C.
Commission on Elections
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Section 1:
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective positions
in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991)
Facts:
Respondent Monsod was nominated by Pres.
Aquino to chair the COMELEC. Petitioner
questioned the qualifications of Monsod
holding that the latter does not have the
necessary 10 year experience in the practice of
law.
Issue:
W/N Monsod is qualified Yes
Held:
Practice of law is not limited to litigation.
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990)
Facts:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred
prompting the president to create a fact finding
commission which would be chaired by Hilario
Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his
chairmanship over the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an
associate commissioner in the COMELEC,
was appointed by then President Corazon
Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she
was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto
Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such
appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution in no case shall any member of
the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the
president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC. -Yes
HELD/Ratio:
Yoracs designation as acting chairman is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that
although all constitutional commissions are
essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the president in the
discharge of their functions. The designation
made by the president has dubious justification
as it was merely grounded on the quote
administrative expediency to present the
functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules
on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC
who should choose whom to sit temporarily as
acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they
normally do that by choosing the most senior
member).
Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49
Facts:
PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason
as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term
of seven years and all expiring on February 2,
2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and
assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman.
Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of
office and assumed their positions as
COMELEC Commissioners. However, they
were not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on several meetings due to its
adjournment.
Issue:
W/N the appointments are valid Yes
Held/Ratio:
The ad interim appointments and subsequent
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on
reappointments because there were no
previous appointments that were confirmed by
 the Commission on Appointments. A
reappointment presupposes a previous
confirmed appointment. The same ad interim
appointments and renewals of appointments
will also not breach the seven-year term limit
because all the appointments and renewals of
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are for a fixed term expiring on February 2,
2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not
extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever
that the renewal of the ad interim appointments
of these three respondents will result in any of
the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin
prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing
renewal of the ad interim appointment of these
three respondents, for so long as their terms of
office expire on February 2, 2008, does not
violate the prohibition on reappointments in
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Hayudini v. Comelec, GR No. 207900, 723
SCRA 223, April 22, 2014
Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851, July 8,
2014
Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February
24, 2015
Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286,
September 23, 2014
Section 2. Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Alfiado v. Comelec, GR 141787, September 18,
2000
Columbres v. Comelec, GR 142038,September
18, 2000
Sahali v. Comelec, GR 134169, February 2,
2000
DOCTRINE COMELEC has inherent power to
amend and control its processes and orders
within the 30 day period from promulgation
before it becomes final and executory.
FACTS During 1998 elections for governatorial
candidates in tawi tawi, Sahali was proclaimed
by Provincial Board as duly elected governor,
COMELEC passed a minute resolution (MR1)
directing the immediate manual recounting of
ballots and suspend effects of proclamation
due to system breakdowns. However, when
COMELEC decided to pass another minute
Resolution (MR2) stating to hold in abeyance
MR1 because of the petition for certiorari filed
with SC, COMELEC issued another minute
resolution (MR3) which recalled earlier
resolutions MR 1 and MR 2 and followed the
order of SC for status quo ante order, thus,
holding Sahali as duly proclaimed.
Held Court held that petitioner failed to show
that promulgation by COMELEC of MR3 was
GAD. The recall of COMELEC under MR3 was
well within its power as this was within the 30
day period before it became final and
executory. COMELEC has the inherent power
to amend and control its process and order.
Claudio v. Comelec, GR 140560, May 4, 2000
Quick Facts: Claudio elected Mayor of
Pasay City in the 1998 elections. Before May
1999, chair of brgys MET to discuss
possibility of recall elections, the concening
preparatory recall assembly (PRA), to which by
July 1999 (one year and one day after
assumption of office by Claudio), they adopted
Resolution No 1 for the RECALL of Claudio.
COMELEC granted the petition finding
signatures of members sufficient and set the
date for the recall elections. Petitioner claims
the one year ban applies and therefore
COMELEC guilty of GAD stating the Recall
refers to a process versus the recall election
and so when the PRA met on May 1999, they
violated the one-year ban. COMELEC
contends that the process of recall starts with
the FILING of the petition and not with the
convening for purposes of recall.
HELD: Court held that Recall is a process does
not start with convening preparatory recall
assembly (PRA). There can be many
preliminary steps for purposes of initiating
recall but the exercise of the power of recall lies
with the Electorate when they do the actual
voting. The PRA is to determine whether there
are sufficient grounds. Thus, when the recall
election was scheduled by COMELEC on April
15, 2000, it was already more than a year from
 when Claudio assumed office.
DOCTRINES RECALL is the election itself by
means of which voters decide whether they
should retain their local official or elect his
replacement. It is a process which begins with
convening preparatory recall assembly
(PRA) or gathering signatures of at least 25%
of the registered voters of a local govt unit, and
then proceed to filing a recall resolution with
COMELEC. The law is clear and states the
power vested on the electorate is to ELECT the
official into office (power of recall) and it is not
the power to initiate the recall proceedings
(PRA). Since the voters do not exercise power
of recall until actual elections, it is clear that the
initiation of recall proceedings is NOT
prohibited within the one-year period. The PRA
is for purposes of providing voters a sufficient
basis for judging elective local official and final
judging is not done until election. COMLEC
determines sufficiency, grants the petition, and
orders the schedule for the recall election
Two limitations on recall: (1) no recall shall take
place within one year from the date of
assumption of office of the official concerned,
and (2) no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
De Guzman v. Comelec, GR 129118, July 19,
2000
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 97-
0002 and 97-0610 and then issued directives
reassigning petitioners City/ Municipal Election
Officers to different stations. They contend that
RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause
since it singles out City and Municipality
Election Officers from holding office in same
city for more than 4 years, singling them out
from other COMELEC officials. Singling out is
not violative of EP Clause especially since this
insures impartiality. There is also no infringing
on security of tenure because this does not
mean perpetual employment but only that they
cannot be removed without due process.
