DMJ-7949 87 f3 00 l 0.

w
E 1937 Pergamon Journal: Ltd.

GAME THEORY APPROACH FOR MULT~OBJECTIVE

STRUCTURAL OPTIMIZATION
s. s. RAO
School of Mechanical Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, U.S.A.

(Receked 21 April t986)

Abstract-The concept of Pareto-optimal solution is discussed in the context of a multiobjective structural

optimization problem and the commonly used methods of generating Pareto-optimal solutions are
indicated. The graphical interpretations of the non-cooperative and cooperative game theory approaches
are presented for a two-criteria optimization problem. The relationship between Pareto-optimal solutions
and game theory is described. A computational procedure is developed for solving a general multiobjective
optimization problem using cooperative game theory. The procedure is illustrated with two numerical
examples.

INTRODUCTION consideration of multiple objectives in mathematical

Recent advances in structural optimization resulted
in the development of techniques, mainly based on
nonlinear programming, for handling problems with
a constantly increasing number of design variables
and constraints. Usually a scalar-valued objective
function is optimized over a feasible design space and
the result is then used as a guiding device in striving
for the best practicable structure. However, there
often exist several structural design problems, which
involve several, usually conflicting, objectives to be
considered by the designer. A promising approach
for solving this type of problem Seems to be multi-
objective nonlinear programming where a vector-
valued objective function is examined. The problem
is stated as:
Find the vector of design or control variables X
which minimizes the vector of criterion or objective
functions
subject to
gj(X) IO, i =: 1,2,. . . , m,
and the objective functions A(X) may be- non-
commensurable.
The multiobjective optimization arose in a natural
fashion in mathematical economics; its use in
engineering and structural design is relatively recent.
A variety of techniques and applications of multi-
objective optimization have been developed in the
past several years. The earliest work reporting the
programming appears to be that of Kuhn and Tucker
[I]. The progress in the field of mutticriteria optimiz-
ation was summarized by Hwang and Masud [Z]
and Stadler [3]. The conversion of a single objective
structural optimization problem into a multiobjective
problem by treating the constraint functions as addi-
tional objectives was discussed in 141.The weighting
method, the constraint method, and the minimax
approaches of generating Pareto optima were given
by Koski along with structural design examples [5].
A method for generating Pareto-optimal set, for
multicriteria problems capable of being formulated
as serial stage-state discrete dynamic programs, was
presented in [6]. The development of a computer pro-
gram called MOEDM, which provides the designer
with useful trade-off information from which sound
design decisions can be made for linear multiobjective
problems was described in Dlesk and Liebman [7].
The e-constraint method was used by Carmichael [S]
for generating the Pareto-optimal solutions of a five
bar planar truss. The role of game theory in the
engineering design process was discussed by Vincent
(91.The basic definitions were given without any com-
putational algorithms or numerical examples. The
multiobjective optimum design of a clamped-hinged
beam was determined by Adali [IO] by approximating
the area by linear splines. The numerical results for
a number of design examples were presented in the
form of graphs of optimal trade-off curves.
A comparison of the computational efficiencies of
the weighting, noninferior set estimation and con-
straint methods was presented along with a study of
the abifities of the methods to produce an approxi-
mation of the Pareto-optimal set [ll]. The multi-
criterion optimization of elastic stress limited isostatic
trusses was considered and a numerical method for
determining the Pareto-optimal set of the problem
was deveioped [ 121.The application of several multi-
objective optim~ation techniques was indicated in

