1. G.R. No.
129670 February 1, 2000
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge
Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TOPIC: Right of Bail: When right may be invoked
FACTS:
Parents of the complainants that their daughter(Lorelie San Miguel), then
16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night
at petitioner's room (April 3, 1997)
Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of
petitioner's activities.
At 8:20 pm( on the same date) Police knocked on the door of Petitioner at
the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where hewas staying.
Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting
officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation
of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence
and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination,
Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7
April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
(Criminal Case Q-97-70550).
Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to
Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged.
Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie
San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla,
Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-
97-70874) againt petitioner on April 29, 1997
In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the
informations, Lavides had sexual intercourse with complainants who had
been "exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for the said
acts of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended.
Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail in the 9 cases
On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving Lavides' Omnibus
Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is probable
cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been made in
accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under
detention until further order of the Court; and that the accused is
entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail
in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all
the cases under certain conditions.
On 20 May 1997, Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against
him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866.
Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the
arraignment scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a
motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment.
On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied Lavides'
motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
arraignment.
Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to
the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997.
The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial
court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May 1997,
denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its
order of 16 May 1997, respectively.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations
were filed against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases against him
to 12, which were all consolidated.
On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating
the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the
accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these
cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest
shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia
-- and maintained the orders in all other respects.
Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall
ensure his presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be
granted.
HELD
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would
then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court
could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting
bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment.
Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the
conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116,
1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion
to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing
the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not
to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure
the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's constitutional
rights.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and
another one is RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and
May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be
valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second paragraph of the
order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of
bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.1wphi1
2. G.R. No. L-101 December 20, 1945
HAYDEE HERRAS TEEHANKEE, petitioner,
vs.
LEOPOLDO ROVIRA, ANTONIO QUIRINO, and POMPEYO DIAZ, respondents.
TOPIC: Right of Bail: When right may be invoked
FACTS:
Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter
Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth
Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, dated 29 December 1944.
She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of
the Supreme Court.
She is now confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the
custody of the Commonwealth Government since October, 1945, when she
was thus delivered to the said government.
On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto
Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the
provisions of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists
upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or,
alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional
liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid executive order, and upon
approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the officer
having official custody of her person to immediately release her.
On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the
People's Court, entered an order referring the petition for provisional
release for consideration by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but
adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied
notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for
her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date,
the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an
order disposing of said petition and denying the same "in view of the
gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the
Special
Prosecutors recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release."
Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through
Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion.
Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus
on 19 October 1945 with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or
information is filed against him.
HELD:
Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which
provides that "All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence
of guilt is strong.
Excessive bail shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to
persons against whom a complaint or information has already been
formally filed.
It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
According to the provision, the general rule is that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he
is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained
or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek
the benefits of said provision.
But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it
is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or
information is filed against him.
From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the
officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and
this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital
offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.
Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already
charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no
legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the
proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient
evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the
latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with
criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this
presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although
already arrested or detained
WHEREFORE, it is the judgement of this Court that:
(a) the order of the People's Court, dated October 9, 1945, denying
petitioner's petition for provisional release under bail, and the order of
said Court, dated October 13, 1945, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said order of October 9, 1945, which we declare to
have been entered with grave abuse of discretion, be set aside; and
(b) that for the proper application of the pertinent constitutional, statutory,
and reglementary provisions alluded to in the body of this decision, a
hearing of the petitioner's application for bail be held before the People's
Court with due notice to the Solicitor General, as well as to the petitioner,
as hereinabove outlined, said hearing, whether summary or otherwise, to
be such as would enable the People's Court to exercise its sound discretion
in the disposal of the aforesaid petition.
Without costs. So ordered.
3. G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
TOPIC: Right of Bail: Procedure of Bail
FACTS:
On 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an
amended information as a co- conspirator in the crime of multiple murder
in Criminal Case 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan
de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in
1984 in Gingoog City of which Paderanga was the mayor at the time.
The original information, filed on 6 October 1986 with the Regional Trial
Court of Gingoog City, had initially indicted for multiple murder 8
accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito
Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged
conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet
Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried
and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison.
