EN BANC
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE,
FORMER Clerk of Court BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON ON
THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE
OF LAW
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x of law by appearing as private counsel in several
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This administrative matter started as a letter-query
dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty.
Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which
query the latter referred to the Court for consideration. In the
course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered that the
query was beyond pure policy interpretation and referred to the
actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a matter that
required concrete action on the factual situation presented.
The query, as originally framed, related to Section
7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). This provision places a limitation on public
officials and employees during their incumbency, and those
already separated from government employment for a period of
one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of
their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; or
xxx
of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from
public
A.M. office,
No. 08-6-352-RTC
except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but
the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection
August 19,with
2009any matter before the office he used to be with,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these
questions: Why may an incumbent engage in private practice
under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself
cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec.
7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very
public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like
myself who is no longer in a position of possible
abuse/exploitation cannot?[1]
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked
as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of
Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1,
2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition
mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the
private practice
cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713
gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee,
who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long
as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has
retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service
like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any
matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of
one (1) year from the date of her separation from government
employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the
above prohibition is to remove the exercise of clout, influence or
privity to insider information, which the incumbent public
employee may use in the private practice of his profession.
However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had
already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon.
She advanced the view that she could engage in the private
practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her
appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict
with her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court
Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following observations
when the matter was referred to him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is to
uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a public
trust. Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of
public officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to
public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity.
Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism
that [t]hey [public officials and employees] shall endeavor to
discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was
intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the
retired government employee and his former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral
ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.[2]
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15,
2008, we resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[3] The OCAT took the view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets
Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of
court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that
provision of law.[4]
and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term
such practice after the phrase provided that. It may indeed be
misinterpreted as modifying the phrase engage in the private
practice of their profession should be prefatory sentence that
public officials during their incumbency shall not be disregarded.
However, read in its entirety, such practice may only refer to
practice authorized by the Constitution or law or the exception to
the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term law
was intended by the legislature to include a memorandum or a
circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the
authority of law.
xxx
The interpretation that Section 7 (b)
(2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees
from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a
prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy
on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the
Constitution
xxx
The policy thus requires public officials and employees
to devote full time public service so that in case of conflict
between personal and public interest, the latter should take
precedence over the former.[5][Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT
pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel the rule that deals with outside employment by an
incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside
employment to one that does not require the practice of
law.[6] The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter
where they have intervened while in the government service is
reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the
government service.[7]
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations,
we issued an En Banc Resolution dated November 11,
2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the
Court a circular on the practice of profession during employment
and within one year from resignation, retirement from or
cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty.
Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of
court and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit
to the Court a report on his verification.[8]
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive
Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon reported
the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal
Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February
19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as
counsel for the plaintiffs;
(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal
versus Zosimo Malasa, et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel
for the plaintiff;
(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor
versus Jose J. Mayor, on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the
plaintiff; and
(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National
Bank versus Sps. Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on April 11,
2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the defendants.
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of
our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a
Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009)
acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008 Resolution. She
likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81
records. As well, she informed the Court that she had previously
taken the following judicial remedies in regard to the above
query:
1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with
Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had been dismissed without
prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) a recourse taken when
undersigned was still a private practitioner;
2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with
Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, which had been also dismissed
(with or without prejudice) on December 4, 2008 (Annex B) a
recourse taken when undersigned was already a public
prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took
her oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]
She also made known her intent to elevate the
dismissal of the above cases so that eventually, the Honorable
Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the
above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2)
and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition
(valid or invalid) on the private practice of undersigneds law
profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not
containing a similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigneds
practice of profession, before the same court, as a public
prosecutor within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter
confronts us, not merely with the task of determining how the
Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the
substance and form (as the Court does not give interpretative
opinions[9] but can issue circulars and regulations relating to
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts[10] and in the
exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel thereof[11]), but also with the task of responding to
admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to
multiple recourses on the same subject.
After our directive to the Office of the Court
Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of the query for
the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this
aspect of the present administrative matter a finished task,
subject only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the
completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffes admitted appearance, before the very
same branch she served and immediately after her resignation, is
a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot
run away from under the cover of the letter-query she filed and
her petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested
she would pursue up to our level. We note that at the time she
filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already
appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms
of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way
and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse
any resulting violation she committed. In other words, she took
the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should suffer the
consequences of the risk she took.
