G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015
NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
(NOVAI), Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
The Factual Antecedents
5
TCT No. T-15387, issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009
square-meter parcel of land (the property)6 situated inside the
former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in
Taguig, Metro Manila.
The property previously formed part of parcel of land situated
at the former Fort William McKinley, Rizal, issued in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines.
then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No.
4237 "reserving for military purposes certain parcels of the
public domain situated in the municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Paraaque, province of Rizal, and Pasay City
then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
4618 which excluded from Fort McKinley "a certain portion of
land embraced therein, situated in the municipalities of
Taguig and Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City and
declared the excluded area as "AFP Officers' Village" to be
disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos.
2749 and 730.10cralawrednad
Barely a month after, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation
No. 47811"reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare
and training center site purposes" an area of the land
previously declared as AFP Officers' Village under
Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under
the administration of the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines (VFP). The property is within the 537,520 square-
meter parcel of land reserved in VFP's favor.
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a
Deed of Sale12between the Republic of the Philippines,
through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director
Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner NOVAI. The
deed of sale was subsequently registered was issued in
NOVAI's name.
The Republic's Complaint for Cancellation of Title
In its complaint13 filed with the the Republic sought to cancel
NOVAFs title based on the following grounds: (a) the land
covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation; (b)
the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI, which
became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is
fictitious; (c) the LMB has no records of any application made
by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the NOVAFs
alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d)
the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487,
claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C.
Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and titling of the
property to NOVAI, is fictitious.
NOVAI's Answer to the Complaint
NOVAI counter-argued that the property was no longer part
of the public dominion, as the land had long been segregated
from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No.
461.
The RTC resolved both issues in NOVAI's favor.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision. It ruled
that the property is inalienable land of the public domain;
thus, it cannot be disposed of or be the subject of a
sale. hence, this petition.
ISSUES: CA erred in declaring that: (a) the property is
inalienable land of the public domain, (b) the deed of sale and
Proclamation No. 2487 were void and nonexistent,
respectively, (c) the Republic's action for cancellation of title
was not barred by prescription, and (d) the ruling
in Southsidewas applicable to the present case.
BCDA's Comment-in-Intervention
On December 28, 2007, and while the case was pending
before this Court, the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) filed a motion for leave to file comment-in-
intervention and to admit the attached comment-in-
intervention AND WAS GRANTED.cralawrednad
As the Republic has done, the BCDA contends that NOVAI is
disqualified from acquiring the property given the
constitutional and statutory provisions that prohibit the
acquisition of lands of the public domain by a corporation or
association; The BCDA further contends that NOVAI miserably
failed to comply with the legal requirements for the release of
the property from the military reservation. Also, the BCDA
observed that NOVAI was incorporated only on December 11,
1991, while the deed of sale was purportedly executed on
November 15, 1991, which shows that NOVAI did not yet
legally exist at the time of the property's purported sale.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DENY NOVAI's petition for review
on certiorari as we find no reversible error committed by the
CA
B. On BCD A's Intervention
In the present case, the BCDA is indisputably the agency
specifically created under R.A. No. 7227 32 to own, hold and/or
administer military reservations including, among others,
those located inside the FBMR. If we are to affirm the CA's
decision, the BCDA stands to benefit as a favorable ruling will
enable it to pursue its mandate under R.A. No. 7227. On the
other hand, if we reverse the CA's decision, it stands to suffer
as the contrary ruling will greatly affect the BCDA's
performance of its legal mandate as it will lose the property
without the opportunity to defend its right in court.
Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest
both in the outcome of the case and in the disputed property
that a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence
without affecting such interest. Clearly, the BCDA's
intervention is necessary; hence, we allow the BCDA's
intervention although made beyond the period prescribed
under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
II. Substantive Issues
A. The property is non-disposable land of the public domain
reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose
We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the
public domain that could not have been validly disposed of in
NOVAI's favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving
that the property was withdrawn from the intended public or
quasi-public use or purpose.
While the parties disagree on the character and nature of the
property at the time of the questioned sale, they agree,
however, that the property formed part of the FBMR - a
military reservation belonging to the public domain. We note
that the FBMR has been the subject of several presidential
proclamations and statues issued subsequent to Proclamation
No. 423, which either removed or reserved for specific public
or quasi-public use or purpose certain of its portions.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic
of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to
time, classifylands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these
lands from one class to another for purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time
to time, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and for purposes of the administration
and disposition of alienable and disposable public
lands, declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under the Acts' provisions. 33cralawrednad
Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands open to
disposition or concession and the requirement that they have
been officially delimited and classified, and when practicable,
surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by implication) from disposition
or concession, public lands which have been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the Government;
or in any manner have become private property, or those on
which a private right authorized and recognized by the Act or
any other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8
authorizes the President to suspend the concession or
disposition of lands previously declared open to disposition,
until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation
or by act of Congress.
Lands of the public domain classified as alienable and
disposable are further classified, under Section 9 of C.A. No.
141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural;
(2) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; and (4) reservations for townsites and for
public and quasi-public uses. Section 9 also authorizes the
President to make the classifications and, at any time, transfer
lands from one class to another.
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands
classified as reservations for public and quasi-public uses as
"any tract or tracts of land of the public domain" which the
President, by proclamation and upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
may designate "as reservations for the use of the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof or "for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it."34 Under Section 88 of the same
Act, these "reserved tract or tracts of lands shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease or other disposition until again declared alienable
under the provisions of [CA No. 141] or by proclamation of
the President."35cralawrednad
As these provisions operate, the President may classify lands
of the public domain as alienable and disposable, mineral or
timber land, and transfer such lands from one class to
another at any time.
Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the President may further classify public
domain lands, according to the use or purpose to which they
are destined, as agricultural: residential, commercial,
industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations
for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses; and, he
may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any
time.
Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel
of land from its classification as agricultural (under Section 9
[a]), to residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
purposes (under Section 9 [b]) and declare it available for
disposition under any of the modes of disposition of alienable
and disposable public lands available under C.A. No. 141, as
amended.
Once these parcels of lands are actually acquired by private
persons, either by sale, grant, or other modes of disposition,
they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain
and become, by operation of law, their private property.
With particular regard, however, to parcels of land classified
as reservations for public and quasi-public uses (under
Section 9 [d]), when the President transfers them to the class
of .alienable and disposable public domain lands destined for
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes
(under Section 9 [b]), or some other class under Section 9,
these reserved public domain lands become available for
disposition under any of the available modes of disposition
under C.A. No. 141, as provided above. Once these re-
classified lands (to residential purposes from reservation for
public and quasi-public uses) are actually acquired by private
persons, they become private property.
In the meantime, however, and until the parcels of land are
actually granted to, acquired, or purchased by private
persons, they remain lands of the public domain which the
President, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, may classify again
as reservations for public and quasi-public uses. The President
may also, under Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, suspend their
concession or disposition.
If these parcels of land are re-classified as reservations before
they are actually acquired by private persons, or if the
President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall
not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other
disposition until again declared open for disposition by
proclamation of the President pursuant to Section 88 in
relation with Section 8 of C.A. No. 141.
Thus, in a limited sense, parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9
(d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable,
even though they are, by the general classification under
Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. By specific declaration under Section 88, in relation
with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-
alienable and non-disposable.
In short, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or
quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-disposable in
view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of CA No. 141
specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not subject
to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands until
they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.
In this regard, Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property
as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article
42037 defines property of the public dominion as those which
are intended for public use or, while not intended for public
use, belong to the State and are intended for some public
service. Article 421, on the other hand, defines patrimonial
property as all other property of the State which is not of the
character stated in Article 420. While Article 422 states that
public dominion property which is no longer intended for
public use or service shall form part of the State's patrimonial
property.

Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code

provisions on Property, lands which are intended for public
use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-
public uses are property of the public dominion and remain to
be so as long as they remain reserved.

As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for

public or quasi-public uses are outside the commerce of
man.38 They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or
encumbrance; any sale, disposition or encumbrance of such
property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to
law and public policy.39cralawrednad

To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of

the public domain designated as reservations must first be
withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the
President, from the public or quasi-public use for which it has
been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been
converted to patrimonial property, pursuant to Sections 8 and
88 of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code. 40 Without
such express declaration or positive governmental act, the
reserved public domain lands remain to be public dominion
property of the State.41cralawrednad

To summarize our discussion:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for

public or quasi-public uses are non-alienable and shall not be
subject to disposition, although they are, by the general
classification under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, until declared open for
disposition by proclamation of the President; and

(2) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations are

property of the public dominion; they remain to be property
of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or
quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of
Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise
positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial
property.

2. Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly revoked

Proclamation No. 478 does not legally exist; hence, it did not
withdraw the property from the reservation or from the
public dominion

Neither can Proclamation No. 2487 serve as legal basis for the
property's sale in NOVAI's favor. Proclamation No. 2487
purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478 and declared the
property open for disposition in favor of NOVAI.

Hence, even if NOVAI relies on Proclamation No. 2487 - on

which it did not as it relied on Proclamation No. 4.61 - the
sale and NOVAI's title are still void.

G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP for
brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of
fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and
to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands.[1] On the same date, then President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay[2] under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA
to amend its contract with CDCP, so that [A]ll future works in
MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA. Accordingly,
PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque
issued Transfer Certificates of Title Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque
issued Transfer Certificates of Title.
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity)
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding
these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-
MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding. the Board of Directors of
PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. As a result, the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the
conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA
seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of
the JVA.
petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA
of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking on the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of
lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of
alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.
PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA, for brevity). the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph
E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. petitioner now prays
that on constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated
contract be declared null and void.[14]
The Issues VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER
TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
ixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the
transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed,
violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which
holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public
domain.Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [42] The King, as the
sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired
and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except
those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the
Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of
the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain.The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-
honored principle of land ownership that all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. [43] Article 339 of the Civil
Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of
1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first
statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of
reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the
Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which
provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands
of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on
November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act
No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,
but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,
but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this
day as the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain.
D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by
statutory authority, the rights of ownership and disposition
over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue
of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any
qualified person without violating the Constitution or any
statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations
from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,
[70]
1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands
whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated, unless
they are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does
not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use.[71]
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands
shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified.[72] The President
has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141.
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the
issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA
from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On
January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84
hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom
Islands.Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds
of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311
and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates
of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual
issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom
Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquinos issuance of a
land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom
Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands
although subsequently there were partial erosions on some
areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no
longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Being neither timber, mineral, nor
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of
the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural
lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that
the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are waters x x x
owned by the State forming part of the public domain, and
are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands
because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the
islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that if the
ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed
lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate.[75] Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as
follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of
works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos
or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless
otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
(Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could now
be undertaken only by the National Government or by a
person contracted by the National Government. Private
parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with
the National Government, and no longer by grant or
permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979,
designated PEA as the National Governments implementing
arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the government,
which shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under such
contract, a private party receives compensation for
reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the
contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of
the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in
kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or
disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no
longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands,
but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still
submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no
legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged
areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered
by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute
that these submerged areas form part of the public domain,
and in their present state are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these
submerged areas are, under the Constitution, waters x x x
owned by the State, forming part of the public domain and
consequently inalienable.Only when actually reclaimed from
the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed
and transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.Thereafter,
the government may declare these lands no longer needed
for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
and within the commerce of man.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed
by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA, could not
automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands of the public domain would automatically become
alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as
alienable or disposable.
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural
resources of the State, DENR exercises supervision and
control over alienable and disposable public lands. DENR also
exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain. Thus, DENR
decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or
not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR
before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay,
or in any part of the country.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the
reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with
the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas
under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to
the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is
tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of
foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public
domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands
are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public
domain. Only such an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition
under the Constitution.
PEAs Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085
or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085
merely transferred ownership and administration of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared
that lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by
PEA. EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of
its reclaimed lands in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084, the charter of PEA.
PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to develop,
improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government.
[87]
(Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether
patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in
accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional
limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not
apply to the sale of PEAs patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain to private individuals since, with the
legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory
prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does
not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative
authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations
remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
Registration of lands of the public domain
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title
issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to
any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to
cancel PEAs patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of
the instant petition is that PEAs certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates,
being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold
to a private corporation.
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom
Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of
CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized by Congress,
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities.
Alienable lands of the public domain held by government
entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands
because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in
accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain
into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private
parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public
domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will
allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to
such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central
implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain
 As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell
reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed
lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased
or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that
DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not
dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public
domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these
lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the
government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of
alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these
lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that
PEA shall hold lands of the public domain as well as any and
all kinds of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public
domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable
lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of
title in PEAs name does not automatically make such lands
private.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a
contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction
and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President
Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing
reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of
PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an
agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be
funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517
transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of
three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known
as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop
the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA
and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said
lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen.
Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands
were part of public domain (famously known as the mother
of all scams).
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain
until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.
The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only
then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI
ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for

mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against
the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from
implementing the JVA. Following these events, under
President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null
and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA
between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of
whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:

G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an
application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land,
Cebu, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more
particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is
alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from
his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the
latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he
and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30)
years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-
0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the
property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence
the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia
L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that
".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for to
prove that she had been in possession of the property since
1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously paying
the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a
Certification6
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a)
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise
known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied
with as Espinosas predecessor-in-interest possessed the
property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations
do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-
in-interest are in the character and for the length of time
required by law.
the MTC rendered a Judgment 9 granting Espinosas petition
for registrationAccording to the MTC, Espinosa was able to
prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that
he complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure
to prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-
interest were for the period required by law.
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy
thereof is fatal to his application.
the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC
Decision
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other
documentary evidence, not necessarily the original tracing
cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be
established by other competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without
merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan
from the Land Registration Commission, Moreover, the CA
ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is
alienable and disposable:
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by
the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006.
Issues b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the
plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted the
survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable
and disposable.
Our Ruling
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts
disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to apprise
themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA
underwent over the years.
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the
requirement for possession and occupation for a period of
thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the
requirement for possession and occupation since June 12,
1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that
applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove
possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945
or earlier. However, vested rights may have been acquired
under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073.
That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who
had already been in possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time
P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their
possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v.
Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as
follows:
However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of
possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said
P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him.
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an
imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession
and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such
possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947
and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the
present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there were
instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years was for the
sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason does
not obtain in this case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should
apply, it follows that the subject property being supposedly
alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2)
categorically provides, only private properties may be
acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of
the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public
use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State

that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.27

Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and

occupied the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30)
years, this does not operate to divest the State of its
ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable and
disposable, is not patrimonial.

