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G.R. No. L-26447 January 30, 1970

NORTHERN PHILIPPINES TOBACCO CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF AGOO, PROVINCE OF LA UNION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Felix S. Falgui for petitioner-appellant.

Conrado V. Posadas and Maximo M. Quero for respondents-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Civil Case No. 58916) upholding the validity of an ordinance passed by
the Municipal Council of Agoo, La Union, imposing municipal license fee upon redrying plants operating in the municipality at a rate said
pending on the quantity of Virginia leaf tobacco redried in said plants.

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. On 2 June 1964, the Municipal Council of Agoo, La Union, enacted Ordinance No. 11,
series of 1964,1 which provides the following:

Section 1. That all redrying plants established, maintained and/or operated within the Municipality of Agoo, La Union, shall
pay Municipal License Tax, as indicated hereunder, payable quarterly, graduated as follows:

1. Redried Plants, having a total or

maximum annually redried Virginia
leaf tobacco of not more than 400,000
Kilos P4,000.00 per annum

2. From 400,001 to 800,000

kilos 8,000.00 per annum
 3. From 800,001 to 1,200,000
kilos 12,000.00 per annum

4. From 1,200,001 to 1,400.000

kilos 14,000.00 per annum

5. From 1,400,001 to 1,600,000

kilos 16,000.00 per annum
and so on ... .

The Northern Philippines Tobacco Corporation, owner of one of the two redrying plants presently operating in the municipality of Agoo, and
directly affected by the above-mentioned ordinance, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for the declaration of its nullity,
contending that the said municipal legislation was unauthorized, unjust, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory and, in its application, was
discriminatory to constitute a denial of the petitioner's right to equal protection of the laws.

After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the validity of the disputed ordinance. Petitioner thus interposed the present
appeal on the same grounds upon which the petition in the court below was based: (1) that the ordinance was enacted by the municipal
council ultra vires; (2) that the increase of the license tax, originally imposed by Ordinance No. 1, series of 1960, by some 300% was unjust,
excessive, oppressive and confiscatory; and (3) that as applied and administered by the respondent municipality, the questioned ordinance
is discriminatory against petitioner-appellant, thereby constituting a denial of its right to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws.

In assailing the authority of the Municipal Council of Agoo to impose the municipal license tax in this case, appellant claims that what is
being levied upon is the "service or redyring" tobacco that it was rendering; and since what would then be properly imposable is only a
license fee, not license tax, it is contended that the collection of tax at the rate specified in the ordinance would be excessive and unjust. In
short appellant's theory is that the ordinance in question was enacted in the exercise of the municipality's power to regulate business or
occupations within its jurisdiction, and consequently, the rate should be a reasonable amount sufficient to cover only the expenses for the
regulation, inspection and supervision of the licensed undertaking. The argument is based on a wrong premise. For by express declaration
of the Municipal Council,2 it was proclaimed that the ordinance was passed to raise revenue, to enable the carrying on of the (municipal)
administration's program "to uplift the well-being of the general public, specially those of the rural area". But even without such pronouncement,
there can be no mistake about the nature of the power the council had exercised. The ordinance provided no police inspection, supervision or
regulation of appellant's business; it set no standard or rules of action for appellant to observe in the conduct of its activities.3 Instead, the
ordinance was titled as one imposing a municipal license tax "on all tobacco redrying plants" established and operated within the municipality; and
its Section 1 prescribed that "all redrying plants established, maintained and/or operated within the municipality of Agoo, La Union, shall pay
municipal license tax" as therein indicated. Clearly, what is being taxed therein is not rendering by appellant of redrying services to its customers
or clients, but the enjoyment of the privilege to operate and maintain the tobacco redrying business in the municipality. It is, therefore, a tax on the
occupation, on the conducting of business itself, an impost that is perfectly within the authority of a municipal (or city) council to create.4
Republic Act No. 2264 (known as the local Autonomy Act) in its section 2, expressly provides that subject to specified exceptions not here
applicable, "all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees, upon persons
engaged in any occupation or business" and it is undeniable that redrying of tobacco is as much an occupation or business as manufacturing or
shoe making.

The circumstance that the rate of tax payable under the ordinance is made to some extent dependent on the minimum and maximum
quantity of tobacco redried per quarter, does not transform said tax into a percentage or sales or income tax and does not bring the case
out of the council's authorized sphere of action. It may be noted that, as framed in the ordinance, the volume of business is merely taken
into account in classifying the taxpayer's business according to its size or extent of operations, for the purpose of imposing the fixed
graduated tax it has to pay; and that there is no set ratio between the tax and the amount of tobacco redried.5

It is even more far-fetched to say that the tax is an exaction on sales or income. As already stated, the imposition here is a levy on the enjoyment
of the privilege to engage in the business of redrying tobacco, not on the operator's making of sales or its receipt of income from the business.

Admittedly, the license tax being imposed on the business of redrying tobacco is not new. As the title of the ordinance indicates, it is just an
amendment to another ordinance existing and apparently in force since 1960. Evidently, the main objection of appellant against Ordinance
No. 11 is in the increase of the rates, from one fourth centavo (P.0025) for every kilo of tobacco redried in the plant as provided in the
amended ordinance, to one centavo (P.01) per kilo, an increase by 300% which, according to appellant, is excessive, unjust, confiscatory
and discriminatory.

