
Bojniki, Koje bi smjernice 21315. Documents and expertise on emigration to Brazil sent
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20. June 1920. In: HDAOABG, b. 3, f. 10. Rdjava iskustva
Njemaca u dravi Sao Paolo, Saopenja o radu po pitanjima iseljenika (bilten of Labor Office
[Radnika komora] for CroatiaSlavonia) of November 1927. In: AJ, 1435107.
293
Bojniki, Koje bi smjernice, 21315.
294
Documents and expertise on emigration to Brazil sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20.
June 1920. In: HDAOABG, b. 3, f. 10.
295
EC (circular letter to all subordinate officials). Case: Immigration procedures conducted in
Buenos Aires. No. 19014/1925 of 6 May 1925.
free of any charge, in state provided immigration board facilities for a period of
six to eight days. These facilities would keep them safe and secure during their
first days in Argentina, and give them time to establish contact with their em-
ployers. If they decided to travel to the interior of the country, emigrants would
be provided with train tickets free of charge. Upon receiving the train ticket,
however, they were not eligible for any further state subsidies. This was indi-
cated by word internado stamped in their passports. Let us now investigate
how these people fared once they were no longer afforded state subsidies or
protection.
Figure 43: Number of Yugoslav emigrants who left for Brazil, Argentina and
Chile 192128:
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Brazil 0 63 1535 6862 2436 4998 2527 499
Argentina 304 290 2721 3860 2247 3327 7127 7484
Chile 78 7 46 179 360 243 425 375
Although Argentinean economy started to lose its way and lag behind the
major world economies during the interwar period, a considerable number of
Yugoslav citizens emigrated there nonetheless, between 1918 and 1928 (see the
Figure 43)296. Opportunities for employment and financial gain were not stable
but depended on the market. Due to the continuous economic and political cri-
296
Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor Sebastian Galiani, Introduction. In: A New Eco-
nomic History of Argentina, ed. Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), 37.
sis in Argentina, market fluctuations were even more frequent and business
prospects more fragile than was to be expected in a market economy at that
time. Additional dangers in Argentina included an almost complete lack of
labor protection and, even more so, a generally low level of law enforcement
and rule of order in the country at the time. Significant improvements in this
regard occurred only after 1930, when the upheaval of Great Depression put
large scale state intervention in motion. From that time on, industrial employ-
ment relationships in Argentina became contractually based, and noteworthy
advances of the labor legislation were passed.297
Yugoslav emigration authorities gathered interesting stories those emigrants
that returned from Argentina. According to the Yugoslav emigration regula-
tions, all repatriated emigrants were obliged to give a detailed account of the
economic and political conditions in their country of emigration. The informa-
tion collected, however, could produce a bit distorted image of life overseas.
Since those that were doing well after emigrating stayed in their new countries,
most returnees were those who had, on the contrary, met with failure. These
reports, therefore, were solely comprised of accounts of misfortune, disap-
pointment and defeat. Because the annual number of repatriated emigrants
from Argentina in the period 19241929 was between 10 and 20 percent of the
number who emigrated (see the Figure 44), these accounts of returnees can
only serve as a testimony on the lived reality of a corresponding minority of
emigrants.
The official statement of Paja Gurjanov, a peasant from Novi Beej, Vo-
jvodina, underlines the depressing details of his own experience in Argentina
during the 1920s. He left for Argentina in December 1923 after he sold his
small house for 15,000 dinars (at that time, a sum equivalent to about US
$160). He became aware of the poor economic prospects in Argentina after
only a few days into his first work experience there. He was employed in a
slaughterhouse, a job for which he could earn only 4 pesos and 40 Argentinean
cents daily (about one US dollar or 96 Yugoslav dinars). This was a better sal-
ary than Gurjanov could earn in Yugoslavia but a very poor return on his prin-
cipal investment in traveling cost. The economic situation in Argentina grew
worse, and after only three months of work, Gurjanov lost this job and was
without any employment for the following three months.
Gurjanovs report gives valuable information on the frequent communication
he had with the Yugoslav General Consulate in Buenos Aires. He acknowl-
edged that he was once given a job at a railroad construction company through
the intervention of the Consulate. During his five weeks of employment there,
his wages 1 peso and 80 cents (about 40 US cents or 40 dinars) per day
were on par with salaries in Yugoslavia. Desperate after all these experiences,
Gurjanov decided to return to his home country where he provided this ac-
297
Sebastian Galiani and Pablo Gerchunoff, The Labor Market. In: Ibid., 12731.
count. The most striking points of the report are probably those referring to the
hostility of the local Argentine population and police towards immigrants dur-
ing the period of general economic recession:
The locals were hostile toward immigrants and police treat-
ment was very bad. There were situations that 34000 of us,
unemployed workers, were standing in front of the factory en-
trance, day after day, expecting a job offer. [...] On one occa-
sion, thousands of us were sprayed by the water cannons [in
front of the factory gates] in order to force us to flee. However,
in spite of these abuses, we stood in front of the entrance trou-
bled by hunger and misery. [...] All around, one could see ex-
hausted workers who looked like beggars or like ghosts, un-
dernourished, naked and barefoot.298
Similar accounts of miserable labor conditions and experiences by Croatian
emigrants in Argentina can be found in immigrants newspapers and other ma-
terial presented in Ljubomir Antis book299. These sources depict the misery of
poor Croatian immigrants who were dirty, unshaven and in rags, living in
dugouts, feeding themselves on trash from steamers or restaurants. Those
who were still capable of working would accept any kind of work, under any
conditions, just to secure food and lodgings. In 1926, one immigrant worker
gave this account of the terrible transition which many Croatian emigrants to
Argentina underwent:
Thousands come, thousands go, thousands fail. They come
welldressed, healthy and strong, they leave skinny, sick and
in rags. A few make it, but the majority fails. There is little sat-
isfaction among those who have arrived during the last few
years, let alone such as would recommend for others to immi-
grate. [...] among them there are such that once lived quite
well, who now try to hide, being ashamed of their state. Some
look more like ghosts than human beings.300
Noe Martinoli, one of the key leaders of the Argentine Croats Community
wrote in 1928 on the generally sorry labor conditions and business prospects in
Argentina during the 1920s301. By his estimation, the greatest number of Yugo-
slav immigrants in Argentina came from the Dalmatian coast and about 80
percent of them were farmers. Martinoli argued that compared to industrial
workers they had some advantages, especially during the general economic
slump and its resulting rates of unemployment. Due to the vast agricultural
298
EC: Juna Amerika, nepovoljne prilike naih iseljenika [Report on Poor Conditions for
Emigrants in South America], of 2 March 1925. In: AJ, 1435109.
299
Anti, Croats and America, 1523.
300
Anti, Croats and America, 153.
301
Ibid.
resources of the country and the particular nature of the farmers job, they
could find at least some seasonal agricultural employment, usually from one
harvest to another.
In his report, Martinoli stressed the problems that derived from a specific la-
bor contract system common to Argentine agriculture during the 1920s. The
contracts were not collective, but concluded between the landowner and the
farmer on an individual basis and the tenancy was limited to only four years.
After this period, it was up to the landowner whether or not the contract would
be renewed. Living in such a state of uncertainty, farmers had little motivation
to invest in the improvement of their (usually only a temporary) homes. In-
stead, a farmer would use the poor huts he had found at the estancia, and so
his living conditions [were] poorer than those he had been used to back home
in coastal Croatia.302
When the time is up, the contracts are not renewed, and our
people have to go look for work in the cities usually without
any success. In their misery, they turn to our Consulate General,
asking to be shipped back home at the Governments expense,
or to be found jobs. As such requests are difficult to meet, they
grumble against the motherland and its representatives
abroad.303
According to Benko Bojniki, however, the fouryear contract system was
actually a significant improvement for farmers when compared to the regime of
agricultural contracts that developed during the First World War. According to
an article Bojniki wrote for the Zagreb daily newspaper Jutarnji list, the ear-
lier practice of leasing land to the farmers on a three to fiveyear basis was
abandoned in the course of the war. When high meat prices (boosted by in-
creased wartime demand) encouraged cattle breeding, landowners shifted from
cereals to fodder crops. Since these plants were easier to cultivate, landowners
started imposing only one and twoyear contracts on farmers. This had a pro-
foundly negative influence on the basic living standards of farmers. Allegedly,
they lived in no more than dugouts during that period which ended when new
legislation in 1922 prescribed a fouryear contract regime.304
In order to increase their presence among the diaspora in South America,
Yugoslav emigration authorities founded an Emigration Office in Buenos Aires
in April 1926. The office was headed by Jovo N. Mareti who was appointed
Emigration Envoy for South America. That the office was the only institution
of this kind on the entire South American subcontinent caused much adminis-
trative trouble for the envoy and his small staff. Although the office was re-
302
Ibid.
303
Ibid.
304
Bojniki, O argentinskom zakonu o zatiti zakupnika, [On Argentine Law on Protection of
Tenants] Jutarnji list, 28 January 1922.
sponsible for no less than 24 countries, it could only provide those emigrants in
the territory of Argentina with direct communication or regular involvement
with the everyday problems of Yugoslav emigration colonies. In a Parliamen-
tary session in Belgrade, the Minister of Social Policy reported on the enor-
mous activities undertaken by the Buenos Aires office.305 During the first ten
months of activity, the cases of 1,453 applicants have been processed in addi-
tion to current administrative tasks. Applicants asked help or information from
office with problems concerning their status, and labor and living conditions in
Argentina. The office provided them with reliable information; in some cases,
staff was engaged in actually resolving their problems. Probably the most im-
portant were activities in the domain of laborrelated issues. If the Ministers
report is to be believed, no less than 1,319 emigrants found employment
through the office. Among these, 541 were employed in agricultural sector, 761
in industry and 17 in intellectual professions.306
Alongside the Emigration Envoys Office, the Yugoslav General Consulate in
Buenos Aires was also preoccupied with emigrants welfare. In 1926, a de-
tailed report on the economic prospects and social conditions in the country
was sent to the Ministry of social policy by the consul307. The report was to
provide wouldbe emigrants with critical information transmitted through the
official channels of Yugoslav emigration offices. On the topic of Argentinean
agriculture, the consulate had some quite practical advice. It was emphasized in
the report that agricultural workers from Yugoslavia should be warned that the
seasonal cycle of agricultural work in South America was inverse to that of the
countries of the North hemisphere. The proper knowledge on this phenomenon
could have been usefully employed by the Yugoslav agricultural laborers seek-
ing temporary seasonal employment. They were advised in the report not to
start their journey before the end of November since the harvesting season for
winter crops in South America took place in December and January. Summer
crops in Argentina and Brazil were harvested in April and May after which
agricultural workers could return home to seek job during the Northern hemi-
spheres harvest season. It was only within these periods that the emigration to
Argentina could be recommended to this category of labor, given that the job of
sowing was completely mechanized and did not required additional labor force
from abroad.
According to the report, the prospects for employment in industries and ser-
vices were bad for newcomers; moreover, even the already settled immigrants
had difficulties to keep their jobs. The report describes changes towards immi-
grant employees status that occurred after some plants of Argentinean oil in-
dustry were nationalized in 1926. The Yugoslav Consulate found out that the
305
Quoted in EC No. 314/27 of 15 February 1927. In: HDA1071, b. 558.
306
Ibid.
307
The report has been forwarded as circular letter to all state services engaged in emigration
affairs. EC, No. 10225/1926 of 22 April 1926. In: HDA1071, b. 558.
state had, through its official channels, ordered the management of the com-
pany to retain only the employment of Argentinean citizens and those aliens
who submitted applications to obtain citizenship. The consulate feared for the
fate of about 34,000 Yugoslavs who were employed in the company. Accord-
ing to the report, Yugoslav emigrants who worked on the construction of rail-
roads which were to connect Argentina and Chile had already lost their jobs
after the Argentinean Parliament failed to pass new credits to finance the rail
project. The only sector of the Argentinean economy where Yugoslav (particu-
larly Dalmatian) emigrants could find permanent employment was in its com-
mercial marine fleet. According to the report, Yugoslavs were not only wel-
comed there as good and reliable seamen but they also occupied important
positions on boats and it was quite common to find them in commanding cap-
tain positions. Apart from the above mentioned categories of labor, the consu-
late was strongly opposed to any sizeable emigration stream for Argentina.
Figure 44: Yugoslav emigration and returned emigration from Argentina