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief
petitions she filed, both of which were dismissed, and her intent
to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed
before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008
because the court declined to exercise the power to declare rights
as prayed for in the petition, as any decision that may be
rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the
uncertainty or controversy.[12] The second, filed with the RTC,
Branch 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate
remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila,
on December 4, 2008.[13] Under these circumstances, we see
nothing to deter us from ruling on Atty. Buffes actions, as no
actual court case other than the present administrative case, is
now actually pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we
see from Atty. Buffes recourse to this Court and the filing of the
two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable
answer to her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in
our action on the case.
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the
merits of Atty. Buffes actions relates to possible objections on
procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal
directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be penalized
for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation
from that Branch. The essence of due process is the grant of the
opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of the
opportunity to be heard.[14] The records of this case show that
Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions.She
was notified, and she even responded to our November 11,
2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to
report on Atty. Buffes appearances before Branch 81; she
expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the
Branch records. Her legal positions on these appearances have
also been expressed before this Court; first, in her original letter-
query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due
process consideration needs to deter us from considering the
legal consequences of her appearances in her previous Branch
within a year from her resignation.
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the
prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the
private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an
exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice
of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law;
and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with
his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a
period of one year after the public official or employees
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except
for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2),
which can already be undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-
year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before
the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the
principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove
any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in
government transactions between a former government official
or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the
efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to
serve the public.[15]
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section
7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend
with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive
rule on the outside employment that an incumbent court official
or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of
office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or
entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business
with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed
outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnels duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the
practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may
render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law
schools, review or continuing education centers or similar
institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or
induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information
acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the
legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably
appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects
adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel
shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713
and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the
practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3
specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the
practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[16] we defined the practice
of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.[17] Under both provisions, a common
objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the
employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential
information acquired from his employment, or use his or her
familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it
applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection
(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed
above. Atty. Buffes situation falls under Section 7.
Atty. Buffes Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is
Atty. Buffes admission that she immediately engaged in private
practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that
she is aware of this provision and only objects to its application to
her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot
practice before her old office Branch 81 for a year immediately
after resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in
matters where a conflict of interest exists between her
appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of
Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential
treatment to incumbent public officials and employees as against
those already separated from government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT
aptly stated, she interprets Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket authority
for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what
we have explained above, that the general rule under Section 7
(b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from the practice of
their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of
court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can
practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows
them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current
duties and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned
above, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice
their profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by
Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
from doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions,
therefore, Atty. Buffes basic premise is misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already
engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation
from the service and without any period limitation that applies to
other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of
courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within
one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a
comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or
employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or
employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because
the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to
work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent
cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the
Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of
interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffes basic
premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffes approach to Section
7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its
violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We
find it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any
inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring to the practice
of other government lawyers known to her who, after separation
from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the
private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before
the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again
we find this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffes part and, to our
mind, only emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands
as unlawful, Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory
word shall, this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty.
Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering
the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)s
unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
however, does not necessarily require the element of criminality,
although the Rule is broad enough to include it.[18] Likewise, the
presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to
bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01,
when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful
conduct.[19] Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to
her lawyers oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully
practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before
the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis
supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby
followed the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to
replicate the former court officials who immediately waded into
practice in the very same court they came from. She, like they,
disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying
and disrespecting the law.[20] By her irresponsible conduct, she
also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers.[21] Her
offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to
cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query,
which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for
declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7
(b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would
find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose
implications do not promote public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.[22]
Considering Atty. Buffes ready admission of violating
Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application,
making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[23] In several cases, the Court has disciplined
lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,[24] the Court disbarred a
lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering
his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct;
the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the
Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and
welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed
their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper
judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their
cases.[25] The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of respondents' administrative
liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under
the principle of res ipsa loquitur.[26]
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards
v. Asoy,[27] that no evidentiary hearing is required before the
respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct
already established by the facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more
in In re: Wenceslao Laureta[28] where we punished a lawyer for
grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a
show-cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type
hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the
opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined.[29]
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,[30] the respondent was
disciplined and punished for contempt for his slurs regarding the
Courts alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on
the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The
Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the
negative imputations against the Court through the media and
even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements.
