Toward a Psychology of Human Agency

Author(s): Albert Bandura

Source: Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 164-180
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 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Toward a PsychologyofHuman
Agency
AlbertBandura

StanfordUniversity

ABSTRACT - This articlepresentsan agentictheoryof hu- visualized futuresthatact on the present;construct,evaluate,

man development,adaptation, and change. The evolu- and modifyalternativecourses of action to secure valued out-
tionary emergenceof advanced symbolizingcapacity comes; and overrideenvironmental influences.In a later sec-
enabled humansto transcendthedictatesof theirimme- tion, this article discusses the growingascendancy of human
diateenvironment and made themuniquein theirpowerto agency in thecoevolution processthrough theforceofsocial and
shape theirlifecircumstancesand thecoursestheirlives technologicalevolution.
take. In thisconception,people are contributors to their
lifecircumstances, not just productsof them. Social cog- AGENCY
COREPROPERTIESOF HUMAN
nitivetheoryrejectsa dualitybetweenhumanagencyand
social structure.People create social systems,and these Social cognitivetheoryadopts an agentic perspectivetoward
systems, inturn,organizeand influence people'slives.This humandevelopment,adaptation,and change (Bandura, 1986,
articlediscussesthecorepropertiesofhumanagency,the 2001). To be an agent is to influenceintentionally one's func-
differentformsittakes,itsontologicaland epistemological tioning and lifecircumstances. In thisview, personalinfluence
status,its developmentand role in causal structures,its is partof the causal structure.People are self-organizing,pro-
growingprimacyin thecoevolutionprocess,and itsinflu- active,self-regulating, Theyare notsimply
and self-reflecting.
ential exerciseat individualand collectivelevels across onlookersof theirbehavior.They are contributors to theirlife
diversespheresoflifeand culturalsystems. circumstances,notjust productsofthem.
There are fourcore propertiesof humanagency.One is in-
tentionality.People formintentionsthat include action plans
Conceptionsofhumannaturehave changedmarkedlyovertime. and strategiesforrealizingthem.Mosthumanpursuitsinvolve
In theearlytheologicalconceptions,humannaturewas ordained other
participatingagents,so thereis no absolute agency.In-
by originaldivine design. Evolutionismtransformed the con- dividualshave to accommodatetheirself-interests iftheyare to
ception to one in which human natureis shaped by environ- achieve unityof effortwithindiversity.Collective endeavors
mental pressures acting on random gene mutations and to a shared intentionand coordinationof
requirecommitment
reproductiverecombinations.This nonteleologicalprocess is interdependentplans of action to realize it (Bratman,1999).
devoid ofdeliberateplans or purposes.The symbolicabilityto Effective is guided by collectiveintention-
groupperformance
comprehend,predict,and alter the course of events confers ality.
considerable functionaladvantages. The evolutionaryemer- The second propertyof humanagencyis forethought, which
gence of language and abstractand deliberativecognitiveca- involvesthetemporalextensionofagency.Forethought includes
pacitiesprovidedtheneuronalstructure forsupplantingaimless morethan future-directed
plans. People set themselvesgoals
environmentalselection with cognitiveagency. Human fore- and
anticipatelikelyoutcomesof prospectiveactionsto guide
bears evolved into a sentientagentic species. Their advanced and motivatetheirefforts. A futurecannotbe a cause ofcurrent
symbolizingcapacityenabled humansto transcendthedictates behavior because it has no material existence. But through
oftheirimmediateenvironment and made themunique in their visualizedfuturesare broughtintothe
cognitiverepresentation,
powerto shape theirlifecircumstancesand the course oftheir presentas currentguides and motivatorsof behavior.In this
lives. Throughcognitive self-regulation,humans can create formof
anticipatoryself-guidance,behavior is governedby
visualizedgoals and anticipatedoutcomes,ratherthanpulledby
an unrealizedfuturestate.The abilityto bringanticipatedout-
Address correspondence to Albert Bandura, Department of Psy-
Stanford comes to bear on currentactivitiespromotespurposefuland
chology, University,Jordan Hall, Building 420, Stanford,
CA 94305-2130, e-mail: bandura@psych.stanford.edu. foresightfulbehavior.Whenprojectedovera longtimecourseon

164 2006 Association

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 AlbertBandura

matters ofvalue,a forethoughtful perspective providesdirec- freedom is conceivednotjustpassivelyas theabsenceofcon-

tion,coherence, andmeaning toone'slife. butalso proactively
straints, as theexerciseofself-influence in
Thethirdagenticproperty is self-reactiveness. Agentsarenot theserviceofselectedgoalsanddesiredoutcomes. Forexample,
onlyplannersand forethinkers. Theyare also self-regulators.peoplehavethefreedom to vote,butwhether theygetthem-
Havingadopted an intention and an action plan, one cannot selvesto vote, and the level and form of their politicalengage-
simplysit back and waitfortheappropriate performances to ment, depends,inlargepart,ontheself-influence theybringto
appear,as Searle(2003)notedinhisanalysesoftheexplanatorybear.In additionto regulating theiractions,peoplelive in a
gap.Agencythusinvolvesnotonlythedeliberative abilityto psychicenvironment largelyof theirownmaking.The self-
makechoicesandactionplans,butalso theabilitytoconstruct management of innerlifeis also partoftheagenticprocess.
appropriate coursesofactionandtomotivate andregulate their Becauseself-influence is an interacting partofthedetermining
execution. Thismultifaceted self-directedness operates through conditions, humanagencyis notincompatible withtheprinciple
self-regulatory processes in the explanatory gap tolink of
thought regulative causality. Given that individuals areproducers as
toaction(Bandura,1991a;Carlson,2002). well as productsof theirlifecircumstances, are
they partial
The fourth agenticproperty is self-reflectiveness.Peopleare authors ofthepastconditions thatdevelopedthem, as wellas the
notonlyagentsofaction.Theyare also self-examiners oftheir future coursestheirlivestake.
ownfunctioning. Through functional self-awareness, theyreflect The cultivation of agenticcapabilitiesadds concretesub-
on theirpersonalefficacy, thesoundnessoftheirthoughts and stanceto abstractmetaphysical discoursesaboutfreedom and
actions,andthemeaning oftheirpursuits, andtheymakecor- determinism. People who develop their competencies, self-
rectiveadjustments ifnecessary. The metacognitive capability regulatory skills,and enablingbeliefsin theirefficacy can
toreflectupon oneself and the adequacy of one's thoughts and generate a wider of that
array options expand their freedom of
actionsis themostdistinctly humancoreproperty ofagency. action,andaremoresuccessful inrealizing desiredfutures,than
People do notoperateas autonomous agents.Noris their thosewithless developedagenticresources(Bandura,1986,
behavior whollydetermined bysituational influences. Rather, 1997;Meichenbaum, 1984;Schunk& Zimmerman, 1994).The
humanfunctioning is a product ofa reciprocal interplay ofin- exerciseoffreedom involvesrights, as wellas optionsandthe
trapersonal,behavioral,and environmental determinantsmeanstopursuethem.Atthesocietallevel,peopleinstitute, by
(Bandura,1986). This triadic interaction includes theexercise collectiveaction,regulatory sanctionsagainstunauthorized
ofself-influence as partofthecausalstructure. Itis nota matter forms ofsocialcontrol (Bandura,1986).
of"freewill,"whichis a throwback tomedievaltheology, but, in
actingas an agent,an individual makescausalcontributions to MODES OF AGENCY
thecourseofevents.The relativemagnitude ofthepersonal
contribution to thecodetermination variesdependingon the Social cognitivetheorydistinguishes amongthreemodesof
levelofagenticpersonalresources, typesofactivities, and sit- agency:individual, proxy, and collective. Everyday functioning
uationalcircumstances. Socialcognitive theory rejectsa duality requiresan agenticblendof thesethreeformsof agency.In
ofhumanagencyand a disembodied social structure. Social personalagencyexercisedindividually, peoplebringtheirin-
systemsare the product ofhuman activity,and social systems, in fluencetobearon theirownfunctioning andon environmental
turn,help to organize,guide,and regulatehumanaffairs. events.In manyspheresoffunctioning, however, peopledo not
However,in the dynamicinterplay withinthe societalrule havedirectcontrol overconditions thataffect theirlives.They
structures,thereis considerable personalvariation in thein- exercisesociallymediatedagency, orproxy agency.Theydo so
terpretation of,adoptionof,enforcement of,circumvention of, byinfluencing otherswhohavetheresources, knowledge, and
andopposition tosocietalprescriptions andsanctions (Burns & means to act on theirbehalf to secure the outcomes they desire
Dietz,1992). (Baltes,1996;Brandtstadter & Baltes-Gotz, 1990;Ozer,1995).
Mosthumanfunctioning is sociallysituated.Consequently, Peopledo notlivetheirlivesinindividual autonomy. Manyof
psychological are
concepts sociallyembedded. Forexample,in thethingstheyseek are achievableonlybyworking together
an interpersonal transaction, in whichpeopleare each other's through interdependent effort. In the exerciseof collective
environments, a givenactioncan be an agenticinfluence, a agency, theypool theirknowledge, skills,andresources, andact
response, or an environmental outcome, depending arbitrarily in concert to shape their future (Bandura,2000a). People's
on differententry pointsin theongoing exchangebetweenthe conjointbeliefin theircollectivecapabilityto achievegiven
peopleinvolved.In humantransactions, one cannotspeakof attainments is a keyingredient ofcollectiveagency.
"environment," "behavior," and "outcomes" as thoughthey Self-efficacy theory (Bandura,1997) distinguishes between
werefundamentally different eventswithdistinct features in- thesourceofjudgments ofefficacy (i.e.,theindividual) andthe
herentin them. levelofthephenomenon beingassessed(i.e.,personalefficacy
A theory ofhumanagencyraisestheissue offreedom and or groupefficacy). Thereis no disembodied groupmindthat
determinism. Whenviewedfrom a socialcognitive perspective, believes. Perceived collective efficacy resides in themindsof

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 PsychologyofHumanAgency

groupmembers as thebelieftheyhave in commonregarding gressionoflife-course trajectories. The profusion of separate

theirgroup'scapability. In a collectivity, members life
actingon chainsofeventsin everyday provides myriad opportunities
theircommon beliefscontribute to thetransactional dynamics forsuchfortuitous intersects. Even ifone knewall thedeter-
thatpromote groupattainments. The findings ofmeta-analyses minate conditions forparticular individuals, onecouldnotknow
showthatperceived collective efficacy accounts fora good share in advance the intersection of unconnected events.Fortuitous
of variancein qualityof groupfunctioning in diversesocial intersects introduce probabilistic uncertainty thatcomplicates
systems (Gully, Incalcaterra, &
Joshi, Beaubien,2002;Stajkovic long-range predictions of human behavior. Most fortuitous
& Lee,2001). events leave peopleuntouched, others have some lasting effects,
The collectiveperformance ofa social systeminvolvesin- and stillotherslead peopleintonewtrajectories oflife.A sci-
teractive, coordinative, and synergistic dynamicsthatcreate ence of psychology does not have muchto say about the
emergent group-level properties notreduciblesolelyto indi- occurrence offortuitous intersects, exceptthatpersonalpro-
vidualattributes. Group activities vary in the degree to which the
clivities, nature ofthe settings in which a personmoves, and
attainments requireinterdependent effort and collaborative the of
types people who populate those settings make some types
contributions. Meta-analysis ofresearchon collectiveefficacy ofintersects moreprobablethanothers. Fortuitous occurrences
corroborates thatthemoreextensive theinterdependence within maybe unforeseeable, buthavingoccurred, theycreatecondi-
a socialsystem, thehigherthepredictiveness oftheperceived tionsthatenteras contributing factors incausal processesinthe
efficacyofthecollectivity (Stajkovic& Lee, 2001). samewayas prearranged onesdo. Hence,psychology can ad-
vanceknowledge ontheeffects offortuitous eventsonlifepaths.
AGENTICMANAGEMENT OF FORTUITY Severallinesofevidenceidentify personalattributes and the
properties of the environments into which individuals are for-
Thereis muchthatpeople do designedlyto exercisesome tuitously as
inaugurated predictors of the nature, scope,and
measureof controlovertheirself-development of the
and life cir- strength impact that such encounters are likelytohaveon
cumstances. Butthereis a lotoffortuity inthecourseslivestake. humanlives(Bandura,1982,1986).
Indeed,someofthemostimportant determinants oflifepaths Fortuity doesnotmeanuncontrollability ofitseffects. People
occurthrough themosttrivial ofcircumstances. Peopleareoften can bringsomeinfluence tobearon thefortuitous character of
inaugurated into new life trajectories, marriages, and careers life.They can make chance happen by pursuing an active life
through fortuitous circumstances (Austin, 1978;Bandura,1986; thatincreasesthenumber andtypeoffortuitous encounters they
Stagner,1981). In their insightful volume on The Travel and will experience(Austin,1978). Chance favors the inquisitive
Adventures of Serendipity, Mertonand Barber(2004) docu- and venturesome, whogo places,do things, and explorenew
mented theworkings offortuitous eventsin lifetrajectories. activities. Peoplealsomakechanceworkforthembycultivating
A fortuitous eventin social encounters is an unintended theirinterests, enablingbeliefs,and competencies (Bandura,
of
meeting persons unfamiliar with each other. The physical 1998). These personal resources enable them to make themost
sciencesacknowledge indeterminacy at the quantum level in of opportunities that arise unexpectedly. Pasteur (1854) putit
thephysicalworld.Fortuitous eventsintroduce an elementof wellwhenhenotedthat"chancefavors the
only prepared mind"
indeterminacy in thebehavioralsciences.The separatepaths (citedin Bartlett, 1992, p. 502). Even thatdistinguished lay
thatlead up toa fortuitous eventhavetheirowndeterminants,philosopher GrouchoMarxis saidtohaveinsightfully observed
buttheyare causallyunconnected untiltheirintersection, at thatpeoplecan influence howtheyplaythehandthatfortuity
whichpointtheencounter createsa uniqueconfluence ofin- dealsthem:"Youhavetobe intheright placeat theright time,
fluencesthatcan alterthe courseof lives. The intersection,butwhenitcomes,youbetter havesomething ontheball."Self-
wherethe transactions take place, occursfortuitously rather development givespeoplea handin shapingthecoursestheir
thanby design(Nagel,1961). Considera trueexampleof a lives take. These variousproactiveactivitiesillustratethe
fortuitous eventat an addresson thepsychology ofchanceen- agenticmanagement evenoffortuity.
counters (Bandura,1982). An academicpublisher entered the
lecturehallas itwasrapidly fillingupandseizedanempty chair NONAGENTICTHEORETICAL APPROACHES
neartheentrance. He endedup marrying thewomanwhohap-
penedtobe seatednexttohim.Withonlya momentary changein In itsbriefhistory, psychology has undergone wrenching para-
timeofentry, seating constellations would have altered, and this digm shifts.Behaviorists proposed an input-output model linked
intersect wouldnothaveoccurred.A maritalpartnership was byan intervening butnoncausalblackbox.Thislineoftheo-
thusfortuitously formed at a talkdevotedto fortuitous deter- rizing waseventually putoutofvoguebytheadventofcomputer
minants oflifepaths! technology. Creative thinkers filledtheblackboxwithsymbolic
A seemingly insignificant fortuitous eventcan setin motion representations, rules,andcomputational operations. Themind
constellations of influences thatchangethe courseof lives. as a symbolmanipulator, in thelikenessofa linearcomputer,
Thesebranching processesalterthecontinuity andlinearpro- becametheconceptual modelforthetimes.Computerized serial

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 AlbertBandura

cognitivism was,in turn,supplanted byconnectionist models Consciousness is an emergent brainactivitywithhigher-level

operating through interconnected, multilayered, neuronal-like controlfunctions, ratherthansimplyan epiphenomenal by-
subsystems working simultaneously inparallel.Inthesemodels, productoflower-level processes.Indeed,iftheneuronalpro-
sensoryorgansdeliverup information to a multitude of sub- cesses of commonactivitieswereautomatically reflected in
systems acting as the mental that
machinery processes the in- consciousness, it would be hopelessly cluttered with mind-
putsand,through sometypeofintegrating system, generates a numbing contents thatwouldforeclose anyfunctionality. When
coherent and
outputautomatically nonconsciously out of the one is a for
driving car, example, one's consciousness is filled
fragmentary neuronal activity. withthoughts ofothermatters rather thansimplymirroring the
Thesealternative theoriesdiffer in whattheyplace in the ongoing neuronal mechanics ofdriving.
mediating system - whether or notit includesdeterminative Emergent properties differin kindfromtheirlower-level
functions andtheforms they take. Radical behaviorism posits a bases. For example, the novel emergent propertiesofwater, such
noncausalconnector, computerized cognitivism posits a linear as and
fluidity viscosity, are not simply thecombined properties
central processor, andparalleldistributed connectionism posits of its hydrogen and oxygenmicrocomponents (Bunge,1977).
interconnected, neuronal-like subunits. Butthetheoriesshare Through theirinteractive effects, thesecomponents are trans-
thesamebottom-up - > -
causation:input throughput output. formed intonewphenomena. VanGulick(2001) madetheim-
In eachofthesemodels,theenvironment actsonthebiological portant distinction betweenemergent propertiesand emergent
machinery thatgeneratesthe outputautomatically and non- causalpowersovereventsat thelowerlevel.In themetatheory
consciously. enunciatedbySperry(1991, 1993),cognitive agentsregulate
Thesenonagentic conceptions striphumans of agenticcapa- theiractionsbycognitive downward causationandalsoundergo
bilities,a functional consciousness, and a self-identity. As upwardactivation bysensory stimulation.
Harre(1983) notedin thisconnection, it is notsentient indi- As previously the
noted, evolutionary emergence of a lan-
vidualsbuttheirsubpersonal partsthatare orchestrating ac- guage-processing system provided theessentialneuronal struc-
tivitiesnonconsciously. In actuality,however, peopleactonthe tureforthedevelopment ofa consciousagenticspecies.Most
environment. Theycreateit,preserve it,transform it,andeven humanthinking operatesthrough language,drawing on a vast
destroy it, rather than merely react to it as a given. These knowledge base. The core of
agenticcapabilities intentionality,
changesinvolvea sociallyembeddedinterplay betweenthe forethought, self-reaction, and self-reflection operateas hier-
exerciseofpersonalagencyandenvironmental influences. archicallyorganized determinants. In a theoryof cognitive
functionalism (Eccles, 1974; Sperry,1993), the patternsof
neuralactivitiescharacterizing interpretiveand deliberative
PHYSICALISTIC THEORY OF HUMAN AGENCY thought processeshave a downward regulatory function over
lower-level neuraleventsthatlead to action.Thesestructural
Onemustdistinguish between thephysicalbasisofthought and and functional properties are centralto theexerciseofhuman
its deliberative construction and functional use. The human agency.
mindis generative, creative, proactive, and reflective, notjust In actingas agents,individuals obviously neitherareawareof
reactive. Thedignified burialofthedualisticDescartesforces nordirectlycontroltheirneuronalprocessesand functional
onetoaddresstheformidable explanatory challengefora phys- structures. Rather, theyexercisesecond-order control.Theydo
icalistictheory ofhumanagencyanda nondualistic cognitivism.so by intentionally engagingin activitiesknownto be func-
Howdo peopleactivatebrainprocessestorealizegiveninten- tionally relatedtogivenoutcomes. In pursuing theseactivities,
tionsandpurposes? overwhichtheycan exercisecontrol, theyactivateandmodify
Consciousness is theverysubstance ofmental life.Itprovides subpersonal neuronal events.Forpurposesofillustration, con-
themeanstomakelifenotonlypersonally manageable, but also sider the following In
analogy. driving an automobile toa desired
worth living.Without deliberative andreflective consciousac- place,thedriverengagesin coordinated actsofshifting gears,
humansare simplymindlessautomatons.
tivity, Cognitive the
ca- steering,manipulating gas pedal, and applyingbrakes.
pabilitiesprovideus withthe meansto function as mindful These deliberateacts,whichthe drivercan controldirectly,
agents.Consciousnessencompassesmultiplefunctions that regulate themechanical machinery togetthecarsafelytowhere
reflectthedifference between being conscious of an activity and the driver wants to go.But the driver has neitherawareness nor
consciously in
engaging purposeful activity (Korsgaard, 1989). understanding of the correlative microcombustion, transmis-
Itincludesa nonreflective component anda reflective awareness sion,steering, and brakingprocessessubserving thedriver's
component, as well as a conceptual functional component op- purposes. The deliberate planning of where to on
go a trip,what
eratingmainlythrough thelinguistic medium.The functional route to take, and what to do whenone getstherekeepsthe
aspectof consciousness involvespurposefully accessingand neuronal circuitry hardat work.
deliberatively processing information forselecting, construct- Consider also dual-levelcontrol in skillacquisition.Baseball
and
ing,regulating, evaluating courses of action. coaches getnovice pitchers topractice of
uniqueways throwing a

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 PsychologyofHumanAgency

baseballin strategicallydesignated situations

thattheyknow sightsintothesocialandbehavioral shapingofbrainfunction.
have an increasedlikelihoodof discombobulating batters.In Thisis a realmofinquiryinwhichpsychology canmakeunique
practicingandrefining theirpitchingperformances,overwhich contributions to thebiopsychosocial ofhuman
understanding
theycan exercisedirectcontrol, pitchers buildand enlistthe development, adaptation,and change.In nonreductive
physi-
subserving neurophysiological over
machinery whichtheyun- calism,all psychosocialphenomenahave a physicalbasis.
knowingly exercisesecond-ordercontrol. Enactments offunc- Researchfrom anagenticperspective,
however,
goesbeyondthe
tionalactivities
atthecontrollable
macrobehaviorallevelprovide anatomicallocalizationand braincircuitry human
subserving
themeansforagentic orchestration
ofthesubserving eventsatthe activitiesto advanceknowledge aboutbraindevelopmentand
microneural level. itsfunctional bybehavioral
organization means(Dawson,Ash-
Muchofpsychological theorizingand researchis devotedto man,& Carver, 2000).
verifyingcausalrelationsbetweenactionsandoutcomes andthe
governing sociocognitivemechanisms. Thefactthatindividuals ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL
haveno awarenessoftheirbrainprocessesdoes notmeanthat REDUCTIONISM
theyarejustquiescenthostsofautomata thatdictatetheirbe-
havior.Neuroimaging can shed lighton howagenticcausal A theory ofhumanagencyraisesthequestionofreductionism.
beliefsandactivitiesdevelopfunctionalneuronalstructuresand One mustdistinguish amongthreedifferent formsof reduc-
orchestrate neurodynamics. tionism(Ayala, 1974). In ontologicalreductionism, mental
eventsare physicalentitiesand processes,notdisembodied
PROACTIVEAGENTSVERSUSONLOOKERS immaterial ones. Epistemological reductionism contendsthat
thelaws governing higher-level psychosocial phenomena are
Onemustdistinguish between understanding how thebiological ultimately reducible to the laws operating at atomic and mo-
machinery worksin implementing cognitivealgorithms bythe lecularlevels.Methodological reductionism maintains thatre-
nervoussystemand howthebiologicalmachinery is orches- searchon rudimentary processesis the reallyfundamental
tratedagentically fordiversepurposes.To use an analogy, the science thatwill explainpsychosocial phenomena at higher
laws of chemistry and physicsexplainhowa televisionset levelsofcomplexity. In theheyday ofbehaviorism, forexample,
producesimages,but do notexplainthe endlessvarietyof elementary processeswereexploredwithanimalanalogues,
creativeprograms it implements. The creativeneuronalacti- usingmainlyratsandpigeons.
vationmustbe distinguished fromthe neuronalmechanical Mosttheorists adopttheontological viewthatmentalevents
production. arebrainactivities andnotimmaterial entities.Buthowmind,
Peoplearecontributors totheiractivities,notjustonlooking characterized as highercognitive processes,arisesfrom lower-
hostsofsubpersonal networks autonomously creating and reg- levelphysicalprocessesremains an intractable problem. Asfor
ulatingtheirperformances. Peopleconceiveofendsand work methodological reductionism, theknowledge gainedthrough the
purposefully to achievethem.Theyare agentsofexperiences, studyofrudimentary is
processes generalizable to some aspects
notjust undergoers of experiences.The sensory, motor, and ofhumanfunctioning, butthereare limitsas to whatthisap-
cerebralsystems are toolspeopleuse to accomplishthetasks proachcan tellus aboutthecomplexhumancapacityforab-
andgoalsthatgivemeaning, direction,andsatisfaction totheir straction and symbolicthinking or the workings of societal
lives.To maketheirwaysuccessfully througha complexworld systems. It is theepistemological formofreductibility thatis
fullof challengesand hazards,people have to make sound mostin contention. The majorargument againstitis thateach
judgments abouttheircapabilities, theprobableef- levelofcomplexity
anticipate - atomic,molecular, biological, psycholog-
fectsofdifferent eventsand coursesofaction,size up socio- ical, and social structural - involvesemergent newproperties
structural opportunities and constraints, and regulatetheir thataredistinct tothatlevelandmust,therefore, be explained
behavior accordingly. These belief area
systems working model by laws inits own right. Proponents ofnonreductive physicalism
oftheworldthatenablespeopletoachievedesiredfutures and arephysicalists at theontological levelbutnonreductionists at
avoiduntoward ones. theepistemological level.Hence,physicality intheontological
Researchon braindevelopment underscores theinfluentialsense does not implyreductionof psychology to biology,
rolethatagenticactionplaysinshapingthefunctional structure chemistry, orphysics.Wereonetoembarkontheepistemolog-
ofthebrain(Diamond,1988;Kolb& Whishaw, 1998).It is not ical reductibilityroute,thejourney wouldtraverse biology and
mereexposureto stimulation butagenticactionin exploring, chemistry andultimately endinatomicsubparticles. Becauseof
manipulating, andinfluencing theenvironment thatcounts.By emergent properties at higherlevelsofcomplexity, neitherthe
regulatingtheir motivation and peopleproducethe intermediate
activities, localesnorthefinalstopin atomistic physicalism
experiences thatform thefunctional neurobiological substrate can fullyaccountforhumanbehavior.
ofsymbolic, social,psychomotor, and otherskills.An agentic As Nagel(1961) explained,thereareseveralnecessary con-
perspective fosters linesofresearchthatcan providenewin- ditions forreductibility: They include explicitness oftheoretical

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 AlbertBandura

postulates foreach specializeddiscipline,correspondence or plied social sciencemustalso be evaluatedin termsoffunc-

connectability through theoretical termsin common, and de- tionalcriteria.Can lawsat theneuronal, molecular, oratomic
from
rivability thepostulates ofthereducing theory. Neither the levelstellus howto developefficacious parents,teachers, ex-
conceptsnor the predicatesin psychological theorieshave ecutives,or social reformers? For reasonsalreadygiven,the
representational counterparts in chemistry or physics.Noris psychological levelis requiredtoprovidesuchguidance.
therean adequatesetofbridging principles linking the vocab-
ulariesof thereducedand reducingtheories,as requiredto ORIGINS OF PERSONAL AGENCY
fulfill
theconditions ofconnectability and derivability. There
are livelydebatesabouttherequiredprecisenessin linkage Thenewborn arrives without anysenseofselfhood andpersonal
betweenthe reducedand reducingtheories - debatesabout agency.The selfmustbe sociallyconstructed transac-
through
whether empirically established linksbetween thetwosuffice or tionalexperienceswiththe environment. The developmental
whether thebridging principles mustprovidelogicallyneces- progression ofa senseofpersonalagencymovesfrom perceiving
saryconceptual links (vanGulick,2001). causal relations betweenenvironmental events,through un-
Consider eventhereduction ofpsychology tobiology. Muchof derstanding causationvia action,and finallyto recognizing
psychology is concerned withdiscovering principles abouthow oneselfas theagentoftheactions.Infants exhibitsensitivityto
tostructure environmental conditions topromote givenpersonal causalrelations betweenenvironmental eventseveninthefirst
and social outcomesand withthe psychosocialmechanisms months oflife(L. Lent,1982;Mandler, 1992).Theymostlikely
through whichtheenvironmental influences producetheiref- beginto learnaboutactioncausationthrough repeatedobser-
fects.Thisline oftheorizing, muchofit based on exogenous vationofcontingent occurrences in whichtheactionsofother
determinants, does nothave corresponding conceptsin neu- peoplemakethingshappen.Infants see inanimate objectsre-
robiologicaltheory. How the neuronal machinery works and how main motionless unless manipulated byotherpeople(Mandler,
to regulateit by psychosocialmeansare different matters. 1992). Moreover, theypersonally experience theeffects ofac-
Knowing wherethings happeninthebraindoesnottellyouhow tionsdirected toward them, whichaddssaliencetothecausative
tomakethemhappen.Each explanatory system is governed by functionsofactions.As infants begintodevelopsomebehavi-
itsownsetofprinciples thatmustbe studiedin itsownlevel. oralcapabilities, not
they only observe butalso directly expe-
Forexample,knowledge ofthelocalityand braincircuitry riencethattheiractionsmakethingshappen.We can greatly
subserving learningcan say littleabouttheoptimallevelsof enhancetheirlearning thatactionsproducecertain outcomes by
abstractness,novelty, and intellectual challenge; about how to linkingoutcomes closelytoactions,byusingaids thatchannel
getpeopleto attendto,process,and organizerelevantinfor- theirattention to the outcomestheyare producing, and by
mation;or aboutwhether learningshouldbe conductedinde- heightening thesalienceandfunctional valueoftheoutcomes
pendently,cooperatively, or competitively. Psychological (Millar,1972;Millar& Schaffer, 1972;Watson, 1979).Withthe
scienceprovidesa richbodyofknowledge regarding thecon- development ofrepresentational capabilities,infants can begin
ditionsconducive tolearning andthepsychosocial mechanisms tolearnfrom and
probabilistic delayed outcomes brought about
through which theyoperate. These social determinants reside in bypersonal actions.
thestructure oflearningenvironments and in sociallyrooted Development ofa senseofpersonalagencyrequires morethan
incentive systems, enablingopportunity and
structures, con- simplyproducing effects byactions.Infants acquirea senseof
straints
(Bandura, 1986;Johnson & Johnson, 1985;Rosenholz & personalagencywhentheyrecognize thattheycan makethings
Rosenholz, 1981).Thesedeterminants operatethrough model- happenand theyregardthemselves as agentsoftheiractions.
ing,socialnorms, aspirations, andexpectations conveyed inthe Thisadditional understanding extendstheperception ofagency
practicesof families, in peer relations, in school systems, and in fromaction to
causality personalcausality. The differentiation
of
socioeconomic lifeconditions (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, oneselffrom others is the product ofa more generalprocess of
& Pastorelli,1996,2001). Theseare thecollectivesocial dy- theconstruction ofanagenticself.Proprioceptive feedback from
namicsofhumanlearning. Theyhavenoconceptual counterpartone's activitiesand self-referent information fromvisualand
inneurobiological theory and,therefore, arenotderivablefrom othermodalities during transactionswiththeenvironment aid in
it.The optimallearningconditions mustbe specifiedbypsy- the earlyperception of an experiential self.Personaleffects
chologicalprinciples.A fullexplanation of humanlearning resulting fromself-directed actionsfurther identify theselfas
must,therefore, encompass both the psychosocial principles therecipient experiencing the effects. if
Thus, touching a hot
and the subserving neurobiological principlesgoverning the objectbringspain,feeding oneselfbringscomfort, and enter-
processesoflearning. tainingoneselfwithmanipulable objectsgenerates enjoyment,
System-level emergence calls fortheoretical pluralityacross such self-produced outcomesfosterrecognition of oneselfas
biological,psychological, and social structural levelsoffunc- an agent.The selfbecomesdifferentiated fromothersthrough
tion,withlinkagebetweenthemratherthanreductibility to a rudimentary dissimilarexperiences.If stubbingone's toe
singlesuperseding theory. The issueofreductionism in an ap- bringspain,butseeingotherpeoplestubtheirtoesbringsno

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 PsychologyofHumanAgency

personalpain,one'sownactivity becomesdistinguished from zation.People,therefore, varyin theirbehavior, withthisvari-

thatofotherpersons. ationconditional on circumstances. But these are instancesof
Theconstruction ofselfhood is notentirely a matter ofprivate thesamebeingdoingdifferent thingsunderdifferent lifecon-
reflectionon one'sexperiences. Thereis a socialaspecttothis ditions,notdifferent selvesdoingtheirseparatethings.One
process.As infants matureand acquirelanguage,thepeople cannotbe all things.Hence,peoplevaryin howheavilythey
aroundthemrefer tothembypersonalnamesandtreatthemas investtheirpersonal identity insociocultural, political, familial,
distinctpersons. With the of
developmentlanguage, social self- and occupational aspects of life.A multifaceted self-view and
referentlabeling accelerates and
self-recognition development variability in behavior reflect the complexity of human func-
ofself-awareness ofpersonalagency.Byabout18 months, in- tioning, notfragmentation ofagency.
fantshaveself-referent verballabelsandapplythemtopictures Personalidentity refers toself-characterizations ofwhatone
ofthemselves, butnotpictures ofotherpeople(Lewis& Brooks- is. The continuity ofpersonalidentity residesmorein psycho-
Gunn,1979).Theydifferentiate themselves from othersintheir logicalfactors andtheexperiential continuity ofone'slifecourse
verballabeling.As theybecomeincreasingly awarethatthey thaninphysical constancy. Continuing self-identity inthemidst
can produceeffects by their actions,by about 20 months, they of notable is
changes preserved in memories that givetemporal
spontaneously describethemselves as agentsof theiractions coherence tolife(MeAdams,1996),incontinuance ofbeliefand
anddescribetheirintentions as theyengageinactivities (Kagan, valuecommitments that link the present to the pastandshape
1981). Beforelong,theybeginto describethepsychological thefuture, andintheconnectedness ofhumanrelationships and
statesaccompanying theiractions.On the basis of growing one's lifework overtime.As an agent,one createsidentity
personaland social experiences, an infant eventually forms a connections overtime(Korsgaard, 1996)andconstrues oneself
symbolic representation of him- or herself as a distinctself ca- as a continuing person over different periods in one's life.
of
pable making things happen. Through their goals,aspirations, social commitments, and ac-
Thereis also a greatdeal ofintentional guidance that fosters tion plans,peopleproject themselves into the future and shape
infants'agenticcapabilities (Heckhausen, 1987;Karniol,1989; thecoursestheirlivestake.Personalidentity is therefore rooted
Papousek& Papousek,1979).Parentscreatehighly noticeable notonlyin phenomenological continuity, butalso in agentic
proximal effects ofinfants' actions,providing themwithobjects continuity.
within theirmanipulative to
capabilities encourage production Continuity in personalidentity is notsolelya product ofan
of effectsby actions and segment activities into manageable intrapsychic autobiographical that
process preserves a sense of
subskills.Parentsalso setchallengesfortheirinfants just be- selfhood over time. Other peopleperceive,socially label, and
yondtheinfants' existing competencies. Theyadjusttheirlevel treatoneas thesamepersonoverthecourseoflifedespiteone's
ofassistanceas infants passthrough phasesofmastery, offeringphysical changes.Personalidentity is partially constructed from
explicitguidancein earlierphases of skill acquisitionbut one'ssocial identity as reflected in howone is treatedbysig-
gradually withdrawing aid as infants becomemorecompetent in nificant others.As the modelof triadicreciprocalcausation
mastering tasksontheirown.Thesetypesofenablingstrategies suggests, a senseofselfhood is theproduct ofa complexinter-
arehighly conducivetothedevelopment ofa senseofpersonal playofpersonalconstrual processes and the social realityin
agencyduring the initialyears of life. which one lives.
Theselfis theperson, nota homunculan overseer thatresides
ina particular placeanddoesthethinking andacting.Selfhood FOUNDATION OF HUMAN AGENCY
embodiesone'sphysicalandpsychosocial makeup,witha per-
sonal identity and agenticcapabilitiesoperating in concert. Amongthemechanisms ofhumanagency, noneis morecentral
Although the brain plays a central role in psychological life, or pervasive than belief of personal efficacy (Bandura,1997).
selfhood does notresidesolelyin thebrain,anymorethanthe This core beliefis the foundation of humanagency.Unless
heartis thesoleplacewherecirculation is located(Schechtman, peoplebelievetheycanproducedesiredeffects bytheiractions,
A
1997). transplant ofthe brain of an extraordinary gymnast into they have little incentive to act,or to persevere in thefaceof
an octogenarian's bodywill notproducea sense of selfas a difficulties. Whatever otherfactors serve as guidesand moti-
dazzlinggymnast, as a single-organ viewwouldimply.Norare vators, theyarerooted inthecorebeliefthatonehasthepowerto
theremultipleindependent selves. Individualswrestlewith effect changesbyone'sactions.
conflicting goalsand coursesofaction.However, givenbuta Beliefinone'sefficacy is a keypersonalresource inpersonal
singlebody, the choices finally made and the actions taken at a and
development change(Bandura, It
1997). operates through its
given time of
requireunity agency. Successful on
implementationimpact cognitive, motivational, affective, and decisional
ofa chosencourseofactionalso calls forcoherent effort. processes.Efficacybeliefsaffectwhetherindividualsthink
Adaptivefunctioning requiresboth appropriategeneral- optimistically or pessimistically, in self-enhancing or self-
izationin the face of bewildering situationalvariationand debilitating ways.Suchbeliefsaffect people'sgoalsandaspira-
perceptive discrimination toavoiddysfunctional overgenerali-tions,howwelltheymotivate themselves, andtheirperseverance

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 AlbertBandura

in theface of difficulties and adversity. Efficacy beliefsalso rality.Theevaluative self-sanctionsserveas themotivators that
shapepeople'soutcome expectations - whether theyexpecttheir keep conductin line withmoralstandards.Moralthought is
effortstoproducefavorable outcomes oradverseones.In addi- translated intomoralconductthrough thisself-reactive regu-
tion,efficacy beliefsdetermine howopportunities and impedi- latory mechanism.
ments areviewed.Peopleoflowefficacy areeasilyconvinced of Moralagentscommitthemselves to social obligations and
thefutilityofeffortinthefaceofdifficulties. Theyquickly giveup righteous causes, consider themoral implications of the choices
trying.Thoseofhighefficacy viewimpediments as surmountabletheyface,and acceptsomemeasureofresponsibility fortheir
byimprovement ofself-regulatory skillsandperseverant effort. actionsand theconsequencesoftheiractionsforotherpeople
Theystaythecoursein thefaceofdifficulties and remainre- (Keller& Edelstein,1993). The typesof activitiesthatare
silienttoadversity. Moreover, efficacybeliefsaffect thequalityof designated as moral,theirrelativeimportance, and thesanc-
emotional lifeand vulnerability to stressand depression. And tionslinkedto themare culturally situated.Hence,societies,
last,butnotleast,efficacy beliefsdetermine thechoicespeople andevensubgroups within them,varyin thetypesofactivities
makeat important decisionalpoints.A factorthatinfluences and social practicestheyconsiderto be centralto morality
choicebehavior canprofoundly affect
thecourseslivestake.This (Shweder, 2003).
is because the social influencesoperatingin the selected Theexerciseofmoralagencyhasdualaspects- inhibitive and
environments continue topromote certain competencies, values, proactive (Bandura,2004b;Rorty, 1993).Theinhibitive form is
andlifestyles. manifested in thepowertorefrain frombehavinginhumanely;
Manymeta-analyses of theeffects of efficacy beliefshave the proactiveformis expressedin the powerto behavehu-
beenconducted. They have included both laboratory andfield manely. Thus,inexercising thisdualnatureofmorality, people
studiesofdiversespheresoffunctioning, withdiversepopula- do benevolent things, as well as refrain fromdoingharmful
tionsofvarying agesandsociodemographic characteristics, and things.Whenindividualsstrongly investtheirself-worth in
in different culturalmilieus(Boyeret al., 2000; Holden,1991; certainprinciples and values,theywillsacrifice theirself-in-
Holden,Moncher,Schinke,& Barker,1990; Moritz,Feltz, terest andsubmit toprolonged maltreatment rather thanaccede
Fahrbach, & Mack,2000;Multon, Brown, & Lent,1991;Sadri& to whattheyregardas unjustor immoral(Bandura,1999b;
Robertson, 1993; Stajkovic& Luthans,1998). The evidence Oliner& Oliner,1988).
from thesemeta-analyses showsthatefficacy beliefscontribute Moralstandards do notfunction as unceasinginternal regu-
significantly to level of motivation, emotional well-being, and latorsof conduct, however. Various psychosocial mechanisms
performance accomplishments. can be used to disengagemoralself-sanctions frominhumane
conduct(Bandura,1991b). Selectivemoraldisengagement is
MORAL AGENCY mostlikelytooccurundermoralpredicaments in whichdetri-
mentalconductbringsvaluedoutcomes.The disengagement
The exerciseof moralagency,rootedin personalstandards maycenteron sanctification ofharmful conductbymoraljus-
linkedto self-sanctions, is an important featureofan agentic tification, social
self-exonerating comparison, and sanitizing
theory of human behavior (Bandura,1986). In the It
develop- language. may focus on obscuring personalagencybydiffu-
mentofmoralagency, individuals adopt standards ofrightand sion and of
displacement responsibility, so thatperpetrators do
wrongthatserveas guidesand deterrents forconduct.In notholdthemselves accountable fortheharmtheycause.Itmay
thisself-regulatory process,peoplemonitor theirconductand involveminimizing, orevendisputing
distorting, theharmthat
theconditions underwhichit occurs,judge it in relationto flowsfromdetrimental actions.And the disengagement may
theirmoral standardsand perceivedcircumstances, and includedehumanizing, and the
demonizing, blaming recipients
regulatetheiractionsby the consequencestheyapply to of the injuriousactions.Throughselectivemoraldisengage-
themselves (Bandura,1991b).Theydo thingsthatgivethem ment,peoplewhoare considerate and compassionate in other
satisfaction and a sense of self-worth, and theyrefrain from areas oftheirlivescan getthemselves to supportdetrimental
behavingin waysthatviolatetheirmoralstandardsbecause social policies,carryout harmful organizational and social
suchconduct willbringself-condemnation. Thus,moralagency practices,and perpetrate large-scaleinhumanities (Bandura,
is exercised through theconstraint ofnegative self-sanctionsfor 1999a).
conductthatviolatesone'smoralstandards and thesupport of In thenonagentic microdeterministic theories reviewed ear-
positive self-sanctions for conduct that is faithful to one's moral behavior
lier, is the product ofnonconscious processes in which
standards. environmental inputsactivatesubpersonal modulesthatcause
Peoplehavethecapability torefrainfrom acting,as wellas to theactions.Ifpeople'sactionsare theproductofthenoncon-
act. In thefaceofsituational inducements to behavein inhu- scious workingsof their neuronalmachinery, and their
maneways,theycan chooseto behaveotherwise by exerting consciousstatesaresimply theepiphenomenal outputs oflower-
self-influence. The moralknowledge and standards abouthow levelbrainprocesses,itis pointlesstoholdpeopleresponsible
oneoughttobehaveconstitute thecognitive foundation ofmo- forthechoicestheymakeandwhattheydo. No one shouldbe

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 ofHumanAgency
Psychology

held personally accountablefortheirharmful behavior- not selectively engagedanddisengaged inthemanagement ofmoral

transgressors fortheircrimes,policeforabusiveenforcementpredicaments.
practices,prosecutors and jurorsforbiased sentencing prac-
tices,jailersformaltreatment ofinmates, orthecitizenry forthe GENETIZATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
socialconditions theirpublicpoliciesandpractices breed.They
can all disclaimresponsibility fortheiractions.Theirneural Wearecurrently witnessing an extensive "genetization" ofhu-
networks madethemdo it. manbehavior. Socialrolesandhumanpractices areincreasingly
Analysesofneuroethics centermainly onthemoreparochial beingproclaimed tobe driven bytheinertia ofancientbiological
issues.Theyincludetheethicsofpharmacological manipulationprogramming. Not all evolutionary theorists speak withone
of neuralsystemsforself-enhancement and court-orderedvoice,however. Psychological evolutionists oftentakea more
management of offenders, breachesof privacythrough func- extremedeterministic stance regarding the rule of nature
tionalneuroimaging intended todetectpersonalcharacteristics(Archer, 1996; Buss,1995)thando manybiologicalevolution-
andcognitive andemotional states,geneticcounseling, and the ists (Dobzhansky, 1972; Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Gould,1987;
like(Farah,2002).Themorefundamental moralimplications of Gowaty, 1997).Psychological evolutionistsarequicktoinvoke
neuroethics receivelittlenotice,however. evolvedbehavioral traitsas cultural universals. Naturalselec-
The subpersonal workings of thebiologicalmachinery are tionoperates through functional advantages ofadaptivepatterns
nonethical. Theissueofmorality arisesinthepurposes towhich in a givenenvironment. Biologicalevolutionists, therefore,
behavioris put,themeansthatare used,and thehumancon- emphasizefunctional relationsbetweenorganisms and local
sequences of the actions. A deterministic thesis thathumans environmental conditions, underscoring the diversifying selec-
havenoconsciouscontrol overwhattheydo,infact,represents a tioninfluence ofvariant ecological niches. Cultures evolve over
on
position morality. It is a position of moral nonaccountability and the
generations shape wayspeople need toliveto survive in
thatis sociallyconsequential. Woulda nonagentic of
conception theparticular cultural milieu in whichthey are immersed (Boyd
humannatureerodethepersonalandsocialethicsthatunder- & Richerson, 1985,2005). As Boydnoted(Dreifus, 2005),hu-
girda civilsociety?Howwouldpeoplecreateand maintain a mansevolvedinthetropicsbuthuntseals intheArctic.Genes
civilsocietyifitsmembers wereabsolvedofanypersonalac- didnotteachthemhowtobuilda kayak;theirculturedid.
countability fortheiractions? Biologyprovidesthe information-processing architectures
The capacityformoralagencyis founded on a senseofper- and potentialities and setsconstraints. Butin mostspheresof
sonal identity, moralstandards,and behavioralregulation functioning, biologypermits a broadrangeofcultural possibil-
through self-sanctions (Bandura,1991b). This abilityis ac- ities.As Gould(1987) noted,themajorexplanatory disputeis
quirable.Socialjudgments ofdetrimental conductaremadein not betweennatureand nurture, as the issue is commonly
terms ofpersonal controllability oftheactions.Forexample, itis framed. Rather,theissue in contention is whether natureop-
within individuals' to
capacity stop ata red signallight.A driver erates as a determinist that has cultureon a "tightleash,"as
whocauseda fatalinjurybyrunning a redlightwouldbe held Wilson(1998)contended, oras a potentialist thathasculture on
accountableforhis actions.In moralagency,individuals can a "looseleash,"as Gould(1987) maintained.
exercisesomemeasureofcontrol overhowsituations influence Humanshavecreatedsocietiesofdiversenatures: aggressive
themandhowtheyshapethesituations. In thetriadicinterplay and pacificones, egalitarianand despoticones, altruistic
of intrapersonal, behavioral, and environmental events,indi- and selfishones,individualistic and collectivistic ones,and
vidualsinsertpersonalinfluence intothecycleofcausationby enlightened and backwardones. Evidencesupportsthe po-
theirchoicesandactions.Becausetheyplaya partinthecourse tentialistview.For example,people possess the biological
ofevents,theyare at leastpartially accountable fortheircon- capabilityforaggressive acts,butculturesdiffer markedly in
tribution tothosehappenings. aggressiveness (Alland, 1972; Gardner & Heider, 1969; Levy,
Researchconducted within theagenticperspective has fur- 1969).Therearealso widedifferences in aggression within the
theredourunderstanding of thedeterminants and processes same culture(Bandura,1973). Even entire nations, such as
governing the development and exerciseof moralagency Swedenand Switzerland, from
havetransformed warring soci-
(Bandura, 1991b,1999a).Thesediverselinesofresearch clarify etiestopacificones.TheSwissusedtobe themainsuppliers of
howindividuals construct moralstandards from themixofsocial mercenary fighters inEurope.Astheytransformed intoa pacific
modeling,the moralvalues conveyedby evaluativesocial society, theirmilitaristic vestigewasevident onlyintheplumage
sanctionsoftheirconduct,and tuition. the
Theyspecify pro- of the Vatican For
guards. ages, theVikingsplundered other
cesses by whichpeople select,weigh,and integrate morally nations.After a prolonged war with the
Russia, populace up rose
relevant information in makingmoraljudgments. Theyexplain and forceda constitutional change(Moerk,1995) thatprohib-
the self-regulatory mechanisms linkingmoraljudgmentsto ited kingsfromstartingwars. This politicalact promptly
moralconductthrough self-sanctions. Andtheyelucidatethe transformed a warring society intoa peacefulone.Swedenis now
psychosocial processesthrough which moral self-sanctions are a mediator for peace among warring nations.Cultural diversity

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 AlbertBandura

and the rapidtransformative societalchangesthathave oc- fundamental constraint. Agenticinventiveness trumpedbio-

curredunderscore thatthe answerto humanaggression lies logicaldesignin getting themairborne. Peopleuse theiringe-
morein ideology thanin biology. nuityto circumvent and insulatethemselves fromselection
Biologicaldeterminists support a conservative viewofsociety pressures. They create devicesthat compensate immensely for
thatemphasizestheruleof nature,inherent constraints, and theirsensory andphysicallimitations. They construct complex
limitations.Theycontendthatpeopleshouldnottrytoremake environments to fittheirdesires,manyofwhichare fadsand
themselves andtheirsocietiesagainsttheruleofnature, as the fashionsthatare sociallycreatedby aggressivemarketing
determinists construeit. Biologicalpotentialists givegreater practices.Theycreateintricate stylesofbehaviornecessary to
weightto enablingsocial conditions thatpromote self-devel- thrivein complexsocialsystems, and through socialmodeling
opment andsocietalchange.Theyemphasizehumanpossibili- andotherforms ofsocialguidancepass on to subsequent gen-
ties and how to realize them.People have changedlittle erationsaccumulated knowledge and effective practices.They
genetically overthepastmillennium, butovertherecentdec- transcend time,place,and distance,as theyinteract globally
adestheyhavechangedmarkedly intheirbeliefs,mores, social withthevirtual environment ofthecyberworld.
andoccupational roles,cohabiting arrangements, family prac- Through contraceptive ingenuity thatdisconnected sex from
and
tices, styles ofbehavior indiverse spheres of life.They have procreation,humanshaveoutwitted andtakencontrol overtheir
doneso through rapidculturalandtechnological evolution. evolvedreproductive system. Theyseeksex without reproduc-
tiveoutcomes, ratherthanstrivetopropagate theirkindinlarge
GROWING PRIMACY OF HUMAN AGENCY IN THE numbers. They are developingreproductive technologies to
COEVOLUTION PROCESS separatesex even from fertilization.
Through geneticengineer-
ing,humansare creatingbiologicalnatures,forbetteror for
Dobzhansky (1972) reminded us thathumansare a generalist worse,rather thanwaiting fortheslowprocessofnaturalevo-
speciesthatwas selectedforlearnability and plasticity ofbe- lution.Theyarenowchanging thegeneticmakeupofplantsand
havior,notforbehavioralfixedness. Although notlimitless, animals.Uniquenativeplantsthathaveevolvedovereonsare
malleability and agenticcapability arethehallmark ofhuman disappearing as commercial horticulturalistsare supplanting
nature.Becauseoflimited innateprogramming, humans require them with genetically uniform hybrids and clones. Notonlyare
a prolonged of
period development to master essential compe- humans cutting and splicing nature's geneticmaterial,but,
tencies.Moreover, different periodsof life presentvariant through synthetic biology, theyare also creatingnewtypesof
competency demands requiring self-renewal overthelifecourse genomes.Humansare eventoyingwiththeprospectoffash-
ifthechallengesofchanging lifecircumstances aretobe met. ioningsomeaspectsoftheirownbiologicalnaturebygenetic
Addingto the necessityof changeability, the eras in which design.
peopleliveusherin technological innovations, shiftsin socio- Thecreative powerofhumanagencygenerally is downgraded
economic conditions, cultural upheavals,andpoliticalchanges in evolutionary accountsofhumanbehavior, especiallyin the
thatmakelifemarkedly different andcall fornewadvantageous morebiologically deterministicviewspropounded in psycho-
adaptations (Elder,1994). These diverse adaptational changes logical evolutionism. Given thegrowing human modifications of
arecultivated bypsychosocial means. evolved heritages and creativecircumventing of endowed lim-
Peopleare notjustreactiveproducts ofselectionpressures itations, thecommon notionthatbiologicalevolution provides
servedup bya one-sidedevolutionism. Theyareprimeplayers thepotential and culturecan do onlyso muchwithit alleges
in the coevolution process.Social cognitivetheorydoes not greaterphysicalconstraints thandoes evidencefromtheex-
questionthecontribution ofgeneticendowment. Indeed,this traordinary humanachievements ofinventive agency.
endowment the
provides very neuronal structures and mecha- As testifiedtoby thediverse modes ofbehavioral control,the
nismsfortheagenticattributes thataredistinctly human.These psychosocial sideofcoevolution is gainingascendancy through
includegenerativethought, symboliccommunication, fore- theagenticpowertotransform environments andwhathumans
thought, self-regulation,andreflective self-consciousness. The become.In short, we arean agenticspeciesthatcan alterevo-
uniquenessofhumansresidesin theseself-directing and self- lutionary heritages and shapethefuture. Whatis technologi-
transforming capacities. callypossibleis likelytobe attempted bysomeone.Wefacethe
Otherspeciesareheavilyinnately programmed as specialists prospectofincreasing effortdirected toward socialconstruction
forstereotypic survivalin a particularhabitat.In contrast, ofourbiologicalnaturethrough geneticdesign.Thesedevel-
through agenticaction,people devise of
ways adapting flexibly opments present an enormous challengeregarding howtobridle
to remarkably diversegeographic, climatic, and social envi- unbounded geneticmanipulation &
(Baylis Robert, 2004). The
ronments. They deviseways to transcend theirbiologicallimi- valuesto whichpeoplesubscribe, and thesocialsystems they
tations.
Forexample, humanshavenotevolvedmorphologicallydevisetooverseetheusestowhichtheirtechnological poweris
tofly,
buttheyaresoaring through theairandevenintherarified put,willplaya vitalrolein whatpeoplebecomeandhowthey
atmosphere of outerspace at breakneckspeeds despitethis shapetheirdestiny.

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 PsychologyofHumanAgency

WereDarwinwriting today,he wouldbe documenting the EXERCISE OF AGENCY IN CULTURAL CONTEXT

overwhelming humandomination of the environment. Many
of the species in our degrading planethave no evolutionaryA contentious dualismpervadesthefieldofculturalpsychol-
future.We are wipingout species and the ecosystems that ogy,pitting autonomy againstinterdependence, individualism
supportlife at an acceleratingpace. Unlike formermass againstcollectivism, andhumanagencyagainstsocialstructure
extinctions by meteoric disasters, the current mass extinc- reified as an entity disembodied from thebehavior ofindividu-
tion of species is the productof humanbehavior.As the als. It is widelyclaimedthatWestern theorieslack generaliz-
unrivaledrulingspecies atop the foodchain,we are draft- abilityto non- Western cultures.In truth, however, therelative
ingtherequiemforbiodiversity. By wieldingpowerful to
tech- weightgiven individual, proxy, and collective agencyvaries
nologiesthatamplify control overtheenvironment, humansare cross-culturally and across of
spheres life, but one needsall
producing hazardousglobalchangesofhugemagnitudede- forms - ofagencytomakeitthrough theday,regardless ofwhere
forestation,desertification, globalwarming, topsoil erosion and one happens to live.
sinkingof watertablesin the majorfood-producing regions, Mostofcultural psychology is basedonterritorial culturalism.
of and
depletion fisheries, degradation of other aspects of Nations are used as for
proxies psychosocial orientations. For
theearth'slife-support systems. Expanding economies fueling example, residents ofJapangetcategorized as collectivists, and
consumptivegrowthby billions of people will intensifythosein theUnitedStatesas individualists. Butculturesare
competition fortheearth's vitalresources andoverwhelm efforts dynamicand internally diversesystems, not static monoliths.
to securean environmentally and economically sustainable Thereis substantial diversity amongsocietiesplaced in the
future.Myriadparochialinterests createtoughimpedimentssamecategory. Forexample,collectivistic systems founded on
to improving living standards globallythrough sustainable Confucianism, Buddhism, and Marxism all favor a communal
ecodevelopment in whicheconomicgrowth preserves theenvi- ethic.Buttheydiffer invalues,meanings, andthecustoms they
ronmental basis forit. Throughcollectivepracticesdriven promote (Kim,Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994).Nor
by a foreshortened perspective, humansmaybe well on the are so-called individualistic cultures a uniform lot. Americans,
road to outsmarting themselvesinto irreversible ecological Italians,Germans, French, andtheBritish differ intheirbrands
crises. ofindividualism. Thereis also diversity acrossregionswithin
The global ecosystemcannotsustainsoaringpopulation thesamecountry. In theUnitedStates,theNortheast brandof
and
growth highconsumption of finite resources. Some of the individualism is quite different from the Midwestern and
global applications of social cognitivetheory are aimed at Western versions, which differ from that of the Deep South
abatingthismosturgent globalproblem, especiallyin less-de- (Vandello& Cohen,1999). Giventhenotablediversity, bicul-
velopednationsthathaveexperienced highfertility ratesand turalcontrasts in which members of a single collectivist culture
doublingof theirpopulationsovera shortperiod(Bandura, are comparedwiththoseof a singleindividualistic one can
2002a;Rogersetal., 1999).Theseapplications alsoseektocurb spawnmisleading generalizations.
thespreading AIDS pandemicandtoraisethestatusofwomen The differences associatedwithsociodemographic charac-
in societiesin whichtheyaremarginalized, disallowedaspira- teristics areevengreater thanthedifferences between cultures
tions,and deniedtheirlibertyand dignity. These worldwide (Matsumoto, Kudoh,& Takeuchi,1996).Forexample, thereare
applications combine the functions of three models inways that generational and socioeconomic differences in communality in
augmentwidespreadchanges.They combinea theoretical collectivistic cultures. Analyses across activity domains and
modelthatprovidestheguidingprinciples, a translational and classesofsocialrelationships further revealthatpeoplebehave
implementational modelthatconvertstheoryintoinnovative communally in someaspectsoftheirlivesand individualisti-
practice, and a social diffusion model that fosters adoption of cally in many otheraspects(Freeman& Bordia,2001; Matsu-
changesthrough functional adaptations to diverse cultural mi- moto et al., 1996). Theyexpresstheirculturalorientations
lieus. conditionally, dependingon incentive conditions, ratherthan
Theseglobalapplications inAfrica, Asia, and Latin America invariantly (Yamagishi, 1988). Measures of cultural traitscastin
usetheenablingpowerandreachofthemassmedia,intheform termsoffacelessothersand disembodied from domains ofac-
oflong-running serializeddramas, as thevehicleofpersonaland tivity, social contexts, and incentive conditions maskthisdi-
social change.Theyportray people'severyday lives,the im- versityupon whichhumanadaptationis conditional.This
pediments withwhichtheystruggle, and realisticsolutionsto multifaceted diversity underscores theconceptual andempiri-
thoseimpediments. They inform, enable, and motivate people to cal of
problems using nations as proxies for culture, and then
takecontrol oftheirreproductive life,tovisualize a better future, ascribing global traits to a nation and its members as though they
andtotakethestepstorealizeit.Thesetypesofchangeshelp all believedandbehavedalike(Gjerde& Onishi,2000).
peoplebreakthecycleofpoverty, improve theirlives,andadopt Notonlyareculturesnotmonolithic entities, buttheyareno
reproductive and environmental practicesthatsupport ecolog- longerinsular.Globalconnectivity is shrinking cross-cultural
ical sustainability. uniqueness.Transnational interdependencies and globalmar-

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 AlbertBandura

ketforces arerestructuring national economies, andshapingthe the culturing of theseinherent capacities.In thisdual-level
politicaland social lifeofsocieties.Advancedtelecommuni-analysis, universality is notincompatible withmanifest cultural
cationstechnologies aredisseminating ideas,values,andstyles plurality. Kluckhohn and Murraysummarized eloquently the
of behaviortransnationally at an unprecedented rate. The blendofuniversality, and
commonality, uniqueness of human
symbolic environment, feeding offcommunication satellites,is qualities:Everypersonis incertain aspectslikeall other people,
altering national cultures and producing intercultural com- likesome other people, like noother person(as citedinMunoz&
monalities in somelifestyles. The growing role of electronic Mendelson, 2005).
acculturation is fostering a more extensive globalization of Researchtestifies tothecross-cultural generalizability ofself-
culture. Peopleworldwide arebecoming increasingly enmeshed efficacy theory. The factorstructure ofself-efficacy beliefsis
in a cyberworld thattranscends time,distance,place,and na- essentially thesamein different culturalsystems (Pastorelliet
tionalborders. In addition, massmigrations ofpeople,andhigh al., 2001). Not onlyis the structure of self-efficacy beliefs
globalmobility ofentertainers, athletes,journalists, academics, comparablecross-culturally, butso are theirfunctional prop-
and employeesof multinational are
corporations, changing erties.Regardless of whether thecultureis American, Italian,
culturallandscapes.Thisintermixing createsnewhybrid cul- Korean,orChinese,thestronger theperceived self-efficacy,the
tural forms,blendingelementsfromdifferent ethnicities. higher theperformance attainments (Banduraetal., 1996;Bong,
Growing ethnicdiversity withinsocietiesconveysfunctional 2001; Joo,Bong,& Choi,2000; Shih & Alexander, 2000).
value to bicultural efficacy thatcan be used to navigatethe Thecross-cultural comparability offunction is evident as wellin
demandsofbothone'sethnicsubculture andthecultureofthe theimpactofefficacy beliefsonperceived occupational efficacy
largersociety. and career choice and development (Banduraet al., 2001;
Thesesocial forcesare homogenizing someaspectsoflife, R. Lent,Brown, & Larkin,1987;R. Lent,Brown, Nota,& Soresi,
polarizing other aspects, and fostering considerable cultural 2003). Even the mechanisms through which self-efficacy beliefs
hybridization (Holton,2000). The newrealitiescall forbroad- affectperformance are replicatedcross-culturally (Bandura,
eningthescopeofcross-cultural research toincludeanalysesof 2002b; Cheung& Sun,2000; R. Lentet al., 2003; Parket al.,
hownationaland globalforcesinteract to shapethenatureof 2000).
cultural life.As globalization reacheseverdeeperintopeople's
lives,a strong senseofcollective efficacy tomaketransnationalGROWING PRIMACY OF HUMAN AGENCY IN DIVERSE
systems work for them becomes critical to furthering their SPHERES OF LIFE
common interests andwelfare.
One mustdistinguish betweeninherent capacitiesand how The societiesoftodayare undergoing drasticsocial,informa-
cultureshapesthesepotentialities intodiverseforms. Forex- tional,andtechnological changes.Therevolutionary advances
ample,observational learningfiguresprominently in social inelectronic technologies andglobalization aretransforming the
cognitive theory. Humans have evolved an advanced capacity nature, reach, speed, and loci of human influence. These new
forobservational learning.It is essentialfortheirself-devel- realitiespresentnewchallengesand vastlyexpandopportuni-
opment andfunctioning regardless ofthecultureinwhichthey tiesforpeopletoexercisesomemeasure ofcontrol overhowthey
reside.Indeed,in manycultures, thewordfor"learning" is the livetheirlives.Wrenching changesthatdislocateand restruc-
wordfor"show"(Reichard,1938).Modelingis a universalized turelivesare notnewin history. Whatis newis theboundless
humancapacity. Butwhatis modeled, howmodeling influences scope and acceleratedpace of humantransactions, and the
aresociallystructured, andthepurposestheyservevaryacross growing globalization ofhumaninterconnectedness.
cultural milieus(Bandura& Walters, 1963).Globalapplications Life in the rapidlyevolvingcyberworld transcendstime,
ofsocialcognitive to
theory promote society-wide changes attest place,distance, and national borders, and alters ourconceptions
to the powerof social modelingin diverseculturalmilieus ofthem.Peoplenowhaveinstantaneous communicative access
(Bandura, et
2002a,2006; Rogers al, 1999; Vaughan, Rogers, worldwide. Itis how
transforming peoplecommunicate, educate,
Singhal,& Swalehe,2000). relatetoeachother, andconduct theirbusinessanddailyaffairs.
A growing bodyofresearchshowsthata resilientsense of These transformative changesare placinga premium on the
efficacy has generalized functional valueregardless ofwhether exerciseofhumanagencyto shapepersonaldestiniesand the
one residesin an individualistically oriented cultureora col- nationallifeofsocieties.
lectivisticallyoriented one (Earley, 1993, 1994; Gibson,1995). Mostofourpsychological theories wereformulated longbe-
Being immobilized by self-doubt and believing in the futilityof forethe revolutionary changes in communications and thenew
efforthavelittleevolutionary advantage. But how efficacy be- social realities these technologies have created. Giventhe
liefsaredevelopedand structured, thewaysin whichtheyare circumscribed situationalboundednessof people's lives at
exercised, and thepurposesto whichtheyare putvarycross- thetime,thetraditional psychological theories focusedheavily
culturally. In short,thereis culturalcommonality in basic on behavioral transactions and contingencies operating within
agenticcapacitiesandmechanisms ofoperation, butdiversity in people'sconfined tangible environment. The situational tran-