19241928:
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
emigration 3941 2337 3337 7127 7484
returned emig ration 340 533 676 575 673
From the viewpoint of both the Yugoslav authorities and emigrants, the eco-
nomic conditions in South American countries were much less favorable than
the United States or the British Dominions. Emigrants had many problems due
to the unstable political and economic situation and weak currencies. If no re-
mittances could be sent back to Yugoslavia, the state monetary situation could
not gain any benefit from the emigration. Therefore, Yugoslav emigration au-
thorities tried to prevent people, or at least conationals, from moving there.308
In spite of the opposition and warnings of Yugoslav emigration authorities, a
considerable number of Yugoslav citizens emigrated to these countries. It is
difficult to give an accurate general account of the living conditions and busi-
ness prospects they found in South American countries, as the circumstance
varied from province to province in the huge territories of these countries. The
sources and information gathered by the Yugoslav emigration authorities did
not yield a single affirmative account of the economic performance of Yugo-
slav emigrants in South America.
3.4 Some Insights on Yugoslav Women in Emigration
In 1999, Debra De Laet warned about invisibility of women in scholarship on

international migration. According to the author, published histories of migra-
tions were too often simply histories of male emigrants who managed to organ-
ize their lives abroad. In these genderbiased studies, women only partici-
pated as (subordinate) dependents, either members of families or fiances: in-
significant actors in the overall scholarly work on international migration.309
Sadly, although it will examine the particular problems faced by women during
emigration, this study will not add much to understanding the independent
women role in migrations. Female emigrants simply do not appear in such
autonomous roles in the sources used in researching this monograph. These
sources were written either by state officials or representatives of immigrant
communities whose conceptions of women did not go beyond societal norms at
the time. Patriarchal and paternalistic attitudes towards women were common
to all agencies involved in process including the Yugoslav emigration authori-
ties, the destination countries immigration authorities, and Yugoslav immi-
grant community organizations. This attitude was also incorporated into regula-
tions, and even the basic legal terminology of civil law and citizenship.
Neither was it possible to identify a category of independent unmarried women
within the data of Yugoslav emigration statistics since the rubric pertaining to
family situation was introduced only in 1928, and even for that year it is not
possible to differentiate independent women from potential fiances. Although
this chapter will not contribute much to the study of the independent role of
308
On this issue see: EC: Juna Amerika, nepovoljne prilike. In: AJ, 1435109.
309
Debra L. DeLaet, Introduction: The Invisibility of Women in Scholarship on International
Migration. In: Gender and Immigration, ed. Gregory A. Kelson, Debra L. DeLaet (New York:
Palgrave Publishers, 1999), 16.
female migrants, it will add to the knowledge of specific legal and family con-
straints on those women who emigrated from Yugoslavia. Their proportion in
emigration contingents varied in accordance with the major changes in emigra-
tion patterns and the regulations of the both Yugoslavia and destination coun-
tries. Conflicting citizenship regulations in Yugoslavia and the countries of
emigration caused serious problems regarding the basic citizenship status of
female emigrants. Perhaps unsurprisingly considering their attitudes towards
women, authorities at the time were often more concerned about the problems
of victimization and exploitation of women, and organized women trafficking
by criminal groups.
3.4.1 Prevalence of female emigrants immediately after war
During the first few years after the First World War, a significant percentage of
emigrants from the Kingdom of SCS were women (see Figure 45). One of the
reasons can be found in peculiarities of the newly adopted US quota system
according to which female immigrants were favored. An official memorandum
issued by American consulate in 1921 listed four groups of aliens (i.e. immi-
grants) who would be given preference. Women are well represented among
these categories of preferred aliens:
1st parents, sisters, children under 18, and fiances of American
citizens
2nd wives, parents, sisters, children under 18, and fiances of
aliens who have applied for citizenship
3rd wives, parents, sisters, children under 18, and fiances of per-
son eligible to citizenship who served in the United States Army
or navy during the recent war
4th Aliens returning from a temporary visit abroad310
The quoted memorandum followed the prescriptions of the 1921 quota legisla-
tion, the guiding principle of which was the reunification of immigrant fami-
lies. This principle consistently governed federal immigration policy after 1891
when jurisdiction over immigration affairs was assumed by the federal state. In
her 2002 book on gender issues surrounding US immigration policy, Dr. Eithne
Luibheid pointed out the firm heteropatriarchal imperative embedded in the
legal texts and practices of federal immigration services throughout the period.
This basic imperative was only rearticulated in the legislative changes of
1902, 1910, 1917, 1921 and 1924 which approved of only a certain kind of
family. According to Luibheid, the preference given to wives and female fian-
310
In: HDAOABG, b.3.
ces reflected the patriarchal assumption that women immigrants were passive
and dependent followers of pioneering male immigrants.311 If the main inten-
tion of the legislation was to reunite families, why there was no word of hus-
bands and male fiancs within the same group of preference given to wives and
fiances? Luibheid claims that the legislators aimed not only at the consolida-
tion of the patriarchal concept of the immigrant family, but also at the imposi-
tion of constraints and controls over female sexuality. The latter issue will be
discussed later in this chapter.
Apart from the US system of preferences, numeric predominance of women in
Yugoslav emigration contingents in 1921 and 1922 was also a result of wartime
disturbances in transportation and in communication between male emigrants
and their former countries. Male Yugoslav emigrants had the tendency to get
married with women from their homeland but until marriage, they had to live
alone. Maintaining of their household proved to be very difficult both physi-
cally and emotionally for the most of Yugoslav immigrants who came from
traditional society. Most of them had never before engaged in work considered
womens domestic duties, like cooking or washing dishes and clothes.
In his book, Zvonimir eparovi presented some of the interviews conducted
with Yugoslav emigrants in the USA and Australia. Interestingly, many of
them complained about these kinds of household chores. When one was asked
about the greatest difficulties he faced in the New World, the first thing he
mentioned was that he was supposed to prepare food by himself. This experi-
ence must have had a strong and lasting impression as it was mentioned even
before the usual laborrelated complaints of the Yugoslav immigrants, like
long hours of work, etc. Another interviewee said that, for the four years he
spent in Australia, there was nobody to wash or to darn his clothes, and that he
did not sleep in a proper bed for all that time.312
As soon as Yugoslav immigrants became settled and began earning a regular
income, they would invite young women from Yugoslavia for the purpose of
marriage. During the war, the number of marriage arrangements increased but
they could be realized only after the war. The proportion of women among the
Yugoslav emigrants later declined (see Figure 45), especially after 1923 when
the stream of emigration to South American countries predominated. It is not
strange that men were the first to risk emigration to these insecure countries.
Fedor Aranicki, Chief of the Zagreb Emigration Commissariat, was particularly
