Journal of Consumer Research Inc.

The Shaken Self: Product Choices as a Means of Restoring SelfView Confidence

Author(s): Leilei Gao, S.Christian Wheeler, Baba Shiv
Source: The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 36, No. 1 (June 2009), pp. 29-38
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/596028 .
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The Shaken Self: Product Choices as a
Means of Restoring Self-View Confidence
LEILEI GAO
S. CHRISTIAN WHEELER
BABA SHIV*

The present research shows that when a confidently held self-view (e.g., I am an
exciting person) is temporarily cast in doubt, individuals are motivated to choose
products that bolster their original self-view (e.g., choosing brands with exciting
brand personalities). The findings across three studies suggest that subtle manip-
ulations can temporarily shake ones self-view confidence, resulting in an in-
creased propensity of choosing self-view-bolstering products in a subsequent
choice task. The consequences of the shaken self for product choices are ex-
amined in different self-domains. The findings also suggest that the effects of the
shaken self are attenuated when individuals have the opportunity to restore their
self-view confidence prior to the final choice task.

The self is not something ready-made, but by proposing that a key determinant of this congruency is
something in continuous formation through self-view confidence. Specifically, we show that threats to
choice of action. (John Dewey) an important self-view can momentarily shake ones con-

M arketing researchers have long been interested in the

relationship between the self-concept and consumer
choice. Most early research was based on the notion that
consumers are motivated to purchase products with images
that are congruent with their self-beliefs (e.g., Birdwell
1968; Levy 1959). For example, Birdwell (1968) showed
that automobile owners perceptions of their cars are es-
sentially congruent with their self-perceptions. However, de-
spite some promising findings such as these, extensive re-
views failed to find consistent evidence that people choose
products congruent with their self-perceived characteristics
(Kassarjian 1971; Sirgy 1982). A wide number of potential
moderators have been examined, including levels of self-
constructs (e.g., actual vs. ideal self), personality, social
class, and product conspicuousness, but these moderators,
too, have failed to yield consistent results (Sirgy 1982).
In this research, we sharpen our understanding of the
relationship between the self-concept and product choices
*Leilei Gao is assistant professor of marketing, the Chinese University
of Hong Kong (leilei@baf.msmail.cuhk.edu.hk). S. Christian Wheeler is
associate professor of marketing (wheeler_christian@gsb.stanford.edu) and
Baba Shiv is professor of marketing (shiv_baba@gsb.stanford.edu) at the
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA 94305-5015. Cor-
respondence: Leilei Gao. The authors thank the editor, associate editor, and
three reviewers for their help and guidance at various stages of this project.
John Deighton served as editor and Susan Broniarczyk served as associate
editor for this article.
Electronically published December 4, 2008
29
fidence in that particular self-view, resulting in the choice
of products that help restore confidence in that self-view.
Ironically, then, we propose that those subtly led to doubt
that they hold a self-characteristic may sometimes be the
ones most likely to choose products congruent with it.
Our research shares some kinship with recent work show-
ing that individuals take actions in response to threats to
self-concept. For example, in a series of studies, Tetlock et
al. (2000) show that threats to sacred moral values result
not only in moral outrage but also in attempts at taking
actions that will restore those moral values (e.g., volun-
teering to help). More recently, Zhong and Liljenquist
(2006) show that such restoration of the moral self can be
achieved not only through direct moral cleansing but also
through physical cleansing, a phenomenon they term the
Macbeth effect. Note, however, that the research cited above
has been restricted to the moral domain; our research prop-
ositions apply to a wider array of domains. Specifically, in
this research, we extend recent work on the moral self by
showing that the types of effects documented in that research
stream occur not only when ones moral purity is threatened
but also across a wider range of contexts in which any
important self-view is threatened.
Our research also extends recent work on the moral self
in other significant ways. We document a new set of specific
processes through which self-view threats can affect product
choice. Specifically, we show that a threat to any important
self-view results in (1) a momentary loss in confidence with
that particular self-view and (2) a broad array of behaviors

2008 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 36 June 2009

All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2009/3601-0008$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/596028
30
that are aimed at restoring confidence in that self-view. We
also document different strategies by which individuals cope
with a threatened self-view. Specifically, we show that the
effects of lowered self-view confidence on consumer choice
can be eliminated by both direct self-view-bolstering strat-
egies (e.g., boosting confidence in the threatened self-view
domain) as well as indirect strategies (e.g., affirming an
unrelated self-value). Finally, we show that in addition to
more blatant threats to the self (e.g., recalling instances of
ones immoral behavior as in Zhong and Liljenquist [2006]),
very subtle actions (e.g., writing with ones nondominant
hand about ones health consciousness) can also affect self-
confidence.
In the next section we provide a more detailed exposition
of the conceptualization underlying our proposed effects.
We then present three experiments that test our conceptu-
alization and rule out alternative accounts for our findings.
Finally, we discuss the conceptual as well as managerial
implications of our findings and provide some promising
directions for future research.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We outline the basis for our predictions in two broad
sections. First, we present our conceptualization related to
the shaken self, highlighting the importance of self-view
confidence in giving rise to the predicted effects. We then
discuss the consequences of a shaken self, highlighting the
direct and indirect coping strategies that could be employed
for bolstering a shaken self-concept and the implications of
these strategies for product choices.