We find nothing in the record, however, to support such charge. Appellant has failed to present proof of the existing municipal conditions
and the nature of its business, as well as other factors that would have been relevant to the issue of the arbitrariness or unreasonableness
of the questioned rates.6 An increase in the rate of tax alone would not support the claim that it is oppressive, unjust and confiscatory municipal
corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of imposable license fees, even in cases of purely police power-measures.7

As regard the claim that the ordinance in its operation is unjust and discriminatory, we find that it is based on its being strictly enforced against the
appellant by the respondent municipal officials, while at the same time treating with leniency its competitor, Central Cooperative Exchange, Inc.,
the only other redrying plant in the municipality. It can be said in this respect that the lower court has aptly observed that if the complained
inequality in the enforcement of the ordinance by the responsible local officials were true, that would not work against the validity of the measure.
Appellant's recourse, if at all, lies in another action; certainly not in an attack on the legality of the duly enacted municipal legislation.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-61637 December 3, 1985

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO B. CAARES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First of Cebu, Branch X, and VISAYAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-61639 December 3, 1985

APO CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO B. CAARES in his capacity as Presiding judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch X, and VISAYAN
ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., respondents.

DE LA FUENTE, J.:

Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer tor a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. One was filed by
the National Power Corporation NPC) and the other, by the Apo Cement Corporation (APOCEMCO). Both seek The nullification at certain
orders issued by the then Court of First instance of Cebu, in Civil Case No. R-21331, entitled "Visayan Electric Co., Inc. versus National
Power Corporation and Apo Cement Corporation" on the ground that the respondent judge, in issuing the said orders, acted without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Apo Cement Corporation (APOCEMCO) is a BOI-registered enterprise engaged in the manufacture of portland cement at Tina-
an, Naga, Cebu. Private respondent Visayan Electric Co., Inc. (VECO) is the grantee of a legislative franchise, Act No. 3499, as amended
by R.A. No. 6454, for the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electric light, heat and power in the cities of Cebu and Mandaue,
and in the municipalities of Talisay, Minglanilla, Naga, San Fernando, Consolacion and Lilo-an, all in the Province of Cebu. VECO has
continued and remained to be the exclusive distributor of electric energy within its franchise area even after the promulgation of P.D. No.
395 on February 26, 1974.

APOCEMCO had expressed to NPC even prior to the implementation stage of its initial development of the Cebu Electric Power Grid, the
intention to purchase power from NPC. The possible allocation and delivery of a 4-megawatt power from the NPC's Naga Diesel Power
Station to APOCEMCO's cement plant compound was later on confirmed by the NPC. hen, APOCEMCO was informed by the NPC by
letter dated July 27, 1977, that pursuant to the Power Development Council resolution No. 77-01-02 APOCEMCO should secure a after of
VECO's priority right to supply power requirements an industrial enterprise operating within its franchise area, APOCEMCO argued that
such waiver is not a condition sine qua non to the approval of its application for direct connection and that the said resolution should not be
given retroactive application, having been issued after APOCEMCO's agreement with NPC for the supply APOCEMCO's power
requirements, while the NPC would like to honor its previous commitment to the latter's application for direct connection was, however,
denied by the NPC on the basis of PDC Resolution No.-770102 in a letter dated November 8, 1977. And this was followed on December
12, 1977, by the denial by the then Secretary of Energy of NPC's request for Department approval of such direct NPC power supply to
APOCEMCO, as it would "run counter" to the aforementioned resolution of the defunct PDC. 2

Early in 1978, APOCEMCO requested VECO to waive its priority right. VECO refused and claimed that it was in a position to match NPC's
applicable industrial rate. Thereafter, APOCEMCO asked VECO to supply its power needs. Negotiations resulted in the signing of a formal
contract by virtue of which VECO began supplying APOCEMCO's power requirements in 1978.

However, a controversy regarding the agreed power rate surfaced when APOCEMCO requested for a revision thereof on the ground that
said rate exceeded the 10% maximum allowable margin over the corresponding NPC rates for utilities. VECO contended that the rate be in
accordance with their contract, while APOCEMCO insisted on those prescribed be PDC Resolution No.-70102 The dispute reached the B
board of Energy, BOE docketed as BOE Case No. 8059 At this juncture, APOCEMCO reasserted its claim that the NPC was committed to
grant its application for direct power connection, In a letter submitted in compliance with an order of BOE, the NPC manifested its
willingness to fulfill said commitment "in the event appropriate authorities decide in its favor." 3

During the pendency of BOE Case No. 80-59 in order to facilitate the approval of applications of BOI-registered enterprises for "direct
connection to NPC" even without the prior written agreement of the Boards of electric power cooperatives and private electric utilities
holding the franchise in the locational area of the enterprise," 4 the Board of Investments (BOI) and the NPC entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on January 12, 1981. It was provided therein,inter alia, "that all BOI-registered enterprises with electrical loads of 2,000 kilowatts and
more, at transmission voltage of 69 kilowatts and above, shall, without restriction except on the economic and financial viability on the part of
NPC, be directly connected with NPC." 5

Relying on this memorandum BOE issued in the pending case an Order 6 holding that APOCEMCO can be supplied its electric power
requirements directly by NPC even without the consent of VECO. VECO's motion for reconsideration thereof was futile. NPC and APOCEMCO
then entered into a contract for the supply of electricity. VECO was subsequently apprised of the said contract and requested to disconnect its
power lines to APOCEMCO. VECO forthwith sued NPC and APOCEMCO filing a complaint seeking injunction and damages. Pending hearing on
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Hon. Judge Leonardo B. Canares presiding,
issued a restraining order temporarily enjoining NPC from proceeding with the direct power connection to APOCEMCO until further orders.
APOCEMCO and NPC argued in vain for the lifting or dissolution of the restraining order. And, after hearing and submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda, the respondent Judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied, NPC and APOCEMCO filed the separate petitions at bar.