Through a per curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him
the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but
also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the
exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious
conduct warranting application of the contempt power.[31]
These cases clearly show that the absence of any
formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has
been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier,
Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed
before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred
or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[32] The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.[33]
In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors
we can apply, save OCATs observation that Atty Buffes letter-
query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of
the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however,
is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of
the legal profession soon after ones separation from the service. If
Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring
the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow
this practice to continue.
As we observed earlier,[34] Atty. Buffe had no qualms
about the simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her
misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A.
6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court
Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for
declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the
possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly
differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not strictly
the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has
done is something that we cannot help but consider with disfavor
because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the
Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a point against Atty.
Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have exercised
because of the OCATs observation about her ignorance of and
misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from
the service.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions
merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together with a stern
warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and
committing other acts of professional misconduct.[35] This penalty
reflects as well the Courts sentiments on how seriously the
retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the
Judiciary should regard and observe the prohibition against the
practice of law with the office that they used to work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen
M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of
professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffes record as a
member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIGEST:
Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former
Clerk of Court- Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon-
On The Prohibition From Engaging In the
Private Practice of LawFACTS:
Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the
RTC, Branch 81 of Romblon, sheresigned from her position
effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter, she engaged in the
privatepractice of law by appearing as private counsel in
several cases before RTC Branch 81 of Romblonwithin 1 year
after the effectivity of her resignation.
RA6713, Code of Conduct and EthicalStandards for
Public Officials and Employees, Section
7(b)(2)places a limitation on publicofficials and employees
during their incumbency and those already separated from
government employment for a period of one (1) year after
separation, in engaging in the private practice of their
profession.
provision,the Court pointed out the limitation that only those authorized by the
Constitution orlaw and those that do not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions areallowed.
Issue: Did Atty. Buffe, as a lawyer, violate the rules governing the practice of law by
means of her actions?
Is she guilty of professional misconduct?
Held: Yes, the Court found Atty. Buffe guilty of professional
misconduct and wasfined. She was also sternly warned that
repetition of the violation shall be dealt withmore severely. As ruled by
the Court, by acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713brands as "unlawful," Atty.
Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code ofProfessional
Responsibility.

SECTION 7.Prohibited Acts and In addition, byfailing to live up to her lawyers oath, shealso violated
Transactions. Canon 7 of the same Code.

In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in theConstitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited actsand transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x
x (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.
deceitful conduct
Publicofficials and employees during their incumbency shall not: x
x x (2)
Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions;
or These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of
one (1) yearafter resignation, retirement, or separation from
public office, except inthe case of subparagraph (b) (2)
above, but the professional concernedcannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before theoffice he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
The following are the violated rules, to wit:
CANON 1: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THECONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTERESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSESx x x
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITYAND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT
THEACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.Although there was the absence
of any formal charge against and/or formalinvestigation of an
errant lawyer, it did not preclude the Court from
immediatelyexercising its disciplining authority, as long as the
errant lawyer or judge has beengiven the opportunity to be heard.
In this case, Atty. Buffe has been afforded theopportunity to be
heard on the present matter through her letter-query
andManifestation filed before this Court.

Case 19: Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-BuffeA.M. No. 08-6-352-

RTC August 19, 2009Facts: Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, a former
clerk of court of Branch 81 of Romblon,addressed a letter-query to
the Office of the Court Administrator. It was related toSection
7(b)(2) of Republic Act (
R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and EthicalStandards for Public
Officials and Employees, which prohibits public officials
andemployees from
engaging during their incumbency in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.
Atty. Buffe questioned the provision giving preferential treatment
toincumbent public officials and employees as regards private
practice, while non-incumbents, according to the last paragraph of
Section 7 of RA 6713, cannot practicetheir profession in
connection with any matter before the office they used to be
withfor a period of one year after resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.Such question was due to the fact
that, within one year after her resignation from herposition, she
engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private
counsel inseveral cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.After
review, the Court found that Atty. Buffe misinterpreted the law.
