Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

NICANOR T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 134787

Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO T. SANTOS-
GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO,
Respondents.
November 15, 2005

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DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Jurisprudence is replete with cases of close family ties sadly torn apart by disputes over inheritance. This is
one of them and, for sure, will not be the last.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Nicanor T. Santos
assails and seeks to set aside the Decision dated March 24, 1998[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 50060 dismissing his appeal from the amended decision dated July 27, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon-Navotas in Civil Case No. 1784-MN, an action for revival of judgment.

The facts:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister,
born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo

1
and eight of their siblings, executed a “Basic Agreement of Partition” covering properties they inherited from
their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the
“Guerreros”), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2)
other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. Docketed as Civil Case No. 4871 and raffled to Branch VI of the
court, the complaint, inter alia, sought to have the aforementioned 1956 Agreement of Partition judicially
declared valid.

Pending resolution of Civil Case No. 4871, the following events transpired:

1. The Santos heirs executed on May 5, 1959 another document, denominated “Deed of Partition (With
More Corrections)”. In it, the properties allotted to the heirs belonging to “Group 4”, to which Consuelo and
Nicanor belonged, were divided into four (4) shares. Share No. 3 was adjudicated to Nicanor who, however, was
obligated to pay Consuelo the amount of P31,825.00.

2. Spouses Guerreros filed another complaint against petitioner Nicanor, docketed as Civil Case No. 5858
of CFI-Rizal, for the recovery of her (Consuelo’s) share under the May 5, 1959 Deed of Partition.

Civil Case No. 4871 and Civil Case No. 5858 would subsequently be consolidated before the CFI-Rizal,
Branch 11, presided, according to petitioner, by Judge Andres Reyes. On November 27, 1960, Judge Reyes
rendered a decision (Exh.“5”), disposing as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment, ordering the defendant [herein
petitioner] to comply with his part of the Deed of Partition and deliver to the plaintiff [respondent
Consuelo] the amount of P26,650.00 without prejudice to the right of reimbursement under the same
deed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket supplied)[2]

Subsequently, the Guerreros instituted another complaint against Nicanor with the CFI at Pasig for recovery
of sums of money under the May 5, 1959 Deed of Partition. For some reason unclear from the records and which
the parties have not explained, the case was also assigned docket number Civil Case No. 5858. It was raffled to
Branch VI of the court, presided by Judge Eutropio Migriño. [3] Thereat, Nicanor, as defendant a quo, filed a third
party complaint against brothers Ernesto et al. And albeit not touched upon in the basic pleadings, the issue of
whether Nicanor was obligated to pay Consuelo the amount of P31,825.00, as stated in the 1959 deed of partition,

2
or the amount of P26,650.00, as decreed in Exhibit “5”, was raised in the parties’ respective memoranda.[4] In
fact, during the hearing of this particular case, the Guerreros filed a “Manifestation and Motion”, stating as
follows:

1. That they agree to submit this case . . . on the basis of the total amount of P34, 825.00 due to
the plaintiff, Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero, minus P8,175.00 due to Group 8, or a net balance of
P26,650.00 in favor of the plaintiff . . . .

2. xxx

3. That they finally agree that the total net balance of P26,650.00 plus the interest thereon and
attorney’s fees in the amount which this Honorable Court will determine, shall be paid by the
defendant-third party plaintiff Nicanor T. Santos and all of the third-party defendants ….

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed . . . that judgment be rendered in the above-entitled case

in accordance with the foregoing terms and conditions.

Eventually, on December 28, 1979, Judge Migriño rendered judgment (Exh. “A”) ordering Nicanor, as
defendant a quo, to pay Consuelo P31,825.00, representing the amount due her under the May 5, 1959
deed of partition, plus damages and attorney’s fees.[5]

In time, Nicanor went to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), now CA, where his appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 69008-CV. In a Decision dated October 21, 1985, the IAC
affirmed the December 28, 1979 CFI decision of Judge Migriño, but reduced the award of moral
damages. Nicanor’s petition for review of the IAC decision would subsequently be denied by this Court
per its Resolution dated February 19, 1986 in G.R. No. L-73121.[6] Following the issuance by the Court
of an Entry of Judgment on April 1, 1986, [7] the records were subsequently remanded to the trial court.
For some reason, however, the Guerreros did not pursue execution of the judgment.
A little over six (6) years later, or on June 3, 1992, to be precise, the Guerreros filed a complaint
for revival of the December 28, 1979 decision of Judge Migriño (Exh. “A”), docketed as Civil Case No.
1784-MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon-Navotas. Petitioner Nicanor, as defendant,
countered with a motion to dismiss on several grounds, among which were: (a) that the complaint for
revival of judgment is barred under the res judicata rule; and (b) that the suit is between members of the
same family and no earnest efforts towards an amicable settlement have been made.
After due proceedings, the RTC of Malabon-Navotas dismissed the complaint for revival of
judgment. However, on motion for reconsideration and following a new trial, the trial court reversed
itself and, accordingly, rendered on July 27, 1995 an amended decision, the fallo of which reads:

3
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reviving the Decision dated December 28, 1979 in
Civil Case No. 5858 and correspondingly, [petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay [private
respondents] as follows.

a) THIRTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS (P31,825.00)

representing the amount due from him to her under their deed of partition of May 5, 1959;

b) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) by way of unrealized profits;

c) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) by way of moral damages; and

d) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) by way of attorney’s fees, all which sums shall be
with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) from October 30, 1959 when the complaint was filed,
up to and including July 28, 1974 and at the rate of twelve percent (12%) from July 29, 1974 until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added)

Therefrom, Nicanor went on appeal to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA G.R.
CV No. 50060. On March 24, 1998, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing
the appeal.[8] A Resolution of July 24, 1998 denying Nicanor’s motion for reconsideration followed.[9]

Hence, this instant petition for review,[10] petitioner ascribing to the Court of Appeals the
commission of the following “serious” errors, viz:

1. In holding that Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court has no application, and if there is, the subsequent act of herein
petitioner already achieved that purpose;

2. In disregarding the fact that the decision issued by Judge Eutropio Migriño is null and
void for being barred by res judicata and therefore cannot be revived; and

3. In not ruling that the action based on the decision issued by Judge Andres Reyes is
already barred by prescription.

The petition has no merit.

A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.[11]Thus, the
Provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance
of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil
actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts

4
toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222[12] of the Civil Code, now pursuant
to Article 151 of the Family Code.[13] Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section
1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.[14] Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no
Such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the
introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective
complaint.[15]
Petitioner cannot plausibly look to Article 222 of the Civil Code to effectively dismiss, as
presently urged, Civil Case No. 1784 MN. It cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the
rationale of said provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be spawned by
litigation between and among the members thereof. Civil Case No. 1784 MN, however, being
merely an action for revival of judgment of a dormant decision rendered in an original action, can
hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222 of the Code. What the appellate court said
in the decision subject of review on the inapplicability under the premises of Article 222 of the
Code is well-taken:

xxx The rule should have been invoked by [petitioner] in the original action [Civil Case 5858
subject of appeal in CA-G.R No. 69008-CV) where the actual controversy is still at issue and not
in the present case where the actual controversy between the parties had already been decided by
the Court and what remains to be done is the enforcement of the decision. [At p. 8; Words in
bracket added]

Certainly not lost on the Court is an incident during the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 1784 MN
which very well addressed, as aptly noted by the appellate court, the ideal sought to be achieved by said
Article 222. We refer to petitioner’s act, via a proposal, of extending a conciliatory hand to his elder sister
in a failed bid to arrive at an amicable settlement. An excerpt of petitioner’s written proposal:

We are fast approaching the “cross-road of our journey”. I am now 75 years and [respondent
Consuelo] is passed (sic) 78. It is unfortunate that for the past 30 years we had been quarrelling
about this partition and I feel embarrassed . . . .