We find no merit in both petitions. Respondent Judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction nor commit any grave abuse of discretion.

In response to the "evident need to issue policy guidelines regarding direct power connection with NPC, due to the increasing demands of
the industrial sector" and to the "apprehension expressed by authorized franchise holders and cooperatives" with respect thereto, the
defunct Power Development Council sought to "give operational meaning to the concepts of a franchise and service area coverage ... and
to protect the economic growth of the franchise utility and the electric cooperatives, 7 by issuing Resolution No. 77-01-02. It provides, amongst
others: "At any given service area, priority should be given to the authorized cooperative or franchise holder in the right tosupply the power
requirement of existing or prospective industrial enterprises (whether BOI-registered or not) that are located or plan to locate within the franchise
area or coop service area as shall be determined by the Board of Power or National Electrification Administration whichever the case may be,"
etc. 8

Said resolution was promulgated by the PDC pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 948, which vested in said Council the powers and functions
to "formulate and approve policies and programs for the power industry." It was also provided in Section 3 of the said Decree that all acts
and decisions of the Counsil in the exercise of such powers and functions are final and conclusive unless otherwise specifically directed by
the President.

Upon the creation in 1977 of the Department of Energy 9 it inherited "the powers and functions of the abolished ... lower Development
Council 10 the same being specifically "vested in a Secretary of Energy." 11 Among the declared policies in the endeavor to achieve self-reliance in
the country's energy requirements, we find that due "consideration [of] the significant and continuing participation of the private sector in
the various areas of energy resource development" was underscored. 12 Thus, instead of repealing or revising PDC Resolution No. 71-01-02 the
then Secretary of Energy manifested adherence thereto. This is explicit in his decision dated December 12,1977, which insofar as pertinent reads:

APOCEMCO apparently has not attempted to comply with said resolution although they were informed about the PDC
Resolution as early as July 27, 1977 by Manager Luchuga of the NPC Visayas Regional Office.

While the Department is cognizant of the preparation that APOCEMCO has undertaken for direct NPC service and the fact
that cement entities are power intensive, it is still the intent of the PDC Resolution to accord priority to the local franchise
holder in serving the power requirement of any industrial enterprise within its franchise area.

As you know, the PDC Resolution was formulated for the express purpose of improving the load of the local electric utilities,
which include cooperatives, and to relieve NPC of collection burdens covering small directly connected loads. In any case,
NPC's positive indication to APOCEMCO re direct connections at least assures them of a rate that is no more than 10% of
the NPC rate to utilize in that grid, should they be connected with VECO subsequently.

In summary, this Office therefore prefers that the PDC Resolution rules be recognized VECO mustfirst be notified and
a waiver secured as a precondition to direct connection, especially since the initial load available from NPC would be only
around 400 KW a level which, it seems, a 60-MW utility system like VECO should be able to service without too much
difficulty. 13

As earlier pointed out, that act or decision of the Secretary (now Minister) of Energy was "final and conclusive, unless otherwise specifically
directed by the President" (section 3, PD No. 948, in relation to section 21, PD No. 1206). The view taken by the BOE that BOI-registered
enterprises could secure direct connection to the NPC without first notifying the franchise holder in the area concerned and/or asking for the
latter's waiver of priority, in line with the BOI-NPC memorandum of understanding, cannot operate to supplant or reverse or modify the
aforementioned act or decision of the Minister of energy in the discharge of the functions and responsibilities devolving upon his Ministry or
office. Such revisory power is lodged by the law only in the President. 14Furthermore, we find nothing in the provisions of P.D. No. 395
(amending P.D. No. 380) which expressly or impliedly allowed or sanctioned the sale in bulk by the NPC of energy direct to BOI-registered
enterprises even if it would be violative of the rights of existing franchise holders. In National Power Corp. vs. Jacinto, 15 this Court had occasion to
stress the following:

Presidential Decree No. 380, as amended, PDC Resolution No. 77-01-02 and NPC's own operational guidelines for the
implementation of the BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding on direct connection establish the state policy that NPC is
statutorily empowered to directly service all the requirements of a BOI-registered enterprise provided that, first any affected
private franchise holder is afforded an opportunity to be heard on the application therefor, and second, from such a hearing,
it is established that said private franchise holder is incapable or unwilling to match the reliability and rates of NPC for
directly serving the latter. But even without the aforementioned statutory or administrative bases, still said franchise
operators' right to due process or priority to be heard on such direct contracts cannot be denied. Like certificates of public
conveyance, legislative or municipal franchises for the operation of a public utility are properties (Raymundo vs. Luneta
Motor Co., 58 Phil, 889) and therefore guaranteed the due process protection of the Constitution. 16

Another decision was rendered by this Court recently in Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 17 where we observed that the exclusive
nature of a franchise is not favored and exclusivity is given by law with the understanding that the grantee is self-sufficient and capable of
supplying the needed service at moderate or reasonable prices. In the instant case, the denial by the NPC and the Secretary of Energy of
APOCEMCO's application for direct connection additionally took into consideration the national policy formulated in PDC Resolution No. 77-01-02
which was reiterated and reaffirmed by the Secretary (now Minister) of Energy after the abolition of the PDC. After the negotiations, it bears
emphasis, APOCEMCO and VECO had already entered into and signed a formal contract and implemented the same until a dispute arose as to
the rate being charged for APOCEMCOs energy consumption. It is conceded that VECO was in a position not only to supply APOCEMCO's power
requirements but also to match NPC rates for industrial users. The situation here, therefore, is quite different from that in the case of Alger Electric,
Inc., the said franchise holder not being in a position to supply the energy requirements of Northern Cement Corp. Northern "had never
purchased" electricity from Alger and the latter admitted being but "a small and struggling corporation." Parenthetically, it may also be noted that
the controversy there arose in 1968 before the changes or policies brought about thereafter by P.D. Nos. 40, 380 and 395.

