Sunteți pe pagina 1din 12

Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of the New Theory of Reference

Author(s): Quentin Smith


Source: Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Aug., 1995), pp. 179-189
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117426
Accessed: 03-11-2017 18:55 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
QUENTIN SMITH

MARCUS, KRIPKE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW THEORY OF


REFERENCE

ABSTRACT. In this paper, presented at an APA colloquium in Boston on December 28,


1994, it is argued that Ruth Barcan Marcus' 1961 article on "Modalities and Intensional
Languages" originated many of the key ideas of the New Theory of Reference that have
often been attributed to Saul Kripke and others. For example, Marcus argued that names are
directly referential and are not equivalent to contingent descriptions, that names are rigid
designators, and that identity sentences with co-referring names are necessary if true. She
also first presented the modal argument that names are directly referential, the epistemic
argument that names are directly referential, and the argument that there are a posteriori
necessities.

The New Theory of Reference in the philosophy of language became


widespread in the 1970s and is still flourishing today. The New The
ory implies that many locutions (e.g. proper names) refer directly to
items, which contrasts with the traditional or old theory of reference,
which implies that names and relevantly similar locutions express descrip
tive senses or are disguised descriptions. The New Theory encompasses
such notions as direct reference, rigid designation, identity across possible
worlds, the necessity of identity, a posteriori necessities, singular propo
sitions, essentialism about natural kinds, the argument from the failure of
substitutivity in modal contexts that proper names are not equivalent to
contingent definite descriptions, and related ideas and arguments. Some of
the contributors to the development of this theory include Kripke, Kaplan,
Donnellan, Putnam, Perry, Salmon, Soames, Almog, Wettstein and a num
ber of other contemporary philosophers.
The point of this paper is to correct a fundamental and widespread
misunderstanding about the origins of the New Theory of Reference; the
main misunderstanding is that it is widely believed that Kripke originated
the major ideas of this theory, presented in his 1972 article on "Nam
ing and Necessity" (Kripke, 1972) and his 1971 article on "Identity and
Necessity" (Kripke, 1971). The fact of the matter is that the key ideas in
the New Theory were developed by Ruth Barcan Marcus, in her writings

Synthese 104: 179-189,1995.


? 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
180 QUENTIN SMITH

in \9A6-A1 (1946; 1947) and especially in her 1961 article on "Modali


ties and Intensional Languages" (reprinted with small changes in (Marcus,
1993)). "Modalities and Intensional Languages" was presented in Febru
ary, 1962 at the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science; Marcus 's
commentator was Quine and Kripke participated in the discussion which
followed.

ii

I shall begin by adducing a number of representative instances where this


historical misunderstanding is evinced. The point of the following series
of quotations is to illustrate the nature and extent of the misunderstanding
of the origin of the New Theory of Reference.
If one picks out at random any essay in the philosophy of language or
essentialism in the past twenty-five years or so, then one will most likely
find the New Theory of Reference attributed to Kripke (and some others,
e.g. Kaplan and Donnellan) and that Marcus' name will only occasionally
be mentioned. A recent example is Recanati's article in PHILOSOPH
ICAL STUDIES: "My starting point will be the ... notion of rigidity,
introduced by Saul Kripke in the philosophical literature" (Recanati, 1988:
103). Paging through recent issues of NOUS, one finds David Braun list
ing the proponents of the new "direct reference" theory of names: "Kripke
(and) Donnellan's view strongly suggest direct reference. Almog, Kaplan,
Salmon, Soames and Wettstein explicitly advocate versions of Direct Ref
erence for proper names" (Braun, 1994: 465, n. 1). It is notable that the
orginator of the new "direct reference" theory, Marcus, is not even men
tioned.
Many misattributions of Marcus' ideas to Kripke and others can be
found in the writings of contemporary philosophers, but what is even
more surprising is that the leading developers of the New Theory do the
same. Apart from Marcus, no one has done more to develop the New
Theory of Reference than David Kaplan. David Kaplan, in some of his
published works, attributes the New Theory of proper names to Kripke.
He correctly notes that "the term 'rigid designator' was coined by Kripke
to characterize those expressions which designate the same thing in every
possible world in which that thing exists and which designate nothing
elsewhere." But Kaplan proceeds to identify falsely the thesis or claim
that proper names are rigid designators as Kripke's specific claim (rather
than Marcus'); Kaplan writes: "He (Kripke) uses it in connection with his
controversial, though, I believe, correct claim that proper names, as well
as many common nouns, are rigid designators" (Kaplan, 1989: 492; my