Lastly, there is no undermining COMELEC
authority to appoint its own officials because
Section 44 establishes a guideline for
COMELEC to follow (criterion for reassignment
or transfer) but does not deprive it of its power
to appoint and maintain authority over all its
officials and employees. It must be
remembered that although it is a government
agency tasked with implementation and
enforcement of election laws, COMELEC is still
duty bound to comply with the laws passed by
Congress. There is no impairment of its power
to appoint, rather Section 44 strengthens its
power to appoint.
Doctrine Singling out of election officers to
ensure impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity
with people of their place of assignment does
not violate equal protection clause. Section 44
of RA 8189 does not undermine COMELECs
power to appoint its own officials.
Social Weather Station, Inc v. COMELEC, GR
NO. 147571, May 5, 2001
SWS brought action for prohibition to enjoin
COMELEC to enforce Sec 5.2 RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act) stating surveys affective national
candidates not published 15 days before
election and local not published 7 days before
election. Election surveys are measurement of
opinions and perceptions of voters. Petitioners
claim that previous elections allowed them to
release even as close as 2 days before.
COMELEC states that it has supervisory power
to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
franchise for operation of media of
communication.
HELD: Comelec Resolution is invalid because
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression and it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even
if it is of a limited period, and governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression. HOWEVER, it must be
noted that COMELEC is given the power to
stop any illegal activity or confiscate, tear down
and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or
false election propaganda, after due notice and
hearing.
Doctrine There is no basis for the COMELEC
claim that petition for prohibition is
inappropriate. Resolution 3636 was not an
exercise by COMELEC of its adjudicatory
power to settle claims of parties, it was to
implement RA 9006, and therefore, petition for
prohibition was appropriate because it tests the
constitutionality of various election laws, rules,
 and regulations. Therefore, ART 9-A Section 7
of the constitution on decisions, orders, or
resolutions may be reviewed by this Court only
by Certiorari does not apply.
Information Technology Foundation
Comelec, GR 159139, Jan 13, 2004
Facts COMELEC approved resolution and
awarded Contract to Mega Pacific eSolutions
Inc (MPEI) for 2004 elections but contends it
did not participate in the bidding but it was
actually Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) that
participated in the bidding. However, it is
claimed that Mega Pacific did not meet eligible
requirements such as the 99.99% accuracy
rating, not able to detect previously
downloaded results, and unable to print
statutorily required audit trails.
Held Court held that there was not two envelop
process submitted to COMCLEC. As shown in
the eligibility requirements submitted by
COMELEC, there was no showing that MPEI
and MPC signed into a joint venture
agreement, consortium MOA or business plan
showing any relationship between the firms.
Therefore, during bidding process, COMELEC
had no basis fat all
Buac v. Comelec, 421 SCRA 92
Doctrine The enforcement and administration
of a law relative to a plebiscite falls under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, which gives it the
power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of a
plebiscite (Art 9C of Constitution).
The conduct of Taguig plebiscite is the core of
the controversy and it is a matter that involves
the enforcement and administration of a law
relative to a plebiscite. COMELEC is an
independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, it has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election
and related laws. Thus, must give enough
latitude in the exercise of its expertise where to
straightjacket its discretion might render
elections impotent.
Capalla v. COMELEC 673 SCRA 1 [2012]
Doctrines (1) The three principles of bidding:
(1) offer to the public (2) opportunity for
v. competition (3) basis for exact comparison of
bids this is to protect public interest by giving
the public the best possible advantages
through open competition in order to place all
qualified bidders in equal footing giving
government lower possible price under most
favorable terms and conditions
(2) A winning bidder is not precluded from
modifying certain provisions in a bidded
contract but must ensure such are not
substantial or material amendments
held Comelec, being confronted with time and
budget constraints, and in view of its mandate
to ensure free, honest, and credible elections,
the acceptance of the extension of the option
period, and exercise of it, are more prudent
choices available to COMELEC for successful
2013 elections.
After smartmatic was granted contract, there
were some amendments to the contract to
which other bidders held violative of their right
to equal bidding and rules. Court ruled that (1)
Smartmatic-TiM was not granted additional
right previously not available to other bidders.
The AES contract granted to Smartmatic is a
contract primarily of that of a lease of goods to
which COMELEC had an option to purchase
(OTP) the goods agreed upon. All bidders were
apprised of this that aside from the lease of
goods and purchase of services, the proposals
should include an OTP. (2), the amendment
after the contract was awarded only pertained
to the period within which Comelec can
exercise the OTP. Morever, the approved
budget of COMELEC was for P11B and the
AES contract with OTP gave contract price of
P7.9B plus P2.1B when decides to exercise
option, which is still within the budget and
competitive bidding conducted was sufficient.
