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REDUCTION VERSUS
ELIMINATION OF THEORIES
between T1 and T2 is satisfied, one may say that 7"1 is eliminable (at least
in principle, if not in the actual practice of research), as soon as T2 is
available.
The interest in a unitary science as well as the formal simplicity of the
methodological scheme associated with it seems to have led to the
attempt to treat all relations between theories (inter-theoretic relations,
or: ITRs for short) under the heading of 'reduction'. It would, of course,
be futile to ct~!ibble about words, but it should be noted that there are
quite different kinds of ITRs. For the purposes of this paper I shall reserve
the term 'reduction' for a particular one among them: the relations
between a theory (often called 'phenomenological') of complex objects
and a theory of the behaviour of small parts of these objects. Examples
may be suggested by the following pairs of theories: physiology/physics-
plus-chemistry, chemistry/quantum theory. Obviously this type of ITR is
of particular importance for the attempt at a unitary science or a unitary
world picture.
A case of the reduction relation in this restricted sense' that has been
studied especially carefully by scientists as well as philosophers of science
is the reduction of classical thermodynamics to classical particle
mechanics. It may, therefore, be 'considered as a paradigm case of
reduction- at least in the following sense: If in this case one would have to
qualify or restrict the simple logical scheme given above, if especially the
reduction of T1 to 7"2 in this case should not be connected with an
elimination of T1 with respect to Tz, one would - so to speak: a f o r t i o r i -
have to be prepared for similar or even stronger restrictions and correc-
tions of the traditional scheme in other more complex cases.
Moreover, since the example of thermodynamics and mechanics has
been worked out more carefully than others, one may hope to obtain
some insight into the dependence of the actual development of research
upon the systematic dependence of theories as articulated in the ITRs.
The interest here is to correlate the history of a theoretically well
developed discipline (at least its gross structure) with the systematic net of
ITRs, in the hope to contribute thereby to a historically realistic 'rational
reconstruction' of scientific development, which includes or bridges also
the discontinuities called 'scientific revolutions' by Thomas Kuhn (1962).
Thus, the systematic analysis of the process of scientific research as well
as of its results motivate equally to select the so-called reduction of
REDUCTION VS ELIMINATION OF THEORIES 297
II
(fl) The theory deals only with the stationary case of equilibrium,
hence will provide only a partial reduction of thermodynamics.
(b2) No proof has been given for the uniqueness of the stationary
state, hence the Maxwell distribution is not shown to be
universal.
The objections (a) and (fl) are pragmatical; they restrict the range of
the reduction that may be effected, whereas (aa), (a2), (b0 and (b2) are
genuine theoretical objections which have to be removed in the further
development of the theory independently of its POssible use (e.g. for
reduction).
Boltzmann directed his efforts mainly toward the removal of (fl), (bl)
and (b2); he tried to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium state by
developing a mechanical theory of the process leading to it, i.e. a
mechanical explanation of the second law of thermodynamics. Maxwell
on the other hand was primarily concerned with removing the restrictions
of the mechanical theory of the equilibrium and rendering it as general as
possible; he therefore attempted to get rid of the complications of
collision theory, i.e. to avoid objection (a), (a 1) and (az) by circumvent-
ing (A).
This assumption was replaced (in Maxwell, 1878) by more general
ones, which had already been used, though not finally adopted, by
Boltzmann (1868, parts II, III; 1871b):
(C) The Ergodic hypothesis: "The system, if left to itself in its actual
state of motion, will, sooner or later, pass through every phase which
is consistent with the equation of energy. ''3
300 L O R E N Z KRUGER
instead of the microcanonical, which was so far the only one that had been
used and believed to be understood. The new form of (D) was at first
viewed by most physicists as being entirely unwarranted and physically
unjustifiable, the more so as Gibbs' introductory comments mentioned
only reasons of simplicity or convenience 1~ and Einstein stated simply
that the distribution is a permitted one.11 What those opposing physicists
(among them Planck, 1904, and Zermelo, 1906) did not see was that a
physical justification of the microcanonical ensemble had not been given
either. Now, the required justification turned out to be more naturally
suggested by the canonical than by the microcanonical ensemble: Gibbs
and Einstein proposed to consider a system with a well-defined tempera-
ture as being immersed in a heat bath. But under this condition - as had
long ago been shown by Maxwell and Boltzmann - the system had to
display a distribution in energy corresponding to the canonical ensemble.
Thus, if temperature (as Gibbs, 1902, p. 179/180, put it) is taken to be an
'independent variable', a realistic interpretation of the canonical ensem-
ble can be given. ~z Einstein has in addition connected this interpretation
with the definition of the thermometer and, moreover, shown the
ingenuity to detect those phenomena for which the usually unobservable
fluctuations predicted by the theory could actually be seen (Einstein,
1904, 1905).
This historical case study - given here only in roughest outline - was
meant to show that, at least for the period covered, it would be inade-
quate to describe the attempted reduction of a macrotheory to a mic-
rotheory as a derivation of the former from the latter. The reduction, if
achieved at all, consists rather in the development of a third theory T3,
which marks - metaphorically speaking - the corner of a triangle erected
over a basis whose corners are marked by T1 and T 2. In our example T 2 is
earliest, T1 is second in time. T3 is latest; it depends on both, 7"1 and T2,
not only for its empirical justification, but also in its conceptual structure
which had to be framed under theoretical boundary conditions, as I would
like to call them, furnished by 7"1 and Tz.
III
What lesson can be drawn from Section II with respect to the questions
raised at the end of Section I?
