G.R. No.
101083 July 30, 1993 salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusio29546n therein of
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents, et. Al. and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined
by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis
of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island
of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with
the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising
from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation
and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents
of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also
joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with
this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed
a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident
to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall
now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific
legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court
notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause
of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot,
no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna
who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the
State to provide sanctions against
all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right
to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing
the same and, therefore, sanctions
may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
 Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance
would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and
grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing
and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3
thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared
the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for
the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall
ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true
value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared
a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and
(c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive
or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What
is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what
was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary,
and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot,
no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would
have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and
the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705,
as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts
shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts,
the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed
in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs.
Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and
the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is
that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-
impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate
change, has of late gained the attention of the international community.
Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the
destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude
of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the
wound no longer simply heals by itself. 2 But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism,
naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the
nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are
tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters,
rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these
agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not
seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records
are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not
mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on
bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic
past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the
past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and
slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference
of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil
Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water
quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the
complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts
of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the
clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion
and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which
reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily
liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and
to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the
continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila
Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a
balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
 (8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No.
6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be
ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted
concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club
followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the
Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples
collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the
amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most
probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No.
34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact
recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS
efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila
Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on
the study being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and
disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning
of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila
Bay
The CA Sustained the RTC
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under
the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which
nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when
refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and
maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily
involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of
the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its
mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill
should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates,
all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is
clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the
clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are
without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are
to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same
token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal;
in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such
services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their
duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such
duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation
of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts
to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court
directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its
Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and
desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But
to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up
an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in
this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924
creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the
MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include
formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal.
It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of
sanitary land fill and related facilities and the
implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum
criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which
provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator
shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec.
41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local
government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on
February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste
and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled
dumps.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted,
is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003,
but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal
system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to
exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its
solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal
basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling
statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19
of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand,
designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for
its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects
of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the
Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water
pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes
and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes]
measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and
abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water
Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management
Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan
which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining
areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein.
As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within
twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise
and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management
Framework within twelve (12) months following the
completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the
framework for each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management
area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and
is in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water
Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months
thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to
accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary
manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with
various government agencies and non-government organizations, has
completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive
action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated
as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of
some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to
fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the
territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several
towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages
as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of
the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control
over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and
regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and
evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to
construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water.
Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the
DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities,
inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation
to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and
sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan
to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative
Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to
promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA
8550), is, in coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other
concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and
surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in
Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable
basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating
with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards
in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the
development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic
resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning,
design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and
water resource development systems in accordance with national
development objectives and approved government plans and
specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA
7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to "flood control and
sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an
integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between
the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency
primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of
the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood
control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood
control and drainage services shall include the removal of structures,
constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and
esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent
laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised
Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979, 24 or the Marine
Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within
the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules
and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by
the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the
latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It
shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any
ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-
made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into
or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the
Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure
to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any
ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from
the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any
kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water
 from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank
of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any
navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed
into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or
by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or
may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution
of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13,
1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec.
86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the
PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions.
Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to
assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution,
the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the
enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution
within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in
Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which
both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said
law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. 25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to
establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national
port system in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover,
Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and
functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the
exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include
the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the
port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the
port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a
signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the Philippines, through
the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at
ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking
in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as
are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid
wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from
vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels
are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the
PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and
maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal
system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is
primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal
provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that
are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places,
such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting
in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or
non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or
operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste
management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA
7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities
occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency,
in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along
the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to
rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the
Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the
demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws
in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the
Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the
establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water
supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other
concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and
operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not
considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the
Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules,
the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the
proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation
clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these
companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on
environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec.
118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission
on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch
and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the
development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of
environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis
on waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under
Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the
efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as
to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives. 34
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or
the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State
shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish,
and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government,
among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention,
control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of
water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of
appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of
water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this
management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and
ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and
to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to
attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys
development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in
themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations
and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not
belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general,
not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality
of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up
water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his
failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall
undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against
the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the
subject, o, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the
Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however,
to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the
provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes
pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable
and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain,
remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense
to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered
unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the
event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the
polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR]
in coordination with other government agencies concerned,
shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations.
Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the
persons found to have caused such pollution under proper
administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost
incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund
or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is
more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to
this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency
in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment
Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific
pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the
twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec.
62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and
"accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in
removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore
it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous
substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions
and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely
direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment,
removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or
portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the
application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents,"
which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated
pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and
cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the
aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body
of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a
specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other
hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read
Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment,
removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to
petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even
expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its
Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution
accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the
Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the
bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a
delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec.
20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues,
coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has
contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the
phrase "cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not
hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup
operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even
in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way
state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them
to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect
its best usage." This section, to stress, commands concerned government
agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary
to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence
of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched,
indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the
pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left
behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall
undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners
assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay
only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite
off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the
Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies
to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at
them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20
of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup
mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In
this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17
and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court
wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of
environmental protection and management. This is better served by
making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to
specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the
implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the
fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope
that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a
general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing
with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of
PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be caused by
polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in
adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay.
Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person
who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an
individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila
Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in
the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous
and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be
categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies
concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to
apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not
be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters
has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been
required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident.
In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and
undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec.
20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup
situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and
the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water
quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the
cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants
found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped
from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just
be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set
by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the
Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the
bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin
them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the
Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level.
Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing
mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the
court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and
municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR)
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros
which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and
garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is
one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and
the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list.
And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously
addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse
these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR
Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal
structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the
building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and
other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas
and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone
of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along
their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zonelonger
than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial
establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other
major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be
treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and
waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the
duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up,
within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities
and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their
sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and
connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments
shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for
petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the
Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem
in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage
Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as
alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila
- the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an
alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep
into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are
used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a
large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding
areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous
contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated
into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now
more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of
the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec.
37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid
Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor
any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including
LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste,
be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further
that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period
of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone,
but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed
standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA
9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros,
and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid
waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper
disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila
sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are
violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water
bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from
vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage
or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the
introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic
environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine
litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of
carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or
harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air
transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes
to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive
departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their
respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and
completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the
nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as
a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in
the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back
the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those
mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals,
would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means
that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation
and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over.
Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle
down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus,
we must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform
their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay.
We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1)
that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform
and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind
and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal
provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and
the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to
future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of
the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and
the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99
are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC
Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain
its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No.
34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec.
19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR
is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of
the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular
coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of
action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code
of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG,
in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct
all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and
private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their
respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor
rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found,
these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments
and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time
to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from
flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under
pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to
provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste
water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where
needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts
and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient
and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the BFAR, is
ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is
also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with
each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other
existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is
ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and
dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into
the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the
violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and
projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila,
in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime
Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation
of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the
rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,
Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies,
shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into
the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1)
year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered
to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases
against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, 47 Sec. 27
of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA
9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all
licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying,
a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under
pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56
of RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention,
waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the
school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of
their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the
General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the
expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the
water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH,
DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the
Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in
accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former
is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration
dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926
of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration
and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such
province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which
applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is
absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree,
and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon
theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it
will recognize actual facts.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring
the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July
1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned
land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with
certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine
Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying
land for many years, and against the government which seeks to deprive
him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted
registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force
in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States,
and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty
years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession
thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for
the registration of certain land. The application was granted by the court
on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government of the Philippines,
and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes. The Court of
First Instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds
of law. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132,
and the case then was brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error
is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more
than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as
the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as
owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences
sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the
country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date.
His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and
he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his
father in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however,
had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and
again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees
then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps,
information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to
be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that
has been carried out by the Philippine government and the United States.
In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the
mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The
government has spent some energy in maintaining that this case should
have been brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We are of
opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The proceeding for
registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in
principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the
Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175
Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an assertion of legal
title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ
of error is the general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal
the exception, confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not
applying the general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134
U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v.
District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is
suggested that, even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it
registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903,
excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation. But
that act deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries,
purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law.
The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is entitled to
registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of 1902,
which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout
the Philippine Archipelago," 2, and authorized in general terms
applications to be made by persons claiming to own the legal estate in
fee simple, as the applicant does. He is entitled to registration if his claim
of ownership can be maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below --
namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the
government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title
to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private
titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown,
and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration
within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was
not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land;
that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the
plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far
correct that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the
date of the Treaty of Paris, to which the United States succeeded, it is not
to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is
true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general
attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled
to the treatment accorded to those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in
legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations,
the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it
does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the
United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on
one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree.
How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts,
are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor
General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was
brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It
seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made
his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical
position of Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the United States,
he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present
government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount
to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white
race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown
to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in
America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the
reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is
to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain.
By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the
property and rights acquired there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the
United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its
attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made
a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like
the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws."
5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from 12, it is
hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next
breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or
that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had
heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native
custom and by long association -- one of the profoundest factors in
human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered
to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands
where some, but not all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to
issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen hectares of public lands
actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898.
But this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the
occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued
for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to give rise to
the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We
hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had
not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes
afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the provision that we
have quoted as to the administration of the property and rights acquired
by the United States such land and property as shall be designated by the
President for military or other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what
property and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further
than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought
to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps,
be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish
law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether
justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry
us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond
the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to
decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes of the
Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the
conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course
as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not
discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that
he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited
by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that
the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any
royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants at will.
For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3
Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper,
to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the
origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed
nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754,
cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall
be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events,
the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was
recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to
lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in
the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that,
for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent
authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal
effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is
enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went
into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms
of the decree. But, it is said, the object of this law was to require the
adjustment or registration proceedings that it described, and in that way
to require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land. That
purpose may have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have
been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made "for
the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals." (We follow the translation in the government's brief.) It
does not appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied.
In Article 6, it is provided that
"interested parties not included within the two preceding
Page 212 U. S. 462
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years]
may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of
the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in
the following manner."
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to
be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not
asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are unlawfully enjoying
the possession, within one year, and threatens that the treasury "will
reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction
such part as it does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not
unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his
father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural
construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council of
state. That report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view
of the condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is important
to fix its status by general rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed
period legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two articles
twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then suggests that
interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their
possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who
may prove" possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook
the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words
"may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all,
but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost.
Page 212 U. S. 463
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were
capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment
had not been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the
withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was
disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the Court of Land Registration
for another recognition of the common law prescription of thirty years as
still running against alienable Crown land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law
present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legal
tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible
effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing
the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of
the whole case, we are of opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain.
Judgment reversed.
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules).
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of
the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays
that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their
Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise
filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR
asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of
those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al.
that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition
for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations
were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover
or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in
favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of
the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides
that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said
Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59,
63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371
and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of
1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which
he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does
not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3
(a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the
filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices
Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate
opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions
of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich
Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life."
Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner 1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-
looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates
tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient
texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy,
and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the
energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to
anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But,
by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with