WHEREFORE, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued in this
case 18 is lifted immediately. If, as a result of the said restraining order, the direct service contract between NPC and APOCEMCO had been
implemented, further implementation thereof is hereby ordered discontinued. And APOCEMCO is also ordered to reconnect its power lines to
VECO which, in turn, must supply the former's energy requirements, charging a rate not to exceed that which would otherwise be paid by the said
user in case of a direct connection of its power lines to the NPC. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97618 December 16, 1993

ISMAEL MATHAY, JR., petitioner,

vs.

VICTOR C. MACALINCAG, Undersecretary of Finance, THE CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE CITY TREASURER OF
QUEZON CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 97760 December 16, 1993

RUFINO S. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.

VICTOR C. MACALINCAG (Undersecretary of Finance), THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 102319 December 16, 1993

CONSUELO PUYAT-REYES, petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, Acting through the then Undersecretary Victor C. Macalincag, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR AND THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF MAKATI, respondents.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioner in G.R. 97618.

Briccio C. Ygana for petitioner in G.R. 97760

Eliseo B. Alampay for intervenor.

Ferry, Toledo, Victorino & Associates for petitioner in G.R. 102319.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for respondents City Assessor and City Treasurer of Quezon City.
 RESOLUTION

NARVASA, C.J.:

On March 21, 1991, Ismael A. Mathay, Jr., describing himself as "a member of Congress, and registered owner of lands in Quezon
City and resident of Metro Manila," instituted in this Court a special civil action of prohibition against Victor Macalincag, then the
Undersecretary of Finance, the City Assessor and the City Treasurer of Quezon City. The action was docketed as G.R. No. 97618.

His petition sought the perpetual enjoinment, as unconstitutional and void, of "(a) the schedule of market values prepared by
respondent City Assessor for all classes of real property situated in Quezon City ("to take effect not earlier than January 1, 1991,"
and "implemented gradually over a three-year period on a 1/3 2/3 2/3 scheme"), (b) the approval of said schedule by respondent
Victor Macalincag, (c) the revised and/or increased assessments of the properties prepared by the City Assessor based on the
illegal schedule of market values, and (d) the oppressive and excessive real estate tax increases being implemented by
respondents City Assessor and City Treasurer pursuant to the illegal schedule of market values and unlawful approval, all in
violation of the Constitution and laws. The essential foundation of the petitioner's thesis of the nullity of the schedule of market
values is that it was prepared by the respondent City Assessor alone, independently of the other City Assessors within the
Metropolitan Manila Area, this being in patent violation of the explicit requirement of Section 9 of Presidential decree No. 921, viz:

Sec. 9. Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real Property within the Metropolitan Area. The Schedule of
Values that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes of real properties located
within the Metropolitan Area shall be prepared jointly by the City Assessors of the Districts created under Section
one hereof, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, and the implementing
rules and regulations thereby issued by the Secretary of Finance.

The "City Assessors of the Districts created under Section one" above referred to apart from the City Assessor of the First
District, Manila, who as aforestated, shall act "as Chairman" are the City Assessors of the second District: Quezon City, Pasig,
Marikina, Mandaluyong, and San Juan; of the Third District: Caloocan City, Malabon, Navotas, and Valenzuela; of the Fourth
District: Pasay City, Makati, Paraaque, Muntinlupa, Las Pias, Pateros, Taguig.

The statutory requirement of joint or collective action is echoed in the regulations promulgated by the Department of Finance (No. 7-
77) on July 25, 1977, Section 1.02 of which provides that "Schedule of Market Values for real property situated within the
Metropolitan Manila area be prepared jointly by the City Assessors of the Districts created under Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 921, with the City Assessor of Manila, acting as Chairman."

On the same day, March 21, 1991, this Court issued "a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and
continuing until further orders . . . ordering the respondents to CEASE and DESIST from implementing the new increased
assessments of real properties in Quezon City" it being made clear, however, that "taxpayers are required to pay under the old
assessments." The Court also set the case for hearing on Tuesday, April 23, 1991.

Six (6) days later, a similar action was initiated in this Court by Rufino S. Javier describing himself as "the Congressman of the
Lone District of Pasig, Metro Manila . . . (and) a real property estate owner in Pasig . . ." this time against Victor C. Macalincag,
as Undersecretary of Finance, and the Municipal Assessor and the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila. The action was
docketed as G.R. No. 97760. On the same legal theory as that espoused by petitioner Mathay in the first action, Javier's petition
sought the permanent proscription of the enforcement of "the unreasonably burdensome, unjust and confiscatory increase" in the
assessment of real estate in Pasig.