Theconfusion lay
in the use of the term such practice
after the phrase "provided that"and the notion that incumbent
public officials and employees are absolutelypermitted to the
practice of their profession. By a thorough analysis of the
 ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, A.C. No. 7269
Complainant,
Present:
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Promulgated:
Respondent. November 23, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
----------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by
Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was
the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167,
while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda
B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale
over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was
annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another
case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also
appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would
accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes
of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25
November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further
alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate
and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged
that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in 2000
but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a
lawyer with the help
of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former
secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was
not a lawyer and that she
represented Ulaso as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed
that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no
proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found
that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of
the case, were all sent to Busmentes designated office address.
The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse was
that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so
that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy
M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs failure
to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284
to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer
to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that
she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and
notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted
that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in November
2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order
of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in
November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until
2005, which belied Busmentes allegation that Dela Rosa was able
to illegally practice law using his office address without his
knowledge and only due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb.
As regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer
was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to
coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any
report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the
time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension
from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May
2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the
IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period
of Busmentes suspension to six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and
submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the signature in the
Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures
submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one
and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-
168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of
directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of
law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist
in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding
ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6
The Court explained:
 The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to
assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law
be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in
aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa,
who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself
as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The
only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly
assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his
office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with
her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb,
another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-
CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in
2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005.
Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmentes office
until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosas practice should
have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all
the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order8 of
Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No.
9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still
representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order,
Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No.
9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible
for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already resigned,
if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmentesoffice.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report
stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case
No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted
by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The
report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the
questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,
however, showed that there were other documents signed
by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November
2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November
2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August
2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August
2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all
signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in
these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware
of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case
when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its
status. Busmentesallegation contradicted the Joint Counter-
Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza
Cervantes, BinondoManila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel
in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA
VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES
for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in
the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH
DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her
signature in the notices or other court records as our legal counsel
the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good
faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it
was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling some
cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA
ROSA did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in
connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty.
YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied
us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article
171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)
for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not
present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false;
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts
must affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with
ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real
lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would
have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her
qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications
to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our
hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed
that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and
that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that
there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty
of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE,
we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
Atty. Busmentes personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
in the land.
DIGEST
Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente
Petitioners claim: Noe-Lacsamana alleged that she
was the counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case while Busmente was
the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property
subject of the said civil case was annulled, which resulted in the
filing of an ejectment casewhere Busmente appeared as counsel.
Another case for falsification was filledagainst Ulaso where
Busmente also appeared as counsel.
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela
Rosa or Atty.Liza Dela Rosawould accompany Ulaso in court
projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that upon verifcation with this Court and
theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela
Rosa wasnot a lawyer. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) foundthat Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that
sherepresented Ulaso as Busmentes collaborating counsel
whichrecommended Busmentes suspension from the practice
of law for not less than five years. The IBP Board of Governors, in
itsresolution, adopted and approved the recommendation of the
IBP-CBD
Respondents claim: Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa
was a law graduate and washis paralegal assistant for a few years.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended
in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continuemisrepresenting
herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb ),
Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in Civil case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly
or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law
that warrants hissuspension from the practice of law?
RULING:
YES. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
EN BANC
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN
L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance
than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege
bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally
unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among
those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant)
filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice
of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However,
the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has
not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized
practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board
of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with
the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims
that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan)
without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution
allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the
charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought
his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan,
not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
 On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of
Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that
his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When
respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant
questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had
not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the
government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared
before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found
that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before
he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends
that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant
failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation
was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC
that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan.In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE
T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that
he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal
counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that
he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On
19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the
lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting
of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice
of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law
when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing
that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become
an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant
contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel
for a private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11
May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-
Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May
2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that
respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and
similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
DIGEST
Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000
FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was
allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys
pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who
charges respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an
election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath
and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment,
respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and
advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer.
The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate
and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of
the meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively
participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as
counsel for the candidate.
I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
R: The court held that respondent did engaged in
unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities he
participated during that time involves the practice of law
despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The
right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to
those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and
skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the
moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to
be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit
to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he
already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.
AGUIRRE vs. RANA B. M. No. 1036
June 10, 2003 FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was
among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for
a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes
in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,"
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan.
Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel for Emily
Estipona-Hao on 19 May 2001 in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21
May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking
of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine
Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. On
22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the
lawyers oath but was disallowed from signing the Roll
of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied
Admission to the Bar.
RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law
when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence
clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that
he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of
the Philippine Bar. The right to practice law is not a natural
or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced
law without a license. True, respondent here passed the
2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (

AGUIRRE VS RANA
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial
of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath.
Respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has
not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims
that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission
to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed
by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is
to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had
to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
Advertisements
DIGEST:
4)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao
court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan,
Samar charging as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR. Malinao
has been appearing in the municipal court of this town for parties
like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable information also
says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do
so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects
fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but does not
pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for
a good government. These facts can be checked with records of
those municipal courts.
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. Being
employed in the Court of First Instance he would instigate
persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact
he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself
and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a
court employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons
being ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes.
This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he
is using his supposed influences to urge persons to commit
crimes.
3 CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. Information has it
that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI. Even he has
been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would
fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent
days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted and
if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by
submitting application for leave but this should not be allowed as
he has already committed crime.
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL
SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is prohibited for a
civil service employee to engage in private practice any profession
or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr.
Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that
were so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service Law
and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner
of Civil Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should
be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we
believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement
relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary
of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge, Court of First
Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable
Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the
undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That
the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the
first indorsement, which absence has also been noticed and noted
on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk
of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and without
waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but
for respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he
has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause
was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality, said
assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the
Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching
herewith a carbon-original of a pleading submitted by Atty.
Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants in
Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al.
for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar,
which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of
this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over
the matter then, referred the said complaint and answer to
District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan,
Western Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation,
and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report pertinent
parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to
subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a resident
of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio
Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in
the investigation in connection with his complaint against
Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to
investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran
of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared
that according to his docket books the respondent appeared as
counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the
Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in
criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo
Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and
on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that
the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case No. 39 in the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus
Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15, 1962,
January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969,
the respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant in civil
case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and
again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it
appears that the respondent had the following entries in his daily
time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and
September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and
present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but
undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared
before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his daily time
records, he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and
February 18, 1963 he was present in his office although according
to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his
Court on December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963.
Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared
in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it
appear in his daily time record that he was present with an
undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any
plausible explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily
time record as shown by the evidence, he had made it appear that
he was present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18,
1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix
Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in
the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The
Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that he be given stern
warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of
Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended, again the
evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel
in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in
violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find
the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply supported
by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public
records and the declarations of the judges before whom
respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart
from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without
prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules
and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it
appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions
when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel,
without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore,
constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above
findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic)
for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him,
considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his
time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on
the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that
respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances
would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously
for considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense
committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more
drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge
Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the
service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any
court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are
allowed to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby
ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of
First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.
DIGEST:
FACTS:
Apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts
without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil
service rules and regulations, respondent court interpreter also
falsified his time records by making it appear therein that her was
present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the
municipal court appearing as counsel, without being a member of
the bar, which furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. The
investigating judge recommenced the reprimand of respondent.
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from his position as
court interpreter.
Zeta vs. Malinao, 87 SCRA 303 , December 20,
1978
Attorneys; Courts; A lower court employee who
has been appearing as counsel in court cases and falsifying
his time record is dismissed from the service the acts
committed being grave in nature.The defense of
respondent that his participation (sic) for defendants
cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services
of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality cannot, even if true, carry the day for him,
considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he
falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence
from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the
number of times that respondent acted as counsel under
the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing
it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other
than pure love of justice.
Same; Same; Same.In the premises, it is quite
obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave,
hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that of
reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no
alternative than to separate him from the service, with the
admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or
investigative body wherein only members of the bar are
allowed to practice. Wherefore, respondent Felicisimo
Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga,
Western Samar, with prejudice to reemployment in the
judicial branch of the government.
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March
1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical
aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There
is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the
Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member
of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant
opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has
none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in
the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the
Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with
the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients
repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of
the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications.
The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He
must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various
phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral
and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking
the lawyers oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to
practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law
membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of
annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to
judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his
Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant
to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not
only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M.
Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his
oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
DIGEST
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin
Dacanay 540 SCRA 424
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in
March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath
of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines. He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission
to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine
bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with
RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
the payment of professional tax;
the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
the retaking of the lawyers oath.
