Pointers in Remedial Law

Bar Exams 2017

by Professor Victoria V. Loanzon
with the assistance of Atty. Sid Bautista,
Atty. Raniel Dayate, Atty. Paula Kintanar
Atty. Allan Pamis and Atty. Zarah Suarez

JURISDICTION

Q. What is Jurisdiction?
A. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case.

Q. What are the kinds of jurisdiction? How does the Court acquire such jurisdiction?
A. (1) Jurisdiction over the plaintiff Acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition, or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff; (2) Jurisdiction over the person of the
Defendant Acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant to the court
or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons; (3)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter - conferred by law, an unlike jurisdiction over the parties,
cannot be conferred to the court by voluntary act or mere agreement of the parties; Jurisdiction
over the Issues - determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by
their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the
failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in
Sec. 5, Rule 10; (4) Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject
matter of the litigation - acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in
question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of
law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its
territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real
property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant

Q. Is venue synonymous with jurisdiction?

A. No. Hon. [Justice] Florenz D. Regalado differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to
be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by
law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of
the parties. (Nocum v Lucio Tan, 2005)

Q. True or False: The adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board (DARAB) have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation
under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL)? (Landbank
v. Suntay, J. Bersamin, 2011)
A. False. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to

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convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary
to the CARL. DARAB adjudicators are only empowered to determine in a preliminary manner
the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners.

Q. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. State the exceptions. (Aranas v.
Mercado, J. Bersamin, 2014)
A. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse

Q. A filed a case for forcible entry before a first level court of Manila against B praying that
the latter be ejected from a parcel of land situated at the boundary of Manila and Quezon City.
B filed a motion to dismiss claiming venue was improperly laid as the larger part of the real
property is situated in Quezon City. Is B correct?
A. No. Section 1. of Rule 4 states that actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. It is also worth pointing
out that B should not have filed a motion to dismiss based on an objection to venue as said
motion is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case under Sec. 13 Rule 70.

Q. What if A filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that resort to conciliation had not been
previously resorted to?
A. The motion to dismiss may be allowed as the rules allow said motion if based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and failure to comply with the conciliation
requirement under Section 12, Rule 70. (Sec. 13, Rule 70 in relation to Section 12, Rule 70)

Q. What are factors determine which court has jurisdiction?

A.
Civil Action Criminal Action
Nature of action and amount of claim Nature of the offense, imposable penalty,
and territorial jurisdiction;

Some criminal cases you need to

consider who the Accused is [i.e.
Sandiganbayan cases] or who the victim
is [i.e. Family Court cases]

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Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over cases involving real property?
A. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts [include] "all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) [outside
Metro Manila or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs.

Q. Suppose an action for reconveyance of real property valued at P19,999.99 is filed before a
Municipal Trial Court, would it be correct to ask for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter as reconveyance is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
A. No. In several cases, the Court has held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation
of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases
that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein. (San Pedro v.
Asdala, 2009) This means that the jurisdiction over the case will be determined based on the
assessed value of the real property involved.

Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over money claims and personal property?
A. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) outside Metro Manila or Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) in Metro Manila, the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction. (Section 19 (8)
of BP 129, as amended - paraphrased)

Q. What is the rule on small claims cases?

A. Under the 2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, Small claims cases are
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
(MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for
payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs. These actions are purely civil in nature
where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of
sum of money.

Q. Rosario filed a suit in the Small Claims Court. The judge ruled in her favor. When can she
ask for execution of the judgment? How can she execute it?
A. Immediately after a Decision is rendered because under Sec. 24 of the 2016 Revised Rules of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases, a Decision is final, executory, and unappealable. Meanwhile,
Rosario can ask for the execution of the judgment through a Motion. (Sec. 25, Id.)

Q. Can Fernando, the losing party appeal the ruling of the Small Claims Court?
A. No, because said decision is unappealable. To question the decision, a petition for certiorari
must be filed. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. (A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, 2014)

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Q. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
A. If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper
jurisdiction. Note that the courts of law HAVE jurisdiction but will defer to administrative bodies
because of their expertise. This is the essence of the principle of primary jurisdiction under
administrative law. (EuroMed Laboratory v. Province of Batangas, 2006)

Q. What is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction?

A. Once the court acquires jurisdiction by virtue of a valid complaint, that jurisdiction shall
continue up to the end of the case. Intervening facts will not deprive the courts of jurisdiction.
(Example: when a public officer resigns during the pendency of a case against him before the
Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan should not dismiss the case because of this principle as it had
already acquired jurisdiction.)