The Shaken Self
Self-view confidence refers to the certainty that one has
in ones self-concept and in ones thoughts related to the
self (DeMarree, Petty, and Brinol 2007; Pelham 1991). Prior
research suggests that individuals are likely to hold highly
confident self-views if they can draw coherent evidence
about their self-characteristics from the environment and
from their past experiences (Campbell 1990; Pelham 1991).
Confident self-views have typically been assumed to depend
on stable evidence about the self, but they are also subject
to situational influences. For example, recalling an unethical
deed in ones past can lead to attempts to bolster ones moral
purity, consistent with the idea that temporarily thinking
about how one is immoral can lower ones feelings of mo-
rality (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006).
In addition to these more blatant influences, we posit that
self-views can also be momentarily shaken by primes and
other subtle situational factors, such as when one has to
perform familiar and routinized tasks in unfamiliar ways.
Examples of such situations include writing with ones non-
dominant hand, driving in the wrong lane (left lane) when
traveling in Britain, and using chopsticks for the first time.
We argue that subtle features of the situation or of ones
actions can trigger metacognitions signaling that something
is wrong, resulting in a reduced confidence with ones on-
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
going thoughts related to a particular self-view and, thus,
leading to a reduced confidence in that self-view (cf. Schwarz
2004).
The arguments presented above receive support from
some research on metacognition. For example, Brinol and
Petty (2003) instructed participants to write with their dom-
inant or nondominant hands about their good or bad qual-
ities. Regardless of whether they wrote about their good or
bad qualities, those who wrote with their nondominant hands
reported lowered confidence in their self-related thoughts,
despite generating content equivalent to those who wrote
with their dominant hands. Brinol and Petty (2003) argued
that thoughts listed with the nondominant hand are more
difficult to write and appear shaky, which contributes to
lowered confidence in the content of the listed thoughts.
Although our discussion thus far shares kinship with psy-
chological processes underlying the Macbeth effect, a key
difference needs to be noted. In research on the Macbeth
effect (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006), some participants were
instructed to write about immoral deeds, an act that pre-
sumably altered their thoughts about themselves as being
moral individuals. In this research we examine whether self-
views can be shaken even when the content of ones
thoughts is held constant. For example, people who write
about ways in which they are intelligent, but who do so
with their nondominant hands, should have doubts about
their intelligence even though (and in fact, because) the
content of their thoughts suggests that they are intelligent.
This is because the doubt activated by the unfamiliar task
(writing with ones nondominant hand) is attributed to the
content of ones thoughts (e.g., I am intelligent), leading to
doubt in those thoughts (e.g., I have low confidence that I
am intelligent). Stated differently, whereas research on the
Macbeth effect manipulated self-views by varying the con-
tent of participants thoughts (related to being either immoral
or moral), we hold the content of participants thoughts
constant yet show that self-views can still be shaken by very
subtle factors that influence the confidence they have in
those thoughts. In the next section, we discuss various strat-
egies that could be brought to bear as a means of coping
with a momentarily shaken self and the implications of these
strategies for the choice of products that are aimed at bol-
stering self-view confidence.
The Shaken Self and Coping Strategies
Individuals generally desire to hold confident self-views,
and evidence suggests that a lack of such confidence can
be aversive, resulting in negative psychological outcomes
such as low self-esteem (Baumgardner 1990; Campbell
1990), unhappiness, and anxiety (Rosenberg 1979). We
therefore posit that when ones self-view confidence is tem-
porarily cast in doubt, one will be motivated to recover from
the negative psychological outcomes and restore ones orig-
inal levels of confidence.
Prior research suggests that individuals can adopt a variety
of strategies to cope with their lowered self-confidence. For
instance, in some circumstances, individuals have been
THE SHAKEN SELF
shown to seek objective information to resolve their uncer-
tainty (Tiedens and Linton 2001). However, obtaining ob-
jective information about oneself may not always be fea-
sible. In such situations, individuals may instead attempt to
bolster their original self-views through either direct or in-
direct means. We discuss each of these strategies in turn.
Direct Means of Recovering from a Shaken Self. It
is now common knowledge that products are chosen not
only for their functional qualities but also for their symbolic
qualities (Belk 1988; Levy 1959; Solomon 1983). Con-
sumption of products can convey the possession of specific
self-characteristics both to others (Belk, Bahn, and Mayer
1982) and to oneself (Bem 1972; Solomon 1983) and serve
as a means of coping with low confidence in specific self-
views (Assael 1981; Piacentini and Mailer 2004; Wicklund
and Gollwitzer 1982). Thus, we posit that the consumption
of symbolic products (e.g., reading sophisticated books)
could help restore a momentarily shaken self-view by pro-
viding direct evidence about ones attributes (e.g., intelli-
gence). Stated differently, this symbolic function of products
could make individuals with momentarily lowered self-con-
fidence particularly prone to choosing products that support
the shaken self-view. Because products can be self-expres-
sive, they can signal to oneself and to others who one is,
thereby helping to restore ones self-view confidence.