All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is

the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE

COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11,
2004 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of
title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN,
BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES,
BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY
JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY
EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW
VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-
LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY,
DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L.
GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH
JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO,
WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO
H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY,
JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG,
MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P.
GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented
by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D.
LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her
father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION
FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this
suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution, the Court required respondents to
comment.[1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The
CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for
the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.),
filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within
said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the
IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.[4]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of
the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan
filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the
law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should
be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise
a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing
to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing
of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section
7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
 SEC OF DENR VS YAP
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or
claimed by named persons.[7]
then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTACircular 3-82[9] to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. In their
petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared
their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
They posited that Proclamation No. 1801 did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG counteredthat Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of
the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition . Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
ISSUE: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal
hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay.
RTC and CA Dispositions
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants,The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to
have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could
not be the subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.[19]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion
was denied.[23] The Republic then appealed to the CA. the
appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision The CA held
that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.Again,
the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.
[25]
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 [26] classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-
eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, [27] Wilfredo
Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this
Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over
portions of Boracay. They have also invested billions of pesos
in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31]
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that
petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No.
705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need
for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.
this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on
the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly
situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands
in Boracay Island.[34]
ISSUE: In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the
power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber. [40] Meanwhile, the
1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and
such other classes as may be provided by law, [41] giving the
government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification
with one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural
lands may be alienated. [44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064
of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain. [48] Necessarily,
it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain
will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as
the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they
may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of
obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise
would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
[81]
In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been
officially delimited and classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof.[87]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De
Aldecoa is misplaced.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when
the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands
of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At
that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.
Private claimants continued possession under Act
No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,107-a ruled:
In short, the Public Land Act operated on
the assumption that title to public lands in
the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title
to public land sprung from the Treaty of
Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The
term public land referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in
the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that
under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by
private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles,
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior
to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and
the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land
of the public domain.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as
a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch
with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination
for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have
built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; [111] that
the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that
the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach
resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it
has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No.
1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
land.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did
not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in
Circular No. 3-82 to private lands [117] and areas declared as
alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be
deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended
to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or
both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.. Simply put, the proclamation
is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.
[119]
 It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which
positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened
the same to private ownership.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to
her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject
to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through
the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
[122]
Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified
until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been

invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a
by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While

they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from
the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss
of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may

claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take
steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original
registration of title, such as by homestead [131] or sales patent,
[132]
subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to

entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots
or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in
the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar
bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707

is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[ GR No. 189852, Aug 17, 2016 ]
THOMAS BEGNAEN v. SPOUSES LEO CALIGTAN &
ELMACALIGTAN +
The case at Bench is an opportunity for Us to reaffirm and
reemphasize Our ruling in Lim v Gamosa[1] where We struck
down as void an administrative rule that expanded the
jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous People
(NCIP) beyond the boundaries of the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act (IPRA). In the process, it likewise behooves Us to
resolve a question of concurrent jurisdiction and determine
the proper tribunal/body to take cognizance of the instant
dispute.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [2] and
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
104150. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision [4] and
Order[5] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc,
Mountain (Mt.) Province, and reinstated the Resolution [6] of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko, Mt.
Province. The case concerns an ancestral land dispute
between members of an Indigenous Cultural Community
(ICC), particularly the Kankanaey Tribe of Mt. Province.
The basic issue is whether or not the CA, in upholding the
jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) over the aforementioned dispute, to the
exclusion of regular courts, committed reversible error.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NCIP-RHO & MCTC
petitioner Thomas Begnaen (Begnaen) filed a Complaint with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondents Spouses
Leo and Elma Caligtan (Sps. Caligtan) for "Land Dispute and
Enforcement of Rights" before the Regional Hearing Office
(RHO) of the NCIP at La Trinidad, Benguet.[7] The RHO
thereafter issued an Order[8] dismissing the complaint based
on respondents' argument that the case should have gone to
the council of elders and not through the Barangay Lupon, as
mandated by the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA). [9]
However, instead of abiding by the Order of the RHO,
Begnaen filed against the Sps. Caligtan a Complaint for
Forcible before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Bauko-Sabangan, Mt. Province.
Begnaen alleged that he was the owner of a 125 square
meter parcel of land situated in Supang, Sabangan, Mt.
Province. He claimed that on two occasions,[11] respondents -
by using force, intimidation, stealth, and threat -entered a
portion of the subject property, hurriedly put up a chicken-
wire fence, and started building a shack thereon without
Begnaen's knowledge and consent.[12]
respondents averred that they owned the area in question as
part of the land they had purchased from a certain Leona
Vicente in 1959 pursuant to age-old customs and traditions.
They introduced improvements evidencing their prior physical
possession.[13]
MCTC RULING
the MCTC dismissed the ejectment complaint in favor of
respondents. reasoned that the fact that petitioner initially
filed a complaint with the NCIP-RHO shows that he recognized
the primary jurisdiction of the NCIP.[16] Aggrieved, petitioner-
appellant filed an appeal before Regional Trial Court Branch
35 of Bontoc, Mt. Province (RTC).
RTC RULING
RTC reversed saying that it was MCTC court that had
jurisdiction over the case for forcible entry.. According to the
RTC, IPRA must be read to harmonize with B.P. Big. 129.[18]
Undaunted, respondents appealed to the CA.
CA RULING
the CA reversed and set aside the RTC rulings and reinstated
the Resolution of the MCTC. In upholding the jurisdiction of
the NCIP over the present case, the CA ruled that the passage
of the IPRA has divested regular courts of their jurisdiction
when the parties involved are members of ICCs/IPs and the
disputed property forms part of their ancestral land/domain.
[21]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CA in its questioned Resolution. [22]
Hence, this Petition.
RULING OF THE COURT
The NCIP Rule purporting to
establish the jurisdiction of the
NCIP-Regional Hearing Officer
as original and exclusive has been
declared VOID for expanding the
law.
R.A. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997,
particularly Sections 65 and 66 thereof, provide:
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and
Practices, When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws
and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its
regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That
no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in
the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not
been resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis
supplied)
The IPRA confers jurisdiction on the NCIP over "all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs," without qualification as
to whether such jurisdiction is original and/or exclusive.
However, Section 5, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Circular
No. 1-03 dated 9 April 2003, known as "The Rules on
Pleadings, Practice, and Procedure Before the NCIP" (NCIP
Rules), went beyond the provisions of the IPRA
" At the outset, We said:
(I)n Unduran, et at. v. Aberasturi, et al, we ruled that Section
66 of the IPRA does not endow the NCIP with primary and/or
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the qualifying proviso,
we held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and
disputes occur only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Since two of the
defendants therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts had
jurisdiction over the complaint in that case.

