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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics:
thelogicof two-levelgames
RobertD. Putnam
of domesticand
Introduction:the entanglements
internationalpolitics
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428 International
Organization
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 429
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430 International
Organization
Domestic-international
entanglements:
thestateoftheart
Muchof theexistingliterature on relationsbetweendomesticand interna-
tionalaffairsconsistseitherofad hoclistsofcountless"domesticinfluences"
on foreign policyor ofgenericobservations thatnationaland international
affairsare somehow"linked.'8 JamesRosenauwas one ofthefirst scholars
tocallattentiontothisarea,buthiselaboratetaxonomy of"linkagepolitics"
generatedlittlecumulative research,exceptfora flurry ofworkcorrelating
domesticand international "conflictbehavior."9
A second streamof relevanttheorizing began withthe workby Karl
5. It is notclearwhetherJimmyCarterfullyunderstood
thedomesticimplications
of his
Bonn pledgeat the time.See Putnamand Henning,"The Bonn Summit,"and Ikenberry,
"MarketSolutionsforStateProblems."
6. KennethN. Waltz, Man, theState, and War:A TheoreticalAnalysis(New York: Columbia
University Press,1959).
7. PeterGourevitch, "The SecondImageReversed:The International
SourcesofDomestic
Politics,"International 32 (Autumn1978),pp. 881-911.
Organization
8. I am indebtedto StephanHaggardforenlightening
discussionsaboutdomesticinfluences
on international
relations.
9. JamesRosenau,"TowardtheStudyofNational-International Linkages,"in his-
Linkage
Politics: Essays on the Convergenceof National and InternationalSystems(New York: Free
Press,1969),as wellas his "Theorizing
AcrossSystems:LinkagePoliticsRevisited,"inJon-
athanWilkenfeld,ed., ConflictBehavior and Linkage Politics (New York: David McKay, 1973),
especiallyp. 49.
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 431
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432 International
Organization
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 433
Two-levelgames: a metaphor
fordomestic-international
interactions
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Organization
434 International
22. DanielDruckman,
"BoundaryRole Conflict:
Negotiation
as Dual Responsiveness,"
in
I. WilliamZartman,ed., The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications(Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1978),pp. 100-101,109.Fora reviewofthesocial-psychological
literature
on bargainers
as representatives,
see Dean G. Pruitt,Negotiation
Behavior(New York:AcademicPress,
1981),pp. 41-43.
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 435
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436 International
Organization
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 437
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438 International
Organization
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 439
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440 International
Organization
is thattherelativesize
The secondreasonwhywin-setsize is important
of thejoint gains
of therespectiveLevel II win-setswillaffectthedistribution
fromthe internationalbargain. The largerthe perceived win-setof a nego-
themorehe canbe "pushedaround"bytheotherLevel I negotiators.
tiator,
Conversely, a smalldomesticwin-setcan be a bargaining advantage:"I'd
liketo acceptyourproposal,but I could nevergetit acceptedat home."
Lamenting thedomesticconstraintsunderwhichone mustoperateis (inthe
wordsofone experienced Britishdiplomat)"the naturalthingto say at the
beginning ofa toughnegotiation."