history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which
appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state
ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties
of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct
sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to
interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our
history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill
the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to
correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal
System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private
property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the
land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands:
how acquired
 2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral
land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and
customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the
Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains
and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural
resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural
resources, control and supervision in their
development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on
ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra
vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural
resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is
allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural
resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be
harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the
International Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE
PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees
embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine"
or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by
the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law
14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias,
set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands
in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands,
territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown
and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper
and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order
that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias,
and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,
and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and
their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now
have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of
pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to them seem most
expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms,
plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers
appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those
who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue
of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest.
Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion
of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of
distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to
Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be
acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes
of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the
Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.
The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of
1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as
already amended by previous orders and decrees. 8 This was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the
"adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands
shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain
ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and
claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the
United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission,
passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case
of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership
of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into
peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-
in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial
treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs
on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to
the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that
their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of
prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to
the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not
owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the
basis of "those special laws which from earliest time have regulated the
disposition of the public lands in the colonies."10 The question posed by
the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription
as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it
recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing
for the disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood
that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the
Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July
5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly
the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and
the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion
de Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that
all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by
Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement
excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did
not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still
the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had
been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law
all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the
authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title
papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be
protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of
the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the
possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action
on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by
Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the
Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a
system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would
be restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced
the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to
issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's
instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and
up to the date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall
have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted,
may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents
by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will
at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to
present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and
valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their
lands, and they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of
lands "wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law,
and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree
and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus
as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a
deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has
always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did that the State remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there
was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain
the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere
possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of
the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect,
Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by
the Spanish Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on
the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has
been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open
to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands. 22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public
Land Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more
comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands
to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act
No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land
Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference
between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of
American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at
par with Filipino citizens and corporations. 24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the
Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of
1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public
and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is
said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land
Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and
procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert
Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South
Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an
official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. 26 The
certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the
parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system
highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation. 27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of
the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country.28There was an overwhelming sentiment in
the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State
ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to
secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by
the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the
provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. 31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8,
Article XIV on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation,"
to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of
Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may
be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong
to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim
is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous
Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in
Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and
defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given
is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among
members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding
15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a
non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated
consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are
given the right to self-governance and empowerment,34 social justice and
human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions,
institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop
their own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent
agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7)
Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic
areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island
groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the
Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern
Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions
of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon
Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary
laws and practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to
the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for
review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not
limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands
and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or
imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from 100,000.00 to
500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages. 40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples
(IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of
"IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations
(UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer
to a group of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-
ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and
who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of
conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous
religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a
group of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously
lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied,
possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since
time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance
to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who
inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain
some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and
mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the
Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and
are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi,
Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or
Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan;
Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva
Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of
Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and
Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of
Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid
or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental
Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon,
Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur;
Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta,
and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of
Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique,
Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and
Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of
Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-
Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal,
Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs
are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of
Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of
Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis
Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis
Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the
Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and
Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI.
They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte;
B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del
Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao
provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato;
the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of
Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of
South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South
Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao,
Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes
back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was
peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. 44 The strains
from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features
which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the
archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the
third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese
economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese
porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the
religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food
gathering became supplementary activities as reliance on them was
reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland,
coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially
homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature
was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign
tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored
similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not
harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure
and form. They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian
parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily communication
but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49 They
fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see,
but which they sensed to be part of their lives. 50 They had their own
religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the
soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking
deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities,
in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored
the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the
objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost
any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of
the relationship between man and the object of nature. 51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its
meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which
transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically a family-
based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each
barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the
chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare
and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the
functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and
was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were
handed down orally from generation to generation and constituted
the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and
chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community. 54 The
written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated
from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body
of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D.
Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code
of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various
subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime
and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption.
Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court
composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury."
Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved
by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of
private property in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in
the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family
with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each
individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil
and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. 58 This
ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of
mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status,
was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or
unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the
development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were
likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic
welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land
communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by
virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic
privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea,
were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from
danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. 61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the
archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established
and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-
tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were
within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. 62The
Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao
territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where
land was still held in common but was private in use. This is clearly
indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision
on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the
acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were
primitive economies where most production was geared to the use of the
producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not
economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis
of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked
to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and separate
communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565,
they found the Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered
along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on
the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered
Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish
government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the
natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of
ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of
community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the
church and convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts
were required to construct their houses around the church and the
unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the
Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian
indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal
point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make
the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long
run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization. 71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo
organization as well as all lands not assigned to them and the
pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land
grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the
introduction of the concept of public domain were the most
immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and
law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything
of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil
and religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious
practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were
the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the
lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim
communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous
communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was
favored by the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below
the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest
classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The
Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the
infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the
deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate
concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands
were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the
newly evolved Christian community.78 Their own political, economic
and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a
generally mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the
Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other.
Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and
historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited
both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine
Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes
are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government
should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them
in the path of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the
latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national
conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian
Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian"
referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more
directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation.
In 1903, they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the
BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among
unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a
"special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing
about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was
modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency
took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and
produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian
Filipinos. The raging issue then was the conservation of the national
patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to
effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social,
moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or
national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent
the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body
politic, creating the Commission on National Integration charged with
said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous
peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created
the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given,
more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American
regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the
colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of a
guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired
result. Like the Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at
integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal
wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas
swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86Knowledge
by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system
resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names.
With government initiative and participation, this titling displaced
several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples
were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government
in the name of national development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following
provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of
national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of
State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes"
or the "cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the
Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture
was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation and
implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI
and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National
Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the
ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and
at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their
original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short, while still
adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known
as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of
land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural
communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims. 91 In
1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was
created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's,
some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were
displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed
by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del
Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979
to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-
Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by
the Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations,
mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government
led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but
also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment. 94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of
integration to one of preservation. Invoking her powers under the
Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim
Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office
for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the
President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure
the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 96 This
Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral
lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live
in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the
Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less
accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-
government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of
the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs
that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the
population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal
with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult
for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions.
The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older
base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured
on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and
authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an
ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which
emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties
of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly
vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples'
existence. There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land
ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately
applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The
people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a
member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and
the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and
primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess
the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future
ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns
the land except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are
its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for
communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of
individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, 101 or
ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by
blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary
laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized
mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are
engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products,
and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms,
orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-
owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common
economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are
shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on
land also sanctions individual ownership.The residential lots and
terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right
to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of
an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. 103 Under
Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is
strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to
meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss
of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a
clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case
may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and
social system. The concept of individual land ownership under the
civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national
land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims
to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior,
if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine
indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their
joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two
Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No.
1728 was a consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the
Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en
toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which
was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second
Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his
sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous
peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro,
have long suffered from the dominance and neglect of government
controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers
to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos
were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of
their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural
resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to
this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their
ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early
years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first
introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13
February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to
legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or
grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the
ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first
inhabited and cared for the land long before any central government was
established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled
themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land-
include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants,
forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their
existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through
political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture
is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting
their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist
as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator
Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native
title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to
the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the
State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first
laid down in the case of Cario v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous
member of the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which,
in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been
overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No.
141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or
implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or
"private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite
the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American
occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored
in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during
the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine
Republic when government organized and supported massive
resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own
and possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the
principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State
and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle
mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap,
which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or
transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21)
Senators voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the
Committee on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and
subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio
Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of
similar implications that would promote, recognize the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's
obligation to assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved
and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained
long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and
promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters
seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality
the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos
that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we
fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of
preservation as mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that
the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cario v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior
to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes. 115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its
corresponding amendments, was approved on Second Reading with
no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE
THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property
of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the
Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over
ancestral domains and ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the
same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of
the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all
areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through
their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall
include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land
occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who
are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots,
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with
government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They
also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. 116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same
conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and
that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also
utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to
the procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO)
No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No.
2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and
ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's)
and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands
is a power conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification
and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have
a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all
the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The
identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in
Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under
the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious,
the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in
the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation of lands
within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate
(family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in
accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to
ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the
NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is
situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands
may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral
lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act
and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and
domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a
claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands
and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains
held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches.
These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of
native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition,
when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. 128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by
native title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership
peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains.
The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private.
(a) Cario v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case
of Cario v. Insular Government.130 Cariofirmly established a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land
registration court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet
Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by
his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences
around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated
some parts of the land. Cario inherited the land in accordance with
Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land
laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. 131 In 1901,
Cario obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his
possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek
a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his
petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation 133 was proclaimed over
his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the
property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cario, off
the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for
absolute ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine
Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which
reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cario's application.
The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying
the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian
doctrine and contended that Cario failed to comply with the provisions
of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land
claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the other, asserted that
he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land
never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
U.S. Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general
attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled
to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute,
and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had
such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist
upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and
how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide." 137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines.
The choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be
decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American
constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced
policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate
extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall
be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the
white race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been
shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the
whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated,
the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is
to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain.
By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes
at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United
States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It
is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United
States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude
in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill
of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall
be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have
quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which
had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land
what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest
factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case
like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like
this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give
the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as
far back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private
ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public
land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish
decrees upheld in the 1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S.
Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor
native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared
to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal
grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of
the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that
titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not
discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us
that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and
laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate
pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume
to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or
even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion
in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys
and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants,
directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of
feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain
beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never
held sway over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws
were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to
register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such
land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to
establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the
doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the
possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under
Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and
concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But
precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process
mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of
title.142 This title was sufficient, even without government administrative
action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes
explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law
present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition.
We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of
the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the
whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration
of the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name. 144
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically
refer to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-
General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never
was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish
Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials
would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration
to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and
which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever
may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in
the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to
that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies
which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to
enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title"
in the entire length of the Cario decision. It is observed that the
widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen
James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines
College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof.
Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law
Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land
Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty
tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and
development of Philippine land laws.147 He
discussed Cario extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to
Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said
case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept
of "native title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually
similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians.148 This is not
surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the
American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently
made in reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated
in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution
authorizing the provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their
domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake
Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned.
Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying
to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming
deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the
petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy
promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful
method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs,
improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in
which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission
to the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The
methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its
dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to
be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is
insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians
have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation
between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine
when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are
always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi
case are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet
it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States,
that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to
their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made
to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good
of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the
legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once
so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully
planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons
exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the
Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart
by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of
Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by
executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and
prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or
reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or
occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual
occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral
home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied
exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists
apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes,
recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy
rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries. 158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native
Americans' rights to land they have held and occupied before the
"discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest
definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of
aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2)
grants made by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme
Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private
persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the
Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the
court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old
world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants
of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them;
but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid
conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle
that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives
and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court
further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the
natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired
being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to
be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the
soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the
fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the
natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in
themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a
title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained
the exclusive right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles.
Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland-
did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The
mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims
to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised
its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands
occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer
purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then
that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians
could not convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself
to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to
nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned. The
claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged
with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring
that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the
present day, proves the universal recognition of this principle. 163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and
their native lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the
government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this
case, the State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons
residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from
the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high
misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not
obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for
interfering with the treaties established between the United States and the
Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse
with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on
some foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for
their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country.
That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged
under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the
British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the
United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of
the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States,
and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United States
which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection
of one more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national
character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations
with distinct territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy
over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts
to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as
nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that
protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of
1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region
claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates
imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation,"
so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x
x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in
conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our
Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of
the discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as
the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was
subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged
the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the
Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer
nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-
either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing,
extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian
title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the
different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as
occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in
themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that
although fee title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the
discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the
United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was
nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy
of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title,
which it accorded the protection of complete ownership. 171 But this
aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the
whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically
recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of
occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. 173 It
is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as
sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal
title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and
occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title
must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot
be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen. 176 Such title
as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the
individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal
property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the
tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which
is ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other
disposal under general laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is
deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and
occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the
reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is
extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on,
or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them. 181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the
ancestral land claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are
clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits
can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal
title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether
jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the
Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over
their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S.
as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not
specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by
Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against
encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to
recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands, 186 the power
of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched. 187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting
sovereignty over the ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA,
however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application
in the Philippines vis--vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title
will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and
enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the
land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and
was never public. Cario is the only case that specifically and
categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases
citing Cario did not touch on native title and the private character
of ancestral domains and lands. Cariowas cited by the succeeding
cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the
Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the
Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public
agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the
Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed
to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The
land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court
declared that the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has
an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh
Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act
and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive
prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify
long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner
of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary
citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities195 that
converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a
torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land
Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the
IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs
over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of
registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration
Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however,
has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act
141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members
of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned
ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same
in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less
than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option
to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are
agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural, residential,
pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty
(20) years from the approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over
their individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to
ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually,
not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of
owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years,
which claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may
be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are
agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential,
pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as
public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18%
or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with
lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands
"declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on
which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other
valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows
registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since
ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail
of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen
per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land
for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be
exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of
approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.
Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four
categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d)
national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of
the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any
one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The
spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs
which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of
sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that
"Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." 202 It is
the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over
their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act
recognizes the concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership
is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to
Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free
patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the
same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner
of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or
prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural
public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate
tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued
to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four
hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable
or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he
files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public
Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.
 (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was
originally public agricultural land but because of adverse possession
since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial
confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and
continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper
application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or
administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate
as entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil
Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429.
This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to
the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under
Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes
the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the
right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from
the thing what it produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its
use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the
thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing
owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such
thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP
to a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT).
The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of
the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of
ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources
found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity.
The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral
domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs
to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It
likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of
ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains
are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private
simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private
character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by
the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself
provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or
not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal rights,
however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the
Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand
partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly
provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a
right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary
law of the community but of the very community itself. 212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over
real property, much less corporate condominium rights. A
corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to
an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.213 Every
stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the
corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present
possessors of the land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs,
past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the
ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The
domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It
belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of
ownership. The lands are communal. These lands, however, may be
transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members
of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions;
and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of
15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new
concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under
customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized
under the Civil Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil
Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no
codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any
applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can
define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the
IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not
depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically
acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept
and the laws on land titling and land registration. 221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without
a paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title.
This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be
recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs
over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is
"belongingness" to the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of
having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful
nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of
usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through
perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man
and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. 222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the
Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over
ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and
possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and
protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over
lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
 by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to
Section 56 hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands
and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the
right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon
the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project; and the right to effective measures by the government
to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment
upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the
territory and not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be
relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor
through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs
as a result of natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to
resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can
have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate
the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into their
domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the
ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems for the
management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim
parts of the ancestral domains which have been reserved for
various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in
accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is
located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and
possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized
and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the
right to transfer land or property rights to/among members of
the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of
the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the
transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or
devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted
by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP
shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d)
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made
by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership
includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to
resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of
migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to
claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to
resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over
the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to
transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or
non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to
ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to
domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources
Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership
Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of
natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may
be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides
that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may
undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization
of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary
power and responsibility in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake
the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation
by the private sector through co-production,224joint venture,225 or
production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period
of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress,
may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the
President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements
with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of
agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may
apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale
mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor
using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy
mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and
limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred
places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies
of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this
enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional
hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing
grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural
resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of
ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all
other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes
Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is
Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over
lands, waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them
at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall
include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess,
the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover
ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources.
The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through
fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable
price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of
ownership over "lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural
resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the
law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to
claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land.231 The
IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources.
Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land
within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that
speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over
these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules was not specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners.
Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules
in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation
of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural
resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of
the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of
the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in
Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to
Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits
from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein;
the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation
and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b)
of the IPRA enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied;
 b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within
the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation
and utilization of the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these
rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right
to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and
share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and
"negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the
purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and
conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the
terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their
exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral
domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural
resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take
the form of management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use
these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate
the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs
must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral domains are
conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these
resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to
national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must
be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources
as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural
resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest
dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated
who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and
survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to
manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very
nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of
the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs
shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains.
A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in
the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than
twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is
entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community,
pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such
operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial
powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs
under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives
the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale
utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial
or other extensive use that require technology other than manual
labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member
of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the
natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of
not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be
done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the
non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage
and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the
ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof.
Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of
priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these
resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over
the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an
affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the
ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the
Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light
of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of
IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly
undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources
by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources
are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise
enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow
such non-member to participate in its agreement with the
ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-
ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement
shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the
ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4)
options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development
and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them
for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an
agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or
juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to
participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically
give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is
within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover,
there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within
their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour
always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State
does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their
exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to
the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their
subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural
resources by the following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing,
renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into
any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the
NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain.
Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is
conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP
without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs
concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency
or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new
concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there
is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this
Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the
exploitation of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted
by all departments and government agencies without prior certification
from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only
after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free
and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-
compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the
right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or
government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the
issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources,
that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does
not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to
determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or
agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent
thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to
agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the
ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains,
Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-
imperialism stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received
a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the
decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the
possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right
of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human
Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought
to the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and
Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights
and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were
founded,239 and during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the
international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was
the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns
against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have
since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the
world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the
international scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity
focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the
destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the
national governments' inability to deal with the situation. 241Indigenous
rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental
protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the
international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of
applying policies, programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some
nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a
result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America.243 The
World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its
projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the
projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of
ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights
within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The IPRA
amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international
category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was
adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No.
107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made
it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples
"with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier
standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise
control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been
plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences were
carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the
imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or
derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in
the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of
contemporary problems.252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was
made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of
myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of
history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino
people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e.,
if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of
the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF
KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y.
SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all
those similarly situated, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------
- x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED
NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS
PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER,
KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan,
which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for
titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery
white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier
Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003
inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of
Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by
named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular
3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to
have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession
of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the
coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were
planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants
declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. 12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego
with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of
their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay
Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the
Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. 15 The titles were
issued on
August 7, 1933.16
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 26 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each
side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando
Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with
this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots
in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of
pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned
first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither
mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land
Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required
period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is
an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705.
Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only
the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is
a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-
claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No.
173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do
not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of
190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by
Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by
then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 39issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these
laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and
such other classes as may be provided by law, 41 giving the government
great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to
the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 45 The
doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up
to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed
of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who
shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what
terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of
obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories
and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 50 The
Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation
that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the
Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant
Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the
lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be
actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the
lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only
be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely:
(1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or
title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines
under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By
this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were
classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and
timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal
of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by
lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of
"agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural
lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v.
Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens
system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed
Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced
the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease
of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of
persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the
public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten
(10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new,
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act
No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to
the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No.
2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, 72 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which
now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use
of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the
decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration
of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the
effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording
of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No.
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to
codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It governs
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 81 In fact, Section
8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands
which have been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There
must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions
of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay
was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a
statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown."90
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced.
These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay
Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner
through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open
to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no
legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926,
it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus
evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands.
By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the
public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the
Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant
for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act
No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.
Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was
proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts
could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption.
In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-
General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a
tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land.
There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the
forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that
it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than
it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient
to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some
mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands
are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral
land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove
swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of
said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter
case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question
of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by
virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what
portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry
or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of
lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became
private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in
Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the
President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then, courts no
longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were
issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for
determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to
resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts
were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification.
Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707
mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was
decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally
different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential
lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and
if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled
that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public
domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act
No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already
stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the
Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also
contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for
the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply
for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v.
Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open
to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the
lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the
public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands
of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines
a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not
been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in
Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under
PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the
island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to
pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist
destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso
beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of
its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will
destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily
refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified
as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and
"forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain
as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the
land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus
of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if
its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or
the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared
as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island
as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to
private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII,
Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands
merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5
of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when
it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits
of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine
reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated
efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine
environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the
areas alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay
Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera
in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron
Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin
Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas
mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition.
That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the
proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the
public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have
no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. 123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation
likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center
line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was
within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under
PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No.
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705
did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land.
Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition. 125 (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass
of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system
of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of
Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under
the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined,
or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural
land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying
on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801,
must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our
present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied
for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of
the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite
period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being
of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this
Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June
12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having
been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested
millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say
their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor
do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently
occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on
the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with
their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of
years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should
prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic
ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now
classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title
does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their
possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales
patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants
to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill 133 now
pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar
bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may
not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification
of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no
longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect
its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between
progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover
on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and
highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. 135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED
SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES,
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES,
Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal
Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of
God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of
the Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM
J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII
ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent,
SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER
(FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG,
FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as
representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN,
CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND
FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS
ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity
as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the
Taon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN
ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental
Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for
Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its
Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court, concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which
allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Taon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated
between the islands of Negros and Cebu. 2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents
from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross
violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and
municipal laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to
nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection
with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to
compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent
documents involving the Taon Strait Oil Exploration Project.4
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and
around the Taon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos
(Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards")
who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon
Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-
governmental organization, established for the welfare of the marginal
fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon
Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal
capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as
then Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as
then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then
DENRRegional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Taon
Strait Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and existing under
the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public
respondents: Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios
(Labios), in their capacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and
then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively. 6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the
DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-I 02
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Taon Strait. The studies included surface
geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon Strait. 7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102
into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Taon Strait.8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and