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
MARCUS, KRIPKE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE 181

italics). Of course, Marcus did not make a claim for the rigidity of common
nouns, and this idea is correctly credited to Kripke, but the same does not
hold for the rigidity of proper names, as we shall shortly see.
Even in cases where we find philosophers listing a series of contributors
to the New Theory of Reference, Marcus is typically not mentioned. John
Perry, who, along with Kaplan, is the leading exponent of the New Theory
of indexicals, writes that "Lessons learned from the works of Donnellan,
Kaplan, Kripke, Putnam, Wettstein and other New Theorists of Reference
have convinced me to accept two theses. ... First, the references of the
singular terms do not depend on Fregean senses, or identifying descriptions
in the mind of the speaker. ... Second, each of these utterances expresses
what David Kaplan has called a 'singular proposition'" (Perry, 1988:
108).
The relevant lessons, however, were first taught by Marcus and repeated
with elaboration by the named individuals. In Nathan Salmon's book on
REFERENCE AND ESSENCE, he writes that versions of the New Theory
of Reference were "developed, to a considerable extent independently, by
several contemporary philosophers of semantics, most notably Keith Don
nellan, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke, and Hilary Putnam" (Salmon, 1981: 3).
Another leading contributor to the New Theory, Howard Wettstein, writes
such things as "New theorists like Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Saul
Kripke, John Perry, and Hilary Putnam - and my own work falls into this
tradition - proffer an account (of direct reference that is anti-Fregean)"
(Wettstein, 1986: 185-186). Quotations such as these can picked out at
will from the current literature. I was once myself among the guilty, call
ing Marcus' theory of proper names "the Kripke-Donnellan theory of
proper names" (Smith, 1987: 387)
Occasionally her work is alluded to in the literature on the New Theory1
but her central role is overlooked. It seems to me that, from the point of
view of the history of philosophy, correcting this misunderstanding is
no less important than correcting the misunderstanding in a hypothetical
situation where virtually all philosophers attributed the origin of the Theory
of Forms to Plotinus. This correction is the aim of the following several
sections. In these sections, I will outline some of the basic ideas in Marcus'
work that also occur in Kripke's "Naming and Necessity" and "Identity
and Necessity". As I shall explain later, I believe the two main causes of the
subsequent failure of philosophers to mention her work is that attributions
to Marcus did not appear in the relevant places in "Naming and Necessity"
and "Identity and Necessity" and that many philosophers may have been
insufficiently familiar with Marcus' earlier contributions.

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
182 QUENTIN SMITH

III

I shall quote some passages from Marcus' 1961 article that reveal six main
ideas she contributed to the New Theory.
First, let us start with the idea that proper names are directly referential
and are not abbreviated or disguised definitions, as Frege and Russell and
most philosophers up to the 1970s believed. Marcus writes:

But to give a thing a proper name is different from giving a unique description. ... (An)
identifying tag is a proper name of the thing. ... This tag, a proper name, has no meaning.
It simply tags. It is not strongly equatable with any of the singular descriptions of the thing.
(1961:309-310)

This is the basis of the contemporary "direct reference" theory of proper


names, where proper names are argued not to be disguised descriptions.
For example, "Scott" refers directly to Scott and does not express a sense
expressible by such a definite description as "the author of WAVERLY".
A second idea that Marcus introduces is that we can single out a thing
by a definite description, but this description serves only to single it out,
not to be strongly equatable with a proper name of the thing. She says: "It
would also appear to be a precondition of language [especially assigning
names] that the singling out of an entity as a thing is accompanied by many
... unique descriptions, for otherwise how would it be singled out? But to
give a thing a proper name is different from giving a unique description"
(1961: 309). This idea later became widely disseminated through Kripke's
discussion of how reference-fixing descriptions are sometimes used to
single out a thing as a bearer of a name, but that the names are not disguised
descriptions. Kripke writes: "It seems plausible to suppose that, in some
cases, the reference of a name is indeed fixed via a description [but that the
description is not "part of the meaning of the name"] (Kripke, 1972: 276).
Kripke, however, added the novel idea (and this is one of the main original
ideas in "Naming and Necessity") that in other cases names' reference
may be secured by a historical causal chain stemming back to the original
"baptism" (Kripke, 1972: 298-303).
A third component of the New Theory of Reference introduced by
Marcus is the famous modal argument for the thesis that proper names are
directly referential rather than disguised contingent descriptions. Contrary
to Nathan Salmon's claim that "The modal arguments are chiefly due to
Kripke" (Salmon, 1981: 24), they are chiefly due to Marcus and presented
by Kripke ("Naming and Necessity" (1972: 269ff.)) without reference to