39
This generalprinciplewas, of course,firstnotedby ThomasSchelling
nearlythirtyyearsago:
The powerofa negotiator oftenrestson a manifestinabilityto make
concessions and meet demands.... When the United States Govern-
mentnegotiateswithothergoverments. . . if the executive branchne-
gotiatesunderlegislativeauthority,withitspositionconstrainedby
law, . . . thentheexecutivebranchhas a firmpositionthatis visibleto
itsnegotiating suchas this]runthe
partners.... [Ofcourse,strategies
riskofestablishing an immovablepositionthatgoes beyondtheability
oftheotherto concede,and thereby provokethelikelihoodof stale-
mateor breakdown.40
Writing pointofview,Schellingstressedwaysinwhich
froma strategist's
win-setsmaybe manipulated, but even whenthewin-setitselfis beyond
thenegotiator's control,he mayexploititsleverage.A ThirdWorldleader
whosedomesticpositionis relatively weak (Argentina'sAlfonsin?)should
be able to drivea betterbargainwithhisinternationalcreditors,otherthings
beingequal, thanone whosedomesticstanding is moresolid(Mexico's de
ofwinning
la Madrid?).41The difficulties congressionalratification
are often
exploitedby Americannegotiators. Duringthenegotiation of thePanama
CanalTreaty,forexample,"theSecretary ofStatewarnedthePanamanians
severaltimes.. . thatthenewtreatywouldhavetobe acceptabletoat least
sixty-seven senators,"and "Carter,ina personalletterto Torrijos,warned
thatfurther concessionsbytheUnitedStateswouldseriously threaten
chances
forSenateratification.'"42Preciselyto forestall
suchtactics,opponentsmay
demandthata negotiator ensurehimself"negotiating room" at Level II
beforeopeningtheLevel I negotiations.
The "sweet-and-sour"implications of win-setsize are summarized in
Figure1, representing a simplezero-sumgamebetweenX and Y. XMand
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 441
xm r r 'I r IY
YX Y2 XI Y3
to understand
It is important affectwin-setsize. Three
whatcircumstances
setsoffactorsare especiallyimportant:
proposedmodelsoflinkedgamesakin
in otherfieldshaverecently
43. Severalinvestigators
to this"two-level"game. KennethA. Shepsleand his colleagueshave used the notionof
"interconnectedgames" to analyze,forexample,thestrategy simultaneously
of a legislator
embeddedin twogames,one in thelegislative arenaand theotherin theelectoralarena.In
thismodel,a givenactionis simultaneously a movein twodifferent games,and one player
maximizes thesumofhispayoffs fromthetwogames.See Arthur Denzau,WilliamRiker,and
KennethShepsle,"Farquharson andFenno:SophisticatedVotingandHomeStyle,"American
Political Science Review 79 (December 1985),pp. 1117-34; and KennethShepsle, "Cooperation
Arrangements,"
and Institutional unpublished manuscript, February1986.This approachis
similarto modelsrecentlydevelopedby economists working in the "rationalexpectations"
genre.In thesemodels,a government contendssimultaneously againstothergovernmentsand
againstdomestictradeunionsovermonetary policy.See, forexample,KennethRogoff, "Can
Monetary
International PolicyCooperation be Counterproductive," JournalofInternational
Economics18 (May 1985),pp. 199-217,and RolandVaubel,"A PublicChoiceApproachto
Organization,"
International Public Choice51 (1986),pp. 39-57. GeorgeTsebelis("Nested
Games: The Cohesion of French Coalitions," BritishJournal of Political Science 18 [April
1988],pp. 145-70)has developeda theoryof "nestedgames,"in whichtwoalliancesplaya
competitivegameto determine whiletheindividual
totalpayoffs, playerswithineach alliance
contendovertheirshares.FritzSharpf("A Game-Theoretical InterpretationofInflationand
Unemployment inWestern Europe,"Journal ofPublicPolicy7 [19881, pp. 227-257)interprets
macroeconomic policyas thejointoutcomeoftwosimultaneous games;inone,thegovernment
playsagainsttheunions,whilein theother,it respondsto theanticipated reactionsof the
electorate.JamesE. Altand BarryEichengreen ("Paralleland Overlapping Games:Theory
and an Application to theEuropeanGas Trade," unpublished manuscript, November1987)
offera broadertypology oflinkedgames,distinguishingbetween"parallel"games,in which
"thesameopponents playagainstone anotherat thesametimein morethanone arena,"and
"overlapping"games,whicharise"whena particular playeris engagedat thesametimein
gamesagainstdistinct opponents, and whenthestrategy pursuedin one gamelimitsthestrat-
egiesavailablein theother."Detailedcomparison of thesevariouslinked-game modelsis a
taskforthefuture.