The others have remained at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of
events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In
an amended information dated 6 October 1988, he was charged as a co-
accused therein.
As Paderanga was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas
engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the
course of the preliminary investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed
affidavit dated 30 March 1989 but which he later retracted on 20 June
1990, implicated Paderanga as the supposed mastermind behind
the massacre of the Bucag family.
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
Issue:
from the case per his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department of Justice,
at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989, Paderanga was
finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second
amended information dated 6 October 1992.
Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to the
Held:
Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon.
Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon,
Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated
on 19 April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him.
The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served on
him, Paderanga through counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for
admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on 5
November 1992.
Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick
F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private
prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5 November 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail.
As Paderanga was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they
were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter
president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of
said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of
the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in
accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State
prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to
the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon further inquiries from the trial
court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence.
On that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992, the trial court
admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following
day, 6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough
to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of
the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and
attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days
later on 26 November 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received
his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing,
was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On
1 October 1993, or more than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action
for certiorari.
The resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga
were annulled on 24 November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga
filed the petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Whether Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion
for admission to bail, and whether the trial court properly inquired into the
nature of the prosecutors evidence to determine whether or not it is strong
to deny or grant the application of bail, respectively.
Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he
was actually and physically placed under arrest.
He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody.
Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his
bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he
should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody
of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which
thereafter granted bail as prayed for.
In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or
merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in
case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to
the military camp area. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made
it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail
that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and
could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital.
The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to
have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have
taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of
the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a
hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his
confinement or placing him under guard.
Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point
since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his
lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his
person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court;
secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and,
more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said
court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or evinced any
intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from
the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
Where the trial court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude
of not opposing the application for bail is not justified, as when he is
evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the
interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the
nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong.
Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused,
the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from
there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really
not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be
attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga.
A review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its
resolution of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March 1993
abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules.
The lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of
the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the
prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the
court conclude that Paderanga could be provisionally released on bail.
Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present,
Paderanga has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution
dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent
court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration
of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid
resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting
bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
4. G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused
appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III
of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charge Petitioner Juan
Ponce Enrile a plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam.
Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was
issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.(Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination)
Petitioner asked the Sandiganbayanin his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospita and his Motion to Fix Ba Motion to Fix Bail which was
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had
not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that,
because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would
only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight
risk due to his age and physical condition.
Sandiganbayan ruled that argument has no merit for purposes of bail, the
presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense
charged
Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter
of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if
ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk
HELD:
1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of
due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment
on the accused
Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds
interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest
in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the
Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under
the law existing at the time of its commission and the application for
admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
[or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence
of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted
according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or
reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party
in either case
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
3.Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he
was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and
that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite
the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
by the trial court. not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
international community arising from its commitment to the Universal the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR petitioner to post bail].
vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July
II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to being detained for some other lawful cause.
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
5.a. G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA,
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO
as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of
ORTIZ. JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-
bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
PADILLA, petitioner,
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will
vs.
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V.
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
RAMOS, and FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus seeking the following relief:
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray this Honorable Court:
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
1. To immediately issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
appear and produce the bodies of Dr. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under
TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR.,
stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary
JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, forthwith before this Honorable Court and
artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
to make due return of the writ therewith;
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they
2. To issue, in addition or in the alternative to the writ of habeas corpus, a writ of
could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity,
mandamus compelling the respondents to disclose the petitioners' present
dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients
place of detention and to order the respondents to allow counsel and
with asthma or COPD
relatives to visit and confer with the petitioners;
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age
3. Pending the determination of the legality of their continued detention, to
and ill health required special medical attention. His confinement at the
forthwith release the detainees on bail upon such terms and conditions as the Court
PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even
may fix, and after hearing, to order petitioners' immediate release; and
recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of
4. To grant petitioners such other and further relief as may be deemed just and
that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at
equitable in the premises.
that hospital.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then
FACTS:
enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
 The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were intimidation and other means which vitiate free will to obtain confession
arrested when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva and statements from the detainees in violation of their constitutional rights.
Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de Guzman and lst Lt. Baria, after
securing a Search Warrant No. S-82 issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of
In the resolution of this Court en banc dated August 17, 1982, the writ of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya conducted a raid at the
habeas corpus was issued and respondents were required to make a
residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the said raid were
return of the writ. Hearing on the petition was set on August 26, 1982.
Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco
Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and
Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982. respondents, through the
room of Dra. Parong's residence which had been doing on of that Solicitor General, alleged, to wit:
same day.
The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, I. AS TO HABEAS CORPUS
Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada, and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested
on the following day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC teams.
On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, 1. The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom
bearing Plate No. DAP 347, was seized by the PC authorities. Vasquez who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on
14 petitioner were detained at at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, July 15, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No.
morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place reportedly to 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No.
Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President
Cagayan Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No. 885. ...
Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by
Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. 2. The corresponding charges against the said detainees have been filed in
on August 13, 1982 court and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya where they
It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently are pleading. A warrant of arrest against detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was
unlawful and illegal since it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of Bayombong, for
the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. ...
search warrant (No. 3-82) issued by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and nowhere in said warrant was authority
given to make arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant which II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON HABEAS CORPUS
authorized respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of
assorted calibers, medicine and other subversive paraphernalia" in the 3. The persons named in the above-mentioned Presidential Commitment
house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant Order were arrested and are being detained for offenses with respect to
and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does not state specifically which under Proclamation No. 2045, the privilege of the writ of habeas
the things that are to be seized corpus continues to be suspended, thus:
that no criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the
detainees; that the fourteen (14) detainees were initially held at the
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister of
PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya.
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or
do hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a state of
about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet
Martial Law in the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104
been given a copy of such PCO nor notified of its contents, raising a doubt
(Declaring the Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the
whether such commitment order has in fact been issued.
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines;
It is further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees their
Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
constitutional right to counsel, averring that the detainees were allowed
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall
regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention from
continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two
July 6 to August 10, 1982
autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents
That when the detainees were transferred on August 10, 1982 to a
therein, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
place known only to respondents, the detainees' counsels and relatives
shag continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of
were not notified, raising the apprehension that petitioners' constitutional
the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present detained as
rights to silence, to counsel and against self- incrimination are being
well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
violated; that counsels have tried to locate if the detainees were taken to
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposals to commit
Camp Crame or Camp Bago Bantay but to no avail;
such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
that there seems to be a deliberate and concerted effort by respondents to
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
conceal from counsel and relatives the detainees' place of detention,
therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
raising the apprehension that respondents are using force, violence, threat,
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them.
Courts cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and
detention.
4. The power of the President in an emergency, such as that which
necessitated the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, to order the detention of persons believed engaged in crimes
related to national security is recognized. (Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 83;
Luneta, et al. vs. Special Military Commission, No. 1, et al., 102 SCRA 56).
5. In the instant petition, petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla does not appear
to have been authorized by the thirteen (13) other detainees to represent
them in the case at bar."
----------------------------------------------
FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were
then having a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior
thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then
identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in
subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only
the PCs know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for
writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid

HELD:
ISSUE: The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a
The fundamental issue here, as in all petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus, is judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a
whether or not petitioners' detention is legal. period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the
HELD: President the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the
We find that petitioners have not been illegally deprived of their privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has
constitutional right to liberty, neither in the manner of their arrest, nor by been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As
their continued detention, and that the circumstances attendant in the provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and
herein case do not warrant their release on a writ of habeas corpus. preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period
1- At the time of the arrest,Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by
were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the the President or the by the Review Committee created for the purpose.
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities
and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva
5.b G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985
Viscaya, as their headquarters .
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that
HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO
they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in
PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA,
law and in fact.
ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN,
2. Thus characterized, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the
BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM
President through the issuance of Presidential Commitment Order PCO is
VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA PADILLA, petitioner,
merely preventive. "When it comes to a decision by the head of the State
vs.
upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL
to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants
V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents
the substitution of executive process for judicial process.
3. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the
FACTS:
detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No.
