I.

Introduction

A. Case Method

Common features of reported opinions (Rombauer)

a) Case Name
b) Name of receiving court and date the opinion was released
c) Headnotes numbered paragraphs that precede the opinion; written by reporters or by employees of publishers
d) Name of the lower court whose decision is being received
e) Concise statement of the case and of the appellate courts judgement or order
f) Names of the parties attorneys
g) Name of the author of the opinion
h) Names of other judges who joined in the opinion

Case Law (Shapo)

Briefing a Case: Parts of a Judicial Decision
a) Facts
- events between the parties that led to the litigation and tell how the case came before the court that is now deciding it
- facts relevant to the issue the court must decise and to the reasons for its decision
- relevant background, plaintiff and defendant, basis for plaintiffs suit, relief the plaintiff is seeking, procedural history, dispositive motions,
lower courts decision, grounds for that decision, party who appealed
b) Issues
- questions that the court must decide to resolve the dispute between the parties
- identify rule of law that governs dispute and ask how it should apply to the facts
- often more than one
c) Holdings
- courts decision on the question that was actually before it
- dicta legal statements not related to the actual question before it
d) Reasoning
- explains and supports the courts decision
- isolate the courts reasoning from the facts and the holding of the case
e) Policy
- underlying legal decisions; goals that the decision-maker wishes to further

Using parts of a Judicial Decision

a) Reasoning by Analogy
ANALOGIZING
- Doctrine of precedent
- Compare cases and make distinctions between them
- Decide how the decisions of previous cases apply to the new problem
- Analogous if cases resemble each other in important ways, such as relevant facts
- Same facts, issues and reasoning must apply equally well to the facts
- Offer probable proof for conclusions
- Assess all possible applications

DISTINGUISHING
- If cases are different, distinguish differences in facts require court to apply different rule
- Able to predict probable outcome of case

b) Applying Precedent
- Determine the facts relevant to the issue in the case and the reasons for the courts holding
- Determine if the facts in the two cases are basically analogous or distinguishable
- Applying precedent

Obiter Dicta (Reed)

- Duty of court to expound and interpret not make it
- A judicial opinion is only binding in so far as it is relevant. When it wanders from the point at issue, it no longer has for as an official utterance
- Obiter is a gratuitious opinion which binds none
- Every statement in an opinion is not to be condemned as unsound merely because it may be classed as obiter
- It is an overflow of mind surcharged with knowledge on the general subject before the court
- Do not condemn judges and protect them against their old obiter dicta
 PACU v SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
97 PHIL 806
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No.
2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180 be declared unconstitutional on several grounds, to wit: (1)
they deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers
and parents of liberty and property without due process of law,
(2) they deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear
their children for civic efficiency, and (3) the provisions of the
said Act conferring to the Secretary of Education unlimitied
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that (1) the matter
constitutes no justiciable controversy, (2) petitioners are in
estoppel to challenge the validity of the said Act, and (3) the Acts
are constitutionally valid.
ISSUE/RULING/RATIO:
(1) WON the issue is justiciable. No. The issue only becomes
justiciable when the petitioners will suffer, or has suffered, an injury as
a result of the statute. On that note, the petitioners already have
permits and are actually operating by virtue of those permits. They did
not show that the respondent threathened to revoke their permits. As
such, they do not need relief in the form they are seeking to obtain.
(2) WON the statute creating the Board of Educational Survey is
unconstitutional. No. The power of the state to regulate educational
PAMIL v TELERON
86 SCRA 413
DOCTRINE: To render a statute unconstitutional, 8 votes are needed to constitute a majority.
FACTS:
Fr. Margarito R. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal
mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol in 1971
Petitioner Pamil, an aspirant for the office, filed a suit of quo
warranto (a hearing to determine by what authority someone has
an office) for Fr. Gonzagas disqualification based on
Administrative Code (1917) Sec 2175:
o In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality.
Respondent Judge sustained the right of Fr. Gonzaga to the
office of municipal mayor
o He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly
repealed by the Election Code of 1971
o (Cited in J Teehankees separate opinion: All persons
possessing the necessary qualifications, except those
expressly disqualified by the election code, are
eligible to run for public office.)
Petitioner elevated the matter to the SC
o He argues that there was no such implied repeal; the
statute is still in full force and effect
ISSUE:
WoN Fr. Gonzaga can be disqualified by virtue of Sec 2175
of the Administrative Code
HOLDING:
Yes.
RATIO:
While 7 Justices seek to affirm Judge Telerons decision,
the remaining 5 members of the SC disagree; the vote of
institutions is provided for in the Constitution. Further, by virtue of a
study and survey which reported that a great majority of the private
educational institutions are money-making devices necessitates the
exercise of the Governments police power.
(3) WON the statute constitutes unlawful delegation of power. No. The
standards are left on the hands of the Secretary because he has the
relevant expertise and experience to do so. Further, the standards
have been in effect for 37 years without complaint.
(4) WON the 1% levied on receipts for expenses in supervision is
unconstitutional.The legality falls within the original jurisdiction of the
CFI.
(5) WON the power to regulate the textbooks to be used by the private
schools constitutes censorship. The issue is not a justiciable
controversy. Further, the petitioners have not shown that the any text
has been prohibited, or that petitioners refused or intend to refuse to
submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial
priveleges or rights for refusing so.
NOTES
The criterion for justiciability illustrated in this case is whether or not
there is an actual controversy.
the 7 does not suffice to render the challenged
provision ineffective
7 Justices: the challenged provision is no longer operative
either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution
or repealed
Reasons for constitutional objections:
(1) The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in
1917. The 1935 Constitution explicitly declares: No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights. The ban cannot survive.
(2) The SC has had previous rulings invalidating Sections
of the Revised Administrative Code on grounds of
being against the 1935 Constitution
(3) The challenged Administrative Code is, on its face,
inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by
the Constitution. To declare as ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office is
to impose a religious test.
(4) It is never too late to re-establish constitutional rights,
even if such statutes neglecting them had been
accepted for a great length of time.
5 Justices: such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic
running for elective office is not unconstitutional. The
following are their separate opinions.
o CJ Castro: Sec 23 of the Election Code of 1971
is of no relevance to Sec 2175 of the
Administrative Code.
o Moreover, the proscription in Sec 2175 does not
prescribe a religious test
o For a later provision of law to be considered as
having repealed a prior provision, there must
 be such absolute repugnance between the
two. There is none.
o Election of ecclesiastics may spawn small
religious wars instead of promote the general
community welfare and peace
The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed it
must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application.
Petition for certiorari granted. Respondent Gonzaga ordered to
immediately vacate the mayoralty.
Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the
PARAS v COMELEC
264 SCRA 49
DOCTRINE: The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its
context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of
Pula, Cabanatuan City. He won in 1994.
A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by
the registered voters of the barangay.
COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the
petition signing on Oct 14, 1995, and set the recall election
on Nov 13, 1995.
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition (the law
requires only 25%)
Petitioner opposed the recall election; it was deferred by
COMELEC
Dec 6, 1995: COMELEC set anew the recall election on
Dec 16, 1995
Petitioner filed before the Cabanatuan City RTC a petition
for injunction, RTC issued a TRO
TRO was lifted, petition dismissed; respondent and his
counsel required to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall was
without COMELEC approval
Jan 5, 1996: COMELEC re-scheduled the recall election for
the 3rd time on Jan 13, 1996, hence the instant petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction
ISSUES:
WoN the petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction has merit
o Petitioner argues, citing Sec 74(b) of RA No.
7160 or the Local Government Code: no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the officials assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
o Jan 13 election is now barred because the SK
election was set by RA No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996 and every 3 years
thereafter
VILLANUEVA v CA
379 SCRA 463
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
several parties including IBC-13, which the labor arbiter ruled in
favor of Villanueva.
IBC-13 appealed to the NLRC, filing a surety bond supposedly
issued by BF General Insurance Company and a confirmation
letter from its President.-Both documents were found to be
1935 Constitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was
also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer
included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Also, legislation that
intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative
intent to repeal the former statutory law.
Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be
such absolute repugnance between the two. No such repugnance is
discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. The
section also admitted no exception, therefore there can be none. The
Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation.
o In Labor Union vs. Letrondo-Montejo, the SC
considered the SK election as a regular local
election
HOLDING:
No.
RATIO:
(1) Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context (i.e. that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment)
The evident intent of Sec 74 is to subject an elective
local official to recall election once during his term of
office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during
the second year of his term of office.
The provision is not with respect to any other election or
term of office other than the office of the local elective
official concerned (because recall election is potentially
disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses)
(2) A statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution
Sec 74 should not be in conflict with the Constitutional
mandate of Sec 3, Art X of the Constitution: enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum
Petitioners reading is too literal.
Nevertheless, recall is no longer possible because the
next Punong Barangay election is barely 7 months
away (May 1997)
Petition dismissed for having become moot and academic. TRO as
issued by the SC on Jan 12, 1996 enjoining the recall election is made
permanent.
falsified, so that criminal informations for falsification of public
documents against a number of accused including respondent
Villadores were filed.
After Villadores was arraigned, the fiscals office submitted a
Motion to Admit Amended Informations with the following
amendment: "to the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and
of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of
truth as therein proclaimed. (granted). Villadores filed a Motion
 for Reconsideration(denied).
Villadores then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking
to annul the Order admitting the amended informations as well
as the Order denying his motion for reconsideration.
Although the petition was dismissed, the CA pronounced that
Villanueva is not the offended party in the cases and that he
could not have sustained damages from the falsifications.
Villadores then moved in the trial court to disqualify Rico &
Associates as private prosecutor of Villanueva on the basis of
the CAs pronouncement. Villanueva opposed the motion on the
ground that the pronouncement is mere obiter dictum.
The trial court denied the motion for disqualification. Villadores
sought reconsideration (denied).
Villadores then filed petition for certiorari with the CA seeking
annulment of the Order denying his motion for disqualification
and the Order denying reconsideration.
The CA reversed the Orders and directed that Villanuevas name
appearing as he offended party in the criminal cases be
stricken.-Villanueva now comes to the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
w/n the pronouncement of the appellate court that petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in the criminal cases is obiter
dictum (opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law
which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it, and as
such is not binding as precedent).
RATIO:
- The pronouncement touched upon a matter clearly raised by
Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the amended
informations. Among the issues therein was w/n Villanueva is the
offended party.
- An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum; this rule applies to all pertinent
questions (even only incidentally involved) presented and decided in
the regular course of considering the case, and led to its conclusion
(or any statement on a matter on which the decision is based).

B. Philippine legal system

The Legal System, Analytical Reasoning, and Legal Authorities by Dan Gatmaytan

Philippine Legal system

- mixture of civil law and common law
- most single importation is the introduction of a judicial system modelled in all its essential characteristics on the judicial system of the United States
- Supreme Court initially respected the civil law tradition introduced by Spain
- later held American Jurisprudence was of transcendental importance
- Philippine common law composed of Anglo-American and Spanish principles and local complementary laws
- Supreme Court interpreting laws and rendering decisions relying on the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases subject to the limited
exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such
precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions

Stare decisis
Judicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater weight than that of an executive or administrative officer in the construction of other statutes of
similar import.
It is an invaluable aid in the construction or interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled.
Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting
society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations and applications
In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by the parties; it must be a
direct ruling, not merely an obiter dictum
Obiter dictum opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it; not binding as
a precedent
The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same.
Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare decisis does not apply.
The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. It does not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law.
The duty of the court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of law in force
Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a precedent enunciated by the SC except by way of repeal or amendment of the law itself

Res Judicata
Attempt to litigate issues anew despite the fact that these have already settled in a case involving the same parties
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must occur: 1) former judgement or order must be final; 2) the judgement or order must be on the
merits; 3) must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and 4) there must be, between the first
and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

Law of the Case

Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law of the case between the same parties
in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
of the case before the court.
In law of the case, the first judgement is generally not yet final. It relates entirely to questions of law and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case
Analytical Reasoning
- two methods: deduction and analogy
- Deduction has an established structure, consisting of a major premise, minor premise and a conclusion. The major premise states a rule of law
applicable to a class of a situation while the minor premise describes the facts of the clients situation, and the conclusion states whether the right or duty
described in the rule of law has been demonstrated to exist under the facts of the clients situation.
- Analogy is a form of logic by which one reasons that because two items are alike in at least one respect, they are alike in at least one other respect. It
involves three steps:
1) a lawyer identifies a rule or holding announced in a prior case,
2) the lawyer determines whether the facts are like those of a prior case
3) the characterization of the facts as like or unlike those of the precedent yields the conclusion that the clients legal situation should or
should not have the same legal consequence as the facts in the precedent.

The Decision
- must be concise, complete, correct and clear
- should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the rules of Court and circulars and orders of
the Supreme court.
- Article 8, Sec. 14 of the Constitution: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctively the facts and the
law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefore.
- in Velarde v. Social Jusrice Society, the essential parts of a good decision include:
1) Statement of the case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. If in a criminal case, this part describes the specific
charge and plea of the accused. If the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for certoriari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court
and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.
2) Statement of facts synthesize, summarize and simplify. There are different ways of relying the facts:
a) objective or reportorial method the judge summarizes without comment the testimony of each witness and the contents of
each exhibit;
b) synthesis method the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant is summarized
c) subjective method version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining the parties versions
d) combination of objective and subjective means testimony of each witness is reported and the judge formulates his or her own
version of the facts
3) Issues or assignment of errors factual and legal issues should be stated; all assigned errors
4) Court ruling - in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in
the complaint or other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition. It is better to resolve procedural questions before substantive ones.
5) Dispositive portion In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the
participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, the modifying circumstances, if any, and the civil liability and costs. In a civil case, the disposition
should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted and the costs.
- DISPOSITIVE > BODY. The dispositive portion cannot be found or inferred from the body of the decision. The portion
of a decision that becomes the subject of execution if that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part but there are exceptions- a) when there is
ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgement because the dispositive part of a decision
must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi; b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the
decision

The Syllabus
- prepared by the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision for the convenience of lawyers in reading reports
- not part of the courts decision
- should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the court

The Certification
- Art 8, Sec 13
- meant to ensure the implementation of the requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts are reached after consultation
with the members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing
- lack of certification does not invalidate decision but serves as evidence of failure to observe certification requirement and holds accountable official
responsible for omission
- Required to be certified: judicial cases, resolutions of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
- Not required to be certified: administrative cases, per curiam decision, minute resolution

Memorandum Decision
- those which adopt by reference the findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior tribunals
- must not be limited to the dispositive portion but to state nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record and contain a statement
of applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and conclusions on the case

Per Curiam Opinions

- opinion of the Court in which judges are all of one mind and the question involved is so clear that it is not necessary to elaborate it by an extended
discussion
- unsigned and decided by the court
- usually resorted to for cases involving the imposition of death penalty or administrative penalties

Minute Resolutions
- decreed by the court as final and executor where: 1) a cases is patently without merit, 2) issues raised are factual in nature, 3) the decision appealed
from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, or 4) it is clear from the records that the
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgement and for non-compliance with the rules
- not constitutionally infirm because they are not decisions

Obiter Dictum
- not precedent; is a matter that was not raised expressly and therefore, it was not a prerequisite in disposing of the case
- remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a case, incidentally or collaterally and not directly upon the question before the court,
or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; lacks force of an adjudication and is not to be regarded as such
- opinions entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case
- not binding as precedent within the stare decisis rule but may be followed if sufficiently persuasive

Authority
- anything that a court can rely on in reaching its conclusion
- Primary authority is any law that the court can rely on in reaching its conclusions. Ex. Statutes, regulations, constitutional provisions, executive orders,
ordinances, treaties and other court opinions
- Secondary authority is any non-law source that the court can rely in reaching its conclusion. Ex. Legal and nonlegal periodical literature, encyclopedias,
dictionaries and treatises
- Two types: mandatory and persuasive
a) Mandatory Authority
- whatever the court must rely on in reaching its conclusion
- only primary authority cannot be secondary authority
b) Persuasive Authority
- whatever the court relies on when it is not required to do so
- 2 kinds: prior court opinion which is persuasive, secondary authority which is persuasive

See Legal System of the Philippines by Feliciano

II. Statutes and their Enactment

A. Definition

Laws, generally
A whole body or system of law
Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state
Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the ex of legislative power), Presidential issuances (ordinance power) Jurisprudence, ordinances passed
by sanggunians of local government units.

Statutes, generally
An act of legislature (Philippine Commission, Phil. Legislature, Batasang Pambansa, Congress)
PDs of Marcos during the period of martial law 1973 Constitution
EO of Aquino revolutionary period Freedom Constitution

Manner of referring to statutes

Public Acts Phil Commission and Phil Legislature 1901- 1935
Commonwealth Acts 1936- 1946
Republic Acts Congress 1946- 1972, 1987 ~
Batas Pambansa Batasang Pambansa
Identification of laws serial number and/or title

B. Classification of Statutes

Public and Private

! Public affects the public at large
general applies to the whole state and operates throughout the state alike upon all people or all of a class.
Special relates to particular person or things of a class or to a particular community, individual or thing.
Local Law operation is confined to a specific place or locality (e.g municipal ordinance)
! Private applies only to a specific person or subject.

Permanent and temporary statutes

 Permanent - one whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until repealed.
Temporary - duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event.
o E.g. statute answering to an emergency

Other classes of statutes

Prospective or retroactive according to application
o RETROACTIVE LAW
! one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws
! creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty
! attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past
o PROSPRECTIVE LAW
! operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect
! looks and applies to the future.
Declaratory, curative, mandatory, directory, substantive, remedial, penal according to operation
According to form
o Affirmative
! does not impliedly repeal the prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest
o Negative
! repeals all conflicting provisions unless the contrary intention is disclosed

C. Parts of a Statute
1. Title
Mandatory law - Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof (Art 6, Sec 26 (1)
1987 Constitution)
2 limitations upon legislation
o To refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects
o Title of the bill should be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import
of the single subject.

Purposes of requirement (on 1 subject)

Principal purpose: to apprise the legislators of the object, nature, and scope of the provision of the bill and to prevent the enactment into law
of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators.
o To prohibit duplicity in legislation
In sum of the purpose
o To prevent hodgepodge/ log-rolling legislation
o To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
o To fairly apprise the people, through publication of the subjects of the legislation
o Used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose; may clarify
doubt or ambiguity.

How requirement construed

Liberally construed; It should not be given a technical interpretation
If there is doubt, it should be resolved against the doubt and in favor of the constitutionality of the statute

When there is compliance with requirement

Comprehensive enough - Include general object
If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title
Title is valid where it indicates in broad but clear terms, the nature, scope and consequences of the law and its operations
Title should not be a catalogue or index of the bill
Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts.
o Enough if it states an act to amend a specific statute
Need not state the precise nature of the amendatory act.
US Legislators have titles ending with the words and for other purposes ( US is not subject to the same Constitutional restriction as that
embodied in the Philippine Constitution)

When requirement not applicable

Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted into law
Does not apply to laws in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect.
No application to municipal or city ordinances.

Effect of insufficiency of title

Statute is null and void
 Where, the subject matter of a statute is not sufficiently expressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not expressed therein is
void, leaving the rest in force, unless the invalid provisions are inseparable from the others, in which case the nullity the former vitiates the
latter
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1)
Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof
LIDASAN v COMELEC
21 SCRA 496
DOCTRINE: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
FACTS:
Republic Act 4790 ( An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur) is signed into law by the Chief
Executive on June 18, 1966.
Section 1, RA 4790 enumerated the barrios that will
constitute the new municipality of Dianaton, Province of
Lanao del Sur. However, it came light later that of the 21
barrios, only 9 are located in the Province of Lanao del Sur
while 12 barrios are located in the Province of Cotabato.
August 15, 1967 Comelec issued a resolution which states that
for purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters
and for other election purposes the new municipality of Dianaton
shall comprise the 22 barrios enumerated in RA 4790
September 7, 1967 Apprised by this development, the Office of
the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary,
recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until clarified by correcting legislation
September 20, 1967 Comelec stood by its own interpretation
and declared that the statute should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
This triggered the petition at bar by Bara Lidasan, a resident,
taxpayer and voter of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato.
ISSUES and JUDGMENT:
1. Whether or not RA 4790 violates Section 26(1), Article 6, 1987
Constitution for including barrios in Cotabato in creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur? " Yes
**Section 26(1), Article 6, 1987 Constitution " Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Dual limitations upon legislative power posed by the above provision
1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
** Compliance is imperative because the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill.
**In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became Republic Act 4790, only its title was
read from its introduction to its final approval in
the House of Representatives where the bill,
being of local application, originated.
Rationale: To inform the Congress as to the full impact of
the law and to apprise the people of the laws affecting
them; To prohibit rider provision which is not germane to
the subject matter of the bill
Ruling: Yes.
Guidelines in ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms
with the constitutional requirement
1. The test of the sufficiency of title is whether or not it is
misleading
a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act, is bad
2. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance
rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose
of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court
With the foregoing guidelines, the title of RA 4790 is considered
misleading because not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in
this new municipality of Lanao del Sur.
Legislation has two-pronged purpose:
1. creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from
twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur
2. dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
Respondent: the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting
in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province
is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary"
of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact
that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in
the title of the law."
SC: Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to
another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income
of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is
as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not
reflect this fact.
2. Whether or not RA 4790 can remain valid if the 12 barrios from
the province of Cotabato is removed from the creation of the new
municipality of Dianaton? -> NO
Black Interpretation of Laws: When part of a statute is held
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated
and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts are mutually
dependent & not separable, the entire statute must be void.
Twin functions of municipal corporations:
1. instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of
government
2. agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs
Explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now RA 4790 " The territory is
now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and
the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants
concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal
autonomy.
Progressive community refers to the 21 barrios and it cannot be
ascertained if it is still true to the 9 barrios in Lanao del Sur
3. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing? " Yes
Ruling : Yes. He is a qualified voter in a barrio in Cotabato
which would be incorporated in the new municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur
HELD: RA 4790 is declared unconstitutional. Comelec is
prohibited from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
Dissent: Fernando, J.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of
the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title
makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment.
TOBIAS v ABALOS
239 SCRA 106
DOCTRINE: The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It must be germane to the subject matter.
FACTS:
As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail
the constitutionality of RA No. 7675 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as City of Mandaluyong).
Prior to the enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San
Juan belonged to one legislative district
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, a plebiscite was held
on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41%
of the voting population, but 18, 621 voted yes, while 7,911 voted
no. Thus, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
ISSUES (raised by the petitioners) and JUDGMENT:
1. Whether or not Art VIII Sec49, RA No 7675 which provides that
the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
violates provisions in the Constitution? " No
a. WON it violates Sec 26(1), Art 6, 1987 Consti? " No
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section
49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the
division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Ruling: No.The creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
Because Sec 5(3), Art 6, 1987 Consti provides
that Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative
Liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule has
been adopted It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
2. Enacting Clause
Written immediately after the title
States the authority by which the act is enacted #
#1 - Phil Commission By authority of the President of the US, be it enacted by the US Philippine Commission
#2 - Philippine Legislature- by authority of the US, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of that object.
It is the duty of the court to give an Act of Congress a fairly susceptible
construction that will make it not in conflict with the higher law.
and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
(Sumulong v. Comelec)
b. WON it violates Sec 5 (1) Art 6 of the 1987 Consti? " No
Petitioners: The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate congressional districts has resulted in
increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Sec 5(1), Art 6 of
the Constitution.
Ruling: No. The 250 limit in Sec 5 (1), Art 6 of the
Constitution is not absolute as evident in the phrase unless
otherwise provided by law
c. WON it violates Sec 5 (4) Art 6 of the 1987 Consti? " No
Petitioner: The assailed provision preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts as provided in
Sec 5(4), Art 6 of the Constitution
Ruling: No. It was the Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including
Section 49 thereof.
2. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made
to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district? " No
Ruling: No. The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized citythe
inhabitants of SanJuan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite
as they had nothing to do with the change of status of Mandaluyong.
3. Whether or not RA 7675 has resulted to gerrymandering? "
No
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor
a particular candidate or party
Ruling: Not Worthy of credence. Rep Ronald Zamora, author of the
law, is the incumbent of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district. He
has been consistently winning in both localities. By dividing the district,
his constituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to him
HELD: Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED
for lack of merit.
 #3 - When #2 became bicameral: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in legislature assembled and
by authority of the same
#4 - Commonwealth- Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines
#5 when #4 became bicameral: be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in congress assembled same 1946-
1972/1987-present.
#6 Batasang Pambansa: Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled
#7 PD NOW THEREFORE, I ______ President of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby decree as
follows
#8 EO Now, therefore, I, ____ hereby order

3. Preamble
Defined prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for making the law to which it is
prefixed
Found after enacting clause and before the body of the law.
Usually not used by legislations because content of the preamble is written in the explanatory note.
But PDs and EOs have preambles.
It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title, which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of the law.
Usually express in whereas clauses.
Generally omitted in statutes passed by:
Phil. Commission
Phil. Legislature
National Assembly
Congress of the Phil
Batasang Pambansa
These legislative bodies used the explanatory note to explain the reasons for the enactment of statutes.
Extensively used if Presidential decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power.
When the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over
its text. Nor can be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning.
When the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted to clarify the ambiguity.
Preamble is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the lawmakers as to the purpose is achieved, the mischief to be remedied, and the
object to be accomplished, by the provisions of the legislature.
May decide the proper construction to be given to the statute.
May restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of law.
It may express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively in which case the law has to be given retroactive effect.
Ex. "WHEREAS, under the 1973 Constitution the incumbent President as Head of Government and Chief of State at the time of its ratification
is vested with extraordinary powers during the transition period and can continue as incumbent President even after the interim Batasang
Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions;

4. Purview
that part which tells what the law is about
body of statute should embrace only one subject should only one subject matter, even there provisions should be allied and germane to the
subject and purpose of the bill.
Statue is usually divided into sections which contain a single proposition.
Parts
o short title EX. Section 1. Short Title - This Act shall be known as the "National Service Training Program (NSTP) Act of 2001".
o policy section EX. Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby affirmed the prime duty of the government to serve and protect its
citizens.
o definition section EX. Section 3. Definition of Terms - For purposes of this Act, the following are hereby defined as follows:
o administrative section
o sections prescribing standards of conduct
o sections imposing sanctions for violation of its provisions
o transitory provision
o separability clause
o effectivity clause

5. Other Clauses
Separability clause
it states that if any provision of the act is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby.
It is not controlling and the courts may invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete and workable
Presumption statute is effective as a whole
its effect: to create in the place of such presumption the opposite of separability.
If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect.
Effectivity Clause
 This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Amendatory Clause
Sec. ___, Art. ___ of RA/PD/EO_____, as well as all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations and other issuances inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby deemed amended and modified accordingly.
Repealing Clause
All other laws, decrees, orders, issuances, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
amended or modified accordingly.

PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES

Presidential issuances
are those which the president issues in the exercise of ordinance power.
i.e. EO, AO (administrative orders), proclamations, MO (memorandum orders), MC (memorandum circulars), and general or special orders.
Have force and effect of laws.
EO
o acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of constitutional/
statutory powers.
o do not have the force and effect of laws enacted by congress
o different from EO issued by the President in the ex of her legislative power during the revolution Presidential decree under the
freedom constitution
AO
o acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head
Proclamations
o acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a statute or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend
MO
o acts of the President on matters of administrative details or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular
officer or office of government
MC
o acts of the president on matters relating to internal administration which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or
some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government, for information of compliance
General or Specific Order
o Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP

Supreme Court circulars; rules and regulations

See Art 8, Sec. 5(5) 1987 Constitution
See Art. 6, Sec. 30 1987 Constitution
It has been held that a law which provides that a decision of a quasi-judicial body be appealable directly to the SC, if enacted without the
advice and concurrence of the SC, ineffective
o Remedy or applicable procedure go to CA
Rules of Court product of the rule-making power of the SC
o Power to repeal procedural rules
o No power to promulgate rules substantive in nature (unlike the legislative department)
Substantive rules if it affects or takes away vested rights; right to appeal
Procedural rules means of implementing existing right; where to file an appeal for transferring the venue
Rules and regulations issued by the administrative or executive officers in accordance with and authorized by law, have the force and effect
of law
o Requisites for validity
! Rules should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
! Regulations be not in contradiction with, but conform to, the standards that the law prescribes
! The be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of the law
o Law cannot be restricted or extended
o Law prevails over regulations, if there are discrepancies
Rule-making power of public administrative agency is a delegated legislative power if it enlarges or restricts such statute is invalid
Requisites for delegating a statute by legislative branch to another branch of government to fill in details, execution, enforcement, or
administration of law. the law must be:
o Complete in itself
o Fix a standard which may be express or implied
! Example of standard simplicity and dignity; public interest; public welfare; interest of law and order; justice and
equity and substantial merit of the case; adequate and efficient instruction
Example:
o Change of and/or to or invalid
o Change of may(permissive) to shall (mandatory) invalid (Grego v COMELEC pp 22)
Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished
Rule makes new law with the force and effect of a valid law; binding on the courts even if they are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or with its innate wisdom
Interpretation merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means
Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts; it may be set aside by judicial department (if there is an error of law, or
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or GAD grave abuse of discretion)

Barangay ordinance
Sangguniang barangay smallest legislative body; may pass an ordinance by majority of all its members; subject to review by Sangguniang
bayan/ panglungsod
Sangguniang bayan/ panglungsod take action on the ordinance within 30 days from submission; if theres inaction, it is presumed to be
consistent with the municipal or city ordinance; if inconsistency is found, it will remand to the Sangguniang barangay
Municipal ordinance
Lodged in the Sangguniang bayan
Majority of the quorum voting, ordinance is passed
Ordinance sent to Mayor within 10 days for approval or veto; if theres mayors inaction, ordinance is presumed approved; if vetoed and
overridden by 2/3 of all members, ordinance is approved
Approved ordinance is passed to Sangguniang panlalawigan for review
o Within 30 days may invalidate in whole or in part and its action is final; if theres inaction within 30 days, it is deemed valid

City ordinance
Vested in Sangguniang panglungsod
Majority of the quorum voting, ordinance is passed
Submitted to Mayor within 10 days
o Approve
o Veto 2/3 of all members approved
o Inaction deemed approved
If city or component city submit to Sangguniang panlalawigan for review which shall take action within 30 days, otherwise, it will be deemed
valid

Provincial ordinance
Sangguniang panlalawigan majority of quorum voting, passage of ordinance
Forwarded to the Governor who within 15 days from receipt shall
o Approve
o Veto 2/3 of all members approved
o Inaction deemed approved

D. Steps in the enactment

Constitution, Art. VI, Section 26 (2)
No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Constitution, Art. VI, Section 27

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item
or items to which he does not object.

Legislative power, generally

Power to make, alter and repeal laws
Vested in congress 1987 Constitution
President 1973 & Freedom (PD and EO respectively)
Sangguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod, panlalawigan only within respective jurisdiction ordinances
Administrative or executive officer
 Delegated power
Issue rules and regulations to implement a specific law

Congress legislative power

The determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.
Legislative power - plenary except only to such limitations as are found in the constitution

Procedural requirements, generally

Provided in the constitution (for Bills, RA)
Provided by congress enactment of laws
! Rules of both houses of congress (provided also by the Constitution)

Passage of bill
Proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of congress for enactment into law
Shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
Signed by authors
File with the Secretary of the House
Bills may originate from either lower or upper House
Exclusive to lower house
! Appropriation
! Revenue/ tariff bills
! Bills authorizing increase of public debt
! Bills of local application
! Private bills
After 3 readings, approval of either house (see Art 6 Sec 26 (1))
Secretary reports the bill for first reading
First reading reading the number and title, referral to the appropriate committee for study and recommendation
Committee hold public hearings and submits report and recommendation for calendar for second reading
Second reading bill is read in full (with amendments proposed by the committee) unless copies are distributed and such reading is
dispensed with
o Bill will be subject to debates, motions and amendments
o Bill will be voted on
o A bill approved shall be included in the calendar of bills for 3rd reading
Third reading bill approved on 2nd reading will be submitted for final vote by yeas and nays,
Bill approved on the 3rd reading will be transmitted to the Other House for concurrence (same process as the first passage)
o If the Other House approves without amendment it is passed to the President
o If the Other House introduces amendments, and disagreement arises, differences will be settled by the Conference Committees
of both houses
o Report and recommendation of the 2 Conference Committees will have to be approved by both houses in order to be considered
pass
President
o Approves and signs
o Vetoes (within 30 days after receipt)
o Inaction
If the President vetoes send back to the House where it originated with recommendation
o 2/3 of all members approves, it will be sent to the other house for approval
o 2/3 of the other house approves it shall become a law
o If president did not act on the bill within 30 days after receipt, bill becomes a law
Summary : 3 ways of how a bill becomes a law.
! President signs
! inaction of president within 30 days after receipt
! vetoed bill is repassed by congress by 2/3 votes of all its members, each house voting separately.

How a Bill Becomes a Law: Excerpt

* House Rule X: Bills, Resolutions, Messages, Memorials and Petitions
* Flowchart: Legislative Process

1. Preparation of the bill

2. First reading
3. Committee consideration / action
4. Second reading
5. Third reading
6. Transmittal of the approved bill to the Senate
7. Senate action on approved bill of the House
8. Conference committee
9. Transmittal of the bill to the President
10. Presidential action on the bill
11. Action on approved bill
12. Action on vetoed bill

PREPARATION OF THE BILL

The Member or the Bill Drafting Division of the Reference and Research Bureau prepares and drafts the bill upon the Member's request.

FIRST READING
1. The bill is filed with the Bills and Index Service and the same is numbered and reproduced.
2. Three days after its filing, the same is included in the Order of Business for First Reading.
3. On First Reading, the Secretary General reads the title and number of the bill. The Speaker refers the bill to the appropriate Committee/s.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION/ACTION
1. The Committee where the bill was referred to evaluates it to determine the necessity of conducting public hearings.
If the Committee finds it necessary to conduct public hearings, it schedules the time thereof, issues public notice and invites resource persons from the
public and private sectors, the academe and experts on the proposed legislation.
If the Committee finds that no public hearing is needed, it schedules the bill for Committee discussion/s.
2. Based on the result of the public hearings or Committee discussions, the Committee may introduce amendments, consolidate bills on the same
subject matter, or propose a substitute bill. It then prepares the corresponding committee report.
3. The Committee approves the Committee Report and formally transmits the same to the Plenary Affairs Bureau.

SECOND READING
1. The Committee Report is registered and numbered by the Bills and Index Service. It is included in the Order of Business and referred to the
Committee on Rules.
2. The Committee on Rules schedules the bill for consideration on Second Reading.
3. On Second Reading, the Secretary General reads the number, title and text of the bill and the following takes place:
a. Period of Sponsorship and Debate
b. Period of Amendments
c. Voting which may be by:
i. viva voce
ii. count by tellers
iii. division of the House; or
iv. nominal voting

THIRD READING
1. The amendments, if any, are engrossed and printed copies of the bill are reproduced for Third Reading.
2. The engrossed bill is included in the Calendar of Bills for Third Reading and copies of the same are distributed to all the Members three days before
its Third Reading.
3. On Third Reading, the Secretary General reads only the number and title of the bill.
4. A roll call or nominal voting is called and a Member, if he desires, is given three minutes to explain his vote. No amendment on the bill is allowed at
this stage.
a. The bill is approved by an affirmative vote of a majority of the Members present.
b. If the bill is disapproved, the same is transmitted to the Archives.

TRANSMITTAL OF THE APPROVED BILL TO THE SENATE

The approved bill is transmitted to the Senate for its concurrence.

SENATE ACTION ON APPROVED BILL OF THE HOUSE

The bill undergoes the same legislative process in the Senate.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
1. A Conference Committee is constituted and is composed of Members from each House of Congress to settle, reconcile or thresh out differences or
disagreements on any provision of the bill.
2. The conferees are not limited to reconciling the differences in the bill but may introduce new provisions germane to the subject matter or may report
out an entirely new bill on the subject.
3. The Conference Committee prepares a report to be signed by all the conferees and the Chairman.
4. The Conference Committee Report is submitted for consideration/approval of both Houses. No amendment is allowed.

TRANSMITTAL OF THE BILL TO THE PRESIDENT

Copies of the bill, signed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and certified by both the Secretary of the Senate
and the Secretary General of the House, are transmitted to the President.

PRESIDENTIAL ACTION ON THE BILL

1. If the bill is approved the President, the same is assigned an RA number and transmitted to the House where it originated.
2. If the bill is vetoed, the same, together with a message citing the reason for the veto, is transmitted to the House where the bill originated.

ACTION ON APPROVED BILL

The bill is reproduced and copies are sent to the Official Gazette Office for publication and distribution to the implementing agencies. It is then included
in the annual compilation of Acts and Resolutions.

ACTION ON VETOED BILL

The message is included in the Order of Business. If the Congress decides to override the veto, the House and the Senate shall proceed separately to
reconsider the bill or the vetoed items of the bill. If the bill or its vetoed items is passed by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of each House, such bill or
items shall become a law.

Note: A joint resolution having the force and effect of a law goes through the same process.

Appropriations and revenue bills

Same as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills
Only difference is that they can only originate from the Lower House but the Senate may propose/ concur with the amendments
Limitations of passage (as per Constitution) Art 6 Sec. 27 (2)
o congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President XXX
o particular appropriation limited
o procedure for Congress is the same to all other department/ agencies (procedure for approving appropriations )
o special appropriations national treasurer/ revenue proposal
o no transfer of appropriations xxx authority to augment
o discretionary funds for public purposes
o general appropriations bills when re-enacted
o President my veto any particular item/s in an appropriation revenue, or tariff bill.

Authentication of bills
Before passed to the President
Indispensable
By signing of Speaker and Senate President: Attestation

Unimpeachability of legislative journals

Journal of proceedings
Conclusive with respect to other matters that are required by the Constitution
Disputable with respect to all other matters
By reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character
Should be public

Matters Required to be Entered in the Journal

The Constitution requires that the following matters be contained in the journal:
(a) The yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill [Art. VI, Sec. 26(2)];
(b) Veto message of the President (i.e., his objection to a bill when he vetoes it) [Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)];
(c) The yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)];
(d) The yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present [Art. VI, Sec. 16(4)]

In addition, the journal contains the summary of the proceedings.

CIR v CTA
185 SCRA 329
DOCTRINE: An item that the President can veto in a revenue bill shall mean the subject of a particular kind of tax and tax rate.
FACTS: in which the club protested claiming the assessment to be
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President
maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, Marcos.
bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that
that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel,
taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the
No. 6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law". development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.
By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and ISSUE:
Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section or
restaurant, and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or
foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating
September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a
hotel, motel or resthouses.
DECISION:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels,
motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not
to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that
inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's
tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec.
20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and
enforceable, hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is
liable for the amount assessed against it.
Item cannot refer to an entire section, as it would create absurd
situations where the President either approves an entire section
that includes a provision he or she finds unacceptable, or vetoing
an entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of
that kind of tax altogether. Even if Pres. Marcos veto had
referred to an entire section, it would then be an ineffectual veto,
making the entire Sec. 191-A in full force and effect.

TOLENTINO v SEC. OF FINANCE

235 SCRA 630
DOCTRINE: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required to exclusively originate from the HOR. Presidential certification of a bills necessity dispenses the requirement of the bills printing and
distribution and separate days for readings. It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision.
Facts: speech)
On various dates between July 22, 1992, and August 31, 1993, 7) RA 7716 violates Sec. 5, Art. III, of the Constitution (free exercise of
several House Bills, a Senate Resolution, and a Senate Bill were religion)
introduced, seeking to amend certain provisions of the National 8) RA 7716 violates Sec. 10, Art. III, of the Constitution (non-
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) relative to the Value-Added Tax (VAT.) impairment of the obligation of contracts)
Among these bills was House Bill Number 11197 (in substitution of 9) RA 7716 violates Sec. 28(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution (uniform
HBs 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012, and and equitable taxation)
10100). 10) RA 7716 violates Sec. 28(3), Art. VI, of the Constitution
HB 11197 was approved on its second (November 11, 1993) and (exemption from taxation of religions)
third (Nov. 17, 1993) readings, and was transmitted to the Senate
(Nov. 18, 1993.) Decision: LOST petitions DISMISSED
February 7, 1994: The Senate Committee on Ways and means Ratio Decidendi:
reported that it recommended for approval Senate Bill Number 1630 in 1) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 24, Art. VI, of the 1987
substitution of SB 1129, taking into consideration PSR 734 and HB Constitution (i.e. bills of revenue shall originate exclusively
11197. from the HOR?)
March 22, 1994: President Fidel V. Ramos certified SB 1630 for A) Petitioners: Yes.
immediate enactment to meet a public emergency. 1) It is the result of the consolidation of
March 24 1994: SB 1630 was approved by the Senate on its 2nd and two distinct bills HB 11197 and SB
3rd readings, and transmitted to the House of Representatives (HOR) 1630. The Constitution qualifies the
along with the request for a conference regarding the disagreeing verb shall originate with the word
provisions of SB 1630 and HB 11197. exclusively, and the phrase as on
On April 13, 19, 20, 21, and 25 1994, the Bicameral Conference other bills found in the American
Committee (BCC) conducted various meetings to reconcile the Federal Constitution is omitted.
proposals on the VAT. 2) The Constitution limits the Senates
The HOR (April 27, 1994) and Senate (May 2, 1994) agreed on the power to produce revenue bills
Conference Committee Report, and the President signed Republic Act compensates for its power to ratify
Number 7716 (The Expanded VAT Law) on May 5, 1994. Said RA was treaties.
published in 2 newspapers of general circulation on May 12, 1994 and 3) SB 1630 was passed not in
became effective on May 28, 1994. substitution of HB 11197 but of
Various suits for certiorari and prohibition challenging the another SB (1129), the Senate
constitutionality of RA 7716 were undertaken. merely took said HB into
Issues: Whether or not... consideration in enacting said SB.
1) RA 7716 violates Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution B) Supreme Court: No.
(i.e. bills of revenue shall originate exclusively from the HOR.) 1) It is not the law but the revenue bill
2) RA 7716 violates Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, of the Constitution (i.e. no bill which is required to exclusively
shall be passed unless it has passed three readings on separate days, originate from the HOR. A bill
and printed copies x x x have been distributed x x x except when the originating from it may undergo
President certifies to the necessity x x x [and] [u]pon the last reading of extensive changes in the Senate that
a bill no amendment thereto shall be allowed.) it might be entirely rewritten.
3) The BCC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack 2) The powers being compared are
of or excess of jurisdiction when it reconciled SB 1630 and HB 11197 different. Legislative power is vested
4) RA 7716 violates Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution (Every bill in the Congress, comprised of the
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject x x x expressed Senate and the HOR.
in the title thereof.) 3) The result would be two bills on the
5) RA 7716 violates Sec. 1, Art. III (Bill of Rights), of the Constitution same subject.
(due process and equal protection) a) The Constitution simply means that
6) RA 7716 violates Sec. 4, Art. III, of the Constitution (freedom of the initiative for filing such a bill must
 come from the HOR as they can be
expected to be more sensitive of
local needs.
2) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, of the
Constitution (i.e. no bill shall be passed unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies x x x have been distributed x x x except when the
President certifies to the necessity x x x [and] [u]pon the
last reading of a bill no amendment thereto shall be
allowed?)
A) Petitioners: Yes.
1) Presidential certification of a bills
necessity only dispenses the
requirement of the bills printing and
distribution,
2) Certification was invalid because
there was no emergency.
3) The President certified SB 1630 and
not HB 11197.
B) SC: No.
1) Unless clause must be read in
relation to the except clause.
Construing one requirement and
alienating the other would negate the
premise of the except clause, which
is the need to secure the immediate
enactment of a certified-urgent bill.
2) No member of the Senate saw fit to
controvert the reality of the factual
basis of the certification.
3) The Senate was considering SB
1630, not HB 11197. The President
certified HB 9210 which was also
pending in the HOR anyway.
3) Did the BCC commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it reconciled SB
1630 and HB 11197?
A) Petitioners: Yes.
1) BCC included provisions found in
neither HB nor SB, surreptitiously
inserting them.
2) The BCC, especially during the last
two days of its session, met behind
closed doors.
3) Under the rules of the Senate and the
HOR, a conference committee can
only act on differing provisions of SBs
and HBs.
B) SC: No.
1) It is within the power of a conference
committee to include in its report an
entirely new provision.
a) Phil. Judges Association
v. Prado (1993)
b) According to Keefe and
Ogul, the American
system permits
conference committee
members to draft
essentially a new bill.
c) If the committee can
propose one or two
amended provisions, then
it can propose several.
d) The report was not final
but needed the approval
of both houses.
2) Often, the only way to reach an
agreement on conflicting provisions is
to meet behind closed doors with
only the conferees present.
3) Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and the courts have no
jurisdiction over them. The courts are
concerned with the procedural
requirements of the Constitution.
SC: Whatever doubts as to the formal validity of RA 7716
must be resolved in its favor. It is an enrolled bill. This rule
is not absolute, as seen in Astorga v. Villegas (1974).
Disregarding the enrolled status of the bill disrespects the
other two departments of government.
4) RA 7716 violates Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, of the Constitution
(Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject x x x expressed in the title thereof.)
A) Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL): Yes.
Neither HB 11197 nor SB 1630
provided for the removal of PALs
exemption (granted through
Presidential Declaration Number
1590) from paying VAT. Said removal
was only done in the BCC bill.
B) SC: No.
1) The title states the purpose of the
statute, and one way of achieving the
statutes objectives is to withdraw
some exemptions granted before.
2) Purpose of Congress embracing only
one subject to be expressed in the
title is to prevent surprise upon
members of the Congress and to
inform the people of the pending
legislation.
3) Sec. 24 of PD 1590 provides that the
franchise may be amended through
special law.
5) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 1, Art. III (Bill of Rights), of the
Constitution (due process and equal protection?)
SC: No. There is a hierarchy of values within the
due process clause. The lack of threat of
immediate harm makes the need for judicial
intervention less evident, rendering any
discussion on the merits of the law academic.
6) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 4, Art. III, of the Constitution
(freedom of speech?)
A) Petitioner Philippine Press Institute (PPI): Yes.
1) PPI: It has withdrawn the exemption
previously granted to the press under
Sec. 103 of the NIRC.
2) PPI: Even though the exemption was
subsequently restored by
administrative regulation with respect
to the circulation income, PPI claims
the exemption may be removed by
mere revocation of the Secretary of
Finance.
3) American Bible Society v. City of
Manila (1957), also cited by PBS:
license fee on those engaged in the
business of general merchandise
 cannot apply to appellants sale of
bibles and religious literature.
B) Petitioner Philippine Bible Society (PBS): Yes.
Sec. of Fin.s power to grant exemptions is
questionable
1) Power to grant tax exemption is
vested in Congress and requires
majority vote to do so.
2) Sec.s duty is to execute the law.
C) SC: No.
1) v. PPI: Publishers of newspapers
have no immunity from the
application of general laws. They
cannot invade rights and liberties of
others, must answer for libel, may be
punished for contempt, and must pay
equitable and nondiscriminatory
taxes.
2) v. PPI: Exemptions are merely being
removed.
3) v. PPI: Cases cited by the PPI show
overt discrimination of the press. RA
7716 applies to a wide range of
goods and services.
4) v. PPI and PBI: In this case, the fee
is not imposed for the exercise of a
privilege but only for defraying part of
the cost of registration. It is an
administrative fee.
7) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 5, Art. III, of the Constitution
(free exercise of religion?): (subsumed by Issue #6.)
8) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 10, Art. III, of the Constitution
(non-impairment of the obligation of contracts?)
A) Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA): Yes. Imposition of the
VAT on the sales and leases of real estate
affects contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law.
B) SC: No. Parties cannot restrain the taxing power
of the state. Protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society.
9) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 28(1), Art. VI, of the
Constitution (uniform and equitable taxation?):
A) Petitioners: Yes. It is regressive.
1) Tait: VAT payment by low-income
households will be a higher
proportion of their income than
payments by higher-income
households.
2) As a result of the 10% VAT, tax on
consumption goods of those who are
in the higher-income bracket, which
were taxed at a rate higher than 10%,
has been reduced, while basic
commodities which used to be taxed
from 3 to 5% are now taxed at a
higher rate.
3) Petitioner Cooperative Union of the
Philippines (CUP): Poor and middle-
income group will be hit harder than
the rich.
B) Respondents: No.
It distributes the tax burden to as
1)
many goods and services as
possible, particularly to those which
are within the reach of higher-income
groups.
2) The law exempts basic goods and
services.
3) Goods and properties subject to the
VAT such as real properties,
industrial/commercial/scientific
equipment, hotels, restaurants,
tourist buses, etc., are
used/consumed primarily by higher-
income groups.
4) Lack of empirical data, especially by
CREBA and PPI makes discussion
on the VATs progressivity academic.
10) Does RA 7716 violate Sec. 28(3), Art. VI, of the
Constitution (exemption from taxation of religions?):
(subsumed by Issue #6.)
Dissent
Regalado, J.:
1) How it was legislated into its present statutory existence is
not in serious dispute.
2) The Presidents certification of SB 1630 was invalid as it
was a tax bill, ergo, it not validly originate from the Senate.
3) SB 1630 was approved in substitution of SB 1129, while
merely taking into consideration PSR 734 and HB 11197.
SB 1630 was never filed in substitution of either PSR 734
or HB 11197.
A) Solicitor Generals (OSG) invocation of Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co. (1911) that the power to
concur in or propose amendments includes an
amendment by substitution is untenable. Said
case had an amendment of only one item in the
statute. The OSG repeatedly cited Flint without
justifying it despite the obvious difference in
circumstance.
B) Amendment by substitution when approved
takes the place of the principal bill, which is
supplanted and goes out of actuality, according
to a publication authorized by the Senate and
quoted by the OSG.
C) To consolidate two bills is to unite them into one.
In this case, this assumes that HB 11197 never
became legally inexistent, however, the OSGs
theory of amendment by substitution eliminates
the legal existence of HB 11197.
D) SB 1630s legislative journey is wrought with
defects: it was a tax bill that originated from the
Senate. Its certification caused its consideration
by the BCC.
E) Respondents dependence on Phil. Judges
Assoc. is the same as their reliance on Flint.
Both cases deal with the amendment of only one
legislative item. Following such precedents
would amount to blind adherence.
F) The enrolled bill doctrine is no longer seen as
absolute. In the United States, cases such as
Gwynn v. Hardee and D & W Auto Supply, et al.
v. Department of Revenue, et al. show the
moving away from absolute obedience to the
enrolled-bill doctrine.
 A) It assumed SB 1630 could validly originate in the
Davide, JR., J.: Senate.
1) RA 7716 is a revenue measure, as such, it must originate B) It assumed SB 1630 and HB 11197 had properly
exclusively in the HOR. passed both chambers.
A) Petitioner Tolentino correctly asserts that on the C) Even though Representative Javier wanted SB
face of the enrolled copy of RA 7716, it is a 1630 to be the frame of reference, said bill was
Consolidation of HB 11197 and SB 1630. It is never transmitted to the HOR for its
an illicit marriage of a bill that originated from the concurrence.
HOR and a bill that originated from the Senate. 5) The approval of the proposed bill by both chambers did not
B) Only bill that could serve as a valid basis for RA cure its infirmities.
7716 is HB 11197, which is the substitute bill A) Doctrine of ratification may cure minor
recommended by the House Committee on procedural flaws but not in violation of the
Ways and Means in substitution of the other Constitution.
HBs. It is interesting to note that HB 11197 was 1) Neither SB (1629 and 1630) could
not certified, unlike HB 9210, which it originate from the Senate as they are
substituted. tax measures, nor were they
After it passed the first reading in the submitted to the HOR for its
Senate, their Committee on Ways concurrence.
and Means did not deliberate on it. 2) HB 11197 was not passed by the
Said committee only acted on SB Senate on its second and third
1129, which in turn prepared and readings.
proposed SB 1630. It was SB 1630 3) Invoking the enrolled-bill doctrine is
which was proposed and submitted misplaced.
for approval, in substitution of SB a) Its origins render it void ab
1129, not HB 11197. initio: the certification itself
C) OSGs citation of Flint is erroneous, as the stated RA 7716 was a
statement that substitution can be supported as consolidation of HB 11197
an amendment was merely the summary of the and SB 1630. It did not
arguments of counsel on one of the companion originate exclusively from
cases. the HOR.
D) Citing flint is not tenable as it only dealt with one b) The enrolled-bill doctrine
amendment. is of American origin, and
E) I disagree with the view of the majority that the is no longer absolute as
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the the Courts expanded
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its jurisdiction includes
receipt of the bill from the House so long as determining whether or
action by the Senate as a body is withheld not there has been a
pending receipt of the House bill. SB 1129 was grave abuse of discretion
filed on March 1, 1993, while HB 11197 was amounting to lack or
approved after its third reading on November 17, excess of jurisdiction by
1993. any branch or
F) SB 1129 is a revenue measure, which cannot instrumentality of the
even be validly introduced/initiated in the government.
Senate, nor can it be substituted. c) Even in the US, the
2) RA 7716 did not pass the requirement of being approved enrolled-bill doctrine is
on its second and third readings which are to be on under fire.
different days.
A) The certification is void ab initio because it Romero, J.:
addressed to the Senate a bill which is 1) By defining both originate and exclusively, and
prohibited from originating from it. juxtaposing these with the legislative history of RA 7716, it
B) Requesting a bicameral conference to reconcile is without doubt that RA 7716, indisputably a revenue
HB 11197 and SB 1630 is erroneous as HB measure, originated in the HOR in the form of HB 253, the
11197 was not submitted for or acted on its first Expanded VAT bill.
second and third readings in the Senate, and SB 2) Whether or not the bills originated exclusively in the HOR is
1630 was not sent to the HOR for its a different matter. There were other amendatory bills to the
concurrence. VAT that did not originate solely in the HOR, such as PSR
3) Both chambers actions amounted to a grave abuse of 734 and SB 1129.
discretion by requesting for a BCC. 3) SB 1630s failure to go through the motions in the HOR is
A) As SB 1630 was not a substitute bill for HB fatal. The Constitution provides for a Congress with two
11197 but for SB 1629, it had to be transmitted chambers.
to the HOR to undergo three readings. 4) Even though RA 7716 is an enrolled bill, the changes
B) HB 11197 was never acted upon by the Senate introduced to it by the BCC are substantial. The BCC
on its second and third readings. exceeded its power and authority. Even the approval of the
4) The BCC itself acted with a grave abuse of discretion. BCCs output does not cure RA 7716 as it is void ab initio.
 The enrolled-bill doctrine only applies to questions of
procedural enactment of non-substantial alterations.
Bellosillo, J.: The Constitution clearly mandates that bills of this type
exclusively emanate from the HOR. There is no getting around it.
Referring to American authorities is erroneous
as the US Constitution differs on the matter.
1) Flint has no importance to this case
as the bill in it originated from the
Lower House, not from the Senate,
and the amendment contested
merely covered a single provision.
2) Amendment by substitution is only
valid in the US.
Puno, J.: The BCC added new provisions. The respondents justify this
incident thusly:
A) Respondents: BCC has an ex post veto power
(veto after approval of the bill by both Houses.)
1) The respondents cite no
constitutional provision, law, not even
rules or regulations.
2) The rules of both Houses themselves
do now support such a theory.
3) The Constitution only provides for a
Congress with two chambers, not
three. Giving BCCs veto power in
effect creates another chamber, even
though they do not represent the
people.
B) Bill prepared by BCC was approved anyway.
1)This may apply to provisions which
actually reconcile conflicts between
HB 11197 and SB 1630.
2) This does not apply to additions and
deletions entirely new and not made
to reconcile inconsistencies between
the aforementioned bills.
C) It was practice in the past Congresses for
conference committees to insert new provisions
in bills.
1) Customs and usages, according to
Mason, are merely subordinate to
higher sources of rules such as the
Constitution.
D) The enrolled-bill doctrine precludes inquiry as to
the regularity of the proceedings leading up to
the enactment of RA 7716.
1) Beginning from the 1940s, American
courts have veered away from the
rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled-
bill doctrine.
2) American courts have diverged as to
the application of such a doctrine.
3) Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (1947): The
SC chose to follow Sec. 313 of the
old Code of Civil Procedure, which
has long been repealed by the Rules
of Court. The jurisprudence and
authorities it relies on, particularly
American ones, are under severe
criticism.