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Organization
442 International
* Level II preferences
and coalitions
* Level IL institutions
* Level I negotiators'
strategies
Let us considereach in turn.
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 443
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444 International
Organization
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 445
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446 International
Organization
53. I am grateful
to ErnstB. Haas and Robert0. Keohaneforhelpful
adviceon thispoint.
54. Ann L. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea (Princeton: Princeton
University
Press,1981),especiallypp. 208-37,andJamesK. Sebenius,Negotiating theLaw
oftheSea (Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press,1984),especiallypp. 74-78.
55. Raiffa,Art and Science of Negotiation, p. 175.
56. I amindebtedto Lisa MartinandKennethShepsleforsuggestingthisapproach,although
theyarenotresponsible formyapplication ofit.Notethatthisconstruction
assumesthateach
issue,takenindividually,
is a "homogeneous" type,nota "heterogeneous"type.Constructing
iso-votecurvesforheterogeneous-type issuesis morecomplicated.
57. I am grateful
to HenryBradyforclarifying thispointforme.
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 447
A1 Am
B1
A2
BM B2
curvesfor two-issuenegotiation
FIGURE 2. Political indifference
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448 International
Organization
benefits)
(and tradeoff thatan externalpartner 58 Economic
couldprovide.'"
interdependencemultipliestheopportunities domesticcoalitions
foraltering
(and thuspolicyoutcomes)by expandingtheset offeasiblealternatives in
thisway-in effect, politicalentanglements
creating acrossnationalbound-
aries. Thus,we shouldexpectsynergistic linkage(whichis, by definition,
explicableonlyin termsoftwo-levelanalysis)to becomemorefrequent as
interdependencegrows.
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 449
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450 International
Organization
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 451
significance
66. The strategic oftargeting inJohnConybeare,
at LevelII is illustrated "Trade
Wars:A Comparative StudyofAnglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts,"
WorldPolitics38 (October1985),p. 157:Retaliation in theAnglo-Hanse tradewarsdid not
havetheintended deterrent becauseitwasnot(andperhapscouldnothavebeen)targeted
effect,
atthecrucialmembers oftheopposingLevelII coalition.CompareSnyderandDiesing,Conflict
AmongNations,p. 552:"Ifonefacesa coerciveopponent, buttheopponent'smajority coalition
includesa fewwavering members inclinedto compromise, a compromise proposalthatsuits
theirviewsmaycause theirdefection andtheformation ofa differentmajoritycoalition.Or if
theopponent'sstrategy is accommodative, basedon a tenuoussoft-line coalition,one knows
thatcare is requiredin implementing one's owncoercivestretegy to avoidtheoppositekind
ofshiftin theotherstate."
67. Walton and McKersie, Behavioral Theoryof Labor Negotiations, p. 319.
68. VladimirVelebit,in Campbell,Trieste1954,p. 97. As notedearlier,ourdiscussionhere
agreement;
wishesto reacha ratifiable
assumesthattheLevel I negotiator in cases (alluded
ownpreferences
to later)whenthenegotiator's are morehard-linethanhis constituents,his
mightallowhimto resistLevel I agreements.
domesticpopularity
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Organization
452 International
Partlyforthisreasonandpartlybecauseofmediaattention, participation
on theworldstagenormally givesa headofgovernment a specialadvantage
vis-a-vishisor herdomesticopposition.Thus,although internationalpolicy
coordination is hamperedby hightransaction costs,heads of government
mayalso reapwhatwe might term"transaction benefits."Indeed,therecent
evolutionofWesternsummitry, whichhas placedgreateremphasison pub-
licitythanon substance,seemsdesignedto appropriate these"transaction
benefits"withoutactuallyseekingthesortof agreements thatmightentail
transactioncosts.69
are likelyto disposeofmoreside-payments
Higherstatusnegotiators and
more"good will" at home,and henceforeigners preferto negotiatewitha
head ofgovernment thanwitha lowerofficial. In purelydistributive
terms,
a nationmighthave a bargaining advantageif its chiefnegotiator were a
mereclerk.Diplomatsare actingrationally, notmerelysymbolically, when
theyrefuseto negotiatewitha counterpart rank.America'sne-
of inferior
gotiatingpartnershavereasonforconcernwhenever theAmerican president
is domesticallyweakened.