around the Taon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's
underwater composition.9
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-
phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters
of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Taon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact
Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related
Measures And For Other Purposes."11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board 12 of the
Taon Strait (PAMB-Taon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-
001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of
JAPEX's application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to
the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in
Taon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to
drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted
until February 8, 2008.16
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to
this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated
December 1 7, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be
enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the
1987 Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike 17 its name as a
respondent on the ground that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. In
support of its motion, it submitted the branch office application of
JAPEX,18 wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly identified. SOS
claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its
oil and gas exploration activities in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS' s
motion on the ground that it was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was
patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS admitted that "it is in law a (sic)
privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration activities
in Taon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They
argued that it would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had
not yet been joined in the case; and that it was "convenient" for SOS to
ask the Court to simply drop its name from the parties when what it
should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to join it in its
motion to enable proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also asked the Court to"
implead JAPEX Philippines as a corespondent or as a substitute for its
parent company, JAPEX.19
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and
G.R. No. 181527.
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested 20 that they were adopting in
toto the Opposition to Strike with Motion to Implead filed by petitioners
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771.
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation 21 that they
were not objecting to SOS's Motion to Strike as it was not JAPEX's
resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did not file any comment at
all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the
parties were given ample chance and opportunity to answer the issues
herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to
again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution
of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771
and 181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The February 7, 2012 Resolution 22 reads as follows:
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Taon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other
Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527
(Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo
Reyes, et al.). - The Court Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit
to RE-SEND the resolution dated September 23, 2008 to the following
parties and counsel, together with this resolution:
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above
addresses on February 23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX
Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of special appearance, filed a
Motion to Admit23 its Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH
requested to be clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February
7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it
has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had already
stopped exploration activities in the Taft. on Strait way back in 2008,
rendering this case moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a
Motion for Extension of Time25 to file its Memorandum. It stated that
since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution on February 23, 2012,
it had until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then
asked for an additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some
time to consider its Motion for Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution26 granting JAPEX PH's
Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification. This Court, addressing
JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification, held:
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various
issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two primary
issues:
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic
principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot
and academic under the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it
necessary to resolve these consolidated petitions as almost all of the
foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that
SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood
issues raised undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents'
contested actions are capable of repetition.
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they
have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of
international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and
for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to
demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral
international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed,
under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of
their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes
in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the
affected residents of Taon Strait and as stewards of the environment
since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to
protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine. 43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this
Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of
epistolary jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine
Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons,
viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties, plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the claiming party, the counter-
claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The
term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant
in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party
defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing
out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of
them were still unborn.45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their
claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals,
which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents
argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure
to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this
case.46 Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public
respondents claim that absent any proof that former President Arroyo had
disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such
acts remain to be her own.47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of a real
party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be
given legal standing in actions before courts of law is not new in the field
o f animal rights and environmental law. Petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v.
Rogers C.B. Morton,49 wherein Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting to
the conventional thought on legal standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put
neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental
issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name
of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by
roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. x
x x. Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a
legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The
corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable
adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation
is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it
represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes,
estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that
feels the destructive pressures of modem technology and modem life.
The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or
nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear,
and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who
enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for
the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a
meaningful relation to that body of water-whether it be a fisherman, a
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger-must be able to speak for the values
which the river represents and which are threatened with
destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek
to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to
comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own
1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the
action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed
by a representative, viz.:
Rule 3 was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the claiming party, the counter-
claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The
term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant
in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party
defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may
be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists
that not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing
because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation
of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many
environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to
show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of
the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental
cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments
in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far
as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the
current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating
court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish
all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be
governed by their respective provisions.52(Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the
Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases
as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated
in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.) Although this petition
for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there
is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission55held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do
not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general
rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on
the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed
the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."56 Furthermore, we said
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not
even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined
as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following
reasons, which we quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and
resident of Malacailang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the
Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as an
unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and
undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your
Petitioners' habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an
unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking her
signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications
that may hereafter arise by reason of her official relations with public
respondents under the alter ego principle in political law. 58 This is
incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should
be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant
and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be
joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party
defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the
jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through
its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a
petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a
denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including
former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to
implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former
President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy
against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention."59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as
one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title
of this case.
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision
or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because
JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that
SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance
agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same
provision.61 The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos62 laid down the guidelines for a valid service
contract, one of which is that there must exist a general law for oil
exploration before a service contract may be entered into by the
Government. The petitioners posit that the service contract in La Bugal
is presumed to have complied with the requisites of (a) legislative
enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
(such as Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Law of 1995,
governing mining contracts) and (b) presidential notification. The
petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining
contracts under Republic Act No. 7942, does not apply in this case. 63 The
petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46
as it is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
subsequent laws, which enunciate new policies concerning the
environment.64 In addition, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our natural
resources,65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of
FTAAs or Financial Technical Assistance Agreements.66
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and
asseverate that SC-46 does not violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of
paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and
3, which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are not
applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant exclusive fishing rights
to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's right to
preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources. 67
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by
law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts
are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that
the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did
not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted
in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with
safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime, to wit: Summation of the
ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful
reading of the Con Com deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers
used the term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving
either technical or financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the
1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or
eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards
that would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital
law regime. In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent
abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits
to Filipino citizens -- and corporations at least 60 percent of which is
owned by such citizens -- the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino
capital and the felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals
and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that
would be considered adequate and reasonable. But some of them, having
more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether; for
them, the provision would permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the
nation's natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for
Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were
heard by the entire body. They sounded off their individual opinions,
openly enunciated their philosophies, and supported or attacked the
provisions with fervor. Everyone's viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony
-- including paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign
corporations as an exception to the general norm in paragraph 1 of
Section 2 of the same article --was resoundingly approved by a vote of
32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical
Or Financial Assistance Are
Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to
in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973
variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as
principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the
foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how,
and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies
(DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire
operation.68
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established
that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to
paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards
this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a
general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions
and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the
President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President
shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an
opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46
is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the
1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization
of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential
Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This
was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the
discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization
of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the
maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the
Philippine Government.70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87,
although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would
have been done expressly by Congress. For instance, Republic Act No.
7160, more popularly known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
expressly repealed a number of laws, including a specific provision in
Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. - (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No.
112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other
decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related
to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No.
1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund;
Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended;
Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526,
632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no
force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as
it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended
insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code:
Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section
12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
972, as amended, and
 (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No.
87 had not yet been expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed.
As we held in Villarea v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied
repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are
in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile
them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper Mining
Corporation,72 we said:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted
and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed
to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the
Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. 73 This
Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections 74 expounding on
this point, pronounced:
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather
than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a
statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. x x x. (Citation
omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is
prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the
standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service
contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No.
87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be
discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource
in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS75 area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not
submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress
be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not
only to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of
the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 1306. The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (Italics
ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 76 this Court held that:
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a
contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law
which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and
govern the relations between the parties. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that
the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration
of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only
by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to
the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have
neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the
execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego
principle," their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's,
cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres,77 we explained the concept
of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and
its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4,
Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere
formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have
explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers
of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during
the martial law regime."78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which
will only render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied
with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in
the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the
contract. Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 79 held:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes
the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into
by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the
President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and
utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power
cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President
had any participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually
the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her
disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter
into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute,
but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the
exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of
paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are
meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may
easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President
has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required
that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval
for the execution of any contract under said statute, as shown in the
following provision:
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. -Every
contract herein authorized shall, subject to the approval of the President,
be executed by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public
notice pre-qualification and public bidding or concluded through
negotiations. In case bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted
or the bids submitted are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being
disadvantageous to the Government, the contract may be concluded
through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum
operations, any of the following alternative procedures may be resorted
to by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to
harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the aforementioned provision of
Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency
or subordinate official has been authorized by the President to enter into
such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at least
shown that the President subsequently approved of such contract
explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of
Republic Act. No. 9147 or the Wildlife Resources Conservation and
Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil
and gas deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
(NIPAS Act), which allows the exploration of protected areas for the
purpose of information-gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 914 7. The said petitioners further claim that SC-46 is
anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998, which protects the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of
municipal waters, with the exception being limited only to research and
survey activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under
Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, the gathering of information must be in
accordance with a DENR-approved program, and the exploitation and
utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a general law passed
by Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR
approved program nor a general law passed by Congress, the seismic
surveys and oil drilling operations were all done illegally. 81 The FIDEC
likewise contends that SC-46 infringes on its right to the preferential use
of the communal fishing waters as it is denied free access within the
prohibited zone, in violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of
the 1987 Constitutional provisions on subsistence fisherfolk and social
justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the provisions in
Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in
municipal waters, should be deemed to have been rendered inoperative
by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and Republic Act No. 7160,
which reiterate the social justice provisions of the Constitution. 83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and
argue that Section 14 of the NIP AS Act is a more particular provision
and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by the more general
prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that
Section 14, under which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an
exemption to Section 27.84 Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R.
No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No.
9147, the public respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the
exploration of minerals, which as defined in the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995, exclude energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas,
radioactive materials and geothennal energy. Thus, since SC-46 involves
oil and gas exploration, Section 27 does not apply. 85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it
does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does not
violate the rule on preferential use of municipal waters. Moreover, they
allege that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project area, contrary to
the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of
the declining fish catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation
is unfounded. They claim that according to the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the reduced fish catch started in the
1970s due to destructive fishing practices.86
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void
for being violative of the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on
the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a guide
for the Government when executing service contracts involving not only
the Tafion Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners allege
that SC-46 is in violation of several laws, including international ones,
their arguments focus primarily on the protected status of the Taon
Strait, thus this Court will concentrate on those laws that pertain
particularly to the Taon Strait as a protected seascape.
The Taon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of
Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of
marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For
this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Taon Strait
as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 -
Declaring the Taon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros
Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP
AS Act and shall be known as Taon Strait Protected Seascape. During
former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Taon
Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum
and sustained use of the resources in that area without threatening its
marine life. He followed this with Executive Order No. 177, 87 wherein
he included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a
member of the Taon Strait Commission, to represent the LGUs
concerned. This Commission, however, was subsequently abolished in
2002 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order
No. 72.88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIP AS Act
to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage.
The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and
biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine.90 It classifies
and administers all the designated protected areas to maintain essential
ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic
diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. 91 The
following categories of protected areas were established under the
NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
 b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or
international agreements which the Philippine Government is a
signatory.92
Under Section 4 of the NIP AS Act, a protected area refers to portions of
land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological
significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected
against human exploitation.
The Taon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and
declared a protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The
NIP AS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national
significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land
while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation
and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this
areas;93 thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect
and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural
conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking
any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC
under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals
of the NIP AS Act shall be implemented.95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in
1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person,
partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared
environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC
issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. 96Pursuant
to the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally
critical areas,97 Proclamation No. 214698 was enacted, identifying the
areas and types of projects to be considered as environmentally critical
and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No.
2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally
critical area as "an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that
significant environmental impacts are expected if certain types of
proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented in
it";99 thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,"100 is
undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and
predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment. 101An EIA
is described in detail as follows:
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - process that involves
evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project (including
cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction,
commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the
community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the
project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee,
affected communities and other stakeholders.102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Taon Strait is an environmentally
critical area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore,
any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to
determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures
in obtaining an ECC103 and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in
Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, due to the following reasons:
1) The Taon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information
on possible energy resources; and 3) Measures are undertaken
to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least
damage to surrounding areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for
activities which are outside the scope of the management plan for
protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment
as required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall
be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the
Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances
where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall
plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and the preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The
proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the
policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict nature
reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the
purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys
shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the
DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the
public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress.
Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within NIP
AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIP AS Act are not without
exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the purpose of
surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIP
AS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court
explained why a statute should be construed as a whole:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated
by one general purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section and so
as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine the attention
to the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of
construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological
dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated
from its context, some particular definition given by lexicographers, and
then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An
instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained
from the context, the nature of the subject treated of and the purpose or
intention of the parties who executed the contract, or of the body which
enacted or framed the statute or constitution. x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption
from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section
14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy
resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated m
Section 2 of the NIP AS Act, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact
of man's activities on all components of the natural environment
particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and
industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities
of the environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to
sustain human life and development, as well as plant and animal life, it
is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people
of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system
of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as
provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features,
possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a
holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective
administration of this area is possible only through cooperation among
national government, local government and concerned private
organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must
be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly
remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats
of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic
zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all
of which shall be designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to
secure an ECC prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required
the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic
surveys were done in the Taon Strait, no such environmental impact
evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management
plan of the Taon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section
12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586,
which provides:
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas
and Projects. - The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative
or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said
critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize
such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or
instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel,
and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall:
(a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s)
or area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental quality standards; (c)
develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective
measures against calamitous factors such as earthquakes, floods, water
erosion and others, and (d) perform such other functions as may be
directed by the President from time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second
sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this violation. The following
penalties are provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the
NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty
involving violations of the ECC requirement:
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership
found violating Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in
the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the
standards, rules and regulations issued by the National Environmental
Protection Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the
suspension or cancellation of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an
amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) for every
violation thereof, at the discretion of the National Environmental
Protection Council. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIP AS Act entails the following fines and/or
imprisonment under Section 21:
SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and
regulations issued by the Department pursuant to this Act or whoever is
found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the
preceding section shall be fined in the amount of not less than Five
thousand pesos (5,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing damaged or imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years, or both, as
determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation
or restoration as determined by the court, the offender shall be required
to restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages: Provided,
further, that court shall order the eviction of the offender from the land
and the forfeiture in favor of the Government of all minerals, timber or
any species collected or removed including all equipment, devices and
firearms used in connection therewith, and any construction or
improvement made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an
association or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly
responsible for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided, finally,
that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties consistent
with this Act. (Emphases supplied.) Moreover, SC-46 was not executed
for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy
resources in the Taon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and
obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in
commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential
Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service
contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Taon
Strait is a NIPAS area.106Since there is no such law specifically allowing
oil exploration and/or extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer
necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these consolidated
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are
GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding
Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A.
ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan
to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing
concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents
of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of
garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by
the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for
adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court
by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as
G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the
Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January
29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin,
Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-
complaint2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop
the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health
of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation,
monitoring and test sampling of the leachate3that seeps from said
dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River.
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required
under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA,
acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the
water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it
indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have
contaminated the sample during collection or handling.7 On December 5,
1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government
of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation
was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City
Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management
Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on
August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the
December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order
enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping
operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine
National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting
the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area
being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on
September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the
issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In
its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as
the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology
within its territorial jurisdiction.9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which,
at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-
retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on
the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution
Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject
matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of
the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order
consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an
earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John
Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however,
maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent
of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion
to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's
motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and
on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order
which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the
Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further
orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the
aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10,
1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and
at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court
of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1)
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over
the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor
of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist
from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A.
Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration
and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent
motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous
situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to
collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore,
imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient
leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this
garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the
Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose
of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by
the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if
it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained
or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at
10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building,
Court of Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on
December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of
Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR
or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his
duly authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15,
1992 to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with
respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of
respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will
submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the
merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.15Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the
dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding
that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try,
hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist
order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is
within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna
Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the
preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and
desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary
restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage
at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject,
however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said
area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works
contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found
on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference
and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding
restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon
LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer
that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-
issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the
proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its
enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage
at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this
date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the
need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance
of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as
to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter
remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a
local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the
Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of
the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the
inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist
order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over
which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on
the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise
known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive
Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to
institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan
or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance
from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned
ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative
agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive
Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The
authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance
with the provisions of this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions
and the time within which such discontinuance must
be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such
conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for
the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the
discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may
also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued
under this Order whenever the same is necessary to
prevent or abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of
appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities
for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and
its implementing rules and regulations and the orders
and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and
totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to
LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are
applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of
government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue
of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a
determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have
the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage
in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality
of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by
