Chavez v.

Public Estates Authority

384 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002

FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources)
insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation(Amari), a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
RULING: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary
to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Domagas v. Jensen
G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Domagas filed for a forcible entry case against Jensen. Summons and complaint were not served on
respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country but it was received by respondents brother Oscar who was
then at the respondents house. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent did not appeal. August
20, 2000, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the annulment of the decision of MTC since the service of
summons was ineffective, the respondent being out of the country. The RTC decided in favor of Jensen since there was no
valid service of the complaint and summons. The CA affirmed the decision, ruling that the case was an ejectment case
which is an action quasi in rem.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an action in personam or quasi in rem.
RULING:
The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. The settled rule is that the aim and object
of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam or in quasi in rem is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right, or the exercise
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the
court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some
act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against a person, as distinguished from a judgment against the proprietary to determine its state Actions for
recovery of real property are in personam.
Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interest
of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Spouses Portic v. Cristobal

G.R. No. 156171, April 22, 2005

FACTS: In 1968, spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door apartment from spouses
Alcantara even though theyre aware that the land was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying SSS. The Portics
then executed a contract with Anastacia Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the said property for P200k. Cristobals down
payment was P45k and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between them states:
That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership
of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right
to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment; (payment is due 22 May 1985, if Cristobal
will not be able to pay Portic will reimburse)
A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was not able to pay on the due date. A suit ensued to lift
the cloud on the title.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the parcel of land?
HELD: The Portics insofar as there was no contract of sale. What transpired between the parties was a contract to sell. The
provision of the contract characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of
sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full
payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a
breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title. In
short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither did it validate the
alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they actually have prior to registration.
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. Clearly,
Cristobal has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She
is also precluded from asserting ownership against the Portics. The CAs finding that she had a valid title to the property
must be set aside.

NPC v. Ibrahim
526 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007

Facts:

Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in Lanao del Norte.

In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of the sub-terrain area of the land and constructed underground tunnels on the
said property.
The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of
NAPOCORs Agus projects.
In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs of Ibrahim) requested Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct or
install a motorized deep well on the parcel of land but it was rejected on the grounds that the construction would
cause danger to lives and property by reason of the presence of the underground tunnels.
Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay damages and to vacate the sub-terrain portion of the land.

Issue: WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub-terrain area of the land.
If yes, are they entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Held: YES. The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to Ibrahim.

The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its
surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which
he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. xxx

Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property
as well as the sub-terrain area of the land where the underground tunnels were constructed.

On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim should be paid a just compensation.

Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built motorized deep wells but was prevented from doing so by the
authorities because of the construction of the tunnels underneath the surface of the land.
Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction
of the deep wells. It has been shown that the underground tunnels have deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land
and considerably reduced its value.

It was held that: If the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many
years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither
convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of their property except
by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.

Sps. Fortuna v. Republic

G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014

FACTS: In December 1994, spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a parcel of land located in San Fernando,
La Union. They claimed that the land was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her
heirs who later on sold the subject land to Sps. Fortuna in 1984. Sps. Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and
their predecessors -in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for
more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.
Republic of the Philippines opposed the application.

The trial court granted the application for registration. The Republic appealed to the CA arguing that there is no official
proclamation from the government that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA
reversed the RTC decision for failure to comply with the length of possession that the law requires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps. Fortuna has complied with the requisites for acquisition of title to alienable lands of public
domain.

HELD: No. CA decision affirmed

Civil Law: There must be a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain

Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present
incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

Petitioners rely on the notation in the survey plan stating the land is alienable and disposable. They likewise argue that the
certification from the DENR that there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for
the subject parcel. However, neither of these documents is evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the
lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties alienable and disposable
character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government office.The applicant,
however, must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared
by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not
proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable.
The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the
President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.

Civil Law: in judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, the period of possession should commence, at
the latest, as of May 9, 1947

PD 1073 was enacted on January 25, 1977 but it was published months later than its enactment. Following the ruling of the
court in Tanada v. Tuvera, PD 1073 took effect 15 days after its publication, the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title is May 8, 1947. In other words,applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.

In the present case, the spouses were unable to prove that they possessed the lot since May 8, 1947. So even if the lot in
question is to be considered as alienable and disposable, the application for registration will still not prosper for failing to
sufficiently prove possession since May 8, 1947.

Republic v. Heirs of Sin

G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014
Alicia Reyes v. Sps. Ramos
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos
G.R. No. 180282, 647 SCRA 495, April 11, 2011
Calimoso v. Roullo
G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016
Tolentino v. Sps. Latagan
G.R. No.179874, June 22, 2015
Province of Zamboanga v. City of Zamboanga
22 SCRA 1334 March 28, 1968
Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles
66 SCRA 481, August 29, 1975
Serg's Products v. PCI Leasing
338 SCRA 499 (2000)
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo
G.R. No. L-40411, 61 Phil. 709 (1935)
Caltex v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
114 SCRA 273
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, et. al.
347 SCRA 128
Republic v. PLDT
26 SCRA 620
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
122 SCRA 759
Rana v. Lee Wong
G.R. No. 192861, June 30, 2014
Cruz v. Pandacan Hikers Club, Inc.
G.R. No. 188213, January 11, 2016
Union Motor v. Court of Appeals
361 SCRA 506
Equatorial Realty v. Mayfair
370 SCRA 56, Nov. 21, 2001
San Lorenzo v. Court of Appeals
449 SCRA 99
Pleasantville v. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 10
Alviola v. Court of Appeals
289 SCRA 537
MWSS v. Court of Appeals
143 SCRA 623
Baes v. Court of Appeals
224 SCRA 562
Binalay v. Manalo
195 SCRA 347
Republic v. Meneses
132 SCRA 514
 Cutanda v. Cutanda
335 SCRA 418
Serespi v. Court of Appeals
331 SCRA 293
Arambulo v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014