Garcia Padilla v. Minister Enrile, 1 is an application for the issuance of the
2045 which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of fourteen detainees, nine of whom were
habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant,
arrested on July 6, 1982, 2 another four on July 7, 1982, 3 and the last one
its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially
on July 15, 1982. 4The writ was issued, respondents were required to make
inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the
a return, and the case heard on August 26, 1982.
privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege
The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom
provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long
Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest
as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need
on July 15, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential
therefor in the interest of public safety continues.
Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No.
1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No.
Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President
against herein petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No. 885.
and their right to be released even after the filing of charges against them in All fourteen were under surveillance as they were then Identified as
court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in
his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.
 subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dr. Aurora Parong in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their headquarters.
Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered
towards different directions leaving on top of their conference table
numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationeries, and other papers, including a plan on how
they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK).
Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets,
nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand
six hundred fifty pesos P l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds,
assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity of
printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.
In the comment of respondents on the motion for reconsideration, it was
the submission of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial,
question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the
motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus
ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the
light of the foregoing manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla,
Francis Divina gracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari,
Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz,
Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to
them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a
warrant of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on
August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is
likewise declared moot and academic. No costs.
6. G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TOPIC: Rights of the Accused Art.III, Sec 14
Presumption of Innocence: Presumption of Guilt
FACTS:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor
of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position
of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner,
Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar
who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer,
a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
A Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order was filed by Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo
Salapantan Jr., in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly
situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa 51,
52, and 53 for being Dumlao specifically questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution.
Said Section 4 provides that "In addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
XII- C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws,
which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the
term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
Dumlao alleged that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against
him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of Section 7 of BP
51, which provides that Terms of Office "Unless sooner removed for cause,
all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term
of 6 years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980";
Section 4 of BP 52, which provides that "any person who has committed
any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to
be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided, that a
judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact";
Section 1 and Section 6 of BP 52.
In addition to the said provisions, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also questioned
the accreditation of some political parties by the COMELEC, as
authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1),
Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide
candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination."
ISSUE:
Whether Section 4, BP 52, which disqualifies elective candidates who have been
charged in civil and/or military tribunals, is valid.
HELD
Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity
of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement (People vs. Vera, supra).
Igot and and Salapatan institutute a case as a taxpayer suit/
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7,
BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the
disbursement of public funds.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal
 protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings
are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already
declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification
based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with
guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on
the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal.
It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted
of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed
for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which
carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office
during the term of the sentence.
Although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence,
and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger"
that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary
proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be
aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as
the COMELEC.
A highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the
extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected
with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated.
The first paragrap of Section 4, BP 52, on the other hand, is valid.
However, that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang
52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of
Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing
laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city
or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
7. G.R. No. L-2809 March 22, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.
TOPIC: Rights of the Accused Art.III, Sec 14 Presumption of Innocence: Right to
be heard personally or by counsel Importance of Counsel
FACTS:
Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a
private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty."
On 8 May 1948, the day set for the trial, Holgado pleaded guilty without
the benefit of a lawyer.
Two days later, or on 10 May 1948, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding Holgado guilty of Slight Illegal Detention and sentencing him the
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in
the medium degree, as minimum, or 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor
to 20 years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs.
It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the
judgment above quoted, the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL
DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused
"stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention."
Holgado appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the duties required of the trial court when the accused has no
counsel were complied with.
HELD:
 Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the
accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least,
for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused
guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as
ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without
absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of
the case.
Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules of Court, when a defendant
appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If he desires
and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio
to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his
own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court.
The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his
right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one.
The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ
an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to assign an
attorney de oficio.
The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an
attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a
question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney
before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it
could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court
that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing
in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that
"no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.
No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the
presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether
the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness
of the confession.
Hence, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded
to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the
accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.
8. G.R. Nos. 151284-85 February 5, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs. JONATHAN BESONIA, appellant.
TOPIC: Rights of the Accused Art.III, Sec 14 Presumption of Innocence:
Improvident Plea of guilt
FACTS:
Besonia was charged with murder in two separate information and upon
arraignment entered not guilty in each case.
Pre trial some facts were admitted.
