Case No.
32 questioning the ownership and possession of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO,
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
Facts:
Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto
Castillo applied for the registration of two
parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in
Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, described in Plan
Psu-119166, with a total area of 39,755 square
meters. In a decision dated August 31, 1951, the
said Modesto Castillo, married to Amanda Lat,
was declared the true and absolute owner of the
land with the improvements thereon, for which
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 was,
issued to him by the Register of Deeds at
Batangas, Batangas, on February 7, 1952.
After the death of Modesto Castillo, on
August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo,
et al., executed a deed of partition and
assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L.
Castillo, et al., as a result of which, Original
Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled,
and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of
title were issued to Florencio Castillo, et al.,
The Republic of the Philippines filed
Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the
annulment of the certificates of title issued to
defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al.,
as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for
the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots
1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged
that said lands had always formed part of the
Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters
thereof, and being of public ownership, it could
not be the subject of registration as private
property. Appellants herein, defendants below,
alleged in their answer that the Government's
action was already barred by the decision of the
registration court; that the action has prescribed;
and that the government was estopped from
appellants.
After trial, the then Court of First
Instance of Batangas ruled in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Land
Registration Court involving shore lands
constitutes res judicata
Held:
There is no question that one of the requisites of
res judicata is that the court rendering the final
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter; that shores are properties of the public
domain intended for public use (Article 420,
Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus,
it has long been settled that portions of the
foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches
cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title
upon the registrant.
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake,
like the lands in question must be differentiated
from foreshore land or that part of the land
adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered
and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides.
Such distinction draws importance from the fact
that accretions on the bank of a lake, like
Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the
estate to which they have been added while
accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the
public domain, and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the
government to be no longer needed for public
use.
But said distinction will not help private
respondents because there is no accretion shown
to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it
was established that the occupants of the lots
who were engaged in duck raising filled up the
area with shells and sand to make it habitable.

The defense of long possession is likewise not
available in this case because, as already ruled
by this Court, mere possession of land does not
by itself automatically divest the land of its
public character.
CASE 33
Republic vs Judge delos Angeles
G.R No. L-30240, March 25, 1988
FACTS:
Ayala and Zobel illegally absorbed
areas belonging to public domain by usurping
the same and causing its subdivision, thereby
acquiring titles over said properties, and selling
it over to third persons.
In a 1965 judgment, the Supreme Court
rendered this modus operandi, as quoted by
the OSG, as illegal and issued an order for the
restoration of subject areas to the Republic and
its lessees.
Respondents thwarted the decision thru
technical maneuvers by asserting that petitioners
cannot recover all subdivided properties because
the 1965 judgment specifically provided the
nullity of a single title only. Furthermore,
petitioners may only recover via writ of
execution, which cannot be issued in full scope
because of the decisions limited
pronouncement on which it is based. Lastly, a
res judicata of the issue bars another filing of an
action, effectively restraining the execution of
the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may validly
claim ownership over subject public properties
by registration of land titles and deeds.
HELD:
NO. The Court held, it is an elementary
principle of law that said areas not being
capable of registration, their inclusion in a
certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title on
the registrant.
CASE 33
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT and
DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT,
Petitioners,
v.
COURT OF APPEALS and MINO HILARIO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 81961. April 18, 1989
FACTS:
- CA declared Mino Hilario as owner of
a parcel of land declared as forest land
- In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals, [154 SCRA 476 (1987), there can be
no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not
yet classified as disposable or alienable.
Declassification of forest land is an express and
positive act of Government. It cannot be
presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
deemed waived
- Said parcel of land was obtained by
Hilario by purchase from his predecessor, who
had been cultivating the land prior to World
War I
- Defendant argues that although his
claim belongs to forest land whose disposability
depends on an express declaration of the
government, his claim would still boast merit by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 141, which
provides:
 "(c) Members of the national
cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at
least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in subsection
(b) hereof. (as amended by R.A.
No. 3872, section 1, approved
June 18, 1964).
Respondent Hilario contends that the
phrase "whether disposable or not" should be
construed to mean that a parcel of land situated
in an inalienable land may be privately-owned
by a member of the cultural minorities.
ISSUE:
WON Hilario may own forest land.
HELD:
No.
Sec. 48 (c) must be read in conjunction
with Sec. 48 (b), which expressly declares that
the land referred to are agricultural lands which
may either be alienable or not. To hold
otherwise would be unconstitutional.
As to the lower courts ruling that
"applicants predecessor Shawidi, had been
occupying and working on the land at the
outbreak of the First World War in 1914" long
before Proclamation No. 217 declaring the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve was issued,
the Court has already declared in Republic v.
Court of Appeals, supra:
"There is an erroneous
assumption implicit in the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals which
the government oppositors also appear to
have overlooked. This is the reliance on
Proclamation No. 217 of Governor
General Henry L. Stimson as the
operative act which converted the lands
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong.
The land was not non-forest or
agricultural land prior to the 1929
proclamation. It did not earn a
classification from non-forest into forest
land because of the proclamation. The
proclamation merely declared a special
forest reserve out of already existing
forest lands. The land was already forest
or timber land even before the
proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915
of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of
15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares
claimed area has no legal significance. A
person cannot enter into forest land and
by the simple act of cultivating a portion
of that land, earn credits towards an
eventual confirmation of imperfect title.