On April 23, 1991, several persons filed a motion to intervene as petitioners in the action, identifying themselves as: "Legal
Management Council of the Philippines, Eliseo B. Alampay, Custodio G. Parlade, Vicente A. Macatangay, Jr., Casiano O. Flores,
Primo L. Agsaoay, Pepito Abrajano, Leonila P. Reyes, . . . residents of Quezon City . . . (suing) in their behalf and in behalf of ALL
OTHER RESIDENTS OF QUEZON CITY AND SIMILARLY SITUATED," and alleging that they "have direct, legal and material
interest in the success of the main petition at bar," and the "subject matter of the present controversy is one of common or general
interest to all owners of real estate properties in Quezon City" in whose behalf the intervention is essayed.

At the hearing of April 23, 1991, the Court heard the petitioners and respondents (who had in the meantime filed their comments on
the petitions) in the two (2) actions: G.R. No. 97618 and G.R. No. 97760. It thereafter issued a Resolution inter alia admitting the
petition in intervention and resetting the hearing of both cases to Thursday, May 16, 1991.

After the Court had again heard the parties on May 16, 1991, it issued a Resolution containing the following disposition, to wit:

It being the petitioners' and intervenors' principal complaint that they were not accorded adequate opportunity to
ventilate their objections to the procedure followed in the establishment of the new assessment levels and to adduce
evidence relative to the correctness and reasonableness thereof, and there being agreement on all sides that in
view of the suspension of the "enforcement of the new real property tax without prejudice to its enforcement when
factual factors and considerations later warrant," a re-examination of the specific rates thereof may be undertaken at
this time in light of said petitioners' and intervenors' objections as well as such evidence as they may wish to submit,
the Court, in the exercise of its extraordinary or certiorari jurisdiction, Resolved to REFER both these cases, G.R.
No. 97618 and G.R. No. 97760, to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals for hearing and determination upon
the issues therein raised and such evidence as the parties may present, and to DIRECT said Board to SUBMIT to
the Court a copy of its final judgment forthwith upon its rendition . . . .

On the same day, May 16, 1991, as in the first action (G.R. No. 97618), a temporary restraining order was issued in this second
one, "ordering the respondents to CEASE and DESIST from implementing the new increased assessments of real properties in
Pasig, Metro Manila," it also being made clear, however, that "taxpayers are required to pay under the old assessments."
On November 5, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution clarifying its earlier one of May 16, 1991. It pointed out that the authority of
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals "to take cognizance of the factual issues raised in these two cases by virtue of referral by
this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary or certiorarijurisdiction should not be confused with its appellate jurisdiction over
appealed assessment cases under Section 36 of P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. The Board is not
acting in its appellate jurisdiction in the instant cases, but rather, it is acting as a Court-appointed fact-finding commission to assist
the Court in resolving the factual issues raised in G.R. Nos. 97618 and 97760."

A third special civil action of prohibition impugning the increase of real property assessment levels, this time in respect of land
located in Makati, was instituted on November 4, 1991 by Consuelo Puyat-Reyes, describing herself as "a registered owner of real
estate property in the Municipality of Makati and
. . . the incumbent Congresswoman of the District in Makati, Metro Manila
. . . ." Impleaded as respondents were the Secretary of Finance (acting through the then Undersecretary Victor C. Macalincag), the
Municipal Assessor and the Municipal Treasurer of Makati. Acting thereon, the Court, by Resolution dated November 12, 1991,
referred the case to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals "pursuant to the resolution dated May 16, 1991 in G.R. No. 97618
(Mathay vs. Undersecretary of Finance, et al.) and G.R. No. 97760 (Javier vs. Undersecretary of Finance, et al.) and clarified in the
resolution of November 5, 1991," and issued a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . . ordering the respondents to CEASE
and DESIST from enforcing the revised real property assessments and from collecting the increased rates of real estate taxes
based thereon in Makati."

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals thereupon proceeded to act on the cases. It opted to hear G.R. No. 97618 (CBAA Case
No. 261) separately from G.R. No. 97760 "in order . . . to independently determine the merits of the said two cases, the issues
therein raised and such evidences presented by the parties."

In rendered a Decision in G.R. No. 97618 (CBAA Case No. 261) on February 24, 1993, 1 which it transmitted in due course to this
Court on March 11, 1993 together with the "records of the case consisting of 426 pages." It found for one petitioner, Ismael A.
Mathay, Jr., and sustained his theory by the following ratiocination:

Section 9 of P.D. 921 is specific and mandatory. The undisputed fact that the City Assessor of Quezon City solely
prepared the Schedule of Market Values in question, without the participation of the other City Assessors of
Metropolitan Manila, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman (SEE Exhibit "K", Letter to Mr. Carlos C.
Antonio to Petitioner, dated March 18, 1991), indicates that the said Schedule of Market Values was prepared
contrary to and unauthorized under Section 9 of P.D. 921 and its implementing rule on Section 1.02 of AR No. 7-77.
The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the said Schedule of Market Values, having been prepared by the
respondent City Assessor contrary to the express provision of and without authority under Section 9 is illegal and
therefore void.

This Board is of the considered view that the E.O. No. 392 has not repealed P.D. No. 921.
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones (Art. 7, New Civil Code). An executive order (like E.O. No. 392) cannot
repeal a legislative act (like P.D. 921) (Largado vs. Masaganda, L-17624, June 30, 1962). A legislative Act,
therefore, can only be repealed by another subsequent legislative Act (Hilado vs. Collector, L-9408, October 31,
1956). Well-recognized by all civilized nations is that a decree issued by the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces who is the head of state and exercising law-making powers under martial law is in the nature of a legislative
act (Ex-parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2).