Before start of the trial Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez,
manifested that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide after a medical operation on his gall bladder.5Thereafter, the trial
court ordered the prosecution to begin presenting its evidence.
Prosecution witness, Dr Doromal (Medico legal officer who conducted an
autopsy) and SPO1 Clarete the duly authorized representative of the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Division who found out that the weapon used was
not licensed.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented PO3 Efren Feliprada and PO3 Hilarion
Roga, Jr., as additional witnesses to testify on the aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in perpetrating the crimes
charged.
PO3 Falipara together with PO2 Jison and PO2 Dignadice. They gathered
information from by stander who later identified Besonia, who then try to
run but chased by the police and recovered . PO2 Dignadice recovered from
Besonias waist a .38 caliber revolver with marking .38JB. which was
loaded with three live ammunition and two empty shells.
PO3 Roga a forensic examiner. Testified that the firearms presented before
the trial court was the same recovered from Besonia.
RTC found guilty of 2 counts of murder, aggravating cicumstamces of
evident premeditation and using of unlicensed firearm and sentence with
supreme penalty of Death.
In the Appellants Brief, Besonia, through his new counsel de parte Atty.
Jose B. Tiangco, prays for the reversal of the judgment of conviction and
his acquittal based on this sole assignment of error:
ISSUE:
Trial Court erred by violating the constitutional right of the accused not to
be compelled to testify against himself and having so compelled him,
rendered judgment sentencing him to death.
Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly on his
confession, which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that
Besonias voluntary confession in open court is valid in all respects.
HELD:
Besides, under Section 2 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, a plea to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the crime charged must be with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor
We do not find anything irregular in the re-arraignment on 5 June 2001. It
complied with Section 1 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Before Besonia pleaded guilty to both charges, the
two informations for murder were first read and translated to Ilonggo
dialect, which was the language known to him.
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.
We have already outlined, as early as in the case of People v.
Camay,19 how compliance with the said rule could be attained by the trial
court, thus:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension [by the accused] of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability;
and
3. The court must ask the accused whether he desires to present
evidence in his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires.
A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension by the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the
plea of guilty can truly be said to be based on a free and informed
judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge
may conduct a searching inquiry, we declared in People v.
Aranzado, 20 citing a plethora of cases, that it would be well for the
court to do the following:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the
custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility
that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature
of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a
lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned
the charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which
he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of
significance.
Cearly, the trial court has substantially followed the aforementioned
parameters for the conduct of a searching inquiry.
The right against self-incrimination23 is intended to prevent the State, with
all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that
may convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to
perjure himself for his own protection.
There is nothing in the records that would indicate that Besonia was
forced, intimidated, or compelled by the trial court or by anybody
into admitting the crimes. At any rate, his plea of guilty and confession
or admissions during the searching inquiry cannot be the sole basis for his
conviction.
It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or
secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accuseds guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
In these cases, the trial court did not comply with the second requisite
mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which is to order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability. It only required the
prosecution to present evidence "to prove the guilt or degree of culpability
of the accused for the use of [an] unlicensed firearm.
Thus, the evidence presented by the prosecution were merely the
testimonies of the police officers on the aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime, apart
from those of the doctors on the injuries sustained by the victims.
Doubtless, they are insufficient to establish the guilt of Besonia.
Mildred who was the eyewitness (the aunt of Besonia), did not testify
anymore because the of the plea of guilt of Besonia.
Worth noting also is that, apart from the Besonias admissions during the
searching inquiry, the only evidence mentioned by the trial court in the
decision subject of this automatic review were the testimonies regarding
the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonias
plea of guilty and his admissions made during the searching inquiry.
Additionally, we observe that Besonias defense counsel Atty. Perez merely
performed a lackadaisical and perfunctory representation of the appellant
before and during the trial. First, he failed to question before the
arraignment the legality of Besonias arrest, which failure is deemed as a
waiver of the right to raise that question once an accused enters a plea.
Second, he failed to object to the admissibility of the firearm seized after
Besonias arrest. Third, there is no showing that he advised Besonia of the
consequences of his plea of guilty to the crimes of murder. Fourth, he
 remained silent throughout the searching inquiry. Fifth, he did not cross-
examine the police officers,31 and his cross-examination of the two doctors
was limited to only two questions each.32 Lastly, he did not present any
evidence on behalf of Besonia.