I appeal to the conscience and understanding of the [respondent] and by way of compromise
settlement, I offer to pay [her] the amount of P5,000.00 in lieu of my original obligation of
P3,536.11 . . . .

Your HONOR, I am very sorry. Allow me to apologize . . . for bringing our family problem to
this courtroom which should had been settled among us privately. (At pp. 8-9 of CA’s Decision;
Words in bracket added)
This bring us to the inter-related second and third assignments of error both of which question,
in the light of Exhibit “5” (the joint decision dated November 27, 1960 of Judge Reyes.[16]), the
validity of Exhibit “A”, the December 28, 1979 decision (of Judge Migriño), the revival of which
is challenged in this case.

5
 Petitioner contends that the “Judgment dated 28 December 1979 rendered by Judge Migriño which
is the basis of the present case is null and void for being barred by res judicata. Said decision, petitioner
adds, “had already been the subject of a prior Decision rendered by Judge Andres Reyes on 27 November
1960.”

We are not persuaded.

Res judicata, according to Black, refers to “the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as
to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of
action.”[17] It embraces two concepts: a) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; this is designated as “bar by former judgment”;
and, b) precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issues in another action between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action. This is the rule on “conclusiveness of judgment”.[18]
Contrary to petitioner’s understanding of the doctrine, res judicata, assuming its applicability on a
given situation, is not a nullifying factor, such that the final judgment in the former action works to
nullify the proceedings in the subsequent action where the doctrine is invoked. In context, res judicata is
a rule of preclusion to the end that facts or issues settled by final judgment should not be tried anew.[19]
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Courts lists res judicata as among the grounds for a motion to dismiss
or as a defense to defeat a claim, but the same must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity, either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer. Else, the defense or objection on that ground is deemed waived.[20]

The Court distinctly notes that Exhibit “A” (Migriño decision), which petitioner described as a
nullity owing to the operation of res judicata, was, as earlier narrated, affirmed first by the IAC, then by
this Court, per its Resolution of February 19, 1986 in G.R. No. L-73121. [21] The implication of these
affirmatory actions on the issue of the validity or nullity of Exhibit “A” need no further belaboring.

The Court observes likewise petitioner’s seeming lack of spirit, if not reasons, to support his
position on the issue of res judicata and the consequent effects thereof on the final outcome of this case.
Consider: Save for copies of the impugned CA decision and resolution, the basic petition for review was
filed with this Court without annexes to support petitioner’s narration of facts whence he drew his
conclusions. Worse still, petitioner did not even take serious effort to explain why he believed the
doctrine of res judicata should be applied. All he virtually does is to state that “xxx after Judge Reyes

6
decided Civil Case No. 5858, all the issues therein were already put to rest [and] [T]he subsequent re-
opening of the same by Judge Migriño was without any legal basis and renders [the latter’s] decision
null and void.” In net effect, petitioner has not demonstrated, but assumed the existence of the requisites
of res judicata and peremptorily pronounced the nullificatory effect thereof on Exhibit “A”. Needless to
state, simplistic conclusions and gratuitous assumptions drawn from unestablished facts are unacceptable
norms for an intelligent judgment.

The third assigned error is also undeserving of consideration predicated, as it were, on the erroneous
proposition that the decision sought to be revived is Exhibit “5” issued, to repeat, on November 27, 1960,
not Exhibit “A”, which petitioner tags as a void decision despite its having been affirmed by the IAC and
this Court. As did the RTC of Malabon-Navotas, the Court of Appeals found Exhibit “5” and Exhibit
“A” to have resolved two (2) separate complaints, each based on different causes of actions or claims.
This factual determination, needless to state, deserves great respect. Surely, petitioner’s declaration,
without more, that Exhibit “5” and Exhibit “A” resolved one and the same cause of action involving the
same parties cannot be the kind of evidence sufficient to overturn such factual finding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

JOSE E. HONRADO, G.R. No. 166333

Petitioner,

Present:

7
 - versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
COURT OF APPEALS, TINGA, and
HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
in his official capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 222;
THE CLERK OF COURT OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Promulgated:
Quezon City; MR. NERY G. ROY,
in his official capacity as Sheriff IV of November 25, 2005
the RTC of Quezon City; and PREMIUM
AGRO-VET PRODUCTS, INC.,
Respondents.

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DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77488 dated June 30, 2004 dismissing the petition for certiorari for the nullification of the
April 14, 2003 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222 in Civil Case
No. Q-97-32965. Also assailed in this petition is the CA Resolution dated December 2, 2004 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of
Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the
name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32965.
Premium sought to collect the amount of P240,765.00 representing the total price of veterinary products
purchased on credit by Honrado from November 18, 1996 until June 30, 1997.

For failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was
declared in default. Premium was, thus, allowed to present evidence ex parte.

It turned out that the Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of

Calamba City for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrado’s name under

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143175 located in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as

their family house. The case was docketed as SP Case No. 489-1998-C. In his petition, Honrado

declared that his creditors were Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J Agriculture Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito

Dela Merced, and that the estimated value of the property was not more than P240,000.00.

On February 23, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Premium:

8
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant directing the latter to pay plaintiff the following:

1) P240,765.00 representing the total overdue account plus interest of 28% per annum thereon
computed from their respective dates of deliveries until the same shall have been paid in full;

2) 25% of the total amount awarded, plus acceptance fee of P50,000.00 and additional
P1,500.00 for each day of court appearance, as attorney’s fees; and
3) Costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Honrado filed a Notice of Appeal. However, on March 20, 2000, the appeal was dismissed for his failure

to file his brief as appellant. Entry of judgment was made on April 26, 2000.[3] On October 10, 2000,

Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.[4] The RTC granted the motion[5] and a writ of

execution was issued on March 29, 2001.[6]

The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-143175. The
[7]
Notice of Levy was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title on April 4, 2001. The Sheriff set the sale
of the property at public auction on April 4, 2001. Honrado was served with a copy of the notice of such
sale but he opposed the same.

On May 17, 2001, the property was sold to Premium, the highest bidder, for the amount of

P650,204.10.[8] On May 23, 2001, the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued [9] and annotated at the

dorsal portion of the title.[10] Honrado failed to redeem the property.

In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision[11] in SP Case No. 489-1998-C on

April 29, 2002, declaring the property a family home.