And (3), amendment with OTP was more
advantageous for COMELEC. OTP is a
preparatory contract for a fixed period of time,
binds the party given the option not to enter into
a principal contract with any other person
during period designated; it is a continuing offer
 to enter into a principal contract. If it does not
decide to purchase, another bidding can be Mercado v. BES 243 SCRA 422 [1995]
held. Here, the extension of the option was
more advantageous for COMELEC since the
alleged defects in the machines as seen can be
corrected and undertaken by Smartmatic
during the extended time to ensure successful
election. Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 [1995]

Election Contests
Flores v. COMELEC 184 SCRA 484 [1990]
People v. Delgado 189 SCRA 715 [1990]

Petitioner contending WON the decisions of

Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 or of Garces v. CA 259 SCRA 99 [1996]
the RTC
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC
shall Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective Zarate v. Comelec and Lallave GR 129096,
regional, provincial, and city officials, and
November 19, 1999
appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal
or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay Regalado v. CA, GR 115962, February 15, 2000
election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under
the afore-quoted section. The two elements of the offense prescribed
under 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal amended, are: (1) a public officer or employee
Circuit Trial Court, should have been is transferred or detailed within the election
appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the
the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act transfer or detail was effected without prior
No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the approval of the COMELEC in accordance with
decision of the municipal or metropolitan court its implementing rules and regulations.
in a barangay election case should be
appealed to the RTC, must be declared Indeed, appointing authorities can transfer or
unconstitutional. detail personnel as the exigencies of public
service require.[19] However, during election
period, as such personnel movement could be
Galido v. COMELEC 193 SCRA 78 [1991] used for electioneering or even to harass
subordinates who are of different political
persuasion, 261(h) of the Omnibus Election
Code, as amended, prohibits the same unless
 approved by the COMELEC.
Faelnar v. People,GR 140850-51, May 4, 2000
Rule 13. - Prohibited Pleadings.
SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed.
The following pleadings are not allowed:
....
(d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc
ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases; . . . (Emphasis added).
Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for
reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or
decision of the COMELEC en banc is allowed
in cases involving election offenses.
Here, there is no question that what is involved
is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an
election offense. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration of such resolution is allowed
under the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC.
In cases where the State Prosecutor, or
Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the
delegated power[10] to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offense cases, after
the investigating officer submits his
recommendation, said officers already resolve
the issue of probable cause. From such
resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the
exercise by the Commission of its review
powers would, at this point, already constitute
a second look on the issue of probable cause,
the COMELECs ruling on the appeal would be
immediately final and executory. Oldmisox
On the other hand, if the preliminary
investigation of a complaint for election offense
is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its
investigating officer prepares a report upon
which the Commissions Law Department
makes its recommendation to the COMELEC
en banc on whether there is probable cause to
prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en banc
which determines the existence of probable
cause.[11] Consequently, an appeal to the
Commission is unavailing. Under the present
Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC,
however, a motion for reconsideration of such
resolution is allowed. This effectively allows for
a review of the original resolution, in the same
manner that the COMELEC, on appeal or motu
proprio, may review the resolution of the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.
Tan v. Comelec, GR 148575, Dec. 10, 2003
Alauya v. Comelec, GR 158830, August 10,
2004
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lays
down three instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely, (1) the
election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; (2) the election in any polling place has
been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or (3) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect
on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. In all
instances there must have been a failure to
elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios,
where the election was not held and where the
election was suspended. As to the third
scenario, the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns, which give rise to the
consequence of failure to elect, must as
aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that
nobody emerged as a winner.[27]
Hence, before the COMELEC can act on a
verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
elections, two conditions must concur, namely,
(1) no voting took place in the precinct or
precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if
there was voting, the election resulted in a
failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would
have affected the result of the election. Note
that the cause of such failure of election could
only be any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes.
Moreover, the proclamation of the petitioners
enjoys the presumption of regularity and
validity.[30] To destroy the presumption, the
respondents must convincingly show that the
 petitioners victory was procured through extra-
legal means. This they tried to do by alleging
matters in their petitions which they believed
constituted grounds for a declaration of failure
of election, such as massive substitution of
voters, fraud, terrorism, disenfranchisement of
voters, and other anomalies. The attendance of
the alleged fraud and irregularities in the
elections as catalogued by the respondents,
however, constitute merely the causes or
events which may give rise to the grounds to
declare failure of elections, namely, (a) no
election held on the designated election date;
(b) suspension of election before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of voting; and (c) election
in any polling place resulted in a failure to elect.
But as aforesaid, the grounds cited by the
respondents do not fall under any of the
instances under Section 6 of Rep. Act No.
7166, the winning candidates having been
proclaimed by the PBC. While fraud is a ground
to declare a failure of election, the commission
of fraud must be such that it prevented or
suspended the holding of an election, including
the preparation and transmission of the
election returns.
Powers Not Given
It is not empowered to decide questions
involving the right to vote
The power to determine WON a person can
exercise or is precluded from exercising the
right is a judicial question and the power to
resolve such question has been excluded from
the Commissions powers. Section 2(6) places
cases involving inclusion or exclusion of
voters under the jurisdiction of courts.
Section 2 and 3, authorizing to make minor
adjustments. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the subject
clearly excluded the power to transfer whole
municipalities. -
Election cases must first be decided in division.
Hence, the COMELEC en banc may not decide
an election case still pending before a division.
A decision, resolution or ruling of a division is
elevated to the COMELEC en banc. However,
while a motion to reconsider an interlocutory
order of a division should be resolved by the
division w/c issued the interlocutory order, it
may be referred to the COMELEC en banc if all
the members of the division agree.
If a case w/c should go to the COMELEC en
banc is erroneously filed w/ a division, it may
automatically be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. This is not provided for in the COMELEC
Rules of procedure, but such action is not
prohibited.