DIGEST
Petition for Leave to resume practice of Law,
Benjamin M. DacanayFACTS
: Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to Philippine Bar
in March 1960. He practiced law in the country but
migrated to!anada to seek medical attention for his
ailments to which he applied and was appro$ed #or
!anadian citi%enship in order toa$ail the country&s
#ree medical pro ram.'n (006) He re*ac+uired
his Philippine citi%enship throu h ,- 9(( /!iti%enship
 ,etention and ,e*ac+uisition -ct o# (00 and
returned
540 SCRA 424 Civil Law Private International Law
Nationality Theory Practice of Law is Reserved for
Filipinos
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek
medical help. In order for him to take advantage of Canadas
free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in
2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year,
he returned to the Philippines and he now intends to resume
his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume
his practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other
professions in the Philippines are reserved and limited only
to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian
citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed
never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino citizenship in
2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to
have never been terminated.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions
in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege
to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason
of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
RESOLUTION REYES, J.: On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by
Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. On Leave per Special Order No.
1257 dated July 19, 2012. On leave. I Resolution 2 B.M. No. 2112
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he
lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on
September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached
to the petition were several documents in support of his petition,
albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit: 1. Oath of Allegiance
dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco; 2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of
same date; 3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
also of same date; 4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing
payment of membership dues with the IBP; 5. Attendance Forms
from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). In Bar
Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was
confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay
(Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to
the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated
to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and
eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14,
2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to
the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.
Resolution 3 B.M. No. 2112 The Court reiterates that Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss
thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in the
bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to
practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.3 It can not be overstressed that: The practice of law is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State appropriate fees. Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of
and promote the public welfare. Adherence to rigid standards of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, Bench and Bar. SO ORDERED. IENVENIDO L
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer 1 Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural born
citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic: I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. Natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath. 2 Petition for Leave to Resume
Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No. 1678,
December 17, 2007. 3 R.A. No. 9225, Section 5. Resolution 4 B.M.
No. 2112 of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him
for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4 Thus, in
pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the
practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit
the original or certified true copies of the following documents in
relation to his petition: 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Citizenship; 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; 4.
Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP; 6.Certification
from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership
dues; 7.Proof of payment of professional tax; and 8.Certificate of
compliance issued by the MCLE Office. In compliance thereof, the
petitioner submitted the following: 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition
of Philippine Citizenship; 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
citizenship); 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; 4.Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues; 6. Professional Tax
Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010; 4 Supra note 2. Resolution 5 B.M.
No. 2112 7.Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and 8. Certification dated December 5, 2008
of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE. The OBC further required the petitioner to update
his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that
the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law. Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC,
the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's
resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines. WHEREFORE,
the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,
subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on
a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
 On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a American citizen in
1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant
to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C. He intends to
retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of
law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for
the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to
resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in
the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for
the practice of law, the OBC required, and incompliance thereof,
petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship
issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-
Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,
particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were
satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is
hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take
the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to
the payment of appropriate fees.
DIGEST
BM No. 2112,In Re: Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege
to Practice Law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses. SC allows
lawyer who re-acquired Philippine citizenship to practice law. The
Supreme Court En Banc has recently granted the petition of a
lawyer to practice law in the Philippines once again after losing
the said privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
United States of America in 1981 and then re-acquiring his
Philippine citizenship in 2006 pursuant to RA 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.The Court further
directed the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to draft the
necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to
resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and the
Bar. In a six-page resolution penned by Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes, the Court unanimously held that upon favorable
recommendation from the OBC, Atty. Epifanio B. Muneses
satisfactorily complied with all the requirements sought by the
OBC and met all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for membership in the Bar. In particular, he had
submitted in compliance the following:1) Petition for Re-
Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;2) Order (for Re-Acquisition
of Philippine Citizenship);3) Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines;4) Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of
Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu
of the Identification Certicate;5) Certification dated May 19,
2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership
dues;6) Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;7)
Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance
period; and8) Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of
Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the
MCLE.The Court sees no bar to the petitioners resumption to
the practice of law in the Philippines, the Court declared, subject
to the condition that Atty. Muneses re-take the Lawyers Oath
and pay the appropriate fee. The Court reiterated that ilipino
citizenship is a continuing requirement for the practice of law, loss
of which means the termination of ones membership in the Bar
and the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Thus, a ilipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country but later re-
acquires his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar, it added. It also noted that the
right to resume the practice of law, however, is not automatic and
Section 5 of RA 9225 states that a person who intends to practice
his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for the license or permit to engage in such practice.