On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under

Article 155 of the Family Code of the Philippines in Civil Case No. Q-97-32965. It was alleged therein

that the property is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as

such before he incurred his indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that he and his family had no

other real property except the land which was levied upon and sold on execution.[12] Premium opposed the

motion on the ground that Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from claiming the

9
exemption, and that said claim has been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for Honrado to

redeem the property. Premium averred that, after the sale at public auction, Honrado and his family even

vacated the property. Honrado re-occupied the property only in April or May 2002. [13] It further averred

that the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was no

showing that its present value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the

Family Code.[14]

On September 18, 2002, the RTC denied said motion on the ground that Honrado is deemed to

have waived the exemption considering that he failed to object to the sale of the property on execution on

May 17, 2001.[15] Honrado did not assail the said order.

On October 14, 2002, Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance and Writ of
Possession[16] asserting that the one-year redemption period had already lapsed on May 23, 2002, without
any redemption being made by Honrado. The latter opposed the said motion claiming that the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna, had already rendered a decision declaring the property a family home. Honrado
further averred that his family resided in the house before the Family Code became effective and was
entitled to the exemption under the Code.[17]

On April 14, 2003, the respondent Judge issued an Order [18] granting the motion of Premium and

directing Honrado to: (1) execute a final deed of conveyance over the subject parcel of land covered by

TCT No. T-143175 of the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; and (2) surrender of the subject title,

TCT No. T-143175. The respondent Judge further ordered that after execution of the deed of conveyance,

a writ of possession be issued over the aforesaid property in favor of the plaintiff and against the

defendant or his successors-in-interest who are in possession of the said premises.

Honrado filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the April 14, 2003 Resolution of the

RTC. On June 30, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition.[19] The CA declared that there was no proof that

the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to

assert his claim for exemption at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time thereafter. It held that

once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of

right, and the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.[20]

10
On December 2, 2004, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Honrado.[21]

In this petition for review, the petitioner alleges that the CA committed serious errors of law and facts:

5:A – IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT ARTICLE 153 OF THE FAMILY CODE
FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE;

5:B – IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT HONRADO’S FAILURE TO ASSERT HIS

CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION OF HIS FAMILY HOME FROM EXECUTION AT THE TIME OF
THE LEVY OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME IS FATAL TO HIS CLAIM;

5:C – IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RIGHT TO CLAIM EXEMPTION CANNOT BE

WAIVED BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND/OR PUBLIC POLICY.[22]

The petitioner contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his

prayer for exemption of his family home from execution. The petitioner avers that the ruling of the RTC

of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 35 in SP Case No. 489-1998-C, declaring that the property in question is a

family home, has already become final; hence, it can no longer be disturbed. The family home cannot be

levied upon considering that the debt, which was the basis of the judgment under execution, was incurred

between the period from November 18, 1996 and June 30, 1997, or after the Family Code had been in

effect. Hence, the family home of the petitioner is exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family

Code.[23]

The petitioner further asserts that he and his family had been occupying the property as their

family home as early as 1992. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, his house was constituted as a

family home in that year. Thus, even if he failed to contest the levy on his property or move for the

lifting thereof, the same cannot be deemed a waiver of his right to claim the exemption of his family

home. He avers that his right cannot be waived, for it would be contrary to public policy. He claims that

the policy of the State, in conferring such exemption, is to allow a particular family to occupy, use and

enjoy their family home, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. Moreover, the

waiver must be shown by

11
 overt acts and it cannot be presumed from the mere failure to assert the claim for exemption

within a reasonable time.[24]

The private respondent avers that the petitioner is estopped from claiming that the property is

exempt from execution and from assailing the levy of the property, the sale thereof at public auction and

the September 18, 2002 and April 14, 2003 Orders of the RTC. It points out that the petitioner agreed to

the levy and sale of the property at public auction; he even surrendered the key to the house and vacated

the property after it was purchased by the private respondent at the public auction. The private

respondent averred that the petitioner hoped to get a higher amount than his debt. The petitioner never

adverted to his petition in the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, for the constitution of the property as a family

home. The petitioner revealed the decision of the RTC in SP Case No. 489-1998-C only on November

25, 2002 when he opposed the private respondent’s motion for a final deed of conveyance. It was only

after the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, rendered its decision that the petitioner re-occupied the property and

claimed, for the first time, that the property is a family home and exempt from execution. By then, the

period for the petitioner to redeem the property had long lapsed.

The petition has no merit.

In dismissing Honrado’s petition, the CA declared that:

Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and
so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by Law. A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must
remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. Such provision finds no application in this case.

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption,
the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption must be claimed by the debtor
himself at the time of levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. It is self-evident that
petitioner did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Any claim for
exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must
be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff. Petitioner and his wife failed to disclose

12
in their petition for the judicial constitution of a family home that Premium Agro-Vet Products,
Inc. is one of their creditors considering the fact that the collection case filed against Honrado
was filed in 1997 or prior to the institution of said petition in 1998. Petitioner never raised the
argument of exemption of his family home before the trial court before and during the auction
sale. We find that such actions reveal a dilatory intent to render nugatory the sale on execution
and defeat the very purpose of execution – to put an end to litigation. Petitioner previously failed
to appear in the pre-trial conference, failed to submit his appellant’s brief and now conveniently
raised the issue of exemption almost a year from the auction sale.

We find no proof of grave abuse of discretion [on] the part of public respondents. Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of
right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. It is well-
settled that the sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. The
function of ordering the execution of a judgment, being judicial, devolves upon the judge.[25]

The ruling of the appellate court is correct. The respondent court, tribunal or administrative agency acts

without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of

jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its

authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a

capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.[26]

Moreover, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is
limited to resolving only cases of jurisdiction.[27] A writ of certiorari is an equitable remedy and he who
comes to court for equity must do so with clean hands.

In this case, the RTC acted in accord with case law when it issued the assailed order. The

petitioner admits to having been notified of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at

9:30 a.m. on May 17, 2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However, he did not bother to

object to the levy and the projected sale on the ground that the property and the house thereon was a

family home. The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a

certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated

the property after the said sale. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or

the court until May 3, 2002, when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution

under Article 155 of the Family Code and Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Even

13
then, there was no showing that, during the hearing of said motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to

prove the value of the property and that it is, indeed, a family home.

Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on May 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private
respondent opposed the motion, but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the petitioner
never informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-
1998-C earlier on April 29, 2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the petitioner revealed to the
RTC of Quezon City that there was such a case and a decision had already been rendered. The petitioner
has not justified why he concealed such matters for such considerable period of time.

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied

as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code,

such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at

public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court

ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:[28]

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption,
the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to
the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;

“In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be
made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable
time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale,
or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority.”