The Government must first declare the
forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title."
LUNOD vs. MENESES
FACTS: 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod,
et.al., alleging that they each owned and
possessed farm lands, situated in the places
known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake
named Calalaran; that the defendant Higino
Meneses, is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip
of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said
lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the
other; that from time immemorial, and
consequently for more than twenty years before
1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the
rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water over the said land
in Paraanan, which easement the plaintiffs
enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that
the water collected upon their lands and in the
Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the
Taliptip River. From that year however, the
defendant, without any right or reason,
converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond
and by means of a dam and a bamboo net,
prevented the free passage of the water through
said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became
flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters,
They therefore asked that judgment be entered
against the defendant, declaring that the said
tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory
easement permitting the flow of water from the
property of the plaintiffs.
Meneses denied the allegations of the
complaint, contending that no statutory
easement existed nor could exist in favor of the
lands described in the complaint, permitting the
waters to flow over the fish pond that he,
together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of
Bambang, the area and boundaries of which
were stated by him, and which he and his
brothers had inherited from their deceased
mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tract of land in
Paraanan is subject to statutory easement
HELD: YES. The lands of Paraanan, being
lower, are subject to the easement of receiving
and giving passage to the waters proceeding
from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran;
this easement was not constituted by agreement
between the interested parties; it is of a statutory
nature, and the law had imposed it for the
common public utility in view of the difference
in the altitude of the lands in the barrio
Bambang. (Art. 530, CC)
The defendant Meneses might have constructed
the works necessary to make and maintain a fish
pond within his own land, but he was always
under the strict and necessary obligation to
respect the statutory easement of waters charged
upon his property, and had no right to close the
passage and outlet of the waters flowing from
the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of
Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not
lawfully injure the owners of the dominant
estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip
River of the waters flooding the upper lands
belonging to the plaintiffs. (Art. 552, CC)
Case No. 37
NAPOCOR VS IBRAHIM
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2008
Facts:
Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in
Lanao del Norte.
In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of
the sub-terrain area of the land and
constructed underground tunnels on the
said property.
The tunnels were apparently being used
by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of
Lake Lanao and in the operation of
NAPOCORs Agus projects.
In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs
of Ibrahim) requested Marawi City
Water District for a permit to construct
or install a motorized deep well on the
parcel of land but it was rejected on the
grounds that the construction would
cause danger to lives and property by
reason of the presence of the
underground tunnels.
Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay
damages and to vacate the sub-terrain
portion of the land.
Issue:
 WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of
the sub-terrain area of the land. If yes, are they
entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Held:
YES. The sub-terrain portion of the
property belongs to Ibrahim.
The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of
the Civil Code which provides that: The owner
of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special
laws and ordinances. xxx
Hence, the ownership of land extends to
the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property as well as
the sub-terrain area of the land where the
underground tunnels were constructed.
On the issue of just compensation, the
Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim should be
paid a just compensation.
Ibrahim could have dug upon their
property and built motorized deep wells but was
prevented from doing so by the authorities
because of the construction of the tunnels
underneath the surface of the land.
Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the
sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have
excavated the same for the construction of the
deep wells. It has been shown that the
underground tunnels have deprived the plaintiffs
of the lawful use of the land and considerably
reduced its value.
It was held that: If the government takes
property without expropriation and devotes the
property to public use, after many years, the
property owner may demand payment of just
compensation in the event restoration of
possession is neither convenient nor feasible.
This is in accordance with the principle that
persons shall not be deprived of their property
except by competent authority and for public
use and always upon payment of just
compensation.
CASE NO. 38
MODESTO PALALI VS. JULIET AWISAN
FACTS:
Respondent Awisan claims to be the
owner of a parcel of land (6.6698 hectares) in
SitioCamambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain
Province covered by her tax declaration no. 147.
On March 7 1994 she filed an action for
quieting of title against Petitioner Palali alleging
that the latter occupied and encroached on the
northern portion (a total of 848 square meters)
of her property. Respondent assails that the land
was originally owned by her father who testified
that he was able to consolidate ownership over
the land by declaring them from public land as
well as purchasing from adjoining land owners.
He also claimed to have introduced
improvements on the subject land since the
1960s.
Petitioner denies encroachment and
asserts ownership over the subject land. He
maintained that he and his ancestors have
openly and continuously possessed subject land
since time immemorial. His own home and
plantations has been standing on the property
for the last 20 years without disturbance against
his ownership and possession thereof.
RTC ruled in favor of herein Petitioner
but such ruling was reversed by the Court of
Appeals in favor of herein respondent under the
misinterpretation that the land in question is the
whole 6.6698 hectares owned by Respondent
Awanis while in fact the subject land in question
is only the 848 square meters northern portion.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
 Who between the parties has the better
right over the subject property?
HELD:
The court finds merit in the trial courts
ruling in favor of herein petitioner. From their
consistent testimonies, the court finds that the
petitioners ancestors occupied the land during
the pre-war era. Their witnesses were longtime
residents of SitioCamambaey. They lived on the
land, knew their neighbors and were familiar
with the terrain. They were witnesses to the
introduction of improvements made by
petitioner and his predecessors.
On the other hand, respondent relied
merely on her tax declaration but failed to prove
actual possession. Respondent and her father
allegedly introduced improvements upon the
subject property however such improvements
were not seen during the ocular inspection by
the RTC. Tax declarations by themselves are not
conclusive evidence of ownership of real
property. In absence of actual, public and
adverse possession, declaration of land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.