B.M. No. 1678PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME
PRACTICE OF LAW,BENJAMIN M. DACANAYThis bar matter
concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave
to resume the practice of law.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-10236-48 January 31, 1958
THE PFOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellant.
Luis F. Gabinete for appellee Eustacio de Luna.
Pedro B. Ayuda for appellee Estella R. Gordo.
Alejandro P. Capitulo for appellees Angelo T. Lopez and
Alawadin I. Bandon.
Fransisco de la Fuente for appellee Oreste Arellano y
Rodriguez.
Bienvenido Peralta for appellee Abraham C. Calaguas.
Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y
Estrellas, Jaime P. Marco, Roque J. Briones, Balbino P.
Fajardo and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. in their own behalf.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an
order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting
a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one
of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction and,
also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the
amended informations, filed in said cases, do not
constitute the crime of contempt of court with which
said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco,
Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez,
Generosa H. Hubilla Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez,
Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin T.
Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and
Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., are charged. It is alleged in said
amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day
of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the person accused in each one Of these cases.
. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar
examination and was not in any way authorized to take
his oath as a lawyer and after haing been duly
informed and notified that certain portions of Republic
Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953,
are unconstitutional and therefore void and without
force and effect, and that all the petitions of the
candidates including the accused who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission
to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution
of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on
March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and contemptously disobey and resist in an insolent
and defiant manner the said Resolution of the
Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone
of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting
improper conduct and manifestations that tend
directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice in all courts of the
Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the
authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme
Court and all other inferior courts by then and there,
without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an
oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making
manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the
Supreme Court.
After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of
Court, the pertinent part of which reads:
Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a
superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed
by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court .
. . (Emphasis our.).
and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the
effect that .
It is a well-established rule that the power to judge the
contempt rest exclusively with the court contemned
and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt
against another. Accordingly, disobedience of the
order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt
by a court of another state or by a federal court.
the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act
allegedly committed by appellees herein "was
committed not against" said court "but against the
Supreme Court of the Philippines" and that,
accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has
no jurisdiction to try and punish" the appellees herein.
This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted
provisions of the Rules of court is permissive in nature.
It is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts
to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It
does not declare that jurisdiction of the court
concerned to so punish the guilty party is exclusive.
Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court
could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which
the jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the
right to exercise said authority, for the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section
13, of the Constitution, is limited to the promulgation
of "rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law,"
and does not extend to the determination of the
jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines. In
fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution
explicitly ordains that "Congress shall have the power
to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that
such power is withheld from the Supreme Court.
Needless to say, the aforesaid view, quoted from
Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only "unless
otherwise provided by stattute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and
such statute, providing "otherwise", exists in the
Philippines.
Moreover, the amended informantions specifically
allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts
constituting improper conduct and manifestations that
the tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of
the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack
the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the
Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it
differently the acts charged werecommitted, according
to said amended informations, in contempt of the
Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the
Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Thus, the very authorities cited in the order
appealed from do not justify the same.
Again , section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule
64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of
any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in
section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64,
"may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or
imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to
section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have
original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months, or a fine of more than two thousand
pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may
be imposed in the cases of contempt under
consideration, it follows that the same are within the
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with
that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent
power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt
against the same.
It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such
concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of
court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the
preferencial right of the court against which the act of
contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty
party. However, insofar as appellees herein are
concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the
promulgated a resolution of the following tenor: Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said
The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying
communication of the following tenor: them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause
SUPREME COURT why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the
MANILA pratice of law;
IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this
NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of
ACT NO. 972. first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the
Public Service Commission, and the Department of
Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez. Justice;
Pedro B. Ayuda. E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action
Alawadin I. Bandon. will be taken later in their respective cases. (pp. 36-37,
Roque J. Briones. rec., G.R. No.L-10245.)
Abraham C. Calaguas. It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this
Balbino P. Fajardo. Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent
Claro C. Gofredo. jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt
Estela R. Gordo. committed by appellees herein and that we preferred
Generoso H. Hubilla. that the corresponding action be taken by the City
Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Angelo T. Lopez. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at
Eustacio de Luna. the bar.