Deputizing Law Enforcement Agencies
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987
Constitution
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcementi agencies and
instrumantalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its
own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
People v. Basilla 179 SCRA 87[1989]
We note that while Section 265 of the Code
vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to
prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the
same time authorizes the Comelec to avail
itself of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the Government.
The contention of private respondents that the
deputation by the Comelec of the prosecuting
arms of the Government would be warranted
only before the elections and only to ensure
tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible
elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping
functions of policemen, lack substance. There
is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution which requires such a pinched
niggardly interpretation of the authority of the
Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or
employees of other agencies and
instrumentalities of the government. The
prompt investigation and prosecution and
disposition of election offenses constitute an
indispensable part of the task of securing free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. The investigation and prosecution of
election offenses are, in an important sense,
more important than the maintenance of
physical order in election precinct. 'without the
assistance of provincial and city fiscals and
their assistants and staff members, and of the
state prosecutors of the Department of Justice,
the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses committed
before or in the course of nationwide elections
would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps,
the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times
larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the
prosecution officers designated by the
Comelec become deputies or agents of the
Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority,
control and supervision of the Comelec in
respect of the particular functions covered by
such deputation. The acts of such deputies
within the lawful scope of their delegated
authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of
the Comelec itself. The only limitation the
Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's
authority over its deputies relates to the
enforcement of such authority through
administrative sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g.,
suspension or removal-may be recommended
by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8],
Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than
directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to
pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with
the executive department of the Government
where the prosecution and other officers
deputized are ordinarily located.
Registration of Parties and Organization
LDP v. Comelec, GR 161265, February 24,
2004
The only issue in this case, as defined by the
COMELEC itself, is who as between the Party
Chairman and the Secretary General has the
authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the
official candidates of the party. Indeed, the
petitioners Manifestation and Petition before
the COMELEC merely asked the Commission
to recognize only those certificates of
candidacy signed by petitioner Sen. Angara or
his authorized representative, and no other.
To resolve this simple issue the Supreme Court
ruled that, the COMELEC need only to turn to
the Party Constitution. It need not go so far as
to resolve the root of the conflict between the
party officials. It need only resolve such
questions as may be necessary in the exercise
of its enforcement powers.
The ascertainment of the identity of a political
party and its legitimate officers is a matter that
is well within the authority of the Commission
on Elections. COMELEC, however, cannot
grant a party official greater authority than what
the party itself grants, lest the same amount to
a violation of the partys freedom of
association.
The repercussions of the question of party
identity and leadership do not end at the validity
of the endorsement of the certificates of
candidacy of persons claiming to be the partys
standard bearer; as the Supreme Court will
have to assume jurisdiction to determine
factional controversies within a political party
where a controlling statute or clear legal right is
involved

A certificate of candidacy makes known to the
COMELEC that the person therein mentioned
has been nominated by a duly authorized
political group empowered to act and that it
reflects accurately the sentiment of the
nominating body.
Atienza v. COMELEC 612 SCRA 761 [2010]
Franklin Drilon is contesting the LP election
that made petitioner Atienza the President of
the said party. The matter was brought to
COMELEC and it annulled the election of
Atienza. Likewise, COMELECs resolution
ruled that Drilons term may be deemed to have
ended. Soon thereafter, another election for
party-leader was held by the Liberal Party and
Manuel Roxas II was elected as the party
President. COMELEC upheld the election of
Roxas II. Now, Atienza challenges
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party
leadership disputes
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELECs
jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes
has already been settled by the Court. The
Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections that the COMELECs powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELECs
power to register political parties necessarily
involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as
LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended
LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party
candidates for all national elective positions. It
is also the LP president who can authorize
other LP officers to issue certificates of
nomination for candidates to local elective
posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president
who certifies the official standard bearer of the
party.
Lokin v. COMELEC 674 SCRA 538[2012]
CIBAC Foundation and CIBAC Sectoral Party
were at odds with one another with regard to
who should be their party nominees. Despite
the infighting, CIBAC submitted their
nomination and manifestation of Intent to
participate in the party-list elections.
COMELEC thereafter ruled on who were the
true nominees of CIBAC. Petitioners now
challenge COMELECs jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled that even as
petitioners insisted on the purely intra-
corporate nature of the conflict between
CIBAC Foundation and the CIBAC Sectoral
Party, they submitted their Certificate of
Nomination and Manifestation of Intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Precisely,
petitioners were seeking the COMELECs
approval of their eligibility to participate in the
upcoming party-list elections. In effect, they
invoke its authority under the Party-List System
Act. Contrary to their stance that the present
dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate
matter, their submissions even recognize the
COMELECs constitutional power to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall. More specifically, as one of its
constitutional functions, the COMELEC is also
tasked to register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of
government.
In any case, the COMELECs jurisdiction to
settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well established. This singular power to
rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as
an incident to its enforcement powers.
Prosecution of Election Offenses
People v. Inting 187 SCRA 788 [1990]
The sole issue here is whether a Provincial
Fiscal can file an information charging one of
an election offence or prosecute one for a
 violation of election law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the 1987
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only
to investigate but also to prosecute cases of
violation of election laws. This means that the
COMELEC is empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping the
Judge determine probable cause and for filing
an information in court. This power is exclusive
with COMELEC. As such, the Provincial Fiscal
assumes no role in the prosecution of election
offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an
information charging an election offense or
prosecutes a violation of election law, it is
because he has been deputized by the
COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole
authority of his office.