ARROYO v DE VENECIA
277 SCRA 268
DOCTRINE: Court may not inquire into allegations of non-compliance of Congress with its internal rules if there is no showing that a constitutional
requirement was violated.
Facts:
-The petitioners assail the validity of RA 8240 which imposes sin
taxes on the manufacture and sale beer and cigarettes.
-Said law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198.
-The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the
House of Representatives (HOR) regarding H. No. 7198 on November
21, 1996. During the sponsorship speech of Rep. Javier, Rep. Joker
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
-After a roll call, the Chair, Deputy Speaker Daza, declared the
presence of a quorum
-Rep. Arroyo registered to interpellate. During his interpellation, he
announced that he will question the presence of a quorum which he
never did.
-After that, Rep. Albano moved to approve the committee report. The
Chairman asked for objections but Rep. Arroyo did not hear it at first.
When the Chairman declared the committee report approved, Rep.
Arroyo simultaneously raised his objection.
-Then Rep. Albano moved to adjourn until 4:00 next Wednesday. The
Chairman approved the motion.
-The bill was signed by the Speaker of HOR, the Senate President and
the respective secretary of each House on the same day. It was
signed by the President on November 21, 1996.
-Petitioners claim that there were 4 versions of the transcript of Rep.
Arroyos interpellation but to expedite the resolution of the petition,
they concede to the correctness of the transcript relied upon by the
respondents.
-Petitioners claim that RA 8240 is void because it was enacted in
violation of Art. VI, 16(3) of the Constitution which grants Congress the
power to determine the rules of its proceedings. According to them,
House rules were violated when the Chairman refused to recognize
Rep. Arroyo when he raised his objection to the adoption of the
committee report. They also alleged that the session was hastily
adjourned to prevent Rep. Arroyo from questioning the quorum and
ask for reconsideration.
-Respondents argue that by virtue of separation of powers, the
Supreme Court must not interfere with the internal rules of Congress.
ISSUE: WON RA 8240 WAS VALIDLY ENACTED
Yes. The Congress did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its
enactment.
1. The Rules allegedly violated were mere internal rules of HOR
instead of constitutional requirements. Petitioners do not claim that
there was no quorum. They only claim that they were prevented from
questioning it.
Cases here and abroad show that the Court may not inquire
into allegations of non-compliance of Congress with its internal rules if
there is no showing that a constitutional requirement was violated.
2. The expanded judicial power under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution did not completely do away with the political question
doctrine. This case involves political questions.
3. There was no showing that the passage of the law was railroaded.
-The Supreme Court accepted the explanation that Rep. Arroyo and
the Chairman were talking simultaneously that is why the Chairman
failed to recognize Rep. Arroyo.
-They also noted the comment of the Solicitor General that the manner
of approval of said committee report was the same as the manner of
approval of committee reports of other famous bills such as the one
which eventually the Local Government Code.
-The Constitution also does not required that yeas and nays of
members be taken every time the House has to vote.
4. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of HOR and Senate President and the certification of the
respective secretaries of each House was conclusive of its due
enactment.
-The due enactment of RA 8240 was also confirmed by the journal of
the House of Representatives.
Held: Petition dismissed.
Separate Opinion:
Romero, J: Clarified that his opinion in Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
cannot be applied to the present case because there is no breach of
Constitutional provisions. Only internal rules are involved. In Tolentino,
there was a violation of Constituional provision against amendments
introduced upon the last reading of a bill.
Puno, J: Concurring and dissenting opinion
-Concur in the result but:
a) Did not agree that the issue was non-justiciable. He based his
opinion on US decisions where the Supreme Court imposed its
authority over the Congress for alleged violation of rules of procedures
of the legislators.
In the Philippine setting, the Court has more reason to
reject the political question doctrine because of the expanded judicial
power granted by Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
b) He also objected to the reliance on the enrolled bill doctrine
because:
1) It is appropriate only in England where it originated, and where
there is no written Constitution and the legislative is supreme.
2) Many courts in the US also have broken away with the rigidity of the
enrolled bill doctrine in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking.
3) Uncritical reliance to the enrolled bill doctrine is inconsistent with
our Constitution and laws.

E. Evidence of due enactment

1. Enrolled Bill Theory

Enrolled bill
Bills passed by congress authenticated by the Speaker and the Senate President and approved by the President
Importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts
o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it was passed by the assembly by the legislative and executive departments.
Courts cannot go behind the enrolled act to discover what really happened
o If only for respect to the legislative and executive departments
Thus, if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and approved by the Chief
Executive, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curative legislation not by judicial decree.
Enrolled bill and legislative journals - Conclusive upon the courts
If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and journal, enrolled bill prevails.

Withdrawal of authentication, effect of

Speaker and Senate President may withdraw if there is discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated and the enrolled bill.
Effect:
o Nullifies the bill as enrolled
o Losses absolute verity
o Courts may consult journals

MABANAG v LOPEZ VITO

78 PHIL 1
DOCTRINE: Enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts.
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The
three senators were suspended by senate due to election
irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat
in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They
argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the
Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has
been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the
votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House.
As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths
vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of
the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case
because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill
or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at
bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both
the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act
had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the
basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory,
for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the
effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not
do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the
two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents
and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by
both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended
by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as
follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of
any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either
house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
CASCO PHIL. CHEMICAL CO. v GIMENEZ
7 SCRA 347
DOCTRINE: Upon mistake in printing, curative statute by amendment of Congress is needed not judicial declaration,
Facts:
1. RA 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law
- issued by Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP)
- Circular No. 95 = fixes uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange (forex) transactions
- to supplement, memorandum was passed establish some
exemptions
2. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc. (Casco)
- engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in
bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers
- brought forex for importation of urea and formaldehyde (main raw
materials)
- paid margin fee twice (Php33,765.42 and Php6,345.72) for two
separate transactions
3. Casco sought refund of the sums paid for margin fee
- Ground: separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from margin fee
4. Auditor of BSP refused
- Ground: exemption granted by BSP Monetary Board for separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde not in accord with provision of
Sec. 2, Par. XVIII of RA 2609
5. Auditor General affirmed upon appeal
6. Hence, this petition for review
Issue:
WON urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from payment of
margin fee.
Held: NO.
Ratio:
(1). Sec. 2, Par. XVIII, RA 2609 = margin established shall not be
MORALES v SUBIDO
26 SCRA 150
DOCTRINE: In cases not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the Enrolled Bill Theory prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
Facts:
- The House submitted HB 6951 to the Senate. Sen. Rodrigo made an
amendment in the Sec. 10 of the HB. However, somewhere in the
legislative process the phrase who has served the police department
of a city or was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was
retained. Petitioner argues that the version approved by the Senate
was the one containing those phrases and not the one that was
submitted as the Enrolled Bill that was signed by the President and
became the Police Act of 1966. If the phrase were there the Petitioner
could be appointed as Chief of Police. Petitioner also said that the
change was only made in the proofreading of the bill, made by an
employee and not by the Congress.
Issue:
certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
imposed upon urea formaldehyde
Petitioner: urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea AND
formaldehyde
Court: urea formaldehyde is a finished product which is patently
distinct from urea and formaldehyde which are separate articles and
are raw materials (source: National Institute of Science and
Technology)
(2). Petitioner: Bill approved in congress uses the conjunction AND
between terms and urea and formaldehyde, as such it is the intention
of congress to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately
Ground: individual statements made on the floor of the Senate
Court: individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Senate much less indicate intent
(3). Enrolled bill which uses urea formaldehyde instead of urea AND
formaldehyde is conclusive
- this has been passed by Congress and approved by the President
after all
- if there has been any mistake in printing before it was certified by
Congress and approved by Executive, remedy should be amendment
or curative legislation and not judicial decree since this would violate
separation of powers
Ruling: Decision by Auditor General affirmed
Notes: Rule on Ejusdem Generies (of the same kinds, class, or
nature")
- When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more
general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general
descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific
words that precede them.
- rule applies only where there is uncertainty
- not controlling when purpose and intent would be hindered and
defeated
1. WON the court can look into the matter and discover what really
happened.
Held:
- Under the enrolled bill theory the court cannot go behind the enrolled
Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the court act upon the faith
and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments.
-Marshall Field & Co. V Clark the signing by the Speaker of the HOR
and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is an official
attestation by the two houses that such bill is the one that has passed
Congress. And when the bill thus attested is signed by the President
and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
-US v Pons rule does not apply because this case does not involve a
discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the journal.
-Enrolled Bill Theory was now controlling and in force in the
Philippines supported by the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. V Gimenez.
-But court did not say that in all cases the Journal Entry Rule must
yield to the Enrolled Bill Theory. There are certain matters that the
FARINAS v EXEC SEC
GR NO. 147387
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
Two petitions were filed seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 which repealed Section 67 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code), which
provides: Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. -- Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
RA No. 9006 is entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices.
The petitioners argue that:
o (a) The bill violates of Section 26 (I), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject, which
should be expressed in its title therefore constituting a rider.
o (b) The bill violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it left intact Section 66 thereof, which
imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials (Sec. 66.
Candidates holding appointive office or positions. - Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.).
o (c) The bill violates the due process clause of the constitution
due to Sec. 16 of the law, which provides that this Act shall take
effect upon its approval.
The respondents argued that:
o (a) the petitioners have not shown they have legal standing to
institute the present suit because they have not shown that they
have suffered harm as a result of passage of RA No. 9006.
o (b) the bill was duly enacted by invoking the enrolled bill
doctrine with proof through the signatures of the Senate
President, Speaker of the House and respective Secretaries of
both houses of congress.
o (c) Sec. 67 is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section
26 (I) of Article VI of the Constitution because the title is so broad
that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election
exercise.
o (d) The repeal of Section 67 is deemed fit in order to remove
the unfairness of considering an elective official ipso facto (by
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v EXEC SEC
+ CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OF PUNO IN ARROYO AND HERE
SEE SEPARATE
FACTS
Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted for reasons of fixing budget,
generation of revenue, inadequacy in fiscal allocation for education,
compensation for health workers, and a wider range of coverage for
full value-added tax benefits. The petitioners, however, questioned,
not only the wisdom of the law, but also the perceived flaws in its
Constitution requires to be entered on the journal of each house. To
what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure
to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question the court did
not decide.
-Rule: In cases not expressly required to be entered on the journal,
the Enrolled Bill Theory prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
Decision: Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
the fact itself) resigned from his elective office because all
elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are
allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any
office.
o (e) RA No. 9006 does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because a substantial distinction exists
between these two sets of officials.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA No. 9006 is unconstitutional
Held:
No. Section 14 of RA No. 9006 is not unconstitutional because it
does not transcend constitutional limitation/ legislative power.
Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a rider. The court is convinced that
the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code. According to Sec 26 (I), Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject, which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. The court laid down the rule that
titles of statues should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
or impede the power of legislation It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably pressing each and every end
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object.
Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a violation of the equal protection
clause of the constitution. The court explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee that it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities forced. Substantial
distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine is applicable in the case. The
necessary signatures are conclusive of its due enactment.
The Effective Clause is defective. In Taada v. Tuvera, the court
ruled: the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication.
passage. RA 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely,
House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of
its provisions being in conflict with each other, the Senate agreed to
request the House of Representatives for a committee conference, in
which the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill recommended the approval of its report. In due to that, the
Senate and the House of Representatives did. On May 24, 2005, the
President signed in to law the consolidated House and Senate
versions as Republic Act 9337. Before its effectivity on July 1, 2005,
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government
from implementing the law, in response to a series of petitions for
certiorari and prohibition, questioning the constitutionality of the said
Republic Act.
ISSUES
1) Can amendment proposals to revenue bills originate from the
Senate without violating Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution?
2) Did the EVAT law violate the "no-amendment rule" under Section
26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution?
3) What are the powers and extent of authority of the Bicameral
Conference Committee?
4) Did the EVAT law, RA 9337, violate the constitutional mandate on
uniformity of taxation?
5) Is the EVAT law, RA 9337, regressive?
HELD
1) Yes. Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution states, "All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments." Thus, Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
2) No. The "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in
each of the aforementioned respective houses, regarding its
transmission to the other house for its concurrence or amendment.
Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution does not mean that the
introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments
and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills is prohibited.
2. Journal Entry Rule
ASTORGA v VILLEGAS
56 SCRA 714
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
- In March 1964 HB 9266 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of Manila etc.) was filed in the House. It was
passed in the House on third reading w/o amendments. When referred
to the Senate for approval, upon second reading, substantial
amendments were introduced by Sen. Tolentino, and approved by the
Senate. When sent back to the House by the Secretary of the Senate,
the Senate-approved amendments were not included, but only Sen.
Roxas minor amendment on succession which was made by his
committee. The House approved this version. Copies were printed and
attested by presiding officers including Senate President et al. The
President also signed it in June, and the bill became RA 4065. The
President and Senate President would later withdraw their signatures
upon learning the circumstances. Vice-Mayor filed a petition for
Mandamus and Prohibitory Injunction to compel respondents to
comply with RA 4065.
Issue:
1. WON RA 4065 is valid (since the Senate President already
withdrew his signature on the enrolled bill and said that it is not the
version passed by the senate) and WON the journal entry rule and not
the enrolled bill theory should be adhered to, to prove the validity of
RA 4065.
Held:
- RA 4065 is not duly enacted.
3) The power of the Bicameral Conference Committee is to reconcile
or settle the differences in the two Houses respective bills, but it is not
limited to the conflicting provisions of the bills. It may include matters
not found in the original bills but germane to the purpose thereof. If
both Houses viewed the pronouncement made by this Court in such
cases as extreme or beyond what they intended, they had the power
to amend their respective Rules to clarify or limit even further the
scope of the authority which they grant to the Bicameral Conference
Committee. Petitioners grievance that, unfortunately, they cannot
bring about such an amendment of the Rules on the Bicameral
Conference Committee because they are members of the minority,
deserves scant consideration. That the majority of the members of
both Houses refuse to amend the Rules on the Bicameral Conference
Committee is an indication that it is still satisfied therewith. At any rate,
this is how democracy works - the will of the majority shall be
controlling.
4) No. Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: "The rule of
taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation." Uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at
the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts
provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all
people at all times. The EVAT law is uniform as it provides a standard
rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Uniform
taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of
taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class.
5) Yes, by its nature it is regressive. But the principle of progressive
taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT
paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services
enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT
paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small.
Hence, the petitions were DISMISSED and the temporary restraining
order issued by the Court was lifted upon finality of the decision.
- The only statutory basis of the enrolled bill theory is Sec. 313 of Act
190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 of the Rules of Evidence in the old
Code of Civil Procedure which says that a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of the Philippine Legislature shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
- But the procedure of signing such acts is merely a mode of
authentication/attestation. Its not an approval because a bill is
considered approve after it has passed both Houses.
- Arguing that the signatures are mandatory would be in effect giving
the presiding officers veto power (veto power is only given to the
President), which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary. The
Constitution doesnt even provide that the presiding officers should
sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
- Petitioners argument that the attestation of the presiding officer of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment, it is said, by the
respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared
his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
- Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill has been duly enacted? In
such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
- The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him.
- In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified
by the Senate President and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to
fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.
Decision: RA 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and
therefore did not become law.

F. Validity
1. Presumption of constitutionality
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 4
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc,
and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Presumption of constitutionality
Every statute is presumed valid
o Lies on how a law is enacted
o Due respect to the legislative who passed and executive who approved
o Responsibility of upholding the constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislative and executive branches as well
Courts cannot inquire into the wisdom or propriety of laws
To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law to the constitution must be clear and unequivocal
All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of law; to doubt is to sustain
Final arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the Supreme Court EN BANC (majority who took part and voted thereon)
Nonetheless, trial courts have jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases

Requisites for exercise of judicial power

The existence of an appropriate case
Interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question
Plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity
Necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case

Appropriate case
Bona fide case one which raises a justiciable controversy
Judicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest, and vital controversy
Controversy is justiciable when it refers to matter which is appropriate for court review; pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law
Courts cannot rule on political questions questions which are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom (v. legality) of a
particular act or measure being assailed
o separation of powers
o However, Constitution expands the concept of judicial review judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
been GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the branch or the part of any branch/ instrumentality of the Government

Standing to sue
Legal standing or locus standi personal/ substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of governmental act that is being challenged
interest an interest in issue affected by the decree
Citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened concrete injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government
o E.g. taxpayer when it is shown that public funds have been illegally disbursed
Member of the Senate or of the House has legal standing to question the validity of the Presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in
an appropriations bills
SC may, in its discretion, take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing
o E.g. calling by the President for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metro

When to raise constitutionality

 xxx at the earliest possible opportunity i.e. in the pleading
it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration / new trial in the lower court; or
in criminal cases at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal
in civil cases, where it appears clearly that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision, and in cases where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below

Necessity of deciding constitutionality

where the constitutional question is of paramount public interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such question, adherence to
the strict procedural standard may be relaxed and the court, in its discretion, may squarely decide the case
where the question of validity, though apparently has become moot, has become of paramount interest and there is undeniable necessity for
a ruling, strong reasons of public policy may demand that its constitutionality be resolved

Test of constitutionality
is what the Constitution provides in relation to what can or may be done under the statute, and not by what it has been done under it.
o If not within the legislative power to enact
o If vague unconstitutional in 2 respects
! Violates due process
! Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
o Where theres a change of circumstances i.e. emergency laws
Ordinances (test of validity are):
o It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
o It must not be unfair or oppressive
o It must not be partial or discriminatory
o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o It must be general and consistent with public policy
o It must not be unreasonable

Effects of unconstitutionality
It confers no rights
Imposes no duties
Affords no protection
Creates no office
In general, inoperative as if it had never been passed
2 views:
o Orthodox view unconstitutional act is not a law; decision affect ALL
o Modern view less stringent; the court in passing upon the question of unconstitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution; decisions affects parties ONLY and no judgment against the statute; opinion of court may
operate as a precedent; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute

Invalidity due to change of conditions

Emergency laws
It is deemed valid at the time of its enactment as an exercise of police power
It becomes invalid only because the change of conditions makes its continued operation violative of the Constitution, and accordingly, the
declaration of its nullity should only affect the parties involved in the case and its effects applied prospectively

Partial invalidity
General rule: that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable
from the invalid, may stand and be enforced
Exception that when parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest
such as in the case of Tatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC

ALBA v EVANGELISTA
100 PHIL 683
DOCTRINE: It must be shown that the statute violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in
the mind of the court. The court presumes that every statute is valid.
FACTS: execution of judgement and is granted. Writ though was not executed
- President appoints Alajar as Vice--Mayor of City of Roxas, but later because Alba brought the matter to the superior courts.
designates Alba in his stead as Vice--Mayor. Alajar institutes quo Writ then is ordered null and void because CFI lost
warranto in CFI that (a) He was appointed as Vice, (b) That there jurisdiction.
existed no vacancy, (c) No legal cause for removal - In the exercise of the power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 603
CFI claims that the petitioner was entitled to remain in on April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among
office. others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during
- Alba appealed but in the meantime Alajar prays for immediate which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the
President (section 8, article II, Republic Act No. 603).
- Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides:
Appointment of City Officials. The President of the Philippines shall
appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he
may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . ., be declared
incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law, because the two provisions are
mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable.
RULING:
- The replacement of Alajar is not removal but an expiration of his
tenure. Under Sec. 8, no fixity of tenure is provided. Hence, officer
when the office is held at the pleasure of President, power of removal
is exercisable by his discretion as well.
- A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign function of government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public.
- The legislative intent of Congress can legally and constitutionally
make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the
President.
- It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior
MORFE v MUTUC
22 SCRA 424
DOCTRINE: In the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail. Courts can review on legality not wisdom of the act.
Facts:
- The Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
which aimed to prevent public officials and employees from committing
acts of dishonesty and foster morality in public service.
- The Act provides for certain procedures in the pursuit of its goal, one
of which is the declaration of the officials or employees assets and
liabilities through a true detailed and sworn statement upon
assumption of office and within the month of January of every other
year thereafter.
- Herein petitioner, as a government official, filed a petition challenging
the constitutionality of the said provision. The lower court ruled in favor
of the petitioner, declaring the provision unconstitutional.
- Herein defendant appealed.
Arguments:
- Plaintiff: The provision as a requirement is oppressive and
unconstitutional.Corruption among officials and employees is
presumed and cannot be trusted to desist from committing corrupt
practices.
- Defendant: Upon assumption of public office and until such time as
he continues to discharge public trust, a government official is deemed
to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give the information
about his personal affair. The public life of an employee cannot be
segregated from his private life.
Issues:
- WON the periodical submission within the month of January of every
other year thereafter of sworn statements of assets and liabilities of
an official or employee violates due process being an oppressive
exercise of police power;
- WON this requirement unlawfully invades the constitutional right to
privacy, unreasonable searches and seizure, and prohibition against
self-incrimination
Ruling/Ratio:
- The provision is CONSTITUTIONAL. The decision of the lower court
is thus reversed.
- Statutes enjoy the presumption of validity.
officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the
exercise of the power of removal is absolute. As long as the removal is
effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, it may
not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how reprehensible and
unjust the motives of the removal might be
- This presumption is based upon the theory of separation of powers
which makes the enactment and repeal of laws exclusively a
legislative function.
- As Chief Justice Marshall said: It is but a decent respect due to the
wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by
which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its
violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
-It should be remembered in this connection that before a legislature
passes a bill, it is presumed that it has decided the measure to be
constitutional; and when the executive approves that bill it is also
presumed that he has been convinced of its validity.
- Under these conditions, therefore, if a statute is reasonably
suspectible of two interpretations, one making it unconstitutional and
other valid, it is the duty of the court to adopt the second construction
in order to save the measure.
- WHEREFORE: Alba has no right to continue office.
Concepcion J, Concurring
Term - time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right
Tenure - Represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds office
- The required periodical submission does not violate due process as it
is not an oppressive exercise of police power.
- Due process is freedom from arbitrariness.
- To prevent a public office inherently decorated with the temptations
to heed the call of greed and avarice from abuse is not arbitrariness.
- Police power is the power to promote general welfare and public
interest, in the course of which a curtailment of liberty is entailed.
- In this case, the police power is to promote morality in public service.
Curtailment of liberty is allowable in view of this end, and for as long
as due process is observed (investigation, hearings, etc.)
- Ermita-Malate Hotel Case: The permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider when the liberty curtailed affects the right to
property, rather than freedom of mind and of person.
* Right to privacy, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizure,
and prohibition against self-incrimination are not invaded.
*Right to privacy
- Rational Relationship: the end sought and the means employed have
rational relationship.
Right to privacy is NOT unconstitutionally intruded upon.
*Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure
Every man is under obligation to give testimonyonly under judicial
sanctions.
*Prohibition from self-incrimination
- No constitutional provision shall protect a mans conduct from judicial
inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
- An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public
officials? THIS IS AN INQUIRY INTO THE WISDOM OF THE LAW,
which the Court is not in the position to decide.
- Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the
action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as
it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main
wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and
confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere.
-There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if
on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary
would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as -The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom
which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain cannot be sustained.
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions.

