Criminal Law; Special Penal Laws; Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg.

22), plus
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 Re: Penalty for Violation of B.P. 22 and
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 Re: Clarification of Admin. Circular No. 12-2000;
and Increasing th

Punishable Acts

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act. [Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22)

Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment
in full by the drawee of such check within (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee. [Section 2, B.P. Blg. 22]

Preference of Imposition of Fine

It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion
allowed by Section 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this

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case, we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an
appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G. R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000), the
Supreme Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the
drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and
concluded that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice. [Administrative Circular No.
12-2000]

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in
B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that:

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations
of B.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve
the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness
of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. [Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001]

Anent the petitioners contention that novation had extinguished his criminal liability for violation of B.P.
22, we likewise find the same utterly specious. The petitioner ought to be reminded that novation is not a
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mode of extinguishing criminal liability. As astutely opined by the CA, novation may only prevent the rise
of criminal liability if it occurs prior to the filing of the Information in court. In other words, novation does
not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.

The fact the petitioner had already made substantial payments to the respondent and that only
P25,000.00 out of his total obligation in favor of the respondent remains unpaid is immaterial to the
extinguishment of the petitioners criminal liability.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
[Edgardo Medalla v. People, G.R. No. 193362, January 18, 2012]

The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of
a check should be written. If the service of the written notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer
of the dishonored check is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as
evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together with the authenticating
affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of
giving the notice of dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending
by registered mail. [Amada Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012]

[I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is
also incumbent upon the prosecution to show "that the drawer of the check received the said notice
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by
the drawee of the check. [Jaime Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011]

The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of
a check should be written. If the service of the written notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer
of the dishonored check is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as
evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together with the authenticating
affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of
giving the notice of dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending
by registered mail. [Amada Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012]

There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank dishonored the checks because the
account had been closed. Notice of dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or
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make arrangements for their payment within five days from notice. With all the above elements duly
proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach. [People v.
Eumelia Mitra, G.R. NO. 191404, July 5, 2010]

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with prision

correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties;
that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine
and imprisonment.

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for
alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted the prison
sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the
amount of the check. We held:

Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the
national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly,
that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the
judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. It would best serve the ends of
criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness
with due regard to the protection of the social order.

In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment and
merely imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of criminal
justice.

Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued
Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that the
clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of
imprisonment applicable to petitioners case of libel. We note that this is petitioners first offense of this
nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then
sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he
was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner
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could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not
commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the
imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six
thousand pesos.

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the
crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of
imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the
penalty imposed to a mere fine. [Jose Buatis v. People, G.R. NO. 142509, March 24, 2006]

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial
courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of
each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not
confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment. [Susan Go
and People v. Fernando Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005]

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