Preponderance of evidence is clearly in favor of
the petitioner. As the actual possessor under
claim of ownership, petitioner enjoys the
presumption of ownership. Settled is the
principle that a party seeking recovery of real
property must rely on the strength of her case
rather than on the weakness of the defense.
Petition is granted. The CA ruling is reversed
and set aside.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD (TRB) vs. HOLY
TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
G.R. No. 172410 (April 14, 2008)
NOTE: FIRST ISSUE additional information,
JUST GET THE 2nd ISSUE
FACTS:
On 29 December
2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated
Complaint for Expropriation against landowners
whose properties would be affected by the
construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the
North Luzon Expressway. Respondent Holy
Trinity Realty and Development Corporation
(HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession, manifesting that it deposited a
sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100%
of the zonal value of the affected properties, in
the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor
Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized
government depository. TRB maintained that
since it had already complied with the
provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes ministerial on the part of
the RTC.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with
the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying
that the respondent or its duly authorized
representative be allowed to withdraw the
amount of P22,968,000.00, out of
TRBs advance deposit of P28,406,700.00
with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest
which accrued thereon. Acting on said motion,
the RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003,
directing the manager of LBP-South Harbor to
release in favor of HTRDC the amount
of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already
proved its absolute ownership over the subject
properties and paid the taxes due thereon to the
government. According to the RTC, the issue
however on the interest earned by the amount
deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still
be threshed out.

On 9 October 2003, TRB instead
submitted a Manifestation to which was
attached a letter dated 19 August 2003 by Atty.
Osoteo stating that the DPWH Expropriation
Account was an interest bearing current
account.
On 11 March 2004, the RTC issued an
Order resolving the issue of ownership of the
interest that had accrued on the amount
deposited by DPWH in its expropriation current
account with LBP-South Harbor in favour of
HTRDC, that the interest earnings from the
deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting one
hundred (100%) percent of the zonal value of
the affected properties in this expropriation
proceedings under the principle of accession are
considered as fruits and should properly pertain
to the herein defendant/property owner
[HTRDC].
The Republic, represented by the TRB,
insisted that HTRDC is entitled only to an
amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property, nothing more and
nothing less. According to the TRB, the owner
of the subject properties is entitled to an exact
amount as clearly defined in both Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 2, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court.
The TRB further points out that the
expropriation account with LBP-
South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but
of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account
includes the compensation for the other
landowners named defendants in Civil Case No.
869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to
respondent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not HTRDC is entitled
ONLY to an amount equivalent to
the zonal value of the expropriated
property as defined in both Section 4
of Republic Act No. 8974 and
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court?
2. Whether or not the interest earned by the
deposited amount in the expropriation
account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue
of accession?
HELD:
1. No. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court speak of different
procedures, with the former specifically
governing expropriation proceedings for
national government infrastructure
projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, The
Court held:
There are at least two crucial
differences between the respective
procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the
Government is required to make
immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint
to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas in Rule 67, the Government is
required only to make an initial
deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover,
Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit
be equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, unlike
Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as
the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration
or the current relevant zonal valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using
the replacement cost method.
The proceedings in this case deal with
the expropriation of properties intended for a
national government infrastructure
project. Therefore, Republic Act No. 8974 is
correctly applied by requiring the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of
the properties sought to be expropriated before
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the Republic.
2. YES. Under Article 440 of the Civil Code,
the right of accession is conferred by
ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership
of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or
artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar
is part of the deposited amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH which pertains
particularly to HTRDC. Such amount,
determined to be P22,968,000.00 of
the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already
ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or
its authorized representative. The deposit of the
amount was already deemed a constructive
delivery thereof to HTRDC:
When the [herein
petitioner] TRB deposited the
money as advance payment for
the expropriated property with an
authorized government
depositary bank for purposes of
obtaining a writ of possession, it
is deemed to be a constructive
delivery of the amount
corresponding to the 100% zonal
valuation of the expropriated
property. Since [HTRDC] is
entitled thereto and undisputably
the owner of the principal
amount deposited by [herein
petitioner] TRB, conversely, the
interest yield, as accession, in a
bank deposit should likewise
pertain to the owner of the
money deposited.
That the expropriation account was in the
name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of
no moment. Thus,
Notwithstanding that the
amount was deposited under the
DPWH account, ownership over
the deposit transferred by
operation of law to the [HTRDC]
and whatever interest, considered
as civil fruits, accruing to the
amount of Php22,968,000.00
should properly pertain to
[HTRDC] as the lawful owner of
the principal amount deposited
following the principle of
accession. Bank interest partake
the nature of civil fruits under
Art. 442 of the New Civil
Code. And since these are
considered fruits, ownership
thereof should be due to the
owner of the
principal. Undoubtedly, being an
attribute of ownership, the
[HTRDCs] right over the fruits
(jus fruendi), that is the bank
interests, must be respected.
Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that
the effects of a conditional obligation to give,
once the condition has been fulfilled, shall
retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with
the given conditions, as determined by the RTC
in its Order, the effects of the constructive
delivery retroacted to the actual date of the
deposit of the amount in the expropriation
account of DPWH.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD (TRB) vs. HOLY
TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
G.R. No. 172410 (April 14, 2008)
NOTE: FIRST ISSUE additional information,
JUST GET THE 2nd ISSUE
FACTS:
On 29 December
2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated
Complaint for Expropriation against landowners
whose properties would be affected by the
construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the
North Luzon Expressway. Respondent Holy
Trinity Realty and Development Corporation
(HTRDC) was one of the affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession, manifesting that it deposited a
sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100%
of the zonal value of the affected properties, in
the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor
Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized
government depository. TRB maintained that
since it had already complied with the
provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes ministerial on the part of
the RTC.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with
the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying
that the respondent or its duly authorized
representative be allowed to withdraw the
amount of P22,968,000.00, out of
TRBs advance deposit of P28,406,700.00
with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest
which accrued thereon. Acting on said motion,
the RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003,
directing the manager of LBP-South Harbor to
release in favor of HTRDC the amount
of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already
proved its absolute ownership over the subject
properties and paid the taxes due thereon to the
government. According to the RTC, the issue
however on the interest earned by the amount
deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still
be threshed out.
On 9 October 2003, TRB instead
submitted a Manifestation to which was
attached a letter dated 19 August 2003 by Atty.
Osoteo stating that the DPWH Expropriation
Account was an interest bearing current
account.
On 11 March 2004, the RTC issued an
Order resolving the issue of ownership of the
interest that had accrued on the amount
deposited by DPWH in its expropriation current
account with LBP-South Harbor in favour of
HTRDC, that the interest earnings from the
deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting one
hundred (100%) percent of the zonal value of
the affected properties in this expropriation
proceedings under the principle of accession are
considered as fruits and should properly pertain
to the herein defendant/property owner
[HTRDC].
The Republic, represented by the TRB,
insisted that HTRDC is entitled only to an
amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property, nothing more and
nothing less. According to the TRB, the owner
of the subject properties is entitled to an exact
amount as clearly defined in both Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 2, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court.
The TRB further points out that the
expropriation account with LBP-
South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but
of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account
includes the compensation for the other
landowners named defendants in Civil Case No.
869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to
respondent.
ISSUE:
3. Whether or not HTRDC is entitled
ONLY to an amount equivalent to
the zonal value of the expropriated
property as defined in both Section 4
of Republic Act No. 8974 and
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court?
4. Whether or not the interest earned by the
deposited amount in the expropriation
account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue
of accession?
HELD:
3. No. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court speak of different
procedures, with the former specifically
governing expropriation proceedings for
national government infrastructure
projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, The
Court held:
There are at least two crucial
differences between the respective
procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the
Government is required to make
immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint
to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas in Rule 67, the Government is
required only to make an initial
deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover,
Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit
be equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, unlike
Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as
the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration
or the current relevant zonal valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using
the replacement cost method.
The proceedings in this case deal with
the expropriation of properties intended for a
national government infrastructure
project. Therefore, Republic Act No. 8974 is
correctly applied by requiring the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of
the properties sought to be expropriated before
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the Republic.
4. YES. Under Article 440 of the Civil Code,
the right of accession is conferred by
ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership
of property gives the right by
accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or
artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar
is part of the deposited amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH which pertains
particularly to HTRDC. Such amount,
determined to be P22,968,000.00 of
the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already
ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or
its authorized representative. The deposit of the
amount was already deemed a constructive
delivery thereof to HTRDC:
When the [herein
petitioner] TRB deposited the
money as advance payment for
the expropriated property with an
authorized government
depositary bank for purposes of
 obtaining a writ of possession, it
is deemed to be a constructive
delivery of the amount
corresponding to the 100% zonal
valuation of the expropriated
property. Since [HTRDC] is
entitled thereto and undisputably
the owner of the principal
amount deposited by [herein
petitioner] TRB, conversely, the
interest yield, as accession, in a
bank deposit should likewise
pertain to the owner of the
money deposited.
That the expropriation account was in the
name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of
no moment. Thus,
Notwithstanding that the
amount was deposited under the
DPWH account, ownership over
the deposit transferred by
operation of law to the [HTRDC]
and whatever interest, considered
as civil fruits, accruing to the
amount of Php22,968,000.00
should properly pertain to
[HTRDC] as the lawful owner of
the principal amount deposited
following the principle of
accession. Bank interest partake
the nature of civil fruits under
Art. 442 of the New Civil
Code. And since these are
considered fruits, ownership
thereof should be due to the
owner of the
principal. Undoubtedly, being an
attribute of ownership, the
[HTRDCs] right over the fruits
(jus fruendi), that is the bank
interests, must be respected.
Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that
the effects of a conditional obligation to give,
once the condition has been fulfilled, shall
retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with
the given conditions, as determined by the RTC
in its Order, the effects of the constructive
delivery retroacted to the actual date of the
deposit of the amount in the expropriation
account of DPWH.
41.) FLORENTINO v SUPERVALUE
G.R. No. 172384, 12 September 2007
FACTS:
Florentino is a lessee of Supervalue (SM).
Florentino is the owner of Empanada Royale, a
food cart business entered into a contract of
lease with SM. The contract was good for 4
months and after the end of the contract, both
parties had the option to either renew or
terminate the contract. Florentino and SM was
able to renew the contract several times that it
even lasted for a year. However, SM terminated
the contract with Florentino for the following
violations: failure to open on two separate
occasions; closing before mall closing time
;introducing a new variety of empanada without
the approval of SM. The store management then
ordered the foreclosure of the space and along
with it were the personal belongings of the
petitioner. Florentino demanded for the return of
her personal belongings and of the security
deposit that she has given SM.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Florentino can claim for
reimbursement on the improvements that
she has made?