unhappy with US immigration regulations that favored female immigrants
within the quota system. According to him, the basic idea of Yugoslav emigra-
tion policy was to make use of temporary (male) emigrants (i.e. future retur-
nees) and their remittances sent back home. There was no intention to render
311
Eithne Luibheid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2002), 116.
312
eparovi, Od Sydneya do San Francisca, 75, 151.
their migration permanent by aiding them to get married and begin families
abroad. He sought a solution to the problem by placing restrictions on the issue
of passports to female emigrants. Aranickis attitude was summarized by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an official letter sent in October 1923 to
Bojniki who was also asked to give his opinion on the same issue. 313
In the response, Bojniki acknowledged that, in demographic terms, the coun-
try would indeed be greatly harmed by high rates of female emigration. He
pointed, however, to both humanitarian concerns and legal limitations standing
in opposition to the restriction policy. Bojniki found it inhumane to prevent
the reunification of families; and legally, freedom of emigration was guaran-
teed by the countrys constitution. It is quite strange that this principle, so often
violated, was to be honored in this particular context. From the rest of his ex-
pert opinion, it is apparent that Bojniki was not particularly devoted to consti-
tutional regulations. He advised rigourous conduct and an individual-case
procedure of issuing passports with the aim of favoring the emigration of
temporary male emigrants over female ones. His way of thinking about the
general domain of the emigration controls seems quite close to that of Aranicki.
Such attitudes suggest that the prevalence of males among Yugoslav emigra-
tion contingents which rose gradually after 1923 may have come to a certain
degree as a consequence of deliberate state policy.
Figure 45: Gender structure of the emigrants from the Kingdom of SCS 1921
28:
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
men 5102 2872 7003 12990 11434 13672 16852 16839
women 7863 3214 4470 6585 6209 4558 5124 4950
313
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Benko Bojniki of 27 October 1923; B. Bojniki to MFA of 6
November 1923. In: HDAOABG, b. 10.
3.4.2 Complications with arranged marriages
Most Yugoslav emigrants came from rural (sometimes almost traditional) soci-
ety where relations between genders were not flexible at all. In most cases,
parents would have arranged their childrens marriages if they had been at
home. Thus, the relatives or friends of an emigrant would usually negotiate his
marriage with the family of a girl from his native country. Emigrants earning
hard currency, especially those working in America, were quite solid candi-
dates for marriage. Unfortunately, some abuses and unpleasant consequences
did occur with these prearranged transoceanic marriages. In 1923, Zagrebs
journal Iseljenike vijesti [Emigration News] published an article on this topic.
Allegedly, it was an often case that young emigrants working in America
would invite girls from their place of birth by promising marriage and prosper-
ous life. In some cases, this was, according to the journalist account, only the
pretext for the real purpose the young men had with these girls:
When she came to America, a kind of ceremony was per-
formed that looked like a marriage and the young man who got
the girl in his hands would force her to prostitute herself or he
would sell her to the bordello. Other men were inviting girls
here under the pretext of marriage only to get cheap servants or
laborers who would support them. In order to prevent this,
American consuls and immigrant authorities are particularly
concerned about the girls who are coming here for the purpose
of marriage or as a laborer.314
The tone of the excerpt is didactic rather than informative. The given example
of what was usually going on with unprotected women was simply meant
to entice the reader before a detailed account on the US immigration protective
regulations. American authorities allegedly tried to prevent these cases by all
means of state intervention and rigorous control. For this reason, they would
not issue a visa to a single girl without a document proving her fiancs will-
ingness to marry her and his ability to support her financially. The girl could
not leave Ellis Island before the man arrived and married her in the presence of
the authorities. Only then could the married couple leave the area under state
surveillance.315 In case the man lived too far away in a remote part of the coun-
try, the girl was only permitted to travel there if she was accompanied by a
person from the Travelers Aid Society or a similar authorized charitable asso-
ciation. The representative of the society would take care that the legal proce-
dure of marriage be carried out immediately after the girl joined the man. Only
314
Iz Sjedinjenih Drava [From United States] Iseljenike vijesti, vol. VI, 1923.
315
See also Berman, Ellis Island, 889, 95.
after the ceremony of marriage was over would married couple be left alone.316
The US immigration authorities insisted on these marriage ceremonies because
they provided women with a certain amount of legal protection.
Some South American countries applied similar regulations. Cuban immigra-
tion regulations of 1925 prohibited the entrance of any woman younger than 21
if she was not accompanied by her parents. In case they were accompanied by
relatives, they were to show formal authorization given by parents. The regula-
tions were strict in case of unaccompanied married women, as well. They were
to have a formal authorization issued by their husbands; otherwise they were to
be deported from the country317. These measures were explained as a necessary
preventative measure against abuse, prostitution and white slavery.
Thus, under the pretext of combating prostitution and providing protection for
unaccompanied women migrants, an intricate system of controls over their
freedom of movement was created. According to Luibheid, power was exer-
cised not only by US legislation which prescribed certain criteria of morals and
decency that the immigrant women were to meet but also by immigrant inspec-
tors who gained discretionary right to judge on these criteria318. In effect, this
made it almost impossible for independent unmarried women (as a category) to
be allowed to enter United States. Cases of women who tried to cross the bor-
der disguised as men provide striking examples of desperate attempts to bypass
these genderbiased criteria for admission. Some South American countries
applied similar regulations concerning controls over women migrants.
Since Brazil and Argentina also imposed rigorous provisions for unaccompa-
nied women emigrating for these countries, in 1925, Yugoslav authorities es-
tablished a general rule applied to emigration to all South American destination
countries319. A rather brief order was sent to all district authorities in the coun-
try, who were in charge of issuing passports. An unmarried woman could get
passport only if accompanied by or invited by her parents, She could also get a
passport, however, if she married her fianc by proxy (per procuram).320 The
roots of this legal institution can be found in the antiquated medieval practice
of proxy marriages between European monarchs. It was revived on a larger
scale at the beginning of 20th century with the famous Japanese system of pic-
turebrides through which Japanese women married their compatriots already
settled in California. The practice lasted until 1920 when the Japanese govern-
316
Ibid.
317
Circular letter, EC to district authorities, Women emigrating to Cuba No. 22546 of 10
September 1927 and Circular letter Cuban immigration regulations, No. 10388 of 12 June
1925. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
318
Luibheid, Entry Denied, IXX.
319
EC circular letter of 3 October 1926, No. 25379. In: HDA1071, b. 556 and EC circular letter
of 6 May 1925, No.19014. In: HDA1071, b. 558.
320
EC to all district authorities, No. 15266 of 8 August 1925. In: HDA1071, b. 556.
ment stopped issuing visas to Japanese wives.321 Recently, proxy marriages