The arguments presented above are consistent with a goal
activation account. Lacking confidence regarding a self-view
could activate a self-view recovery goal. Kurt Lewin (1935)
suggested that objects are valued to the extent that they
satisfy a goal, and hence, a self-view recovery goal could
lead people to prefer self-view-bolstering products. Once
the goal is satisfied and deactivated (Brendl, Markman, and
Messner 2003), however, consumers should no longer be
more likely to display product-self congruity.
Indirect Means of Recovering from a Shaken Self. In
addition to the more direct means of restoring the self-con-
cept delineated in the previous section, we propose that
individuals can also adopt more indirect coping strategies.
Self-affirmation theory proposes that individuals can cope
with threats to their selves through a fluid compensation
procedure (Steele 1988) such as affirming an important self-
value (Shrira and Martin 2005). As Steele (1988, 267) wrote,
This fluidity of adaptation suggests the existence of a larger,
ego-protective self-system not geared to resolving specific
self-concept threats, but geared to maintaining an overall
conception of self-integrity. Thus, individuals who have a
shaken self-concept along one dimension could potentially
restore their overall self-views by affirming an unrelated
self-value.
Next, we present three experiments that accomplish sev-
eral broad goals. First, we test the notion that subtle situ-
ational factors that reduce self-view confidence will instigate
processes aimed at restoring the self-concept. Second, we
test the notion that this restoration can occur via multiple
means, including more direct methods (e.g., purchasing
products to restore the specific shaken self-dimension) and
31
more indirect methods (e.g., affirming an unrelated self-
value). Third, in line with work by Brendl et al. (2003) and
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), we provide tests of our con-
ceptualization by arguing that if such self-restoration is al-
lowed to occur prior to the final choice, then the final choices
would be no different than those for whom the self-concept
was never shaken in the first place. Finally, we show that
trait-specific confidence is the underlying mechanism of the
shaken-self effects.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that
subtle manipulations can increase choice of self-view-bol-
stering products and that choosing such products can restore
the shaken self. In experiment 1 we relied on the previously
validated handwriting procedure employed by Brinol and
Petty (2003) to subtly affect confidence in a particular self-
view (intelligence) self-confidence (or not). Specifically,
akin to Brinol and Petty (2003) participants in this experi-
ment were instructed to write with either their dominant or
their nondominant hand an essay about their intelligence,
the idea being that writing about the particular self-view
with the nondominant hand can subtly shake self-view con-
fidence.
Experiment 1 also served to test our conceptualization
and reduce the viability of alternative accounts. To test our
conceptualization, some participants were provided the op-
portunity for self-recovery prior to the final choice task, the
idea being that the opportunity for self-recovery in an in-
tervening task ought to attenuate the choice of the self-view
(intelligence) bolstering option in the final task.
Participants and Procedure
Eighty-one participants were randomly assigned to one
of four conditions in a 2 (handwriting: dominant hand vs.
nondominant hand) # 2 (opportunity for self-recovery: yes
vs. no) between-subjects design. The cover story was that
a group of experimenters was testing the validity of ancient
graphological methods in predicting ones professional suc-
cess. The experimenters were ostensibly interested in both
dominant hand and nondominant hand handwriting. Partic-
ipants were first asked to write three personal characteristics
that depicted them as being intelligent individuals. A pretest
revealed that participants in the study sample population
believe that they are intelligent individuals and are confident
about this belief. Some participants were assigned to write
the essay with their dominant hands; others were assigned
to write the essay with their nondominant hands. Participants
then engaged in an intervening choice task in which some
participants had the opportunity to restore self-view confi-
dence. Specifically, participants were told that their name
would be entered in a lottery in which they had the chance
of receiving a product in one of four categories (gift cer-
tificate, magazine, home game, or CD). One group of par-
ticipants received a set of lottery choices that contained
products related to intelligence (i.e., Borders gift certificate,
32
National Geographic magazine, Rubiks cube, and Mozart
CD); another group was presented with lottery choices that
contained no products related to intelligence (i.e., AMC
movie theater gift certificate, People magazine, Magic 8
Ball, and Now 19 pop music CD). A pretest conducted with
a separate sample from the same population (n p 40) in-
dicated that the intelligent products in each category were
rated significantly more related to intelligence than the non-
intelligent products ( ps ! .001).
All participants then completed the 20-item PANAS (Pos-
itive and Negative Affect Schedule) mood scale (Watson,
Clark, and Tellegen 1988) and rated their self-esteem using
a one-item self-esteem scale (I have high self-esteem,
where 1 p not very true of me; 5 p very true of me; Rob-
ins, Hendin, and Trzesniewski 2001). These measures served
to reduce the viability of alternative accounts related to
mood and self-esteem.
Finally, as our key dependent measure, participants chose
between two gift optionsa fountain pen or a pack of
M&Ms candiesas an additional reward for having taken
part in the study. A pretest conducted with a separate sample
from the same population (n p 49) indicated that a fountain
pen was rated as significantly more related to intelligence
than was a pack of candy (F(1, 49) p 94.80, p ! .001) and,
thus, constitutes an intelligence-bolstering choice. The
candy and pen did not bear any similarity to the options
presented in the intervening task, and so the choice of items
in the previous task should not affect the desirability of these
items, except for their common intelligence-related associ-
ations. To control for social and normative factors, which
could have otherwise influenced participants decisions (see
Ratner and Kahn 2002; West and Broniarczyk 1998), the
final choice task occurred completely out of sight and ear-
shot of the other respondents and the experimenters.