2. When statutes, regulations and ordinances take effect

Civil Code, Art. 2
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

1987 Admin Code, Book I, Chapter 5, Sec. 18

When Laws Take Effect. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

1987 Admin Code, Book VII, Section 2-9

Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order
to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government
corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as
provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in,
or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls,
classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed
by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person.
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties
as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than
an agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a
party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency
as a party for limited purposes.
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or
injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges.
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order.
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter,
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege.
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal,
limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding
of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages,
reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive
action.
(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or
remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application
or petition of any person.
(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial
thereof.
Section 3. Filing. -
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of
any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective
fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate
tables.

Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -

(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly
cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which
adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be
obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall
in all cases be published in full text.

Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of
the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin
and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a
price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified
rules.

Section 9. Public Participation. -

(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

RA 7160, Sec 54-59

Section 54. Approval of Ordinances. -
(a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial
governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each
and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the
same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the
ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten
(10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay.

Section 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. -

(a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground
that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an
ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating
liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the
sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive
concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive
concerned.

Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang
panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its
action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same
shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. -
(a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal
ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the
sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended
until such time as the revision called for is effected.

Section 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local
development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or
employee concerned.

Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. -

(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take
effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay
hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days
after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language understood by the majority of the
people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the
dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative
body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in
addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the
ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.

When laws take effect

Art 2 CC - xxx laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country
o The effectivity provision refers to all statutes, including those local and private, unless there are special laws providing a different
effectivity mechanism for particular statutes
Sec 18 Chapter 5 Book 1 of Administrative Code
Effectivity of laws
o default rule 15-day period
o must be published either in the OG or newspaper of general circulation in the country; publication must be full
The clause unless it is otherwise provided solely refers to the 15-day period and not to the requirement of publication

When Presidential issuances, rules and regulations take effect

The Presidents ordinance power includes the authority to issue EO, AO, Proclamations, MO, MC and general or specific orders
Requirement of publication applies except if it is merely interpretative or internal in nature not concerning the public
2 types:
o Those whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation or to fill in the details of a statute;
requires publication
o Those which are merely interpretative in nature or internal; does not require publication
Requirements of filing (1987 Administrative Code):
o Every agency shall file with the UP Law Center 3 certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within 3 months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party/ persons
When local ordinance takes effect
Unless otherwise stated, the same shall take effect 10 days from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol or city, municipality or barangay hall, AND in at least 2 other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned
The secretary to the Sangguinian concerned shall cause the posting not later than 5 days after approval; text will be disseminated in English
or Tagalog; the secretary to the Sangguinian concerned shall record such fact in a book kept for that purpose, stating the dates of approval
and posting
Gist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the respective province concerned; if
NO newspaper of general circulation in the province, POSTING shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the
Sanggunian of origin is situated
For highly urbanized and independent component cities, main features of the ordinance, in addition to the posting requirement shall be
published once in a local newspaper. In the absence of local newspaper, in any newspaper of general circulation
o Highly urbanized city minimum population of 200,000 and with latest annual income of at least 50M Php

Statutes continue in force until repealed

Permanent/ indefinite law once established continues until changed by competent legislative power. It is not changed by the change of
sovereignty, except that of political nature
Temporary in force only for a limited period, and they terminate upon expiration of the term stated or upon occurrence of certain events; no
repealing statute is needed

Territorial and personal effect of statutes

All people within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

TANADA v TUVERA
146 SCRA 446
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
- Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various PDs, LOIs,
general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrative orders.
- Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not
a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted
that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG
is indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless
otherwise provided
Ruling:
1. The clause unless it is otherwise provided in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
2. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
3. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative
rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary
Board circulars to ill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Further, publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws.
Rationale:
1. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code

YAOKASIN v COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

180 SCRA 591
DOCTRINE: Administrative rules not needed to be published if applied for particular persons or internal administration.
FACTS: petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo to
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/sacks prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District Collector of
of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, Customs, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar.
and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. The Furthermore, petitioner objected to the enforcement of Customs
Memorandum Order No. 20-87, upon which the automatic review of
decisions by the Commissioner of Customs was based. Accordingly,
such issuance was not published in the Official Gazette
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative issuances are considered laws
which require publication in the Official Gazette for their effectivity.
RULING: It depends. Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to
be published in the Official Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87
which is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs
addressed to his subordinates, the customs collectors. Commonwealth
Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK UNION v VEGA
GR No. 105364
DOCTRINE: For effectivity clauses provided with specific dates, it will take effect immediately upon approval.
FACTS:
- In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance
in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of
Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein
petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits.
- On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which
was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
- Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
- In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing
the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and
reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
REPUBLIC v PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.
GR No. 173918
DOCTRINE: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
FACTS:
On October 10, 1984 the government created the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF).The Office of Energy Affairs (now DOE),
informed Pilipinas Shell that their foreign exchange risk charge was
insufficient:
1.) On December 4, 1991 for the period December 1989 to March
1990:P14, 414, 860. 75;
2.) On December 9, 1991 for the period April 1991 October 1991:
P10, 139, 526. 56.They also charged surcharges of:1)P11, 654,
782.31,2)P 2, 806, 656. 65 pursuant to MOF CIRCULAR No. 1-85, as
amended by DOF 2-94:2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as
provided for under SECTION 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 made not
later than the 20th of the month following the month of remittance of
the foreign exchange payment of the import or themonth of payment to
thte domestic producers in case of locally produced crude. Period after
the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of 15% of
theamount, id paid within 30 days from due date, plus 2% per month if
paidafter 30 days.Pilipinas Shell justified its calculations pursuant to a
valid interpretation of theMOFs but nonetheless paid the principal
amount of its underpayment: P24,554, 387. 31 but not the
surcharges.DOE required Shell to pay the surcharges subject to
proceeding againstShells Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit.Shell
appealed to the Office of the President.The Office of the President
affirmed DOE.CA reversed the Office of the President, MOF
CIRCULAR 1-85 as amended wasineffective for failure to comply with
the requirement to file with ONAR.
3) Even if the Circular was issued before the effectivity of The
AdministrativeCode of 1987, Book 7, Chapter 2, SECTION 3 specifies
that rules already inforce at the date of effectivity of the Administrative
Code of 1987 must befiled within 3 months from the effectivity of the
code.
ISSUE: WON the MOF CIRC 1-85 was effective?
Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines.
Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be
published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general
applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply
strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed
only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs
collectors). It need not be published, on the assumption that it has
been circularized to all concerned.
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2,
1992.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect
after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in
the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this
clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that
such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
HELD: No
RATIO: Shell did not waive the requisite publication and filing of MOF
CIRC 1-85 by paying the principal amount of its underpayment.
Citing Tanada V. Tuvera (1986) , SC enunciated that publication
isindispensible in order that statures, including administrative rules that
areintended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force
andeffect:We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
applicationand private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity,which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
differenteffectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule
are presidential decrees and executive orderspromulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powerswhenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, atpresent, directly conferred by
the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuantalso to a valid
delegation.
(Emphasis provided.)Publication and filing are safeguards against
abuses on the part of lawmakersand as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and toinformation on matters of
public concern, and therefore, require compliance.
Citing: National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms
V.Energy Regulatory Board (2006), SC emphasized that both
publicationand filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce
existing laws aremandatory for the effectivity of said
issuances:Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the
GRAMImplementing Rules was published in the Official Gazette or in
anewspaper of general circulation.Significantly, the effectivity clauses
of both the GRAM and ICERAImplementing Rules uniformly provide
that they shall take effectimmediately.These clauses made no mention
of their publication in either the OfficialGazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11,
2006 of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the
said implementingrules and regulations were not likewise filed with the
said office incontravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.Applying
the doctrine enunciated in
Taada v. Tuvera
, the Court haspreviously declared as having no force and effect the
followingadministrative issuances:
(1.) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-
Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding
theaccreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories;
(2.) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of
payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to
thenational government;
(3.) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine
OverseasEmployment Administration regulating the recruitment of
domestic helpersto Hong Kong;
(4.) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by
thePhilippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications
forimportation from the Peoples Republic of China;
(5.) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by
theDepartment of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment
of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials
andemployees; and
(6.) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which
providedfor the schedule of placement and documentation fees for
privateemployment agencies or authority holders.In all these cited
cases, the administrative issuances questioned thereinwere uniformly
struck down as they were not published or filed with theNational
Administrative Register.On the other hand, in
Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc
,the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the
NationalTelecommunications Commission had not become effective
despite thefact that it was filed with the National Administrative
Register becausethe same had not been published at the time.The
Court emphasized therein that publication in the Official Gazette ora
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non
beforestatutes, rules or regulations can take effect.In this case, the
GRAM Implementing Rules must be declaredineffective as the same
was never published or filed with the NationalAdministrative
Register.To show that there was compliance with the publication
requirement,respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on
the fact thatparties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer
groups, wereduly notified of the public consultation on the ERCs
proposedimplementing rules.These parties participated in the said
public consultation and evensubmitted their comments thereon.
However, the fact that the parties participated in the publicconsultation
and submitted their respective comments is notcompliance with the
fundamental rule that the GRAMImplementing Rules, or any
administrative rules whose purposeis to enforce or implement existing
law, must be published inthe Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.
The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes
ismandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in
thiscase, there was public consultation and submission by the parties
of their comments. (Emphasis provided.)
DISPOSITION:
Petition is DENIED. CA is AFFIRMED

3. Manner of computing time

Civil Code, Art. 13
When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days;
days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)

Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it means ten calendar days and
NOT ten working days
E.g. 1 year from Oct. 4, 1946 is Oct. 4, 1947
If last day falls on a Sunday or holiday, the act can still be done the following day
Principle of exclude the first, include the last DOES NOT APPLY to the computation of the period of prescription of a crime, in which rule, is
that if the last day in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be
filed on the next working day, as the offense has by then already prescribed

PNB v CA
222 SCRA 134

WEEK 7 DAYS
Note:
1) Notices of sale under Section 3 Act No. 3135 as amended by Act
No. 4118 on extra judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage are
required to be posted for not less that twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated
2) If property is worth more than 400, such notices shall be published
once a week for atleast three consecutive weeks in a news paper of
general circulation in the municipality or city
Facts:
1) Epifanio dela Cruz mortgaged to PNB 2 parcels of land and PNB
allegedly unlawfully foreclosed the property
2) PND consolidated ownership unto himself and sold the parcels to
third party
3) PNB claims that the foreclosure, consolidation of ownership and
sale to third party were all valid
4) PNB counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies
5) 3 promissory notes were signed in exchange for the 2 parcels
located at Bunlo, Bocaue Bulacan with Torrens titles (no. 16743 area
of
3,109 sqm.; no. 5787 around 610 sqm.)stood a residential
commercial building
6) Lots were under the common names of the Epifanio dela Cruz, his
brother Delfin and his sister Maria
7) Promissory notes were as follows:
a) For P12,000 dated September 2, 1958 payable within 69 days (date
of maturityNov. 10, 1958)
b) For P4000,dated Sept. 22, 1958 payable within 49 days (date of
maturityNov. 10, 1958)
c) For P4000 dated June 30, 1958 and payable within 120 days (date
of maturityNov, 10, 1958)
8) Sept 6, 1961-Atty Ramon delos Reyes (PNB) presented under ACT
NO. 3135 a foreclosure petition (sheriffs office, malolos Bulacan)
9) October 20, 1961two lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as
the highest bidder for P28,908.46
10) March 7, 1963sheriff leopoldo Palad executed Final Deed of
Sale
11) January 15, 1963certificate of sale in favor of PNB executed by
Palad
12) March 19, 1963final Deed of Sale registered in the Bulacan
Registry of Property
13) Plaintiff did not buy back the landJune 4, 1970land was sold
to Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a deed of conditional
sale"
LOWER COURT: dismissed instant complaint against PNB.
Counterclaim against Epifanio dela cruz was also dismissed for the
Court does not believe
that the complaint had been made in bad faith.
Not satisfied with judgment plaintiff appealed the case presenting
alleged errors in the decision of the lower court
Decision of CA: construed the publication of the notices on March 28,
April 11 and 12, 1969 as a fatal announcementreversed the
judgment appealed from declared void, inter alia, the auction sale of
the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale and the
consolidation of ownership
Reasons:
1) The notices of sale requirements were not metpublished on
March 28 (Friday) , april 11 (Friday) and April 12, 1969(Saturday)
(requirement: notice of auction sale be published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks")
2) Rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
mortgage foreclosure must be strictly complied with, and that even
the slight deviations from therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale atleast null and void
3) It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure
sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a
jurisdictional
defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a
VIR-JEN v NLRC
15 SCRA 347
Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it means ten calendar days and NOT ten
working days
NSB DECISION: VirJen shipping and Marine Services Inc, to pay the
following complainant seamen who have not withdrawn the case:
a) Earned wages from 16 to 19 April 1979
b) Wages corresponding to unexpired portion of their contract as
adjusted by the company on 1 mar 1979
c) Adjusted representation allowances
d) Vacation pay- months pay after 6 months of service and
months pay after completion of 1 year contract
e) Tanker service bonus1/2 months pay
f) Earned overtime pay for 1 to 19 april 1979
Secretariat of NSB directed to issue within 5 days from receipt of
decision the necessary clearances to the suspended seamen.
Facts:
1) Private respondents have a manning contract for 1 year with
petitioner (representing principal Kyoei Tanker Co Ltd.)
2) Manning contract approved by NSB
3) Petitioner and respondents executed side contract to pay ITF rates
when it calls on any ITF controlled foreign port , private respondents
would return to petitioners the amount paid to them (just to satisfy TF
requirements)
4) March 23, 1979: one of private respondents sent a cable to
petitioner demanding 50% increase in wages as the best and only
notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale
4) Therefore, the court had no choice but to declare the auction sale
as absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and
purchaser in said auction sale was defendant-appellee bank.
5) The Certificate of Sale, the Final deed of sale and affidavit of
consolidation are likewise of no legal effect
COMPUTATION OF TIME ACCORDING TO PNB: There was no
breach of the proviso since after the first publication on March 28,
1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969 (last day of
the second week) while the third publication on April 12, 1969
(announced as first of next week)
- It is enough that the second publication be made on the day within
the second week and the third publication, on any day within the third
week
- This refers only to the dates of publication and not that there was
non-compliance with the publication requirement
PRIVATE RESPONDENT:
- Believes that the period between each publication must never be less
than seven consecutive days
COURT:
- Erroneous impression that the day on which the first publication was
made, or on MArch 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code
- Conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of
what a week" is
- Term was interpreted to mean a period of time consisting of seven
consecutive days (Moreno, Philippine Law dictionary)
- A WEEK MEANS SEVEN DAYS INLCUSIVE OF DAY OF
PUBLICATION
- Therefore first week must cover March 28-April 3, second week april
4-april 10 and third week from april 11-16.cannot be equated
with compliance with law
DECISION OF SC: The petition for certiorari and intervention are
hereby dismissed and the decision of the CA dated April 17, 1991 is
hereby affirmed
solution to
solve ITF problems (while in Australia, ITF controlled port)
5) Due to threat and intimidation" petitioner replied on March 24,
1979 proposing an increase of 25% on basic pay plus special
compensation for the particular voyage
6) March 26, 1979: petitioner wrote to NSB denouncing the conduct of
private respondentsdemands amounting to $3,096.50/ month
7) Because of conduct and breach of contract Kyoei Tanker Co Ltd.;
Terminated the manning contract in a letter dated April 4, 1979
effective April 17, 1979
8) April 6, 1979: petitioner wrote to NSB to ask permission to cancel
manning contract with petitioner on April 17, 1979
9) April 10, 1979: NSB through Exec Dir. Cresencio C. Dayao, wrote
petitioner authorizing it to cancel the manning contract
10) Seamen disembarked in Japan and repatriated to the Phils
11) Seamen filed complaint with NSB for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of wages
12) NSB found the termination justified
13) Seamen appealed to NLRC and it reversed the decision of NSB
and required payments demanded by seamentermination without
valid cause
Thus this petition:
Issues:
1) Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion in said NSB case nos. 2250-79 and 2252-
79 in the following reasons:
a) When it adjudged the petitioner Vir-jen liable to the respondents-
seamen for terminating its employment contracts
despite authority from NSB
b) When it concluded that there is nothing on record to show that
seaman made any threat that they would complain or report to ITF
their low wage rates if their demand or proposal was not met
c) When it concluded that the respondent-seamen acted within
their rights when they imposed upon their employer their demands for
salary and wage increase in disregard of existing manning contracts
d) When it failed and refused to admit and take into account the
Addendum agreement dated December 27, 1978-to enlighten NLRC
on the ITF problem
e) When it ordered the petitioner to pay the respondents their wages
and other bonuses
f) In still including ROMEO ACOSTA as beneficiary when in fact he
already signed statement of satisfaction of judgment
g) Because the NSB decision became final and executor for failure of
aid respondents to serve on the petitioner a copy of their APPEAL
AND MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL within ten (10) days reglementary
period for appeal and even after the expiration of said period
SOLICITOR GENERALs CLAIMS
1) Private respondents conduct was uncalled for, while workers are
free to ask for wage increase, they should not use threat or such
nature and in such situation as to put the employer at their complete
mercy and with no choice but to accede to their demands
2) There was a valid justification of the part of the petitioner and or its
principal to terminate the manning contract
SC RULINGS
July 9, 1980: said decision received by respondents
July 23, 1980- filed memorandum of appeal (14 days after)
Article 223 of Labor Code: appeals should be made within 10 days
CIR v AICHI
GR No. 184823
DOCTRINE:
- The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the
complete documents within which to grant or deny the claim for
refund/credit of input vat. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days
from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day
period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the
remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days.
- A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute
expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or
under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes
erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove
not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the
procedural due process.
- As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is
the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the
legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.
- The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund under Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the
NIRC refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not
to appeals made to the CTA.
from receipt of decisionthis meaning calendar days and not
working days
The law has commanded that labor cases be promptly if not
preemptorily dispose of
Verily, the Minister of Labor has no legal power to amend or alter in
any material sense whatever the law
itself unequivocally specifies or fixes
Acosta should not have been included as beneficiary since he
already signed satisfaction of judgment
Article 12 of Labor code- duty of the state to protect the good name
of the Philippines abroad and duty of the NSB to secure the best
possible terms and conditions of employment for seamen
All manning contracts should be approved by the NSB and it cannot
be altered without approval of NSB
recognizes rights of seamen to seek high wages but it could not
however use threat and intimidation or force
Powers of NLRC in relation to the works and actuations of the NSB
is only appellate according to Article 20 read in relation to Article
223, over questions of law, since as to factual matters, it may
exercise such appellate jurisdiction only if errors in the findings of
fact are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.
General practice is to have side contracts(issue of bad faith)the
said contracts are not meant at all to alter or modify the contracts
approved by the NSBthey are purported to enforce them to the
letter, making it clearer that even if the ships have to call at ITF
controlled ports, the same shall remain to be the real and binding
agreement between the parties in intentional disregard of whatever
the ITF may extract.
WHEREFORE: petition herein is GRANTED. Decision of the NLRC
complained hereby is SET ASIDE, the decision of the NSB should
STAND. No
costs.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its
zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA
2nd Division partially granted respondents claim for refund/credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year
period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A)
and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a
leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30,
2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September
29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides
that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In
addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and
229 of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an
administrative claim is a condition precedent before a judicial claim
can be filed.
The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En
Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period
given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section
112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are
filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof,
respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that if the CIR
takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about
to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the
end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed
period
2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the
judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires
the prior filing of an administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held:
1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008),
the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group,
Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that
as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is
equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is
the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following
the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a
claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents
administrative claim was timely filed.
2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120
days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in
support of the application [for tax refund/credit], within which to grant
or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the
120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax
refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of
the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales.
The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund refers to applications for refund/credit filed
with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling,
Co., Inc. is inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is
Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not
apply to refunds/credits of input VAT.
The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input
VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction
was acquired by the CTA.

G. Application of Statutes

Constitution, Article III, Section 22 : No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex post facto law After the fact; an act or fact occurring after some previous related act
Bill of Attainder A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for
a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining
legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

Civil Code, Article 4 Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.

1987 Administrative Code, Section 19 - Prospectivity. Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided

Revised Penal Code, Article 22 Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Art 62 of this code, although at the time of publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Prospective and retroactive statutes, defined

Prospective
o operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect
o looks and applies to the future.
Retroactive
o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past.
o A statute is not made retroactive because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or part of the requirements for its action
and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage.

Laws operate prospectively, generally

It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the
legislature is to give them a retroactive effect, expressly declare or necessarily implied from the language used.

Presumption against retroactivity

 Presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or
necessarily implied.
In case of doubt: resolved against the retroactive operation of laws
If statute is susceptible of construction other than that of retroactivity or will render it unconstitutional- the statute will be given prospective
effect and operation.
Presumption is strong against substantive laws affecting pending actions or proceedings. No substantive statute shall be so construed
retroactively as to affect pending litigations.

Words or phrases indicating prospectivity

Indicating prospective operation:
o A statute is to apply hereafter or thereafter
o from and after the passing of this Act
o shall have been made
o from and after a designated date
Shall implies that the law makes intend the enactment to be effective only in future.
Statutes have no retroactive but prospective effect:
o It shall take effect upon its approval
o Shall take effect on the date the President shall have issued a proclamation or E.O., as provided in the statute

Retroactive statutes, generally

The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligation of contract, deprive persons of
property without due process of law, or divest rights which have become vested, or which are not in the nature of ex post facto laws.
Statutes by nature which are retroactive:
o Remedial or curative statutes
o Statutes which create new rights
o Statute expressly provides that it shall apply retroactively
o Where it uses words which clearly indicate its intent

STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Penal statutes, generally

Penal laws operate prospectively.
Art. 21 of the RPC provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
Provision is recognition to the universally accepted principle that no penal law can have a retroactive effect, no act or omission shall be held
to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed.
Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis there is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law.

Ex post facto law

Constitution provides that no ex post facto law shall be enacted. It also prohibits the retroactive application of penal laws which are in the
nature of ex post facto laws.
Ex post facto laws are any of the following:
o Law makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such act
o Law which aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was, when committed
o Law which changes the punishment & inflicts a greater punishment than that annexed to the crime when committed
o Law which alters the legal rules of evidence, authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense
o Law which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful
o Law which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty.
Test if ex post facto clause is violated: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right vital for protection of life
and liberty?
Scope: applies only to criminal or penal matters
It does NOT apply to laws concerning civil proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate civil or private rights or political privilege
Bill of attainder
Constitution provides that no bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Bill of attainder legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial
Essence: substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt
Serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislature to rule-making & thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of judicial functions.
History: Bill of Attainder was employed to suppress unpopular causes & political minorities, and this is the evil sought to be suppressed by the
Constitution.
How to spot a Bill of Attainder:
o Singling out of a definite minority
 o Imposition of a burden on it
o A legislative intent
o retroactive application to past conduct suffice to stigmatize
Bill of Attainder is objectionable because of its ex post facto features.
Accordingly, if a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is also an ex post facto law.

When penal laws applied retroactively

Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused.
Art.22 of RPC penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 Art 62 of the Code , although at the time of the application of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
This is not an ex post facto law.
Exception to the general rule that all laws operate prospectively.
Rule is founded on the principle that: the right of the state to punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of justice.
Favorabilia sunt amplianda, adiiosa restrigenda Conscience and good law justify this exception.
Exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and accepted by science.
2 laws affecting the liability of accused:
o In force at the time of the commission of the crime during the pendency of the criminal action, a statute is passed
! reducing the degree of penalty
! eliminating the offense itself
! removing subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the civil liability
! prescription of the offense
such statute will be applied retroactively and the trial court before the finality of judgment or the appellate
court on appeal from such judgment should take such statute in consideration.
o Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal action
Exceptions to the rule:
o When accused is habitual delinquent
o When statute provides that it shall not apply to existing actions or pending cases
General rule: An amendatory statute rendering an illegal act prior to its enactment no longer illegal is given retroactive effect does not apply
when amendatory act specifically provides that it shall only apply prospectively.

Statutes substantive in nature

Substantive law
o creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for
administration of public affairs.
o that part of law which creates, defines & regulates rights, or which regulates rights or duties which give rise to a cause of action
o that part of law which courts are established to administer
o when applied to criminal law: that which declares which acts are crimes and prescribe the punishment for committing them
o Cannot be construed retroactively as it might affect previous or past rights or obligations
Substantive rights
o One which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
Cases with substantive statutes:

Effects on pending actions

Statutes affecting substantive rights may not be given retroactive operation so as to govern pending proceedings.