Q. What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

A. The court will defer to the administrative agency before taking cognizance of the case.
Otherwise stated, a party must exhaust all remedies before administrative bodies before judicial
recourse unless case falls within the exceptions.

Q. What are the exceptions?

A. x x x (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l)
in quo warranto proceedings. (SAMELCO II v. Seludo, 2012)

CAUSE OF ACTION

Q. How do you determine the sufficiency of a cause of action?

A. The test is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs.
David). To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous
facts and circumstances or other matter aliunde are not considered but the court may consider in
addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or
admissions in the records. (Zepeda v. China Banking Corp, 2006)

PARTIES

Q: M filed a collection suit against C and T, shareholders of Z Corp, which included an

application for issuance of Writ of Attachment. The Court granted the application. M posted

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the necessary bond. Two days later, the Court issued the Writ of Attachment. The Sheriff then
levied upon the equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property belonging
to Z Corp. Who are real parties in interest? Can C & T claim for damages against arising
from the wrongful attachment of Z Corps assets? (Stronghold Insurance v. Cuenca, J.
Bersamin, March 6, 2013)

A. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that a real party in interest is one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
Here, C & T cannot claim for damages as they are not real parties in interest. They were only
stockholders of Z Corp, which had a personality distinct and separate from any or both of them.
Only the corporation is the real party in interest for that purpose.

Q. Can a law firm acting as counsel for one of the parties in the intestate proceedings a quo
file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to protect its own interests?
A. Yes. While the general rule (which limits the availability of the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 only to parties in the proceedings before the lower court) must be strictly adhered to, it is
not without exception. In this case, the order of reimbursement was directed to SRMO in its
personal capacitynot in its capacity as counsel for either Remedios or Gerardo. Considering
that the RTC's order of reimbursement is specifically addressed to SRMO and the established
fact that SRMO only received the subject money in its capacity as counsel/agent of Gerardo,
SRMO's interest can hardly be considered as merely incidental. That SRMO is being required to
reimburse from its own coffers money already transmitted to its client is sufficient to give SRMO
direct interest to challenge the RTC's order. Neither can SRMO be considered a total stranger to
the proceedings. (Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices v. Hon. Norma
Chionlo-Sia, February 2016)

VENUE

Q. True or false. An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real property mortgage may be tried on the place where the main office of the
petitioner (plaintiff) was located. Discuss the concept of venue in civil actions. (BPI Family
Savings Bank v. Sps Tujuico, J. Bersamin, 2015)
A. True. An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein. Thus, petitioner correctly brought the case in the Makati RTC
because Makati was the place where the main office of the petitioner was located.

The venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. Under Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. A real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court
having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. The venue
of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

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 KINDS OF PLEADINGS

Q. Define counterclaim. How do you determine if its compulsory or permissive?

A. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out
of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case. (Alba v. Malapajo,
2016)

PARTS OF A PLEADING

Q. What is forum shopping? (Sotto v. Palicte, J. Bersamin, 2014)

A. Forum shopping is an act of malpractice by a party who repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.

Q. How is frum shopping committed? (Sotto v. Palicte, J. Bersamin, 2014)

A. Forum shopping can be committed in either of three ways, namely: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the
same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Q. Atty. Santos filed a pleading before the trial court. In the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, he signed it on behalf of his client. Atty. Reyes, opposing counsel, moved to dismiss
the case. As the judge, will you grant the Motion to Dismiss?
A. I will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court held in a decided case: In this light, the Court
finds that the CA correctly dismissed Andersons Petition for Review on the ground that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her
behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error
by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the
petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a
defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true
that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it
did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding
the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. (Anderson v. Ho, 2013)

Q. What are the guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the requirements on or
submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping? (Fernandez v.
Villegas, 2014)
A.

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 1. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
2. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
3. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance
or presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.
4. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature
of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the Rule.
5. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.