Results
A logistic regression revealed a main effect of the oppor-
tunity-for-self-recovery factor (x 2 p 4.56, p ! .03). More
important, the analysis revealed a main effect of the hand-
edness factor (x 2 p 3.57, p p .05) such that writing with
the nondominant hand about their intelligence increased par-
ticipants likelihood of choosing the fountain pen (65% vs.
39% in the nondominant and dominant hand conditions,
respectively) as their take-home gift. Consistent with pre-
dictions, the logistic regression also revealed a marginally
significant handedness # opportunity-for-self-recovery in-
teraction (x 2 p 2.64, p p .10). A planned comparison
showed that the choice of the fountain pen (the intelligent
option) was higher in the nondominant hand/no-self-restor-
ing-opportunity condition (78%) than in the other three con-
ditions (the average choice share was 45%; b p 1.49, p !
.02). Participants likelihood of choosing the fountain pen
in the other three conditions did not differ from each other
( ps p NS; see fig. 1). These results suggest that writing
with the nondominant hand led to a higher likelihood of
choosing self-view-bolstering products only when partici-
pants did not previously have an opportunity to restore their
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 1
CHOICE OF THE INTELLIGENT OPTION (FOUNTAIN PEN):
EXPERIMENT 1
self-view confidence. Once participants in the nondominant
hand conditions had the opportunity to bolster their self-
view in an intervening task, they were no more likely than
those in the dominant hand conditions to choose the intel-
ligent gift.
Alternative Accounts. An alternative explanation to our
findings is that participants might have chosen exciting prod-
ucts not as a means to restore self-confidence but instead
as a means of either boosting their lowered self-esteem or
liberating themselves from a negative mood state as a result
of writing with the nondominant hand. We reduced the vi-
ability of this account in two ways. First, the interactive
pattern of results on participants final choices reduces the
viability of the mood account. If the mood account had been
valid, one ought to have observed only a main effect of the
handedness factor on the dependent measure. Second, we
examined participants responses to the 20-item PANAS
scale (Watson et al. 1988). We observed a marginal main effect
of the handedness factor on negative affect (F(1, 76) p 3.62,
p p .06), but importantly, the handedness # opportunity-for-
self-recovery interactions on both positive and negative af-
fect were not significant ( ps 1 .30). Additionally, neither pos-
itive nor negative affect was correlated with choice ( ps 1 .20).
To examine whether an explanation related to self-esteem
could account for the findings, we examined participants
responses to the self-esteem measure. Participants self-es-
teem scores did not differ across the four conditions (ps 1
.25), thereby reducing the viability of this alternative account.
Discussion
The findings of experiment 1 suggest that writing an essay
with ones nondominant hand about how intelligent one is
results in a greater likelihood of choosing intelligence-re-
lated products in a subsequent unrelated task. Because writ-
ing with ones nondominant hand has been previously
shown to reduce participants self-view confidence (Brinol
and Petty 2003), these results provide initial support for our
THE SHAKEN SELF
conceptualization that momentary lapses in self-view con-
fidence will lead to a greater tendency to choose self-view-
bolstering products.
In addition, experiment 1 demonstrated the self-view re-
covery function of product choice. After making the self-
restoring choices, participants who suffered from a shaken
self (i.e., those who wrote with their nondominant hands)
were no more likely to choose a pen (vs. M&Ms) at the end
of the experiment than were participants who did not so
suffer. These results suggest that choosing self-view-bol-
stering products can serve as a means of restoring self-view
confidence.
EXPERIMENT 2
The purpose of experiment 2 was threefold. First, we
sought to explore whether an indirect self-bolstering strat-
egy, namely, affirming an important but unrelated self-value,
could be another means of coping with a shaken self-con-
cept, thereby attenuating the effects of lowered self-confi-
dence on product choice. According to self-affirmation the-
ory, individuals can cope with a self-threat through a fluid
compensation procedure (Steele 1988), such that a threat
in one self-domain can be dealt with through affirmation in
an unrelated domain. Consistent with this account, recent
research suggests that affirming an important self-value can
increase confidence (Brinol et al. 2007). Thus, we expected
that effects of shaken self-confidence on product choice
would be reduced if individuals affirmed an important but
unrelated self-value prior to the final choice.
Another important goal of experiment 2 was to provide
direct measures of self-view confidence after the handwrit-
ing manipulation. Although writing with the nondominant
hand has been documented to cause lower thought confi-
dence (Brinol and Petty 2003), it was not directly measured
in experiment 1. In the current experiment, we included self-
view confidence measures directly after the handwriting ma-
nipulation to provide support for the efficacy of our ma-
nipulation.
Finally, experiment 2 extended our examination to an-
other self-domainhealth consciousness. A pretest revealed
that participants held strong beliefs that they were health-
conscious individuals and were confident about these beliefs.
Participants and Procedure
One hundred thirty participants were assigned to the con-
ditions of a 2 (handedness: dominant vs. nondominant) #
2 (self-affirmation: yes vs. no) between-participants factorial
design. The manipulation was similar to that used in ex-
periment 1. Participants were first asked to write about their
health-conscious behaviors with their dominant or nondom-
inant hand. Directly following the handwriting task, partic-
ipants rated how confident they were in their written thoughts
(1 p not at all confident; 10 p extremely confident).