such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the
environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of
a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16
of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the powers
and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission
created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR
Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains
to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the
special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy20 of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna
and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan21 with
due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems,
and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA,
by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all
plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed
its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its
charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation
that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in
Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA,
as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is
also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental
Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case
was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR
when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the
representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the
possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows
down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and
authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin
open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws,23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of
injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution."24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d)
explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue
and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the
City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984
which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927,
series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the
conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question
when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the
LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the
effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency
has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise
a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.26 In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order"
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board
v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court ruled that the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and
desist order when there isprima facie evidence of an establishment
exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano,
declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge
of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and
other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made
to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course
may take several years. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted
and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as
the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting
vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied
in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987
Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
 The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the
correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the
declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them."28 It is to be
borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which
recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a
proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the
first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of
conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders,
has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary
legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement
or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with
sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the
Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector,
insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant
to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders
issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed,
resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are
beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the
Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are
concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised
which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with
the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B.
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001
and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5
November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed
against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper
Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading
to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed
a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed
out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners
in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with
violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD
1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic
Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), 9 and
Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds:
(1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice
charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric
Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when
the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the
Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or
justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC 12 initially
deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of "indubitable ground for
the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled
petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners
motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997
("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order
and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article
365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to
"mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit
and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due
to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent
pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the
very term and condition required to be undertaken under the
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the
Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence
necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the
elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant
to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In
other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of
the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the
parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid
laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine
Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for
[v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD
1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the
aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute
violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48
and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and
96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to
be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the
common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic]
damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes
not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for
the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution
for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. 13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining
charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997,
petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order
in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making
of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the
arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for
violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional
Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942.
Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that
portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents appeal was raffled
to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38 ordered public
respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside
the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated.
Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch
94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion
that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses,
as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each
other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each
other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which
resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis
for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct
offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements
of each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require
[sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not
although they stemmed from a single act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1)
the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the
Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of
mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16Petitioners further
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation
of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained
of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs
the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Branch 94s ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash
the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section
3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the
grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section
3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public
respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for
being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged
to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the
second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under
Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first
sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to
the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are
for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in
character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that
the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly
absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of
these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence
that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against
the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court
equally finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion
to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their
motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one
should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused
for more than one offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for "the same offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we held
that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
present.28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners
claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with
approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA
7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on
which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not
required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and
the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities
concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in
the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942
(Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One
can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the
absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of
its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take
the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved
is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself.
In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under
this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or
lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure
the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog
and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused
satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It
does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water
Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element
of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required
under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of
mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river
system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished
by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners,
although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA
7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In
particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law
seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal
in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric
power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a
City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that
it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same
but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an
ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription
against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence
in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas
City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal
Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereofand that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This
is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision
involved which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of
the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or
prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x
x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of
double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national
statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of
Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same
offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same
incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court
of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170599 September 22, 2010
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and HON. GENERAL
MANAGER CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. (in its capacity as operator of SM
CITY MANILA), Respondent.
The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on February 4,
2002 by the Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater
collected from herein respondent's SM City Manila branch. The results
of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from the said
facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water
imposed in accordance with law.4
On March 12, 2002, the LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation,
directing the same to perform corrective measures to abate or control the
pollution caused by the said company and ordering the latter to pay a
penalty of "One Thousand Pesos (1,000.00) per day of discharging
pollutive wastewater to be computed from 4 February 2002, the date of
inspection, until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater."5
In a letter6 dated March 23, 2002, respondent's Pollution Control Officer
requested the LLDA to conduct a re-sampling of their effluent, claiming
that they already took measures to enable their sewage treatment plant to
meet the standards set forth by the LLDA.
In an Order to Pay7 dated October 2, 2002, herein petitioner required
respondent to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) which
represents the accumulated daily penalty computed from February 4,
2002 until March 25, 2002.
In two follow-up letters dated July 2, 20028 and November 29,
2002,9 which were treated by the LLDA as a motion for reconsideration,
respondent asked for a waiver of the fine assessed by the LLDA in its
March 12, 2002 Notice of Violation and Order of October 2, 2002 on the
ground that they immediately undertook corrective measures and that the
pH levels of its effluent were already controlled even prior to their
request for re-sampling leading to a minimal damage to the environment.
Respondent also contended that it is a responsible operator of malls and
department stores and that it was the first time that the wastewater
discharge of SM City Manila failed to meet the standards of law with
respect to inland water.
On January 10, 2003, the LLDA issued an Order10 denying respondent's
request for a waiver of the fine imposed on the latter.
On April 21, 2003, respondent submitted another letter11 to the LLDA
requesting for reconsideration of its Order dated January 10, 2003.
On May 27, 2003, the LLDA issued another Order to Pay12 denying
respondent's request for reconsideration and requiring payment of the
fine within ten days from respondent's receipt of a copy of the said Order.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA praying
for the nullification of the Orders of the LLDA dated October 2, 2002,
January 10, 2003 and May 27, 2003.
On June 28, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition of
herein respondent and reversing and setting aside the assailed Orders of
the LLDA. Ruling that an administrative agency's power to impose fines
should be expressly granted and may not be implied, the CA found that
under its charter, Republic Act No. 4850 13 (RA 4850), the LLDA is not
expressly granted any power or authority to impose fines for violations
of effluent standards set by law. Thus, the CA held that the assailed
Orders of petitioner, which imposed a fine on respondent, are issued
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied
by the CA via its Resolution dated November 23, 2005.
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the petition
for certiorari filed by respondent with the CA is premature. Petitioners
argue that respondent did not raise purely legal questions in its petition,
but also brought to the fore factual issues which were properly within the
province of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which is the agency having administrative supervision over the
LLDA.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners aver that a reading of the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court would show that the CA has
no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by respondent.
Petitioners also assert that respondent is already barred by estoppel from
questioning the LLDA's power to impose fines, because it (respondent)
actively participated in the proceedings conducted by petitioners without
challenging such power.
Lastly, petitioners aver that the LLDA has the power to impose fines and
penalties based on the provisions of RA 4850 and Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 927.
The Court rules for the petitioners.
As to the first assigned error, the Court agrees with petitioners that
respondent did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should
have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her.15 Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the courts judicial power can be sought. 16 The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of
action.17 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on practical and legal reasons.18 The availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to
give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.19 While the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to several exceptions,20 the Court finds
that the instant case does not fall under any of them.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is when the issues raised are purely legal.
However, the Court is not persuaded by respondent's contention that the
special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA involved only
purely legal questions and did not raise factual issues. A perusal of the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that factual
matters were raised, to wit: (a) whether respondent has immediately
implemented remedial measures to correct the pH level of the effluent
discharges of SM City Manila; and (b) whether the third party monitoring
report submitted by respondent proves that it has complied with the
effluent standards for inland water set by the LLDA. Respondent insists
that what has been raised in the petition filed with the CA was whether
the LLDA committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the
evidence it presented and in proceeding to impose a penalty despite
remedial measures undertaken by the latter. Logic dictates, however, that
a determination of whether or not the LLDA indeed committed grave
abuse of discretion in imposing fine on respondent would necessarily and
inevitably touch on the factual issue of whether or not respondent in fact
complied with the effluent standards set under the law. Since the matters
raised by respondent involve factual issues, the questioned Orders of the
LLDA should have been brought first before the DENR which has
administrative supervision of the LLDA pursuant to E.O. No.
149.211avvphi1
Neither may respondent resort to a petition for certiorari filed directly
with the CA on the ground that the Orders issued by the LLDA are
patently illegal and amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, as
will be subsequently discussed, the assailed Orders of the LLDA are not
illegal nor were they issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion.
Anent the second assigned error, the Court does not agree with
petitioners' contention that the CA does not have jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for certiorari filed by respondent questioning the subject
Orders of the LLDA. Petitioners argue that Section 1, 22 Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court enumerate the quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or
orders are directly appealable to the CA and that the LLDA is not among
these agencies. Petitioners should have noted, however, that Rule 43
refers to appeals from judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies in
the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. On the other hand, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court specifically governs special civil actions
for certiorari, Section 4 of which provides that if the petition involves
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or the rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the CA. Thus, it is clear that jurisdiction over acts or omissions
of the LLDA belong to the CA.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioners that respondent is already
estopped from questioning the power of the LLDA to impose fines as
penalty owing to the fact that respondent actively participated during the
hearing of its water pollution case before the LLDA without impugning
such power of the said agency. In fact, respondent even asked for a
reconsideration of the Order of the LLDA which imposed a fine upon it
as evidenced by its letters dated July 2, 2002 and November 29, 2002,
wherein respondent, through its pollution control officer, as well as its
counsel, requested for a waiver of the fine(s) imposed by the LLDA. By
asking for a reconsideration of the fine imposed by the LLDA, the Court
arrives at no conclusion other than that respondent has impliedly
admitted the authority of the latter to impose such penalty. Hence,
contrary to respondent's claim in its Comment and Memorandum, it is
already barred from assailing the LLDA's authority to impose fines.
In any case, this Court has categorically ruled in Pacific Steam Laundry,
Inc. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,23 that the LLDA has the
power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the adjudication
of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB),24 except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides
for another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB
assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not
preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within
its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.
In the earlier case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v.
Laguna Lake Development Authority,25 this Court affirmed the ruling of
the CA which sustained the LLDA's Order requiring the petitioner
therein to pay a fine representing penalty for pollutive wastewater
discharge. Although the petitioner in that case did not challenge the
LLDA's authority to impose fine, the Court acknowledged the power of
the LLDA to impose fines holding that under Section 4-A of RA
4850,26 as amended, the LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages
resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent standards.
Section 4-A provides, thus:
Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources
of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet
established water and effluent quality standards and from such other
wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or
otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to
be earmarked for water quality control management.
In addition, Section 4(d) of E.O. No. 927, which further defines certain
functions and powers of the LLDA, provides that the LLDA has the
power to "make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished." Likewise, Section 4(i) of the
same E.O. states that the LLDA is given authority to "exercise such
powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry
out its duties and responsibilities under this Executive Order." Also,
Section 4(c) authorizes the LLDA to "issue orders or decisions to compel
compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing."
In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA,27 this Court had occasion
to discuss the functions of the LLDA, thus:
x x x It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws [PD 813 and EO 927], to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding Provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue
of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas. x x x28
Indeed, how could the LLDA be expected to effectively perform the
above-mentioned functions if, for every act or violation committed
against the law it is supposed to enforce, it is required to resort to some
other authority for the proper remedy or penalty. The intendment of the
law, as gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O. No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA
not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which are
implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the
full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge
of Appeals, dated June 28, 2004, and the Resolution dated November 23, Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary
2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79192, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. measures to abate the water pollution.8 On 1 March 2002, a compliance
The Orders of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, dated October monitoring was conducted and the result of the laboratory analysis 9 still
2, 2002, January 10, 2003 and May 27, 2003, are showed non-compliance with effluent standards in terms of TSS, BOD,
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), and Oil/Grease Concentration. It was
reported that petitioners wastewater treatment facility was under
SO ORDERED. construction. Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was conducted
on 25 April 2002 but the results10 still failed to conform with the effluent
standards in terms of Oil/Grease Concentration.
G.R. No. 165299 December 18, 2009
Meanwhile, on 15 April 2002, a Pollution Control and Abatement case
PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., Petitioner,
was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. During the public hearing
vs.
on 30 April 2002, LLDA informed petitioner of its continuous non-
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
compliance with the effluent standards. Petitioner requested for another
wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002. The
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged laboratory results11 of the wastewater sampling finally showed
in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental compliance with the effluent standard in all parameters. On 9 August
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural 2002, another public hearing was held to discuss the dismissal of the
Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development water pollution case and the payment of the accumulated daily penalty.
Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke According to LLDA, the penalty should be reckoned from 5 September
emission from petitioners plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, 2001, the date of initial sampling, to 17 May 2002, the date LLDA
Quezon City.3 On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and received the request for re-sampling. Petitioner manifested that its
found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioners laundry wastewater discharge was not on a daily basis. In its position
washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del paper12 dated 25 August 2002, petitioner prayed that the Notice of
Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report 4stated that Violation dated 30 October 2001 be set aside and the penalty and fine
petitioners plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, imposed be reckoned from the date of actual hearing on 15 April
and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the 2002.1avvphil
Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted
wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. 5 The result of the
On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay, 13 the pertinent
laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards portion of which reads:
particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen
Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color
Units.6 Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October
Violation7 dated 30 October 2001 which states: 2001 and its corresponding daily penalty be set aside and that the
imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not
on 5 September 2001. It is respondents position that the Notice of
THE GENERAL MANAGER
Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis
PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.
because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to
114 Roosevelt Avenue, Brgy. Paraiso abate the water pollution.
Quezon City
This Public Hearing Committee finds respondents arguments devoid of
Subject: Notice of Violation merit. Presidential Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive
PH-01-10-303
wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for every day during
Gentlemen: which such violation continues. The mere discharge of wastewater not
conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD
This refers to the findings of the inspection and result of laboratory No. 984. Sample of respondents effluent was collected on 5 September
analysis of the wastewater collected from your firm last 5 September 2001 and the results of laboratory analysis confirmed the quality thereof.
2001. Evaluation of the results of laboratory analysis showed that your Thus, a notice of violation was issued against the respondent after it was
plants effluent failed to conform with the 1990 Revised Effluent established that its discharge was pollutive. The fact that the subsequent
Standard for Inland Water Class "C" specifically in terms of TSS, BOD, re-sampling reported compliance with the effluent standard does not
Oil/Grease and Color. (Please see attached laboratory analysis) negate the 5 September 2001 initial sampling. Respondent passed the
standard because it already implemented remedial measures to abate the
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to submit corrective measures water pollution. It is therefore but just and proper that the penalty should
to abate/control the water pollution caused by your firm, within fifteen be imposed from the date of initial sampling, 5 September 2001, to 17
(15) days from receipt of this letter. May 2002, the date the request for re-sampling was received by the
Authority. The 5 June 2002 sampling confirmed that respondents
effluent already complied with the standard showing that its water
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 984, pollution has ceased. Respondent did not submit any proof of its actual
PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. is hereby ordered to pay a penalty operation hence, the penalty shall be computed for five (5) working days
of One Thousand Pesos (1,000.00) per day of discharging pollutive per week, excluding Saturdays and Sundays as well as legal holidays
wastewater to be computed from 5 September 2001, the date of from 5 September 2001 to 17 May 2002, for a total of one hundred
inspection until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater and a seventy-two (172) days.
fine of Five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) per year for operating without
the necessary clearance/permits from the Authority.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Pacific steam Laundry,
Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the accumulated daily penalty amounting to
Very truly yours, ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND (PhP172,000.00)
PESOS within fifteen(15) days from receipt hereof as a condition sine
(signed) qua non for the dismissal of the above-captioned case.
CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ
General Manager SO ORDERED.14
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied in
its Order15 dated 27 November 2002.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition,
as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Hence, this
petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that LLDA has the power to impose fines,
thus:
Concededly, the power to impose administrative fines in pollution
abatement cases was expressly granted under Section 9 of P.D. 984 to
the now defunct National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), thus:
"Section 9. Penalties. - (a) Any person found violating or failing to
comply with any order, decision or regulation of the Commission for the
control or abatement of pollution shall pay a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos per day for every day during which such violation or
default continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized and
empowered to impose the fine after due notice and hearing."
Nonetheless, it may be well to recall that the LLDA was created under
R.A. 4850 with the end view of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, and carrying out the development of the Laguna
Lake Region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the preservation of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. To correct deficiencies and
clarify ambiguities that "impede the accomplishment of the Authorities
goal," Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated P.D. 813.
Finally, to enable the LLDA to effectively perform its role, Former
President Marcos further issued E.O. 927, which granted the LLDA
additional powers and functions, viz:
"Section 4. Additional Powers and Functions. - The authority shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxx
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and time within which such continuance must
be accomplished.
xxx
(i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be
necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Executive
order."
Indeed, the express grant of power to impose administrative fines as
couched in the language of P.D. 984 was not reproduced in E.O. 927,
however, it can be logically implied from LLDAs authority to exercise
the power to "make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance
of pollution." In addition, the clear intendment of E.O. 927 to clothe
LLDA not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those
implied, incidental and necessary for the exercise of its express powers
can be easily discerned from the grant of the general power to "exercise
(such) powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to
carry out its duties and responsibilities."
This finds support in the wealth of authorities in American
Jurisprudence, citing adherence of other courts to the principle that the
authority given to an agency should be liberally construed in order to
permit the agency to carry out its statutory responsibilities. This is
especially true where the agency is concerned with protecting the public
health and welfare, the delegation of authority to the agency is liberally
construed.
The LLDA, as an agency implementing pollution laws, rules and
regulations, should be given some measures of flexibility in its
operations in order not to hamper it unduly in the fulfillment of its
objectives. How could it effectively perform its role if in every act of
violation, it must resort to other venue for the appropriate remedy,
because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal with it? 16 (Emphasis in
the original)
The Issues
Petitioner raises two issues:
1. Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to
impose fines as set forth in PD 984?
2. Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose
penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative
powers?17
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
Power of LLDA to Impose Fines
Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such
power to impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the
Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO
192).18
We disagree with petitioner.
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984)19 created and established the
NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the
DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the
DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC
with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Section 19 of EO 192 provides:
SEC. 19. Pollution Adjudication Board. There is hereby created a
Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The
Board shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2)
Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary, the Director of
Environmental Management, and three (3) others to be designated by the
Secretary as members. The Board shall assume the powers and functions
of the Commission/Commissioners of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under
Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984, particularly with respect
to Section 6 letters e, f, g, j, k, and p of P.D. 984. The Environmental
Management Bureau shall serve as the Secretariat of the Board. These
powers and functions may be delegated to the regional officers of the
Department in accordance with rules and regulations to be promulgated
by the Board. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6, paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), (k), and (p) of PD 984 referred to
above states:
SEC. 6. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx
 (e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it
may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial
waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however,
the Commission, by rules and regulations, may require
subdivisions, condominium, hospitals, public buildings and
other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central
sewerage system and sewage treatment works, except that no
permits shall be required of any new sewage works or changes
to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic
or sanitary wastes from a single residential building provided
with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may
impose reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal
of all permits herein required.
xxx
(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or
restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate
government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission.
xxx
(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as
may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Decree.
On the other hand, LLDA is a special agency created under Republic Act
No. 4850 (RA 4850)20 to manage and develop the Laguna Lake region,
comprising of the provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. RA 4850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 (PD 813),21mandates LLDA to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake region, with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of
the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 22
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),23 LLDA is granted additional
powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its
prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement, thus:
SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The Authority [LLDA]
shall have the following powers and functions:
a) Issue standards, rules and regulations to govern the approval
of plans and specifications for sewage works and industrial
waste disposal systems and the issuance of permits in
accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order; inspect
the construction and maintenance of sewage works and
industrial waste disposal systems for compliance to plans.
b) Adopt, prescribe, and promulgate rules and regulations
governing the Procedures of the Authority with respect to
hearings, plans, specifications, designs, and other data for
sewage works and industrial waste disposal system, the filing
of reports, the issuance of permits, and other rules and
regulations for the proper implementation and enforcement of
this Executive Order.
c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules
and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished.
e) Issue, renew or deny permits, under such conditions as it may
determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement
of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or
for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial
disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however, that the
Authority, by rules and regulations, may require subdivisions,
condominiums, hospitals, public buildings and other similar
human settlements to put up appropriate central sewerage
system and sewage treatment works, except that no permits
shall be required of any new sewage works or changes to or
extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or
sanitary wastes from a single residential building provided with
septic tanks or their equivalent. The Authority may impose
reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal of all
permits herein required.
f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke,
suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order
whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate
government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decision of the Authority.
h) Authorize its representative to enter at all reasonable times
any property of the public dominion and private property
devoted to industrial, manufacturing processing or commercial
use without doing damage, for the purpose of inspecting and
investigating conditions relating to pollution or possible or
imminent pollution.
i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as
may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Executive Order. (Emphasis supplied)
A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication
Board and the LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Both the Pollution
Adjudication Board and the LLDA are empowered, among others, to: (1)
make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution;
(2) issue, renew, or deny permits for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system;
and (3) exercise such powers and perform such other functions necessary
to carry out their duties and responsibilities. The difference is that while
Section 19 of EO 192 vested the Pollution Adjudication Board with the
specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general,24 the scope of
authority of LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to the Laguna
Lake region as defined by RA 4850, as amended.
Thus, in Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 25 the
Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to
the Pollution Adjudication Board, except where a special law, such as the
LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. Indeed, even PD 984
authorizes the LLDA to undertake pollution control activities within
LLDAs development area. Section 10 of PD 984 provides:
SEC. 10. Jurisdiction. The Commission [NPCC] shall have no
jurisdiction over waterworks or sewage system operated by the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, but the rules and
regulations issued by the Commission for the protection and prevention
of pollution under the authority herein granted shall supersede and
prevail over any rules or regulations as may heretofore have been issued
by other government agencies or instrumentalities on the same subject.
In case of development projects involving specific human settlement
sites or integrated regional or subregional projects, such as the Tondo
Foreshore Development Authority and the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, the Commission shall consult with the authorities charged
with the planning and execution of such projects to ensure that their
pollution control standards comply with those of the Commission. Once
minimum pollution standards are established and agreed upon, the
development authorities concerned may, by mutual agreement and prior
consultation with the Commission, undertake the pollution control
activities themselves. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
In this case, the DENRs Environmental Management Bureau endorsed
to LLDA the pollution complaint against petitioner. Under Section 16 of
EO 192, the Environmental Management Bureau assumed the powers
and functions of the NPCC except with respect to adjudication of
pollution cases, thus:
SEC. 16. Environmental Management Bureau. There is hereby created
an Environmental Management Bureau. The National Environmental
Protection Council (NEPC), the National Pollution Control Commission
(NPCC) and the Environmental Center of the Philippines (ECP), are
hereby abolished and their powers and functions are hereby integrated
into the Environmental Management Bureau in accordance with Section
24(c) hereof, subject to Section 19 hereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of
the Pollution Adjudication Board, and its Director is one of the members
of the Pollution Adjudication Board. Clearly, by endorsing to LLDA the
pollution complaint against petitioner, the Environmental Management
Bureau deferred to LLDAs jurisdiction over the pollution complaint
against petitioner.
Although the Pollution Adjudication Board assumed the powers and
functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases,
this does not preclude LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution
cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.
Thus, in the recent case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v.
Laguna Lake Development Authority,26 the Court affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Appeals which sustained LLDAs Order, requiring
petitioner therein to pay a fine of 1,062,000 representing penalty for
pollutive wastewater discharge. Although petitioner in that case did not
challenge LLDAs authority to impose fine, the Court acknowledged the
power of LLDA to impose fines, holding that under Section 4-A of RA
4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages
resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent standards.
Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, reads:
SEC. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources
of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet
established water and effluent quality standards or from such other
wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or
otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to
be earmarked for water quality control and management.
Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and
perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties
and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court
of Appeals,27the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred
by law, holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court
ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter,
as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and
desist order." In the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power
to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioner contends that if LLDA is deemed to have implied power to
impose penalties, then LLDA will have unfettered discretion to
determine for itself the penalties it may impose, which will amount to
undue delegation of legislative power.
We do not agree. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to
impose fines is not unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the
pollution complaint against petitioner and conducted wastewater
sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only after the investigation result
showing petitioners failure to meet the established water and effluent
quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner. LLDA
then imposed upon petitioner a penalty of 1,000 per day of discharging
pollutive wastewater. The 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with
the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984:
SEC. 8. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise
dispose into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines,
or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or
otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic matter or any
substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof.
xxx
SEC 9. Penalties. x x x
(b) Any person who shall violate any of the previous provisions of
Section Eight of this Decree or its implementing rules and regulations, or
any Order or Decision of the Commission, shall be liable to a penalty of
not to exceed one thousand pesos each day during which the violation
continues, or by imprisonment of from two years to six years, or by both
fine and imprisonment, and in addition such person may be required or
enjoined from continuing such violation as hereinafter provided.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, there are adequate statutory limitations on LLDAs power to
impose fines which obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise of such