Qualification of rule
A substantive law will be construed as applicable to pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law.
To promote social justice or in the exercise of police power, is intended to apply to pending actions
As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law as it exists at the time of the decision of the appellate court, where the statute
changing the law is intended to be retroactive and to apply to pending litigations or is retroactive in effect
This rule is true though it may result in the reversal of a judgment which as correct at the time it was rendered by the trial court. The rule is
subject to the limitation concerning constitutional restrictions against impairment of vested rights

Statutes affecting vested rights

A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy
Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons, as a
present interest
The right must be absolute, complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency
A mere expectancy of future benefit or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does not
constitute a vested right
Inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not vested
 A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively under the following circumstances:
o if it impairs substantive right that has become vested;
o as disturbing or destroying existing right embodied in a judgment;
o creating new substantive right to fundamental cause of action where none existed before and making such right retroactive;
o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability already extinguished by operation of law
Law creating a new right in favor of a class of persons may not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs any vested right
acquired before the establishment of the new right nor, by the terms of which is retroactive, be so applied if:
o it adversely affects vested rights
o unsettles matter already done as required by existing law
o works injustice to those affected thereby

Statutes affecting obligations of contract

Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of execution. Such law forms part
of, and is read into, the contract even without the parties expressly saying so.
Laws existing at the time of the execution of contracts are the ones applicable to such transactions and not later statutes, unless the latter
provide that they shall have retroactive effect.
Later statutes will not, however, be given retroactive effect if to do so will impair the obligation of contracts, for the Constitution prohibits the
enactment of a law impairing the obligations of contracts.
Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract itself
A statute which authorizes any deviation from the terms of the contract by postponing or accelerating the period of performance which it
prescribes, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which are however minute or apparently immaterial in
their effect upon the contract, impairs the obligation, and such statute should not therefore be applied retroactively.
As between two feasible interpretations of a statute, the court should adopt that which will avoid the impairment of the contract.
If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by a subsequent legislation.
A law by the terms of which a transaction or agreement would be illegal cannot be given retroactive effect so as to nullify such transactions or
agreement executed before said law took effect.

Repealing and amendatory acts

Statutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate prospectively, unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect clearly appears.
Although a repealing state is intended to be retroactive, it will not be so construed if it will impair vested rights or the obligations of contracts,
or unsettle matters that had been legally done under the old law.
Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are generally applied retroactively if favorable to the accused, unless the contrary appears or the
accused is otherwise not entitled to the benefits of the repealing act.
While an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had always been contained therein , it may not be
given a retroactive effect unless it is so provided expressly or by necessary implication and no vested right or obligations of contract are
thereby impaired.
The general rule on the prospective operation of statutes also applies to amendatory acts

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Procedural laws
The general law is that the law has no retroactive effect.
Exceptions:
o procedural laws
o curative laws, which are given retroactive operation
Procedural laws
o adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion
o they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer injustice
o they include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence
o Applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to modes of procedure- which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of the rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.
o A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are
pending.
o Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not:
o violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected;
o nor constitutionally objectionable.
Rationale: no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
 A person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure
Curative statutes
curative remedial statutes are healing acts
they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations
the rule to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made
harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one
curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are designed and
intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make
valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid.
Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with
Limitations of rule
remedial statutes will not be given retroactive effect if to do so would impair the obligations of contract or disturb vested rights
only administrative or curative features of the statute as will not adversely affect existing rights will be given retroactive operation
the exception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is a remedial or curative statute which is enacted as a police power measure
Statutes of this type may be given retroactive effect even though they impair vested rights or the obligations of contract, if the legislative intent
is to give them retrospective operation
Rationale: The constitutional restriction against impairment against obligations of contract or vested rights does not preclude the legislature
from enacting statutes in the exercise of its police power

Police power legislations

as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate certain activities, are applicable not only to those activities or
transactions coming into being after their passage, but also to those already in existence
Rationale: the non-impairment of the obligations of contract or of vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of power, by the
legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people
Any right acquired under a statute or under a contract is subject to the condition that it may be impaired by the state in the legitimate exercise
of its police power, since the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereign power is deemed read into every statute or contract as a
postulate of the legal order

Statutes relating to prescription

General rule: a statute relating to prescription of action, being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its effectivity. In other
words, such a statute is both:
o prospective in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it took effect, and
o retroactive in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued before its passage
However, a statute of limitations will not be given retroactive operation to causes of action that accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will
remove a bar of limitation which has become complete or disturb existing claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon
Statutes relating to appeals
The right to appeal from an adverse judgment, other than that which the Constitution grants, is statutory and may be restricted or taken away
A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions in which no judgment has yet been
promulgated at the time the statute took effect.
Such statute, like other statutes, may not however be construed retroactively so as to impair vested rights. Hence, a statute which eliminates
the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered in a case final and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a decision rendered
after the statute went into effect, but NOT the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected before the passage of the law, for in the
latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become vested under the old law and may not therefore be impaired.
Stature shortening the period for taking appeals is to be given prospective effect and may not be applied to pending proceedings in which
judgment has already been rendered at the time of its enactment except if theres clear legislative intent.

PEOPLE v SUMILANG
G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946)

DOCTRINE: Procedural laws are retrospective if pending. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
FACTS:
The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and
sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4
months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor.
On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the
lower court.
Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court
denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the
petitioners attorney.
However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not
receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the
mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings
guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be
suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever
pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal
necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or
motion should be granted.
HELD:
No. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that
statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
 their passage. extent.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that

TIU SAN v REPUBLIC

DOCTRINE: Expressed intent to take effect in pending cases.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of
naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court dueto his conviction
on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of
Lucena, Quezon that occurredduring the intervening two years
from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July
13, 1950pursuant to R.A. No. 530.
The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1
clause (3), thisprovision is not applicable to the case at bar
since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance
occurredprior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530.
ISSUE:Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect? OR
whether the conviction of an applicant for naturalization for
violation of a municipal ordinance would disqualify him from
taking his oath as a citizen.
DECISION:Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with
reference to the date of the hearing of the petition
fornaturalization, the said Act was meant to have a
retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides: This
Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases
pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet
taken the oath of citizenship..
Statute: An applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a citizen
after 2 years from the promulgation of the decision granting his
petition for naturalization if he can show that during the
intervening period he has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of government rules
Held: law did not make any distinction between mala in se and
mala prohibita. Conviction of the applicant from violation of
municipal ordinance is comprehended within the statute and
precludes applicant from taking his oath. The illegal timberyard
is still present up to time of promulgation.

CHAVEZ v COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS

9 SCRA 412 (1963)
DOCTRINE: Amendment does not give successional right especially if it impairs a substantive right.
Facts: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the
intention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the
land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want
to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his
son Eugenio Chavez was working the land for him, he was 74 years of
age already.
- Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo
Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was
dismissed.
- Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958.
When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is
Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship
between the petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was
terminated by reason of such death.
- On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No.
1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he
amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the
event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and
one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is related
to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall
cultivate the land himself personally .
Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively?
Decision: NO. Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively.
- Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo
Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the tenancy
relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was
terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of
Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any
successional right to continue as tenant.
- In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that The amendment to section
9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the
continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or
incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenants
immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the
second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land
himself personally which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be
applied retroactively. To hold otherwise would lay open this particular
provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the
ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become
vested.

CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO. v COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968)

DOCTRINE: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the
express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. Tax laws
operate prospectively, whether they enact, amend, or repeal.
FACTS: taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the
The case involves petitioner's claim for refund of sales tax paid Court of Tax Appeals.
from November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem tax paid Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by
from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June
Portland cement produced by petitioner. 1955), producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said
Since 1952, however, petitioner had been protesting the tax. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise.
imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement, and on ISSUE:
January 1953, it also protested the payment of the ad valorem Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively.
HELD:
A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively,
unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest
either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
against the retrospective effect.
While the purpose of the amendment, as mentioned in the
explanatory note to the bill, was not only to "accelerate the
collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also
clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative
scope of the two terms,".
It certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to
unsettle previously consummated transactions between the
taxpayer and the Government.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-28774 (February 28, 1980)
DOCTRINE: Curative statutes apply retroactively.
FACTS:
The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land
for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in
monthly installments for 20 years.
However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land
and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending
approval by the Bureau of Lands, the sales agreement between
the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for
registration by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether
it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose
of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85.
However, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of the
property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were segregated
and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated
portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation
TACAN v COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: Contracts are construed at the time they were entered into. A repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect when substantive statute
was existing at the time the contract was entered into.
FACTS:
March 1960: Atty. Felipe G. Tac-An represented brothers Eleuterio
and Maximino Acopiado, accused of frustrated murder and theft of
large cattle in Mun. Court of New Pian, Zamboanga del Norte
April 4, 1960: a Deed of Quitclaim was created by Tac-An, which
states that the borthers were to convey to him a parcel of land (3
hectares) as his fees for representing them; it was acknowledged
before a notary public
2 days after: the brothers told Tac-An that they were terminating his
services because their wives and parents did not agree with the
conveyance of the land; but he continued to represent them
Acquitted and dismissed for frustrated murder and theft,
respectively
April 2, 1961: Eleuterio sold his share of the land previously
conveyed to Tac-An to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario, who
did not take possession of the same
June 1964: Tac-An appointed Irineo Villejo as his overseer in the
land
July 2, 1964: Tac-An secured approval of Governor of Zamboaga
del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim
o Approval revoked on April 12, 1965
A statute operates prospectively and never retroactively, unless
contrary is made manifest by the legislative intent either
expressly or by necessary implication. Doubt must be resolved
against retroactivity.
Nothing in the statute shows the legislative intent for retroactive
effect. The use of the word shall shows that it was intended for
future effect.
Congress discussions made no mention of the taxes previously
collected
Tax laws operate prospectively, whether they enact, amend, or
repeal
whatsoever to the title.
Then, RA 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the
DBP Charter (RA 85), among which was Sec. 13.
ISSUE:
W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by
RA 3147.
HELD:
Yes. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147,
by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts
regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159
lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to
establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their
own.
It is, therefore, a curative statute to render valid the acquisition
by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC.
Oct. 7, 1964: filed a complaint against the brothers, Paghasian, and
Libetario (CFI of ZDN) for him to be declared owner of the land and
the subsequent sale be annulled
CFI decided in favor of Tac-An
CA voided the transfer of land to Tac-An
o It applied Sec 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and
Sulu (because the brothers were Non-Christians but Subanons)
o States that no contract shall be made with non-Christian tribes
for the payment or delivery of money or any real property, unless
it is executed before a judge of a court of record, justice or
auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public, and it must bear
the approval of the provincial governor
o Contracts made in violation are null and void
Hence, present petition
Petitioner argues that since the revocation was made after
the complaint was filed, it cannot affect his right to the land
which has already vested
He also argues that Admin Code of Mindanao and Sulu was
repealed by RA No. 4252 on June 19, 1965, hence the
approval was not even necessary
ISSUE: W/N RA No. 4252 has retroactive effect
HELD: No.
RATIO:
 During the material times of the case, 1) when the deed was
executed, 2) when the approval of the governor was given and
revoked, the Administrative Code of the Mindanao and Sulu were in
full force and effect
EUGENIO v DRILON
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
DOCTRINE: If there is expressed intent for a law to have retroactive effect, it will apply even in contracts. The intent of the statute is the law.
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from
Petitioner, two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations
because of nondevelopment on the property.
Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and
the title was registered under their name.
Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of
the lot to him.
Applying P.D. 957 "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree", the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development,
reinstate Private Respondent's purchase contract over one lot
and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest)
he made for the lot sold to the spouses.
ALUNAN III v MIRASOL
FACTS:
Sec 423 of the LGC of 1991 (took effect Jan. 1, 1992)
provides for an SK in every barangay (chairman, 7 members,
secretary, treasurer)
Sec 532(a): first election shall be held 30 days after the next
local election
1st local election under the code: May 11, 1992
SK elections scheduled for Sept 30, 1992 (postponed), then
Dec. 4, 1992 through a COMELEC resolution (which also
placed the SK elections under the direct control and
supervision of the DILG)
Sept. 18, 1991: DILG, through then Sec. Alunan III issued a
letter-resolution exempting City of Manila from holding
elections for SK on the ground that the elections held on May
26, 1990 for Kabataang Barangay (precursor of SK) were to be
considered the first under the code (conducted bet. Jan 1,
1988 and Jan 1, 1992 under BP 337)
Private respondents, claiming to represent members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a paetition in the RTC of Manila
to set aside the DILG decision
SUBIDO, JR v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Filed July 28, 1995 (but dated July 17, 1995) : petitioners
Bayani Subido, Jr. (then a Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation BID) and Rene Parina (then a BID
Special Agent) were charged with Arbitrary Detention
o They allegedly issued and implemented a warrant of arrest
for one James J. Maksimuk on June 25, 1992, even as the
BID decision requiring Maksimuks deportation has not yet
become final and executory
o He was detained for 43 days
Aug. 28, 1995: arraignment was scheduled
Aug. 28, 1995: petitioners filed a Motion to Quash because
according to them, in view of the effectivity of RA 7975
(provided for the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan;
amended PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan) on May 16,
1995, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the
offense and the accused.
The said Admin Code was substantive in nature; the repealing
statute cannot be given retroactive effect
Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957
saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that
non-development does not justify the non-payment of the
amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover
even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957
did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can
be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. "The intent
of the statute is the law."
RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents, ordered
petitioners to desist from implementing the DILG order and to
perform the specified pre-election activities
Petitioners went to the SC, insisting that because the City of
Manila already had an election on May 26, 1990, it was
exempted from holding elections on Dec. 4, 1992, citing LGC,
Sec. 532(d)
o Stated that elections held for the kabataang barangay
conducted under BP 337 bet. Jan 1, 1988 and Jan 1, 1992
shall be considered as the 1st election under the Code
o Petitioners argue: said provision should apply to
elections conducted before the effectivity of the code
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 532(d) has retroactive effect
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Sec 532(d) is a curative law. It was enacted to validate an act
done in the past which otherwise would be invalid under existing
laws. Thus, it has retroactive effect
o Said RA should be given prospective application
o At the time the case was filed, Subido was already a
private person, having been separated from the service
on Feb. 28, 1995 and because Parina does not have a
salary grade of 27 (i.e. none of them fall under the
categories in Sec. 4 of RA 7975)
o They also argued that Arbitrary Detention did not fall under
Crimes Committed by Public Officers of the RPC but under
Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State, hence
not covered by RA 7975
o The case should have been filed with the RTC of Manila
o They also contend that penal laws should not be given
retroactive application if they are unfavorable to the accused
(RPC 22)
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash. 2nd motion for
reconsideration denied.
Hence, present petition
ISSUE: W/N RA 7975 should be applied retroactively to the case
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The alleged commission of the crime happened 1 year, 10
months, and 21 days before RA 7975 took effect
Thus, Sec 4 of PD 1606, prior to the amendment, contains the
applicable provisions
o states that offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office punishable by penalties
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years
are within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
ZULUETA v AIA BREWERY
FACTS:
Zulueta is a dealer and operator of an outlet selling Asia
Brewerys beer
Mar. 30, 1992: Zulueta filed before the Iloilo RTC a complaint
against AB for breach of contract, specific performance and
damages
July 7, 1994: AB filed with Makati RTCa complaint for the
collection of a sum of money (P463,107.75) corresponding
Zuluetas debt to AB
Jan. 3, 1997: Zulueta moved for the consolidation of the cases
Feb. 13, 1997: Makati RTC, through Judge Parentala, granted
the motion
May 19, 1997: ABs motion for recon was denied
Aug. 18, 1997: AB filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari
CA set aside the RTCs rulings, on the ground that the two
cases do not have a common issue of law (Iloilo case deals
with W/N AB breached its dealership contract while the Makati
case deals with Zuluetas indebtedness)
Hence, present petition
Petitioner argues that the Makati RTCs orders consolidating
the cases could no longer be assailed because the CA petition
for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary 60-day period
REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
April 19, 1995: A 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe
Manuel located in Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite was declared by the
National Historical Institute as a historical landmark (Resolution
No. 2)
o This is in line with the Centennial Celebration of Phil.
Independence; govt embarked on several commemorative
Centennial Freedom Trail projects
Dec. 4, 1997: government (thru National Centennial
Commission) filed a complaint for expropriation against Fe
Manuel and Metrobank (bec. the land was mortgaged by Fe to
Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by Metrobank on
Nov. 20, 1997)
May 27, 1998: Cavite RTC dismissed the petition for lack of
cause of action
(1) No prior determination by the Pres. As to the
necessity/wisdom of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain
(2) No prior written authority for the Solicitor General to
institute the expropriation case
June 3, 1998: petitioner received a copy of the RTC decision
June 17, 1998: republic filed a motion for recon
o prescribed penalty for their case is prision mayor (6 years
and 1 day to 12 years)
o plus, it was committed while they were in performance of
their official functions
RA 7975 is not a penal law but a procedural law
o Penal laws: laws that prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violation
Procedural laws: prescribes rules and forms of procedure of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those
which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice
prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
which took effect on July 1, 1997
May 23, 1997: AB received the order denying the motion for
recon (60 days after = July 22, 1997, but filed CA petition on
Aug 18)
Reglementary period before the 1997 Rules was 90 days (90
days after = Aug. 21)
ISSUE: W/N 1997 Revised Rules should apply retroactively to the
case
HELD: Yes. Petition for certiorari was filed late; RTC decision
reinstated.
RATIO:
General rule: laws have no retroactive effect
Remedial or procedural laws are exceptions because they
dont create new or take away vested rights but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights
They may apply to cases pending at the time of their passage
Although the period for filing the petition was shortened, AB
was not deprived of that right
o There are no vested rights to rules of procedure
o 90-day limit was not a vested right; it was merely a
discretionary prerogative of the courts
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Rules, ABs lawyers still had 21
days to file
Oct. 6, 1998: motion for recon denied
Oct. 12, 1998: copy of the order denying the motion
received by republic
Dec. 11, 1998 : republic filed petition for certiorari before
the CA
Mar. 15, 1999: CA dismissed petition for having been filed out
of time
o CA applied Sec 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on Sept 1, 1998
o Provides that the 60-day period shall be counted from
the receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution;
60-day period will be interrupted if motion for recon is filed. If
denied, the respondent may file certiorari within the
remaining period
! 60 days from June 3, 1998: Aug. 2
! But since motion for recon was filed on June 17, 1998
(after 14 days), respondent has 46 days left (after Oct.
12, 1998) or until Nov. 27, 1998
o Before: 60-day period shall be counted from the receipt
of the order denying the motion for reconsideration
! 60 days from Oct. 12, 1998: Dec. 11, 1998
Jan 13, 2000: CA denied motion for recon
 Hence, present petition
Republic argues that the CA should not have applied the
amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on Sept. 1, 1998
ISSUE: W/N the amendment should be given retroactive affect
HELD: Yes. But the said rule reverted to its original on Sept. 11,
2001.
RATIO:
Sept. 11, 2001: A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC took effect, which
again provided that the 60-day period shall be counted
from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration
Under this rule, the petitioner filed the certiorari on the 60th day
from receipt of the order denying its motion for recon
Since the amending rule is procedural or remedial in character, it
does not create new or remove vested rights and can therefore be
applied retroactively

H. Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal

Civil Code, Article 7

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the laws declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

1987 Administrative Code, Sections 21 and 22

Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not
be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be
revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.

AMENDMENT
Power to Amend
$ The legislature has the authority to amend, subject to constitutional requirements, any existing law.
$ Authority to amend is part of the legislative power to enact, alter and repeal laws.
$ The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or change the law,
such authority being the exclusive to the legislature.

How amendment effected

$ Amendment the change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a statute which survives in its amended form.
$ The amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of a statute
either expressly or impliedly.
$ Express amendment done by providing in the amendatory act that specific sections or provisions of a statute be amended as
recited therein or as common indicated, to read as follows.

Amendment by implication
$ Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the same subject, in the absence of a clear inconsistency.
$ Legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is shown by a statement in the later act that any provision of law that is
inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly.
$ Implied Amendment- when a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as the later may not be enforced without nullifying
the pertinent provision of the latter in which event, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to the extent of repugnancy.
When amendment takes effect
$ 15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified therein after
such publication.

How amendment is construed, generally

$ Statute and amendment read as a whole
$ Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the original statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the amended form
had been adopted.
$ Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally enacted in it amended form.
$ Read in a connection with other sections as if all had been enacted in the same statute, as if all had been enacted in the same
statute.
$ Where an amendment leaves certain portions of an act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning
and effect they have before the amendment.
$ Where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions
of the existing law as are retained either literally or substantially
Meaning of law changed by amendment
 $ An amended act should be given a construction different from the law prior to its amendment, for its is presumed that the legislature
would not have amended it had not it not wanted to change its meaning.
$ Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute had a different meaning which the amendment changed in all the particulars
touching which a material change in the language of the later act exists.
$ Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act different from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a
change in the law or in its meaning.
Amendment Operates Prospectively
$ An amendment will not be construed as having a retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided or the legislative intent to give it a
retroactive effect is necessarily implied from the language used and only if no vested right is impaired.
Effect of Amendment on Vested Rights
$ After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment
or to obligations that were contracted under the prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be governed by the law
before its amendment.
$ Not applied retroactively so as to nullify such rights.

Effect of amendment on jurisdiction

$ Jurisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted.
$ Jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally decided therein.

REVISION AND CODIFICATION

Generally
$ Purpose: to restate the existing laws into one statute and simplify complicated provisions, and make the laws on the subject easily
found.
Construction to harmonize different provisions
$ Presumption: author has maintained a consisted philosophy or position.
$ The different provisions of a revised statute or code should be read and construed together.
$ Rule: a code enacted as a single, comprehensive statute, and is to be considered as such and not as a series of disconnected
articles or provisions.
What is omitted is deemed repealed
$ all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or
code provides otherwise
$ Reason: revision or codification is, by its very nature and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the subject and an
expression of the whole law thereon, which thereby indicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate those provisions of the
old laws that are not reproduced in the revised statute or code.
$ Possible only if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to is a complete and perfect system in itself.
$ Rule: a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute.
$ When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provision of the prior act that are omitted from the
revised act are deemed repealed.
Change in phraseology
$ It is a well settled rule that in the revision or codification of statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor the admission or
addition of words in the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts.
$ Words which do not materially affect the sense will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the revise statute or code, or that
some general idea will be expressed in brief phrases.
$ If there has been a material change or omission, which clearly indicates an intent to depart from the previous construction of the old
laws, then such construction as will effectuate such intent will be adopted.

Continuation of existing laws.

$ A codification should be construed as the continuation of the existing statutes.
$ The codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly existed.
$ The rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in seprate
sections, does not operate to change the operation, effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of such nature as to
manifest clearly and unmistakably a legislative intent to change the former laws.

REPEAL

Power to repeal
$ Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact one.
$ The legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable laws or limit its future legislative acts.
 Repeal, generally
$ Repeal: total or partial, express or implied
$ Total repeal revoked completely
$ Partial repeal leaves the unaffected portions of the statute in force.
$ A particular or specific law, identified by its number of title, is repealed is an express repeal.
$ All other repeals are implied repeals.
$ Failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
$ Repealed only by the enactment of subsequent laws.
$ The change in the condition and circumstances after the passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a statute to
overcome the difficulties brought about by such change does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor make the later statute so
inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it.

Repeal by implication
$ Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect.
$ There must be a sufficient revelation of the legislative intent to repeal.
$ Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest
$ General rule: the latter act is to be construed as a continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as the two acts are the same,
from the time of the first enactment.
$ Two categories of repeals by implication
% Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act to the extent of
the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier.
% If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a
repeal of the earlier act.

Irreconcilable inconsistency
$ Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized and
both cannot be given effect, once cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
$ Implied repeal earlier and later statutes should embrace the same subject and have the same object.
$ In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law
that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.
$ It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to exist that is be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same
subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former.
$ the fact that the terms of an earlier and later provisions of law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to constitute the later an
implied repeal of the former.
Implied repeal by revision or codification
$ Revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is
excluded there from shall be discarded.
Must be intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself in order that the prior statutes or part thereof which
are not repeated in the new statute will be deemed impliedly repealed

Other forms of implied repeal

$ The most powerful implication of repeal is that which arises when the later of two laws is expressed in the form of a universal
negative.
$ There is a clear distinction between affirmative and negative statutes in regard to their repealing effects upon prior legislation.
% Affirmative statute does not impliedly repeal the prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest,
% A negative statute repeals all conflicting provisions unless the contrary intention is disclosed.
$ Legislative intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts something in general term and afterwards it passes another on the same
subject, which though expressed in affirmative language introduces special conditions or restrictions
% The subsequent statute will usually be considered as repealing by implication the former regarding the matter covered by the
subsequent act.
$ The express repeal of a provision of law from which an executive official derives his authority to enforce another provision of the
same law operates to repeal by implication the latter and to deprive the official of the authority to enforce it.
$ The enactment of a statute on a subject, whose purpose or object is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier law on the same
subject which thereby deprives it of its reason for being, operates to repeal by implication the prior law, even though the provisions
of both laws are not inconsistent.
 All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, construed.
$ Nature of repealing clause
% Not express repealing clauses because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
% A clause, which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and
prior acts of the same subject matter.
% The presumption against implied repeal and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeal apply ex proprio vigore.
% Legislature is presumed to know the existing law so that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express it.

Repeal by implication not favored

$ Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied repeal
$ Legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
$ A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether should, if possible, be rejected.
$ In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedly repealed a prior law on the same subject, the doubt should be resolved
against implied repeal.

As between two laws, one passed later prevails

$ Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later statute repeals prior ones which are not repugnant thereto.)
% Applies even if the later act is made to take effect ahead of the earlier law.
$ As between two acts, the one passed later and going into effect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going into effect
later.
General law does not repeal special law, generally
$ A general law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the same subject, unless it clearly appears that the
legislature has intended by the later general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law.
$ Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws, one is special and the other general and this applies even though
the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter covered by the special statute.
$ Generalia specialibus non derogant a general law does not nullify a specific or special law
$ The legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of the particular case.
$ Reason why a special law prevails over a general law: the legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of
the particular case.
$ General and special laws are read and construed together, and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by constituting the
special law as an exception to the general law.
$ General law yields to the special law in the specific law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.
$ Applies irrespective of the date of passage of the special law.
When special or general law repeals the other.
$ There is always a partial repeal where the later act is a special law.
Effects of repeal, generally
$ Appeal of a statute renders it inoperative as of the date the repealing act takes effect.
$ Repeal is by no means equivalent to a declaration that the repealed statute is invalid from the date of its enactment.
$ The repeal of a law does not undo the consequences of the operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is directed by
express language or by necessary implication, except as it may affect rights which become vested when the repealed act was in
force.
On jurisdiction, generally
$ Neither the repeal nor the explanation of the law deprives the court or administrative tribunal of the authority to act on the pending
action and to finally decide it.
$ General rule: where a court or tribunal has already acquired and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation repealing the statute which originally conferred
jurisidiction.
$ Rule: once the court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final
determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal admits of exceptions.
$ Repeal or expiration of a statute under which a court or tribunal originally acquired jurisdiction to try and decide a case, does not
make its decision subsequently rendered thereon null and void for want of authority, unless otherwise provided.
$ In the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, the expiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what, under the old
law, is an illegal transaction, so as to deprive the court or tribunal the court or tribunal of the authority to act on a case involving such
illegal transaction.
$ Where a law declares certain importations to be illegal, subject to forfeiture by the Commissioner of Customs pursuant to what the
latter initiated forfeiture proceedings, the expiration of the law during the pendency of the proceedings does not divest the
Commissioner of Customs of the jurisdiction to continue to resolve the case, nor does it have the effect of making the illegal
importation legal or of setting aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter.

On jurisdiction to try criminal case

 $ Once a jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined.
$ A subsequent statute amending or repealing a prior act under which the court acquired jurisdiction over the case with the effect of
removing the courts jurisdiction may not operate to oust jurisdiction that has already attached.

On actions, pending or otherwise

$ Rule: repeal of a statute defeats all actions and proceedings, including those, which are still pending, which arose out of or are
based on said statute.
$ The court must conform its decision to the law then existing and may, therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct when
pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears that pending appeal a statute which was necessary to support the judgment of
the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.

On vested rights
$ repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that accrued and became vested under the statute before its repeal.
$ The statute should not be construed so as to affect the rights which have vested under the old law then in force, or as requiring the
abatement of actions instituted for the enforcement of such rights.
$ Rights accrued and vested while a statute is in force ordinarily survive its repeal.
$ The constitution forbids the state from impairing, by enactment or repeal of a law, vested rights or the obligations of contract, except
in the legitimate exercise of police power.
On contracts
$ Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law will not
affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right of the parties thereunder.

Effect of repeal of tax laws

$ Rule favoring a prospective construction of statutes is applicable to statutes which repeal tax laws.
$ Such statute is not made retroactive, a tax assessed before the repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in force when
the assessment or levy was made.

Effect of repeal and reenactment

$ Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not affect the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original
statute, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption.
$ The repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the
same act done by him under the old law, will not preclude the accuseds prosecution, nor deprive the court of the jurisdiction to try
and convict him.
Effect of repeal of penal laws
$ Where the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had
and the action should be dismissed.
$ Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the
new law, the previous offense is obliterated.
$ That a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence, persons, charged with violations of the old law
prior to the repeal.
$ Repeal of a statute which provides an indispensable element in the commission of a crime as defined in the RPC likewise operates
to deprive the court of the authority to decide the case, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning the effect of a repeal of a
penal law without qualification.
$ Reason: the repeal of a penal law without disqualification is a legislative act of rendering legal what is previously decreed as illegal,
so that the person who committed it is as if he never committed an offence
$ Exception:
% where the repealing act reenacts the statute and penalizes the same act previously penalized under the repealed law, the act
committed before reenactment continues to be a crime, and pending cases are not thereby affected.
% Where the repealing act contains a saving clause providing that pending actions shall not be affected, the latter will continue to
be prosecuted in accordance with the old law.

Distinction as to effect of repeal and expiration of law

$ In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of conviction of an accused for violation of the penal law before its repeal
is erased.

Effect of repeal of municipal charter

$ The repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts an end to the functions of the incumbents.
$ The conversation of a municipality into a city by the passage of a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of abolishing all
municipal offices then existing under the old municipality offices then the existing under the old municipality, save those excepted in
the charter itself.

Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of

 $ When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby revived unless expressly so
provided
$ Where a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will have no effect of repealing the former statute, the former or old statute
continues to remain in force.

SARCOS v. CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)
This case explains why legislative purpose to determine legislative intent
Frankfurter
o Legislative words are not inert but derived vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed
o Legislation working instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words
Benjamin Natham Cardozo
o Legislation is more than a composition
o It is an active instrument of government which means that laws have ends to be achieved
Holmes
o Words are flexible
o The general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down
o Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them
DOCTRINE: The deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a change in the law was intended.
When dealing with elective posts, the necessity for restricted construction is greater. We must look at the legislative intent of the whole law.
FACTS: suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967.
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, HELD:
was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by No. Sec. 2188 provides that the provincial governor can
Respondent, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. order preventie suspension if the charge against a municipal
The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct official was one affecting his official integrity. Under RA
in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner 5185, it is the provincial board which has been granted the
with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of power.
timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the damage The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension
and prejudice of the public and of the government. was vested on the Provincial Board.
Petitioner answered that he merely used the money for the The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations
sale of police uniforms. by vesting the power on a board where no one person may
And on the basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner have monopoly over the power of suspension. It also grants
was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent local governments greater freedom.
pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of
Decentralization Act of l967. preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. Mayor of
Sec. 2188 of RAC provides for the power of the provincial Barobo is therefore reinstated and Provincial Board is
governor to investigate complaints and inflict punishment enjoined in the disposition of peitioners administrative
against municipal officers for maladministration of office and complaint.
final judgement of any crime involving moral turpitude.
RA 5185 repeals previous law
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive

MECANO v COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992)

DOCTRINE: Repeal of statute by implication is not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.
FACTS: June 22, 1990 Director Lim forwarded Mecanos claim
Antonio Mecano is a Director II of NBI who was hospitalized (thru 1st Endorsement) to the Secretary of Justice together
for cholecystitis in less than two weeks from which he with the comment and recommendation of Chief, LED of the
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total NBI. Finding Mecanos illness to be service-connected, the
amount of which he is claiming from COA. Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of
May 11, 1990 thru a memo to Director Lim of NBI, Mecano Justice favorably recommended the payment of Mecanos
requested for reimbursement for his expenses on the claim.
ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Sec. 699 of November 21, 1990 in a 4th Endorsement, the then Usec
RAC: In case of sickness caused by or connected directly Bello of Justice Department returned Mecanos claim to
with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Director Lim having considered the statements of COA
Department head may in his discretion authorize the Chairman that the RAC 1917 being relied upon by
payment of the necessary hospital fees. Mecano was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987.
 In response, Mecano re-submitted his claim to Director Lim
with the copy of Opinion No. 73 of then Sec. of Justice
Franklin Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code of 1987 aid not operate to repeal or
abrogate in its entirety the RAC, the particular Sec. 699 of
RAC.
May 10, 1991 Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos
claim to then Usec Bello for favorable consideration.
July 2, 1991 Sec. Drilon forwarded Mecanos claim to the
COA Chairman.
January 16, 1992 COA Chair Domingo denied Mecanos
claim on the ground that Sec. 699 of RAC has been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the
reason that the same section was not re-stated nor re-
enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He
commented that the claim may be filed with ECC
considering that the illness of Mecano occurred after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
February 7, 1992 Usec Montenegro returned Mecanos
claim to Director Lim with the advice that Mecano may
elevate the matter to Supreme Court if he so desires.
CONTENTIONS:
Petitioner: Sec. 699 of RAC was not repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987 based on Opinion No. 73 of Sec.
Drilon. In the event that his claim is filed in ECC, as
suggested by COA, he would still not be barred from filing a claim
under Sec. 699 of RAC.
Respondent:
(2) The enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC
of 1917. From the whereas clauses of the
new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent
of the legislature to repeal the old Code.
(2) Employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately
covered by ECCs Program under PD 626 such that to allow
simultaneous recovery of benefits
under both laws on account of the same contingency would be
unfair and unjust to the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the enactment of the Administrative Code
of 1987 operates to repeal the Revised Administrative Code of
1917.
US v SOLIMAN
DOCTRINE: When a law which repeals a prior law by implication is itself repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law.
FACTS:
Soliman was charged with estafa; however, he filed sworn
statement as evidence in support of the estafa case against him
which was in effect and extrajudicial confession of guilt.
He, however, contends that he was merely coerced by the police
to submit the false testimony to certain material allegations of
fact. He was acquitted for estafa on the ground that there was
reasonable doubt whether the extrajuidicial confessions was
made voluntarily but was still made liable for perjury.
The trial court convicted him for the crime of perjury in
accordance with Act No. 1697 and sentenced him to 6 months
imprisonment and P300 fine. He contends that since his
judgement was rendered on November 23, 1915, section 3 of Act
1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the
LAGMAN v CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 1966)
RULING: No. The enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
did not operate to repeal the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. The Repealing Clause indicated in Sec. 27 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 is not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be
repealed.
It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing
and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that
the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls
under the category of an implied repeal.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code
does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter
of the Old Code. There are several matters treated in the
Old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public
bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness
benefits under Sec. 699 and still others.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for
the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.
*PETITION GRANTED AND COA WAS ORDERED TO GIVE
DUE COURSE TO PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR BENEFITS.
Additional Info:
Two Categories of Implied Repeal:
(1)Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter
are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
(2) If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law.
Administrative Code which became effective on July 1, 1916.
Thus, the repeal of said law criminalizing his actions extinguishes
his criminal responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the express repeal of Act No. 1697 by the
Administrative Code extinguishes the criminal responsibillity of the
accused?
HELD: No. Provisions on perjury in Act. 2142 or Penal Code impliedly
repealed by section 3 of Act No. 1697 are revived by the express
repeal of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code
(Act No. 2657). However, the penalty which should be imposed is that
one which is more favorable to the convict. Thus, the penalty is
reduced from six months imprisonment and P300 fine to a penalty of 4
months and 1 day of arresto mayor and a fine of P75.
DOCTRINE: A special law and later enactment prevails.
FACTS:
March 20, 1962 - Petitioner was granted a license of public
convenience to operate 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and
regular terminal for the transportation of passengers (Bocaue
Bulacan to Paranaque) and freight under firm name Marco
Transit and began operating 12 passenger buses along his
authorized line.
June 17, 1964 - The Municipal Board of Manila pursuant to Sec
18, RA 409 which authorizes the municipal board to regulate
public vehicles within the city, establish bus terminals and
regulate entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the city,
enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting
Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and For
Other Purposes."
August 17, 1964 Enforcement of ordinance and prevented
petitioner from operating his buses except for 2 shuttle buses.
Petitioner contends that ordinance is illegal as the roads which
he was authorized to operate are national roads which according
to CA No. 548 are subject to the regulation of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications and not the municipal board.
HAGAD v GOZODADOLE
DOCTRINE: Repeals by implication are not favoured every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.
FACTS:
Administrative complaints were filed to the Ombudsman against
the Mayor, Vice Mayor and other officials of Mandaue City.
The respondents contended that the Ombudsman do not have
primary jurisdiction because the later enactment of the Local
Government Code - which vests the power to investigate and
impose administrative sanctions against local officials as well as
to effect their preventive suspension with the Office of the
President and thus shifting the power to sanction investigations
and preventive suspensions from the Ombudsman as provided in
the Ombudsman Act.
The respondents filed a preliminary writ of injunction in the RTC
of Mandaue to prevent further investigation of the Ombudsman
PEOPLE v PIMENTEL
DOCTRINE: Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new
law, the previous offense is obliterated as this is favourable to the accused.
FACTS:
1983: Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700
(the Anti-Subversion Law) before the RTC of Manila
o June 5, 1990: Arrested 7 years later
June 14, 1990: he was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866
before the RTC of Makati
July 16, 1990: his counsel filed a motion to quash the information
filed in Makati RTC on the ground of double jeopardy
o Contends that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
should be absorbed in the crime of Subversion
Oct. 12, 1990: RTC granted motion to quash
May 27, 1991: CA affirmed the RTC ruling
Present petition: Petitioner contends double jeopardy
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not 1st and 2nd Information are for Subversion
2. Whether or not private respondent was placed in double jeopardy
with the filing of Second Information for Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion.
HELD:
Under PD 1866, Section 1 (1), the mere possession of an
unlicensed firearm is the crime itself; subversion only increases
Also, the power conferred by RA 409 does not include right to
enact ordinance which amended or modified the certificate of
public convenience granted by Public Service Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
HELD:
CA No. 548 has already been repealed by Sec. 27 of RA 917.
More importantly, RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment
than C.A. No. 548 and the Public Service Law, so that even if
conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the
latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts.
Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service
Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the
regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic.
and were granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 is divested of
his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
officials by virtue of subsequent enactment of the Local Government
Code
HELD: No. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate
that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. They are not inconsistent or
irreconcilable. The presumption is that the legislature have known the
existing laws on the subject and not enacted conflicting statutes. The
Local Government Code merely shifted the power from the Minister of
Local Government to the Office of the President.
the imposable penalty; therefore, its different from the act
punishable under RA 1700, which is subversion itself
He has not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for
subversion
The Information filed against Pimentel in violation of PD 1886
(Illegal Possession)does not charge him with the separate and
distinct crime of Subversion in the same Information but simply
describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Sec. 1 of
PD 1866 was committed so as to qualify the penalty to death.
There is only one offense charged in the information and it is
clear from the title of the law. Previous charge of subversion is
different and based on RA 1700. Subversion and illegal
information can co-exist. Therefore, he could be charged under
both laws
No double jeopardy as requisites not complete. First case not yet
convicted.
HOWEVER, RA 1700 is totally repealed by RA 7636 on
September 22, 1992. The latter governs as this action is still
pending. The sentence no longer exists. Total repeal deprives
the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
Offense of illegal possession is now bailable and has reduced
 penalty under RA 8294 enacted on 1997.
The repealing law is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent; it should be given retroactive effect
The repeal was categorical, definite, and absolute; there was no
saving clause
The legislative intent of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion
law is clear
REPUBLIC v MARCOPPER MINING CORP.
MAXIM: Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi. Every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
DOCTRINE: Repeal of laws by implication is not favoured and that courts must generally assume their congruent application.
FACTS:
MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea
disposal system for the period Oct. 31, 1985 to Oct. 21, 1986
MMC filed for extension before permit expired
Sept. 20, 1986: National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC)
ordered MMC to cease and desist from discharging mine tailings
into Calancan Bay
But NPCC issued a new temporary permit dated Nov. 11, 1986, to
expire on Feb.10, 1987
Feb. 5, 1987: MMC requested for extension of its temporary permit
June 10, 1987: NPCC was abolished and its powers were
integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau and into the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
April 11, 1988: DENR Secretary, as Chairman of PAB, directed
MMC to cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into
Calancan Bay
Apr. 15, 1988: a telegraphic order was issued by the DENR USEC
enjoining immediate compliance by MMC of the cease and desist
order of Apr. 11
MMC appealed the cease and desist orders to the Office of the
President
May 2, 1988: Office of the Pres denied requests
May 6, 1988: Partial Motion for Recon
May 13, 1988: granted
o With said order, the Office of the Pres ordered MMC to remit
P30,000 a day starting May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund
(ETF) for the rehabilitation of the Calancan Bay; issued a TRO
June 30, 1991: MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay
July 9, 1991: MMC filed a motion manifesting that it would
discontinue its deposits to the ETF
Feb. 5, 1993: Office of the Pres dismissed MMCs initial appeal,
affirmed the cease and desist order and lifted its TRO
Jan. 22, 1997: Sta. Cruz, Marinduque Mayor Wilfredo Red informed
the PAB that MMC stopped remitting
Apr. 23, 1997: PAB ruled that MMCs obligation to remit subsists
and since the order was lifted only on Feb. 5, 1993, its obligation
stopped only then
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO v REYES
MAXIM: Expressio unius est esclusio alterius. Express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Franchise tax: RA 7160 lgc repeal RA 3648, 2340 and pd 551(50% of 1% not 2% exempted)
Implied repeal
FACTS:
Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Service Company
legislative franchise to maintain and operate and electric light and
power system in San Pablo and nearby municipalities
o Sec 10 provides that the grantee shall pay unto the municipal
treasury a tax equal to 2% of the gross earnings IN LIEU of any
and all taxes of any kind
Franchise transferred to MERALCO under RA 2340
Sept. 11, 1974: PD 551 was enacted; reiterated the tax provisions
above, payable now to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
It would be illogical to try and sentence the accused for an offense
that no longer exist; subversion is no longer a crime
Punishable 6 yrs. Maximum; detained for more than 7 yrs; immediate
release is in order
Jan. 7, 1998: CA set aside the PAB order
o CA applied RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Mining
Act), approved on Mar. 3, 1995)
o Sec. 67: grants the mines regional director the power to issue
orders or to take appropriate measures to remedy any practice
connected with mining or quarrying operations; Sec. 115: general
repealing clause
o Prior to the passage of said Act, the PAC had jurisdiction to act
on pollution-related matters in the mining business
o OSG argues that the Mining Act did not amend or repeal RA
3931 (June 18, 1964) as amended by PD 984 of 1976
(National Pollution Control Decree of 1976) where PAB has
authority vested by EO 192
o (EO 192 of 1987 created the PAB giving it adjudication powers
over pollution cases under RA 3931 and PD 984)
ISSUE: Has the PAB under RA 3931 been divested of authority to try
and hear pollution cases connected with mining operations by virtue of
subsequent enactment of RA 7942?
HELD:
Provisions of RA 7492 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) do not
repeal RA 3931 (National Pollution Control Decree of 1976) as
amended by PD 984 and EO 192. RA 7492 does not contain any
provision which categorically and expressly repeals the
provisions of Pollution Control Law. There is also no implied
repeal. PAB has power to issue, renew or deny permits for
discharge of mine tailings.
Mines regional director in 7492 is complementary to Pollution
Adjudication Board in RA 3931. He has express administrative
and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations
but no adjudicative powers over complaints for violations of
pollution control statutes and regulations.
PAB has jurisdiction to act and rule on complaints on violation of
pollution laws. However, MMC must be declared not to have
arrears in deposits as ETF has sufficient funds to undertake
rehabilitation.
Jan 1, 1992: RA 7160 or the LGC of 1991 took effect
o Authorizes provinces and cities to impose a tax on business
franchises at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross
annual receipts of the preceding calendar year
Oct. 5, 1992: the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City
enacted Ordinance No. 56 or the Revenue Code of the City of San
Pablo
o Sec. 2.09 imposed a tax on business franchises of 50% of 1% of
gross annual receipts
 o City Treasurer demanded from MERALCO (priv. resp.) payment
of said franchise tax
MERALCO paid under protest from 1994-1996 (P1,857,711.67)
MERALCO filed before the RTC to declare Ordinance No. 56 null
and void insofar as it imposes franchise tax and to claim for a
refund
Court ruled in favor of MERALCO
o LGC did not expressly or impliedly repeal the tax exemption of
MERALCO under its charter
ISSUE: W/N the LGC repealed the provision on MERALCOs charter
regarding its tax exemption
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
LGC Sec 137: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law
or other special law, the province may impose tax
JUAN v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Brgy. Talipapa, Novaliches, QC Brgy. Chairman Juan, and
Kagawads de Jesus, Carreon, and Galguerra were charged with
violation of Sec 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code
o Juan and de Jesus allegedly used a VHF radio transreceiver
owned by the Brgy. govt of Talipapa for their election campaigns
o Carreon and Galguerra allegedly used a tricycle owned by the
Brgy. govt of Talipapa for their political campaigns
Apr. 3, 1997: RTC of QC issued an Order suspending all accused
for 60 days
CA upheld RTC order
o Preventive suspension authorized under Sec. 13 of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
Hence, present petition
Petitioners insist that the RTC didnt have jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases filed because the imposable penalty for the
charges does not exceed 6 years
LAMBINO v COMELEC
DOCTRINE: If a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. There is logrolling when the initiative petition incorporates
an unrelated subject matter in the same petition and this invalidates whole petition. Amendment changes a part of the Constitution without altering basic
principles while revision constitutes an overhaul of the Constitution.
FACTS:
Feb. 15, 2006: Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino
Group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Consti
Aug. 25, 2006: filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to
ratify their petition under RA 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Act)
o They alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its
registered voters; claimed that COMELEC had verified the
signatures
Proposed changes will shift the Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of govt
Proposed question: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF
ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
Aug. 31, 2006: COMELEC denied the petition due course for lack of
an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution
Sec. 151: Scope of taxing powers (rates)
Sec. 193: Tax exemptions are hereby withdrawn
Sec. 534 repeals city charters, among others, which are
inconsistent with it
It was an implied repeal (because it did not expressly state
repealing RA 3648)
Moreover, LGC expressly provides for those given the tax
exemption: 1)local water districts, 2) cooperatives duly registered
under RA 6938, 3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions
LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such
exemptions or privileges
o Under Sec. 2 of RA 7691, which amended BP 129, the first-level
courts are the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and
municipal circuit trial courts
ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the cases
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
Under Sec. 268 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) states that
the RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any criminal action
for violation of the said Code, regardless of the penalty prescribed,
except those relating to failure to register or vote (MTC or MeTC)
Since the Omnibus Election Code is a special law, it must be
construed as an exception to the general law (BP 129 as amended
by RA 7691)
Substantive:
W/N their offense falls under RA 3019, and therefore would warrant
suspension. Yes, because the Om. Election Code is a complement to
RA 3019
Petitioners appealed to the SC, opposed by various groups and
people
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
The initiative petition does not comply with Sec 2 of Art. XVII of the
Consti on Direct Proposal by the People
o The draft of the proposed amendment should be ready and show
to the people before they sign the proposal; the proposal must be
embodied in the petition; the people must know what they are
signing
o There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of the text of the
Lambino groups proposed changes in the signature sheet that
they passed around.
o Neither does the sheet say that the proposed changes are
attached to it.
o They never alleged in their petitions that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition with the signature sheets; only in their
reply to the interventions
o Even if they did circulate it, they admitted that they printed only
100,000 copies (10 signatures per signature sheet), nowhere
near the 6.3 M signatories
o Those who signed could not have known the following changes:
1) Term limits on members of legislature will be lifted
 2) Members of the interim parliament will determine the
expiration of their own term of office
3) The interim parliament shall convene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Consti
The initiative violates Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Consti disallowing
revision through initiatives
o Peoples initiative to change the Consti applies only to an
amendment of the Consti and not to its revision
o Amendment: change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved; piecemeal changes (like
changing the voting age, adding a qualification for Constitutional
offices, etc.)
o Revision: a total overhaul of the Constitution; change that alters
a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances;
alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution
o Quantiative test: asks whether the proposed change is so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous provisions
KIDA v SENATE
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
June 30, 2011: RA 10153 was enacted; it reset the ARMM elections
from Aug. 8, 2011 to 2nd Monday of May 2013, and every 3 yrs
thereafter (to synchronize it with regular national and local
elections)
o Also granted the Pres the power to appoint OICs as Regional
Gov, Regional Vice Gov, and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who will sit until the May 2013 elections
Aug. 1, 1989: RA 6734 was enacted; An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the ARMM; plebiscite held on Nov. 6, 1990 (Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi became ARMM)
o Scheduled the 1st regular elections between 60 and 90 days from
the date of ratification
Mar. 31, 2001: RA 9054 reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the 2nd Monday of Sept. 2001
o Ratified in a plebiscite on Aug. 14, 2001; Basilan and Marawi
vited to join ARMM
June 22, 2001: RA 9140 was passed, resetting the 1st regular
elections from 2nd Monday of Sept. to Nov. 26, 2001
Sept. 21, 2004: RA 9333 was passed to reset the ARMM regional
elections to 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same day every
3 years thereafter
o Not ratified in a plebiscite
Next elections, pursuant to RA 9333 should have been held on Aug.
8, 2011, but on June 30, 2011, RA 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013
Various petitioners filed various petitions against RA 10153s
constitutionality
Sept. 13, 2011: SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of
RA 10153, ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should the cases not be decided
by the end of their term on Sept. 30, 2011
ISSUE: W/N RA 10153 is unconstitutional
Petitioners contend that RAs 9140, 9333, and 10153 amend RA 9054
and should have complied with the supermajority vote (2/3) and
plebiscite requirements under Sec. 1 & 3, Art. XVII of RA 9054
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
o Qualitative test: whether the change will accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of the basic governmental plan
o Only Congress or a Constitutional Convention can propose both
amendments and revisions
o (Three modes of amending (i.e. changing) the Constitution:
1) Through Congress, upon a 3/4 vote of all its Members
2) Through and ConCon
3) Peoples intiative)
o Under both tests, the intiative is a revision
1) QUANTI: Art VI (Legislature) and Art VII (Executive), 105
provisions
2) QUALI: alters the basic plan of the government, from
presidential to parliamentary, from bicameral to unicameral
legislature; 3 co-equal branches reduced to 2; leg and exec
merged; abolition of the Office of the President and one
chamber of Congress
o Radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers
o Peoples iniatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, are allowed to
undertake only amendments and not revisions
o PETITION DENIED
House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall
become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
- They also allege that 10153 failed to comply with the 3-reading
requirement
- They also allege that 10153 violated the right of suffrage of the
people of ARMM
- Challenge the Presidents power to appoint OICs
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
Synchronization is a recognized constitutional mandate (as shown
by Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution)
President certified RA 10153 as urgent; exempted from 3 readings
on 3 separate days
Neither RA 9333 nor RA 10153 amends RA 9054; 9054 only
provided for the schedule of the first ARMM elections; a need
existed for the Congress to fix the date of subsequent elections;
9333 and 10153 did not change or revise any provision in 9054
" no need for plebiscite
Even assuming that they did amend 9054, the supermajority
vote requirement has to be struck down for giving 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what
the constitution demands
o The consti only requires that as long as majority of the members
of the HOR or Senate are present, a quorum exists and with
quorum, a majority vote is sufficient to enact laws
o The current Congress cannot bind itself or its successors by
enacting irrepealable laws; cannot bind the future
legislature/generation to its present will
o Limits the repealing power of the Congress
The Plebiscite requirement of Sec. 3 of RA 9054 excessively
enlarged the plebiscite requirement of Sec. 18, Art. X of the
Consti
o Consti states that plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces will be
included
 o Thus, only amendments or revisions constitutionally-essential to
the organic act need a plebiscite (assuming the supermajority
and plebiscite requirements are valid)
a) Basic structure of the regional government
b) Judicial system
c) Legislative powers of the regional government
Date of elections does NOT fall under these
With regard to the Presidents power to appoint OICs
o It was the best option considering that the other options are (1)
holdover of current officials (will extend their terms 3-year terms;
terms are specified in the Consti) and (2) special elections
(COMELEC cannot simply hold special elections without an
enabling law)
Appointment is okay, since the appointing power is inherently

III. The Constitution

Constitution defined
fundamental law which sets up a form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its officers, reserving to the
people themselves plenary sovereignty
written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a government for them is established
permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to existing conditions but also to future needs
basically it is the fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation
absolute and unalterable except by amendments
all other laws are expected to conform to it

Origin and history of the Philippine Constitutions

1935 Constitution

People v. Linsangan explained as to how this Constitution came about:

Tydings-Mcduffie Law- allowed the Filipinos to adopt a constitutions but subject to the conditions prescribed in the Act.
o Required 3 steps:
! drafting and approval of the constitution must be authorized
! it must be certified by the President of the US
! it must be ratified by the people of the Philippines at a plebiscite
1973 Constitution
o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the problems of the country
o March 16, 1967: Congress passed Resolution No.2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4, calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution
1987 Constitution
o after EDSA Revolution
o also known as the 1987 Charter

A. Purpose, Objective
Primary purpose of constitutional construction
primary task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as expressed in its language
purpose of our Constitution: to protect and enhance the peoples interests

Constitution construed as enduring for ages

Constitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs to endure through a long lapse of ages
WHY? Because it governs the life of the people not only at the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future
it must be adaptable to various crisis of human affairs but it must also be solid permanent and substantial
Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the people (rich or poor)
It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time to be progressive and not static
What it is NOT:
o It should NOT change with emergencies or conditions
o It should NOT be inflexible
o It should NOT be interpreted narrowly
Words employed should not be construed to yield fixed and rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet new or changed conditions
as they arise
Courts should construe the constitution so that it would be consistent with reason, justice and the public interest

NITAFAN v CIR
152 SCRA 284 (1987)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: They contend that pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1987
3 RTC-NCR judges are seeking to have the Court prohibit the Constitution, their salaries could not be decreased during their
respondents CIR and the FO of the SC from making any deductions continuance in office and a tax corresponds to a decrease in
in their salaries with withholding/income taxes income
 Because in the 1973 Constitution, there was a particular provision
that stated that: No salary or any form of emolument of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax. (Sec. 6, Art. XV)
This provision was removed from the 1987 Constitution
ISSUE: W/N the taxing of their incomes are the decrease in income
envisioned by the constitution
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the
proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax
to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality
among the three branches of Government" in the words of
Commissioner Rigos.
Deliberations: it was further expressly made clear, specially with
regard to Fr. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of
Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary
would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers
Somehow, this clear intent was not clearly set forth by the provision
Draft proposal of Sec. 10: their salary shall not be diminished nor
subjected to income tax
But the deliberations show that the Commissioners saw this as a
violation of the principle of uniform taxation and equal protection
Commissioner Rigos proposed to remove nor subjected to income
tax (and change diminished to decreased)
GOLD CREEK MINING v RODRIGUEZ
66 PHIL 259 (1938)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Prior to Nov. 15, 1935 (when the 1935 Constitution took effect), GC
applied for patent or title to a mining claim in Benguet, Mountain
Province
However, because the 1935 Constitution took effect on Nov. 15,
1935, the respondents Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce and
Director of Bureau of Mines, refused to approve the application,
issue the patent or title for the mining claim, and to prepare the
necessary documents to be approved by the President, invoking
Sec 1, Art. XII of the Constitution which states in part:
o Natural resources, with the exception public agriculture land,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five years.
ISSUE:
CIR v GUERRERO
21 SCRA 180 (1967)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, B. Fernando for respondents.
vs. ANTONIO G. GUERRERO, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondents. L-19089
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-19089 January 31, 1967
ANTONIO G. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
L-19074.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General F. R. Rosete and Atty. A. B. Afurong for petitioner. Venancio
Fr. Bernas proposed to add but may be subject to general income
tax so as not to revert to the rulings in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia and Jugo vs. David, which upheld the tax exemption
But after the suspension of the session, Fr. Bernas again
announced that the provision will now read During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. but with
the understanding that the 1973 provision on the non-granting of tax
exemption will be replicated in the 1987 Constitution
At any rate, it was finally approved, with the understanding that the
Perfection and Endencia rulings will not apply
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding
the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution
fundamental principle of constitutional construction: the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it
should be given effect
it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers
It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
W/N the respondents can be compelled by the court to issue the
patent license to the petitioner
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
It should be borne in mind that constitutional provisions must be
presumed to have been framed and adopted in light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to
them
The location of the mining claim was perfected before the 1935
Constitution took effect
Thus, as ruled in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia, a valid location
of a mining claim segregated the area from public domain
The taking effect of the 1935 Constitution should not affect rights
already fixed under it
Thus, the mining claim does not fall under the prohibition of Sec 1 of
Art 12
Venancio B. Fernando for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General
Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Atty. A.
B. Afurong for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
These are two (2) appeals from the same decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals. One (L-19074) was taken by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and the other (L-19089) by Antonio G. Guerrero. The
dispositive part of said decision reads:
In line with the foregoing opinion, the decision appealed from is hereby Guerrero during the years 1949 and 1950, upon which the disputed
modified. Petitioner (Antonio G. Guerrero) is ordered to pay the sum of reassessment is based. The only issues in these appeals are whether
P3,775.66 within thirty days from the date this decision becomes final. or not he is liable for the payment of: (1) P3,775.66, by way of forest
No pronouncement as to costs. (Emphasis ours.) charges and surcharges on the logs sold to the company, which the
Court of Tax Appeals answered in the affirmative; (2) P1,192.51, by
Said Antonio G. Guerrero was, during the years 1949 and 1950, a way of fixed and percentage taxes and surcharges as producer of said
dealer in logs, which he used to sell to the Aparri Lumber Company, logs, which said court decided in the negative; (3) P668.36, as
hereinafter referred to as the company. additional forest charges and sales taxes, as well as surcharges,
which was decided by the trial court in favor of the taxpayer; and (4)
P120.00 and P50.00 as compromise penalties for violation of Sections
On April 2, 1954, the then Collector of Internal Revenue made an 208 and 209 of the Revised Internal Revenue Code and of the
assessment and demand requiring Guerrero to pay the sum of bookkeeping regulations, respectively, likewise, decided by the Court
P4,014.91, representing fixed and percentage taxes and forest of Tax Appeals against the Government.
charges, as well as surcharges and penalties, in connection with his
aforementioned business transactions with the company. Upon
Guerrero's request, the matter was submitted to the Conference Staff With respect to the first item, Guerrero maintains that, he is not liable
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which, in due course, thereafter, or therefor because he bought the logs in question for the company, as
on January 11, 1956, recommended that the assessment be increased agent thereof and with money belonging thereto. However, before the
to P5,139.17, computed as follows: Conference Staff of the then Bureau of Internal Revenue, Guerero
had: claimed that he financed his business with his own money and
sold the logs to the company on a commission basis. Moreover, he
C-14 producer's fixed tax for 1949 and 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . admitted having sold some lumber to other enterprises inP Manila, 20.00
5% sales tax on P18,760.20 although he had previously asserted that he dealt exclusively with the
(P14,377.92 & P4,382.28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . company. 938.01
25% surcharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234.50
Total for fixed and sales taxes and surcharges . . . . . . . .
Vol. of timber, July 4, 1949 to May 21, 1950 (41,880 & 13,892) . . . Upon the other hand, the auxiliary invoices presented before
55,772 Bd. the
ft
Add: 40% for squaring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bureau of Internal Revenue were either spurious, or referred 22,309 to" logs
"
other than
Total volume to bethoseassessedinvolved. . . . in. . .the
. . .disputed
. . . . . . . .reassessment.
. . . . . 78,081Thus, " "for
instance,
or . . . .in. .exhibit
. . . . . .8-AA
. . . . (O.R.
. . . . . No.. . . .6578049,
. . . . . . . . p.
. . .82,
. BIR record),
184.15 cu. the
m.
Regular forest charges on 184.15 cu. m. at P3.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . word "June" was superimposed over the word "May" and, atP the back
644.53
300% surcharge for cutting without license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of Exhibit 8-AA-1 (p. 81, BIR record), which is the corresponding 1,933.59
50% (x) surcharge for transporting without invoice . . . . . . . . . . . . . invoice, two similar alterations were made. In the auxiliary 322.26 invoices
50% surcharge for discharging without permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exhibits 00-3 and 00-4 (PP. 28-29, BIR record), submitted by Guerrero 322.26
50% surcharge for late payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to the Conference Staff, as Exhibits C-3 and C-4, his name is322.26 written
(script), in ink, on the space opposite the
Forest charges & surcharges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . word consignee". However,
Regular forest charges on 13.94 cu. m. at P3.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in the copies of said auxiliary invoices (Exhibits 8-R-2 and 8-S pp. 117
48.79
300% surcharge for cutting without license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and 119, BIR record), taken from the company, the corresponding 146.37
25% surcharge for transporting without invoice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . space is blank. Again, the taxpayer's name on said Exhibits 00-3 and
12.20
25% surcharge for discharging without permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 00-4 is handwritten with a penmanship that is markedly different from
12.20
25% surcharge for late payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . that of Segundo Agustin, the signatory of said invoices, who had
12.20
supposedly
Forest charges accomplished
& surcharges . . . . .the
. . .same,
. . . . . .thus
. . . .indicating
. . . . . . that said name
could not have been written by Segundo Agustin, and rendering the
authenticity of the documents highly doubtful. Furthermore, said
TOTALinvoices,
AMOUNT asDUE well .as . . .the
. . .other
. . . . .invoices
. . . . . . .submitted
. . . . . . . . .by Guerrero to the
In addition to the above amount, the sums of P20.00 and P100.00 as Conference Staff (Exhibits C-1 to C-14, also, marked as Exhibits 00-1
compromise penalties in extrajudicial settlement of his penal liabilities to 00-14, pp. 18-31, BIR record), referred to logs other than those
under sections 208 and 209 of the N.I.R.C. should be reiterated. That involved in the questioned reassessment.
another sum of P50.00 as compromise penalty for his violation of the
Bookkeeping Regulations should be imposed against the taxpayer, he The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate that the logs involved in
having admitted during the hearing of this case that he did not keep said reassessment were obtained from illegal sources, and that the
books of accounts for his timber business. forest charges due thereon had not been paid. Since these charges
"are liens on the products and collectible from whomsoever is in
This recommendation was approved by the Collector of Internal possession" thereof, "unless he can show that he has the required
Revenue, who, accordingly, made the corresponding reassessment auxiliary and official invoice and discharge permit" (Collector of
upon receipt of notice of which Guerrero requested, on February 10, Internal Revenue vs. Pio Barretto and Sons, L-11805, May 31, 1960)
1956, a rehearing before the Conference Staff. Instead of acting on which Guerrero has not shown it follows that he is bound to pay
this request, on April 20, 1956, the corresponding Internal Revenue the aforementioned forest charges and surcharges, in the sum of
Regional Director issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the P3,775.66.
properties of Guerrero, in order to effect the collection of his tax
liabilities under said reassessment. Hence, on June 8, 1956, Guerrero As regards the second item of P1,192.51, representing fixed and
filed with the Court of Tax Appeals the corresponding petition for percentage taxes and surcharges, as producer of the logs involved in
review. Subsequently, said court rendered the decision appealed from. the reassessment, the Court of Tax Appeals held that Guerrero is not
Hence, these appeals. liable therefor, upon the theory that said logs were sold by the
Government to the one who had cut, and removed the products from
There is no dispute as to the volume of sales of logs made by the forest; that the original sale of said logs was, therefore, made by
the Government, not by the concessionaire or cutter of the forest
products; and that, accordingly, Guerrero is not liable for the payment
of the corresponding fixed and percentage taxes thereon. This theory
is based upon the premise that, whereas in Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. M.R. Lacson, L-12945 (April 29, 1960), we held that
forest charges are internal revenue taxes, this ruling was reversed in
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Pio Barretto Sons, L-11805 (May 31,
1960).
It is true that the dispositive portion of our decision in the first case
expressly sustained the concurring and dissenting opinion of a
member of the Court of Tax Appeals in the appealed decision thereof
and that the writer of the opinion maintained that forest charges are
internal revenue taxes. A careful perusal of the text of the decision of
the Supreme Court therein shows, however, that said dissenting
opinion is not the ratio decidendi of the aforementioned decision. It
should be noted that the Collector of Internal Revenue contested the
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals to entertain the appeal taken
by Lacson from the assessment made by said officer involving forest
charges, and that the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the tax
court to hear and decide said appeal, because the issue therein was
the validity of said assessment. From the viewpoint of the Supreme
Court, this issue was decisive on the question of jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals, regardless of whether forest charges were taxes
or not.
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to advert to a problem of
semantics arising from the operation of Section 1588 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the counterpart of which is now Section 315 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, pursuant to which:
Every internal revenue tax on property or on any business or
occupation, and every tax on resources and receipts, and any
increment to any of them incident to delinquency, shall constitute a lien
superior to all other charges or liens not only on the property itself
upon which such tax may be imposed but also upon the property used
in any business or occupation upon which the tax is imposed and upon
all property rights therein.
xxx xxx xxx
The enforcement of this lien by the Commissioner (formerly Collector)
of Internal Revenue, has often induced the parties adversely affected
thereby to raise the question whether a given charge is a tax or not, on
the theory that there would be no lien if said question were decided in
the negative. In connection therewith, said parties had tended to
distinguish between taxes, on the one hand as burdens imposed
upon persons and/or properties, by way of contributions to the support
of the Government, in consideration of general benefits derived from
its operation and license fees charged in the exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state, under its police power and other
charges for specific things or special or particular benefits received
from the Government on the other hand.
It is high time to stress that the term "tax," as it appears in said Section
1588 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 315 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, is used in these provisions, not in the
limited sense adverted to above, but, in a broad sense encompassing
all Government revenues collectible by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue under said Code, whether involving taxes, in the strict
technical sense thereof, or not. Thus, under the heading "injunction not
available to restrain collection of tax", Section 305 of said Code
which is the first provision of Title IX (entitled "General Administrative
Provisions"), Chapter I (entitled "Remedies in General) thereof
provides:
No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the
collection of any national internal-revenue tax, fee, or charge imposed
by this Code.
Similarly, under the heading "Civil remedies for the collection of
delinquent taxes," Section 316 of the same Code ordains;
The civil remedies for the collection of internal revenue taxes, fees, or
charges, and any increment thereto resulting from delinquency shall
be (a) by distraint of goods, chattels, or effects, and other personal
property of whatever character, including stocks and other securities,
debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and rights to personal
property, and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to real
property; and (b) by judicial action. Either of these remedies or both
simultaneously may be pursued in the discretion of the authorities
charged with the collection of such taxes.
No exemption shall be allowed against the internal revenue taxes in
any case. (Emphasis supplied.)
In other words, the National Internal Revenue Code makes a
distinction between taxes, on the one hand, and fees or charges, on
the other; but as used in Title IX of said Code, the term "tax" includes
"any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by" the
Code. And it is in this sense only that we sustained the view taken in
the aforementioned concurring dissenting opinion in Collector of
Internal Revenue vs. Lacson (supra). Hence, in the Barretto case, it
was held that the Government does not sell forest products, but
merely collects charges on the privilege granted by it "for the
exploitation of forest concessions, i.e., charges for the right to exercise
the privilege granted by the Government to the licensee of cutting
timber from a public forest or forest reserve". In line with this view, we
stressed in Cordero vs. Gonda, L-22369 (October 15, 1966), the
declaration made in Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, L-18649 (February 27, 1965), that a mining ad
valorem tax "is a tax not on the minerals, but upon the privilege of
severing or extracting the same from the earth," although strictly a fee
for something received is not a tax. As a consequence, the original
sale, as contemplated in Section 186 of the Internal Revenue Code, is
made by the concessionaire or whoever cuts or removes forest
products from public forests or forest reserves in the case at bar,
Guerrero, who is accordingly, bound to pay said sum of P1,192.51.
While this case was being heard in the Court of Tax Appeals, certain
documents were discovered, tending to show that Guerrero had
evaded the payment of forest charges on certain logs (other than
those heretofore mentioned), which had been shipped and sold by him
to the company. Said documents, which were found in the possession
of the latter, covered logs shipped and sold thereto as follows:
Exhibit Date Volume Invoice
8-I-2 May 9, 1949 4.966 Cu. m. 12272263
8-I-3 May 9, 1949 2.151 Cu. m. 12272263
8-BB-1 May 20, 1949 5.20 Cu. m. 6578041
8-AA-1 May 21, 1949 4.63 Cu. m. A-6578048
The aforementioned documents consist of auxiliary invoices
purporting to have been issued by Concessionaire Segundo Agustin to
Guerrero as consignee of the logs therein mentioned which are not
included in Agustin's certificate (Exhibit 00, p. 32 BIR record) of the
invoices covering logs sold by him to Guerrero, thus showing that the
said invoices (Exhibits 8-I-2, 8-I-3, 8-BB-1 and 8-AA-1) are spurious;
that the logs therein described must have been obtained by Guerrero
from illegal sources; and that the forest charges and the sale and
percentage taxes thereon have not been paid. Although these charges
and taxes are not included in the original and revised assessments
made in this case, petitioner herein maintains that Guerrero may
nevertheless be held liable therefor, inasmuch as:
Where plaintiffs themselves show facts upon which they should not
recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a defense or not,
their claim should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection
becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any
favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.
(Emphasis ours; Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30.)
Petitioner's contention is untenable. The foregoing doctrine deals with
plaintiff's right to recover, when his own evidence proves the contrary.
In short, it refers to a point in issue. In the case at bar, the additional
logs under consideration were not included in the contested
assessments. Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals is
purely appellate, said Court correctly declined to make an award
thereon, for lack of jurisdiction over the same.
With reference to the last two (2) items of P120.00 and P50.00, the
Court of Tax Appeals did not sentence Guerrero to pay the same upon
the ground that he had not entered into a compromise agreement with
the Government. The record shows, however, that Guerrero had
expressed his willingness to pay "any compromise penalty which may
be imposed by the Honorable Court."
In short we find that the Court of Tax Appeals has erred in not
sentencing Antonio G. Guerrero to pay, besides the sum of P3,775.66
awarded in the decision appealed from, the aforementioned additional
sums of P1,192.51, P120.00 and P50.00. Thus modified, with the
addition of these sums in the award in favor of the Government and
against Antonio G. Guerrero, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respect, with costs against the latter. It
is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

B. Language
How language of constitution construed
primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the LANGUAGE itself
The words that are used are broad because it aims to cover all contingencies
Words must be understood in their common or ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employee
o WHY? Because the fundamental law if essentially a document of the people
Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its meaning would change
What if the words used have both general and restricted meaning?
Rule: general prevails over the restricted unless the contrary is indicated.

JM TUASON v LTA
31 SCRA 413 (1970)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: o Art. XIII, Sec. 4 provides: "The Congress may authorize, upon
Aug. 3, 1959: RA No. 2616 took effect without executive approval payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
It provides for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in QC jointly subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals."
owned by JM Tuason, Gregorio Araneta and Co., and Florencio In looking at the relevant Constitutional provisions: it is to be
Deudor, et. al. (Lands constitute a certain portion of the Sta. Mesa assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
Heights Subdivision couched express the objective sought to be attained
Nov. 17, 1960: JM Tuason filed a petition for prohibition before the They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
RTC to enjoin the LTA from implementing the expropriation terms are employed constitution is not primarily a lawyers
Jan. 10, 1963: RTC held RA 2616 as unconstitutional and granted document; it should be easily understood by the people
petition o Based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional what they say
HELD: NO. It is obvious that the Congress has the power to expropriate, under
RATIO: the Art 13 provision.
The SC looked into the constitutional power of Congress to The Congress has a broad grant of expropriation, which is very
authorize the expropriation of lands apparent in the Constitutional provision

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXEC SEC

194 SCRA 317 (1991)

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
July 25, 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 284 providing
that
o Sec. 1: A member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor.
Petitioners assailed the said EO, alleging that it is unconstitutional
for being contrary to Sec 13 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides
o Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
 otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.
ISSUE: W/N EO 284 is unconstitutional
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
C. Rules of Construction
SARMIENTO v MISON
156 SCRA 549 (1987)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as
taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, seeking to
enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his
functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o confirmation by
the CA, is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: W/N Salvador Mison was validly appointed as Commissioner
of Customs
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
Art. VII, Sec. 16, as originally proposed by the Committee on
Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read:
o Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a
Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
IBP v ZAMORA
338 SCRA 81 (2000)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Then President Estrada ordered the PNP and the Marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention
and suppression.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief,
through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated a Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which
the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted.
This Task Force Tulungan is placed under the leadership of the
Police Chief of Metro Manila.
The President confirmed his verbal directive on the deployment of
the Marines in a Memorandum dated 24 January 2000 wherein he
expresses his desire to improve the peace and order situation in
Metro Manila.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and the PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the
IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare
the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void, and
unconstitutional, arguing that:
o MAIN ARGUMENT # 1: The deployment of the Philippine
Marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution, in that:
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided
under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of
Justice being exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Still, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation
in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official's office
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments.
However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in
the text of the provision.
o (1) to delete the phrase "and bureaus,"
o (2) to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the
phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT
ANY."
Thus, as it currently stands, and following the accepted rule on
constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would
follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments
A) No emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would
justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law
enforcement work; hence, said deployment is in derogation of
Article II, section 3 of the Constitution;
B) Said deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the
Military in a civilian function of government (law enforcement)
in derogation of Article XVI, section 5(4) of the Constitution;
C) Said deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the
Military to perform the civilian functions of government.
o MAIN ARGUMENT # 2: In militarizing law enforcement in Metro
Manila, the administration is unwittingly making the Military
more powerful than what it should really be under the
Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N LOI 02/2000 is unconstitutional.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
On the No emergency argument:
o the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of
peace and order and promotion of the general welfare
o The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to
bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
 such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief,
provides in part:
o The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such
proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
MARCELINO v CRUZ
121 SCRA 51 (1983)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with rape before the CFI of Rizal
Rested his case on August 4, 1975
Attorneys for both parties (Marcelino and People), moved for time to
submit their memoranda
CFI granted the motion, giving them 30 days to submit
Petitioner submitted on time, but the People did not
Sept. 4, 1975: case was submitted for decision
On the date set for the promulgation of the decision (Nov. 28, 1975
or 85 days from Sept. 4), counsel for the accused raised the issue
of loss of jurisdiction because the case for failure of the CFI to
decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision
A certification dated January 26, 1976 was for the complaining
witness, and the counsel for the accused, respectively, were posted
in Grace Park Post Office on December 4, 1975. These notices
were received by the respective addressees on December 8 and 9,
1975.
Jan. 19, 1976: petitioner filed present petition before SC
Petitioner alleges that the three-month period prescribed by Section
11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional
directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance
thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the
unresolved case.
o SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the
maximum period within which a case or matter shall be decided
or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen
months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts,
and three months for all other inferior courts.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI lost its jurisdiction over petitioner.
HELD: NO.
The rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the
signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the
constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of
judgment and not to the promulgation thereof.
CO v ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
199 SCRA 692
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of
Northern Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend
that based on the 1987 Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on
June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative), is
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
simply lumped together the three powers and provided for
their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters
Moreover, Fr. Bernas comments: But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it
is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody
Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining
whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the
allotted period.
Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as
the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later
date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as
well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the
control of the judge.
As pointed out in People v. Court of Appeals, the promulgation of a
judgment in the trial court does not necessarily coincide with the
date of its delivery by the judge of the clerk of court.
Moreover, the provision cited is merely directory, not mandatory
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be
construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest."
"The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by
enforcing the letter of the law."
The phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls
within the exception rather than the general rule.
By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident
that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this
Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of
Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... "
And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been
incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of
procedure.
Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, declares that constitutional
provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to
matters merely procedural.
not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese
father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
ISSUE:
1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.
2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively.
HELD:
Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural
born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. They need not perform any act of election granted that his
PERFECTO v MEER
GR. No. L-2348 (1950)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of
this Court during the year 1946.
After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the
Manila CFI contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary
not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
o Article 8, section 9 provides that the members of the Supreme
Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office."
CFI upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount
collected. The defendant Collector of IR appealed.
ISSUE: W/N taxes to salaries of members of the Judiciary correspond
to diminution thereof
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
ENDENCIA v DAVID
GR No. L-6355-56 (1953)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
CFI of Manila declared section 13 of RA No. 590 unconstitutional,
and ordered David as Collector of IR to refund to Justice Endencia
P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as
Associate Justice of the CA in 1951, and to Justice Jugo P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January
1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the CA, and
from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice
of the SC
CFI held that under the doctrine laid down in Perfecto vs. Meer, the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and
Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and
so ordered the refund of said taxes
Immediately after the promulgation of the Perfecto ruling, Congress
enacted RA 590
o SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from
the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA. 590, Congress
says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of
MAGTOTO v MANGUERA
63 SCRA 4 (1975)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first
time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right.
o No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when
he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied
retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under
the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien
mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers were not
Applying various US cases, the logical conclusion may be reached
that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of
judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs.
Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in
office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would
diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham).
The next sentence reads: "Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an
annual compensation of P16,000, and each associate Justice,
P15,000."
Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an
amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries
of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant,
i.e. the salaries of judges cannot be taxed as it corresponds to a
decrease in their salaries
And even then, the taxes cannot apply to those judges currently in
office
compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary
If the Congress be allowed to interpret laws, a final court
determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law
of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the
Constitution by the Legislative department
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes
is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide for its own interpretation, tying the hands of the courts in
their task of later interpreting said statute, esp. when such
interpretation runs counter to a previous Court interpretation
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
 In the 3 criminal cases (G.R. Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929),
the respondent judges declared certain confessions of the accused
as admissible as evidence even if they were obtained even if the
said accused were not informed of their right to remain silent and
their right to be informed of such right
ISSUE: W/N the said confessions are admissible as evidence
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The constitutional provision has and should be given a prospective
and not a retrospective effect.
A confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right
(to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on
January 17, 1973.
CALDERON v CARALE
GR No 91636 (1992)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.
From the cases Sarmiento vs. Mison, Mary Concepcion Bautista v.
Salonga, and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on
Constitutional Commissions, et al., the following doctrines were
established:
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and
Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints
other government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as
observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices
but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in
an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the
officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
In March 1989, RA6715 was passed, amending PD442 or the Labor
Code
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and
other Commissioners shall all be appointed by thePresident,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the
accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the
New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and
even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no
law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.
Because the confessions of the accused in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02,
37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the New
Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had
been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although
they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to
counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because.
No such right existed at the time.
Constitutional provisions as a rule should be given prospective
effect
Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from
the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor.
The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be
appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
President Cory Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners
of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers
sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify
and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.
After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating
the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
The present petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality
and legality of the permanent appointments, without submitting the
same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation
ISSUE: W/N Congress may, by law, add to the Constitutional list of
officials appointed by the President that are subject to confirmation by
the CA
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, or under
"third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Therefore it is unconstitutional for the Congress to enact a law
requiring CA confirmation for additional officials because
1. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments
requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
and
2. it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments on appointments which
are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative.
Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function.
The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted
Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner. Legislation cannot
expand it after it has been interpreted by the SC.
Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
 or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . . (Expanded
powers, as compared to the 1987 version)
The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not
judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional
convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional)
assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935
Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system
between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions.
Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in
accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the
legislature or the executive would want it interpreted

D. Aids in construction/interpretation
Aids to construction, generally
apart from its language courts may refer to the following in construing the constitution:
o history
o proceedings of the convention
o prior laws and judicial decisions
o contemporaneous constructions
o consequences of alternative interpret-tations
these aids are called extraneous aids because though their effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the essentials of the process
(remember preamble? # ganito lang din yun)

Realities existing at time of adoption; object to be accomplished

History basically helps in making one understand as to how and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution.
In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because there are certain considerations rooted in the historical
background of the environment at the time of its adoption (Legaspi v. Minister of Finance)
Proceedings of the convention
RULE: If the language of the constitutional provision is plain it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic aids
EXCEPTION: when the intent of the framer doesnt appear in the text or it has more than one construction.
Intent of a constitutional convention member doesnt necessarily mean it is also the peoples intent
The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into because it sheds light into what the framers of the constitution had in mind at that
time. (refers to the debates, interpretations and opinions concerning particular provisions)

Contemporaneous construction and writings

may be used to resolve but not to create ambiguities
In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction are entitled to great weight however when it comes to the constitution it has no weight
and will not be allowed to change in any way its meaning.
Writings of delegates has persuasive force but it depends on two things:
o if opinions are based on fact known to them and not established it is immaterial
o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not be a shade better in the eyes of the law.