Next, manipulated orthogonally to the handwriting ma-
nipulation was self-affirmation, wherein half of the partic-
ipants wrote about the most important value in their lives
33
(Shrira and Martin 2005). Participants were given 5 minutes
to write (with their dominant hands) about the most im-
portant value in their life, explain why it was important to
them, and describe how they had acted consistently with it
in the past and planned to act consistently with it in the
future. (It is important to note that none of the participants
in the self-affirmation condition wrote about health con-
sciousness.) The other half of the participants spent an equiv-
alent amount of time on a filler task (also with their dominant
hands). All participants then completed a set of measures
such as gender, mood (PANAS; Watson et al. 1988), and
self-esteem (Robins et al. 2001), many of which served as
covariates in the various analyses. Last, all participants
chose between a healthy snack (apple) and an unhealthy
snack (M&Ms).
Results
Manipulation Check. We predicted that writing with
ones nondominant hand about ones self-view would de-
crease self-view confidence. Consistent with this prediction,
a one-way ANOVA showed that compared to participants
writing with their dominant hands (M p 8.48), those writing
with their nondominant hands were indeed less confident in
their written thoughts regarding their health consciousness
(M p 7.84; F(1, 124) p 3.95, p ! .05). This result suggests
that writing about health consciousness with the nondomi-
nant hand did shake participants confidence in their health
consciousness.
Choice Task. We expected participants writing with
their nondominant hands to be more likely to choose the
health-conscious option (apple) but only when they did not
have the opportunity to previously self-affirm. Four partic-
ipants did not take a snack either because of dietary restric-
tions or a food allergy, which left us with 126 valid data
points for analysis. In line with our prediction, a logistic
regression revealed a significant handedness # self-affir-
mation interaction (x 2 p 3.93 , p ! .05), in addition to a
significant main effect of the self-affirmation factor (x 2 p
7.19, p ! .01).
To provide further support for our conceptualization, we
conducted planned comparisons using a logistic regression.
Consistent with our conceptualization and as shown in figure
2, the choice of the apple (the healthy option) was higher
in the nondominant hand/no-affirmation condition (66%)
than in the other three conditions (the average choice share
was 41%; b p 1.11, p p .01). Participants likelihood of
choosing the apple in the other three conditions (nondom-
inant hand/self-affirmation, dominant hand/self-affirmation,
dominant hand/no affirmation) did not differ ( ps 1 .40).
Thus, writing with the nondominant hand led to a higher
likelihood of choosing self-view-bolstering products only
when participants did not previously have an opportunity to
write about an important but unrelated self-value. Once par-
ticipants in the nondominant hand conditions had the op-
portunity to affirm their most important self-value, they were
no more likely to choose the healthy gift than were those
34
FIGURE 2
CHOICE OF THE HEALTHY OPTION (APPLE): EXPERIMENT 2
in the dominant hand conditions. The results suggest that
an indirect self-view-bolstering strategy, namely, affirming
an important but unrelated self-value, could be another
means of coping with a shaken self-concept, thereby atten-
uating the effect of lowered self-confidence on product
choice.
Mediation Analysis. To provide further support for a
trait-specific shaken-self account, we conducted a moderated
mediation analysis. Based on a recent work by Preacher,
Rucker, and Hayes (2007, model 3), a moderated mediation
hypothesis is supported if the path from the independent
variable to the mediator is significant, and the effect of the
mediator on the outcome variable depends on the level of
a moderator variable. Hence, we expected a significant effect
of the handedness manipulation on thought confidence and
a thought confidence # self-affirmation interaction on choice.
However, the moderated mediation analysis did not succeed.
Although the confidence manipulation significantly predicted
participants thought confidence (b p .646, p ! .05), the
interaction term was not significant (b p 1.40, p ! .2). We
elaborate on this result in the discussion of this experiment.
Alternative Accounts Related to Mood and Self-Es-
teem. As in experiment 1, neither the mood nor the self-
esteem account seems to be a viable alternative account to
our findings. First, only a marginally significant effect of
the affirmation factor on positive affect was observed
(F(1, 120) p 3.84, p ! .06). Second, the handedness # self-
affirmation interactions on both positive and negative affect
were nonsignificant ( ps 1 .65). Additionally, neither posi-
tive nor negative affect were correlated with choice ( ps 1
.35). Similarly, the independent variables had no significant
effects on self-esteem ( ps 1 .65).
Discussion
Experiment 2 provides further support that subtle situa-
tional factors such as writing with the nondominant hand
can shake self-confidence and lead to self-view-bolstering
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
product choices. It also suggests that a direct-bolstering strat-
egy as in experiment 1 need not be the only way individuals
cope with a shaken self-view; individuals can also recover
from a shaken self-view through an indirect-bolstering strat-
egy by affirming another important value related to the self.
One notable finding in experiment 2 was that the medi-
ation analysis conducted using participants thought confi-
dence (i.e., confidence toward their written thoughts) as the
mediator, although in the predicted pattern, was not signif-
icant. One possible reason for this is that, conceptually, con-
fidence in ones self-view, rather than confidence in ones
written thoughts, ought to be a stronger mediator and more
precise test of our hypotheses. Therefore, in the next exper-
iment, we measured both self-view confidence and thought
confidence and tested them separately as mediators.