In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not assert their
claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law
on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in
Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on
execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very
purpose of execution—to put an end to litigation. We said before, and We repeat it now, that
litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for
exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be
presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.[29]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

14
 SECOND DIVISION

MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and G.R. No. 132537

EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-
SALCEDO, Petit Present:
i o n e r s,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE

BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON Promulgated:
STA. INES,
R e s p o n d e n t s. October 14, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals reversing the
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, dismissing the
complaint of herein respondents for lack of jurisdiction.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On 17 June 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez (Mary Josephine) and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo
(Socorro) filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines
(Marietta) alleging that they are the children of the deceased Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez who, during
her lifetime, entrusted her rice land with an area of 25,087 square meters located at Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, to Marietta, together with the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47082 covering said land,
for the latter to manage and supervise. Mary Josephine and Socorro further alleged that they have
demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice land while under the management of Marietta,
and for the return of the TCT to the property, but the latter refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a
civil case[3] before the Pasig RTC.

During the pre-trial conference of the case, both Marietta and her counsel failed to appear, thus, by
motion of counsel for Mary Josephine and Socorro, the trial court declared Marietta in default.

On 24 January 1989, the trial court rendered judgment against Marietta ordering her to deliver to Mary
Josephine and Socorro the owner’s copy of TCT No. 47082 and to pay P40,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages, and
P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

15
After said judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, by
virtue of which, a parcel of land (with improvements) located in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, with an
area of 432 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-55314 registered in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta.
Ines, was levied upon by Flaviano Balgos, Jr., then Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Vizcaya, to satisfy the
damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction on 25 August 1992 to Mary
Josephine as the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on
17 September 1992.

On 12 July 1993, a complaint[4] for annulment of said sale was filed before the RTC of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, by Hinahon Sta. Ines together with Noel, Roel, and Jannette, all named Sta. Ines,
husband and children of Marietta, respectively, against Mary Josephine and Sheriff Flaviano Balgos, Jr.
on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus
exempt from execution under Section 12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the
Family Code.

Mary Josephine moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1) the Nueva Vizcaya RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case; 2) the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and 3) the complaint does
not state a cause of action. Acting on the Motion to Dismiss, the Nueva Vizcaya RTC issued an Order on
10 November 1993 denying said motion. According to the court a quo:

After studying the law, rules and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that the motion to dismiss
has no legal basis.

On the claim that this court has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as this case involves
proceedings to execute the decision of the Pasig RTC, it must be noted that the petitioners are not
parties to the Pasig case. They are third-party claimants who became such only after trial in the
previous (the Pasig) case has been terminated and the judgment therein has become final and
executory. They are not indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig case and they could not,
therefore, even intervene in the said case.

Execution proceedings are entirely a different proceedings from the trial proper of a case
inasmuch as trial proper is conducted by the Court while execution proceedings are conducted by
the Sheriff after the judgment in a trial proper has become final and executory. The petitioners,
therefore, could not, even if they wanted to, intervene in the trial proper because they are neither
indispensable nor necessary parties and because, precisely, the trial was already over and the
judgment has become final and executory.

But they could, as they have done, intervene in the execution stage because their rights have
been violated by the action of the sheriff. Under Section 17 of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the
petitioners could, as they have done, file an independent action to protect their rights. Under the
Judiciary Reorganization Act and Section 2, paragraph a, of Rule 4, Rules of Court, this Court
can take cognizance of the action. There is, therefore, no doubt that this court has jurisdiction
over this case.

It must be mentioned that there are legal obstacles for the petitioners to seek remedy from the
Pasig Court.
Firstly, they are not indispensable nor necessary parties to the Pasig case. Secondly, the
judgment therein has become final and executory. Thirdly, under paragraph a, Section 2 of Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, cases involving real properties must be filed in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies. The property levied upon is located in the province of Nueva
Vizcaya. Fourthly, as the judgment in the Pasig case has become final and executory, the said

16
Pasig court has already lost jurisdiction over the said case except in some instances and the
exception does not apply to this case.

While it is, therefore, true that conflicts of jurisdiction should be avoided, nonetheless, there can
be no conflict of jurisdiction in this case because there is no concurrent jurisdiction between the
Pasig court and this court for reasons already set forth above.

On the allegation that the petitioners have no legal capacity to sue, the court believes that they
have, in fact, that capacity to sue. Under Article 154 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
petitioner Hinahon Sta. Ines and the other petitioners are beneficiaries of the Family home. Any
one or all of them can, therefore, legally question the execution, forced sale or attachment which
is prohibited under Article 155 thereof. It should be noted that, as already pointed out, the right of
the petitioners as beneficiaries of the family home has been violated when the said family home
was levied upon on execution and sold in violation of the law.

As for lack of cause of action, the Court has already stated above that the right of the petitioners
as beneficiaries of the family home has been transgressed. They, therefore, have a cause of action
against the sheriff’s act of unlawfully levying upon and selling the rights, interests, title and
participation in the land in question and its improvement of Marietta dela Cruz-Sta. Ines.
Pertinently, it may be asked whether an undivided interest of the owner of the family home like
Marietta Sta. Ines can be levied upon on execution and this fact will not violate the prohibition on
such levy found in the Family Code.

The court believes that this can not be done.

Article 154 of the Family Code expressly enumerates the beneficiaries of a family home. If a
person other than any of those enumerated in Article 154 would be allowed to have an undivided
interest in the family home, then he becomes a beneficiary of such property in violation of the
said provision under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, Article 152 of the Family Code provides that “the family home, constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife x x x, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the
land on which it is situated.”

The family home as defined by the said article can not be split in such a way that part of it, albeit
undivided, is owned by a non-beneficiary. To allow this would be to diminish the family home
which can be used and enjoyed by those entitled thereto under the law. This is so because
whoever buys the undivided portion belonging to one of the owners, as in this case, can demand
an equal exercise of the right of co-ownership from the other beneficiaries thereof. To the extent
that such demand can be made effective, the full enjoyment of the property by the beneficiaries
thereof will be correspondingly diminished. The court believes that when the Family Code allows
the constitution of a family home, it does so with the idea that the beneficiaries thereof can have
untrammelled use and enjoyment thereof; hence, the express prohibition to levy on such property.
WHEREFORE, for lack of basis, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. The
respondent is hereby directed to file her answer within 15 days from receipt of this Order.
[5]

On 01 December 1993, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was then granted by
the Nueva Vizcaya RTC in an Order dated 28 January 1994. The trial court reasoned thus:

17
After restudying the jurisprudence involved in the motion for reconsideration impinging [sic] on
the jurisdiction of this court in relation to the execution of a judgment rendered by another
Regional Trial Court (in Pasig, Metro Manila), indeed, the only conclusion that can be honestly
reached is that this court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the herein action.
As correctly posited by the defendant’s counsel, it is the Pasig Regional Trial Court that should
still exercise jurisdiction over execution of its judgments, “a power that carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.” (see GSIS vs.
Guines, 219 SCRA 724; Darwin vs. Takonaza, 197 SCRA 442). In fine, plaintiffs should have
challenged the action of the Sheriffs in the civil case wherein the judgment being executed was
promulgated, and not in an independent action filed with a different or even the same court.
WHEREFORE, for this court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide this case, the instant action
is hereby DISMISSED, with costs de officio.[6]

Herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order of dismissal which was
denied by the lower court in an Order dated 15 March 1994.

Aggrieved, respondents appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals raising the following errors: 1) the
lower court erred in holding that it lacks jurisdiction for the question presented in this case should have
been brought in the Pasig Court as a part of the proceedings therein and not as a separate case; and 2) the
lower court erred in holding that plaintiffs (herein respondents) cannot be considered third-party
claimants.