2. Whether or not Florentino is entitled to
claim for the security bond that she has
posted?
HELD:
(1)Florentino is no longer entitled for
reimbursment on the improvements that she has
done on her stall.
Article 1678: If the lessee makes in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable to the
use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form or substance of the property
leased,the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the of the
improvements at that time. Should the lessor
refused to reimburse said amount the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damages thereby. He
shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary."
As stated in Geminianovs CA: "Being mere
lessees, the private respondents knew that their
occupation of the premises would continue only
for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be
considered as possessors nor builders in good
faith"
(2)Florentino is entitled to half of the security
deposits made with SM because it would
unconscionable for the former to be imposed
such penalty.
Obligations with Penal clause:
Article 1226: In obligations with penal clause,
the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of
noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the
contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if
the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty
of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is
demandable in accordance with the provisions
of this code.
As a rule the courts are not in the liberty to
ignore the freedoms of the parties to agree on
such terms and conditions.The courts may
equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the
contracts in two instances:
1. if the principal obligation has been
partly or ireegularly complied with;
2. If there has been no compliance if the
penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in
accordance with Article 1229:
Article 1229: The judge shall equitably reduce
the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the
debtor. Even if there has been no performance,
the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if
it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
Damian Ignacio vs Elias Hilario
76 Phil 605 Civil Law Property Accession
Industrial Builder in Good Faith; Owner in
Good Faith
Sometime during the 1940s in Pangasinan, a
civil suit arose between Damian Ignacio and
Elias Hilario. Hilario was the owner of a parcel
of land. He later discovered that Ignacio built
some buildings therein (a granary and a house).
After trial, Judge Antonio Felix of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan ruled that both
were in good faith (Hilario was the owner in
good faith while Ignacio was the builder in good
faith).
Judge Felix then spelled out the rights of the
parties to wit:
a.) Ignacio can retain possession over the
buildings he erected until after he is paid by
Hilario for the value of the buildings he erected;
b.) Hilario can choose to buy the said buildings
or he can choose to sell Ignacio his land since
the value of his land was only P45.00 while the
value of the buildings erected was P2,000.00.
However, Hilario refused to avail of his options.
Instead, he filed a motion in court to have
Ignacio be ejected and have them destroy the
buildings he erected. Judge Felipe Natividad (he
replaced Judge Felix), granted Hilarios motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hilario, the owner in
good faith, may eject a builder in good faith
without choosing either to appropriate the
building for himself after payment of its value
or to sell his land to the builder in good faith.
HELD: No. The owner in good faith has to
make a choice. He cannot dispense the options
under the law and then eject the builder in good
faith. This is because both are in good faith.
But when can the owner in good faith
compel the builder in good faith to remove the
building he erected?
This is only available if after the owner in good
faith chose to sell his land to the builder in good
faith and the latter fails to pay the value of the
land within the agree period. Only then can the
owner in good faith compel the builder in good
faith to remove the building he erected.
CASE 43
LEONOR GRANA and JULIETA TORRALBA
VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA
BONGATO and JARDENIO SANCHEZ
GR L-12486 31 AUG 1960
Facts:
The herein Petitioners were sued by Bongato
and Sanchez for the recovery of 87 square
meters of residential land which they have
inherited as the children of the spouses Marcos
Bongato and Eusebia. The former were ordered
by the to vacate and deliver it to said
respondents and to pay a monthly rental of
P10.00 from the filing of the complaint until
they actually vacate the same, plus attorney's
fees and costs.
The Petitioners alleged that the said property
became a subject of a cadastral survey due to
conflicts and overlapping of boundaries. In that
survey, Gregorio Bongato's lot, according to
petitioners, was identified as Lot No. 311 and
that of IsidariaTrillo, their predecessor in
interest, as Lot No. 310. Citing the fact that
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138)
covers 295 square meters of land, while the
sketch plan of the second cadastral survey of
Butuan shows that Lot No. 311 has only 230
square meters, petitioners maintain that it is the
latter area properly belongs to respondents and
that the land in question is part of the adjoining
land, Lot No. 310, which belonged to their
predecessor in interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the first survey was erroneous or
that it included part of the contiguous land of
petitioners' predecessor in interest?
Held:
Petitioners' stand is untenable. No proof was
presented to show that the first survey was
erroneous or that it included part of the
contigous land of petitioners' predecessor in
interest as part of the lot now covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-72 (138).
Note that the difference in area between the land
covered by said title and Lot No. 311 of the
resurvey plan is 65 square meters while the area
of the land in dispute if 87 square meters. And
what is more, the alleged sketch plan of the
resurvey was not presented in evidence.
Upon the other hand, it is not disputed that the
land in question is part of the lot covered by the
Torrens title issued way back in 1923 in the
name of respondents' predecessor in interest.
Said title has not been contested up to the
present, and, therefore, has become
inconvertible evidence of the ownership of the
land covered by it. Well settled is the rule that a
Torrens certificate of title becomes conclusive
and indefeasible after the lapse of the period
within which it may be impugned (Reyes, et al.
vs. Borbon, et al., 50 Phil., 791; Yumul vs.