Corpus v. Tanodbayan 149 SCRA 281[1987]
COMELEC dismissed a complaint filed by
Mangaser against Castillejos who was then a
candidate for mayor. Mangaser proceeded to
file a complaint with the Tanodbayan. The
issue in this case is whether the Tanodbayan
or Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offences?
The Supreme Court ruled that an examination
of the provisions of the Constitution and the
Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear
intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
election offenses committed by any person,
whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance,
irrespective of whether the offense is
committed in relation to his official duties or not.
In other words, it is the nature of the offense
and not the personality of the offender that
matters. As long as the offense is an election
offense jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its
all-embracing power over the conduct of
elections.
COMELEC v. Silva 286 SCRA 177[1998]
Respondents, who were charged of having
tampered some certificates of canvass, moved
for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against
them. The Chief State Prosecutor,who had
been designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in
private respondents' request. Eventually, the
cases were dismissed.The COMELEC sought
to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the CA.
The authority to decide whether or not to
appeal the dismissal of a criminal
prosecution for an election offense belongs
to the COMELEC, not the designated
prosecutor. Prosecutors designated by the
COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its
deputies. They derive their authority from it
(COMELEC) and not from their offices.
Consequently, it was beyond the power of
Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the
appeal of the COMELEC. Moreover, if the
Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no
probable cause for proceeding against private
respondents, he should have discussed the
matter with the COMELEC and awaited its
instruction.
The COMELEC has the right to appeal, in its
own name, from a decision dismissing a
criminal case filed by it. Considering the
authority of the COMELEC over the
prosecution of election offenses, its decision to
bring a petition for certiorari and mandamus is
conclusive on the Solicitor General.
Comelec v. Hon. Espanol, GR 149164, Dec. 10,
2003
Bautista filed before the Law Department of the
Comelec a complaint against certain
individuals for vote buying. By virtue of a
resolution, an information was filed against
respondents with the RTC. COMELEC later on
recommended that the resolution of the Office
of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor be nullified
because the accused are exempt and that the
prosecution of election offenses were under the
sole control of the COMELEC.
COMELECs act was proper. The
Constitution empowers the COMELEC to
investigate and when appropriate,
prosecute election offenses. The
prosecutors deputized by the petitioner

(COMELEC) are subject to its authority,
control and supervision in respect of the
particular functions covered by such
deputation. The acts of such deputies within
the lawful scope of their delegated authority
are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the
petitioner itself.
The power to grant exemptions is vested
solely on the petitioner. This power is
concomitant with its authority to enforce
election laws, investigate election offenses
and prosecute those committing the same.
Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181[2012]
The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order
creating and constituting a Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases. One of the issues raised in
this case is whether or not the DOJ should
conduct preliminary investigation only when
deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction.
The Constitution envisions a truly independent
Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections and to
serve as the guardian of the peoples sacred
right of suffragethe citizenrys vital weapon in
effecting a peaceful change of government and
in achieving and promoting political stability.
Under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants are given continuing
authority as deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under election laws and to prosecute
the same.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases of election offenses to
the Comelec was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election
Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now
conducts preliminary investigation of
election offenses concurrently with the
Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.
Recommendatory Powers
Section 3. Decisions
The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Pangilinan v. COMELEC 228 SCRA 36[1993]
Petitioner Pangilinan and respondent
Belmonte were both candidates for
congressman in the 4th legislative district of
Quezon City. However, respondent was
alleged to have violated the Omnibus Election
Code by giving money and other material
considerations to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend the Canvass and Proclamation of
Belmonte before the COMELEC. COMELEC
argued that they are not able to judge on pre-
proclamation cases involving members of
House of Representatives under Section 15 of
R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution 2413.
While the COMELEC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests of all
elective regional, provincial and city
officials, the Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives is the sole judge over
election contests of all its members. Sec. 15
of R.A. 7166 is consistent with Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which makes
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the
House of Representatives the sole judge of all
election contests of their respective members.
Where the candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an
electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives.
Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307[1992]
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
resolved the appeals of petitioners in 9 Special
Cases without first referring them to any of its
Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit
en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void
and must be set aside. Consequently, the
appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.
Carnicosa v. COMELEC 282 SCRA 512[1997]
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC
is mandated to hear and decide cases first
by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc.
This is when it is jurisdictional. In the instant
case, as aforestated, the issues presented
demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of
its administrative functions.
Canicosa alleged that he was credited with less
votes than he actually received. But he did not
raise any objection before the Municipal Board
of Canvassers; instead, he went directly to the
COMELEC. He now claims, after the
COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition, that
it was error on the part of COMELEC to rule on
his petition while sitting en banc.
In Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections it
was made to appear in the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the
Winning Candidates that respondent therein
received 4,951 votes or more than what he
actually obtained. In resolving the case we
ruled that the correction of the manifest mistake
in mathematical addition calls for a mere
clerical task of the board of canvassers. The
remedy invoked was purely administrative.
In Feliciano v. Lugay, we categorized the issue
concerning registration of voters, which
Canicosa cited as a ground in his petition
for declaration of failure of election, as an
administrative question. Likewise, questions
as to whether elections have been held or
whether certain returns were falsified or
manufactured and therefore should be
excluded from the canvass do not involve the
right to vote. Such questions are properly
within the administrative jurisdiction of
COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon
directly by the COMELEC en banc without
having to pass through any of its divisions.