In their Appellee’s Brief, herein petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the appellate court to entertain the
said appeal arguing that the issues raised were purely questions of law which the Supreme Court has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

On 29 March 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the Order of dismissal.
According to the appellate court:

Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Proceedings where property claimed by third person - If property levied on be claimed

by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an
affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such
right or title, and served the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof
upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the officer
against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied
on. xxx xxx xxx” (Italics supplied)

To fall within the ambit of a third-party claimant within the contemplation of the foregoing, it is
not required that one must claim title to the property levied upon, a claim to the right to the
possession thereof being enough, provided that the grounds of such right are amply explained.

The plaintiffs-appellants in this case claim in their complaint that they have occupied the house
and lot subject of the levy as a family residence since 1972 and that, under Articles 153 and 155
of the Family Code, the same is exempt from execution. Additionally, if indeed the house and lot
subject of this suit are components of a family home, under Article 154 of the same Code, the
plaintiffs are the beneficiaries thereof.

18
As such third-party claimants, plaintiffs-appellants may avail of the remedy known as “terceria”
provided in Section 17 above quoted, by serving upon the sheriff and the judgment creditor their
affidavit attesting to their right of possession of the property under the Family Code. Also, the
plaintiffs-appellants, as third-party claimants, may invoke the supervisory power of the Pasig
Court, as explained in Ong vs. Tating, et al., 149 SCRA 265, and after a summary hearing, the
Pasig Court may command that the house and lot be released from the mistaken levy and restored
to the rightful possessors or owners. But, as held in Ong vs. Tating, supra, the Pasig Court is
limited merely to the determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
performance of his duties in the execution of judgment. The Pasig Court cannot pass upon the
question of title to or right to the possession of the property subject of the levy with any character
of finality and this question has to be resolved in a “proper action” entirely separate and distinct
from that in which the execution was issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit (Sy vs.
Discaya, 181 SCRA 378). Plaintiffs-appellants are not impleaded as parties in the case decided
by the Pasig Court. While, as previously stated, plaintiffs-appellants may avail of the “terceria”,
or may apply for a summary hearing with the Pasig Court as contemplated in Ong vs. Tating,
supra, or may file an independent proper action to assert their right of possession to the house
and lot levied upon, such remedies are not comulative and may be resorted to by them
independent of or separately from and without need of availing of the others (Sy vs. Discaya,
supra).

...

Given the foregoing premises, the Nueva Vizcaya Court was therefore in error in ousting itself of
jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 5853 on the submission that it is only the Pasig Court, which
decided Civil Case No. 53555, that has general supervisory control over the execution of the
judgment in said case, which carries with it, the right to determine every question of fact and law
which may be involved in the execution process.

Coming now to the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal.

The defendant-appellee maintains that since the issue raised in this appeal is purely a question of
law, which is, whether the Nueva Vizcaya Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’
complaint, the latter should have taken their case directly to the Supreme Court.

True it is, that it has been held in a number of cases, that there is a “question of law” when there
is doubt or difference of opinion as to what the law is on a certain state of facts and which does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants and
that there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts (Far East Marble [Phils.], Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 225 SCRA 249 [1993];
Caiña vs. People, 213 SCRA 309 [1992]; Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA
93 [1991]). But a reading of defendant-appellee’s Motion to Dismiss dated October 1, 1993 filed
with the Nueva Vizcaya Court shows that she raised questions of fact in asserting that plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue, claiming that Marietta Dela Cruz Sta-Ines is not a party plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 5853 and that the other plaintiffs are not real parties in interest. The determination
of whether plaintiffs-appellants are real parties in interest hinges on the factual issue of whether
or not they are beneficiaries of a family home within the contemplation of Article 154 of the
Family Code and this would require the reception of factual evidence as to whether said plaintiffs
are really the husband and children of Marietta Sta. Ines and whether they actually reside in the
house and lot subject of Civil Case No. 5853 as to qualify said properties to be considered a
“family home” within the contemplation of Article 153 of the same Code. Moreover, defendant-
appellee argues that the complaint is premature as there is no Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale yet.

19
This, again is a factual issue. There is likewise the question of whether the house and lot
exclusively belong to Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Ines or whether they are conjugal properties, and if
they are conjugal properties, whether they could be levied upon to satisfy the personal liability of
the defendant Marietta Sta. Ines in Civil Case No. 53555 of the Pasig Court. Again, in the Order
dated March 15, 1994 of the Nueva Vizcaya Court, it expressed doubts whether plaintiffs-
appellants are really “third-party claimants in the legal sense of the word” because the house and
lot levied upon in Civil Case No. 53555 exclusively belong to Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Ines and
the plaintiffs-appellants seem to have no right thereto. As to whether the latter have a right to the
house and lot is a question that has to be resolved factually. The dispute or controversy in this
case, therefore, would inevitably raise a question of fact, and accordingly, the appeal to this Court
is proper.

But prescinding from the question of whether the issue raised herein is purelyone of law, it seems
odd that if the Nueva Vizcaya Court had ruled that it had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5853
and defendant-appellee would seek to forthwith assail assumption of jurisdiction. She could do so
only by way of certiorari filed with this Court, and not with the Supreme Court, considering the
prevailing principle upholding the so-called “hierarchy of courts”. But since the Nueva Vizcaya
Court dismissed the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction, defendant-appellee now
vehemently argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the same issue which could have
been raised by her before this same Court had the ruling of the Nueva Vizcaya Court been
different.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of the Court a quo dated January 28, 1994,
dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint for lack ojurisdiction, and the Order of the same Court
dated March 15, 1994, denying plaintiffs-appellants’ motion for reconsideration, are both
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to proceed with the hearing of its
Civil Case No. 5853 until its termination, and to thereafter decide the case accordingly, as the
evidence may warrant.[7]
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Appeals. Claiming that the appellate court committed serious and reversible errors of law
in issuing its 29 March 1996 decision, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, raising the following assignment of errors[8]:

The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya had jurisdiction over the respondent’s petition.

II.
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion in finding
respondents as proper third-party claimants.

III.
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction of the appeal of respondents that involves only questions of law; and in reversing the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya.

Ruling of the Court

First, we shall endeavor to dispose of the issue of whether or not the appellate court has jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal from the Order of dismissal.

20
Petitioners maintain that the question of whether or not the dismissal by the Nueva Vizcaya RTC of the
complaint filed by respondents due to lack of jurisdiction, lack of capacity to sue, and failure to state a
cause of action is a pure question of law which does not require evidence and should be resolved on the
basis of the allegations in the complaint alone. Petitioners further argue that the case involves only two
issues: 1) whether or not the Nueva Vizcaya RTC can annul and set aside an execution sale made by the
sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Pasig RTC; and 2) whether or not the beneficiaries of
a family home can claim exemption from the execution under Art. 155 of the Family Code for wrongful
acts committed by Marietta from 1977 up to 1986 before the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August
1988. Petitioners conclude that the disposition of these two issues does not necessitate the reception of
factual evidence, thus, are clearly questions of law.