119
120 s. s. RAO
the context of the design of vibration isolation
systems by Rao [ 131.
Usually there exists no unique solution which
would give an optimum for all the objective functions
simultaneously. Thus a new optimality concept,
different from that used in scalar optimization, is to
be used in finding the solution of the vector optimiz-
ation problem. The concept of Pareto optimality has
been found to be quite useful in this context. Several
methods were suggested for generating the Pareto-
optimal solutions. The game theory approach for
generating the best compromise (Pareto-optimal) solu-
tion is presented in this work afong with numerical
examples,
PARETO-OPTIMAL SOLUTION
A vector X*o S is called Pareto-optimal for the
probiem of eqn (If if and oniy if X f S and
_KW SWI*) for i = 1,2,. . . , k imply that
f;(X)=f;(X*) for i = 1.2,. ..,k (171. Verbally, the
vector X* is Pareto-optimal if there exists no feasible
vector X which would decrease some objective func-
tion without causing a simultaneous increase in at
Ieast one objective function. Usually several Pareto
optima exist for a vector optimi~tion problem and
additional information is needed to order the Pareto-
optimal set. This clearly makes it possible to bring
in additional considerations not included in the
optimization model, thus making the multiobjective
approach a flexible technique for most design prob-
lems. Several numerical methods have been suggested
for solving a vector optimization problem. Each
method, in general, generates a different Pareto-
optimal solution.
In the most commonly used approach, known as
the weighting method, a scalar objective function is
fo~ulated as a weighted sum of the individual
objective functions. If a E Rk denotes the vector of
weighting coefficients, the problem takes the form
mi$ize a*f(X), (3)
where
s=(xER}gj(X)So, j=1,2 ,-.., m}. (4)
The vector a can be normalized so that the sum of its
components which are non-negative and not ail zero,
is equal to one. Now Pareto-optimal solutions can be
generated by parametrically varying weights a, in the
objective function. One disadvantage of this method
is that it is incapable of producing the whole Pareto-
optimal set for certain nonconvex problems. In the
<-constraint method 131,the e-constraint problem can
be formulated as
minimizefl(X)
subject to&(X) < 4; i = 1,2, . . . , k and i + i (5)
and X o S,
where f? is the ideal feasible solution of f;.
ej =f: + A,, and A, are positive increments. This
means that one objective function is taken as a scalar
objective function and the others are constrained by
suitably chosen constants E,. By systematically vary-
ing 4, the entire set of Pareto-optimal solutions can
be generated even in nonconvex situations.
In this work, a game theory approach is presented
for finding the best compromise (Pareto-optimal)
solution of the multiobjective optimization problem.
GAME THEORY APPROACH
The game theory approach can be seen with refer-
ence to a two objective, two design variable opti-
mization problem whose graphical representation is
shown in Fig. 1. Letf, (xi, x2) andfr(x, , x2) represent
two scalar objectives and xi and x2 two scalar design
variables. It is assumed that one player is associated
with each objective. The first player wants to select a
design variable x, which will minimize his pay-off&
and similarly the second player seeks a variable x,
which will minimize his own pay-offf,. Iff, andf, are
continuous, then the contours of constant values of
h and 52 appear as shown in Fig. I. The dotted lines
passing through 0, and OL represent the loci of
rational (minimizing) choices for the first and second
player for a fixed value of x2 and x,, respectively.
The intersection of these two lines, if it exists, is a
candidate for the two objective minimization prob-
lem assuming that the players do not cooperate with
each other (non-coo~rative game). In Fig. 1, the
point N (x:,x:) represents such a point. This point,
known as a Nash equilibrium solution, represents a
stable equilibrium condition in the sense that no
player can deviate unilaterally from this point for
further improvement of his own criterion [15].
This point has the characteristic that
fl(.C* x?) $4 (XIYx:1 (6)
and
fi(X?% x:1 S-iW I x*)3 (7)
where x1 may be to the left or right of x? in eqn (6)
and x2 may lie above or below x: in eqn (7).
Extension of the idea to a k-player non-cooperative
game gives the mathematical definition of a Nash
equilibrium solution as
fi(x:,x:,..., Xk*)Ifi(X,,X2*,...~X~)
x:)sx?(x:,~2,...,x:)
ficq,xr,...,
. (8)
x~)sf&:rX:,...,-d
A&:,x:,..., ~
Sofar it has been assumed that there exists only one
 Multiobjective structural optimization
Fig. I. Cooperative and non-cooperative game solutions.
Nash equilibrium point, i.e. the dotted lines in Fig. 1
intersect only at one point. An interesting situation
occurs when the two lines intersect at more than one
point. In this case, since the values offi andf2 are
different Nash equilibrium points, any player can
have the advantage of declaring his/her move first
thereby forcing the other players to play at the
equilibrium point of his/her own choice.
In a cooperative game, the two players agree to
cooperate with each other and hence any point in the
shaded region S of Fig. 1 will provide both of them
with a better solution than their respective Nash
equilibrium solutions [16]. Since the region S does not
provide a unique solution, the concept of Pareto-
optimal (non-infe~or) solutions can be introduced to
eliminate many solutions from the region S. It can be
seen that all points in the region S can be eliminated
except those on the continuous line O,ACQDBO,
which represents the loci of tangent points between
the contours off, and f2. Every point on this fine has
the property that it is not dominated by any other
point in its neighborhood, i.e.
f,(e) Ifi
and
where Q is a point lying on the line 0,02 and P is a
neighboring point. Thus all points of S that do not
lie on the fine O,O, need not be considered during
cooperative play. The set of all points lying on AB is
known as a Pareto-optimal set and is denoted by S,.
Since S, represents the solution szt to be considered
in a cooperative game, the main task in a multicriteria
optimization problem will be to determine the
solution set S,.
After determining the Pareto-optimal set, one
has to pick up a particular element from the set by
adopting a systematic procedure. If it is possibIe to
convert all the criteria involved in the problem to
some common units, then the problem will be greatly
simplified. If this is not possible, further rules of
negotiation in the form of a supercriterion or bar-
gaining model should be specified before selecting a
particular element from the set .S,. A procedure for
finding the set S, and an element of S, based on a
su~rc~te~on is presented in the following section.
COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
The cooperative game theory approach of solving
the multicriteria optimization problem can be stated
as follows. k players are assumed to correspond to the
k objectives; one for each objective. While playing the
game (i.e. while designing the structure), each player
will try to improve his/her own conditions (i.e. to
decrease the value of his/her own objective function).
The players will start bargaining from their respective
reference (starting) values and put a joint effort in
maximizing a subjective criterion (su~r~te~on)
formed by themselves. It is assumed that each player
has analyzed his/her own criterion before starting the
game to find the maximum possible benefit he/she can
obtain. This will also help him,her in guaranteeing
against the worst value. This analysis is necessary
since each player should know the extreme conditions
122 s. s. Rio