No grave abuse of discretion committed by
public respondent COMELEC dismissing the
petition before it on the ground that the
allegations therein did not justify a declaration
of failure of election.
Ramas v. COMELEC 286 SCRA 189[1998]
Petitioners and private respondents were the
official candidates for elective municipal
positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur.
Petitioners were proclaimed as the duly elected
municipal officials. Respondents filed an
election protest wherein the court ruled in their
favor. Respondents filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution of Decision pending
Appeal. Petitioners opposed.
As to election cases involving regional,
provincial, and city officials, which fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC,
Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution
vests the COMELEC with the authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies.
Additionally, the Omnibus Election Code
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate
rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of the Code or other laws which
it is required to enforce and administer.
Accordingly, the COMELEC promulgated the
 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of
Rule 41 thereof expressly provides that [i]n
the absence of any applicable provision in
[said] Rules, the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect
SC has explicitly recognized and given
approval to execution of judgments pending
appeal in election cases filed under existing
election laws. All that was required for a valid
exercise of the discretion to allow execution
pending appeal was that the immediate
execution should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order.
Garvida v. Sales 271 SCRA 767[1997]
Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for
the position of Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan. Respondent filed with the
COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
against petitioner for falsely representing her
age qualification. COMELEC en banc granted
the petition.
Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the
COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc.
Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when
the required number of votes to reach a
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not
obtained in the Division. Moreover, only
motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. COMELEC en banc
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion when it entertained the petition.
Velayo v. Comelec, GR 135613, March 9, 2000
FACTS:
Velayo and Natividad were running as mayor
of Gapan. During the canvass, Natividad
wanted to annul illegally canvassed election
returns. In the meantime, Velayo won, but this
was annulled by the COMELEC.
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC en banc acted in grave abuse
of discretion when it annulled the proclamation
of Velayo. Although pre-proclamation
controversies shall be disposed of summarily
by the COMELEC within 7 days, parties should
be afforded due process. THe non-inclusion of
a proclaimed winner in a pre-proclamation
controversy and his lack of notice, which
resulted to the cancellation of his proclamation,
is clearly a denial of due process.
Sebastian v. Comelec, GR 139573, March 7,
2000
FACTS:
Sebastian and Romano ran for mayor in Sto.
Tomas, Davao Del Norte. During the canvass,
the Sebastian sought the exclusion of votes
from certain precincts as these were prepared
under extreme duress, threat, intimidation,
and political pressure and influence. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers denied the
petition, so Sebastian lodged three appeals.
Finally, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of the second division (which ordered
exclusion of election returns).
DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC need not inquire into
allegations of irregularities in the casting of
counting or casting of votes. Pre-proclamation
controversies require the examination of
election returns on their face.
Requiring the COMELEC to pierce the veil of
election returns that appear prima facie regular
is remedied by an election protest lodged with
the regular courts.
Soller v. Comelec, GR 139853, September 5,
2000
FACTS:
Soller and Saulong both ran for mayor in
Oriental Mindoro. Soller was proclaimed as
winner. Thus, Saulong filed with the COMELEC
an annulment of the proclamation, and with the
RTC a protest. The COMELEC en banc
eventually dismissed the case. Soller filed a
motion to dismiss in the RTC, claiming that
COMELEC already dismissed the case.
DOCTRINE:
COMELEC en banc does not have the requisite
 authority to hear and decide election cases
involving pre-proclamation controversies in the
first instance.
Any decision by the COMELEC en banc as
regards to election cases decided by it in the
first instance is null and void.
Barroso v. Ampig et al, GR138218, March 17,
2000
FACTS:
Barroso and Escobilio ran for mayor in
Tampakan, Cotabato. Escobilio filed with the
COMELEC several cases against Barroso,
which were dismissed. Barroso was then
proclaimed the winner, which Escobilio
questioned in the RTC. This was due to the
failure to disclose the pendency of two pre-
proclamation controversies.
DOCTRINE:
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the
COMELEC in the 1998 elections were deemed
terminated at noon of June 30, the beginning of
the term involved, and the rulings of the board
of canvassers were deemed affirmed without
prejudice to the filing of a regular election
protest with the regular courts.
Maruhom v. Comelec, GR 139357, May 5,2000
FACTS:
Maruhom and Dimaporo were candidates for
mayor. Because of serious irregularities,
anomalies, and electoral frauds allegedly
committed, Dimaporo lost by a margin of 20
votes, and Maruhom was declared winner.
Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC a petition to
annul the proclamation of Maruhom. The case
was dismissed. Dimaporo eventually filed a
protest ad cautelam with the RTC, to which
Maruhom opposed because of an alleged
forum shopping.
DOCTRINE:
An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of
the people is imperative, much more so in this
case considering that a mere 20 votes
separated the winner from the loser in the
contested election returns.
The motion to dismiss by Maruhom was clearly
a perfidious plot to delay the proceedings,
which was seen in previous acts hoping to
avert the revision of the ballots.
Balindong v. Comelec, GR 153991, Oct. 16,
2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Anwar, Aklima and Amir-Oden are
half brothers all running for mayor in Malabang,
in the 2001 elections. Anwar was proclaimed
as mayor with 42 votes over Aklima.
COMELEC consolidated the two pre-
proclamation cases lodged with it. COMELEC
en banc Resolution proclaimed Amir-Oden as
the winner.
DOCTRINE:
The matter should have been settled by the
COMELEC Division, and not the poll body as a
whole, as this is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The COMELEC en banc does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide pre-
proclamation controversies at the first instance.