Granting for the sake of argument, that E.O. No. 392 was a valid repealing act that abolished the Metropolitan
Manila Commission, yet the said Executive Order did not in any manner affect the life of P.D. 921 nor the
assessment districts and committee created therein under Section 9 thereof nor its provision regarding the
preparation of schedule of market values for real properties within the Metropolitan Manila Area.

So that, whether it is named Metro Manila Commission or Metro Manila Authority, P.D. 921 remains effective until
validly repealed by subsequent legislation through Congress (Hilado vs. Collector, supra). Furthermore, implied
repeals are never favored in our jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208). Expressed otherwise, the Local
Treasury and Assessment Districts created by P.D. 921 has a life independent of the Metropolitan Manila Authority,
and the abolition of the Metro Manila Commission does not follow the abolition also of P.D. 921 or the Treasury and
Assessment Districts under Metropolitan Manila. Moreover, a perusal of E.O. 392 shows that it provides no
repealing clause and it does not contain a specific provision relative to preparation of schedule of values. It is then
clear that Section 9 of P.D. 921 still subsists and is the controlling provision with respect to the manner of
preparation of schedule of values for Metropolitan Manila.

This Board considers untenable the allegation in this Comment submitted to the Supreme Court for Respondent
Hon. Undersecretary
Victor C. Macalincag, that the Respondent City Assessor has authority to prepare alone the questioned Schedule of
Market Values for the reason that Section 9 of P.D. 921 refers to a general revision and has no application to
selective revaluation or assessment of properties in a certain local government unit. There is nothing in the provision
of Section 9 where we should distinguish between a general revision or revaluation or reassessment in the
preparation of the Schedule of Market Values for Metropolitan Manila, as basis for the appraisal and assessment of
taxation purposes of real properties located in the area. "Where the law does not distinguish we should not
distinguish."

As this Board has ruled that the questioned Schedule of Market Values is illegal and, therefore, void, the review and
findings of the created Technical Review Panel, that the said Schedule of Market Values was prepared in
compliance with the "instructions" embodied in the Assessment Regulation No. 7-77, will not render valid the void
Schedule of Market Values.
 Petitioner further assailed the legality of the Schedule of Market Values in question on the ground that it was not
approved by the Secretary of Finance, but by Respondent Undersecretary Victor Macalincag contrary to Section 15
of P.D. 464.

We believe that it is at this point immaterial to determine whether or not the questioned Schedule of Market Values
should be approved by the secretary of Finance himself. The fact being that the said Schedule of Market Values as
approved by Respondent Undersecretary Macalincag is void from its preparation.

As repeatedly emphasized by our Supreme Court in a line of jurisprudence, "an illegal act confers no rights, creates
no duties, and in the eyes of the law, it is as if the same had never existed. It can be slain at sight." Such is the case
of the questioned Schedule of Market Values, which is hereby declared void and without force and effect. Therefore,
the realty tax rates based on the Schedule of Market Values are likewise void and unenforceable.

Further, consisting that this Board in its findings ruled on the illegality of the Schedule of Market Values as prepared
by the Respondent City Assessor, the question of notice of assessment is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring, as this Board hereby declares, null and void, and, therefore,
unenforceable the subject Schedule of Market Values for all classes of lands in Quezon City, as prepared solely by
Respondent City Assessor being contrary to and in violation of Section 9 of P.D. No. 921. Respondent City
Assessor and Treasurer of Quezon City are hereby ordered to act accordingly.

This Board hereby declares null and void, and, therefore, unenforceable, the subject Schedule of Market Values for
all classes of lands in Quezon City, as prepared solely by Respondent City Assessor, being contrary to and in
violation of Section 9 of P.D. No. 921.

The Board also rejected the respondents' argument that "the subsequent issuance of Executive Order No. 392, constituting the
Metropolitan Manila Authority on January 9, 1989, has in effect abolished the Metro Manila Commission, and therefore has ceased
to function." It ruled that Executive Order No. 392 could not repeal a legislative act like P.D. No. 921, and that even assuming that
Executive Order did abolish the Commission, the former "did not in any manner affect the life of P.D. 921 nor the assessment
districts and committee created therein under Section 9 thereof nor its provision regarding the preparation of schedule of market
values for real properties within the Metropolitan Manila Area."

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals rendered its decision in the second case, G.R. No. 97760 (CBAA Case No. 262) (Javier
vs. Macalincag), on May 7, 1993, which it transmitted to this Court by letter of its Chairman dated May 17, 1993. It pronounced null
and void by its Municipal Assessor. Said the Board:
 The argument of Respondents about the meetings of the League of City and Municipal Assessors to consider the
proposed schedule for Quezon City or Pasig, for that matter, is untenable. The League has no authority to prepare
the Schedule Market of Values, for not having been constituted in accordance with Section 9 of P.D. 921 and 2nd
par. of Section 1.02 of DOF AR No. 7-77 which pertained only to the Districts created under Section 1 of P.D. 921.
But even granting that the League has authority, the League did not extend any hand in the preparation of said
schedule. Consideration or discussion thereof, is not preparation.

In this Board's Decision on CBAA Case No. 261 G.R. No. 97618, ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., Petitioner, vs. THE
HON. VICTOR C. MACALINCAG (Undersecretary of Finance), et al., the dispositive portion thereof reads as
follows:

The Board hereby declares null and void, and, therefore, unenforceable, the subject Schedule of
Market Values for all classes of lands in Quezon City, as prepared solely by Respondent City
Assessor, being contrary to and in violation of Section 9 of P.D. No. 921.