Rivera, et al., 64 Phil., 13).
Although without any legal and valid claim over
the land in question, petitioners, however, were
found by the Court of Appeals to have
constructed a portion of their house thereon in
good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil
Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the
land on which anything has been built in good
faith shall have the right to appropriate as his
own faith shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the building, after payment to the
builder of necessary and useful expenses, and in
the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or
mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the
price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the
land, have therefore the choice of either
appropriating the portion of petitioners' house
which is on their land upon payment of the
proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to
petitioners that part of their land on which
stands the improvement. It may here be pointed
out that it would be impractical for respondents
to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e.,
buy that portion of the house standing on their
land, for in that event the whole building might
be rendered useless. The more workable
solution, it would seem, is for respondents to
sell to petitioners that part of their land on
which was constructed a portion of the latter's
house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to
buy, then they must vacate the land and must
pay rentals until they do so. Of course,
respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that
of the aforementioned portion of the house. If
such be the case, then petitioners must pay
reasonable rent. The parties must come to an
agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and
should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix
the same. (Article 361, old Civil Code; Article
448 of the new).
Case No. 44
Felices vs Iriola
G.R No. L-11269, Feb. 28, 1958
FACTS
It appears that Felices was the grantee
of a homestead, by virtue of which he was
issued OCT. A month after patent, he conveyed
in conditional sale to Iriola a portion of his
homestead with an express stipulation subject to
Sec. 119 of Act 141 (PLA), that after the lapse
of 5 years or as soon as may be allowed by law,
the vendor or his successors would execute in
vendee's favor a deed of absolute sale over the
land in question. 2 years after sale, Felices tried
to recover the land, but the latter refused unless
he was paid P2,000 as the value of
improvements. Felices deposited the received
price in court and filed this action.
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant may re- cover
or be reimbursed the value of his improvements
on the land in question.
HELD
While recognizing Felices' right to
"redeem", Iriola insisted that he must first be
reimbursed. But investigation found that
improvements were made after the complaint
had been filed; some of the improvements were
even introduced after a commissioner had
already been appointed. "He who builds, plants
or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted, or sown without right to
indemnity" (Art. 449, New Civil Code). The
sale in question was executed by the parties
within the 5-year prohibitive period (Sec 118 of
PLA), the same is absolutely null and void and
ineective from its inception. Consequently,
Felices never lost his title or ownership over the
land in question, and there was no need either
for him to repurchase the same.
CASE 45
Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 scra 122
Facts:
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the
latter's mother had told him the couple could
build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE whom Ernesto
did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the
LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00
whoprobably assumed that the wife's mother
was the owner of the LAND and that,it would
be transferred to the spouses. Subsequently
turned out that the LANDhad been titled in the
name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who, sold
the sameto petitioner SARMIENTO.
SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment suit against
them. Inthe evidentiary hearings before the
Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submittedthe
deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which
showed the price to beP15,000.00. On the other
hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of
theRESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.Sarmientorefuse to
pay and give option to buy the property.
Issue:
1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith.
2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both
refusal to pay thespouses and give option to
purchase.
Held:
1. Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were
builders in good faith in view of the peculiar
circumstances under which they had constructed
the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they
knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's
mother-in-law who, having stated they could
build on the property, could reasonably be
expected to later on give them the LAND. In
regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of
the Code provides:
ART. 448.
The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown orplanted in good faith,shall
have the rightto appropriate as his own the
works,sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land,and the one who sowed, the
proper rent.However, the builder or planter
cannotbe obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of thebuilding or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of theland does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after
properindemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
2. No. The owner of the building erected in
good faith on a land owned byanother, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until
he is paid thevalue of his building, under article
453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land.
upon, the other hand, has the option, under
article 361 (now Article 448),either to pay for
the building or to sell his land to the owner of
the building.
But he cannot,
as respondents here did,
refuse both to pay for the buildingand to sell the
land
and compel the owner of the building to remove
it fromthe land where it is erected. He is entitled
to such remotion only when, afterhaving chosen
to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for
the same.We hold, therefore, that the order of
Judge Natividad compellingdefendants-
petitioners to remove their buildings from the
landbelonging to plaintiffs-respondents only
because the latter choseneither to pay for such
buildings nor to sell the land, is null andvoid,
for it amends substantially the judgment sought
to beexecuted and is, furthermore, offensive to
articles 361 (nowArticle 448) and 453 (now
Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignaciovs.
Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
hereby ordereddismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
DEPRA VS DUMLAO
FACTS:
Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in
Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his.
Dumlao built his house on his own land, but the
kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depras
property. Upon finding this, Depras mom
ordered Dumlao to move back from his
encroachment, then subsequently filed an action
for unlawful detainer against Dumlao.
The lower court found that Dumlao was a
builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay
rent (PhP5.00/month) forced lease between
the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals
so Dumlao deposited this with the MTC.
Neither party appealed judgment so this became
final and executory.
1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint
for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this,
stating that the suit is barred by res judicata. But
Depra averred that the lower court did not have
jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real
property only the CFI has jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to
the case at bar?
2. Whether or not the land owner can be
compelled to accept rent payments by the court
(with both LO and BPS being in good faith)?