Q. Who are the corporate officers allowed to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping?
A. Corporate officers who can sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping
without need of an authorizing board resolution: (1) Chairperson of the board of directors, (2)
President, (3) General Manager or acting general manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5)
Employment Specialists in a labor case. (Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. v. Tablante,
2010)

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS

Q. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial
in the answer raises an issue of fact. State these modes. (Fernando Medical Enterprises v.
Wesleyan University, J. Bersamin, January 2016)

A. (1) Defendant specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to
support his denial; (2) Defendant who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the denial
is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate facts as
is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) Defendant states in the answer that he is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer

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 Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the
respondent ought to know or could have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such
material averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of
matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been
known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.

Q. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a case without conducting any proceeding without
violating the principle of due process?
A. Yes. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.

FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

Q. True or false. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode provided in the
Rules
A. False. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules.
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally
or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case,
the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed
the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not
prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners Notice of Appeal via LBC
timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private
letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court; instead,
the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that
pleading. Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received
by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly
ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. (Heirs of Numeriano Miranda v. Pablo
Miranda, 2013)

SUMMONS

Q. Discuss the rule on service of summons.

A. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be served personally on the
defendant. For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to.
When the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate
him have failed, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service. Substituted service
is effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by
publication. As an exception to the preferred mode of service, service of summons by publication
may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown, but
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means that there must be
prior resort to personal service under Section 7 and substituted service under Section 8, and proof

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that these modes were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed. This mode
also requires the plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to effect service of summons
by publication, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth
the grounds for the application. (Express Padala v. Ocampo, September 6, 2017)

Q. What happens if the Sheriff failed to serve the summons?

A. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
tantamount to voluntary appearance. (De Pedro v. Romasan, 2014)

Q. The lack of or defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendants
subsequent voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. Cite an example of voluntary
submission.
A. The lack of or defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendants subsequent
voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as
an answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective
summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance. (Guy v.
Gacott, January 13, 2016)

MOTIONS

Q. Discuss the 3-day notice rule viz-a vis the 10 day setting rule under Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
A. When a pleading is filed and served personally, there is no question that the requirements in
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure pose no problem to the party
pleading. Under this mode of service and filing of pleadings, the party pleading is able to ensure
receipt by the other party of his pleading at least three days prior to the date of hearing while
at the same time setting the hearing on a date not later than ten days from the filing of the
pleading. (Palileo v. Planters Development Bank, 2014)

PRE-TRIAL

Q. What is the effect of Defendants failure to appear during the pre-trial despite due
notice?
A. Defendants runs the risk of not being able to dispute the evidence presented ex parte by
Plaintiff. Plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. (Metrobank v. FADCOR,
2016)

MODES OF DISCOVERY

Q. S Bank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. In its Motion for Production
and Inspection of Documents, it requested for inspection of all documents pertaining to,
arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement. If you were
the Judge, would you grant the Motion?

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A. No. S Banks motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to
specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. S Banks Motion called
for a blanket inspection. S Banks request for inspection of all documents pertaining to, arising
from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement was simply too broad
and too generalized in scope. A motion for production and inspection of documents should not
demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be
limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the
adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce. (Solidbank v. Gateway
Electronics Corporation, 2008)

JUDGMENT

Q: What is the doctrine of immutability of judgment? Are there exceptions? (Sofio v.

Valenzuela, J. Bersamin, 2012)

A: The doctrine of immutability of judgment states that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Exceptions: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any
party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable.

NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

Q. Plaintiff filed a complaint. Defendant, instead of filing an Answer, decided to file a

Motion to Dismiss. The Court granted the Motion. Plaintiff, then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR). However, the Court, through an Order, denied the MR. Plaintiff
then filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Defendant now questions the appeal on
the ground that the appeal is unmeritorious considering that the Order denying the MR is
an interlocutory Order. Do you agree? (Jose v. Javellana et al., J. Bersamin, 2012)

A: First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done
by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final
order, not an interlocutory one. And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory
determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. The Court has held that an appeal from
an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an
appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition
against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

EXECUTION

Q. How to stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case?

A. To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, defendant must
perfect an appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically deposit the rentals becoming due

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during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the
plaintiff.