After a comprehensive analysis of the classes of jurisdiction,
We held that "the NCIP cannot be said to have even primary
jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP cases x x x. We do not find
such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in
Section 66 of the IPRA. Neither does the IPRA confer original
and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs." Furthermore,
It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules
and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into effect..
Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, but
must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and
implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant
or to modify, the law.
At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent
with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the
latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies
brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies. (Emphases supplied)
SECTION 1. Right to Transfer Land or Property. The various
indigenous modes of acquisition and transfer of property
between and among members of the ICCs/IPs shall be
recognized as legal, valid and enforceable. [33] (Emphases
supplied)
Furthermore, when questioned, both parties admitted that
the land subject of their dispute and of the case, was
ancestral land.[34] This admission was also attested to in
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the Petition, and the
land subject of this case is an ancestral land." [35]
the RHO in effect determined that the property was ancestral
land, and that the parties to the dispute must conform to the
customary practice of dispute settlement.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104150 is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Decision dated 11 March 2008 and
the Order dated 29 May 2008, both rendered by the RTC of
Bontoc, Mt. Province, are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE; and the Resolution of the MCTC of Bauko, Sabangan,
dated 6 August 2007 is REINSTATED.

Thus, We struck down as void the latest iteration of the NCIP SO ORDERED.
rule purporting to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction
upon the RHO, contrary to the provisions of the IPRA:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
petition is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Section 1 of NCIP
Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014,
promulgated on 9 October 2014 declaring the jurisdiction
of the Regional Hearing Officer as original and exclusive is
declared VOID for expanding the law. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)

The NCIP is vested with jurisdiction

over (1) the parties, who are all
members of the same ICC, and (2)
the subject property, which is ancestral land.

We do not agree.

Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the

Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, specifically governs
the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
domains.[30]

Section 3(a) and (b) and Section 56 of R.A. 8371 provide for a
more comprehensive definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands:

Indeed, "ancestral lands are lands occupied, possessed and

utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of
the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to
the present xxx." Thus, the claim of petitioner that when land
is purchased, it is no longer within the ambit of ancestral
land/domain, is devoid of merit.

PART III

Rights of the ICCs/IPs to Their Ancestral Lands