EXPERIMENT 3
In experiment 3, we sought to replicate the previous find-
ings by using a manipulation of self-view confidence that
was different than those used in experiments 1 and 2. Spe-
cifically, we directly manipulated self-view confidence with
a priming task adapted from Petty, Brinol, and Tormala
(2002). Participants were instructed to write two essays. The
first essay was designed to engender confidence or doubt in
oneself, at a general level. In the second essay, participants
were asked to write about a particular self-view. Based on
prior findings (Petty et al. 2002), we expected that partici-
pants would attribute the general level of confidence or
doubt induced by the first essay to the confidence or doubt
in the specific self-view they wrote about in the subsequent
essay.
In our previous studies, participants were asked to choose
between products that were either relevant or irrelevant to
a previously written self-view. For example, participants in
experiment 1 chose between a pen and candy after writing
about their intelligence. Although our pretest showed that
a pen is more relevant than candy to intelligence, one could
argue that candy might have been seen as an intelligence-
related product because it contains glucose, which helps in
mental tasks. To rule out any such potential alternative ac-
counts, experiment 3 adopted a fully crossed design such
that participants first received a confidence manipulation in
one of two self-view domains and then chose between prod-
ucts relevant to one or the other self-view. Thus, a particular
product is self-view bolstering when it matches the doubted
self-view and is nonbolstering when it mismatches it.
Another important goal of the present study was to pro-
vide more direct evidence that choosing self-view-bolstering
products can help participants recover from a momentarily
shaken self-view. To this end, we explicitly measured par-
ticipants self-view confidence before and after the choice
task. We expected that a doubt prime would lead to a de-
crease in before-choice confidence, but it should not affect
participants after-choice confidence.
THE SHAKEN SELF
TABLE 1
CHOICE OF COMPETENT AND EXCITING OPTIONS: EXPERIMENT 3 (%)
Activated self-view Product category Confidence priming
Competence Magazine
Computer
Gift
Excitement Magazine
Computer
Gift
Participants and Procedure
One hundred twenty-three participants were randomly as-
signed to the conditions of a 2 (confidence prime: confidence
vs. doubt) # 2 (self-view activated: exciting vs. competent)
between-subjects design. Participants were told that they
were helping out with a research project on human expe-
riences. They were asked to write about their behaviors and
self-characteristics in two unrelated domains and answer
some questions afterward. The first essay was a confidence-
priming task designed to engender confidence or doubt at
a general level. Specifically, one group of participants was
asked to list two experiences in which they felt a great deal
of confidence or certainty; the other group was asked to list
two experiences in which they felt a great deal of doubt or
uncertainty. This procedure has been successfully used in
previous research to manipulate confidence (e.g., Petty et
al. 2002).
Next, manipulated orthogonally to the first essay, one of
two self-views was activated through a second writing task.
In particular, some participants were asked to list two ex-
periences in which they felt that they were an exciting per-
son; others were asked to list two experiences in which they
felt that they were a competent person. Directly following
the second essay, all participants rated how confident they
were that they were a(n) exciting/competent person (1 p
not at all confident; 7 p extremely confident). They also
rated how confident they were in their written thoughts con-
cerning excitement/competence (1 p not at all confident;
7 p extremely confident).
Following this procedure was a purportedly unrelated
choice task. Participants were told that they were helping a
group of researchers identify appropriate prize-drawing re-
wards for an upcoming large-scale experiment. Participants
were asked to indicate their decisions in five domains. A
pretest was conducted to identify products with either ex-
citement or competence as their primary brand personality
using Aakers (1997) 55-item Brand Personality Scale. Our
target questionschoice of magazines, computers, and
giftswere the first, third, and fifth questions, respectively.
Choices of computers included an exciting computer brand
(Apple) and a competent computer brand (IBM). The mag-
azine category included two exciting magazines (Rolling
Stone and Vanity Fair) and two competent magazines
(Newsweek and Time). Choice of gifts included three ex-
citing gift ideas (a skydiving tour, 1-day rental of a luxurious
35
Doubt priming Choice share change
58.6 73.1 14.5
41.4 61.5 20.1
58.6 76.9 18.3
38.9 56.3 17.4
44.4 56.3 11.9
38.9 43.8 4.9
car, shopping with a personal fashion stylist) and three com-
petent gift ideas (a palm pilot, a Seiko watch, and a Mont
Blanc fountain pen).
Finally, all participants completed a purportedly unrelated
self-assessment task in which they rated whether various
personality characteristics were self-descriptive (1 p very
uncharacteristic of me; 7 p very characteristic of me) and
how confident they were in these self-ratings (1 p not at
all confident; 7 p extremely confident). Embedded in these
characteristics were our target traits, namely, excitement and
competence.