have become increasingly prominent once again with the emergence of cyber
dating and internetbrides. Unfortunately, no documents proving this pre-
scribed legal institution was actually being practiced in the Kingdom of SCS
could be found.
Figure 46: Physical Examination of Female Immigrants. Ellis Island:
Courtesy: Keystone Collection
3.4.3 Cases of women trafficking in Canada
Yugoslav sources note that in Canada there were no strict regulations like those
in the United States, and some individual cases of white slavery and women
trafficking were recorded there. Among archival material was the almost in-
credible story of the sale and even the auctioning of Yugoslav emigrant
women. A certain Gajo Vukosavljevi, the president of the Serbian National
Defense (SND) organization in Canada, sent a detailed report on the latter
event to the Yugoslav Consulate in Canada.322
From this source, it is apparent that Canadian authorities were allowing young
women from 18 to 25 years of age to enter Canada if they were invited by their
relatives or simply by their friends who paid their traveling costs. Vuko-
321
On picture brides and legal institution of proxy marriages in US see in: Martha Gardner,
The Qualities of a Citizen. Women, Immigration and Citizenship, 18701965. (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 17, 389, 41, 43, 226.
322
Quoted in: Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior of June 11, 1922; No.
23334. In: , 1437114.
savljevi described one particular set of cases in which the following scenario
occured after a Yugoslav girl entered Canada. Upon the arrival of the girl, the
man who had invited her would immediately begin arranging her marriage.
According to Vukosavljevis description, what followed resembled a public
auction:
He [i.e. the man who invited them] has already informed as
many men as possible of the arrival of the young girl and upon
her arrival, a deal would be concluded with the one who of-
fered the greatest sum. The man who invited the girl will take
the whole amount of money [] [by compensating himself
for] not only the steamship ticket (traveling costs) but also
some unforeseen expenses, all together 4 to 5 times more than
the price of the ticket. These unforeseen expenses sometimes
can reach the amount of 500 dollars or even more.323
Usually, young women who found themselves in a foreign country and among
strangers were obedient and knew no way out of the situation. Vukosavljevi
mentioned three similar cases that happened in Yugoslav emigration colony in
Weland, Ontario. He stressed the case of Dragica uki who was sold immedi-
ately after she arrived and then a second time a few days later, every time with
great commissions for the middlemen. Only at that point, when she became
property of the third man, did someone allegedly advise her to seek protection
from Vukosavljevis SND organization in Weland. Great pressure was exerted
by people of SND and the Yugoslav community to persuade this third man to
marry Dragica.
In addition, Vukosavljevi gave details on a case that reveals the amount of
money people were ready to invest in purchasing a newly arrived female immi-
grant. A certain Stevo Krajc from Niagara Falls, Ontario, sent money to a girl
from Slavonia to cover the costs of traveling to Canada, probably promising to
marry her upon arrival. Before the girl came to Ontario, Stevo had been already
concluded a deal with another man who was willing to marry the girl. The price
paid to Stevo was not less than 800 dollars whereas the average traveling cost
amounted to 130 dollars. Like the man from the previous case, Stevo was also
prevented from carrying out his plan; pressed by the community, he was com-
pelled to marry the girl.
One striking detail is that Yugoslav people and emigration organizations did
not even consider saving these girls from the hands of obvious criminals. In-
stead they were pushing them to get married; probably following an old Balkan
attitude that a disgraced woman should be left to live with one who disgraced
her. The aforementioned stories should not be taken as a reflection on the gen-
eral issue of female immigration to Canada but rather as insight into one par-
323
Ibid.
ticular deficiency of Canadian immigration provisions compared to those of