power.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
30 June 2004 and the Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169228 September 11, 2009
THE ALEXANDRA CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
The Antecedent Facts
Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty) developed, established,
and constructed The Alexandra Condominium Complex from 1987 to
1993. In a Deed of Conveyance dated 18 April 1988, PhilRealty
transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC) a
parcel of land with an area of 9,876 square meters located at 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig City as well as all the common areas of the project. The
land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64355.
The condominium project consists of the following phases:
(a) Cluster A - 3 Five Storey Buildings; A-1, A-2 and A-3;
(b) Cluster B - 2 Eleven Storey Buildings; B-1 and B-2;
(c) Cluster C - 2 Seven Storey Buildings; C-1 and C-2;
(d) Cluster D - 2 Fourteen Storey Buildings; D-a and D-2; and
(e) Cluster E 2 Eleven Storey Buildings; E-1 and E-2.
On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
issued a Development Permit to PhilRealty to develop Cluster A of the
project. In the Development Permit, PhilRealty was required to submit
its condominium plans to the Building Official of Pasig City. Architect
Walter R. Perez (Architect Perez), then Building Official of Pasig City,
reviewed the Site Development and Location Plan as well as the
Sanitary/Plumbing Plans and Specifications of the project. On 24
September 1987, Architect Perez issued a Building Permit. On 30
September 1987, Architect Perez issued a Sanitary/Plumbing Permit
acknowledging the fixtures to be installed but without indicating the
System of Disposal including a Waste Water Treatment Plan. On 15
December 1988, Architect Perez issued a Certificate of Final Inspection
and a Certificate of Occupancy for Buildings A-1 to A-3.
PhilRealty undertook the same process for Clusters B, C, D, and E.
Building Permits and Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy
were issued for these clusters from 1991 to 1993. On 31 December 1993,
upon completion of Buildings E-1 and E-2, PhilRealty formally turned
over the project to TACC. However, PhilRealty did not turn over the as-
built plans for the perimeter drainage layout, the foundation, and the
electrical and plumbing layout of the project. Thereafter, TACC
managed the project through Century Properties Management
Corporation.
On 24 June 1998, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised
TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards
provided in Sections 68 and 69 of the 1978 National Pollution Control
Commission Rules and Regulations (NPCC) as amended by Department
of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No.
34.3 LLDA informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage
Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government
standards.
Since a sewage treatment plant would cost approximately 15 million to
put up, TACC experimented with a proposed solution from Larutan
Resources Development Corporation, which treated the septic vault
water with biological enzymes. Still, TACCs water discharge failed to
meet the government standards.
On 26 March 1999, LLDAs Environmental Division collected samples
of TACCs wastewater. In a report dated 6 April 1999, LLDA found two
determinants in TACCs samples: (1) Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD)
and (2) Oil/Grease (OG). LLDA found that TACCs samples failed to
meet government standards of 150 for COD and 5 for OG.
In a Notice of Violation4 dated 6 May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to
submit corrective measures to abate or control its water effluents
discharged into the Laguna de Bay. LLDA likewise imposed upon TACC
a daily fine of 1,000 from 26 March 1999 until full cessation of
pollutive wastewater discharge.
TACC entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the
construction of the STP for 7,550,000. The construction was completed
by the second week of October 2001.
In an Order dated 19 July 1999, LLDA stated that the daily penalty was
imposed upon TACC for the pollutive wastewater discharge, and to
condone the penalty would be tantamount to tolerating the pollution of
the river bodies and the Laguna de Bay which is contrary to LLDAs
mandate.
On 1 April 2002, TACC requested LLDA to dismiss the water pollution
case against it because of the favorable analysis undertaken by the
LLDAs Pollution Control Division on 28 February 2002. LLDA
conducted a hearing on 26 April 2002. In its position paper filed on 15
May 2002, TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the
penalty of 1,000 per day since March 1999 in recognition of the
remedial and corrective measures it undertook to comply with
government standards.
On 4 September 2003, LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay a
fine of 1,062,000 representing the penalty from 26 March 1999 to 20
February 2002.
TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 26 April 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals resolved the petition
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, instant petition is DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the prayer for temporary restraining order is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.5
The Court of Appeals sustained LLDAs contention that the petition for
certiorari was prematurely filed. LLDA pointed out that TACC failed to
file a motion for reconsideration of the 4 September 2003 Order before
filing the petition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that before a party is allowed to seek the courts intervention, he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. The Court of Appeals ruled that the proper remedy should have been
to resort to an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to
judicial action. The Court of Appeals noted LLDAs allegation of
TACCs offer to compromise, which LLDA countered with an advice to
address the offer to the Commission on Audit (COA). Hence, the Court
of Appeals found that TACC had not abandoned its administrative
remedies despite simultaneous resort to judicial action.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Republic Act No. 4850 6 (RA
4850), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813, 7 LLDA shall be
compensated for the damages to the water and aquatic resources of
Laguna de Bay resulting from failure to meet established water and
effluent quality standards. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section
4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,8 LLDA is mandated to
"make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuation of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance
must be accomplished." Further, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Presidential Decree No. 9849 provides for penalties for violation or non-
compliance with any order, decision or regulation of the Commission for
the control or abatement of pollution.
TACC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 1 August 2005
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
TACC raises the following issues in its memorandum:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding TACCs
exhaustive efforts in complying with the governments
standards on effluent discharge; and
 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petition for certiorari was prematurely filed.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the transfer of LLDA to the DENR
under Executive Order No. 14910 (EO 149), TACC should have first
resorted to an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to
filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that
resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution
of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy
may be elevated to a court of justice for review.11 A premature invocation
of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action
and dismissible.12
EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR
"for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision
x x x."13 Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power over
LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.14
However, Executive Order No. 19215 (EO 192), which reorganized the
DENR, mandates the DENR to "promulgate rules and regulations for the
control of water, air and land pollution" and to "promulgate ambient and
effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels
of other pollutants and radiations."16 EO 192 created the Pollution
Adjudication Board17 under the Office of the DENR Secretary which
assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the
adjudication of pollution cases, including NPCCs function to "[s]erve as
arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution."18Hence, TACC has an
administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have
first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty
RA 4850 specifically mandates LLDA to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of
the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 19 LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas.20
Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled to
compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established
water and effluent quality standards, thus:
Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources
of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet
established water and effluent quality standards and from such other
wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or
otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to
be earmarked for water quality control and management.
In the present case, TACC does not challenge LLDAs authority to
impose the fine. However, TACC argues that since it had already
exhausted efforts and substantially spent to comply with established
effluent quality standards, the daily penalty imposed by the LLDA is an
unwarranted financial burden to its unit owners and should thus be
condoned. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with
government standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty.
TACCs arguments have no merit.
PhilRealty formally turned over the project to TACC on 31 December
1993. Thereafter, TACC managed the project. It was almost five years
after, or on 24 June 1998, when LLDA advised TACC that its wastewater
did not meet government effluent standards. It is clear that the
responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC. If,
as claimed by TACC, the non-compliance was due to the omission and
fault of PhilRealty, TACCs recourse is to file an action, if warranted,
against PhilRealty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to
LLDA by shifting the blame to PhilRealty. Hence, the LLDA did not
abuse its discretion in issuing its 4 September 2003 Order.
Condonation of Penalty and Pending Offer to Compromise
As regards the condonation of the penalty, the power to compromise
claims is vested exclusively in the COA or Congress pursuant to Section
20 (1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which provides:
Section 20. Power to Compromise Claims. - (1) When the interest of the
Government so requires, the Commission may compromise or release in
whole or in part, any settled claim or liability to any government agency
not exceeding ten thousand pesos arising out of any matter or case before
it or within its jurisdiction, and with the written approval of the President,
it may likewise compromise or release any similar claim or liability not
exceeding one hundred thousand pesos. In case the claim or liability
exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom
shall be submitted, through the Commission and the President, with their
recommendations, to the Congress[.] x x x
In a letter dated 5 May 2004,21 TACC manifested its offer to compromise
by paying a reduced fine of 500,000. In its response dated 8 July
2004,22 LLDA stated that the proposal would be forwarded to LLDAs
Board of Directors although "it is necessary that the case be withdrawn
from the court." In a letter dated 11 September 2004,23 TACC stated that
in a regular meeting held on 6 September 2004, the members of TACCs
Board of Directors unanimously agreed to withdraw the petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, provided the LLDA would agree
to reduce the penalty to 500,000. In a letter dated 22 September
2004,24 LLDA referred the offer to its resident auditor Antonio M. Malit
(Auditor Malit) on the ground that only the COA had the authority to
compromise settlement of obligations to the State. In a letter dated 23
September 2004, Auditor Malit informed LLDA that the power to
compromise claims is vested exclusively in the COA pursuant to Section
36 of Presidential Decree No. 1445.25Auditor Malit stated that the request
for compromise should be addressed to COA. However, since the amount
of the penalty sought to be condoned is 1,062,000, the authority to
compromise such claim is vested exclusively in Congress pursuant to
Section 20 (1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. This remedy is not administrative but
legislative, and need not be resorted to before filing a judicial
action.1avvphi1
Moreover, the Court cannot sustain the Court of Appeals finding that
there was a pending offer to compromise when the petition for certiorari
was filed before it. There is nothing in the records that indicates that
TACC withdrew its offer of compromise. At the same time, there is also
nothing to indicate that TACC submitted a compromise offer to COA, as
Auditor Malit had advised. Hence, it is not proven that this petition was
simultaneously availed of with the offer to compromise.
Failure to File a Motion for Reconsideration
For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
prosper, TACC must show that (1) the LLDA acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.26 The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes
without the intervention of a higher court. 27 To dispense with this
requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for
the failure to comply with the requirement.28 Petitioner may not arrogate
to itself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
necessary or not.29
In the present case, TACC did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
4 September 2003 Order. TACC also failed to show sufficient
compelling and valid reason to dispense with the requirement of filing a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed before it.
Finally, TACC wants the Court to review the mandate of LLDA to help
transform it from a regulatory agency into a developmental and
promotional agency. However, we agree with LLDA that such a review
of LLDAs charter is not within the jurisdiction of this Court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 April 2005
Decision and 1 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 82409.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137174 July 10, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR),petitioner,
vs.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, respondent.
The following antecedent facts are undisputed:
Respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was issued a
temporary permit to operate a tailings6 sea disposal system under TPO
No. POW-85-454-EJ for the period October 31, 1985 to October 21,
1986. Before it expired, MMC filed an application for the renewal thereof
with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC). On September
20, 1986, MMC received a telegraphic order from the NPCC directing
the former to "(i)mmediately cease and desist from discharging mine
tailings into Calancan Bay." The directive was brought about through the
efforts of certain religious groups which had been protesting MMCs
tailings sea disposal system. MMC requested the NPCC to refrain from
implementing the aforesaid directive until its adoption of an alternative
tailings disposal system. The NPCC granted MMCs request and called
a conference to discuss possible alternative disposal systems.
Consequently, an Environmental Technical Committee, composed of
representatives from the NPCC, the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences,
and MMC was created to study the feasibility of various tailings disposal
systems that may be appropriate for utilization by MMC and to submit
its findings and recommendations thereon.
Meanwhile, after the expiration of MMCs TPO No. POW-85-454-EJ on
October 21, 1986, the NPCC issued to MMC a new temporary permit,
TPO No. POW-86-454-EJ dated November 11, 1986, to expire on
February 10, 1987, with the condition that "[t]he tailings disposal system
shall be transferred to San Antonio Pond within two (2) months from the
date of this permit." MMC moved for the deletion of the condition stating
that it needed to develop and mine the ore deposits underneath the San
Antonio pond for it to continue its mining operations. In a letter-
manifestation dated February 5, 1987, MMC requested the NPCC for an
extension of TPO No. POW-86-454-EJ and the indefinite suspension of
the condition in said permit until such time that the NPCC shall have
finally resolved the NPCC case entitled "Msgr. Rolly Oliverio, et al. vs.
Marcopper Mining Corporation."
In the meantime, the NPCC was abolished by Executive Order No.
1927 dated June 10, 1987, and its powers and functions were integrated
into the Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB).8
On April 11, 1988, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
in his capacity as Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC
to "cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay."
The order reads:
The Temporary Permit to Operate issued to Marcopper Mining
Corporation expired on February 10, 1987.
Section 96 of the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) Rules
and Regulations, which were adopted by the Board, provides that in no
case can a permit be valid for more than one (1) year.
Records show that Marcopper Mining Corporation has not filed any
application for renewal of the permit.
Marcopper Mining Corporation is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay immediately upon
receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED."9
Immediately thereafter, the DENR Undersecretary for Environment and
Research issued a telegraphic order dated April 15, 1988, enjoining
immediate compliance by MMC of the cease and desist order of April
11, 1988.
MMC appealed the above orders of April 11, 1988 and April 15, 1988 to
the Office of the President, docketed as O.P. Case No. 3802. In an Order
dated May 2, 1988, the Office of the President denied MMCs requests
for issuance of restraining orders against the orders of the PAB.
Consequently, MMC filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Partial Motion for
Reconsideration" dated May 6, 1988, seeking the reconsideration of the
above Order. In an Order dated May 13, 1988, the Office of the President
granted the above partial motion for reconsideration, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the instant "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration" is hereby GRANTED, and the Order of this Office,
dated May 2, 1988, is hereby set aside insofar as it denies respondent-
appellants requests for issuance of restraining orders.
Accordingly, the Pollution Adjudication Board, its agents, deputies or
representatives are hereby enjoined from enforcing its cease and desist
order of April 15, 1988 pending resolution by this Office of respondent-
appellants appeal from said orders.
It is further directed that the status quo obtaining prior to the issuance of
said cease and desist order be maintained until further orders from this
Office.
It is understood, however, that during the efficacy of this restraining
order, respondent-appellant shall immediately undertake, at a cost of not
less than P30,000.00 a day, the building of artificial reefs and planting of
sea grass, mangroves and vegetation on the causeway of Calancan Bay
under the supervision of the Pollution Adjudication Board and subject to
such guidelines as the Board may impose.
SO ORDERED."10
In line with the directive from the Office of the President, the Calancan
Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted the
amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology
Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped
discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making
further deposits to the ETF.
From the issuance of the Order on May 13, 1988 until the cessation of
the tailings disposal on June 30, 1991, MMC made its contribution to the
ETF in the total amount of Thirty-Two Million Nine Hundred and
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P32,975,000.00). Thereafter, MMC filed
a Motion dated July 9, 1991 manifesting that it would discontinue its
contributions/deposits to the ETF since it had stopped dumping tailings
in the Bay. MMC prayed that the Order issued by the Office of the
President on May 13, 1988 be lifted.
On February 5, 1993, the Office of the President rendered a decision in
O.P. Case No. 3802 dismissing the appeal; affirming the cease and desist
Order issued by the PAB; and lifting the TRO dated May 13, 1988. The
Office of the President resolved the appeal in this wise:
"This brings to the fore the primordial issue of whether or not the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources gravely erred in
declaring the TPO No. POW-86-454-EJ issued to respondent-appellant
MMC expired on February 10, 1987, and in ordering the latter to cease
and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay.
Respondent-appellant argues that the cease and desist orders were issued
by the PAB ex-parte, in violation of its procedural and substantive rights
provided for under Section 7 (a) of P.D. No. 984 requiring a public
hearing before any order or decision for the discontinuance of discharge
of a sewage or industrial wastes into the water, air or land could be issued
by the PAB.
We are not persuaded.
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, reads in part:
"Sec. 7(a) Public Hearing. Public hearing shall be conducted by the
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or any senior official duly
designated by the Commissioner prior to issuance or promulgation of any
order or decision by the Commissioner requiring the discontinuance of
discharge of sewage, industrial wastes and other wastes into the water,
air or land resources of the Philippines as provided in the Decree:
provided, that whenever the Commission finds a prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds
the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may
issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or
person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing. x x x . (underscoring supplied).
Clearly then, it is self-indulgent nonsense to assume that the DENR
Secretary, acting as PAB Chairman, is absolutely without authority to
issue an ex-parte order requiring the discontinuance of discharge of
sewage or other industrial wastes without public hearing. As can be
gleaned from the afroequoted proviso, this authority to issue an ex-
parte order suspending the discharge of industrial wastes is postulated
upon his finding of prima-facie evidence of an imminent "threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, to animal or plant life or exceeds the
allowable standards set by the Commission."11
In a letter dated January 22, 1997 12 , Municipal Mayor Wilfredo A. Red
of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque informed the PAB that MMC stopped remitting
the amount of 30,000.00 per day as of July 1, 1991 to the ETF of the
CBRP. This letter-complaint of Mayor Red was docketed as DENR-PAB
Case No. 04-00597-96, for violation of P.D. 98413 and its implementing
Rules and Regulations.
In an order dated April 23, 1997, the PAB ruled that the obligation of
MMC to deposit P30,000.00 per day to the ETF of the CBRP subsists, as
provided for in the Order of the Office of the President dated May 13,
1988, during the "efficacy of said order restraining the PAB from
enforcing its cease and desist order against MMC". Since the Order was
lifted only on February 5, 1993, the obligation of MMC to remit was
likewise extinguished only on said date and not earlier as contended by
MMC from the time it ceased dumping tailings into the Bay on July 1,
1991. We quote in part:
"The issue before this Board is whether Marcopper Mining Corporation
is still obliged to remit the amount of P30,000.00 to the CBRP. The
answer by the Order from the Office of the President dated 13 May 1988,
which states that the obligation on the part of Marcopper Mining to pay
the amount of P30,000.00 per day for the rehabilitation of Calancan Bay
is binding only during the efficacy of the said Order.
The record further shows that on 05 February 1993, the Office of the
President lifted its Order dated 13 May 1988. This means that as of the
date of the lifting, Marcopper Mining Corporation no longer had any
obligation to remit the amount of P30,000.00 to the CBRP. Thus,
Marcoppers obligation only runs from 13 May 1988 to 05 February
1993. Beyond the cut-off date of 05 February 1993, Marcopper is no
longer obligated to remit the amount of P30,000.00 per day to the CBRP.
It does not matter whether Marcopper was no longer dumping its tail
minings into the sea even before the cut-off date of 05 February 1993.
The obligation of Marcopper to pay the amount of P30,000.00 to the
CBRP arises from the Office of the President Order dated 13 May 1988,
not from it dumping of mine tailings.
WHEREFORE, Marcopper Mining Corporation is hereby ordered to pay
the CBRP the amount of P30,000.00 per day, computed from the date
Marcopper Mining Corporation stopped paying on 01 July 1991, up to
the formal lifting of the subject Order from the Office of the President on
05 February 1993.
SO ORDERED."14
MMC assailed the aforequoted Order dated April 23, 1997 of the PAB
as null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction) before
the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-44656. In
a Resolution dated July 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals required the PAB
and its members to comment on said petition.
On November 19, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of
the PAB and its members, filed with the Court of Appeals the required
comment.
On September 15, 1997, for purposes of determining whether or not to
grant MMCs prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, the Court of Appeals conducted a hearing where counsel for
the parties were heard on oral arguments.
In a Resolution dated September 19, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of preliminary injunction, conditioned upon the filing of a bond by
MMC in the amount of P500,000.00 enjoining the PAB and its members
to cease and desist from enforcing the assailed Order dated April 23,
1997, until it had made a full determination on the merits of the case.
On January 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44656, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and,
accordingly, the questioned Order of respondent Pollution Adjudication
Board dated 23 April 1997 is hereby SET ASIDE. Respondents are
ordered to REFRAIN and DESIST from enforcing aforesaid Order. The
injunctive bond filed by the petitioner in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) is hereby RELEASED."
The motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied in a
Resolution dated January 13, 1999 of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942
(otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) repealed the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 984, (otherwise known as the National Pollution Control Decree of
1976), with respect to the power and function of petitioner Pollution
Adjudication Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of
the mine tailings.
II
Respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation bound itself to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 a day for the duration of the period starting May
13, 1988 up to February 5, 1993.
III
Respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation was not deprived of due
process of law when petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board directed it
to comply with its long-existing P30,000.00 per day obligation under the
Order of the Office of the President dated May 13, 1988. 15
In setting aside the Order of the PAB dated April 23, 1997, requiring
MMC to pay its arrears in deposits, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
PAB exceeded its power and authority in issuing the subject Order for
the following reasons:
"The applicable and governing law in this petition is Republic Act No.
7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("Mining
Act", approved on March 3, 1995).
Chapter XI of the Mining Act contains a series of provisions relating to
safety and environmental protection on mining and quarrying operations.
More specifically, Section 67 of the Mining Act in essence, grants the
mines regional director the power to issue orders or to take appropriate
measures to remedy any practice connected with mining or quarrying
operations which is not in accordance with safety and anti-pollution laws
and regulations.
From a reading of that provision, it would appear therefore that prior to
the passage of the Mining Act, the Pollution Adjudication Board had
jurisdiction to act on pollution-related matters in the mining business.
With the effectivity of the Mining Act and in congruence with its Sec.
115 (i.e., Repealing and Amending Clause), the power to impose
measures against violations of environmental policies by mining
operators is now vested on the mines regional director. Be that as it may,
we are constrained to enunciate that the PAB had no authority to issue
the challenged Order dated 23 April 1997. More so, respondent PAB as
petitioner argued and We note, had remained perplexingly silent on the
matter for almost six (6) years from July 1991 when MMC ceased to
make its deposits up to April 1997 when respondent PAB precipitately
issued the Order requiring MMC to pay its arrears in deposits to the ETF.
And PAB, apparently oblivious to MMCs economic quandary had
issued said Order ex-parte without hearing or notice.
xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special
law, expressly or impliedly, provides for another forum, as in the instant
petition.
Thus under Republic Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules and
regulations, the mines regional director, in consultation with
the Environmental Management Bureau (italics ours), is specifically
mandated to carry out and make effective the declared national policy
that the State shall promote the rational exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of all mineral resources in public and private
lands within the territory and exclusive economic zone of the Republic
of the Philippines, through the combined efforts of government and the
private sector in order to enhance national growth and protect the rights
of affected communities. (Sec. 2, R.A. 7942).
Under this expansive authority, the Mines Regional Director, by virtue
of this special law, has the primary responsibility to protect the
communities surrounding a mining site from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the dumping of tailing wastes from the
surrounding areas. Thus, in the exercise of its express powers under this
special law, the authority of the Mines Regional Director to impose
appropriate protective and/or preventive measures with respect to
pollution cases within mining operations is perforce, implied. Otherwise,
the special law granting this authority may well be relegated to a mere
paper tiger talking protection but allowing pollution.
It bears mention that the Pollution Adjudication Board has the power to
issue an ex-parte order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution
laws of the country. (Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 195 SCRA 112). However, with the passage of R.A. 7942, insofar
as the regulation, monitoring and enforcement of anti-pollution laws are
concerned with respect to mining establishments, the Mines Regional
Director has a broad grant of power and authority. Clearly, pollution-
related issues in mining operations are addressed to the Mines Regional
Director, not the Pollution Adjudication Board.
This being the case, the questioned Order dated 23 April 1997 requiring
MMC to pay its arrears in deposits was beyond the power and authority
of the Pollution Adjudication Board to issue and as such, petitioner may
seek appropriate injunctive relief from the court. Thus, certiorari lies
against public respondent PAB."16
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the obligation of MMC to
contribute to the ETF of the CBRP ceased inasmuch as the latter
discontinued dumping tailings into the Bay and the actual funds in the
ETF are sufficient to rehabilitate the Bay. It ratiocinated thus:
"In the instant case, it is of record that petitioner MMC undertakes its
obligation to provide for the rehabilitation of the Bay waters. This
obligation, through its monetary contribution to the ETF, is however
anchored on its continuing disposal of the mines tailings waste into the
Bay. Hence, since it ceased its mining operations in the affected area as
of July 1991 and had not been discharging any tailings wastes since then,
its consequent duty to rehabilitate the polluted waters, if any, no longer
exists.
xxx
Be that as it may, this Court observes that out of the approximate sum of
thirty-two (32) million pesos contributed by the petitioner to the ETF
there is admittedly an existing estimated balance of fourteen (14) million
pesos in the Fund. For its part, petitioner does not renege on its obligation
to rehabilitate and in fact undertakes to continue the rehabilitation
process until its completion within two (2) years time and which would
only cost six (6) million pesos. Thus, as petitioner convincingly argued
and which respondent unsatisfactorily rebuked, the existing fourteen (14)
million pesos in the ETF is more than enough to complete the
rehabilitation project. (TSN, Hearing dated 15 September 1997, at pp. 56
to 62, Rollo).
xxx. Without much ado, the Court concurs with the finding that to
demand a daily deposit of thirty thousand (P30, 000.00) pesos even if the
root of the obligation, that is, the dumping of tailings waste, had ceased
to exist, is indubitably of a herculean and onerous burden on the part of
petitioner amounting to a deprivation of its property and a denial of its
right to due process."17
Unsatisfied, the OSG argues that the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 did
not amend or repeal the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 984 (otherwise known as the
National Pollution Control Decree of 1976); that the Mines Regional
Director has no power over areas outside mining installations and over
areas which are not part of the mining or quarrying operations such as
Calancan Bay; that the powers of the Mines Regional Director cannot be
exercised to the exclusion of other government agencies; that the
jurisdiction of a Mines Regional Director with respect to anti-pollution
laws is limited to practices committed within the confines of a mining or
quarrying installation; that the dumping of mine tailings into Calancan
Bay occurred long before the effectivity of the Philippine Mining Act
and that MMC cannot hide under cover of this new law. The OSG further
argues that the portion of the Order of May 13, 1988, setting the period
of time within which MMC shall pay P30,000.00 per day, which is during
the efficacy of the restraining order was never questioned or appealed by
MMC. Finally, the OSG argues that PAB did not violate MMCs right to
due process by the issuance of the Order dated April 23, 1988 without
notice and hearing as it was simply requiring MMC to comply with an
obligation in an Order which has long become final and executory.
In the context of the established facts, the issue that actually emerges is:
Has the PAB under RA 3931 as amended by PD 984 (National Pollution
Control Decree of 1976) been divested of its authority to try and hear
pollution cases connected with mining operations by virtue of the
subsequent enactment of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)? As
mentioned earlier, the PAB took cognizance and ruled on the letter-
complaint (for violation of PD 984 and its implementing rules and
regulations) filed against MMC by Marinduque Mayor Wilfredo Red. In
the subject Order dated April 23, 1997, the PAB ruled that MMC should
pay its arrears in deposits to the ETF of the CBRP computed from the
day it stopped dumping and paying on July 1, 1991 up to the lifting of
the Order of the Office of the President dated May 13, 1988 on February
5, 1993.
The answer is in the negative. We agree with the Solicitor General that
the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the PAB
had no authority to issue the Order dated April 23, 1997.
Republic Act No. 3931 (An Act Creating The National Water And Air
Pollution Control Commission) was passed in June 18, 1964 to maintain
reasonable standards of purity for the waters and air of the country with
their utilization for domestic, agricultural, industrial and other legitimate
purposes. Said law was revised in 1976 by Presidential Decree No. 984
(Providing For The Revision Of Republic Act No. 3931, Commonly
Known As The Pollution Control Law, And For Other Purposes) to
strengthen the National Pollution Control Commission to best protect the
people from the growing menace of environmental pollution.
Subsequently, Executive Order No. 192, s. 1987 (The Reorganization
Act of the DENR) was passed. The internal structure, organization and
description of the functions of the new DENR, particularly the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, reveals no provision pertaining to the resolution of
cases involving violations of the pollution laws. 18 The Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau was created under the said EO 192 to absorb the
functions of the abolished Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, Mineral
Reservations Development Board and the Gold Mining Industry
Development Board to, among others, recommend policies, regulations
and programs pertaining to mineral resources development; assist in the
monitoring and evaluation of the Bureaus programs and projects; and to
develop and promulgate standards and operating procedures on mineral
resources development.19
On the other hand, the PAB was created and granted under the same EO
192 broad powers to adjudicate pollution cases in general. Thus,
SEC. 19. Pollution Adjudication Board. There is hereby created a
Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The
Board shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2)
Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary, the Director of
Environmental management, and three (3) others to be designated by the
Secretary as members. The Board shall assume the powers and functions
of the Commission/Commissioners of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under
Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984, particularly with respect
to Section 6 letters e, f, g, j, k, and p of P.D. 984. The Environmental
Management Bureau shall serve as the Secretariat of the Board. These
powers and functions may be delegated to the regional offices of the
Department in accordance with rules and regulations to be promulgated
by the Board.20
Section 6 letters e, f, g, j, k, and p of PD 984 referred to above are quoted
as follows:
SEC. 6. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
(e) Issue orders or decision to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which
such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it
may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial
waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however,
That the Commission, by rules and regulations, may require
subdivisions, condominium, hospitals, public buildings and
other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central
sewerage system and sewage treatment works, except that no
permits shall be required to any sewage works or changes to or
extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or
sanitary wastes from a singles residential building provided
with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may
impose reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal
of all permits required herein.
(h)
(i)
(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or
restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate
government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission.
(l)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as
may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Decree.
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 further provides in part:
"Sec. 7(a) Public Hearing. Public hearing shall be conducted by the
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or any senior official duly
designated by the Commissioner prior to issuance or promulgation of any
order or decision by the Commissioner requiring the discontinuance of
discharge of sewage, industrial wastes and other wastes into the water,
air or land resources of the Philippines as provided in the Decree:
provided, that whenever the Commission finds a prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or Welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds
the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may
issue and ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or
person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing. x x x . (underscoring supplied).
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of
authority to act on pollution-related matters in mining operations is
anchored on the following provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act
of 1995):
SEC. 67. Power to Issue Orders. The mines regional director shall, in
consultation with the Environmental Management Bureau, forthwith or
within such time as specified in his order, require the contractor to
remedy any practice connected with mining or quarrying operations,
which is not in accordance with safety and anti-pollution laws and
regulations. In case of imminent danger to life or property, the mines
regional director may summarily suspend the mining or quarrying
operations until the danger is removed, or appropriate measures are taken
by the contractor or permittee.
And
SEC. 115. Repealing and Amending Clause. All laws, executive orders,
presidential decrees, rules and regulations, or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
The other provisions in Chapter XI on Safety and Environmental
Protection found in RA 7942 promote the safe and sanitary upkeep of
mining areas to achieve waste-free and efficient mine development with
particular concern for the physical and social rehabilitation of areas and
communities affected by mining activities21 , without however,
arrogating unto the mines regional director any adjudicative
responsibility.
From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions of law, we hold that
the provisions of RA 7942 do not necessarily repeal RA 3931, as
amended by PD 984 and EO 192. RA 7942 does not contain any
provision which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of the
Pollution Control Law. Neither could there be an implied repeal. It is
well-settled that repeals of laws by implication are not favored and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. Thus, it has
been held:
"The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws aas to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."22
There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. Section 19 of
EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution
cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the term "pollution"
as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological
properties of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or
any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is
likely to create or to render such water, air and land resources harmful,
detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or which will
adversely affect their utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial,
agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes.
On the other hand, the authority of the mines regional director is
complementary to that of the PAB. Section 66 of RA 7942 gives the
mines regional director exclusive jurisdiction over the safety inspection
of all installations, surface or underground in mining operations. Section
67 thereof vests upon the regional director power to issue orders
requiring a contractor to remedy any practice connected with mining or
quarrying operations which is not in accordance with safety and anti-
pollution laws and regulations; and to summarily suspend mining or
quarrying operations in case of imminent danger to life or property. The
law likewise requires every contractor to undertake an environmental
protection and enhancement program which shall be incorporated in the
work program which the contractor shall submit as an accompanying
document to the application for a mineral agreement or permit. In
addition, an environmental clearance certificate is required based on an
environment impact assessment. The law also requires contractors and
permittees to rehabilitate the mined-out areas, and set up a mine
rehabilitation fund. Significantly, the law allows and encourages
peoples organizations and non-governmental organizations to
participate in ensuring that contractors/permittees shall observe all the
requirements of environmental protection.
From the foregoing, it readily appears that the power of the mines
regional director does not foreclose PABs authority to determine and act
on complaints filed before it. The power granted to the mines regional
director to issue orders requiring the contractor to remedy any practice
connected with mining or quarrying operations or to summarily suspend
the same in cases of violation of pollution laws is for purposes of
effectively regulating and monitoring activities within mining operations
and installations pursuant to the environmental protection and
enhancement program undertaken by contractors and permittees in
procuring their mining permit. While the mines regional director has
express administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and
installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for violation
of pollution control statutes and regulations.
True, in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals,23 this
Court held that adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) except where the special law
provides for another forum. However, contrary to the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, RA 7942 does not provide for another forum inasmuch as
RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines Regional
Director. The authority is vested and remains with the PAB.
Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and
the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by the said law. The
provisions creating the Panel of Arbitrators for the settlement of conflicts
refers to disputes involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreements
or permits and those involving surface owners, occupants and claim-
holders/concessionaires.24 The scope of authority of the Panel of
Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board conferred by RA 7942
clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases. Nowhere
is there vested any authority to adjudicate cases involving violations of
pollution laws and regulations in general.
Thus, there is no genuine conflict between RA 7942 and RA 3931 as
amended by PD 984 that precludes their co-existence. Moreover, it has
to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to
repeal the said law. There is nothing in the sponsorship speech25 of the
laws proponent, Representative Renato Yap, and the deliberations that
followed thereafter, to indicate a legislative intent to repeal the pollution
law. Instead, it appears that the legislature intended to maximize the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys mineral
resources to contribute to the achievement of national economic and
social development with due regard to the social and environmental cost
implications relative thereto. The law intends to increase the productivity
of the countrys mineral resources while at the same time assuring its
sustainability through judicious use and systematic rehabilitation. MR. EDEL GENATO:
Henceforth, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as
the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, Presently, under the Steering Committee of the Calancan Bay
management, development, and proper use of the States mineral Rehabilitation, there is another phase that is being proposed. Actually the
resources, through its Secretary, has the authority to enter into mineral two years time will definitely cover the other phase of the . . (inaudible)
agreements on behalf of the Government upon the recommendation of
the Director, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
JUSTICE RASUL:
necessary to carry out the provisions of RA 7942. 26 The PAB and the
Mines Regional Director, with their complementary functions and
through their combined efforts, serve to accomplish the mandate of RA Never mind that. Will the amount be sufficient to the end of the
3931 (National Pollution Control Decree of 1976) as amended by PD 984 construction?
and EO 192 and that of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
MR. EDEL GENATO:
That matter settled, we now go to the issue of whether the appellate court
erred in ruling that there is no basis for further payments by MMC to the Yes, Sir.
Ecology Trust Fund of the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project
considering that MMC "convincingly argued and which respondent JUSTICE RASUL:
unsatisfactorily rebuked, the existing fourteen (14) million pesos in the
ETF is more than enough to complete the rehabilitation project." Indeed,
the records reveal that witness for PAB, Mr. Edel Genato, who is the Enough?
Technical Resource person of the PAB for the project admitted that the
funds in the ETF amounting to about Fourteen Million Pesos are more MR. EDEL GENATO:
than sufficient to cover the costs of rehabilitation. Hereunder are excerpts
from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing held Yes, Sir.
on September 15, 1997:
JUSTICE RASUL:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:27
There is no more need for collecting the 30 thousand a day? . . . Do not .
I would like your Honor, if the court will allow, our witness from the . . I will hold you for contempt . . .
EBRB Your Honor would attest to that . . .
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
JUSTICE JACINTO:
Im sorry Your Honor.
Is it not being taken from the 14 million?
JUSTICE RASUL:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
Again.
Yes, Your Honor.
MR. EDEL GENATO:
JUSTICE RASUL:
Well Your Honor, I cannot comment on the amount Your Honor.
What is his role?
JUSTICE RASUL:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
You have already made your comment, but you received some signal
He is our Technical Resource person Your Honor, of the project. from your lawyer.

