Joint Operating Principles:

What can we learn from them when studying military history.

Topic: Japanese Invasion of Korea (1592 1598)

Source: http://www.theshogunshouse.com/2012_09_01_archive.html
I broke the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-1598) into the three Levels of War (Strategic, Operational, and
Tactical) and looked at each Joint Operations Principle in those areas. I then rated the Japanese performance in each
Principle based on my assessment of how it worked out for them. Red is obviously worst, Green best, and Yellow
means there was good and bad. Looking at the charts, two things stand out to me.

Hideyoshi studies the map with his generals. Was he the weak link?

1. If you look at the old 9 Principles of War, Japan did fairly well at the tactical level, and decently at the operational
level, with onlyUnity of Effort really suffering from the rivalries between different field commanders (primarily
Kato Kiyomasa and Konishi Yukinaga, though there were others). What really hurt them, if you stick to the original
9 Principles, was the strategic level--in other words, the Wehrmacht also sympathizes with Hideyoshi's field
commanders. 4 of the 9 Principles (Maneuver, Objective, Security, and Surprise) get a red rating from me, and only
2 (Offensive and Unity of Effort) get greens--and those could be argued pretty easily. Much like Germany in WWII
or France in the Iberian Campaign of the Napoleonic wars, Hideyoshi's army was superior to their Korean and
Chinese foes at the tactical and operational levels, but failed miserably at the strategic level, setting his objectives
way too large without really understanding the magnitude of what "subduing all of China and becoming the Chinese
emperor" really entailed. Certainly some blame lies with his CIA chief.

2. Looking at the 3 new Principles of Joint Operations (Legitimacy, Restraint, and Perseverance), these were red
across the board for the most part. And considering we in the US military are just now making them a part of our
doctrine, this isn't surprising. After all, it is not as if anywhere at this time saw the exercise of Restraint as part of
it's official military posture. The violence of the Thirty Years War in Europe was testament to that on that side of the
world. Legitimacy was important to Hideyoshi's domestic political power (as we discussed previously), but he
didn't exactly need to justify himself to the Korean people in order to take over their country, at least not in the
context of the day.
 Mimizuka in Kyoto, where the captured body parts of Koreans are buried

And yet...I can't help but wonder if some attention had been paid to these factors, perhaps Hideyoshi's road would
have been a little easier. Rather than simply decide he wanted to invade China, and oh by the way Korea you're
going to help me or we'll kill you first, what if he had legitimate reasons (abuses by Chinese government against
Japanese traders, perhaps) to go to war with China? Korea might not have offered to serve as a highway for the
Japanese, but the political response might have been different. What if, instead of collecting ears and noses from
Korean prisoners to ship back to Japan as evidence of martial prowess, the Japanese commanders had, I don't
know...shown some compassion and Restraint in their dealings with the local populace, perhaps even implementing
favorable taxation and agricultural/economic reforms compared to their rule under the Korean court? Is it
conceivable that the Korean peasantry and local land holders would have decided life under the Japanese was better
than under their own king? Nationalism in most places was not a strong concept, so assuming loyalty to the Seoul
court by Korean farmers in the Pusan area may not be accurate. Finally, what if Japan had the domestic will
to Persevere in the Korean conflict and continue the fight after Hideyoshi died? The Japanese domestic political
situation makes this highly unlikely, but had Hideyoshi had a strong succession instead of the boondoggle that
occurred, it might have led to a Japanese/Korean version of the Hundred Year's War. Or not--but the point is that
consideration of these factors, even though we don't expect to see them in 16th century warfare, is interesting--if
only to highlight how different our ideas of warfare are today.

Does this exercise tell us the exact reasons the Japanese invasion of Korea failed? No, not in detail--but it suggests
places to look, and that's the point. Military professionals (systematically since the time of Clausewitz, Jomini, and
the Prussian War Academy model was adopted by everyone in the late 1800's) study military history to identify
trends and understand principles in order to better fight and win their nation's wars. As Lasse points out in his
comment, sometimes we can do this better, and we have to learn from those times. As a historian, however, you can
flip the model around and learn the weaknesses, strengths, and the why of success and failure in historical examples.
The Principles of Joint Operations, even those Principles recently made part of the doctrine, are useful as an
analytical tool not just in planning future military operations, but in examining those of the past. Let's face it, as my
history professor here at ILE says constantly: history echoes and history rhymes. The operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan are not the first time larger armies have had trouble with insurgencies: Vietnam, French Algeria, the
Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, the US Civil War, the Iberian Campaign in the Napoleonic wars, the US
Revolutionary War...and (relating back to Japanese history) the Ikko Ikki fighting Nobunaga, the campaigns of
Kusunoki Masashige, and even the Bakumatsu period pro-Meiji revolution are all examples of successful and
unsuccessful insurgencies. I'll join Lasse in his criticism of the military's study of history--there really shouldn't be
anything "new" about Afghanistan or Iraq, because we've seen it all before. I won't be pretentious enough to say
we've learned our lesson, because history shows that eventually we'll forget it again. However, the more we study it,
the easier it will be to remember it when the time comes.

Thanks all, hope you've enjoyed this series. Try looking for these Principles in other places--for instance, do you
ever get tired of seeing the same commercial 15 times in the span of a 1 hour television show? That advertising
agency is practicing MASS, betting that even though you are annoyed (or because of), you'll remember the product.
I'll be back eventually with another series, I'm sure, but in the meantime feel free to comment (and Lasse, I'm just
picking on you--seriously, I do appreciate the comment) and keep the discussion going, but keep it civil.

And with that, mata ne!

Note:

For further reading on this topic, use the link above.

The official blog of the Samurai Archives Japanese History Page