US.
3.4.4 Emigrant women and citizenship right
Let me now elaborate on some problems that occurred in cases of completely

ordinary marriages concluded between Yugoslav women and emigrants with
American citizenship. A proper understanding of the problem demands prior
clarification of the legal basis and particular legal provisions of the citizenship
regulations in the Kingdom of SCS. After this short explanation, we will see
how the citizenship regulations and procedures functioned in practice.
According to Yugoslav citizenship regulations before 1928, the matrimonial
status of a woman had significant importance for her citizenship status. As in
the case of her contractual capacity or property rights, her citizenship right was
enjoyed only through male patronage.324 Yet because the Kingdom of SCS did
not unify its citizenship regulations until 1928, the basic provisions on acquisi-
tion and loss of the citizenship differed from one province to another. Accord-
ing to the contemporary university Professor Dr Ladislav Poli, the newly cre-
ated state simply continued to implement the former Austrian, Hungarian, Ser-
bian or Montenegrin provisions on the loss and acquisition of the citizenship.
There were some attempts in 1924 and 1925 to extend the provisions of the
Serbian Civil Code in the domain of naturalization to other provinces but with
no real success.325
According to the provisions of the Serbian Civil Code, which governed the
prewar territory of Serbia after 1844, changes in the marital status of women
could affect their citizenship status in the cases she married an alien citizen.
The legislation prescribed reciprocity in dealing with this issue:
An alien woman married to a Serbian citizen shall obtain the
Serbian citizenship by the very act of marriage in those cases
when the foreign State gives the same right to a Serbian
woman married to their citizen; A Serbian woman married to
324
Those considered underage persons include all those who cannot, or to whom it is forbidden
to dispose of their own property; including: mentally retarded persons, spendthrifts, as designated
by the courts, persons heavily in debt with mortgaged property, married women during their
husbands life time ( 920 of the Serbian Civil Law). More on family and social position of
women in the Kingdom of SCS see in: Aleksandar R. Mileti, Urban life, Cultural Changes and
Modernization in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 191828, Ethnologia Balkanica
10, 2006.
325
The expose he held on the Second Congress of the Jurists in Ljubljana September 1926.
Quoted in: Dr Otomar Pirkmajer, Dravljanstvo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca [The citi-
zenship of the Kingdom of SCS], (Belgrade: Izdavaka knjiarnica Gece Kona, 1929), 1120.
an alien will lose all the rights of Serbian citizenship in those

cases when the foreign state deprives of citizenship rights its
own [female] citizen married to a Serbian citizen. 326
The reciprocity principle prescribed in this Article of the Serbian Civil Code
was capable of leading to some serious consequences. The law school professor
and later distinguished politician of the Peoples Radical Party (Narodna Radi-
kalna Stranka) Ninko Peri wrote in his textbook on international private law
about the hypothetical case of a country whose legislation prescribed that a
Serbian woman married to its citizen would not obtain its citizenship by the
simple act of marriage, but only under some specific circumstances. On the
other hand, according to the same hypothetical legislation, a female citizen of
that country would lose her citizenship by the act of marriage to an alien. In
that case, a Serbian woman married to a citizen of that country would not be-
come the citizen woman of that country, but she would lose her Serbian citi-
zenship. As a result of this rather complicated reciprocity mechanism, the Ser-
bian (i.e. Yugoslav) woman citizen would end up without any citizenship at
all.327
In the Yugoslav territories governed by former Austrian and Hungarian legisla-
tion, the procedure was even more rigorous: a woman married to an alien
would automatically lose her citizenship by the act of marriage. There were no
exceptions and no complications of reciprocity. Let us now see how these Ser-
bian, Austrian and Hungarian pieces of legislation corresponded to US citizen-
ship regulations at the time.
In 1922, the American government enacted new legislation on the issue, the
socalled Cable Act.328 The most significant innovation of the 1922 legislation
was the principle of independent citizenship for women. By this law, the
citizenship status of women in the United States became detached from their
marital status. In other words, an alien woman who married an American
would not get American citizenship automatically by the very act of the mar-
riage. In the same way, an American woman who married a foreigner would
not lose her American citizenship unless she requested it in writing. Thus, be-
cause of the way disparate Yugoslav regulations interacted with American pro-
visions, marriages with brides from different Yugoslav provinces could yield
different outcomes in terms of legal citizenship status. Let us see how they
functioned in practice.
326
Article 48 of the Serbian Civil Code.
327
Ninko Peri, Meunarodno privatno pravo, [International Private Law] (Belgrade: Geca Kon,
1926), 44.
328
A nice historical outline of the development of American provisions for the citizenship of
married women can be found in an article by Cyril D. Hill, published in 1924. Cyrill D. Hill,
Citizenship of the Married Woman, The American Journal of International Law 18, No. 4
(Oct. 1924): 72036.
The Belgrade newspaper Novosti reported in June 1924 on a serious complica-