HELD:
In the first issue, res judicata would not apply
should the first case be one for ejectment and
the other for quieting of title. Article 448 of the
Civil Code provides that the land owner has 2
options to buy the building or to sell/rent his
land. This is so because the rights of the owner
of the land is older, and by the principle of
accession, he also has a right to the accessories.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC to
determine the fair price of the land, the expenses
incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in
value of the land, and whether the value of the
land is considerably more than the value of the
kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give
Depra 15 days to exercise such option.
ORTIZ vs. KAYANAN
FACTS: Plaintiff used to be the legal guardian
of Martin Dolorico II. When his ward died,
plaintiff continued to cultivate and possess the
latters property, which was formerly a subject
of homestead application. In the said
application, the wards uncle was named as his
heir and successor in interest. Thus, the uncle
executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights
over the property in favor of Comintan and
Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law and had
the Director of Lands cancel the homestead
application. Ortiz protested, saying that he
should be given preference to purchase the lot
inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has
been in continuous possession of the same, but
was not given due course. Still, the lot in
question was sold at a public auction wherein
defendant Comintan was the only bidder. On
appeal, respondent court rules that half of the
portion of land should be given to the defendant,
being the successful bidder. The other half
should be awarded to Zamora without prejudice
to the right of Ortiz to participate in the public
bidding of the lot. If Ortiz is to be not declared
the successful bidder, defendants should
reimburse jointly said plaintiff for the
improvements introduced on the land, with him,
having the right to retain the property until after
he has been paid for. It was later found out that
Ortiz collected tolls on a portion of the property
wherein he has not introduced any
improvement. The judgment became final and
executory. Private respondents filed a motion
for its execution requesting that they file a bond
in lieu of the amount that should be paid to
Ortiz, on the condition that after the accounting
of the tolls collected by plaintiff, there is still
and amount due and payable to the said
plaintiff, the bond shall be held answerable.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition,
contending that in issuing the Order and Writ of
Execution, respondent Court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, moving astray from the
terms of the judgment they purportedly seek to
enforce. He argued that since said judgment
declared the petitioner a possessor in good faith,
he is entitled to the payment of the value of the
improvements introduced by him on the whole
property, with right to retain the land until he
has been fully paid such value. He likewise
averred that no payment for improvements has
been made and, instead, a bond therefor had
been filed by defendants (private respondents),
which, according to petitioner, is not the
payment envisaged in the decision which would
entitle private respondents to the possession of
the property. Furthermore, with respect to
portion "B", petitioner alleges that, under the
decision, he has the right to retain the same until
after he has participated and lost in the public
bidding of the land to be conducted by the
Bureau of Lands. It is claimed that it is only in
the event that he loses in the bidding that he can
be legally dispossessed thereof.
It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits
of the property, including the tolls collected by
him from the passing vehicles, which according
to the trial court amounts to P25K, belongs to
him and not to defendant/private respondent
Quirino Comintan, in accordance with the
decision itself, which decreed that the fruits of
the property shall be in lieu of interest on the
amount to be paid to petitioner as
reimbursement for improvements.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is still
entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit
all the fruits of the property, after the rendition
by the trial court of its judgment confirming the
award of one- half of the property to Quirino
Comintan.
RULING: NO.
1. Possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received only before the possession is legally
interrupted, that is, from the moment defects in
the title are made known to the possessor, by
extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action
in court by the true owner for the recovery of
the property. Hence, all the fruits that the
possessor may receive from the time he is
summoned in court, or when he answers the
complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to
the owner or lawful possessor.
2. However, even after his good faith ceases, the
possessor can still retain the property (Art 546)
until he has been fully reimbursed for all the
necessary and useful expenses made by him on
the property. Considering that the right of the
possessor to receive the fruits terminates when
his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order
that this right to retain may be useful, to
concede to the creditor the right to secure
reimbursement from the fruits of the property by
utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the
interest as well as the principal of the debt while
he remains in possession.
3. Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own
exclusive benefit the tolls which he collected
from the property retained by him. It was his
duty under the law, after deducting the
necessary expenses for his administration, to
apply such amount collected to the payment of
the interest, and the balance to the payment of
the obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after
deducting petitioner's expenses for
administration, belong to Quirino Comintan,
owner of the land through which the toll road
passed, further considering that the same was on
portions of the property on which petitioner had
not introduced any improvement. The trial court
itself clarified this matter when it placed the toll
road under receivership. The omission of any
mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be
attributed to the fact that the tolls appear to have
been collected after the rendition of the
judgment of the trial court.
4. As to the other lot, it appears that no public
sale has yet been conducted by the Bureau of
Lands and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to
remain in possession thereof. This is not
disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. After
public sale is had and in the event that Ortiz is
not declared the successful bidder, then he
should be reimbursed by respondent Zamora in
the corresponding amount for the improvements
on Lot 5785-B
TUATIS VS. SPOUSES ELISEO AND
VISMINDA ESCOL
G.R. No. 175399 October 27, 2009
FACTS:
Visminda Escol, the seller and Ophelia Tuatis,
the buyer entered into a Deed of Sale by
Installments, the subject matter of which is a
parcel of land in Sindangan. It provided that
upon the failure of the buyer to pay the
remaining balance within the time stipulated, he
shall return the land to the seller, and the seller
shall return all the amounts paid by the buyer.