JUSTICE RASUL: ATTY. HERNANDEZ:

In other words, he has participated in the . . (inaudible)? Your Honor . . .

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: MR. EDEL GENATO:

Yes, Your Honor. No, no Your Honor. . .

JUSTICE RASUL: JUSTICE RASUL:

Do you agree with him? My question is, do you agree with him that the 14 million fund will be
enough to sustain the construction up to the end?
MR. EDEL GENATO:
MR. EDEL GENATO:
Yes, Your Honor, that the Calancan rehabilitation program is being
funded by Marcopper through the Ecology Trust Fund. Two years?

JUSTICE RASUL: JUSTICE RASUL:

Will the construction be finished in two years time? Yes.

MR. EDEL GENATO:
Your Honor. . .
JUSTICE AMIN:
Categorical answer.
JUSTICE RASUL:
You just answer, is it enough, in your own honest way, on your honor?
MR. EDEL GENATO:
I think so Your Honor.28
We must sustain the appellate court on this point on account of the
testimony of Mr. Edel Genato.1wphi1 Further, we note that the Office
of the President never objected nor ruled on the manifestation dated July
9, 1991 filed by MMC that it would stop paying since it already ceased
dumping mine tailings into the bay. Still further, the order of the OP
directing MMC to rehabilitate at a cost of P30,000.00 a day "during the
efficacy of the restraining order" had become functus officio since MMC
voluntarily stopped dumping mine tailings into the bay.
To sum up, PAB has jurisdiction to act and rule on the letter-complaint
of Mayor Wilfredo Red of Marinduque for violation of PD 984 and its
implementing rules and regulations which jurisdiction was not lost upon
the passage of RA 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
Nevertheless, MMC must be declared not to have arrears in deposits as
admittedly, the ETF already has more than sufficient funds to undertake
the rehabilitation of Calancan Bay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is REVERSED insofar as the jurisdiction of the PAB
to act on the complaint is concerned; but AFFIRMED insofar as
Marcopper Mining Corporation has no arrears in deposits with the
Ecology Trust Fund of the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129546 December 13, 2005
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MATEO,
PINTONG BOCAUE MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF RIZAL, INC., ROLANDO E.
VILLACORTE, BERNARDO HIDALGO, ANANIAS EBUENGA,
VILMA T. MONTAJES, FEDERICO MUNAR, JR., ROLANDO
BEAS, SR., ET AL., and KILOSBAYAN, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
& NATURAL RESOURCES, LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT,
METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The earth belongs in usufruct to the living.1
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its
environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by
the Office of the President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28
August 1995, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal
applications. In fact, this site, extending to more or less 18 hectares, had
already been in operation since 19 February 1990 2 for the solid wastes of
Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and
Taguig.3
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San
Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for
lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.
The facts are documented in painstaking detail.
On 17 November 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Governor of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA),4 which provides in part:
1. The DENR agrees to immediately allow the utilization by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission of its land property located at Pintong
Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal as a sanitary landfill site, subject to whatever
restrictions that the government impact assessment might require.
2. Upon signing of this Agreement, the DPWH shall commence the
construction/development of said dumpsite.
3. The MMC shall: a) take charge of the relocation of the families within
and around the site; b) oversee the development of the areas as a sanitary
landfill; c) coordinate/monitor the construction of infrastructure facilities
by the DPWH in the said site; and d) ensure that the necessary civil works
are properly undertaken to safeguard against any negative environmental
impact in the area.
On 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo
wrote Gov. Elfren Cruz of the MMC, Sec. Fiorello Estuar of the DPWH,
the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management, Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, and Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., pointing
out that it had recently passed a Resolution banning the creation of
dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction, asking that
their side be heard, and that the addressees "suspend and temporarily hold
in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the San
Mateo Landfill Dumpsite." No action was taken on these letters.
It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and
owned by the DENR was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation
Area. Thus, on 31 May 1989, forest officers of the Forest Engineering
and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural
Resource Office, (CENRO) DENR-IV, Rizal Province, submitted a
Memorandum5 on the "On-going Dumping Site Operation of the MMC
inside (the) Upper Portion of Marikina Watershed Reservation, located
at Barangay Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal, and nearby localities."
Said Memorandum reads in part:
Observations:
3.1 The subject area is arable and agricultural in nature;
3.2 Soil type and its topography are favorable for agricultural and
forestry productions;
...
3.5 Said Dumping Site is observed to be confined within the said
Watershed Reservation, bearing in the northeastern part of Lungsod
Silangan Townsite Reservation. Such illegal Dumping Site operation
inside (the) Watershed Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. . .
Recommendations:
5.1 The MMC Dumping Site Inside Marikina Watershed Reservation,
particularly at Brgy. Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal and at Bo.
Pinugay, Baras/Antipolo, Rizal which are the present garbage
zones must totally be stopped and discouraged without any political
intervention and delay in order to save our healthy ecosystems found
therein, to avoid much destruction, useless efforts and lost (sic) of
millions of public funds over the land in question; (Emphasis ours)
On 19 June 1989, the CENRO submitted another Investigation Report 6 to
the Regional Executive Director which states in part that:
1. About two (2) hectares had been excavated by bulldozers and garbage
dumping operations are going on.
2. The dumping site is without the concurrence of the Provincial
Governor, Rizal Province and without any permit from DENR who has
functional jurisdiction over the Watershed Reservation; and
3. About 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered by four
(4) Barangays surrounding the dumping site will adversely be affected
by the dumping operations of MMC including their sources of domestic
water supply. x x x x
On 22 January 1990, the CENRO submitted still another Investigation
Report7 to the Regional Executive Director which states that:
Findings show that the areas used as Dumping Site of the MMC are found
to be within the Marikina Watershed which are part of the Integrated
Social Forestry Project (ISF) as per recorded inventory of Forest
Occupancy of this office.
It also appears that as per record, there was no permit issued to the MMC
to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes.
It is further observed that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly
affects the ecological balance and environmental factors in this
community.
On 19 February 1990, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau,
through Undersecretary for Environment and Research Celso R. Roque,
granted the Metro Manila Authority (MMA [formerly MMC]) an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of a two-
and-a-half-hectare garbage dumpsite.
The ECC was sought and granted to comply with the requirement of
Presidential Decree No. 1586 "Establishing an Environmental Impact
Statement System," Section 4 of which states in part that, "No persons,
partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate." Proclamation No. 2146, passed
on 14 December 1981, designates "all areas declared by law as national
parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves, and sanctuaries" as
"Environmentally Critical Areas."
On 09 March 1990, respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA), through its Acting General Manager, sent a letter8 to the MMA,
which reads in part:
Through this letter we would like to convey our reservation on the choice
of the sites for solid waste disposal inside the watershed of Laguna Lake.
As you may already know, the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) has scheduled the abstraction of water
from the lake to serve the needs of about 1.2 million residents of
Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Bacoor, Cavite by
1992. Accordingly, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) is
accelerating its environmental management program to upgrade the
water quality of the lake in order to make it suitable as a source of
domestic water supply the whole year round. The said program
regards dumpsites as incompatible within the watershed because of
the heavy pollution, including the risk of diseases, generated by such
activities which would negate the governments efforts to upgrade
the water quality of the lake. Consequently, please consider our
objection to the proposed location of the dumpsites within the watershed.
(Emphasis supplied by petitioners)
On 31 July 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC,
Undersecretary Roque suspended the ECC in a letter 9 addressed to the
respondent Secretary of DPWH, stating in part that:
Upon site investigation conducted by Environmental Management
Bureau staff on development activities at the San Mateo Landfill Site, it
was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted
from improper development of the site. We believe that this will
adversely affect the environmental quality in the area if the proper
remedial measures are not instituted in the design of the landfill site. This
is therefore contradictory to statements made in the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) submitted that above occurrences will be
properly mitigated.
In view of this, we are forced to suspend the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) issued until appropriate modified plans are submitted
and approved by this Office for implementation. (Emphasis ours)
On 21 June 1993, the Acting Mayor of San Mateo, Enrique Rodriguez,
Jr., Barangay Captain Dominador Vergara, and petitioner Rolando E.
Villacorte, Chairman of the Pintong Bocaue Multipurpose Cooperative
(PBMC) wrote10then President Fidel V. Ramos expressing their
objections to the continued operation of the MMA dumpsite for causing
"unabated pollution and degradation of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation."
On 14 July 1993, another Investigation Report 11 submitted by the
Regional Technical Director to the DENR Undersecretary for
Environment and Research contained the following findings and
recommendations:
Remarks and Findings:
....
5. Interview with Mr. Dayrit, whose lot is now being endangered because
soil erosion have (sic) caused severe siltation and sedimentation of the
Dayrit Creek which water is greatly polluted by the dumping of soil
bulldozed to the creek;
6. Also interview with Mrs. Vilma Montajes, the multi-grade teacher of
Pintong Bocaue Primary School which is located only about 100 meters
from the landfill site. She disclosed that bad odor have (sic) greatly
affected the pupils who are sometimes sick with respiratory illnesses.
These odors show that MMA have (sic) not instituted/sprayed any
disinfectant chemicals to prevent air pollution in the area. Besides large
flies (Bangaw) are swarming all over the playground of the school. The
teacher also informed the undersigned that plastic debris are being blown
whenever the wind blows in their direction.
7. As per investigation report there are now 15 hectares being used as
landfill disposal sites by the MMA. The MMA is intending to expand its
operation within the 50 hectares.
8. Lots occupied within 50 hectares are fully planted with fruit bearing
trees like Mangoes, Santol, Jackfruit, Kasoy, Guyabano, Kalamansi and
Citrus which are now bearing fruits and being harvested and marketed to
nearby San Mateo Market and Masinag Market in Antipolo.
....
Recommendations:
1. As previously recommended, the undersigned also strongly
recommend(s) that the MMA be made to relocate the landfill site because
the area is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation and Lungsod
Silangan. The leachate treatment plant ha(s) been eroded twice already
and contaminated the nearby creeks which is the source of potable water
of the residents. The contaminated water also flows to Wawa Dam and
Boso-boso River which also flows to Laguna de Bay.
2. The proposed Integrated Social Forestry Project be pushed through or
be approved. ISF project will not only uplift the socio-economic
conditions of the participants but will enhance the rehabilitation of the
Watershed considering that fruit bearing trees are vigorously growing in
the area. Some timber producing species are also planted like Mahogany
and Gmelina Arboiea. There are also portions where dipterocarp
residuals abound in the area.
3. The sanitary landfill should be relocated to some other area, in order
to avoid any conflict with the local government of San Mateo and the
nearby affected residents who have been in the area for almost 10-20
years.
On 16 November 1993, DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala sent MMA
Chairman Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. a letter12 stating that "after a series of
investigations by field officials" of the DENR, the agency realized that
the MOA entered into on 17 November 1988 "is a very costly error
because the area agreed to be a garbage dumpsite is inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation." He then strongly recommended that all
facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue
be dismantled, and the garbage disposal operations be transferred to
another area outside the Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect "the
health and general welfare of the residents of San Mateo in particular and
the residents of Metro Manila in general."
On 06 June 1995, petitioner Villacorte, Chairman of the PBMC,
wrote13 President Ramos, through the Executive Secretary, informing the
President of the issues involved, that the dumpsite is located near three
public elementary schools, the closest of which is only fifty meters away,
and that its location "violates the municipal zoning ordinance of San
Mateo and, in truth, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board had
denied the then MMA chairmans application for a locational clearance
on this ground."
On 21 August 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo issued a
Resolution14 "expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion of
the landfill operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos
to disapprove the draft Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6
Hectares from Marikina Watershed Reservation for the landfill site in
Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal."
Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the
government agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President,
through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued
Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August 1995, "Excluding from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for
Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the
Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority."
The pertinent portions thereof state:
WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements of the growing population in
Metro Manila and the adjoining provinces and municipalities, certain
developed and open portions of the Marikina Watershed Reservation,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources should now be excluded form the
scope of the reservation;
WHEREAS, while the areas delineated as part of the Watershed
Reservations are intended primarily for use in projects and/or activities
designed to contain and preserve the underground water supply, other
peripheral areas had been included within the scope of the reservation to
provide for such space as may be needed for the construction of the
necessary structures, other related facilities, as well as other priority
projects of government as may be eventually determined;
WHEREAS, there is now an urgent need to provide for, and develop, the
necessary facilities for the disposal of the waste generated by the
population of Metro Manila and the adjoining provinces and
municipalities, to ensure their sanitary and /or hygienic disposal;
WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements for the development of the
waste disposal facilities that may be used, portions of the peripheral areas
of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, after due consideration and
study, have now been identified as suitable sites that may be used for the
purpose;
WHEREAS, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources has recommended the exclusion of these areas that
have been so identified from the Marikina Watershed Reservation so that
they may then be developed for the purpose;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the aforecited
premises, I, Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby ordain:
Section 1. General That certain parcels of land, embraced by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation, were found needed for use in the solid
waste disposal program of the government in Metropolitan Manila, are
hereby excluded from that which is held in reserve and are now made
available for use as sanitary landfill and such other related waste disposal
applications.
Section 2. Purpose The areas being excluded from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are hereby placed under the administration of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, for development as
Sanitary Landfill, and/or for use in the development of such other related
waste disposal facilities that may be used by the cities and municipalities
of Metro Manila and the adjoining province of Rizal and its
municipalities.
Section 3. Technical Description Specifically, the areas being hereby
excluded from the Marikina Watershed Reservation consist of two (2)
parcels, with an aggregate area of approximately ONE MILLION SIXTY
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE (1,060,529) square
meters more or less, as follows: x x x x
Section 4. Reservations The development, construction, use and/or
operation of any facility that may be established within the parcel of land
herein excluded from the Marikina Watershed Reservation shall be
governed by existing laws, rules and regulations pertaining to
environmental control and management. When no longer needed for
sanitary landfill purposes or the related waste disposal activities, the
parcels of land subject of this proclamation shall revert back as part of
the Marikina Watershed Reservation, unless otherwise authorized.
On 06 September 1995, Director Wilfrido S. Pollisco of the Protected
Areas and Wildlife Bureau wrote the DENR Secretary to express the
bureaus stand against the dumpsite at Pintong Bocaue, and that "it is our
view . . . that the mere presence of a garbage dumpsite inside a watershed
reservation is definitely not compatible with the very purpose and
objectives for which the reservation was established."
On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and
the residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented by former Senator Jovito
Salonga, sent a letter to President Ramos requesting him to reconsider
Proclamation No. 635. Receiving no reply, they sent another letter on 02
January 1996 reiterating their previous request.
On 04 March 1996, then chairman of the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA [formerly MMA]) Prospero I. Oreta addressed a
letter to Senator Salonga, stating in part that:
. Lake, and the distance, plus the increasing accumulation of water from
2. Considering the circumstances under which we are pursuing the
project, we are certain you will agree that, unless we are prepared with a
better alternative, the project simply has to be pursued in the best interest
of the greater majority of the population, particularly their health and
welfare."
2.1 The San Mateo Sanitary Landfill services, at least, 38% of the waste
disposal site requirements of Metro Manila where an estimated 9 million
population reside.
2.2 Metro Manila is presently estimated to be generating, at least, 15,700
cubic meters of household or municipal waste, a 1.57 hectare of land area
will be filled in a months time with a pile 31 meters high of garbage, or
in a year, the accumulated volume will require 18.2 hectares.
....
4. The sanitary landfill projects are now on their fifth year of
implementation. The amount of effort and money already invested in the
project by the government cannot easily be disregarded, much more set
aside in favor of the few settlers/squatters who chose to ignore the earlier
notice given to them that the area would be used precisely for the
development of waste disposal sites, and are now attempting to arouse
opposition to the project.
4.2 There is no place within the jurisdiction of Metro Manila, with an
area big enough to accommodate at least 3 to 5 years of waste disposal
requirements. x x x x
4.21 The present site at San Mateo was selected because, at the time
consideration was being made, and up to the present, it is found to have
the attributes that positively respond to the criteria established:
4.21.1 The site was a government property and would not require any
outlay for it to be acquired.
4.21.2 It is far from any sizeable community/settlements that could be
affected by the development that would be introduced and yet, was
within economic hauling distance from the areas they are designed to
serve.
4.21.21 At the time it was originally decided to locate the landfills at the
present site, there were not more that fifteen (15) settlers in the area and
they had hardly established themselves. The community settlements
were located far from the site.
4.21.22 The area was hardly accessible, especially to any public
transport. The area was being served by a public utility jeep that usually
made only two (2) trips daily. During the rainy season, it could only be
reached by equipping the vehicle with tire chains to traverse the slippery
muddy trail roads.
4.21.3 There was, at least, seventy-three (73) hectares available at the
site.
4.3 While the site was within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under
the administration of the DENR, the site was located at the lower
periphery of the buffer zone; was evaluated to be least likely to affect the
underground water supply; and could, in fact, be excluded from the
reservation.
4.31 It was determined to be far from the main water containment area
for it to pose any immediate danger of contaminating the underground
water, in case of a failure in any of the mitigating measures that would
be installed.
4.32 It was likewise too far from the nearest body of water, the Laguna
other tributaries toward the lake, would serve to dilute and mitigate any
contamination it may emit, in case one happened.
4.33 To resolve the recurring issue regarding its being located within the
Marikina Watershed Reservation, the site had been recommended by the
DENR, and approved by the President, to already be excluded from the
Marikina Watershed reservation and placed under the administration of
MMDA, since the site was deemed to form part of the land resource
reserve then commonly referred to as buffer zone.
5. Contrary to the impression that you had been given, relocating the site
at this point and time would not be easy, if not impracticable, because
aside from the investments that had been made in locating the present
site, further investments have been incurred in:
5.1 The conduct of the technical studies for the development being
implemented. Through a grant-in-aid from the World Bank, US$600,000
was initially spent for the conduct of the necessary studies on the area
and the design of the landfill. This was augmented by, at least, another
P1.5 million from the government for the studies to be completed, or a
total cost at the time (1990) of approximately P20 million.
5.2. Additionally, the government has spent approximately P33 million
in improving on the roadway to make the site accessible from the main
road/highway.
5.3 To achieve the necessary economies in the development of the site,
the utilities had been planned so that their use could be maximized. These
include the access roads, the drainage system, the leacheate collection
system, the gas collection system, and the waste water treatment system.
Their construction are designed so that instead of having to construct
independent units for each area, the use of existing facilities can be
maximized through a system of interconnection. On the average, the
government is spending P14.8 million to develop a hectare of sanitary
landfill area.
6. Despite the preparations and the investments that are now being made
on the project, it is estimated that the total available area, at an
accelerated rate of disposal, assuming that all open dump sites were to be
closed, will only last for 39 months.
6.1 We are still hard pressed to achieve advanced development on the
sites to assure against any possible crisis in garbage from again being
experienced in Metro Manila, aside from having to look for the additional
sites that may be used after the capacities shall have been exhausted.
6.2 Faced with the prospects of having the 15,700 cubic meters of
garbage generated daily strewn all over Metro Manila, we are certain you
will agree that it would be futile to even as much as consider a suspension
of the waste disposal operations at the sanitary landfills.
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing
on the prayer for preliminary injunction was held on 14 August 1996.