We agree with petitioners that the appeal of respondents to the Court of Appeals raises only questions of
law. It must be stressed at this point that the appeal of respondents to the appellate court stemmed from
the Order of the Nueva Vizcaya RTC dated 28 January 1994 dismissing the complaint “for lack of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.” Whether or not such dismissal is correct is neither a question of
fact nor of fact and law; it involves a pure question of law because what is to be resolved is whether,
admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial court has jurisdiction over it in the light of
the laws governing jurisdiction.[9]

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.[10] On the other hand, there is a question of fact when
the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.[11] In
cases of motions to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint are deemed
admitted.[12] Thus, the hypothetical admission in a motion to dismiss of the facts alleged in the complaint
renders them beyond dispute and forecloses any issue of fact for purposes of the motion.[13] And the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom for purposes of applying the law on jurisdiction is
accurate or correct is a question of law.[14]
Therefore, respondents’ appeal having been improperly brought before the Court of Appeals, it should
have been dismissed by the appellate court pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – An appeal under

Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by the said
court. . . .

Nonetheless, in order to put to rest this case involving the execution of the house
and lot in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, the Court deems it proper to discuss
the issue of whether or not herein respondents, husband and children of the owner of the
levied property, may validly seek the annulment of the sale of said property.[15]

It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against property
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor, and any third person adversely affected by the mistaken
levy of his property to answer for another man’s debt may validly assail such levy through the remedies
provided for by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Under said rule, a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of (1) terceria[16] to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the
property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor; and (2) independent “separate action” to

21
vindicate their claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.[17] If a “separate
action” is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an
action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or
without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ.[18]

In the case at bar, herein respondents are strangers to the action where the writ of execution was
issued. As pointed out by the Nueva Vizcaya RTC in its original Order denying the motion to dismiss,
the husband and children of Marietta were not parties to the Pasig RTC case and are third-party claimants
who became such only after trial in the previous case had been terminated and the judgment therein had
become final and executory. Neither are they indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case,
and they could not, therefore, intervene in said case. As strangers to the original case, respondents cannot
be compelled to present their claim with the Pasig RTC which issued the writ of execution.[19] In
choosing to institute a “separate action” before a competent court in the province where the levied
property is located (Nueva Vizcaya RTC), respondents correctly exercised a remedy provided for in the
Rules of Court in order that they may vindicate their alleged claim to the levied house and lot. It was,
therefore, erroneous for the trial court to dismiss the complaint based on lack of jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, respondents’ complaint for annulment of sale of the levied property must still be
dismissed. In their petition before Nueva Vizcaya RTC, herein respondents aver that the property is
exempt from execution under Section 12, Rule 39 of the 1988 Rules on Civil Procedure as said property
is the judgment debtor’s duly constituted family home under the Family Code. According to respondents,
the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time
they occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under Section 153 of the Family Code,
there is no longer any need to constitute the said property as family home, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, because it became such by operation of law. Furthermore, respondents assert that the
money judgment against Marietta was rendered by the trial court in January 1989 long after the
constitution of the said family home.

Such contentions are erroneous. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to
the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not
constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her
debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family
home. As stated in the case of Modequillo v. Breva[20]:

. . . Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It
does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Neither is it correct to say that the obligation sought to be satisfied by the levy of the
property was incurred only upon the issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of
1989. As stated by herein petitioners, the complaint against Marietta was instituted on 17 June
1986 to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to acts and omissions committed by
Marietta as early as 1977 when she assumed management and supervision of their deceased

22
mother’s rice land. This means to say that Marietta’s liability, which was the basis of the
judgment, arose long before the levied property was constituted as a family home by operation of
law in August 1988. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred by Marietta
falls squarely under one of the instances when a family home may be the subject of execution,
forced sale, or attachment, as provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to
answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 5853 entitled, “Roel Sta.
Ines, et al. v. Mary Josephine Gomez, et al.,” filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, is hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]

FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE,

INC., respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family
Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?

Statement of the Case

This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of
Appealsi[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on February 21, 1990 and its Resolution promulgated
on March 21, 1991, affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding the issuance of various
writs of execution to enforce the latter’s decision in Civil Case No. 53271.

The Facts

Petitioner Florante F. Manacopii[2] and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-
meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.iii[3] The property, located in
Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 174180.

23
 On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner
and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to
collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered
into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides:
“c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their
means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected.” (sic)
On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise
agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private
respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23, 1986. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other
personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at
public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution
and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet
executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there was no showing
that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected. They
buttressed their motion with supplements and other pleadings.
On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the following grounds: (a) it was too
late to question the September 23, 1986 Order considering that more than two years had elapsed; (b) the
second alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitioner and his company were in
bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that from February 1984 to January 5,
1989, they had collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56. On September 21, 1989, private respondent
filed an opposition to petitioner and his company’s addendum to the motion to quash the writ of
execution. It alleged that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not be considered a family
home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired
in 1972, should have been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.
On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the
prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his
company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting to
P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that
petitioner’s residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home,
pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing
the lower court’s Orders of September 23, 1986 and September 26, 1989. On February 21, 1990,
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The appellate court quoted with approval the findings of the lower court that: (a) the judgment based on
the compromise agreement had become final and executory, stressing that petitioner and his company had
collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but still failed to pay their indebtedness and (b) there was no
showing that petitioner’s residence had been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it from
execution. On the second finding, the Court of Appeals added that:
“x x x. We agree with the respondent judge that there is no showing in evidence that
petitioner Mañacop’s residence under TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a family home
in accordance with law. For one thing, it is the clear implication of Article 153 that the family
home continues to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its beneficiaries enumerated in
Article 154 actually resides therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family home if
none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it. There is no showing in evidence that any of its
beneficiaries is actually residing therein. On the other hand, the unrefuted assertion of private

24
 respondent is that petitioner Florante Mañacop had already left the country and is now, together
with all the members of his family, living in West Covina, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.”
Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground that the
property covered by TCT No. 174180 was exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the Court of
Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its ruling on Modequillo v.
Breva,iv[4] which held that “all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.”
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the Court of Appeals explained:
“The record of the present case shows that petitioners incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00
from private respondent corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex `A’, Petition). The judgment
based upon the compromise agreement was rendered by the court on April 18, 1986 (Annex
`C’, Ibid). Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo case, both the debt and the judgment
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily, the case at bar does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided under Article 155 of the Family Code.”
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari arguing that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He contends that there was no need for him to constitute his house and
lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of the same property
from the time “it was levied upon and up to this moment.”

The Issue

As stated in the opening sentence of this Decision, the issue in this case boils down to whether a final
and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family
Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On
the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.