As in the Mathay case, the same issues were substantially raised in the Javier case. It would be utter folly for this
Board to apply the same law differently to the latter case. What is good for the goose should be good for the gander.
The principle of Stare Decisis impels this Board to abide by its Decision to stand as precedents for future judgments.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring null and void the instant Schedule of Market Values,
prepared solely by the Municipal Assessor of Pasig, for lands in Pasig, Metro Manila, in violation of Section 9 of P.D.
921. Respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby ordered to act
accordingly.

The Board pronounced judgment in the third case, G.R. No. 102319 (CBAA Case No. 263) (Consuelo Puyat-Reyes v. Secretary of
Finance, et al.) on October 5, 1993. This is also sent to this Court, together with the records, on October 18, 1993.

The decision states that in March, 1993, the Board allowed two (2) firms to make common cause with petitioner Puyat-Reyes as
petitioners-in-intervention, namely: Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) and Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA),
"owners/lessees of real properties located within the Municipality of Makati;" and that compromise agreements were arrived at and
submitted by Puyat-Reyes and the respondents, as well as by the latter and the intervenors.

The Board declared the compromise agreements to have no legal basis and hence unacceptable under Article 1306 of the Civil
Code. And it disposed of the merits of the controversy as follows:

Still fresh from its memory, this Board cannot simply set aside its decision on CBAA Cases Nos. 261 (Ismael A.
Mathay, Jr. vs. the Hon. Victor C. Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, et al.), and 262 (Rufino S. Javier vs. the
 Hon. Victor C. Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, et al.) and disregard the principle of stare decisis. This Board
must abide or adhere to decided cases, especially and more so when such decisions emanate from the Board itself.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring null and void the instant Schedule of Market Values,
prepared solely by the Municipal Assessor of Makati, for lands in Makati, Metro Manila, in violation of Section 9, P.D.
921 and the Compromise Agreements, entered into by and between the Petitioner and Respondents and among
and between the Intervenors and Respondents, inexistent and void and without force and effect. Respondents
Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila, are hereby ordered to act accordingly.

The Court has reviewed the records of all these three (3) cases and finds that the Central Board of Assessment Appeals has
proceeded correctly as regards their hearing and determination. It also agrees with the Board's conclusion that the Schedules of
Market Values for real properties located in Quezon City, the Municipality of Pasig and the Municipality of Makati, respectively
prepared solely by the City Assessor of Quezon City, and the Municipal Assessors of Pasig and Makati, failed to comply with the
explicit requirements of Presidential Decree No. 921 in relation to the corresponding Administrative Regulations promulgated by the
Department of Finance (No. 7-77) on July 25, 1977, and are on that account illegal and void. The Court therefore hereby approves
and adopts as its own the following dispositions made by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in all said case, to wit:

1) RE G.R. No. 97618 (CBAA Case No. 261)

This Board hereby declares null and void, and, therefore, unenforceable, the subject Schedule of Market Values for
all classes of lands in Quezon City, as prepared solely by Respondent City Assessor, being contrary to and in
violation of Section 9 of P.D. No. 921.

2) RE G.R. No. 97760 (CBAA Case No. 262)

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring null and void the instant Schedule of Market Values,
prepared solely by the Municipal Assessor of Pasig, for lands in Pasig, Metro Manila, in violation of Section 9 of P.D.
921. Respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby ordered to act
accordingly.

3) RE G.R. No. 102319 (CBAA Case No. 263)

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring null and void the instant Schedule of Market Values,
prepared solely by the Municipal Assessor of Makati, for lands in Makati, in violation of Section 9, P.D. 921 and the
Compromise Agreements, entered into and between the Petitioner and Respondents and among and between the
Intervenors and Respondents, inexistent and void and without force and effect. Respondents Municipal Assessor
and Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila, are hereby ordered to act accordingly.
 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Taxation Local Taxation Taxes Levied By a Province Sand and Gravel Fee
In 1968, the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union undertook road constructions. It sent its trucks to the nearby Municipality of
Luna, La Union to gather sand and gravel. But then the agents of the Luna, La Union imposed fees on each truck. Mayor Lorenzo
Dacanay of San Fernando then filed for injunction against the mayor of Luna (Timoteo Sta. Romana), its treasurer and their
agents to enjoin them from collecting said fees. Sta. Romana, in their defense, averred that the collection of said fees is pursuant
to an ordinance duly approved by the Municipal Council of Luna in consonance with its power to tax, and that the fees collected
are reasonable, fair and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Luna is validly exacting the assailed fees on the hauling of gravel and sand.
HELD: No. Pursuant to the then Local Tax Code, a municipality like Luna is not authorized to exact fees for the hauling of gravel
and sand within it. Such power is lodged only in the province, in this case, the province of La Union. Only La Union has the
authority to exact taxes for sand and gravel extracted within its jurisdiction. The tax ordinance of Luna providing for such power
to the municipality is therefore void. Corollarily, San Fernando cannot extract sand and gravel from the Municipality of Luna
without paying the corresponding taxes or fees that may be imposed by the province of La Union.