Previous laws and judicial rulings

framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions. THUS
when courts adopt principles different from prior decisions it is presumed that they did so to overrule said principle

Changes in phraseology
Before a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of revisions and changes in phraseology (ex. deletion of words) and these changes may be
inquired into to ascertain the intent or purpose of the provision as approved
HOWEVER mere deletion, as negative guides, cannot prevail over the positive provisions nor is it determinative of any conclusion.
Certain provisions in our constitution (from 1935 to the present) are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thus these changes may indicate
an intent to modify or change the meaning of the old provisions.

Consequences of alternative constructions

consequences that may follow from alternative construction of doubtful constitutional provisions constitute an important factor to consider in
construing them.
if a provision has more than one interpretation, that construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences must
be rejected.
e.g. directory and mandatory interpretation: Art. 8 Sec 15(1) requires judges to render decision within specific periods from date of submission
for decision of cases (construed as directory because if otherwise it will cause greater injury to the public)

Constitution construed as a whole

provision should not be construed separately from the rest it should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonized with conflicting provisions
so as to give them all force and effect.
sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution.
Mandatory or directory
 RULE: constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory unless a different intention is manifested.
Why? Because in a constitution, the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down rules which for the time being at least are to control alike the
government and the governed.
failure of the legislature to enact the necessary required by the constitution does not make the legislature is illegal.

Prospective or retroactive
RULE: constitution operates prospectively only unless the words employed are clear that it applies retroactively

Applicability of rules of statutory construction

Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good example in which the SC applied a number of rules of statutory construction.
Issue: whether or not the appointment of a Commissioner of Customs is subject to confirmation by the Commission on appointments

LEGASPI v MINISTER OF FINANCE

115 SCRA 418 (1982)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang
Pambansa, prayed for the SC to declare PD 1840 "granting tax
amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some
other purposes" unconstitutional
Pres. Marcos issued the PD pursuant to Amendment No. 6 of the
Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of October 27,
1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595, which granted him
legislative powers
Legaspi contends: under the 1973 Constitution "(T)he legislative
power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article
VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of
the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art. VII);
Further, Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the
President by the Constitution as amended on April 7, 1981
There is also the question of whether the President retained his
legislative power after the temporary lifting of Martial Law and after
the Constitution was amended on April 7, 1981
ISSUE: W/N the Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution as
approved in 1976 was repealed by omission by the April 7, 1981
amendment
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
Examining closely how the 1981 amendments altered Amendment
No. 2 (amendment creating the BP), it will be readily seen that the
only change consisted of the non-inclusion of the "incumbent
President" as member of the assembly in pursuance of the
fundamental objective to separate the Presidency from the regular
legislative body and thereby establish in our country a modified
form of parliamentary government
Therefore, what we have now is still the interim Batasang
Pambansa created in 1976.
It then follows that its legislative authority cannot be more exclusive
now after 1981 amendments than when it was originally created in
1976
Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of
the Charter.
The ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that the
meaning conveyed by its language, albeit plain, do not only portray
current events and developments but must likewise consider its
historical roots and the environment at the time of its adoption
This is to perceive the law as being written as part and parcel
thereof.
Historical precedents: It is to be recalled that the said amendment
was formulated in October 1976, more than fully four years after the
whole Philippines was first placed under martial law pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972.
Purpose: (1) the quelling of nationwide subversive activities
characteristic not only of a rebellion but of a state of war fanned by
a foreign power of a different Ideology from ours, and not excluding
the stopping effectively of a brewing, if not a strong separatist
movement in Mindanao, and (2) the establishment of a New Society
by the institution of disciplinary measures
The purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines be
henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest extreme situations
should ever demand it.
to make the proclamation of martial law remotest, but nevertheless
enable the government to meet emergencies effectively, they
conceived the Idea of granting to the President (Prime Minister) the
power endowed to him by Amendment No 6

MONTEJO v COMELEC
142 SCRA 415 (1995)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while
December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of
among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed
Second District of Leyte and the municipality of Palompon of the that the municipality of Tolosa (from his district) with 7,7000
Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second
First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the District.
composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed. he argues that COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that
Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election
pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736, is to be worth as much as another's."
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District,
violates the principle of equality of representation. vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district.
 Issue involves the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the
legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC has the constitutional power to transfer
municipalities from one district to another
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and
administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white
in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution.
COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws
Said Ordinance provides:
o Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under
the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila Area as
o Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered
to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein
made.
o Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of
its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
VERA v AVELINO
77 PHIL 192 (1946)
Facts:
- In May 25, 1946, the Philippine Senate passed a resolution excluding
Senators-elect Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero
from taking their seats in the Senate while the election protest against
them was still pending. The protest involved alleged electoral fraud
due to certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in Pampanga,
Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac.
- Petitioners are now filing this action against the Senate resolution,
praying for its annulment and compelling respondents to let them take
their seats.
Issues:
- WON the Court had jurisdiction over the case
- WON the Senate has exceeded its powers
- WON it was respondents legally inescapable duty to permit
petitioners to take their seats
- WON respondents can be called to account for their votes regarding
the assailed resolution
Held:
- Due to the separation of powers, the Court has no actual jurisdiction
over the case. It had already established this in Alejandrino vs.
Quezon. It is however alleged that the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission modified this doctrine; this is not true as the Court
specifically cited Alejandrino in Angara to justify their lack of
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXEC SEC
FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions. This runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The
number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created or where the city,
whose population has so increased, is geographically
located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be
made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election.
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3
of President Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the provisional
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the
Batasang Pambansa. She then exercised legislative powers under
the Provisional Constitution.
From the deliberations: The Constitutional Commission denied to
the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it
itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made."
Meaning of minor clarified by Comm. Davide: meaning to say, for
instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening municipality in
the enumeration, which ought to be included in one district. That we
shall consider a minor amendment.
Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent
COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section
3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members
(not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created. . . ."
Sec. 1 of the ordinance was annulled by the SC
jurisdiction over that case, as well as this one.
- The Senate did not exceed its powers. Independent of any
constitutional or statutory grant, it still has the power to inquire into the
credentials of any member and that members right to participate in its
deliberations.
O The assignment of contests regarding elections to the Electoral
Tribunal does not negate this power.
- It may also be approached in the viewpoint of the Senate exercising
its powers under Art. VI, Sec. 10 (3) of the 1935 Constitution to set its
own rules for its proceedings, and it exercises this power to
promulgate orders to maintain its prestige and dignity. It could be said
to have done this in this case in order to make sure that these
Senators really were elected properly.
- Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 725 provides that those who are
elected are to come to Manila and assume office, but it does not imply
that the House could not deny admission in the case of
disqualification.
- The Constitution provides, under Art. VI, Sec. 15, that Senators and
Congressmen cannot be questioned in any other place for any speech
or debate made in Congress. Therefore, the Court cannot question or
permit respondents to question the votes made regarding the
resolution before it.
employment during their tenure.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2.
HELD:
No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or
positions in the
government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who
took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during
the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad
exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The former is
meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices
LA BUGAL-BLAAN v RAMOS
GR No. 127882 (2004)
DOCTRINE: Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial
and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court
challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30
March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision,
granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA
executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding
that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution,
were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice
of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had
criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign
contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise,
including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered;
control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered
control over the disposition and sale of the products
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at
the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic
resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2
of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently,
Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive
Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of
control over the EDU of our natural resources?
Held:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter
into agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the other hand,
Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of
every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional]
provision within thirty days from its execution. In contrast to this
express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration,
development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
DE CASTRO v JBC
GR No 191002 (2010)
+ Majority Opinion and Carpio Morales Dissent
applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter
is meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise
would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and
purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O. 284 is therefore
declared null and void.
the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should
the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this
regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual
duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not
inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of
control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-
equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain
itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President
and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our
country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate
the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable
employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to
interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of
their official functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by
Justice George Malcolm, Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian
of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred
on it by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry
be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let
not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution
of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of
all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should
not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow,
parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the
President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to
enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to
secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and
peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal Blaan
and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their
communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an
otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or
the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The
Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of
discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of
such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing
required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology
needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the
States need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve
and enhance our countrys competitiveness in world markets. On the
basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of
the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations -
insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well
as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
DOCTRINE: Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the
controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven
days after the presidential election.
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an
ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution stating that they have unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on
May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose
its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed
to the next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint,
written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,
2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the
position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the
JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list
of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case
being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of
intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the
shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight
appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re
Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by
which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial
positions during the period therein fixed.
Arguments:
A. Petitioners:
a. De Castro: The JBC, in not submitting the list of
nominees, is arrogating unto itself the judicial
function that is not conferred upon it by the
Constitution, which has limited it to the task of
recommending appointees to the judiciary.
b. Soriano: JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion
in unanimously deciding to open the searc,
nomination and selection process for the position of
CJ, because the appointing authority for the said
position is the Supreme Court itself, the Presidents
authority being limited to the appointment of the
Members of the SC.
c. PHILCONSA: Perfunctory understanding of Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution is affecting the JBCs
proper exercise of its principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary by
submitting only to the President (not the next) a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every
vacancy from which members of the SC and judges
of the lower courts may be appointed. Also, the ruling
in Valenzuela should be reviewed.
d. Peralta:Mandamus can compel the JBC to
immediately transmit to the President, within a
reasonable time its list of nominees in the event the
Court decides that the President can appoint a CJ
even during the election ban.
B. OSG:
a. Writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC
from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees.
b. JBCs function to recommend is a continuing
process, which does not begin with each vacancy or
end with each nomination because the goal is to
submit the list of nominees to Malacaang on the very
day the vacancy arises.
c. Petitioner Sorianos theory that it is the Supreme
Court, not the President, who has the power to
appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds
from his misinterpretation of the phrase members of
the Supreme Court found in Section 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution as referring only to the Associate
Justices, to the exclusion of the Chief Justice.
d. A writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to
submit the list of nominees to the President,
considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least
three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of
the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to
perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the
nature of whose principal function is executive, is not
vested with the power to resolve who has the
authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and,
therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from
the President.
e. Writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the JBC to
include or exclude particular candidates as nominees,
considering that there is no imperative duty on its part
to include in or exclude from the list particular
individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBCs
determination of who it nominates to the President is
an exercise of a discretionary duty.
f. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does
not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
i. in their deliberations on the mandatory
period for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices, the framers neither
mentioned nor referred to the ban against
midnight appointments, or its effects on
such period, or vice versa
ii. Had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments,
they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department);
iii. the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the
Presidents power to appoint members of
the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from political vicissitudes
 and its insulation from political pressures,
such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC,
the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.
g. Although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC
Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of
the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does
not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even
recognized that there might be the imperative need
for an appointment during the period of the ban, like
when the membership of the Supreme Court should
be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should
the voting on a particular important question requiring
expeditious resolution be divided
i. Valenzuela also recognized that the filling
of vacancies in the Judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, most
especially if there is any compelling reason
to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the prohibition.
h. there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the
incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice:
i. a deluge of cases involving sensitive
political issues is quite expected
ii. the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
President and Vice President and, as such,
has the power to correct manifest errors
on the statement of votes (SOV) and
certificates of canvass (COC)
iii. if history has shown that during ordinary
times the Chief Justice was appointed
immediately upon the occurrence of the
vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of
the Constitution, there is now even more
reason to appoint the next Chief Justice
immediately upon the retirement of Chief
Justice Puno
iv. should the next Chief Justice come from
among the incumbent Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, thereby causing a
vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon
the JBC to start the selection process for
the filling up of the vacancy in accordance
with the constitutional mandate.
C. Intervenors:
a. Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera,
IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL take the position that
De Castros petition was bereft of any basis, because
under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is
constitutionally banned from making any
appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30,
2010, including the appointment of the successor of
Chief Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to
compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the
outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition is
already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against
midnight appointments was applied by the Court to
the appointments to the Judiciary made by then
President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty
of the President to fill the vacancies within 90 days
from occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme
Court) or from the submission of the list (for all other
courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional
prohibition.
b. Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP,
BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence
that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the
President may appoint the next Chief Justice if
exigent circumstances warrant the appointment,
because that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver
that the absence of a Chief Justice or even an
Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or
absolute disruption or paralysis in the operations of
the Judiciary.
c. IntervenorsUbano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and
Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election Code
penalizes as an election offense the act of any
government official who appoints, promotes, or gives
any increase in salary or remuneration or privilege to
any government official or employee during the period
of 45 days before a regular election; that the provision
covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a
government office, agency or instrumentality,
including the President; that for the incumbent
President to appoint the next Chief Justice upon the
retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period
of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code,
constitutes an election offense; that even an
appointment of the next Chief Justice prior to the
election ban is fundamentally invalid and without
effect because there can be no appointment until a
vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position
can occur only by May 17, 2010.
d. IntervenorBoiser adds that De Castros prayer to
compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the
incumbent President is off-tangent because the
position of Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to
speak of a list, much more a submission of such list,
before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that
the proposed advance appointment by the incumbent
President of the next Chief Justice will be
unconstitutional; and that no list of nominees can be
submitted by the JBC if there is no vacancy.
e. All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section
15, Article VII makes no distinction between the kinds
of appointments made by the President; and that the
Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that the appointments by
the President of the two judges during the prohibition
period were void.
f. IntervenorWTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution does not apply only to the
appointments in the Executive Department, but also to
judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of
PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does not distinguish;
and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition
as applicable to judicial appointments.
g. Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner
Sorianos contention that the power to appoint the
Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the
Supreme Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief
Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as
contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at
any rate, the term members was interpreted in
Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26,
1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate
 Justices of the Supreme Court; that PHILCONSAs
prayer that the Court pass a resolution declaring that
persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but
with conditions, shall not be considered nominees by
the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in
the body of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency
between the allegations in the body and the relief
prayed for highlights the lack of merit of
PHILCONSAs petition; that the role of the JBC
cannot be separated from the constitutional
prohibition on the President; and that the Court must
direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, that is, to
submit the list of nominees only to the next duly
elected President after the period of the constitutional
ban against midnight appointments has expired.
h. Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC
because it is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial
body has no duty under the Constitution to resolve
the question of whether the incumbent President can
appoint a Chief Justice during the period of
prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up
with a short list, it still has to bow to the strict
limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should
the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not
arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simply
respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and
that the application of the general rule in Section 15,
Article VII to the Judiciary does not violate the
principle of separation of powers, because said
provision is an exception.
i. Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al.
state that the JBCs act of nominating appointees to
the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not
involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no
default on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of
nominees to the President, considering that the call
for applications only begins from the occurrence of the
vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the
commencement of the process of screening of
applicants to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief
Justice only begins from the retirement on May 17,
2010, for, prior to this date, there is no definite legal
basis for any party to claim that the submission or
non-submission of the list of nominees to the
President by the JBC is a matter of right under law.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing?
2. WON there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination?
3. WON the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief
Justice?
4. WON mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. Petitioners have legal standing because such
requirement for this case was waived by the Court.
Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
2. Yes. There is a justiciable issue
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy
that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC
already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the
nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the
President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is
not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet
to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation
ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the
public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list
of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as
may be needed.
The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality
the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving
on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3. Yes.
a. Prohibition under section 15, article vii does not
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential electionsand up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice andfourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously
drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of
the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest
their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which
embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among
the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive
(Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The
arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of
powers that underlies the political structure
 As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the
Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word
shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced
should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the
President the imperativeduty to make an appointment of a Member of
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for
the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the
President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere
judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article
VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other
appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the
adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate
midnightappointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the
Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer
be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the
JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing
away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII
to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior
Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9,
1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the
constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light
of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis
of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no
application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation
was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for
consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of
Appeals.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14,
Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the
President.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the
same character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that
Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends
to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department
from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will
tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes
of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the
current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself
suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the
appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In
contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the
same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because
her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no
need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition
period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of
Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45
days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the
coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by
May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every
situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be
held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8,
at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential
elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days.
If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is
109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full
mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The
result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference
between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the
90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing
President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty
to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a
doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any
President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from
the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the
Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court
aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme
Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the
Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.
4. No. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
 that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a
judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied
with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
(b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act,
because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully
neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act
to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
5. No. Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
The conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint
the Chief Justice. Hence, Sorianos petition for prohibition in G.R.
No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening
in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice
Puno, lacks merit.
On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342
is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the
composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional
allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the
Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing
the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the
minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules
of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners actual interest,
because they have not alleged in their petition that they were
nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary.
Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.
Dissenting Opinion: Carpio Morales, J.
Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in
arriving at a constitutional construction. It is a precept, that
inferences drawn from title, chapter or section headings are
entitled to very little weight. And so must reliance on sub-
headings, or the lack thereof, to support a strained
deduction be given the weight of helium.
1. Concededly, the allocation of three Articles in the
Constitution devoted to the respective dynamics of the
three Departments was deliberately adopted by the
framers to allocate the vast powers of government
E. Self-Executing Provisions
Generally, constitutional provisions are self-executing
RULE: constitutional provisions are self executing except when provisions themselves expressly require legislations to implement them.
SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS- provisions which are complete by themselves and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
legislation.
Just because legislation may supplement and add or prescribe a penalty does not render such provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation.
In case of Doubt? Construe such provision as self executing rather than non-self executing.
TANADA v ANGARA
272 SCRA 18 (1997)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
April 15 1994: Secretary for Department of Trade and Industry
Rizalino Navarro, representing the govt of the Phils, signs the
final act of approval of the WTO agreement
among the three Departments in recognition of the
principle of separation of powers.
2. The equation, however, does not end there. Such
kind of formulation detaches itself from the
concomitant system of checks and balances. Section
sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of Article
VII, as explained in the fourth ratiocination, does not
suffice to signify functional structuring.
The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the
evils of midnight appointments in the judiciary
The Constitutional Commission (ConCom) saw it fit to
provide for a comprehensive ban on midnight
appointments, finding that the establishment of the JBC is
not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial appointments
from politicization.
To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only
to executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary
and independent constitutional bodies, is to make the
prohibition practically useless. It bears noting that Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution already allows the
President, by way of exception, to make temporary
appointments in the Executive Department during the
prohibited period. Under this view, there is virtually no
restriction on the Presidents power of appointment during
the prohibited period.
o The general rule is clear since the prohibition
applies to ALL kinds of midnight appointments.
The Constitution made no distinction.
It bears noting that the Court had spoken in one voice in
Valenzuela. The ponencia should not hastily reverse, on
the sole basis of Justice Regalados opinion, the Courts
unanimous en banc decision penned by Chief Justice
Andres Narvasa, and concurred in by, inter alia, Associate
Justices who later became Chief Justices HilarioDavide,
Jr., ArtemioPanganiban and Reynato Puno.
The Supreme Court can function effectively during the
midnight appointments ban without an appointed Chief
Justice. To begin with, judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and not in its individual members, much
less in the Chief Justice alone. Notably, after Chief Justice
Puno retires, the Court will have 14 members left, which is
more than sufficient to constitute a quorum.
December 9 1994: President Ramos seeks concurrence
regarding PS 1083 (Concurring in the Ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization)
December 14 1994: Senate adopts Resolution 97 (Resolved, as
it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
 concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization)
December 16 1994: President Ramos ratifies WTO agreement
December 29 1994: Tanada et al file petition declaring WTO
agreement unconstitutional
ISSUES:
Whether or not the WTO agreement goes against Art. II Sec. 19,
and Art. XII Sec 10 and 12 of the Constitution.
Whether or not the WTO agreement impairs Philippine
sovereignty by imposing limits on its legislative and judicial
power.
HELD:
No.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v GSIS
267 SCRA 408
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
throughpublic bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a closebidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, aFilipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the samenumber of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending thedeclaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of thenecessary
contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered byRenong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28
September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managerscheck to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17
October 1995,perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
PrinceHotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held:
- A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Article II of the 1987Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
- Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
- The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence
of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
No.
RATIO:
(re: Art. II) State principles are not self-executing.
(re: Art. XII) Purpose is protection from unfair exchanges with the
rest of the world, not isolationism (note competitive in Sec. 12)
Philippine sovereignty is actually subject to limitations the State
agrees to, as a member of the family of nations. The Constitution
does not envision a hermit-like isolationism for the Philippines.
Philippines joining the UN -> adopting the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily
an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.
-The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the
exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
- As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing.
- If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage.
- When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
- In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions,
especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has
to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino,
the latter shall be chosen over the former. The Supreme Court
directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to
cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong
Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44
per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
 OPOSA v FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792 (1993)
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
- The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now
the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their
respective parents.
- The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn."
- Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . .
ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises."
Issue:
- Whether or not minor petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to
GAMBOA v TEVES
GR No. 176573 (2011)
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
Petition to nullify sale of shares of stock of Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation by government through
the Inter-Agency Privatization Council, to Metro Pacific Assets
Holdings, Inc., an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited, a Hong
Kong-based investment management company and a shareholder of
PLDT. Petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it involved an
indirect sale of 12M shares (6.3% of the outstanding common shares)
of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. The sale caused First
Pacifics common shareholding in PLDT to increase from 30.7 to 37,
increasing its total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to
81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership
of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.
Issue:
Does capital in Sec11, ArtXII refer to the total common shares only,
or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common
and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
Held:
Capital refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors of a public utility, or, in the instant case, to the total common
shares of PLDT. Sec11, ArtXII: Section 11. No franchise, certificate,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
F. The Preamble
AGLIPAY v RUIZ
GR No. 45459 (1937)
DOCTRINE: Preamble shows the drive to uplift the government and
file complaint.
Ruling:
- Yes, minor petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file
complaint. This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn.
- Supreme Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
- Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations.
- Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens xxx
Capital does not refer to the total outstanding capital stock comprising
both common and non-voting preferred shares [of PLDT]. One of the
rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation, exercised through voting in the
election of directors that control or manages the corporation. In
absence of articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred
shares, the same have voting rights as common shares. But preferred
shares are often excluded from control, on the theory that the
preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for
income in the same manner as bondholders. xxx. Capital only refers to
common shares. If preferred shares have right to vote, then capital
will include the preferred shares. In short, the term capital in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors. Mere legal title is insufficient to meet
the 60 percent Filipino-owned capital required in the Constitution.
Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The
legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with
the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is considered
as non-Philippine national[s]. To consture capital as both common
and non-voting contravenes constitution where State shall develop a
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
FACTS:
- The Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, announced on May 1936 that he
shall order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
- Gregorio Aglipay protested against this and requested to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines.
- Despite of the petitioners protest, Ruiz publicly announced having
sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing.
- Stamps were issued and then sold some. Aglipay filed for a petition
for a writ of prohibition, in his desire to prohibit the sale of the
remaining unsold stamps.
Issues:
- Whether or not the writ of prohibition is the proper legal remedy in
the case.
- Whether or not the respondent has violated the Constitution (more
specifically Article VI, Section 23, Paragraph 3) in issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
Held:
- Yes, the writ of prohibition could have been a proper legal remedy.
- No, there was no violation committed.
- The petition for a writ of prohibition was denied, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio:
- Even though the writ of prohibition is generally used to restrain or
control the performance only of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it
CAN be granted in cases where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner (to stop an officer or person
whose acts are without or in excess of his authority)
- The Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under
the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. And under
this law, his actions of creating and selling the stamps are justified
under his discretion as long as it is done as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government.
*Furthermore, Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in
view.
The sale of the stamps has no direct relation to the Church. There was
merely the intent to take advantage of the event, highlighting the fact
that the Eucharistic Congress was held at Manila, the seat of
Congress.
Thus, it is proven that there was no constitutional infraction in the case