tion that had arisen from these legal incompatibilities. The account tells a story
in which the confusion arising from conflicting citizenship regulations had a
particularly troubling effect on the private life of one emigrant couple:
Mato Letuni, a Dalmatian, who aquired US citizenship and
has lived for a long time in the Texas, came before long to Du-
brovnik to see his parents. During this visit, he got married to a
girl from Dalmatia. When he came to Belgrade to arrange their
return, the American Embassy refused to issue the passport for
his wife since she was not an American citizen... On the other
hand, the Yugoslav Emigration Department cannot issue her a
passport as she was no longer considered our citizen as she
married an American. After many petitions and attempts with
all sorts of state authorities, the American ambassador, in the
end, decided to issue her a pasavant.329
In this particular case, the Dubrovnik girl lost her Yugoslav citizenship in
Dalmatia according to the provisions of the former Austrian state. If the mar-
riage had been concluded in Serbia, the girl would not have lost her Yugoslav
citizenship due to the reciprocity principle of the Serbian citizenship regula-
tions. The administrative mess of parallel rules for Yugoslav citizenship lasted
few years afterwards, until 1928 when the first citizenship law was enacted for
the whole territory of Yugoslavia.
Under the provisions of Yugoslav law of 1928, the citizenship status of a mar-
ried woman was regulated in such way that she could never become stateless as
a consequence of marriage. A Yugoslav woman could be deprived of her
Yugoslav citizenship only after she acquired her husbands citizenship, and if
she wanted to, she could retain her Yugoslav citizenship.330 In this way, the
state showed a bit of concern for emigrant womens troubles, at least those
related to citizenship regulations.
From the point of view of the emigration policy of the Kingdom of SCS, the
Law on Citizenship of 1928 was designed with the aim to strengthen the binds
between the country and its diaspora. The lawmakers stipulated jus sanguinis
principle, where the blood relation determines the citizenship, i.e. by the citi-
zenship of the parents. This means that children born in overseas countries
were granted Yugoslav citizenship if born from Yugoslav citizens. The jus
sanguinis principle was quite useful to Yugoslavia, a country with a consider-
able diaspora; by means of citizenship, the state could maintain legal ties with
conationals living abroad.
329
Naa ena u Americi. [Our Woman in America], Novosti, 2 June, 1924.
330
Zakon o dravljanstvu Kraljevine SHS [Law on Citizenship of the Kingdom of SCS],
Slubene novine Kraljevine SHS, No. 254 (1 November 1928).
3.4.5 The traditional role of women in emigrant families
The actual family and social status of women in Yugoslav communities abroad
is an interesting topic for extensive further research. Very often, the remnants
of traditional society continued to exist in immigrant families many years after
settlement in the Americas. American historian John Bodnar has written about
the findings of the US Immigration Commission in 1911 concerning the family
structure of immigrants of Serb and Croat origin. In the immigrant community
of the steel town of Lackawanna, New York, the Commission found extended
families where married brothers lived together in the same home with their
parents331. Moreover, the Commission established that the traditional family
pattern persisted among Lackawanas immigrants after two decades of their
settlement in America. According to the Commission, 34 percent of Serbian
and Croatian families were extended compared to only 20 percent of the Polish,
Slovak and Hungarian residents.332 It is amazing how this relic of premodern
society survived in the most technologically advanced country in the world.
Due to wartime disturbances, the high numbers of women in Yugoslav emigra-
tion contingents continued for a few years after war. In the majority of cases,
these women went to overseas destinations where they were to join their future
husbands. American authorities developed an extensive system of state surveil-
lance to ensure the wellbeing and security of these women while under their
jurisdiction. A young woman who came to the United States as a fiance could
not avoid immigration authorities surveillance before she was married. In
Canada, where such strict regulations did not exist, some severe exploitation of
Yugoslav emigrant women occurred. Before new Yugoslav citizenship legisla-
tion was enacted in 1928, the legal status of a Yugoslav woman married to a
foreigner might have resulted in her complete loss of any citizenship status. A
statelessness woman was left without any legal protection, even without a
passport. An additional peculiarity of the Yugoslav case was that the traditional
roles women played in the household in their old country were maintained in
their new homes abroad.
331
Short elaboration on the origins and structure of the South Slavic extended family pattern see
in the 2.1.1 section of the book.
332
Bodnar, Immigration and Modernization, 467.
Conclusions
The violence of the First World War and subsequent government restrictions in
the domain of international migrations had a considerable impact on global
migration. The almost complete and uncontrolled freedom of movement and
travel within the Atlantic economic sphere, which had existed until 1914,
would never come again. A new age emerged in which both countries of immi-
gration and emigration began to establish restrictions and quotas for migrants.
Before the war, during the first globalization, it seems that the economy was of
paramount importance in the state policies of the countries of the Atlantic eco-
nomic system: labor mobility benefited the global labor market, and all people,
whether aliens or citizens, were free to travel. In 1914, in the course of only a
few months, they all came under suspicion. During the war, a new system of
surveillance and control was constructed. Compulsory passport and visa proce-
dures for those entering or leaving national territories became the key instru-
ment for state control over the movement of people; the distinction between the
legal status of the citizen and the alien was reemphasized and would become
ever more important.
The breakdown of the global labor market that emerged during the war and
continued in the interwar period was one of the most remarkable features of the
international economy until the modern second globalization period. In techni-
cal terms, the process of passportization enabled national governments to con-
trol population movement in accordance with a wide range of newly introduced
criteria. In the extremely complex environment of the interwar period, the
states were able to place controls on migration in reaction to the perceived eco-
nomic, political and military needs of the country, and to support national,
demographic, eugenic or even racial policies. Much of this new way of think-
ing and its application in official state policy came as a consequence of the
harsh experience of the war and the enormous prerogatives assumed by states
during the period. Since these international obstacles and limitations on migra-
tion in different form and extent have survived until today, the First World War
and the 1920s, in particular, appear to be significant turning points in the Euro-
pean and global history of migration.
At a legal level, and even more so in administrative practice, Yugoslav emigra-
tion policy followed the global changes in the period under review. Among
influences coming from abroad, Italian legislation played particularly important
role as a model upon which Yugoslav law makers framed emigration institu-
tions. From 1921 on, the emigration procedure in Yugoslavia was integrated
into a unified system based in the emigration offices in Zagreb and later also
Belgrade. General emigration policy was placed under control and guidance of
the Ministry of Social Policy while some administrative tasks were shared with
the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs. The Yugoslav authorities early
plans and high hopes to facilitate overall nationalization of the means and
process of emigration proved to be unrealistic. There was neither an adequate
technical infrastructure on domestic ports nor sufficient financial assets on part
of domestic entrepreneurs for such an ambitious undertaking. Throughout the
period, the majority of Yugoslav emigrants embarked from German, French
and Dutch ports, and travelled by foreign steamship companies.
The decrees, laws, and regulations by the state guaranteed citizens an unre-
stricted freedom of movement, but there were exceptions, both official and
unofficial. One of the first sizeable administrative undertakings by Yugoslav
emigration authorities came in connection with the establishment of the US and
Australian quota system; the Yugoslavs were obliged to control the fulfillment
of these quotas for the Kingdom of SCS. Apart from this limitation, no formal
restrictions existed on emigration from the Kingdom. Unofficial emigration
policies were used to facilitate the departure of national minorities and, con-
versely, to prevent an exodus of ethnic Yugoslavs from the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, but these regulations could not be publicly spelled out.
This hidden agenda was nevertheless carried out through confidential and ex-
trainstitutional orders that circulated among state personnel.
Only members of the German and Hungarian national minorities had the
privilege to get all necessary travelling papers in the shortest possible time
within the new restrictive guiding principles. While the state constitutive na-
tions (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) could not be issued passports before it was
approved by the central authorities on individuals basis, members of minority
nations received them at the first administrative level to which they applied.
During the 1920s, when those countries which had traditionally welcomed im-
migration imposed quotas which made this sort of state management over mi-
nority issues impossible, Yugoslav authorities turned their attention to less
favorable countries of the New World. In particular, Brazil became a destina-
tion which would play a special role in this area of Yugoslavias emigration
policy. Because it was perceived by emigration authorities as a dangerous
country with bad economic prospects, ethnically Slavic citizens (including even
minority Czechs, Slovaks and Poles of Yugoslav citizenship) were required to
complete an immense amount of paperwork and other administrative hurdles
before leaving for Brazil. According to the confidential order of 1924, not even
lone individuals of the state constitutive nations could go to Brazil without the
special permission of the Ministry of Social Policy. In case of Yugoslav family
units, the restrictions were even harsher since their migration would conflict
with the states demographic and military concerns. According to the set of
confidential orders issued between 1924 and 1926, members of state constitu-
tive nations could not emigrate anywhere abroad in family units without a spe-
cial permission issued by the ministry.
Throughout the period under review this basic segregation on the level of pass-
port procedure existed between Slavic and nonSlavic, national and
nonnational citizens. This policy accounts for the low levels of emigration
of Yugoslavs and the large share of nonSlavic minorities in the annual con-
tingents of emigrants from the Kingdom of SCS. This effort to prevent the
emigration of nationals and to favor the emigration of the nonnational
element was probably the only example of successful Yugoslav state inter-
vention into emigration affairs. As a result, emigration from the Kingdom of
SCS was, compared to prewar levels, was almost negligible. For these rea-
sons, Yugoslav emigration statistics should be taken to reflect, to a consider-
able extent, the effects of the state policy and administrative measures, rather
than taken alone as indications of the natural patterns of Yugoslav emigration
per se.
Under the new policy, the procedure of issuing passports became utterly com-
plicated. The discretionary rights given to officials opened the door for corrup-
tion and the financial exploitation of applicants. The abuses and lowlevel cor-
ruption damaged the reputation of the state, particularly the Belgrade admini-
stration, and discredited the noble cause of a great legislative and administra-
tive effort aimed at protecting emigrants from exploitation. The complete ad-
ministrative chaos, misconduct, and extortion from applicants reached a level
that one might wonder whether it would not have been better if the state had
not intervened in emigration matters at all. As for emigrants already settled
overseas, state authorities concern often did not go further than providing
channels for efficient transfer of their remittances home. In return, the steady
influx of hard currency was an essential contribution to the monetary stability
of the first Yugoslav state.
Apart from financial revenues coming from remittances, one of the great ex-
pectations of the Yugoslav emigration services was that eventually their coun-
try would benefit from a large number of emigrants returning to Yugoslavia
with new knowledge and technical skills. From this view, emigration might
prove highly useful and fully justified by state concerns. Yet Yugoslav authori-
ties would be disappointed. Returnees were usually those who dropped out
those who could not adapt themselves to the way of life and work in the highly
advanced societies of US, Canada or Australia. Immigrants who acquired some
knowledge were usually among those who decided to stay in these countries.
The position of female Yugoslav emigrants was marked by substantial legal
limitations in civil codifications and migration regulations produced by both
Yugoslavia and destination countries, and shaped by the eras patriarchal and
paternalist attitudes towards the role of women. According to the legal/societal
norms common at the time, a womans position was one of clear dependency
and subordination. In the domain of emigration affairs, women were expected
to follow their husbands (if married) or parents (if single), already settled in
destination countries. Exceptions were made rarely, and only to fiances emi-
grating to join their future husbands, and thus in transition from one tutelage
(that of parents) to another one (of future husband). Most destination countries
were not willing to allow the entry to unaccompanied women which made it
highly unlikely for independent unmarried woman to emigrate. The strict im-
migration rules concerning womens civil status caused such improper and
degrading practice as proxy marriage. Prior to 1929, even the citizenship right
of women was enjoyed through a male tutelage in the case of married Yugoslav
woman. Under the circumstances she might be even left without any citizen-
ship since the Yugoslav procedure for losing/obtaining citizenship was incom-
patible with those that existed in countries of emigration.
It is apparent that the emigration flows of the underdeveloped EastCentral and
Southeastern European countries did not fit into the patterns of the global labor
movements during the period of the first globalization (18461914). Together
with Polish territories and Bulgaria this applies also to Yugoslav prov-
inces/countries before 1914: numerically significant Croatian emigration was
part of a (lowwage) emigration stream incompatible with the Atlantic labor
market system, while Serbia itself created obstacles for the transoceanic emi-
gration of its citizens. The economic periphery of Europe was not entirely in-
corporated into the labor market system of the first globalization. Ironically,
the only global system into which these countries might have been fully inte-
grated was the one of trade tariffs and restrictions on the freedom of transport
and movement, imposed in the rest of the world during and after the First
World War.
Appendix
Emigration Authorities
Emigration Law of 30 December 1921333
Article 1
The Department of Emigration and Immigration is established within the Min-