Q. Esteban is not a party to a case which has become final and executory. He was forewarned
that the sheriff is about to execute the judgment which would adversely affect his substantive
right. What remedy is available to Esteban?
A. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent separate action
to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the
person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is
not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. The right of a third-party
claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before
the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property mistakenly
levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably
establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil.
401 [1990]) we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must
first sufficiently establish his right on the property. (Villasi v. Garcia 2014)

Q. What are the elements of res judicata? (Sotto v. Palicte, J. Bersamin, 2013)
A. Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action
these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former
judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in
both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Q. Valentino Development Co. moved to dismiss the case filed by Production Bank against it
since the new complaint raises the same issues in a prior case which has become final and
executory. As judge, will you grant the motion?
A. Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is binding and conclusive on the
parties. The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. (LZK
Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, 2014)

APPEALS

Q. Differentiate the RTCs equity jurisdiction from appellate jurisdiction.

A. The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected. On the other hand,
equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to

11 | P a g e
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal
inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. (Regulus
Development v. Dela Cruz, 2016)

Distinguish a question of law from a question of fact.

A. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but most solely rely on what the law
provides on the given set of facts.

Q: May the Supreme Court look into or determine questions of fact?

A. As a general rule, the Supreme Court may not look into the questions of facts passed to it on
an appeal. However, the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the lower courts in
the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Q. Distinguish a Final Order from an Interlocutory Order. What is the relevance for the
distinction? (Garrido v. Tortogo et al., J. Bersamin, 2011)

A. The distinction is relevant in deciding whether the order is the proper subject of an appeal, or
of a special civil action for certiorari.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes
of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the
latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and
the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.

Q. What is the Neypes Doctrine?

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A. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court ruled that a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration should be given to litigants (Neypes v. CA, 2005)

Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to administrative cases?

A. No. The Neypes ruling applies to judicial proceedings only as the reason for such ruling also
known as the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules of
Court. Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Jocson v. San Miguel, March 9, 2016)

Q. True or false. The Neypes Doctrine is applicable to Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 as
it is akin to a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. (Fortune Life
Insurance v. COA, J. Bersamin, 2015)
A. False. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64.

Petition for Review under Rule 42
Rule 42 governs an appeal from the
judgment or final order rendered by
the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Question of fact, or of law, or of mixed
question of fact and law
Aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to
file the petition for review from receipt
of the assailed decision or final order,
or from receipt of the denial of a
motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64
Assails a judgment or final order of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
or the Commission on Audit.
Questions of fact cannot be raised
except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction
Filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration,
if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, interrupts
the period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period,
which shall not be less than five days in
any event, reckoned from the notice of
denial.

Q. Can a judicial compromise agreement be assailed by a Petition for Certiorari claiming

that the compromise agreement was patently unjust, one-sided, unfair, fraudulent and
unconscionable? (Chung vs. Huang, J. Bersamin, 2016)
A. No. If the ground of the respondent to assail the judgment based on the compromise
agreement was extrinsic fraud, his action should be brought under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the original action for annulment may be based only on extrinsic

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fraud or lack of jurisdiction, but extrinsic fraud, to be valid ground, should not have been availed
of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Moreover, the
remedy under Rule 47 is to be availed of only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. Ostensibly, the respondent could have availed himself of the petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Hence, his failure to resort to such remedy
precluded him from availing himself of the remedy to annul the judgment based on the
compromise agreement

INJUNCTION

Q: Can the RTC issue Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated
by, the government? How about a CA? (Nerwin Industries v. PNOC-ENERGY, J. Bersamin,
2012)
A. No. Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from
issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials,
or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments direction,
from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National
Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National
Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e)
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.

Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a
TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a
government contract or project acts contrary to law

CERTIORARI

Q. If a decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion, should there always be resort to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
A. No. The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on
the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power
in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
decision (Sawadjaan v. CA, 2005) Besides, the Rules expressly provide: Section 1. Petition for
certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

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Q. Distinguish a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from a petition for review under Rule
43.
A. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the
two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the
other hand, seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. (Dee
Ping Wee v. Lee Hiong Wee, 2010)

FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

Q. A Real Estate Mortgage (REM) does not contain a power or authority to sell. Neither was
there a special power to sell the property in favor of the mortgagee (creditor) embodied in a
separate instrument attached to the REM. Once the debtor defaults on his loan, can the
creditor proceed to extra-judicial foreclosure? (Sps. Baysa v. Sps. Plantilla, J. Bersamin,
2015)

A. No. To enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM, the special power to sell should have
been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied in a separate instrument attached to the REM.
It is not disputed that no special power to sell was either inserted in the REM or attached to the
REM. Hence, the respondent spouses must resort to judicial foreclosure pursuant to the
procedure set forth in Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.