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
MARCUS, KRIPKE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE 183

Marcus' earlier statement of them. Let us begin with this passage, where
Marcus is discussing (10) and (15) (in her notation). (10) and (15) are

(10) The evening star eq the morning star


(15) Scott is the author of WAVERLY
The symbol "eq" stands for some equivalence relation. Types of equiv
alence relation include identity, indiscernibility, congruence, strict equiv
alence, material equivalence and others. Marcus wants to argue that the
equivalence relations to be unpacked in (10) and (15) are not strong enough
to support the relevant theses of the "disguised contingent description"
theory of proper names. She writes (1961: 308-309):

If we decide that "the evening star" and "the morning star" are [proper] names for the same
thing, and that "Scott" and "the author of WAVERLY" are [proper] names for the same
thing, then they must be intersubstitutable in every context. In fact it often happens, in a
growing, changing language, that a descriptive phrase comes to be used as a proper name
- an identifying tag - and the descriptive meaning is lost or ignored.

Marcus will find that not all of the relevant expressions are names for
the same thing. They are not intersubstitutable in modal contexts; Marcus
writes:

Let us now return to (10) and (15). If they express a true identity, then 'Scott' ought to be
anywhere intersubstitutable for 'the author of WAVERLY' in modal contexts, and similarly
for 'the morning star' and 'the evening star'. If they are not so universally intersubstitutable
- that is, if our decision is that they are not simply proper names for the same thing; that
they express an equivalence which is possibly false, e.g. someone else might have written
WAVERLY, the star first seen in the evening might have been different from the star first
seen in the morning - then they are not identities. ( 1961: 311 )

Marcus' modal argument shows why the "disguised contingent descrip


tion" theory of proper names is false. Since (10) and (15) do not express
identities, the expressions flanking "is" are not proper names for the same
thing. In (10) and (15) a weaker equivalence relation should be unpacked,
for example, by a theory of descriptions. (By contrast, the sentence "Hespe
rus is Phosphorus" evinces an identity sign flanked by the two expressions;
thus, it passes Marcus' modal test for containing proper names of the same
thing.)
This modal argument goes back to Marcus' formal proof of the necessity
of identity in her extension of S4 (Barcan, 1946; 1947), which is a fourth

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
184 QUENTIN SMITH

component she introduced into the New Theory of Reference. She showed
that

(T) (xly) = D (xly)


is a theorem of QS4, QS4 being her quantificational extension of Lewis's
S4. The quadruple bar here means strict equivalence. Since identities are
necessary, a failure of intersubstitutivity in modal contexts will show that
a proper name does not express the relevant descriptive sense. If "Scott"
is not intersubstitutable with "the author of WAVERLY", "Scott" does not
express the sense expressed by this definite description. This opens the
door to the theory that proper names do not express descriptive senses but
instead are directly referential.
Of course, this argument does not prove that proper names do not
express senses, merely that they do not express senses of contingent defi
nite descriptions. Marcus' modal argument is consistent with the idea of L.
Linksy (1977) and A. Plantinga (1978) that proper names express senses
expressible by necessary definite descriptions, which are definite descrip
tions that express modally stable senses. For example, "Scott" may express
the modally stable sense of "the actual author of WAVERLY".
In order to rule out this modally stable descriptive theory of proper
names, one needs further argumentation, such as the epistemic argument
that proper names are directly referential. If the descriptive theory of proper
names is true, i.e. proper names are defined by descriptions, then "Venus is
the evening star" should express a truth knowable a priori, i.e., knowable
merely by reflection upon the concepts involved. But it cannot be known
a priori that Venus is the evening star; this is known a posteriori, through
observation of the empirical facts. As Marcus writes:

You may describe Venus as the evening star, and I may describe Venus as the morning star,
and we may both be surprised that, as an empirical fact, the same thing is being described,
But it is not an empirical fact that

(17) Venus I Venus. (1961: 310)