of his/her own and others so that none of them begins
bargaining from a reference value which is unrealistic
(i.e. unacceptable to the other players).
The extreme values for each player are determined
as follows.
At any starting feasible design vector X,, the
objective function values are found and positive
constant multipliers M,, mz, , m, are chosen such
that
i th player, indicates that during the cooperative play.
he/she should not expect a value for his objective
better than 4(X:) but is guaranteed that his/her
objective will never be worse than F,,.
Assuming that all the players start negotiation by
taking their worst values as reference values, a super-
criterion S can be constructed as
S = fi {Fiu- MX:)}, (14)
i-l

mifi(X,) = mzf2(X,) = ... = m&(X,) = IV, (9)

where Xy, a Pareto-optimal solution, minimizes a
where M is a constant. By redefining the objective combined objective function F,(c, X) defined by
functions as

F,(c, X) = i ciFi(X) (15)

&(X)=m&X); i=1,2 ,..., k, (IO) 1-I

one can notice that any design vector which minim- subject to the constraints of eqn (2) and cis satisfy the
izes the functionf;(X) will also minimize the function conditions
FJX). This scaling is done to make all the objective
functions numerically equal at a particular design X,. ci 2 0, i = 1,2,...,k
Hereafter, it will be assumed that the k players
correspond to the k scaled objective functions given and
by eqn (10).
,$, ci = 1. (16)
Starting from the design vector X,, each objective
function h(X); i = 1,2, . . . , k is minimized subject to
the constraints of eqn (2). Then a matrix [P] is From eqn (14) it can be seen that all the players will
constructed as be interested in maximizing the criterion S. As X: is
implicitly indepenent on the c,s, the problem now is
F,(X?) FZCG) f-,(x:) to determine the optimum values of c,s for which S
of eqn (14) attains a maximum value.
F,(F) F*(x:) Fk(X?) The procedure of obtaining the optimum vector

[PI= . (11)
c:

It can be seen that the diagonal elements in the matrix

[P] are the minima in their respective columns.
Defining Fiu as
c*=

H .

C;:
begins by assuming any vector c and improving it
in the subsequent iterations by moving along the
steepest ascent directions of S through appropriate
FiU=maxFJXT); i=l,2, step lengths.
:;2,
a rectangular matrix [R] is as

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Example 1
The two bar truss shown in Fig. 2 is considered for
illustrating the game theory approach. The area of
cross section of the members (A ) and the position of
[R] = Fi(X:) Flu (13) the joints 1 and 2 (x) are treated as design variables.
The truss is assumed to be symmetric about the y
axis. The coordinates of joint 3 are held constant. The
weight of the truss and the displacement of the joint
3 are considered as the objective functions fi and h.
The stresses induced in the members are constrained
This matrix gives the extreme values of all the players. to be smaller than the permissible stress, u,,. In
For example, the ith row, which corresponds to the addition, lower bounds are placed on the design
 Multiobjective structural optimization 123

P(x, - I)(1 +x:)o.5

b?(X)= _ c -a,50 (20)

g,(X) = xI - x, IO (21)

g4(X) = ,y! -x2 IO, (22)

where 5, = x/h, x2 = A/A,,, E = Youngs modulus,

p = density of the material, and xi) = lower bound
on ?c,; i = 1,2. The supercriterion (S) is chosen as the
maximization of the product of deviations of the
individual objective functions from their respective
worst possible values:

S(X) = M(X) -f;IMV) -fTl, (23)

wheref; =fi(Xf) andfy =f;,(X:). The problem
Fig. 2. Two-bar truss (example I). data is taken as p = 0.283 lb/in, h = 100 in. A,, =
1 in2, P = 10,000 lb, E = 30 x IO6Ib/in2, u. = 20,000
variables. Thus the problem becomes: lb/in2, .x{)= 0.1 and x 2)= 1.0. The contours of the
two objective functions in the feasible design space
minimize f, (X) = 2$1x, Jix (17) are shown in Fig. 3 and the ideal feasible solutions
fr and ff are also identified. The contours of the
Ph(l +x;).S(l +x;)o.s objective function in the weighting method (with
L(X) = (18)
2 fi Ex;x, equal weights forf, andf,) are shown in Fig. 4. It is
to be noted that the objective functions are normal-
subject to ized so that they have the same numerical value at the
initial design point during numerical optimization.
P(1 +x,)(1 +x:) d I 0 The constraints g, and g, are normalized by dividing
g,(x)= (1%
2&,x, - O throughout by cro. The constraints g, and g4 are

k3 r Ii1 i ! \ X W=80.00 A// 1

0.25
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25
XI
Fig. 3. Contours of the objective functions.
124

2.25

1.50
X2

1.25

1.00 i\

0.75

0.50

0.25 __
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 I.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25
XI
Fig. 4. Contours of the objective function in the weighting method.

normalized by dividing throughout by their respec-
tive lower bound values. The results of numerical
optimization are shown in Table 1. It can be observed
that the optimum design vectors obtained bear mixed
characteristics of XT and Xz.
Example 2
The twenty-five bar space truss shown in Fig. 5 is
considered with the objectives of minimizing the
weight, minimizing the deflection of nodes 1 and 2,
and maximizing the fundamental frequency of vibra-
tion. The truss is required to support the two load
conditions given in Table 2 and is designed subject to
constraints on the member stresses as well as Euler
buckling. The minimum and maximum allowable
areas of the members are specified as 0.1 in and
S.Oin, respectively. The aiiowabie stresses for all
members are specified as 40,000 psi in both tension
and compression. The Youngs modulus is taken as
E = 10 psi and the material density as p = 0.1 Ib/in3.
The members are assumed to be tubular with a
nominal diameter to thickness ratio of D/t = 100 SO
that the buckling stress becomes
- 100.01nm,
bbi = , i=l,2 ,..., 25. (24)
SL:
The member areas are linked in the following groups:

Table I. Results of m~tiobj~tive optimi~tjo~ of example 1

Weighting
Minimization Minimization method Game theory
Quantity offi offi (c, = c* = l/2) approach
X=G 0.5295
0.6743 0.8612
2.5OOoi 1.0540
0.7635 0.768
1.14081
*

F+ 200.1214
45.1615 233.2904
38.5847 93.1723
93.7941 101.7106
86.4693
f J,;!bI 36.1493 186.7361 75.0595 81.4137
iz(m.1 0.0943 0.0182 0.0442 0.0408
19,994.9t 4033.6 9747.6 8996.0
* = ul
9: (psi) 3889.7 300.9 1306.9 1180.1
t Active constant: F, = nt,A, F2= m&; m,, m, are constants; ci, = stress in member
1. o2 = stress in member 2.
 Multiobjective structural optimization 125

Fig. 5. Twenty-five bar truss (example 2).

A,; A, = A, = A, = A,; A, = A, = A, = A,; A,0 = A,,; The values of the objective functions at the start-
A,2=A,3; A,,=A,,=A,,=A,,; A,s=A,9=Azo ing design vector are taken as F,, = F?, = 500 and
= A,, ; 4, = 4, = A,, = A,,. Thus a total of eight F,, = - 500. The results of minimization of the three
independent areas are selected as the design variables. individual objective functions are given in Table 3.
The single criterion optimization problems are solved
Table 2. Loads acting on twenty-five bar truss by using the method of feasible directions [14]. The
Joint 1 2 3 6 matrix [P] is obtained as

1
Load condition 1, loadr in pouna!s
-
FY 20,ooa - 20,000 0 0 [PI= 2448.1753 100.0015 -509.7537 . (25)
FZ -5,000 -5,000 0 0
FX 0 0 0 0 L 908.4379
352.3705 439.4703
624.3236 - 53
788.6644
1.8644
Load condition 2, loa& in pout&
FX 1000 0 500 500 As stated earlier, the diagonal elements of [P] can be
F, -5,000
10,000 - 10,000
5,000 0 0 seen to be the smallest elements in their respective
columns.