PARTITION

Q. Can an action to rescind a donation be joined with an action for partition?

A. As a general rule, no. An action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the
ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of
partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or
them being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern
the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite
elements of each particular cause of action.

Q. Is the foregoing rule absolute?

A. No. If there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined
causes of action. x x x It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court
trying the case has jurisdiction over all the causes of action therein notwithstanding the
misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of
action, then such misjoined cause of action should be severed from the other causes of action,
and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a
nullity. (Ada v. Baylon, 2012)

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 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Q. P filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against D. MTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
based on its finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be
properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTC and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon remand, MTC ultimately dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. Once more, P appealed to the RTC. the RTC ordered the
petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment,
and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. Ultimately, RTC rendered its judgment
reversing the MTC decision. Did the RTC ruled correctly? (Manalang v. Bacani, J.
Bersamin, 2015)
A. No. The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing
or trial de novo. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate RTC, which
shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court.Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the
relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the
testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo.

Q. Y was adjudged loser in an ejectment case. Considering that ejectment is summary

proceeding, what remedy is available to Y to postpone the effectivity of the judgment?
A. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits
the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-
appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not
stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then,
the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal. In short,
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file
a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency
of the appeal. (Acbang v. Hon. Luczon, Jr. 2014)

Q. Gabby filed an unlawful detainer case against Ali and won. Ali filed a petition for relief
from judgment before the same MTC that rendered the decision in the unlawful detainer case.
Was Ali correct?
A. No. A Petition for relief from judgment is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case
under Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Q. May Ali file his petition for relief from judgment before the RTC?

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A. No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. -
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

Q. What is Alis remedy? What court has jurisdiction?

A. The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC. (Agdal v. Carlos, 2010)
*Note that the Court treated the petition for relief from judgment before the RTC as a petition for
certiorari in this case.

WRIT OF AMPARO

Q: True or False. In a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, allegation and proof that
the persons subject thereof are missing suffice.
A. False. In Navia v. Padico, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that for the protective writ of
amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough.
It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving
by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

Q. Does the issuance of a Hold Departure Order impair one's right to travel and is the
violation of the right to travel covered by the Writ of Amparo?
A. A Hold Departure Order does not automatically impair a person's right to travel. There should
be proof to establish that the right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).

Q: May a writ of amparo or other reliefs granted by the writ be filed in another court if a
criminal action has been filed or is pending?
A. No. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be
filed. The writ or any relief available under the writ should be filed by filing in the same court
where the criminal action was pending. (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).

WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Q. What should be alleged in a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan?

A. In a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or
regulation violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Even the Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for

17 | P a g e
Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua
non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified
petition. (LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. vs. Agham Party List, 2016)

APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Q. In the estate proceedings of V, N filed a complaint-in-intervention to exclude the

paraphernal properties of his deceased sister I (I is the wife of V) from inclusion in the
estate of V. The RTC dismissed the same. What is Ns remedy? (Chipongian v. Lirio, J.
Bersamin, 2015)
A. He should file a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the
complaint-in-intervention. The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing," that is, his right in the
paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section
1, Rule 109, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as
well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1, supra, because it was a final determination in the trial
court of his intervention. Conformably with either or both paragraphs, which are boldly
underscored above for easier reference, the dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due
course by virtue of its nature of completely disposing of his intervention. Thus, the proper mode
of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by filing a notice of appeal and
record on appeal within 30 days from notice of judgment or final order.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Q. What is criminal jurisdiction?

A. It is the power of the State to try and punish a person for a violation of its penal laws.

Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction and venue in criminal cases?

A. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides:
a. Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred;
b. Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while
in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its
trip, including the place of its departure and arrival;
c. Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law;
d. Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed (the
case must be filed, generally, where the crime is committed exceptions are provided
by law and the rules such as the venue of actions for libel under Art. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides multiple venues)

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Q. What are the requisites for a valid exercise of jurisdiction?
A.
1. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter - the offense is one which the court is by law
authorized to take cognizance of;
2. Jurisdiction over the Territory - the offense must have been committed within its
territorial jurisdiction;
3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused - the person charged with the offense must
have been brought to its presence for trial, by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary
submission to the court.