Jaramilla v. Comelec, GR 155717, Oct. 23,
2003
FACTS:
Suyat and Jaramilla ran for member of the
Sangguniang Bayan for the municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur. Upon review by Suyat,
Jaramilla was credited 23 votes from a
precinct, the figures of which were increased to
73 in the statement of votes by precinct. Thus,
Suyat filed with the COMELEC a petition for
correction of manifest errors.
DOCTRINE:
A petition for correction of manifest errors
alleges an erroneous copying of figures from
the election return to the Statement of Votes by
precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of
results, which merely requires clerical
correction without opening of the ballot boxes
or examining the ballots, demands only
exercise of administrative power of the
COMELEC. Hence, the COMELEC en banc
may assume jurisdiction.
Likewise, the petition was filed beyond the 5
day period from proclamation. In this case, the
Court found that the COMELEC had the
authority to suspend the period to meet the
ends of justice.
Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796-97, Oct. 23,
2003
FACTS:
Bautista filed a certificate of candidacy as
punong barangay in the 2002 elections, but
COMELEC did not accept this because he was
not a registered voter. The RTC, however,
ordered COMELEC to include his name, but
the COMELEC recommended cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy. COMELEC en
banc failed to act before the election, so his
name was still included in the list, and he
eventually won the election.
DOCTRINE:
A division of the COMELEC should have first
heard the case. The COMELEC en banc can
only act on a case when there is a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the
COMELEC decision. Thus, since there was
none in this case, the COMELEC en banc did
not have the jurisdiction to render the decision.
De Llana v. Comelec, GR 152080, Nov. 28,
2003
FACTS:
Dela Llana and Pabo were candidates for
Provincial Board Member in Zambales, where
there were three seats allotted. During the
election, respondent Pablo ranked fourth,
having garnered 24 votes less than the third
placer. Pablo field an election protest with the
COMELEC, alleging that he obtained 42 votes
in a precinct, but the canvass only stated that
he had 4. COMELEC division treated this as a
correction of manifest errors and annulled the
proclamation of Dela Llana.
DOCTRINE:
Although the case was lodged as an election
protest, it can be validly treated as a correction
of manifest errors when such is evident from
the pleadings. Likewise, in the interest of
justice, COMELEC can suspend the
reglementary period for filing the petition,
especially since only 24 votes separated the
parties in this case.
Repol v. Comelec, GR 151418, Apr. 28, 2004
SC and COMELEC en banc can only take
cognizance of final decisions, not interlocutory
orders. SC can only take cognizance of
decisions from COMELEC EB, and COMELEC
EB can only take cognizance of final Division
decisions.
In this case, Repol lost and filed a protest
before the RTC. It was initially dismissed but
COMELEC Div remanded it. RTC then ruled
IFO of Repol, voiding the proclamation of his
opponent Ceracas for Mayor of Pagsanghan,
Samar. Repol then filed a motion for execution
pending appeal, which was granted by RTC.
Ceracas appealed RTC decision, but pending
appeal, filed for TRO before COMELEC Div.
It was granted, and Div. issued Status Quo
ante until further orders. Hence, this petition
by Repol. SC held (first paragraph), but said
that it wasnt ironclad, and may be relaxed if the
issue involves the principle of social justice,
and may be glossed over to prevent
miscarriage of justice.
Pedragoza v. COMELEC 496 SCRA 513
While there is a rule requiring COMELEC
Commissioners to state the reason for their
inhibition, the requirement concerns the judge
himself and not the ruling involved. Hence, if for
example in an en banc case involving 5
commissioners, 2 inhibited without stating the
reason, it does not necessarily invalidate the
ruling.
In this case, Pedragoza initially won by 39
votes, and when contested by respondent
Sumulong, RTC initially dismissed but
COMELEC Div granted and en banc sustained,
5 commissioners signed the resolution and 2
did not take part, without citing the reason. SC
said it wouldnt affect the validity of the order,
as there is already quorum.
Cayetano v. COMELEC 479 SCRA 514
In raising the case to SC by R65, only
GADALEJ or involving jurisdiction may be
raised. Factual matters such as appreciation of
the ballots, which SC said to be best left with
COMELEC.
This case pertains to taguigs cityhood where
Cayetano was questioning the plebiscite
conducted. Initially, Cayetano was saying
COMELEC was without jurisdiction to
 determine the conduct of a plebiscite, but SC
pointed out that no less than the constitution
itself under Sec.2(1) Art. IX(C) specifies it.
Upon reaching the SC, it was found that
Cayetano was merely raising factual grounds
which SC said is best left with COMELEC
Munoz v. COMELEC 495 SCRA 407
Mere pendency of two cases before the same
division of COMELEC is not a ground for their
outright consolidation. The rules provide that
cases may be consolidated if it involves similar
questions of law and fact.
COMELEC is also authorized by law to annul
any canvass and proclamation which was
illegally made. [This case implies that] The
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) must
wait for authorization from COMELEC before
proclaiming any candidate as the winner, or
else such proclamation is void ab initio.
HOWEVER, COMELEC EB in this case made
a decision that gravely exceeded its authority.
The parties were competing candidates for
Mayor of Albay. Several ERs were contested
by respondent to MBC, but was denied, thus
the MBC included the contested ERs in the
count. Respondent appealed to COMELEC
(Case 1)
Pending Case 1, Petitioner was proclaimed.