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is
not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means
an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation
No matter how outrageous the crimes charged might be or how depraved
the offender would appear to be, the uncompromising demand of due
process and of the rule of law must still prevail.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
23, in Criminal Cases Nos. 00-52307-08, finding appellant Jonathan
Besonia guilty of two counts of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death in each case is hereby SET ASIDE, and Criminal Cases
Nos. 00-52307 and 00-52308 are hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial
court for further reception of evidence and rendition of a new
judgement.
9. G.R. Nos. 115236-37 January 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y
GARCIA, accused-appellants.
Facts:
Gina Marie Mobley, together with her companion Helen Kathleen Tennican,
both American nationals, were exchange students at the Chengdu
University of Science and Technology in Chengdu, Sichuan, China.
Gina was taking up Biology.
Helen was also a Biology major and took Chinese Studies as an additional
course. Both were enrolled at the Pacific Lutheran University at Tacoma,
Washington, where Gina was a university scholar. Having heard of the
renowned Filipino hospitality from their Filipino-American friends, Gina and
Helen decided to spend their semestral break in the Philippines.
They arrived in the country on 10 January 1994. In the afternoon of 12
January 1994, they were driven from their hotel to the Philippine Rabbit
Bus terminal in Dau, Pampanga, where they were supposed to take a ride
to Baguio City.
While waiting for their bus, they went to a Shakeys Pizza Parlor near the
terminal.
Gina and Helen took the table near the comfort room, while Bryan Dy y La
Madrid and Giovan Bernardino y Garcia, who are brothers-in-law, and their
driver Rizal, were seated at the next table. With them was their driver,
Rizal. Bryan and Giovan offered the girls a ride to Baguio City, which
eventually, was accepted by Helen and Gina, thinking that they could save
some money besides the thought that the boys looked nice and
trustworthy.
They left Shakeys at 7:30 p.m. and boarded a white 1991 four-door
Mitsubishi sedan. Rizal took the wheel, while Bryan sat at the front
passenger seat. Helen, Gina and Giovan stayed on the back seat, in that
order. Before proceeding to Baguio, they stopped at a residential area
where Bryan delivered some papers and picked up some jackets.
The group arrived in Baguio City at 10:45 p.m., proceeding first to the
house of Bryans uncle, but shortly afterwards, looked for another place to
stay.
They went to the Terraces Hotel, the Baden Powell, and the Benguet Pines
Tourist Inn to check the rates and the rooms. They checked in at the
Benguet Pines Tourist Inn at 11:00 p.m. They got two rooms on opposite
sides of the corridor on the second floor. After a while, Bryan and Giovan
asked the girls out for some drinks and dancing at the Songs Jazz Bar
along Session Road. While at the Songs Jazz Bar, Helen drank a margarita,
tequila and blowjob with plenty of water. Gina drank Singaporean sling,
blowjob and half a glass of Giovans mai tai.
Bryan drank just one shot of tequila while Giovan drank half a glass of mai
tai. After the group left Songs Jazz Bar, Giovan drove to a convenience
store on the pretext that he was thirsty and wanted to buy cola drinks.
Giovan and Bryan alighted and returned after some 10 minutes with
Giovan carrying 3 plastic cups of Sprite or Seven-Up and Bryan, two cups
and a plastic bag containing Chinese food with small lemons to be
squeezed on it. Bryan gave Helen and Gina a cup each. Helen and Gina
drank from the cups.
Meanwhile, as they were drinking their cola drinks, Giovan drove the group
to Club John Hay where he told the guards at the gate that they were just
going to check on the Clubs billeting rates. They parked in front of the
billeting office.
Gina was then about to finish her cola drink when she felt something gritty
in it which stuck into her teeth; they were like small particles. She spat
them back into the cup and dumped out the remaining contents of the cup
outside the car and thereafter gave the cup to Giovan who threw it into a
trash can. Gina commented out loud about the gritty substance in her drink
and related that in China they often found strange things in their food.