Results
Manipulation Check. We expected that writing about
ones confident or doubtful life experiences would lead
one to feel confident or doubtful about a subsequently
written self-view. Consistent with this prediction, a one-
way ANOVA examining before-choice self-view confidence
showed that compared to participants writing about confi-
dent experiences, those writing about doubtful experiences
were less confident that they were a(n) exciting/competent
person (Mconf p 5.43; Mdoubt p 4.38; F(1, 121) p 11.60,
p ! .001). In line with this finding, a one-way ANOVA
showed that compared to participants writing about confi-
dent experiences, those writing about doubtful experiences
were also less confident in the exciting/competent examples
they wrote (Mconf p 5.63; Mdoubt p 5.11; F(1, 121) p 4.28,
p ! .05). Thus, the manipulation successfully decreased par-
ticipants confidence in their before-choice self-view and in
their self-related thoughts.
Product Choices. Our prediction was that participants
would be more likely to choose self-view-bolstering prod-
ucts after a doubt prime than after a confidence prime. Spe-
cifically, we predicted that a doubt prime would lead to more
exciting product choices and less competent product choices
when excitement was activated; however, we predicted it
would lead to more competent product choices and less
exciting product choices when competence was activated.
Consistent with our conceptualization and as shown in ta-
ble 1, a doubt prime increased the choice of competent
products by an average 17.6% when competence was ac-
tivated, whereas a doubt prime increased the choice of ex-
citing products by an average of 11.4% when excitement
was activated. Using an ANOVA to examine the number
36
of competent products that participants chose from the three
target choice sets (possible range p 03) revealed only a
significant interaction between confidence priming and acti-
vated self-view (F(1, 119) p 8.34, p ! .01). Planned com-
parisons showed that when competence was activated, par-
ticipants chose more competent products in the doubtful
condition (2.12) than in the confident condition (1.59;
F(1, 119) p 5.59, p p .02); when excitement was acti-
vated, participants chose fewer competent products (and,
hence, more exciting products) in the doubtful condition
(1.44) than in the confident condition (1.78; F(1, 119) p
2.85, p p .09).
Confidence Recovery. We predicted that choosing self-
view-bolstering products would boost participants self-view
confidence, especially for those in the doubt conditions. To
test this hypothesis, we conducted a repeated-measures
ANOVA comparing before-choice and after-choice self-
view confidence ratings within the excitement and compe-
tence conditions. The results indicated a significant main
effect of the time factor such that participants were more
confident about their written self-view after the choice task
(Fcomp (1, 53) p 8.06, p ! .01; Fexcite (1, 65) p 51.11, p !
.001). Moreover, we found a significant interaction between
time and confidence manipulation (Fcomp (1, 53) p 5.32, p !
.05; Fexcite (1, 65) p 4.63, p ! .05). Planned comparisons
showed that participants in the confidence and doubt condi-
tions differed significantly in their before-choice confidence
ratings (Fcomp (1, 53) p 7.16, p p .01; Fexcite (1, 65) p 7.65,
p ! .01). However, no such difference was found when ex-
amining after-choice confidence ratings (Fs ! 1). Partici-
pants in the confidence and doubt conditions were equally
confident about their target self-view after the choice task
(see table 2). These findings provide additional support for
the hypothesis that choosing self-view-bolstering products
can help participants recover from a shaken self-view.
Mediation Analysis. To provide further support for a
trait-specific shaken-self account and to understand why we
failed to find moderated mediation in experiment 2, we con-
ducted two separate mediation analyses, one using self-view
confidence and the other using thought confidence as me-
diators. The results show that moderated mediation succeeded
when self-view confidence served as the mediator. The con-
fidence manipulation significantly predicted participants self-
view confidence (b p 1.052, p ! .001), and the effect of self-
view confidence on choice of competent products depended
on the self-view being activated (b p .235 , p ! .05 ). These
results suggest that the indirect effect of the confidence ma-
nipulation on product choices through self-view confidence
varies as a function of the self-view being activated, thus
supporting a trait-specific shaken-self account.
When we used thought confidence as the mediator to
conduct mediation analysis, the effect of confidence manip-
ulation on thought confidence was still significant (b p
.528, p ! .05), but the conditional effect of thought confidence
on choice was only marginally significant (b p .241 , p !
.10). This accounts for why the moderated mediation was
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
TABLE 2
SELF-VIEW CONFIDENCE RATINGS IN EXPERIMENT 3
Self-view Condition Before choice After choice
Competence Doubt 5.38 6.16
Confident 6.14 6.22
Excitement Doubt 3.56 6.01
Confident 4.74 6.09
weak in experiment 2. It is also consistent with the idea that
self-view confidence is a more proximal mediator of these
particular effects than is thought confidence.
Discussion
The results of experiment 3, in which we used new op-
erationalizations of self-view confidence, were highly con-
sistent with the shaken-self account and the prior studies.
Compared to participants who were primed at a general level
with confidence, those primed with doubt chose more ex-
citing products when excitement was activated and chose
more competent products when competence was activated.
A moderated-mediation analysis further indicated that a mo-
mentary lack of confidence in one self-domain leads to
choosing products that are consistent with that specific self-
domain. Finally, a fully crossed design further ruled out the
alternative hypothesis that the effect might be due to certain
characteristics of the handwriting manipulation or other
qualities of the irrelevant products used in previous studies.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three studies showed that the confidence with which par-
ticipants hold their self-view can be momentarily shaken by
subtle manipulations, which in turn can lead them to choose
self-view-bolstering products. In our studies, participants
self-view confidence was subtly manipulated such that they
would misattribute the doubt originating from an irrelevant
source to the lack of confidence in a specific self-view. Our
results suggest that such subtle manipulations were enough
to shake participants self-view confidence and lead to self-
bolstering product choices in different self-view domains.