Q. Are the criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant declared EXTINGUISHED by
his death prior to final judgment?
A. Yes. Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both
jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal
representative of the estate of the deceased for purposes of representing the estate in the civil
aspect of this case," the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, require the
private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their
claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and
requires only a preponderance of evidence. The civil action which may thereafter be instituted
against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of
Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86
and 87. (People of the Philippines vs. Lipata, 2016)

Q. Is Pabatid Sakdal or an Information filed by an Assistant City Prosecutor, sans an

approval of the City Prosecutor, defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to
Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court?
A. Yes. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the
filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts. Thus, as a
general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the same Rules. As held in
People of the Philippines vs. Garfin, the filing of an Information by an officer without the
requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by
silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.

A Certification from the Assistant City Prosecutor to the effect that "the filing of the
Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor." The Court had
already rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such
certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in

19 | P a g e
court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written
authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. There must be definite and certain proof that the
Information was approved by either the City Prosecutor or any of the OCP's division chiefs or
review prosecutors. (Quisay vs. People of the Philippines, 2016)

Q. Is the action of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the finding of prosecutors
be subject to judicial review?
A. Yes. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial
functions. The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not
make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. However, even
when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of
grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (De Lima vs. Reyes, 2016)

Q. May the Secretary of Justice, even without a pending petition for review, motu proprio
order the conduct of a reinvestigation?
A. Yes. Although the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before
the Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor - Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states that the Secretary of Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the
provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review. This is because the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over
prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of
her prosecutors. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the
authority to directly act on any "probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the
prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city
prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even
without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of
justice. (De Lima vs. Reyes, 2016)

Q. Does a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary
investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable cause
and issues a warrant of arrest?
A. Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his

20 | P a g e
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation. When the trial court has already determined,
independently of any finding or recommendation by the prosecutors, that probable cause exists
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially
determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been
rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment. The
prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. The accused, however, is not
without remedies. He may still file any appropriate action before the trial court or question any
alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial. (De Lima vs. Reyes, 2016)

Q. What are the distinctions between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?
A. The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
Applying this analogy to [a case under BP22 or the Bouncing Checks Law], knowledge of
insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while
dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such
knowledge. (Bautista v. CA, 2001)

Q. What is the relevance of such distinction?

A. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do not need to be alleged.

Q. Does it, then, follow, that a motion for bill of particulars cannot be used by an accused to
request that he be furnished with evidence?
A. Yes. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters
of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or
how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particular.
(Enrile v. People, 2015)

Q. When should a motion to quash be filed instead of a bill of particulars?

A. If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused
cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy. Thus, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate
remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense. (Enrile v.
People, 2015)

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Q. What is the remedy against a denial of a Motion to Quash?
A. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea,
go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and
assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not
appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of
other remedies in the ordinary course of law. (Enrile vs. Manalastas, 2014)

Q. How is conspiracy alleged?

A. A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege
all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that
can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. (People v. Quitlong, 1998)

Q. What are the elements of a prejudicial question?

A. (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed (Sec. 7, Rule 111).

Q. Is it possible that an action before an administrative body may be the basis to suspend a
criminal case due to a prejudicial question?
A. Yes. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to
speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an
action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. (San Miguel v. Perez, 2013)

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

A prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is
enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of

22 | P a g e
the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has
not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A
challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. (San Miguel
Properties, Inc. vs. Perez, 2013)

Q. What are the elements of double jeopardy?

A. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for
which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. (Ocampo v. Hon. Abando,
2014)

Q. When is bail a matter of right and when is it discretionary? (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, J.

