Finally, Smith believes that widespread poverty is not only a sign and cause

of economic inefficiency. It is also unjust.

It is but equity...that they who feed,

clothe, and lodge the whole body of the
people, should have such a share of the
produce of their own labour as to be
themselves tolerably well fed, clothed,
and lodged (WN I.viii.36).

But what underlies these liberal egalitarian normative claims or

gives Smith the confidence that others should be convinced to accept them?
Two things, at least,I shall argue: first, Smiths account of the metaethics
and psychology of moral judgments of propriety and equity, and second,
Smiths understanding of the nature of free exchange. As Smith analyses
both of these, equal dignity and mutual respect are built into their
foundations (p. 130-1).

For Smith, therefore, the implied framework of judgments of both equity

and propriety is a moral community among independent equal persons.
Judgments of both sorts involve an implicit intersubjectivity, a projection
into the standpoints of independent individuals that is disciplined by a
standard of one among equals [...] (p. 132).

This egalitarian metaethics grounds a normative doctrine of equal

dignity. What most enrages us against the man who injures or insults us,
Smith says, is the little account which he seems to make of us that
absurd self-love, by which he seems to imagine, that other people may be
sacrificed at any time, to his conveniency (TMS II.iii.1.5, emphases added)
(p. 132).

These same fundamental themes are at play also in Smiths

analysis of free exchange, about which I shall have to be briefer. Although
exchanges operative motive is personal gain, it is itself impossible without
a presupposed second-personal normative infrastructure (p.133).

For Smith, therefore, exchange itself presupposes reciprocal

recognition as mutually accountable equals.
Once we appreciate how deeply reciprocal recognition as mutually
accountable equals is grounded in Smiths metaethics and his moral
psychology, both in his theory of moral judgment and in his conception of
exchange, the egalitarian character of his normative convictions is no
surprise. They commit Smith to the positions that Rothschild so
convincingly details, for example, that goals such as economic efficiency
may be pursued only to the extent that these are consistent with mutual
respect for all as free and equal persons (p. 133).

Nesse texto, Darwall reafirma o que havia escrito em Sympathetic Liberalism,

acrescentando, entretanto, aspectos interessantes. Em primeiro, ele mostra como o
reconhecimento de uma dignidade igual e recproca entre os indivduos, para alm da
esfera da psicologia dos julgamentos morais e da meta-tica, se faz presente tambm
 nas relaes de troca. Isso porque, ao trocarem, os indivduos inconscientemente
assumem que se trata de uma relao voluntria entre duas pessoas capazes de julgar
por si mesmas, mas tambm que o outro respeitar o processo e seu desfecho, sem
inteno de desfazer a troca por meio de coero e/ou violncia.
Assim, Darwall entende que a economia poltica de Smith est condicionada pelo seu
reconhecimento igualitrio fundamental dado dignidade humana. O livre-mercado
tm funo instrumental na promoo da autonomia e do reconhecimento da
reciprocidade dos indivduos em termos de sua igual dignidade. partir dessa
concepo de Smith que se entende sua defesa pela reduo da pobreza e de melhoria
na condio dos mais pobres, pois isso necessrio para possibilitar a reciprocidade
de dignidade entre as pessoas.

Referncias
DARWALL, Stephen. Equal Dignity in Adam Smith. Adam Smith Review (1), p. 129-34,
2004.