There was no word from the boys. Helen finished her drink and then
handed the empty cup to Giovan who likewise threw it into a trash can.
After leaving Club John Hay, the group returned to their hotel. Gina and
Helen appeared to have been drugged, as they were disoriented by the
events thereafter. Helen felt that someone was violating her personal space
before she became unconscious. Gina remembered that Giovan forcefully
kissed her and inserted two fingers in her vagina before someone else
entered her room; finding Bryan attempting to have carnal knowledge with
her, she did oral sex on Bryan to prevent him from penetrating her before
she passed out.
Gina woke up at 3:00 p.m. feeling groggy and confused. She opened her
purse to get money to pay for the room, but found that her US$290.00,
 P2,000.00, 300 yuan and US$200.00 travellers check were all missing.
Only her US $100.00 travellers check was left. She tried to wake Helen up
but the latter only rolled over. Gina ran downstairs and met Hilda, a hotel
desk girl, who asked her if she was alright. Gina cried and told her that she
had been robbed. Hilda said she will call the police. Gina returned to their
room to wake up
Helen but the latter still did not wake up. After sometime, Gina again went
downstairs and was introduced to 5 or 6 members of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS). She told them that she was robbed and
sexually molested and narrated to them what had happened. Bryan and
Giovan were charged with Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal
Cases 12600-R, and 12601-R. The two cases were tried jointly. Bryan and
Giovan refused to be arraigned and enter a plea; hence, a plea of not
guilty was entered on their behalf.
During the trial, and based on the set of facts provided by the private
prosecutor, the entries in Ginas journal and the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the preliminary examination conducted by the trial
court in the afternoon of January 26 and 27, 1994, Dr. Hernandez opined
that Gina and Helen were drugged, possibly with lorazepam or ativan,
which is a benzodiazepine. On 16 March 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring Bryan and Giovan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness as charged.
In Criminal Case 12600 (rape), the court sentenced Bryan to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum (appreciating the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender); and Giovan to an indeterminate
penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20
years and 1 DAY of reclusion perpetua, as maximum (appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender).
Both were ordered to pay Gina Marie Mobley in the amounts of:
P50,000.00 for her being raped, P12,195.00 (the equivalent of US$450.00
dollars at the exchange rate of P27.10 to US$1.00) as actual damages, and
P500,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs.
In Criminal Case 12601-R (acts of lasciviousness), the Court sentenced
Bryan to suffer a straight penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor; and
Giovan to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Both were ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally Gina Marie Mobley in
the amount of P100,000.00 for and as moral damages, plus costs; and
furthermore, pay, jointly and severally, the offended party attorneys fees
in the amount of P100,000.00 in the two cases.
Bryan and Giovan filed separate appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the alleged lack of arraignment nullifies the
proceedings against Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino.
HELD:
Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right
to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf.
However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused
themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them.
The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading
of the complaint or information. The reason proffered by Bryan and Giovan
for their refusal to be arraigned, i.e., that to do so would supposedly
constitute a waiver of their right to appeal the resolutions of the prosecutor
to the Secretary of Justice, appears to be specious. Evidently, Bryan and
Giovan only wanted the trial court to suspend the arraignment to enable
them to exhaust their remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
However, Bryan and Giovan had no valid ground to move that their
arraignment be held in abeyance, considering that at that time they had
not filed a petition for review of the prosecutors resolution before the
Department of Justice.
It is also important to stress that to nullify the proceedings had before the
court a quo would set a dangerous precedent. For, all that an accused
would do is to refuse to be arraigned and then proceed to trial, and if found
guilty would just invoke the absence of arraignment to set aside the
proceedings had in the trial court.
Such practice would run counter to the purpose and spirit of our rules of
procedure which is: to help achieve an orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Nonetheless, Bryan and Giovan were substantially informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them when their counsel
received a copy of the Prosecutors resolution maintaining the charge for
rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The failure to read the complaint or information in a language or dialect
known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was eventually
non-prejudicial to Bryan and Giovan.