On 13 June 1997, the court a quo rendered a Decision,15 the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction for lack of cause of action, is hereby DENIED. 16
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the above decision on the
following grounds:
I render the case moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion in deliberately
ignoring the significant fact that Presidential Proclamation No. 635 was
based on a brazen forgery it was supposedly issued, as stated in the
proclamation itself and repeatedly asserted by respondents in their
comment, on the basis of the alleged recommendation of the DENR
Secretary dated June 26, 1995 but which assertion was denounced by the
then Secretary Angel C. Alcala himself in a sworn statement dated
September 18, 1996 and again during the special hearing of the case in
the Court of Appeals on November 13, 1996 as a forgery since his
signature on the alleged recommendation had been falsified, as now
admitted by respondents themselves in their comment filed with the
Court of Appeals, through the Office of the Solicitor General.
II
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion in completely
ignoring the significant fact that the respondents are operating the landfill
based on a spurious Environmental Compliance Certificate.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the respondents did not violate
R.A. 7586 when they issued and implemented Proclamation No. 635
considering that the withdrawal or disestablishment of a protected area
or the modification of the Marikina Watershed can only be done by an
act of Congress.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion when it deliberately
and willfully brushed aside the unanimous findings and adverse
recommendations of responsible government agencies and non-partisan
officials concerned with environmental protection in favor of the self-
serving, gratuitous assertions found in the unsolicited, partisan letter of
former Malabon Mayor, now Chairman Prospero Oreta of the MMDA
who is an interested party in this case.
V
The Court of Appeals erred when it readily swallowed respondents
assertion that the San Mateo Dumpsite "is located in the Buffer Zone
of the reservation" and is therefore outside of its boundaries, and even
declared in its decision that it took "serious note" of this particular
argument.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion when it encroached
on the function of Congress by expressing its unjustified fear of mini-
smokey mountains proliferating in Metro Manila and justifying its
decision in favor of "an integrated system of solid waste management
like the San Mateo Landfill.
On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,17pointing out that the effects
of the El Nio phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless
destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. They noted that
respondent MMDA had, in the meantime, continued to expand the area
of the dumpsite inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, cutting
down thousands of mature fruit trees and forest trees, and leveling hills
and mountains to clear the dumping area. Garbage disposal operations
were also being conducted on a 24-hour basis, with hundreds of metric
tons of wastes being dumped daily, including toxic and infectious
hospital wastes, intensifying the air, ground and water pollution. 18
The petitioners reiterated their prayer that respondent MMDA be
temporarily enjoined from further dumping waste into the site and from
encroaching into the area beyond its existing perimeter fence so as not to
On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early
Resolution,19 calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite
by the MMDA that caused the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and
barricade the Marcos Highway to stop the dump trucks from reaching the
site for five successive days from 16 January 1999. On the second day of
the barricade, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly
declared their full support for the rally, and notified the MMDA that they
would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province. 20
As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay,
agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. Thus, the municipal
mayors of Rizal, particularly the mayors of Antipolo and San Mateo,
agreed to the use of the dumpsite until that period, which would end on
20 July 1999.21
On 13 July 1999, the petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Early
Resolution22 in anticipation of violence between the conflicting parties as
the date of the scheduled closure of the dumpsite neared.
On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of
the gravity of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that
violence would erupt among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum
ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 December
2000.23 Accordingly, on 20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on
Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA
with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo,
and the City of Antipolo, wherein the latter agreed to further extend the
use of the dumpsite until its permanent closure on 31 December 2000. 24
On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior
and Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman
Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite "in view of the emergency
situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical
and imminent health and sanitation epidemic."25
Claiming the above events constituted a "clear and present danger of
violence erupting in the affected areas," the petitioners filed an Urgent
Petition for Restraining Order26 on 19 January 2001.
On 24 January 2001, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for, "effective immediately and until further orders." 27
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise
known as "The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000," was
signed into law by President Estrada.
Thus, the petitioners raised only two issues in their Memorandum28 of 08
February 2005: 1) whether or not respondent MMDA agreed to the
permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000, and
2) whether or not the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is
mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003.
We hold that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.
Although the petitioners may be deemed to have waived or abandoned
the issues raised in their previous pleadings but not included in the
memorandum,29 certain events we shall relate below have inclined us to
address some of the more pertinent issues raised in the petition for the
guidance of the herein respondents, and pursuant to our symbolic
function to educate the bench and bar. 30
The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the
dumpsites permanent closure.
The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January
1999, with the full support of all the mayors of Rizal Province caused the
MMDA to agree that it would abandon the dumpsite after six months. In
return, the municipal mayors allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20
July 1999.
On 20 July 1999, with much fanfare and rhetoric, the Presidential
Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered
into a MOA with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality
of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo, whereby the latter agreed to an
extension for the use of the dumpsite until 31 December 2000, at which
time it would be permanently closed.
Despite this agreement, President Estrada directed Department of
Interior and Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA
Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite on 11 January 2001,
"in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro
Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation
epidemic;" our issuance of a TRO on 24 January 2001 prevented the
dumpsites reopening.
Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would
have been lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v. Factoran,
the freedom of contract is not absolute. Thus:
.. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this Court stated: "The freedom
of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, to wit: "'Under our form of government the use of property and
the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right
is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In short, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
We thus feel there is also the added need to reassure the residents of the
Province of Rizal that this is indeed a final resolution of this controversy,
for a brief review of the records of this case indicates two self-evident
facts. First, the San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs,
and second, sources of water should always be protected.
As to the first point, the adverse effects of the site were reported as early
as 19 June 1989, when the Investigation Report of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer of DENR-IV-1 stated that
the sources of domestic water supply of over one thousand families
would be adversely affected by the dumping operations. 31 The
succeeding report included the observation that the use of the areas as
dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental
factors of the community.32 Respondent LLDA in fact informed the
MMA that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites
rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation incompatible with its program of upgrading the water
quality of the Laguna Lake. 33
The DENR suspended the sites ECC after investigations revealed
ground slumping and erosion had resulted from improper development
of the site.34 Another Investigation Report35 submitted by the Regional
Technical Director to the DENR reported respiratory illnesses among
pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the
site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris
all over the schools playground. It further reiterated reports that the
leachate treatment plant had been eroded twice already, contaminating
the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the
residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa
Dam and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.
This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be
saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals,36 we had occasion to
reaffirm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,37 on the primordial importance of
watershed areas, thus: "The most important product of a watershed is
water, which is one of the most important human necessities. The
protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future
generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property
but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered now. 38
Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the
garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act39 to
"adopt urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water
crisis which adversely affects the health and well-being of the population,
food production, and industrialization process. One of the issues the law
sought to address was the "protection and conservation of
watersheds."40
In other words, while respondents were blandly declaring that "the reason
for the creation of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, i.e., to protect
Marikina River as the source of water supply of the City of Manila, no
longer exists," the rest of the country was gripped by a shortage of
potable water so serious, it necessitated its own legislation.
Respondents actions in the face of such grave environmental
consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of
providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened
the problem. It is this readiness to wreak irrevocable damage on our
natural heritage in pursuit of what is expedient that has compelled us to
rule at length on this issue. We ignore the unrelenting depletion of our
natural heritage at our peril.
I.
The Reorganization Act of the DENR Defines and
Limits Its Powers over the Countrys Natural Resources
The respondents next point out that the Marikina Watershed Reservation,
and thus the San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain. They allege
that as such, neither the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San
Mateo has the power to control or regulate its use since properties of this
nature belong to the national, and not to the local governments.
It is ironic that the respondents should pursue this line of reasoning.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,41 we had
occasion to observe that "(o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of
the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of
state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary
starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization."42
The Regalian doctrine was embodied in the 1935 Constitution, in Section
1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources."
This was reiterated in the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," and reaffirmed in
the 1987 Constitution in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy
and Patrimony," to wit:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.43
Clearly, the state is, and always has been, zealous in preserving as much
of our natural and national heritage as it can, enshrining as it did the
obligation to preserve and protect the same within the text of our
fundamental law.
It was with this objective in mind that the respondent DENR was
mandated by then President Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 192, 44 otherwise known as "The Reorganization
Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources," to be
"the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the countrys environment
and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain. It is also responsible for the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos."
We expounded on this matter in the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran,45 where we held that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies,
among other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
countrys resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR under the
aforequoted Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192. Moreover:
Section 3 (of E. O. No. 192) makes the following statement of policy:
SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but
for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development
and conservation of our natural resources. (Emphasis ours)
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. - (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit
of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to
the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment."46 (Emphasis ours.)
In sum, the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192
entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures.
However, although the DENR, an agency of the government, owns the
Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not
absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject
to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate
of the DENR, makes particular reference to the agencys being subject
to law and higher authority, thus:
SEC. 2. Mandate. - (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying
out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's
natural resources.
With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that
the public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the
power to control the San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their
corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this
tormented piece of land.
II.
The Local Government Code Gives to Local Government Units All the
Necessary Powers to Promote the General Welfare of Their Inhabitants
The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also
violates Rep. Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.
Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635,
which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10
October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state " to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions."
Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall
be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of
the sanggunian is obtained.
During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task
Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the
required consultations. However, he added that "(t)his is the problem, sir,
the officials we may have been talking with at the time this was
established may no longer be incumbent and this is our difficulty now.
That is what we are trying to do now, a continuing dialogue." 47
The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when,
at the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to
stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the
province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump
garbage in their province. 48
The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were
in fact fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 allows
every local government unit to "exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare," which
involve, among other things, "promot(ing) health and safety,
enhance(ing) the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and
preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. "
In Lina , Jr. v. Pao,49 we held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations
with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national
government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance
of the particular community implementing the project. Rejecting the
petitioners contention that Sections 2(c) and 27 of the Local
Government Code applied mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets
around the country, we held that:
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only
to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a
particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of
the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO.
Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say
that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the
Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26
thereof. Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the
Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every national
agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or
involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program
that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction
of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain
the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize
the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among
those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause
the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of
crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain
animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the
introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna. (emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this doctrine in the recent case of Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v.
Lanzanas,50 where we held that there was no statutory requirement for
the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a
mooring facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which
are not environmentally critical.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and
functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power
to, among other things, "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code." These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms
of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling
of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result
in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of
ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of
property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a
comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of
this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with
the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of
buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the
provisions of this Code; [Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section
17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities,
providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks,
greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development
projects .and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for
the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system
to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the
water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use
of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and
quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this
purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all
territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within
one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water
service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water."
[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met
before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented:
prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent
either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is
illegal.
III.
Waste Disposal Is Regulated by the Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act of 2000
The respondents would have us overlook all the abovecited laws because
the San Mateo site is a very expensive - and necessary - fait
accompli. The respondents cite the millions of pesos and hundreds of
thousands of dollars the government has already expended in its
development and construction, and the lack of any viable alternative
sites.
The Court of Appeals agreed, thus:
During the hearing on the injunction, questions were also asked. "What
will happen if the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill is closed? Where will the
daily collections of garbage be disposed of and dumped?" Atty.
Mendoza, one of the lawyers of the petitioners, answered that each
city/municipality must take care of its own. Reflecting on that answer,
we are troubled: will not the proliferation of separate open dumpsites be
a more serious health hazard (which ha(s) to be addressed) to the
residents of the community? What with the galloping population growth
and the constricting available land area in Metro Manila? There could be Environment and Natural Resources is DISMISSED on the ground of
a mini-Smokey Mountain in each of the ten citiescomprising Metro mootness.
Manila, placing in danger the health and safety of more people. Damage
to the environment could be aggravated by the increase in number of SO ORDERED.
open dumpsites. An integrated system of solid waste management, like
the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill, appears advisable to a populous
metropolis like the Greater Metro Manila Area absent access to better
technology.51

We acknowledge that these are valid concerns. Nevertheless, the lower

court should have been mindful of the legal truism that it is the
legislature, by its very nature, which is the primary judge of the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law. 52

Moreover, these concerns are addressed by Rep. Act No. 9003. Approved
on 26 January 2001, "The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000" was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state "to adopt
a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management
system which shall ensure the protection of public health and
environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize
the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation
and recovery."53 It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid
Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer,
processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of
solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and
public information, and the funding of solid waste management projects.

The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste

Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the
method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within
eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open
dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer,
groundwater reservoir or watershed area.54 Any landfills
subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements
laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be
consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit,
and that the site must be located in an area where the landfills
operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive
resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed
areas.55

This writes finis to any remaining aspirations respondents may have of

reopening the San Mateo Site. Having declared Proclamation No. 635
illegal, we see no compelling need to tackle the remaining issues raised
in the petition and the parties respective memoranda.

A final word. Laws pertaining to the protection of the environment were

not drafted in a vacuum. Congress passed these laws fully aware of the
perilous state of both our economic and natural wealth. It was precisely
to minimize the adverse impact humanitys actions on all aspects of the
natural world, at the same time maintaining and ensuring an environment
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other, that these legal safeguards were put in place.
They should thus not be so lightly cast aside in the face of what is easy
and expedient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
24 January 2001 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision
granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corporation
of the Philippines (PICOP) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking the reversal of the same Decision
insofar as it nullified the award of damages in favor of PICOP is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing
the lifting of the Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Secretary of