istry of Social Policy. It has jurisdiction in all matters related to emigration and
governs all institutions authorized for controlling emigration and immigration.
Article 3
Diplomatic and consular offices of our Kingdom in countries and states with
large and important settlements of our emigrants are to be assigned an envoy
for emigration by the Emigration Department of the Ministry of Social Politics,
as a liaison/connection between the Department and our emigrants and for the
purpose of meeting their needs. This envoy is appointed by the Minister of
Social Policy, as agreed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his work he is
subordinate to the diplomatic representative or consul in charge. He is also
assigned assistant staff. In all larger settlements of our emigration, an Emigra-
tion Board with a secretary is established from/out of our emigration organiza-
tions. It cooperates with our consular and diplomatic authorities who are assist-
ing the envoy of Emigration Department abroad by intervening with foreign
authorities. The Minister of Social Policy is empowered to determine the scope
and tasks of emigrational authorities by a book of regulations.
Article 4
All the tasks regarding the emigrants, subjects of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes are under the competence of the Ministry of Social Politics and
its subordinated institutions.
In case their tasks correspond to authorities of other ministries, the Ministry of
Social Policy issues provisions in agreement with them.
333
Slubene novine, 21 February 1921, No. 39.
Article 5
Every year, the Ministry of Social Policy makes an exhaustive report about the
work of our emigration service, which is submitted to the National Assembly
either in writing or in printed form.
Police emigration regulations
Article 6
Emigration is free under this law, but the Minister of Social Policy can limit it
for a certain period of time and a certain country, if it is for the benefit of the
country or of the emigrants.
Article 7
As stipulated by this law, every citizen of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes who emigrates to the overseas states in order to earn money by man-
ual work or who emigrates to join her/his relatives who had previously emi-
grated under the same circumstances, is held to be an emigrant.
Article 8
An emigrant can only leave our territory with his traveling document (passport)
which is valid exclusively for traveling from a home port to the port of a coun-
try to which he is emigrating and can return into our country exclusively with a
passport which is valid for ports of the country he is leaving in order to get to
our port. Traveling via foreign European ports is forbidden.
The procedure for issuing passports to the emigrants is regulated by a special
decree of the Ministry of Social Policy and the Ministry of the Interior.
Article 9
Passport will be issued to an emigrant if he fulfils these requirements:

1. if he submits the document proving that he has completed all of his military
service obligations.
2. if he matches the immigration regulations of the country to which he is emi-
grating; the Minister of Social Policy is authorized to provide more precise
information on this issue by a particular regulation.
3. if he is at least 18 years old; in case he is younger, a passport will be only

issued to him together/collectively within the family passport if he travels with
family or with a person authorized by his father or tutor to be his escort for
which there should be an official approval issued by authorities.
4. if he proves with a document issued by the corresponding fiscal authorities
that he has paid all required taxes.
5. if there is no criminal trial against him, or if he has served his sentence in
case he was convicted.
Any attempt to evade these regulations, whether for oneself or for somebody
elses interest, will be punished by the strictest stipulations of this law.
Transportation of emigrants
Article 10
Only authorized [by State] steamship companies with embarkation from and
disembarkation in our ports can sell transport tickets to our emigrants and only
these companies can transport these persons. Such authorization [i.e. conces-
sion] is given by a decision of the Ministerial Council and cannot be allocated
[to another company].
Companies which apply for such authorization are subject to all stipulations of
the Law on emigration in regard to the transport of emigrants.
This authorization is valid in the whole territory of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes. The applicant shall specify in his application the site of
his intended representative agencies.
Article 11
Steamship tickets for transportation to oversea countries can be issued only for
steamships which are allowed embarkation and disembarkation in home ports
and they (the tickets) are valid only for embarkation and disembarkation in our
ports. The violation of this regulation has as a consequence the strictest pun-
ishments envisaged by this law.
Article 12
Steamship tickets can be issued only for steamships that comply with the regu-
lations of the orders of the maritime district of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes of December 19, 1919, Number 2200.
Prior to embarkation of passengers, each steamship shall be inspected by the

port authorities for the purpose of determining its compliance with the afore-
mentioned regulations.
Article 13
The steamship company which applies for the abovementioned authorization

must present a security deposit amounting to 500,000 dinars in a form which
will be prescribed by the Ministry of Social Policy. This amount will be re-
turned in case companys application is rejected or if it is stripped of the au-
thorization [concession]. The security deposit may consist of money in cash or
government bonds and it is to be deposited with the National Bank of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which will govern these assets at the
expanse of the depositor. Primarily, this security deposit is to serve as a guaran-
tee of the fulfillment of obligations the steamship companies have towards
emigrants, and for the execution of fines levied to punish the companies.
As soon as these amounts are reduced to 400,000 dinars, the steamship com-
pany is obliged to top up the amount to the prescribed 500,000 dinars.
Article 15
Transportation tickets are publicized in dinars; their sale in foreign currency is

forbidden in the country.
Article 19
A steamship company is obliged to return emigrant at its own expanse in case

he is denied entrance by immigration authorities of the country where he has
travelled.
Article 22
All rights and advantages provided by this law for emigrant citizens of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will apply also for emigrants subjects
of foreign states who embark from or disembark in ports of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
Sources
Archival sources
Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of Yugoslavia) AJ

Collection (39) of the Ministry of Social Policy of the KSCS
Collection (14) of the Ministry of Interior of the KSCS
Hrvatski Dravni Arhiv (Croatian State Archive) HDA

Ostavtina Artura Benka Grada [Collection of Artur Benko Grado]
(OABG)
Fond Iseljenikog komesarijata [Collection of the Emigration Com-
missariat] (1071)
Dr Ninko Peris Private Archive
Newspapers
Novosti (Belgrade)
Politika (Belgrade)
Socijalni preporoaj (Belgrade)
Domovina (Zagreb)
Iseljenike vijesti (Zagreb)
North American Review (Boston)
Organizovani radnik (Belgrade)
Slubene novine KSHS (Belgrade)
Cicvariev beogradski dnevnik (Belgrade)
Amerikanski Srbobran (Pittsburgh, PA)
Izseljeniki magazin (Sarajevo)
Jutarnji list (Zagreb)
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Stenografske beleke Narodne skuptine Kraljevine Srbije XCIX. [Stenographic
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Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957. Washington
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Zbornik zakona i uredaba u Kraljevini Srbiji. Belgrade: Kraljevskosrpska
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I PART: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND GLOBAL EMIGRATION TENDENCIES

1.1 Disturbances in World Emigration as a Consequence of the War 18

II PART: PATTERNS OF EMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION POLICY OF THE

2.1 Economic Underdevelopment The Ultimate Reason for Emigration? 55

2.2 Regulations and Effects of the Emigration Policy 68

2.3 Emigration Affairs and Minority Policy of Yugoslavia 92

2.4 Misconduct and Corruption of State Personnel 103

III PART: YUGOSLAV EMIGRANTS IN THE NEW WORLD 113

3.1 Emigrants on the Journey 113

ment from an underdeveloped country (Bangladesh) to the United States or

comparison with the broad examination of emigration in this monograph,

and archival materials. There is also no information on official Yugoslav emi-

system of immigration quotas. The issue is of great importance to later chap-

Goran Miloradovi18, Mile Bjelajac19, Zoran Janjetovi20, Ivan M. Beci21,

At this point I have to mention Belgrade University Professor Ljubodrag Dimi

I PART: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND GLOBAL

The restrictions on freedom of movement and transportation that began during

1.1 Disturbances in world emigration as a consequence of the

1.1.1 Passportization30 19141918

ministrative border control32. In both Germany and AustriaHungary, control

population movement in accordance with a wide range of newly introduced

1.1.2 Control of labor migration during the war

Table 1: The Average Annual Emigration from Europe:

Period 190610 191115 191620 192130 193140

Average annual 1,400,000 1,350,000 431,000 700,000 120,000

Source: Bade, Migration in European History, 1845.

1.1.3 Deportations and forced migrations

Labor shortages compelled belligerent state authorities to make use of prisoners

tinued to pacify local Albanians in KosovoMetohija, and the worst was to

much international concern if the traditional destination countries had main-

1.1.4 First World War and transatlantic migrations

War had an immediate impact on the volume of migration to America. An arti-

Figure 1: Immigration from NWE55 and ESE56 countries to USA (1913=100):

Source: Historical Statistics, 569.

Figure 2: Norway emigrants departing for USA from Christiana:

Courtesy, the KeystoneMast Collection, UCR, California Museum of Photography

Courtesy, the KeystoneMast Collection

1.2 Worldwide emigration restrictions in the 1920s: the end of

1.2.1 US immigration policy during the war and throughout the

There should be some immigration

Nonetheless, when reading accounts of American policymakers friendly and

Source: Historical Statistics, 569.

1.2.2 The introduction of the quota system and the Convergence

The American people want restric-

1.2.3 Immigration restrictions in British Dominion countries

The governments of Australia72, New Zealand73 and Canada introduced legal

Figure 5: New Zealand: Fears about Asian immigration:

1.2.4 Migration restrictions and control imposed by European

It was not only destination countries which imposed significant restrictions on

In its constitution, the German Weimar Republic proclaimed itself a country

overseas emigration was inescapable, it should at least be directed toward for-

1.2.5 Restrictions before worldwide restrictions: Polish territories,

arbitrarily determined by local authorities for each individual case.104 Once

Figure 6: Immigrants just arriving from foreign countries. Ellis Island:

Courtesy, the KeystoneMast Collection

Figure 7: Italian emigrants for USA:

Courtesy, the KeystoneMast Collection

1.3 Public Debates on Eugenics and Racial Criteria of the US