No Novel Issue

At the outset, the Court notes that the issue submitted for resolution in the instant case is not entirely
new. In Manacop v. Court of Appeals,v[5] petitioner himself as a party therein raised a similar question of
whether this very same property was exempt from preliminary attachment for the same excuse that it was
his family home. In said case, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of money. As an
incident in the proceedings before it, the trial court issued a writ of attachment on the said house and lot.
In upholding the trial court (and the Court of Appeals) in that case, we ruled that petitioner incurred the
indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence,
petitioner’s family home was not exempt from attachment “by sheer force of exclusion embodied in
paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in Modequillo,” where the Court categorically ruled:

25
 “Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family
who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
‘Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.’
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted
as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one
year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1960 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it is provided that `the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.’ It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences
at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article
162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited?
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time
of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.”vi[6]6 (Underscoring supplied.)

Article 153 of the Family Code Has No Retroactive Effect

26
 Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt from
execution in view of his failure to show that the property involved “has been duly constituted as a family
home in accordance with law.” He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply the
occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a
family home.vii[7]
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988,viii[8] the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article
153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not
have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil
Codeix[9] had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof
that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the
law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred
and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded
by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.

List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted to Those Enumerated in the Code

In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to address the other arguments of petitioner
other than to correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing
in the family home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person
staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the
family home. This contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
“any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is “actual” is something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. x[10] Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.
“Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for lead support.”
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife.xi[11] But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries
contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by an overseer like Carmencita V.
Abat in this case xii[12] is insufficient compliance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This Decision is
immediately executory. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

27
28
 i
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999]

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA
AYSON, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged
that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No.
0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 12, 1984, which
modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in a land registration
case[1] filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived of income from the land
as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of rentals from tenants of the
land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that
private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad
faith.[2]
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent
Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived
petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of
possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao,
the return thereof having been received by petitioners’ counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly
receiving rentals from the tenants of the land; that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros
and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed
upon by the trial court; that petitioners’ claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims
before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith
and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to
private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to
private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents.[3]
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that “earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful.”
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in which they
denied, among other things, that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise but the parties were
unsuccessful.
On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private
respondents’ answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the
complaint.[4] Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners’ claims and thus
tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after trial.[5]
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. At the same time, however, it dismissed
the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and,
therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial
court reads:[6]
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, is of the
opinion and so holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in
their answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to the amended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages
against them, but also because of the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA
307), citing Rili vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily
prove the amount thereof and that though the rule is that failure to specifically deny the allegations in the
complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admission of said allegations, there is however an exception to it, that
is, that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. This ruling is
in accord with the provision of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise with
the defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was not verified as provided in Article 151 of the
Family Code. Besides, it is not believed that there were indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile
the two feuding brothers, Gregorio and Augusto, both surnamed Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, the same is not necessary
or jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, et
al., respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977, is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar for
the fact is the rationale in that case is not present in the instant case considering these salient points:
a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not a
member of the Hontiveros Family, is not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio, a fact which
Gregorio also denied in their verified answer to the amended complaint;
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right or interest in the
land that was litigated by Gregorio and Augusto, unlike in the cited case of Magbaleta where it was
shown that a stranger to the family acquired certain right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at all of the name of
Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot 37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was
therein described as a widower. Moreover, Teodora was never mentioned in said decision, nor in the
amended complaint and in the amended motion for judgment on the pleadings that she ever took any
part in the act or transaction that gave rise to the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which
they now claim some compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it hereby orders, the dismissal
of this case with cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. [7] Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST
EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS
REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT DENYING THE MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
 Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should have brought this case
on appeal to the Court of Appeals since the order of the trial court judge was actually a decision on the merits.
On the other hand, even if petition for certiorari were the proper remedy, they contend that the petition is
defective because the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a respondent.[8]
Private respondents’ contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. As explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:[9]
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested
with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved. A similar provision is contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law
are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in
conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of law have to be
through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held that:
x x x when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct
mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of
error, involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal - except only if the appeal is taken in special
proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which even the
filing of a record on appeal is additionally required. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely
questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder) specified in
Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.
By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on March 9, 1990 Circular
No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which provides:
2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court. – Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be
appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the
clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that herein petitioner adopted
the correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court a petition to review on certiorari the
decision of the Regional Trail Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of
law.
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held:[10]
It must also be stressed that the trial court’s order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner’s complaint was,
whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the particular matter resolved, or settled
definitely the matter therein disposed of and left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution
of the order. It is a firmly settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and not
certiorari. That appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be taken only to this Court; or on
questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal should be brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to
Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court should be by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from which an
appeal can be taken. It is final in the sense that it disposes of the pending action before the court and puts an end
to the litigation so that nothing more was left for the trial court to do.[11] Furthermore, as the questions raised are
questions of law, petition for review on certiorari is the proper mode of appeal. These questions are: (1)
whether after denying petitioners’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court could dismiss their
complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code which provides that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the complaint, which must be verified,
that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but the same have failed; and (2) whether Art. 151
applies to this case. These questions do not require an examination of the probative value of evidence presented
and the truth or falsehood of facts asserted which questions of fact would entail.[12]
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when no motion
to that effect was made by any of the parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, private respondents did not seek the dismissal of the case but only the denial of petitioners’ motion.
Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the case even without a
motion to that effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog,[13] this Court mentioned these cases, to
wit:
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff’s right to be heard, except in
the following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court
finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.
Moreover, the trial court itself found that “judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact
that [private respondents] in their answer . . . specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also
because of the [rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. . . .”
Necessarily, a trial must be held.
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:[14]
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegation of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of the party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court has the
discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party.[15] Where there are actual issues
raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and assessment
thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render judgment based on the pleadings alone.[16] In this
case, aside from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private
respondent Teodora Ayson’s participation and/or liability, if any, to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and
duration of private respondents’ possession of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied
petitioners’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint on the ground that, although it alleged
that earnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint was not
verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding
efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to
verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings
or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.[17]
Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest
efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties’ efforts proved unsuccessful is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the court be
justified in dismissing the action. Thus, Art. 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. It
if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is
not exclusively among family members. Citing several cases[18] decided by this Court, petitioners claim that
whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to
compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to
the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the
phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.[19] As this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC,
Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI:[20]
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of “brothers and
sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-law.” In that case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that “sisters-in-law” (hence, also “brothers-in-law”) are not listed under Art. 217 of the
New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of “members of the family,” we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.[21]
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in
effect amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in
favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the
conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this
question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this decision.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004]

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions [2] dated 2 July
1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[3] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite (“RTC”), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribiana’s (“Edwin”) motion to
dismiss the petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent Lourdes Tribiana (“Lourdes”).

Antecedent Facts

Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union
only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming
that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (“Khriza”). Edwin has since
deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later,
it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina Tribiana (“Rosalina”). Edwin moved to
dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise
were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior
efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File
Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring
Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,
Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwin’s petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate court also denied
Edwin’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

The RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action attached by
Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise but failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not required in petitions for habeas corpus.