tactics
and bargaining
Uncertainty
Level I negotiatorsare oftenbadlymisinformed about Level II politics,
on theopposing
particularly side. In 1978,the Bonn negotiatorswereusually
wrongin theirassessmentsof domesticpoliticsabroad; example,most
for
AmericanofficialsdidnotappreciatethecomplexdomesticgamethatChan-
cellorSchmidtwas playingover theissue of Germanreflation. Similarly,
Snyderand Diesingreportthat"decisionmakersin our cases onlyocca-
sionallyattempted such assessments,and whentheytriedtheydid pretty
miserably.... Governments generallydo not do well in analyzingeach
other'sinternalpoliticsin crises[and,I wouldadd, in normaltimes],and
indeeditis inherentlydifficult.
"70 Relaxing theassumption ofperfect infor-
mationto allowforuncertainty has manyimplications forourunderstanding
oftwo-levelgames.Let me illustrate a fewoftheseimplications.
Uncertaintyaboutthesize of a win-setcan be botha bargaining device
and a stumblingblockin two-level negotiation. In purelydistributive Level
I bargaining,
negotiatorshavean incentive to understatetheirownwin-sets.
Since each negotiatoris likelyto knowmoreabouthis own Level II than
his opponentdoes, theclaimhas someplausibility. This is akinto a tactic
69. Transaction
benefitsmaybe enhancedifa substantiveagreement is reached,although
sometimes leaderscan benefit
domestically
byloudlyrejecting
a profferedinternational
deal.
70. SnyderandDiesing,Conflict
AmongNations,pp. 516,522-23.Analogousmi*perceptions
in Anglo-American diplomacyare thefocusof RichardE. Neustadt,AlliancePolitics(New
York:ColumbiaUniversity Press,1970).
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 453
thatSnyderandDiesingdescribe,whennegotiators seektoexploitdivisions
withintheirown government by saying,in effect,"You'd bettermakea
deal withme,because thealternative to me is evenworse.""71
On the otherhand,uncertainty aboutthe opponent'swin-setincreases
one's concernabout the riskof involuntary defection.Deals can onlybe
struckifeach negotiator is convincedthattheproposeddeal lies withinhis
oppositenumber'swin-setandthuswillbe ratified. Uncertainty aboutparty
A's ratification lowerstheexpectedvalueoftheagreement to partyB, and
thuspartyB willdemandmoregenerousside-payments frompartyA than
would be needed underconditionsof certainty. In fact,partyB has an
incentive to feigndoubtaboutpartyA's abilityto deliver,preciselyinorder
to extracta moregenerousoffer.72
Thus,a utility-maximizing negotiator mustseek to convincehis opposite
numberthathis own win-setis "kinky,"thatis, thattheproposeddeal is
certainto be ratified, butthata deal slightlymorefavorableto theopponent
is unlikelytobe ratified. Forexample,ontheenergy issuein 1978,bysending
SenatorByrdon a personalmissionto Bonnbeforethesummit andthenby
in
discussinghispoliticalproblems length a with
tete-'a-tete the chancellor,
Cartersoughtsuccessfully to convince Schmidt that immediate decontrol
was politicallyimpossible,but thatdecontrolby 1981 was politicallydo-
if
able. Kinkywin-setsmaybe morecredible theypivot on what Schelling
calls a "prominent"solution,suchas a 50-50 split,forsuchoutcomesmay
be distinctly more"saleable" at home.Anotherrelevanttacticis forthe
negotiator actuallyto submita trialagreement forratification, in orderto
demonstrate that it is notin his win-set.