Here "I" is the identity symbol. If "Venus" expresses the modally stable
sense expressible by "whatever is actually the evening star and morning
star", then the persons designated by "you" and "I" in the passage quoted
from Marcus' article should be able to know a priori, simply by reflection
upon the semantic content of the expressions "Venus", "the morning star"
and "the evening star" that Venus is both the morning star and the evening
star. The fact that they cannot know this indicates that "Venus" does not
express the modally stable sense expressed by "whatever is actually the
evening star and morning star". Thus we have the irony that Plantinga's

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
MARCUS, KRIPKE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE 185

and Linsky's theory of proper names was refuted years before they for
mulated it, unbeknownst to themselves (and unbeknownst to later New
Theorists)!
Marcus' arguments for the "direct reference theory" make manifest her
discovery of a fifth crucial component of the New Theory of Reference,
the concept of rigid designation (although the name of this concept, "rigid
designation" was first coined by Kripke). "Hesperus" is intersubstitutable
salva veritate with either occurrence of "Phosphorus" in "Necessarily,
Phosphorus is Phosphorus". Each of these two names actually designates
Venus in respect of every possible world in which Venus exists and does
not actually designate anything in respect of worlds in which Venus does
not exist. If these two names were instead equivalent to contingent descrip
tions (e.g. "the morning star" and "the evening star"), they would not be
intersubstitutable salva veritate in this modal context and thus would be
non-rigid designators. Marcus notes in her 1970 APA paper, "Essential
Attribution", presented at a symposium at which Kripke was one of the
symposiasts, that "individual names don't alter their reference, except to
the extent that in (respect of) some worlds they may not refer at all" (1971 :
194).
Although I have used the "rigid designation" terminology, Marcus does
not use it, since Kripke's introduction of this expression in his "Identi
ty and Necessity" (1971) assimilated proper names to some descriptions
(viz., modally stable descriptions), which obscures their different semantic
properties. Marcus' point can be accommodated, consistently with the con
tinued use of "rigid designators", if we make the following classification,
which is familiar to those working with the New Theory of Reference.
Adopting the genus/species terminology, we may say that the genus is
rigid designators, and the different species are (a) proper names, (b) refer
entially used definite descriptions (in Donnellan's sense), (c) attributively
used definite descriptions that express a modally stable sense, (d) uses of
indexicals, (e) natural kind terms, and certain other expressions. We avoid
assimilating proper names to some modally stable descriptions, since prop
er names refer directly, whereas attributively used definite descriptions that
express modally stable senses refer indirectly, via the expressed sense.
A sixth idea introduced into the New Theory of Reference by Marcus
is the idea of a posteriori necessity. Recall our earlier quotation of Marcus'
remarks about Venus and the evening star:

You may describe Venus as the evening star, and I may describe Venus as the morning star,
and we may both be surprised that, as an empirical fact, the same thing is being described.
But it is not an empirical fact that

(17) Venus I Venus. (1961: 85)

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
186 QUENTIN SMITH

Consider the expression "Hesperus is Phosphorus". We do not know this


to be true a priori. It is not an analytic assertion whose truth value is known
by analysis of the concepts involved. Nonetheless, it is necessarily true,
since both names directly refer to the same thing, Venus. It is true that

(a) Hesperus I Phosphorus,


whereas, as before, "I" is the sign for identity. Given Marcus' theorem of
the necessity of identity, it follows that

(b) Necessarily, Hesperus I Phosphorus.


Thus "Hesperus is Phosphorus" can be viewed as a synthetic a posteri
ori necessary truth. This belies Salmon's historical comment about the
sentence "Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorous". He writes of Kripke's
three 1970 talks at Princeton, published in 1972 as "Naming and Neces
sity", that "In 1970 Saul Kripke astonished the analytic philosophical
community with his claim - supported by the rich theoretical apparatus
of possible-world semantics and his new 'picture' of reference - that [the
mentioned sentences], though synthetic and a posteriori contain necessary
truths, propositions true in every possible world" (Salmon, 1986: 2.)2 A
more accurate statement would be that Kripke eloquently elaborated upon
Marcus' idea and extended it to new sorts of items, such as "water is
H20".
What explains the wide misunderstanding of the historical origins of
the New Theory of Reference, a major movement in the history of analytic
philosophy? I have already suggested that two reasons may be that many
philosophers were insufficiently familiar with Marcus' earlier work and
that Kripke did not attribute the relevant ideas to her in "Naming and
Necessity" and "Identity and Necessity" (despite the fact that he was
present when she presented her seminal work in 1962 and was undoubtedly
familiar with her earlier formal papers on modal logic). There seems to me
a plausible explanation of why Kripke did not make these attributions.
He writes in the Preface to the 1980 edition of NAMING AND NECES
SITY that "The ideas in NAMING AND NECESSITY evolved in the early
sixties - most of the views were formulated in about 1963-64" (1980: 3).
Of course some of the ideas in "Naming and Necessity" are genuinely new,
such as the causal chain picture of the reference of names, the idea that
natural kind terms are rigid designators and the theory of the necessity of
origins. But since most of the views in "Naming and Necessity" occur in
1961 with Marcus' article "Modalities and Intensional Languages" and in
her formal work on modal logic in 1946^47, we need to look at Kripke's
remark about the evolution of his views from this perspective. First, recall

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
MARCUS, KRIPKE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE 187

that Marcus presented her paper "Modalities and Intensional Languages"


in February 1962 at the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science.
Her paper was published, in conjunction with the colloquium, in the 1961
volume of SYNTHESE.
Kripke was present and participated in the discussion, which was sub
sequently published. Kripke, it seems, did not wholly grasp Marcus' ideas
at this time. During the discussion of the paper at the 1962 colloquium,
Kripke made the following remark about Marcus' theory:

The tags are the "essential" denoting phrases for individuals, but empirical descriptions
are not, and thus we look to statements containing "tags", not descriptions, to ascertain the
essential properties of individuals. Thus the assumption of a distinction between "names"
and "descriptions" is equivalent to essentialism. (Marcus et al, 1962: 142)

This is mistaken, since Marcus clearly did not claim in her article that
things have their names essentially. As Marcus later explained, "that was
not my claim. Socrates might have been named Euthyphro; he would not
thereby be Euthyphro" (1993: 226-227). To the contrary, her claim was
that names are what later came to described as directly referential. They
are not denoting phrases, essential or otherwise.
This suggests how we may understand the statement in the 1980 Preface
to NAMING AND NECESSITY that "most of the views were formulated
in about 1963-64." We should interpret this as suggesting that Kripke first
correctly understood Marcus' theory in 1963-64 and that before this time,
he did not grasp what she conveyed in the presentation he attended. In par
ticular, it was Marcus' theory of the necessity of identities, where names
flank the identity sign, and the associated ideas of direct and rigid refer
ence that became clear to Kripke in subsequent years. We should perhaps
interpret this 1980 passage from Kripke in this light: He says "Eventually
I came to realize - this realization inaugurated the aforementioned work
of 1963-64 - that the received presuppositions against the necessity of
identities between ordinary names were incorrect, that the natural intuition
that the names of ordinary language are rigid designators can in fact be
upheld" (1980: 5).
But why does Kripke not say instead that at this time he first came
to understand Marcus' arguments for the necessity of identity and the
directly referential and rigid character of proper names? In the 1972 essay,
he attributes one idea to Marcus: "Marcus says that identities between
names are necessary" (1972: 305). But instead of explaining how this
idea and Marcus' other ideas formed the theoretical basis of "Naming and
Necessity", Kripke goes on to criticize a minor aside made by Marcus,
viz., that a good dictionary should be able to tell one if "Hesperus" and
"Phosphorus" have the same reference (1972: 305). (But as Marcus later

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
188 QUENTIN SMITH

explained, she should have made it clear that what she had in mind was a
"dictionary" that functions as an encyclopedia, where co-referring names
are listed as in a biographical dictionary (Marcus, 1993: 34, n. 1).) I believe
a reasonable explanation of why Kripke did not attribute the central features
of the "New Theory" to Marcus is that he originally misunderstood Marcus '
New Theory of Reference. When he eventually understood it, after a year
or two, the insight that came made it seem that the ideas were new. I suspect
that such instances occur fairly frequently in the history of thought and
art.3