Further, we showed that the effects of these subtle confi-
dence-shaking actions on choice can be eliminated when
participants are first provided with the opportunity to bolster
their self-concept either directly (through choosing self-
view-bolstering products) or indirectly (through self-affir-
mation), suggesting a fluid and flexible system against
threats to ones self-views. These results highlight the im-
portance of self-view confidence for product choice and
illustrate the role of product choices in maintaining stable
self-views.
Prior research suggests that an individuals self-view con-
fidence is a relatively stable construct. This research shows
that it can be momentarily shaken by subtle manipulations.
In addition to more blatant threats to ones self-view (e.g.,
THE SHAKEN SELF
reflecting on ones past immoral deeds; Zhong and Liljen-
quist 2006), very subtle actions can affect ones self-view
confidence. This has important implications for understand-
ing consumers behavior. First, it substantially extends the
range of instigators of self-view-bolstering consumption to
include seemingly innocuous events that slip below the ra-
dar. Second, because these threats are so subtle, they are
more difficult to counteract. For example, one can minimize
the effects of blatant threats to ones self-views through
strategies such as rationalizing the event (e.g., maybe that
exam was nondiagnostic, so Im not so dumb after all),
minimizing the importance of the event (e.g., its only one
test, after all), and so forth. When self-concept threats lack
an overt cause, these strategies are unavailable. Furthermore,
because such threats can be implicitly induced, marketers
may be less likely to encounter resistance when employing
such strategies (e.g., Friestad and Wright 1994).
Third, our research also supports the counterintuitive as-
sertion that products symbolizing certain characteristics are
sometimes chosen most by those who doubt that they pos-
sess those characteristics. Although some previous research
has documented how self-doubt can influence information
processing and behavior (e.g., Brinol, DeMarree, and Petty,
forthcoming; Brinol, Petty, and Wheeler 2006), the present
research shows how self-doubt can not only lead to efforts
at greater self-certainty but also lead to greater consistency
between ones self-view and ones behavior.
We found the greatest levels of self-product congruence
among those with shaken self-views, but we are not sug-
gesting that lower self-view confidence will always be as-
sociated with larger self-product congruency effects. The
participants in our studies held confident self-views that
were temporarily cast in doubt. We suspect that those who
chronically lack confidence in their self-views may not bol-
ster these self-views through product choice. Research on
self-verification shows that people often prefer information
that confirms their self-views but only if they chronically
hold the self-views with confidence (Marecek and Mettee
1972; Swann and Pelham 2002).
Our findings provide several directions for future re-
search. For example, will the self-view-bolstering effects
that we document under short-term conditions persist over
longer time periods? When and how would individuals at-
tempt to restore self-view confidence? Note that our research
examined relatively low-involvement choices. Future re-
search could examine whether our findings extend to more
involving decision contexts. Also, note that in our research,
individuals were presented with opportunities to restore a
shaken self-view. Future research could examine when and
how individuals will actively seek opportunities to reduce
the self-threat.
Is the underlying process related to bolstering a shaken
self-view conscious or nonconscious? Note that although
our participants were aware of the confidence that they had
in a particular self-view, we do not know whether they were
aware that this confidence had been momentarily shaken by
our subtle manipulations. Either way, our funneled debrief-
37
ing procedures suggested that participants had no awareness
that the confidence manipulation tasks affected their subse-
quent choices, and so such choices did not appear to stem
from deliberate attempts at self-repair. Because the manipu-
lations in our experiments were rather subtle, it remains plau-
sible that people might consciously attempt to repair doubt
stemming from more blatant confidence-shaking events.
Finally, how certain can we be that our manipulations of
self-view confidence did not affect overall self-esteem, as
prior research might suggest (Brinol and Petty 2003)? Note
that we found no effects of the independent variables on the
measure of overall self-esteem. A possible reason for the
discrepancy between our findings and those reported in prior
research lies in the number of traits that were written about
in the manipulation (three traits in Brinol and Pettys study
vs. one trait in our studies). Alternatively, the discrepancy
could be due to the different framing of the task. Because
the phenomenon is metacognitively driven, the experienced
doubt should be directed at the subjective content of the
thought. Brinol and Pettys participants were asked to write
with their nondominant hands about several general positive
or negative qualities and, hence, should doubt that they have
such qualities, thereby affecting overall self-esteem. Our
participants, however, were asked to write about a single
specific trait, which should (and did) lead to doubt only that
they possessed that specific trait. Future research could fur-
ther examine when more localized versus more general ef-
fects of self-view confidence arise.
CONCLUSION
The John Dewey quote at the beginning of this article
suggests that the self is in continuous formation through
choice of action. The present studies highlight the validity
of this view. Seemingly inconsequential actions can shake
ones self-confidence, leading one to choose products that
bolster this shaken self-view. By the same token, other seem-
ingly inconsequential actions, such as reflecting briefly on
an important value, can restore the self-view and eliminate
the effects on choice and consumption. Thus, ones self-
views are highly susceptible not only to lifes more perni-
cious slings and arrows but also to more pervasive and subtle
threats, thereby, making continuous the formation and re-
formation of the self.
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