The Issue

Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
 WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Edwin argues that Lourdes’ failure to indicate in her petition for habeas corpus that the parties exerted prior
efforts to reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petition’s dismissal under Section
1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family Code,
an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable condition precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.
Edwin’s arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss,
Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the
authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the parties tried to
compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite
the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A
dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition
precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the
proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5] It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to
arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. [6] Such
defect does not place the controversy beyond the court’s power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in
a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.[7] Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right
without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading.[8] A motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading.[9] More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that
in cases where the defect consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court
should order the amendment of the complaint.[10] Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies between the parties.[11]
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the
paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities
should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. [12] This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, “No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” In this case, the child (Khriza)
was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwin’s contentions by citing as an additional ground the exception in
Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (“LGC”) on barangay conciliation, which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. – the parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:
xxx
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
xxx.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding in two
instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention. The second instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such
custody. The most common case falling under the second instance involves children who are taken away from a
parent by another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas corpus
proceedings where a person is “deprived of personal liberty.” In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes
the parties “to go directly to court” without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of
personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the “rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.”[13] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwin’s
contentions on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay
conciliation requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTC’s denial of his motion to dismiss merely
states a blanket allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.” An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory
and is not a proper subject of a petition for certiorari.[14] Even in the face of an error of judgment on the part of a
judge denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of
procedure.[15] The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose
as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary
circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort to a petition for certiorari is
proper.[16]
The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on technicalities. This is precisely
what has happened in this case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint of the slightest abuse of discretion by
the RTC or the Court of Appeals. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency of
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse. More importantly, any
matter involving the custody of a child of tender age deserves immediate resolution to protect the child’s
welfare.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending
before it. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

ii
iii

iv
THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004]

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 15,
1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to
acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the
amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf
of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in
the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as
petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her
to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to
support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual encounter.
The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was
pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he
rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City,
she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatania’s version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her
employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following
morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year’s Eve in
Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While
they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they
spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when
he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the
following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner’s house hoping to
be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner’s wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However
petitioner’s wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told
petitioner’s wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and
they did not see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia’s counsel. She was
demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He
insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in
at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her
in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery
that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private
respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the
personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of
the defendant with plaintiff-minor’s mother, Florencia Regodos.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff in
support of the claim to “be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with the
plaintiff’s mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was presented before
the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child, then
there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor’s
mother, Florencia Regodos.”[2]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not
prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a witness has
been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the whole
of her testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly reasonable to believe
the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts
(People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her
first intercourse with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September
9, 1982, she gave birth to appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit “A”).
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial court and
there being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the trial court’s findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[3]
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL
CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[4]
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general rule,
factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a different conclusion, and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. The Court is convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions.[5]
 The trial court’s finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was based on
the testimony of the child’s mother and “the personal appearance of the child.”
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation.[6] An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.[7]
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was
without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child on the information of a third person.[8]
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child’s paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.[10]
Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod
City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia’s testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court
brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both
courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that
Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption
that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. [11] The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow
out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.[12]
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before
the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60,
in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent’s petition for recognition and
support is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

v
vi

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate
which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was
signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely
affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said
certificate.

Statement of the Case

Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as
follows:
IN VIEW wHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista
Guinto. 4

The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:

the Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]

1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void "ab initio";

2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City
BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;

Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for
private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter
referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 3046.

From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the onlysurviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on
September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old,
and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years
old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house,
assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature
of Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name
BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it;
that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth,
since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a)
Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941,
the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared
void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . .
the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the
respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan
City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.

TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack
on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa
Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code;
and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code."
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of private
respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent."

In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known asTeofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto;
that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for
the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of
the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of Baptism, . . .
Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of
special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it
being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñoza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the
Family Code. 5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological
child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became
pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy
had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the
advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate
was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of
Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.

The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father
could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said
provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not
his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the
ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the mother.

Hence, this appeal. 6

Issues

Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:

1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding
of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review on certiorari;

2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of
limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record of
petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent. 7

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

First Issue: Subject of

the Present Action

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 8 of the Family Code states that
the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the
legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.

This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 9 The interest of respondent in the civil status
of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. 10 The case concerned
the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.

Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all.
Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:

Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:

xxx xxx xxx

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166,
it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for
him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
his child; (3) that in case of children conceived insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs
should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err
when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166
SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

Second Issue: Prescription

Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already
prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge
of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside
in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the placeof birth as defined in the first paragraph
or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period
shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said
birth, whichever is earlier.

This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it
does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does
not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab
initio. 1

Third Issue:

Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate

Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the Birth Certificate.

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by
the local civil
registrar. 14 More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.

Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy,
such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that
time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly
suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.1âwphi1.nêt

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor
her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:

q Who are your children?

a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.

q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?

a She is not our child.

q Do you recall where she was born?

a In our house because her mother was our house helper.

q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?

a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.

q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?

a No, sir. 15

Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogena's child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.

All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.

Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.

Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1

The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in
Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died
intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria
Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797
(90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well
and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-
deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without
descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .On
November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente
Benitez and capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress
their legal postures.

The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2)
Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of
the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also
testified that the said spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a
child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-
Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the
biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents
petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the
spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code.

On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the
Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another one entered declaring that
appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the
petition for the appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is,
consequently, DENIED; said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower
court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and
the Rules.

Costs against appellee.

SO ORDERED.

In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code.

In this petition for review, petitioner contends:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply
the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in adopting
and upholding private respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child;

2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of
Marissa's birth, still the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more
weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and demeanor have not
convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the
now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of the supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.

We find no merit to the petition.

Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at
bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of thehusband or that of a donor or
both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or
ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The
instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:

a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; o

c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.

2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of
the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph
or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period
shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said
birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding Article only in the following case:

1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

2) If he should de after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it
is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that
in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should
file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner
was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451,
457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz.:

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal
heir of the deceased.We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the
biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court
exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as follows:

. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her
biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing
that she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late Vicente
O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting her
treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such
that she herself had believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.

The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:

First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never
delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already
been married for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still could not
bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent
obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years. There
is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then,
being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother)
through law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when she
refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby
girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby
girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio
was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque, MM.
Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria
Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any
time, she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under
her oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who
testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had drugstore
in the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee
Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is
also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who
used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever
become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa
in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter
where the baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell
about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).

The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are
matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and
could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby
as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa
Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that baby.

Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly
questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years old at the time of the child's
supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child
not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-
gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been
difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth
certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no
physician or even a midwife attending?

At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent times for people who want to
avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil
registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the
expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the
parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a
little older but did not come around doing so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But
definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not
a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child,
and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.

Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife
Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on
April 25, 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN
because she died without descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness stand by
appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he
signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such
a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and,
therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document
without understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we
cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13,
1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-
law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa
stating that:

even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only daughter will inherit what is legally my own
property, in case I die without a will,

and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband —

that any inheritance due him from my property — when he die — to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not
mean what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to decide for himself regarding those.

(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B"We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests
to her husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and
supplicate her husband to give appellee although without any legal papers her properties when she dies, and likewise for her
husband to give Marissa the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly
their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.

Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the
date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's)
mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same
birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that
they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on
record. The weight of these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable
of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by
the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted
the truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the most telling was the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente
Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The
repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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