NOTES

1 Some philosophers have noted in passing some of Marcus' contributions, but have not
recognized their full extent. J. Almog (1986:220, n. 8) goes further than most in recognizing
some of Marcus' contributions (e.g. the idea of direct reference), but confines this remark
to a footnote in an article devoted to the theory that proper names are rigid designators,
which he believes was originated by Kripke rather than Marcus. Another example is Alan
Sidelle's recognition that Marcus, not Kripke, first formulated the idea of the necessity of
identity (1989: 25.), but Sidelle notes this in a book devoted to the idea of a posteriori
necessity, which he believes was originated by Kripke rather than Marcus. John McDowell
(1994: 105, n. 28) mentions the trend towards construing some expressions as directly
referential and, after referring to Kripke and Donnellan as "early proponents of this trend",
writes: "See also, predating the trend, Ruth Barcan Marcus, 'Modalities and Intensional
Languages', Synthese 27, (1962), 303-22." {Material added in May, 1995: It should be
added that in publications subsequent to the ones I quoted from Kaplan, N. Salmon, and
H. Wettstein, each of them credits Marcus for developing at least one of the ideas for the
New Theory of Reference. These appear in Salmon's FREGE'S PUZZLE, Wettstein's HAS
SEMANTICS RESTED ON A MISTAKE? and in Kaplan's contribution to MODALITY,
MORALITY, AND BELIEF: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUTH BARCAN MARCUS, Wal
ter Simmot-Armstrong et al. (eds.).}
2 Of course Salmon is expressing here the nearly universal misunderstanding of the origin
of this idea. For another example, consider Sidelle's comment in his book devoted to the
idea of a posteriori necessity: "Enter Kripke and his NAMING AND NECESSITY. Kripke
made it very plausible that there are necessary truths that are synthetic and knowable only a
posteriori. Some of the more familiar examples are 'Hesperus and Phosphorus'" (Sidelle,
1989:2).
3 Even official histories, such as Munitz's CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSO
PHY, get it wrong. In the chapter where the ideas developed by Marcus are explained, we
find the chapter title "Referential Opacity, Modality, and Essentialism: Saul Kripke".

REFERENCES

Almog, Joseph: 1984, 'Semantical Anthropology', in P. French, et al. (eds.), Midwest


Studies in Philosophy 9, 479-90.
Almog, Joseph: 1986, 'Naming Without Necessity', The Journal of Philosophy, 83,210-42.
David Braun: 1993, 'Empty Names', Nous 27(4), 443-69.

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
MARCUS, KRIPKE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE 189

Donnellan, Keith: 1966, 'Speaking of Nothing', The Philosophical Review, 83, 3-32.
Kaplan, David: 1985, 'Dthat', in A. Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of Language, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, David: 1989, 'Demonstratives', in J. Almog et al. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, Saul: 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Kripke, Saul: 1972, 'Naming and Necessity', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Seman
tics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 253-355.
Kripke, Saul: 1971 'Identity and Necessity', in M. Munitz (ed.) Identity andIndividuation,
New York: New York University Press.
Linksky, Leonard: 1977, Names and Descriptions, Chicago. University of Chicagao Press.
Marcus, Ruth Barcan: 1993, Modalities, New York: Oxford University Press.
Marcus, Ruth Barcan: (1961 ) 'Modalities and Intensional Languages', Synthese 13,303-22.
[Marcus] Barcan, R.: 1946, 'A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implica
tion', Journal of Symbolic Logic 11, 1-16.
[Marcus] Barcan, R.: 1946, 'The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of
First Order', Journal of Symbolic Logic 12, 12-5.
Marcus, Ruth Barcan, et al.: 1962, 'Discussion of the Paper of Ruth B. Marcus', Synthese
14, 132-43.
McDowell, John: 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.
Munitz, Milton: 1981, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, New York. Macmillan Pub. Co.
Perry, John: 1977, 'Frege On Demonstratives', The Philosophical Review 86,474-97.
Perry, John: 1988,'Cognitive Signficance and New Theories of Reference', Noms 22,1-18.
Plantinga, Alvin: 1978, 'The Boethian Compromise', American Philosophical Quarterly
15,129-38.
Recanati, F: 1988, 'Rigidity and Direct Reference', Philosophical Studies 103-17.
Salmon, Nathan: 1981, Reference and Essence, Princteon, Princeton University Press.
Salmon, Nathan: 1986, Frege's Puzzle, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Sidelle, Alan: 1989, Necessity, Essence, and Individuation, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Smith, Quentin: 1987, 'Problems with the New Tenseless Theory of Time', Philosophical
Studies 52, 77-98.
Smith, Quentin: 1993, Language and Time, New York: Oxford University Press.
Soames, Scott: 1987, 'Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content',
Philosophical Topics 15, 47-87.
Wettstein, Howard: 1986, 'Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?', The Journal of Philosophy
83, 185-209.

Philosophy Department
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, MI 49008

This content downloaded from 108.61.242.12 on Fri, 03 Nov 2017 18:55:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

S-ar putea să vă placă și