304 LORENZ KRUGER
for us remains important. Niels Bohr has occasionally remarked that the
thermodynamical consideration of a physical system is complementary to
the mechanical consideration of the same system (Bohr, 1930, 1957).
Neglecting the depths of Bohr's concept of complementarity one may
perhaps say that the alternative to complementarity of thermodynamical
and mechanical descriptions would consist in embedding the former in
the latter. Yet, this embedding seems to be impossible, if one cannot
simply transgress the order of things for us, as it has developed in
accordance with our abilities and interests in actual history.
In this sense thermodynamics has also been viewed by Einstein: not as
epitheorem of mechanics, but rather as its touchstone, after he had
recognized the insufficiency of classical mechanics in ca. 1900.15 Of
course, he was also ready to correct or limit classical thermodynamics in
the light of statistical mechanics, e.g. in the domain of fluctuation
phenomena. What, according to this view of the matter, actually happens
in the development of a theoretical science is not so much the construc-
tion of a (e.g. mechanical) world-picture, but rather of a net of interre-
lated theories which takes into account the systematic connections of
things as well as the conditions of investigating them.
By this remark I have come to question (3): It should have become
dear to what extent a problem of reduction can influence the develop-
ment of research. Indeed, everything said in section II contributes to a
positive answer to question (3); and the general remarks at the end of
section II give a rough outline of how this result may be accounted for.
Further analysis will, of course, be needed, more cases will have to be
studied, before a more rigorous conceptual formulation can be found or
can be examined as to its realistic character with respect to the object,
which is actual scientific practice. It may nevertheless be noted already
now that our example shows in which way even revolutionary changes in
scientific development, e.g. the step from a deterministic to a statistical
theory, can be integrated into a continuous chain of scientific argument.
IV
For some types of interaction (pair potentials with a hard core) the
ergodic hypothesis is reported to have been proved (of course not in
Maxwell's original version) by Sinai. 16 As far as this proof goes and is
correct, a justification of probability measures in phase space, hence of
statistical ensembles corresponding to them, has been given in a way that
is no longer exposed to objection (d2), provided the debatable assumption
is granted that our measurements furnish only the value of the mag-
nitudes averaged over long intervals of time.
Moreover, by a suitable type of forming mathematical limits the
existence of systems in thermal equilibrium has been shown on a purely
mechanical basis. Yet, exact results for irreversible processes are still
missing, and in this sense "our understanding is quite insufficient for
providing a solid foundation of the concept of equilibrium" (Ruelle,
1969, p. 2).
It seems fair to summarize this situation by saying that the foundations
for the claim of the mutual compatibility of thermodynamics and
mechanics have been reinforced rather than a derivation of the former
from the latter has been achieved. 17 Besides the quite general argument
that we shall always need thermodynamics as evidence for the claim of the
empirical adequacy of statistical mechanics, one has to admit that the
special conceptual structure of this theory (e.g. the choice of the kinds of
mathematical limits to be taken) continues to be determined by the basis
of the theory-triangle, i.e. mechanics on the one hand and ther-
modynamics on the other. Whether this stage of research will ever be
overcome, this question one may rather leave open. The aim of this paper
was only to show that the non-linear structure of the net of theories is a
real feature of some phases of scientific development.
NOTES
of this motion, and had even employed the same in several investigations and calculations.
In my former memoirs I intentionally avoided mentioning this conception, because I wished
to separate the conclusions which are deducible from certain general principles from those
which presuppose a particular kind of m o t i o n . . . " (Clausius, 1857, translation from Brush,
1965, p. 112; cp. also Daub, 1967, p. 294).
3 This is a verbal quotation from Maxwell, 1878, p. 714.
4 Maxwell, 1878, p. 715.
5 Boltzmann, 1871a, p. 255; Boltzmann, 1872, p. 345.
6 The restriction to gases did not bother him much, since he was primarily interested in
proving atomism and was justified to choose the case which was certainly most suitable for
this purpose.
7 Boltzmann, 1877, p. 165.
8 Jeans, 1904, w58.
9 Gibbs, 1902, p. 151.
lo Gibbs, 1902, p. 33.
11 Einstein, 1902, p. 421; 1903, p. 175.
12 It is then only a second step to prove that, for sufficiently large systems, other types of
ensembles including the microcanonical give the same results.
13 In principle an epistemological elimination would seem to be possible: there might be a
way of justifying 7"2 and 7"3 independently of T1 by relating them directly or via theories
other than 7"1 to experience.
14 What I have in mind here is roughly this: There might be a set of principles of 7"2 and 7"3
sufficient to derive (at least approximately) 7"1, b u t - i n contradistinction to principles
involving notions like 'equilibrium' or 'temperature'-conceptually independent of 7'1.
Ontological eliminability conceived in this or a similar fashion would be something less than
epistemological eliminability but implied by it. Conversely, epistemological elimination
would then presuppose ontological eliminability.
15 Cf. Einstein's autobiography in which he winds up a critique of classical mechanics by a
praise of thermodynamics (P. Schilpp: Einstein, Philosopher - Scientist, New York, 1949,
pp. 24-33).
16 Cf. the report given by Arnold/Avez, 1967.
17 For a detailed evaluation of recent results in statistical thermodynamics compare also
Grad 1967. His basic idea of interrelating different "levels of description" which are chosen
according to the problem at hand including the relevant conditions of observation (e.g. pp.
65, 66) seems to come close to the point of view suggested in this paper, though a number of
problems and disagreements- concerning physical theory as well as its philosophical
evaluation - are left for further study.
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REDUCTION VS E L I M I N A T I O N OF THEORIES 309