Tuatis took possession of the land and
constructed a residential building. Tuatis
asserted that she paid Visminda the remaining
balance of P3000 in the presence of one Erik
Selda and thereafter requested Visminda to sign
the absolute deed of sale. Visminda refused
contending that the purchase price has not been
fully paid. The RTC dismissed Tuatiss
complaint and also ruled that Tuatis constructed
the building in bad faith for she had knowledge
of the fact that Visminda is still the absolute
owner of the land and there was also bad faith
on the part of Visminda since she allowed the
construction of the building without opposition
on her part. The rights of the parties must,
therefore, be determined as if they both had
acted in bad faith. Their rights in such cases are
governed by Article 448 of the Civil Code. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal by Tuatis
which resulted to the finality of the appealed
decision. Visminda filed a writ of execution.
Tuatis then moved that the RTC issue an order
allowing her to buy the subject property and
maintained that she has the right to choose
between being indemnified for the value of her
building or buying from Visminda the parcel of
land. During the pendency of the motion, the
writ of execution was enforced. Tuatis filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus but the same was denied hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tuatis is entitled to exercise the
options granted in Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
No, Tuatis is not entitled to exercise the options
granted in Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Article 448 provides that the owner of the land
on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof
. Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the
According to the provision, the landowner can
choose between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity for the same, as
provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code; or obliging the builder to pay the price of
the land, unless its value is considerably more
than that of the structures, in which case the
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
Under the first option, Visminda may
appropriate for herself the building on the
subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for
the necessary and useful expenses the latter
incurred for said building, as provided in Article
546 of the Civil Code. Until Visminda
appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the
building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may
retain possession of the building and the subject
property.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose
not to appropriate the building and, instead,
oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair
value of the land.The P10,000.00 price of the
subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale
on Installment executed in November 1989,
shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be
obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in
the exercise of Vismindas rights under Article
448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said
Deed. Tuatis obligation will then be statutory,
and not contractual, arising only when Visminda
has chosen her option under Article 448 of the
Civil Code.
Still under the second option, if the present or
current value of the land, the subject property
herein, turns out to be considerably more than
that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot
be obliged to pay for the subject property, but
she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the
same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the
terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix
the terms.
The Court highlights that the options under
owner of the subject property. There is no basis
for Tuatis demand that, since the value of the
building she constructed is considerably higher
than the subject property, she may choose
between buying the subject property from
Visminda and selling the building to Visminda
for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is
for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And,
depending on Vismindas choice, Tuatis rights
as a builder under Article 448 are limited to the
following: (a) under the first option, a right to
retain the building and subject property until
Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under
the second option, a right not to be obliged to
pay for the price of the subject property, if it is
considerably higher than the value of the
building, in which case, she can only be obliged
to pay reasonable rent for the same.
Case No. 49
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC
G.R No. 68166, February 12, 1997
Facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual
filed an application for foreshore lease covering
a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan, having an area of approximately
seventeen (17) hectares. This application was
denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion
for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased,
Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty
five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the
application was denied, eventually however the
grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land
is an accretion to his property, The Talisay
River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby
depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso
Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian
owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of
Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the subject property,
the same being a portion of the public domain
and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the court a
quo rendered judgment finding the subject
property to be foreshore land and, being a part
of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of
land registration proceedings. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the findings of the
court a quo and granted the petition for
registration of the subject property but
excluding certain areas. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the
same was denied. Anchoring their claim of
ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code,
petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed
14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the
joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers
which run their course on the eastern and
western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners'
own tract of land.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can
rightfully claim the land under the principle of
accretion
Held:
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The
principle of accretion is only applicable to
owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as
stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The
disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank
but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern
side. As such, the applicable law is not Article
457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property
is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being
an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the
public domain. As part of the public domain, the
herein disputed land is intended for public uses,
and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to
the national domain and is reserved for public
uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by
any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority."Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the
right and the power to make the declaration that
the lands so gained by action of the sea is no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility or
for the cause of establishment of special
industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners
utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the
disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the
property of petitioners as owners of the estates
adjacent thereto.
CASE NO. 50
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CA
AND TANCINCO
FACTS:
Benjamin Tancinco et, al are registered
owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-
89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
On 24 June 1973, Tancinco filed an
application for registration of 3 lots adjacent to
their fishpond property. On 26 June 1976, the
lower court rendered decision granting the
application on the finding that the land in effect of the current of the rivers but as a result
question are accretions to the Tancinco fishpond of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
covered by TCT 89709. The Republic appealed encroaching upon it.
to the CA however the appellate court rendered
decision in favor of the lower court. Hence this
petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of
the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion can be
valid subject of registration.

HELD:
Supreme Court granted the petition,
reversed and set aside the decision appealed
from and orders private respondents to move
back the dikes of their fishpond to their original
location and return the disputed property to the
river which it belongs.
There is no accretion to speak of as the
transfer of dikes is man-made and artificial.
Private respondents merely transferred their
dikes further down the river bed and thus such
accretion is not the result of gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the
river. Article 457 of the New Civil Code states
that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters. Article 457 requires the
concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion is said to have taken place; 1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible. 2) that it
be made through the effects of the current of the
waters. 3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent ti the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should
be due to the effects of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Article 457
all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition of said
property was made gradually through the effects
of the currents of the river. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole