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Lindsey Meyer

Dr. Honeycutt

PHI 314

February 21, 2017

Descartes and the Implications of Religious Doubt

Since the publishing of his Meditations in 1641, scholars have debated the true religious

beliefs that Descartes held: Was he an atheist? Was he a deist? Was he the Catholic that he

claimed to be? In order to understand and answer these questions, a close reading of Descartes

Meditations is crucial. Specifically, examinations of his purpose for creating proofs of the

existence of God, his description of God as an infinite being and of human as a finite being, and

the importance of the natural light in his arguments are relevant. Descartes sincerity must also

be questioned, as he presents himself as a Christian, but this could have easily been a safeguard

against the retaliation of the church. Is the Meditations a treatise that expounds upon Descartes

deeply held belief in the Christian God or can it be interpreted as the ponderings of a man who is

coming to terms with his own faith and feels morally obligated to share his conclusions with

others?

In 1642, Calvinist theologian and scholastic philosopher Gisbert Voetius accused one of

Descartes followers, Regius, of subverting Christianity through his lectures on Cartesian

philosophy. Voetius argued that This philosophy is dangerous, favorable to Skepticism, apt to

destroy our belief concerning the reasonable soul, the possession of divine persons in the Trinity,

the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, original sin, miracles, prophecies, the grace of our regeneration,

and the real possession of demons. Voetius vehemently believed that Descartes skepticism was
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a direct attack on the Christianity because there was no place for doubt in the true Christian faith

(Jolley 395). Not only did the Calvinists critique Cartesian skepticism, but the Catholic Church

perceived Descartes as refuting the doctrine of transubstantiation, which Descartes in turn

attempted to refute with his own philosophical method instead of merely accepting the doctrine

on faith alone (Jolley 397).

When considering only the first mediation and the power of religious institutions during

his lifetime, it is understandable that Descartes was accused of atheism by his critics. By striving

towards the general demolition of his opinions, Descartes is forced to reconsider his opinion of

the Christian God in the Meditations (M 18). Descartes does this by contemplating the idea of a

deceiver, and supposes that not God, who is supremely good and the source of truth, but rather

some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order

to deceive me (M 23). Descartes doubt of God is written as a supposition in this passage, but

what if his supposition is in fact a covert method of acknowledging his atheism? Descartes

himself (though not in the Meditations) stated that Actors, taught not to let any embarrassment

show on their faces, put on a mask. I will do the same. So far I have been a spectator in this

theater which is the world, but I am now about to mount the stage, and I come forward masked

(AT 10:213). It is possible that Descartes was being insincere with his provisional doubt of God,

and that he was simply wary of being condemned by the Catholic Church as Galileo had been in

1633?

Despite considerations of possible insincerity, it is difficult to read the entirety of the

Meditations and continue to deny Descartes belief in a deity. In part, this results from his utter

dismissal of atheism: in the Second Replies, Descartes argues that It does not matter that the
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atheist may think he has demonstrations to prove that there is no God. For, since these proofs are

quite unsound, it will always be possible to point out their flaws to him, and when this happens

he will have to abandon his view (OR 141). Though Descartes begins his arguments in the

Meditations with a deeply skeptic vein of thought, his conclusion in the sixth meditation that

corporeal objects do exist, as far as they can be clearly and distinctly perceived, is predicated on

the existence of God (M 80). In the fifth meditation, Descartes posits that But from the fact that

I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and

hence that he really exists For I am not free to think of God without existence (that is,

supremely perfect being without a supreme perfection) as I am free to imagine a horse with or

without wings (M 67). Descartes argues that the atheist is delusional precisely because of their

lack of belief in the existence and subsequent perfection of God. The denial of God forces the

atheist to remain in a persistent state of uncertainty. Descartes is certain that corporeal things

exist because God is perfect and would not deceive him, while the atheist cannot find this

grounding of thought. Also, by concluding that God is perfect and thus not a deceiver, Descartes

dismisses the idea as it was presented in the first meditation, rendering Voetius argument that

Descartes skepticism leads to atheism as unlikely.

Furthermore, it is through the natural light of reason that Descartes is able to clearly

and distinctly perceive the existence of God that this previous argument rests on. He first

mentions the natural light in meditation three:

When I say Nature taught me to think this, all I mean is that a spontaneous impulse
leads me to believe it, not that its truth has been revealed to me by some natural light.
There is a big difference here. Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light - for
example that from the fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on - cannot in
any way be open to doubt.This is because there cannot be another faculty both as
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trustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me that such things are not
true. (M 39)

Descartes assumes that the reader understands precisely what this revelatory light is, and here

only mentions that it is more trustworthy than that which is revealed through nature or

experience alone. Even in his earlier Discourse on the Method, Descartes mentions the natural

light without fully explaining what it is: ... so I learned not to believe too firmly in anything of

which I had been persuaded only by example and custom. Thus I gradually freed myself from

many errors which may obscure our natural light and make us less capable of heeding reason

(DM 11). From this context, it is understood that the reader should equate the natural light with

the capacity to reason.