TITLE: Iloilo Bottlers v City of Iloilo 164 SCRA 607Topic: Situs of Taxation and Double Taxation Part III of the outlineDigest by: Andrew Velasco
Seat number: 31 Law 124 Section: AFACTS: Iloilo Bottlers Inc., a company in the business of bottling and selling soft drinks, wasdemanded
by the City of Iloilo to pay an amount of 59,505 in the form of an license tax the cityclaims were due to it under an ordinance which was enacted
on January 11, 1960 known asOrdinance No. 5, Series of 1960; which provides that manufacturers, bottlers, and distributers ofsoft drinks in Iloilo
are subject to a municipal license tax of 10 centavos per case of 24 bottles.Iloilo Bottling Inc asserted however that since their plant base has
moved to municipality ofPavia shortly after the aforementioned ordinance was enacted, they are not liable for any taxes.The city however, still
demanded taxes and also demanded back taxes under the claim that IloiloBottlers is still distributing in the city of Iloilo since its transfer. Iloilo
Bottlers paid thedemanded license tax and back taxes under protest. After bringing the case to court, the courtsruled in favor of Iloilo Bottlers
and declared that Iloilo Bottlers is free from liability. The city ofIloilo then appealed this ruling, hence this case.ISSUE: Whether or not the courts
were correct in their initial ruling that Iloilo Bottlers Inc. isfree from liability and directing the city of Iloilo to refund the tax money.HELD: No, the
courts were not correct. The ruling was reversed in favor of the City of Iloiloand Iloilo Bottlers is deemed liable for the aforementioned taxes.
RATIO: Situs of taxation (place of taxation) depends on various factors including the nature of the tax and subject matter thereof both of which
must be scrutinized to reach a fair decision. The tax ordinance enacted by the City of Iloilo imposes a tax on persons, firms, and corporations
engaged in the business of distribution of soft-drinks, manufacture of soft-drinks, and bottling of soft drinks within the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Iloilo. There is no question that Iloilo Bottlers has moved out of Iloilo Citys jurisdiction and into the municipality of Pavia where its
plant now stands therefore, the latter two conditions for taxation are no longer applicable. The ruling now depends upon whether or not Iloilo
Bottlers can be considered as distributing its products within Iloilo city. Iloilo Bottlers disclaims liability, saying that it does not independently
distribute but rather actively sells directly to its consumers. Distribution is therefore only incidental to its business. However, the courts find that
Iloilo Bottlers is indeed considered as distributing since while the manufacturing and bottling occurs outside of Iloilo city, the drinks are sold in
Iloilo city to consumers in a moving store fashion. The transactions are considered to occur within the city. The tax imposed under Ordinance
No. 5 is an excise tax. By its nature, the power to levy an excise tax depends upon the place where the business is done,or the occupation is
engaged in, or where the transaction took place. In this case, it is a tax on theprivilege of distributing, manufacturing or bottling soft drinks. Even
though the base of operations is at Pavia, the areas of transactions where it conducts its business are within Iloilo city limits. The Situs for excise
tax is the area of transaction, not necessarily base of operation.

ALEJANDRO B. TY & MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC., V. THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG
G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.
 Facts of the Case: Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube Inc., as residents and
registered owners of land & buildings in Municipality of Pasig (now City) filed a case impugning the validity of the new tax assessments prepared solely by the respondent municipal assessor. The validity and legality of the increased real estate taxes imposed by and being collected in Pasig, effective from the year 1994 is being questioned. PD 921 & LGC of 1991 are the statues involved. Both dealing with the assessment and collection of real
estate taxes.

PETITIONERS P.D. 921, Sec. 9. Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real

Property within the Metropolitan Area. The Schedule of Values
RESPONDENTS
that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for
-The schedule of market taxation purposes of real properties located within the -Tax assessments are
Metropolitan Area shall be prepared jointly by the City Assessors
values and the of the Districts created under Section one hereof, with the City valid.
Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman, in accordance with the
assessments prepared pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended, -PD 921 and LGC of
solely by the municipal otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, and the
implementing rules and regulations thereof issued by the 1991(RA 7160) are
assessor, in accordance Secretary of Finance.
with LGC of 1991 (RA clearly & unequivocally
7160) are invalid and Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 212. Preparation of Schedule of Fair incompatible since both
Market Values. Before any general revision of property
illegal because the said assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there dwell on the same
Code did not effectively shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the
provincial, city and the municipal assessors of the municipalities
subject matter
repeal the previous law within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of (preparation of schedule
real property situated in their respective local government units
on the matter (PD 921). for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. The of values for real property
schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province, city or municipality in Metro Manila area).
-PD 921 was not concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the Due to this, PD 921 was
provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other
expressly repealed nor conspicuous public place therein. not expressly repealed in
impliedly repealed by the Codes repealing
LGC of 1991(RA 7160) Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (c) . . . ; and Presidential Decree
clause, but it was
Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 626, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby
and is therefore the repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
WON Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise impliedly repealed.
applicable statute. PD
known as the Local Government Code of Therefore, LGC of 1991
921 is strict and
mandatory. 1991, repealed the provisions of (RA 7160) is the
Presidential Decree No. 921. prevailing statute.

Ruling of the RTC: RTC ruled in favour of the respondents and rendered the schedule of
market values and assessments valid and legal.
Ruling of the Supreme Court: SC ruled that PD 921 is still a good law and the schedule of
values prepared solely by the municipal assessor is illegal & void. It was held that if the intention
of the legislature was to abrogate PD 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause. An
implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that
the two laws are clearly repugnant & inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. While RA 7160 covers
almost governmental functions delegated to local governments units, PD 921 embraces only the
Metropolitan Manila Area and is limited especially to the assessment and collection of real estate
(& some other taxes). Therefore, it is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only
possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent & policy. By
this harmonization, the preamble of both statutes shall be fulfilled.