2
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 ofHumanAgency
Psychology
scendence affordedby ready access to vast symbolic envi-
ronments in thecyberworld has enabled people totake a strong-
er hand in shapingtheirlives. Considersome examples of the
growingprimacyof humanagency in virtuallyeverysphere of
life.
In the educational field,studentscan now exercise greater
personal controlover their own learning. In the past, their
educationaldevelopmentwas heavilydependenton the quality
of the schools in whichtheywere enrolled.Studentsnow have
thebestlibraries,museums,and multimediainstruction at their
fingertipsthroughthe global Internet,and they can use
these resources for educating themselves.They can do this
independentlyof timeand place. This shiftin the locus of ini-
tiative requires a major reorientationin students' concep-
tionofeducation.Theyare agentsoftheirownlearning,notjust
recipients of information.Education for self-directedness
is now vital fora productiveand innovativesociety.Proficient
self-regulators gain knowledge,skills, and intrinsicinterestin
academic areas; deficientself-regulators achieve limitedself-
development(Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman, 1989).
At the student, teacher, and school levels, a sense of
efficacycontributesto academic development(Bandura, 1997;
Pajares & Schunk,2001). We are enteringa newera in whichthe
constructionof knowledgewill relyincreasinglyon electronic
inquiry.Studentswithhighperceivedefficacyforself-regulated
learningare the ones who make the best use of Internet-based
instruction (Jooet al., 2000).
Health is anothersphereoffunctioning in whichtheexercise
of personal agency gainingprominence.The health fieldis
is
changingfroma disease model to a health model. It is just as
meaningfulto speak oflevels ofvitalityand healthfulnessas to
speak of degrees of impairmentand debility.The quality of
healthis heavilyinfluencedbylifestylehabits,whichmeansthat
people can exercise some controlover their health. Current
healthpracticesfocusheavilyon the medical supplyside, and
thereis growingpressureon health systemsto reduce, ration,
and delay health services to contain health costs. The social
cognitiveapproach, founded on an agentic model of health
promotion,focuses on the demand side (Bandura, 2000b,
2004a). It promoteseffectiveself-management ofhealthhabits
thatkeep people healthy.
Increasingapplicationsof the self-regulatory model are en-
hancingpeople's health status,improving quality of their
the
lives, and reducingtheirrisk of disease and need forcostly
healthservices(Bandura,2005; M. Clarket al., 1997; DeBusk et
al., 1994; Holman & Lorig,1992; Long & Holman,2003). This
self-regulatorymodelis beingintegratedintomainstreamhealth
care systemsand adopted internationally (N. Clark et al., in
press; Dongbo al., 2003; Lorig,Hurwicz,Sobel, & Hobbs, in
et
press). People's beliefs in theirself-regulatory efficacyaffect
everyphase in the adoption of healthfulpractices- whether
theyeven considerchangingtheirhealth habits,whetherthey
enlist the motivationand perseverance needed to succeed
176
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should theychoose to do so, and how well theymaintainthe
changes theyhave achieved (Bandura, 1997, 2004a).
A major part of people's daily life is spent in occupational
activities.These pursuitsdo morethanprovideincomeforone's
subsistence.They serve as a majorsource ofpersonalidentity,
self-evaluation,and social connectedness.Beliefs of personal
efficacyplay a key role in occupationaldevelopmentand pur-
suits (Bandura, 1997; R. Lent, Brown,& Hackett,1994). The
capacity forself-renewalis becominga prominentfactorin a
satisfyingoccupational life. In the past, employeeslearned a
given trade and performedit much the same way throughout
theirlifetimein the same organization.The historictransition
fromthe industrialto the information era calls foradvanced
cognitive and self-regulatory competencies.Withthe fastpace
ofchange,knowledgeand technicalskillsare quicklyoutmoded
unless theyare updatedto fitthe new technologies.Employees
have to take charge of their self-developmentto meet the
challengesofevolvingpositionsand careersoverthefullcourse
of theirworklives. Those of high self-efficacy influencethe
course oftheiroccupationalself-development, are receptiveto
innovations,and make their work life more productiveand
satisfyingby restructuring their occupational roles and the
processes by which their work is performed(Frese, Teng, &
Cees, 1999; Jorde-Bloom& Ford, 1988; McDonald & Siegall,
1992; Speirer& Frese, 1997).
Many occupational activitiesare increasinglyconductedby
membersof virtualteams workingtogetherfromscatteredlo-
cations via the Internet.Workingremotelyacross time,space,
and culturalorientations can be taxing.A highsense ofefficacy
promotespositiveattitudesforremotely conductedcollaborative
work and enhances group performance(Staples, Hulland, &
Higgins,1998).
Agenticadaptabilityhas become a premiumat the organiza-
tionallevel as well. Organizationsmustcontinuouslyinnovateto
surviveand prosperin therapidlychangingglobal marketplace.
They face the paradox of preparingforchange at the heightof
success. Many fall victimto the inertiaof success. They get
locked intothe technologiesand productsthatproducedtheir
success and fail to adapt fastenough to the technologiesand
marketplacesof the future.The developmentof new business
venturesand therenewalofestablishedones depend heavilyon
innovativenessand entrepreneurship. Turningvisions intore-
alities entailsheavyinvestment and resourcesin
oftime,effort,
ventures strewnwith many difficulties, unmerciful impedi-
ments,and uncertainties.A resilientsense ofefficacyprovides
the necessarystayingpowerin the torturous pursuitof innova-
tions.Indeed, perceivedself-efficacypredictsentrepreneurship
and which patent inventorsare likely to startnew business
ventures(Baron & Markman,2003; Chen, Greene, & Crick,
1998).
It is theorganizationswitha highsense ofcollectiveefficacy
thatcreateinnovativechangesthatfitevolvingtechnologiesand
global marketplaces(Bandura, 2000a). However,hard-driving
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 AlbertBandura

competitiveness raisesvalueissuesconcerning thepurposesto Acknowledgments - A majorportion ofthisarticlewas pre-

whichhumantalent,advancedtechnologies, andresources are sentedat theannualmeetingof theAmericanPsychological
put.Someintense market activitiespromote lavishconsumptionSocietyin Chicago,May2004, fortheJamesMcKeenCattell
thatneither usesourfinite resources wiselynorleadstoa better AwardforDistinguished Achievements in Psychological Sci-
qualityoflife.Manyofthesepracticesmaybe profitable inthe ence.A fewsectionsofthisarticleinclude
revised,updated, and
shortrun,but,as previously noted,theyare environmentally
expanded material from Bandura (2001).
unsustainable in thelongrun.
The revolutionary advancesin communications technology
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