Uncertainty aboutthe contoursof therespective"politicalindifference
curves" thushas strategic uses. On theotherhand,whenthenegotiators
are seekingnovelpackagesthatmightimprovebothsides' positions,mis-
representation ofone's win-setcanbe counterproductive. Creativesolutions
thatexpandthescopeforjointgainandimprovetheodds ofratification are
likelyto requirefairlyaccurateinformation aboutconstituents' preferences
andpointsofspecialneuralgia.The analysisoftwo-level gamesoffers many
illustrations
ofZartman'sobservation thatall negotiationinvolves"thecon-
trolledexchangeofpartialinformation. 73
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Organization
454 International
and reverberation
Restructuring
Formallyspeaking,game-theoretic analysisrequiresthatthe structure of
issues and payoffsbe specifiedin advance.In reality,however,muchof
whathappensin anybargaining situationinvolvesattempts by theplayers
to restructure thegameand to alterone another'sperceptions ofthecosts
ofno-agreement and thebenefits ofproposedagreements. Such tacticsare
moredifficult intwo-levelgamesthaninconventional negotiations,because
itis harderto reachconstituentson theothersidewithpersuasivemessages.
Nevertheless, governments do seektoexpandoneanother'swin-sets.Much
ambassadorialactivity-wooingopinionleaders,establishing contactwith
oppositionparties,offering foreignaid to a friendly,butunstablegovern-
ment,and so on-has preciselythisfunction. WhenJapaneseofficials visit
CapitolHill, or BritishdiplomatslobbyIrish-American leaders,theyare
seekingtorelaxdomesticconstraints thatmight otherwise prevent theadmin-
istrationfromcooperating withtheirgovernments.
Anotherilluminating exampleof actionsby a negotiator at theopposing
Level II to improvethe odds of ratification occurredduringthe 1977ne-
gotiationsbetweentheInternational Monetary FundandtheItaliangovern-
ment.InitialIMF demandsforausterity triggered strongoppositionfrom
theunionsand left-wing parties.Although theIMF's bargaining positionat
Level I appearedstrong, theFund's negotiator soughtto achievea broader
consensuswithinItalyin supportof an agreement, in orderto forestall
involuntary defection.Accordingly, afterdirectconsultations withtheunions
leaders,theIMF restructured
and leftist itsproposalto focuson long-term
investment and economicrecovery(incidentally, an interestingexampleof
without
targeting), backingofffromits short-term demands.Ironically, the
initialCommunist supportforthisrevisedagreement subsequently collapsed
because of conflictsbetweenmoderateand doctrinaire factionswithinthe
party,illustratingtheimportance ofmultilevel analysis.74
In someinstances,perhapseven unintentionally, internationalpressures
"reverberate"withindomesticpolitics,tippingthe domesticbalance and
thusinfluencing the internationalnegotiations. Exactlythiskindof rever-
berationcharacterized the 1978summit negotiations.DieterHiss, theGer-
mansherpaand one ofthosewhobelievedthata stimulus program was in
Germany'sowninterest, laterwrotethatsummits changenationalpolicy
onlyinsofaras theymobilizeand/orchangepublicopinionand theatti-
tude of political groups.... Oftenthatis enough, if the balance of
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 455
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456 International
Organization
In thestylizedmodelof two-levelnegotiationsoutlinedhere,thechiefne-
gotiatoris theonlyformallinkbetweenLevel I and Level II. Thus far,I
haveassumedthatthechiefnegotiator has no independentpolicyviews,but
acts merelyas an honestbroker,or ratheras an agenton behalfof his
constituents.Thatassumption simplifies
powerfully theanalysisoftwo-level
games.However,as principal-agent theoryremindsus, thisassumption is
thepreferences
Empirically,
unrealistic.79 ofthechiefnegotiator maywell
divergefromthoseofhisconstituents.Two-levelnegotiationsarecostlyand
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 457
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Organization
458 International
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Diplomacyand domesticpolitics 459
Conclusion
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Organization
460 International
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