Bersamin, 2015)

A. The general rule is x x x that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from
the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he
can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right
to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as
matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior
to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime

aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

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 e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

Q. Who determines whether the evidence of guilt is strong?

A. The trial court. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. (Enrile
v. Sandiganbayan, J. Bersamin, 2015)

Q. What must the trial judge consider in granting bail in favor of an accused charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment?
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:

In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
1. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7
and 8)
2. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19) Otherwise petition should be
denied. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, J. Bersamin, 2015)

Q. Can bail be granted based on humanitarian grounds, independent of the legal merits of the
case?
A. Yes. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial. Granting bail x x x on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court: x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden
by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is
a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of
the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit
the prisoner to bail;47 x x x [G]ranting provisional liberty to [ill accused] will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. The grant of bail is proper if it will aid in accuseds adequate
preparation of his defense [and], more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, J. Bersamin, 2015)

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NOTE: Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court
and this includes the accuseds right to appeal. (People v. Piad, et al., 2016)

Q. Gerry, Ricky and Nikki were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Upon finding probable cause, the Ombudsman directed that a case be filed
against the three accused. During trial, the Ombudsman wanted to grant the request for
immunity sought by Gerry and Ricky so that they may testify against the mastermind of the
corrupt act, Nikki. Is the power of the Ombudsman to grant immunity still subject to the
provisions of the Rules of Court?
A. Yes. RA 6770 provides: Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x. Under such terms and conditions as it may
determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman
may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the
truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its
authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not
exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011)

Q. What are the requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness? What is the
effect of an order granting the discharge of an accused as a state witness?
A. The requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that: (ADSuMM)
(a) There is Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) The is no other Direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be Substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the Most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving Moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the
court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall
be inadmissible in evidence. The effect of the discharge of an accused as a state witness is that of
an acquittal under Section 18 which states: Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as
acquittal. The order indicated in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the
discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the
accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for the discharge.

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Q. Where can a party question orders and resolutions of the office of the Ombudsman?
A. It depends. If what the party wishes to question is an order or resolution in an administrative
case, the party may appeal before the CA via Rule 43. If it involves orders and resolutions
involving criminal cases such as determination of probable cause (Baviera v. Zoleta, 2006) or an
order granting immunity to an accused (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011) and there is grave abuse
of discretion, the party may question the orders or resolutions before the Supreme Court via Rule
65.

Q: Can the courts interfere in the COMELEC's finding that probable cause exists?
A: Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The established
rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of only such evidence as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Q. What is the nature of search warrant proceedings?

A. A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only to an incident in the
main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most
incidental to the main criminal case, an order granting or denying a motion to quash a search
warrant may be questioned only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Q: After receiving a complaint from PLDT of the illegal activity of X Corporation of using
Mabuhay card and other equipment capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA
to the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT, PAOCTF filed
two applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the RPC for
Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of
telephone communication. The trial court issued two search warrants for the said violations.
In implementing the search warrants, the police team searched the premises of X Corporation
and seized the articles specified in the search warrants. Subsequently, the prosecutor
conducted a preliminary investigation and found that the officers of X Corporation were
probably guilty thereof. X Corporation and its officers sought to quash the search warrants on
the grounds that there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general
warrants and were wrongly implemented. Should the trial court grant the Motion to Quash?
What is probable cause? Are the search warrants in this case in the nature of general
warrants?
A. The court should not grant the Motion to Quash the search warrants on the ground that there
was no probable cause. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is
such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that
his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. PLDT was able to produce pieces of evidence that, if taken together, are more than
sufficient to support a finding that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that X

26 | P a g e
Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal activities. Evidence
to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyond
reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.
The subject search warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were
sufficiently identified and specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged
which are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR
activities. A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general
warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution. In Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, the Court explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a valid search
warrant, to wit: A Search Warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - what articles they
shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses
may not be committed. (HPS Software and Communication v. PLDT, 2012)

EVIDENCE

Q. What is the Best Evidence Rule?

A. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides
that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody or the record.

Note: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale
with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other
than the original document. (Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez, J. Bersamin, 2013)

Q. Mr. Cayetano is the custodian of the record of birth of Charie Mae. He executed an
affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the fact of birth of Charie Mae and he attached her
duly-authenticated birth certificate of birth to his affidavit. Must Mr.Cayetano affirm his
affidavit in open court?
A. No. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the officials attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
course of his duty. The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of

27 | P a g e
performance of official duty. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. (Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 2014)

Q. What is the Parol Evidence Rule?

A. The Parol Evidence Rule applies to the parties and their successors in interest. Conversely,
it has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol Evidence Rule, a
person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such
as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that a third party who
avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract. This
is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate
his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. Moreover, to preclude the application
of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that at least one of the parties to the suit is not party
or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. A
beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore
cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed
stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from
proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. (Heirs of Pacres vs. Heirs
of Ygoa, 2010)

Q. Can a void contract be admitted as evidence in court?

A. Yes. While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed
inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that
occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the execution
of the contract. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law of these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not
excluded by the Rules for its admissibility. Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence
because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter
of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself. (Tan vs. Hosana, 2016)

Q. Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction? (People of the Philippines vs.