Not only did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise
participated in the trial, cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses
and presented their own witnesses to debunk and deny the charges against
them. The conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the
trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of
the accusations against them. Interestingly, after the arraignment, the
defense never brought up the supposed invalidity or defect thereof. Rather,
Bryan and Giovan and their counsel vigorously and fully participated in the
trial of the case. Bryan and Giovan are clearly estopped to question the
alleged invalidity of or infirmity in their arraignment.
By actively participating in the trial of the case, they have effectively
waived whatever procedural error there was in their arraignment. In short,
whatever was the defect in their arraignment was substantially cured by
their own omission and subsequent actions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case No. 12600-R, finding
accused-appellant BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN
BERNARDINO y GARCIA guilty of Rape, and sentencing accused-
appellant Bryan Dy to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight
years of prision mayor, as minimum, up to fourteen years and eight
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED. The said
decision, insofar as accused-appellant Giovan Bernardinos penalty is
concerned, is MODIFIED in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 12601-R, finding
accused-appellants guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness and sentencing
accused-appellant Dy to suffer the straight penalty of two months
of arresto mayor, and accused-appellant Bernardino to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellants Dy and Bernardino are further ORDERED, jointly and
severally, to pay complainant, Gina Marie Mobley, the amounts of
 P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of the suit. The award
of P12,195.00 or US$450.00 as actual damages is DELETED.
10 G.R. No. 153008 May 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. LARRY CACHAPERO y BASILIO, appellant.
TOPIC: Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation: Sufficiency of the
Information
Time is not an essential element of rape. An information that states
the approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is sufficient in
form. Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised before
arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a motion to quash; otherwise,
objection to such defect shall be considered waived.
FACTS:
Anna Toledo went to play with Lorena and Dino Cachapero at a nearby
house.
During the occasion, Larry Cachapero(brother of Lorena) made her lie
down and removed her short and panty. He inserted his penis into her
sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry told her not to tell her parents
because he might be scolded.
Witness Conchita Donato(Teacher) told by classmate of the Anna that she
was sexually abused by Manong Larry and Conchita confronted Anna and
got asked if she was raped. Anna covered her face with her two hands,
cried, and said yes. The teachers had a conference, after which they
decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna.
Anna Mother brought to hospital to examined, Dr. Gapultos testified that
she found old hymenal lacerations and that it may be caused by many
factors like penetration of the hymen by a hard object, or by an
object forcibly entered.
Appellant denied the accusation, He alleged the case was filed against
[him] because of the long standing feud between his mother and the
mother of the private complainant."8 (Citations omitted)
Lower Court( Tarlac) succeed intercourse with Anna Laurence Toledo, a
7 year old minor. (having a sexual intercourse)
Upon arraignment appellant assisted by his counsel de officio.
RTC- accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape, and herby sentence reclusion Perpetua and accessory penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether there is failure of the prosecution to state the precise date of
commission of the alleged rape [,] it being an essential element of the
crime charged."
HELD:
We disagree. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of
rape.12 This being so, its precise date and hour need not be alleged in
the complaint or information.
Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission."(Italics supplied)
The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed
"sometime in March 1998" which, according to private complainant,
was more or less at the closing of the school year. Being reasonably
definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court merely requires that the information must state, among others,
the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal.16 If the present
appellant found the Information insufficient, he should have moved
before arraignment either for a bill of particulars,17 for him to be
properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the
quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with
the prescribed form.18 Having failed to pursue either remedy, he
is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the
Information.
By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence
for the defense, appellants counsel actively took part in the trial.
Furthermore, the defense never objected to the presentation of the
prosecution evidence20proving that the offense had been committed in
March 1998. Appellant has not shown that he was deprived of a proper
defense, for he was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be said,
therefore, that his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him has been violated.
At age nine, she narrated to the court the violation of her person in
this manner:
To be sure, the victims testimony was not flawless or perfect
in all aspects. We must remember, however, that it was the narration
of a minor who barely understood sex and sexuality.24 Hence, in
assessing her testimony, it would not be fair to apply the standards
used for adults.
In this case, the prosecution duly established that appellant had sexual
intercourse with private complainant; and that the latter, as shown by
her birth certificate,36 was under twelve years old at the time.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, AFFIRMED. The award
of exemplary damages is DELETED. Costs against appellant.