Nonetheless, Descartes does not attempt to describe this natural light in explicit detail in

either work, leaving it open to interpretation. When considering possible interpretations, the

usage of the word natural is contentious. By natural, did Descartes mean that the natural light

belongs to the natural world or is it actually a supernatural force that is given by God? If the

natural light is interpreted as mans ability to understand clear and distinct truths in terms of

nature alone, it is possible to conclude that his lack of an explanation has the subtle implication

of atheism or at the very least of deism, as it would demonstrate God as simply being a natural

mover. However, if the clear and distinct perceptions associated with the natural light do come

directly from God, then the idea of a supernatural natural light would not be incompatible with

the Christian God, though its emphasis on reason could still have been suspicious to church

authority.
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Though it may be reasonably unlikely that Descartes was a closeted atheist, perhaps he

does in fact wear a mask that hides his adherence to a deistic instead of Christian God. This

could account for the natural light as being purely natural yet not being atheistic. When Voetius

accuses Descartes of atheism, he is more concerned with the possible refutation of church

doctrine than the direct denial of the existence of God. Interestingly, in his preface to the

Meditations, Descartes writes:

I will only say in general that all the objections typically bandied about by the atheists to
assail the existence of God always depend either on ascribing human emotions to God, or
on arrogantly claiming for our minds such power and wisdom that we attempt to
determine and grasp fully what God can and ought to do. Hence these objections will
cause us no difficulty, provided we but remember that our minds are to be regarded as
finite, while God is to be regarded as incomprehensible and infinite. (M 9)

By emphasizing the limited human understanding of God that results from human finitude being

unable to grasp Godly infinitude, Descartes appears to refute the objections of atheists, but he

could also be covertly critiquing an emphasis on church doctrine as its purpose is to explain God

in a manner that is easily grasped by the finite human through a faithful acceptance of that

doctrine.

Descartes again repeats this idea of the limited understanding of the infinite in the third

meditation: It does not matter that I do not grasp the infinite, or that there are countless

additional attributes of God which I cannot in any way grasp, and perhaps not even reach in my

thought; for it is in the nature of the infinite not to be grasped by a finite being like myself (M

46). Is it possible that Descartes subtly critiques Christian ideas of original sin, the trinity, etc.

when he focuses in on the infinite being of God? Why is the church able to describe the

incomprehensible and ascribe human emotions (such as love) to God? Descartes himself does

describe certain attributes of God, including Gods infinite nature, omniscience, and
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omnipotence, but these have a more abstract nature than the fatherly, anthropomorphized image

of God as is sometimes portrayed by both Catholic and Calvinist doctrines.

In the fourth meditation, Descartes expands upon finitude as being the source of human

error: the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within

the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand. Since the will is indifferent

in such cases, it easily turns aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error

and sin (M 58). In one sense, this theodical account for the source of error or sin belonging to

human free will instead of being a fault of God aligns well with Catholic doctrine. When reading

Descartes as a Deist though, this account again relates to the limits of human reason; one can will

to understand God through faith in church doctrine, but what if church doctrine (and by

extension church leadership) is that which attempts to go beyond the finite scope of the intellect?

However, one could also argue that using logical proofs to attest to the existence of God

is also beyond the capacity of the intellect. Does Descartes contradict himself by proving the

incomprehensible? This would account for perceived weaknesses in Descartes proofs of God.

This leads to the greater question of why Descartes resorts to logical proofs for the existence of

God in the Meditations; why not simply take a Kierkegaardian leap of faith? For those who are

already faithful, proving the existence of God is not necessary. For those who adhere to atheism,

it is unlikely that Descartes proofs were sufficient enough to have ever caused any great

conversion experiences. It could be that the answer to this question is that Descartes himself was

struggling with defining his own faith. By even simply attempting to prove the existence of God,

it is possible that Descartes was more shaken by his doubts about God than he admitted to.

Maybe writing the Meditations was a way for Descartes to come to terms with either his deistic
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beliefs or simply his own interpretation of or reckoning with Catholicism that may not have been

pleasing to religious authority.

Whether he was a Christian, a deist, or an atheist will likely never be sufficiently

answered, but by bringing philosophical doubt into conversation with religion, Descartes did take

a monumentally important risk. During a time when thinkers like Gisbert Voetius commonly

equated doubt with denial, it was unavoidable that Descartes would have been accused of

undermining the church. Though he carefully wore his mask in his writings, it may be that

Descartes recognized that doubt was a force that could cleanse the church and renew spirituality.

It is for this reason that Descartes, despite proving that his doubts could be solved with reason

and through God, ended the Meditations by humbly declaring that: it must be admitted that in

this human life we are often liable to make mistakes about particular things, and we must

acknowledge the weakness of our nature (M 90). It is through the recognition of human

weakness and finitude that one can most authentically come to terms with God or the infinite

scope of being by questioning antiquated religious practices that were (and on occasion still are)

so contrary to the modern, rationalist worldview that Descartes held. And it is through doubt that

Descartes gave the individual the power to interpret God instead of the church.

When explaining why he decided to write and publish his thoughts in the Discourse on

the Method, Descartes wrote that Every man is indeed bound to do what he can to procure the

good of others, and a man who is of no use to anyone else is strictly worthless (DM 66). By

taking a risk and publishing the Meditations (regardless of however much he attempted to mask

what may or may not have been his true thoughts), Descartes gave readers an explanation of how

to use their natural light to determine a better understanding of not only the world, but by
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extension, religious doubt as it relates to the true nature of God. Consequently, the publishing of

the Meditations allowed Descartes to procure the good of others by quietly entreating them to

question any church authority which attempted to veil the natural light of reason by denying the

individual ability to interpret and understand God. It is this quiet entreatment that presents the

Meditations as a strikingly modern and prolific philosophical treatise.

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Bibliography

Jolley, Nicholas. The reception of Descartes Philosophy. In The Cambridge Companion to

Descartes, edited by John Cottingham, 393-419. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1992.