Baron, J. Bersamin, 2016)
A. Yes. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

Q. What is the Hearsay Rule?

A. The Hearsay Rule renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons
who are not presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated. This rule
proceeds from the basic rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is unable
to cross-examine the person making the statement.

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Q. What is a double hearsay?
A. An out-of-court statement offered as evidence contains another out-of-court statement. To be
admissible, both layers of hearsay must be found separately admissible.

Q. The rape victim sought to recant her testimony identifying the accused after the
Prosecution had already filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. The trial court dismissed the
recantations as incredulous and unworthy of belief, and found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape. Was the RTC correct in its ruling?
A. Yes. The victims recantation is unreliable. In fact, the RTC noted that the alleged real culprit
had died in 2004, two (2) years before the commission of the rape charges in 2006. The trial
court dismissed the recantations as incredulous and unworthy of belief. In her testimony, AAA
intimated that she was not raped by her father, but was actually raped by her grandfather who
had already passed away. A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It
is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be
repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary
consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the
relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Finally,
denial could not prevail over the victims direct, positive and categorical assertion. Appellants
guilt of the crime charged was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Q. Is a Traffic Accident Investigation Report admissible as evidence in court, as an exception

to the Hearsay Rule? (DST Movers Corporation vs. Peoples General Insurance Corporation,
J. Bersamin, 2016)
A. No. A traffic accident investigation report prepared by a police officer relying solely on the
account of a supposed eyewitness and not on his or her personal knowledge is not evidence that
is admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule. One of the exceptions of the Hearsay Rule is
provided under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, in relation to entries in official record. Precisely as an
exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away with the need for presenting as
witness the public officer or person performing a duty specially enjoined by law who made the
entry. This, however, is only true, for as long the following requisites have been satisfied:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

Q. The witness Estao testified as follows: (1) Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his
uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; (2) Estao had hurriedly dressed up
to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; (3) on the way to the
hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his
assailant had been Salafranca; (4) at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be
having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; (5) about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and

29 | P a g e
had been pronounced dead. Is the testimony of Estao admissible? (People v. Salafranca, J.
Bersamin, 2012)

A. Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the
conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both. The above circumstances
qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his
death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or
part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay

character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao,
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon
was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according
to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the
stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his
death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as
the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician.
Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived.
Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which
Bolanon was the victim.

On the other hand, a declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and
thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for
admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the
identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his
stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to
the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.

Q. Does a Protection Oder issued by a Barangay Chairman have any efficacy?

A. Yes. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical

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harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
his duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to
maintain public order in the barangay.

Q. Can a trial court issue a Temporary Protection Order without hearing without violating the
constitutional guarantee to due process?
A. Yes. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,
the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the
life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that
the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC
or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is
broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
challenged as violative of the right to due process. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests. (Tua v. Hon. Mangrobang, 2014)

Q: Does failure to photograph or inventory the seized illegal drugs render them inadmissible
as evidence against the accused? May this failure be raised as a ground for the first time on
appeal?
A. Failure to photograph or inventory the confiscated illegal drugs is not fatal to the prosecution
of the case against the accused. The seized items may still be admitted in evidence as long as the
evidentiary value thereof is preserved. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA9165 reads:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.-The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:

(a)The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be

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 required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial
the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were
instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial
court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.
Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. (People vs.
Taculod, 2013)

Q. Can the accused be pronounced guilty of the offense if all the links of the chain of custody
of the drug subject of the illegal sale the corpus delicti are not shown?
A. No. The reason is that the drug presented as evidence at the trial is not shown beyond
reasonable doubt that it was the drug subject of the illegal sale. Chain of Custody means the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction. The marking upon seizure serves a two-fold function, the first being to give to
succeeding handlers of the specimens a reference, and the second being to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from
the accused until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. (People of the Philippines vs. Alagarme,
2015)

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