Table 3. Results of minimization of individual objective functions

Starting Minimization Minimization Maximization
Ouantitv voint of weight of deflection of freauencv
1.0 lo. 1 3.793 1 *o. 1
1.0 0.8023 l5.0 0.7977
Design 1.0 0.7479 +5.0 0.7461
vector, 1.0 0.1 3.3183 0.7282
X(in) 1.0 0.1245 *5.0 0.8484
1.0 0.5712 5.0 1.9944
1.0 0.9785 *5.0 1.9176
1.0 0.8025 *5.0 4.1119
Weight (lb) 330.7208 233.0726 1619.3258 600.8789
Deflection (in.) 1.5417 1.9250 0.3083 1.3550
Fundamental
frequency (Hz) 68.8648 73.2535 70.2082 108.6224
Active
behavior
constraints 0 9t 0 43
Active
side constraints 0 2 8 1
Supercriterion, S -0.2362 x 10 0 0
t Buckling of members 2, 5,7,8, 19 and 20 in load condition 1 and members 13, 16 and 24 in load
condition 2.
$ Buckling of members 2, 5, 7 and 8 in load condition I.
126 s. s. RAO

Table 4. Results of maximization of the supercriterion

Optimal c.
Initial c, c, = 0.1433, c? = 0.3628.
Quantity c, = c* = C]= l/3 cj = 0.4939
*o. 1 lo.I
0.8718 1.1464
Design 0.9841 1.3156
vector 0.2602 0.4838
X(in) 0.1003 40.1
0.5447 1.3315
0.9669 1.8558
2.3169 4.4960
Weight (lb) 326.94828 596.5181
Deflection (in.) 1.4152 0.9401
Fundamental frequency (Hz) 90.8159 100.2154
Active behavior
constraints 4t 0
Active side
constraints I 2
Supercriterion, .S 0.4833 x lo* 1.0761 x IOn
t Buckling of members 19 and 20 in load condition 1 and members 12 and 16 in load
condition 2.

It can be seen from these results that the minimiz-
ation of weight resulted in 624.3% increase in deflec-
tion and 32.56% decrease in fundamental frequency
compared to their respective optimum values.
Similarly the optimization of deflection led to
694.8% increase in weight and 35.37% reduction
in fundamental frequency. The maximization of the
fundamental frequency yielded a design with 257.8%
increase in weight and 439.5% increase in deflection.
The active constraints at each of these optimum
points are also indicated in Table 4. The [RI-matrix
is constructed as
352.3705 2448.1753
VI = I~.~15 624.3236 . (26)
[ -788.6644 - 509.7537 I
The first player, corresponding to the first objective,
cannot claim a value lower than 352.3705 for his/her
objective while he/she is guaranteed that it will never
exceed the value of 2448.1753. Similarly the second
and third rows of [R J indicate the two extreme values
of the second and third players respectively.
Now the supercriterion S is constructed and max-
imized with respect to the parameters cis without
vioIating eqn (16). For this, initially c, , c, and c, are
taken as l/3 each, and their values are changed in
the subsequent iterations depending on the gradient
of the supercriterion, and by taking a suitable step
length along that direction. The procedure is termi-
nated when the function S attains a local maximum.
The initial and the optimum values of c and S
obtained are given in Table 4 along with the corre-
sponding design vectors. It can be seen that although
initially equal weights are given to all the objectives,
at the optimum solution (where S is maximum) the
weightage of the first objective has decreased and that
of the third has increased substantially. The increase
in the value of the su~rc~terion obtained is about
122.65%. The optimum design vector given in Table 4
is the required Pareto-optimal solution (which max-
imizes S) of the design problem. From the matrix [R]
and Table 4, it is found that at the end of the play,
although no player could drive his/her objective near
to his/her own minimum, all of them have reduced
their values significantly in comparison to their
respective reference values.
CONCLUSIONS
The concepts of Pareto-optimal solution and game
theory are presented. Methods of generating the
Pareto-optimal solution set are described. The theor-
etical basis of game theory is explained in graphical
terms. The relationship between Pareto-optimal
solutions and game theory is described. The gener-
ation of Pareto-optimal solutions and the selection of
a particular Pareto-optimal solution according to
game theory approach are illustrated with simple
truss design examples. Although only two and three
objective optimization problems are considered in
this work, the procedure is quite general and
is applicable to any multiobjective optimization
problem.
Acknowiedgemenrs-The research was partly supported
by the Flight Dynamics Laboratory, WPAFB through
Universal Energy Systems, Task # 84-25, contract no.
F33615-83-c-3000. The useful suggestions made by Dr V. B.
Venkayya during the progress of this work are gratefully
acknowledged.
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C.A.S. 25:1-i