Jaime P. Marco. The next question for determination is whetehr the
Santos L. Parina. acts charged in the amended informations constitute
Florencio P. Sugarol, and contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said
Maria Velez y Estrellas. amended informations to the effect that the defendant
Attorneys. in each one of the instant cases.
xxx xxx xxx. . . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
MANIFESTATION contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent snd
COMES NOW the undersigned for and in defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme
representation of the above-named attorneys and to Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the
this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully makes petitioners and perform acts constituting improper
manifestation that they have taken the oath of office conduct and manifestations that tend directly and
as Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City administration of justice. . .
of Manila, with office at R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, the lower court had the following to say:
Manila, in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that
No. 972; any command, order or notification from the judicial
There are attached to this manifestation seventeen court or any non-judicial person, committee or body
(17) copies of the oath of office as Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', clothed by law with power to punish for contempt has
'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'. been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused.
Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Godofredo, and Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of
Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1954
examination in August, 1954. They also had taken their directing the accused not to take their oath as lawyers.
oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20, 1955. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a
This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer
will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines. without having completed the requirements
Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955. prescribed by the Supreme Court for the admission to
the practice by law. It is necessary before his admission
(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA
to the Bar that he passes the required bar
examinations and is admitted by the Supreme Court to
In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his practice as attorney. Our statutes punish as criminal
capacity as president of the 1946-1952 BAR contempt one 'assuming to be an attorney or an officer
EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila. of a court and acting as such without authority.' (par.
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath of
Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not passed the lawyers by herein accused, in the humble opinion of
examinations, it was resolved: this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However,
A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for if this had taken one step further, as for example, after
investigation and appropriate action in connection taking their oaths, they have held out themselves as
with Section 3 (e), Rule 64; lawyers to the public, received cases for litigants,
B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney appeared before any court of justice personally or by
without authority, he is given 10 days from notice filing pleadings therewith, would be considered that
thereof, within which to explain why he should not be they are really engaged in the practice of law. These
dealt with for contempt of the Court; accused have not committed any of these acts as
enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of
Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed
or defied any command, order or notification of this
Court or of the Honorable Supreme Court. What they
have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers
before a notary public who was not authorized by law
to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can only
swear as such before the Supreme Court or any
member thereof.
Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of
the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt has
been committed by the herein accused before this
Court and neither before the highest Tribunal of this
land.
The aforementioned quotation from the amended
informations is, however, incomplete. It did not
include the allegation to the effect that the defendant
in each one of the cases ar bar took his "oath as a
lawyer before a notary public" and filed the
manifestation transcribed in the resolutionabove
quoted,
well knowing that he has not passed the bar
examination and was not in any way authorized to take
his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly
informed and notified that certain portions of Republic
Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953,
are unconstitutional and therefore void and without
force and effect, and that all the petition of the
candidates including the accused who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive for admission
to the bar were refused and denied by the resolution
of the Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, .
..
In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass
the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought
admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953,
they were subsequently notified of the resolution of
this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath
as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and
may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by
those authorized by the latter to engage in such
practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned
petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a
denial of the right to said oath, as well as a prohibition
of or injunction against the taking thereof. When, this
notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a
notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only
of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the
courtr of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed
the order implied, in said resolution, thus violating
section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished as for contempt:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge.
and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of
Court, which is identical.
This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. vs.
Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two
lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan
Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney
and Bosque", stating that they had established an
office for the general practice of law in all courts of the
Islands and that Bosque would devote himself
especially to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were
convicted as charged, although upon different
grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a
former order of this Court denying his admission to the
practice of in the Philippines, on account of alienage,
"was directly binding upon him;" that the
aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation
of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of
law; and that "consequently the conduct of the
defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order
made in a proceeding to which he was a party." As
regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour"
committed by "an officer of the court."
Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in
the amended informations, appellees herein expressed
clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and
defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and
settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue
whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as
well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the
administration of justice and impair the respect due to
the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme
Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts
constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice," in violation of section 3,
subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.
. . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its
majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt
of court. . . . (12 Am. Jur.395.).
The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression
that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court
unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or
"held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of
circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for assuming to be
an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority,"
is, only one of the means by which contempt of court
may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of
the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "'the oath of
office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme
Court that they had done so and would "practice law in
all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had for all
intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such
attorneys-at-law (U.S. vs. Ney and Mosque, supra).
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby
reversed, and let the records of these cases be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.