Respondent then filed a petition to annul
proclamation (Case 2, raffled at SAME division)
Division granted Case 2 petition, annulling
proclamation. MR to EB denied, setting aside
Petitioners proclamation anddirected MBC to
recount and re-canvass. Hence this petition.
SC held that the Case 2 decision by EB was
with excess of authority, as it was issued even
before its Division could decide Case 1. Note
that EB can only decide on final division
decisions.
Tan v. COMELEC 507 SCRA 352
This case concerns simultaneous petitions to
suspend the proclamation and petitions to
annul the proclamation of Benjamin loong as
Governor of Sulu. One of the issues raised was
whether it can be entertained simultaneously
by COMELEC
Background to election laws, a petition to
suspend the proclamation is filed pre-
proclamation and tolls the running of the 10-
day period in petitions to annul the
proclamation (filed after proclamation, you
have 10 days after proclamation to file a
petition).
These two separate petitions are allowed
because it prevents the practice of grab the
proclamation and prolong the protest.
Moreover, they differ in issues involved, is
more practical than piecemeal adjudications,
which in turn leads to speedy disposition of
cases.
Eriguel v. COMELEC 613 SCRA 809
In this case, Eriguel won by about 3k votes
against Dumpit for Agoo Mayor position.
Dumpit filed an election protest contesting
some ballots to RTC, but Eriguels
proclamation was upheld.
On appeal to COMELEC, the division that the
case was raffled to has one inhibiting
commissioner. The divisions presiding
commissioner then issued an order elevating it
to en banc, where Eriguels proclamation was
reversed.
SC held that an automatic elevation of the
appeal to EB is invald; it must follow Sec.3
Art.IX-C, and may only decide on the case
upon MR of the divisions order. Until then, EB
has no jurisdiction
Mendoza v. COMELEC 616 SCRA 443
If the opinion is equally divided, there must be
re-hearing. If after re-hearing no decision is
reached, the action must be dismissed if
originally commenced with the Commission;
and if appealed, the judgment appealed from
must stand and the petition denied.
In this case, the protest was filed by
Respondent on 2007, but COMELEC Div only
issued the resolution in 2009. Pending MR to
EB, a motion for execution was filed in Div, and
the EB ruled in 2010 dismissing the MR and
 granting the Motion for Execution. Protestant
then filed the instant petition for Certiorari
before SC, calling for re-hearing as the EB
decision lacked the concurrence of majority of
COMELEC.
Pending petition to SC, COMELEC Eb issued
another resolution scheduling the re-hearing.
The re-hearing again failed to have the
required majority vote, 3 not taking part and 1
dissenting.
Maria Laarni L Cayetano v. Comelec, GR
193846, 12 April 2011 (also in Sec. 7, Art IX-A)
Almost same with Repol. The interlocutory
order in this case is the order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss at COMELEC
Div.
An MR of an interlocutory order shall be
resolved by the division issuing the order,
except when all members of the division decide
to refer to the COMELEC en banc.
Also, interlocutory division orders may be
elevated to en ban if the interlocutory order is
of patent nullity because of absence of
jurisdiction to issue such order
Section 4. Supervision/Regulation of Public
Utilities, Media Grants, Privileges
The Commission may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision
or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Unido v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
Facts:
The case involves several COMELEC
Resolutions which prohibited UNIDO from
campaigning through mass media for NO
votes for the amendment of the 1973
Constitution.
Issue: W/N the Resolutions are valid?
Held/Ratio: YES
The provisions of all election laws regulating
propaganda through the mass media, for
example, Section 41 of the Election Code of
1978, must be deemed applicable to
plebiscites. Therefore, it is the duty of the
Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by
TV and radio stations insure(s) that time equal
as to duration and quality is available to all
candidates for the same office or political
parties, groups or aggrupations at the same
rates or given free of charge.
If the effect of COMELEC regulations impairs
free speech and freedom of the press, it is
because they must have been contemplated to
precisely constitute an exception to freedom of
speech and of the press clauses, on account of
considerations more paramount for the general
welfare and public interest which exceptions
after all would operate only during limited
periods that is during the duration of the
election campaign fixed in the charter itself
and/or by law.
The COMELEC has indeed the power to
supervise and regulate the mass media in such
respect, but such authority arises only when
there is a showing that any sector or member
of the media has denied to any party or person
the right to which it or he is entitled.
Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of
Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167
in relation to the upcoming plebiscite for the
organic act of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. The assailed section provides that
during the plebiscite campaign period, on the
day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the
 plebiscite issues.
Issue: W/N the Section 19 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional?
Held/Ratio: NO
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation
of transportation or other public utilities, media
of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates are ensured. The
evil sought to be prevented by this provision is
the possibility that a franchise holder may favor
or give any undue advantage to a candidate in
terms of advertising space or radio or television
time.
However, neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite.
In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on
some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of
specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or
against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Osmena v. COMELEC 199 SCRA 750 [1991]
(Wrong citation. The correct case is Osmena v.
COMELEC [1998])
Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of RA
6646 which prohibits mass media from selling
or giving free of charge print space or airtime
for campaign or other political purposes, except
to the COMELEC. Petitioners allege that
although the issue has already been decided in
NPC v. COMELEC, the effects of such decision
needs reconsideration because the law creates
a disadvantage for the poor candidates.
Issue: W/N the law is constitutional?
Held/Ratio: YES
The term political ad ban, when used to
describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading,
for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation
of print space and air time to political
candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to
procure and itself allocate to the candidate's
space and time in the media. There is no
suppression of political ads but only a
regulation of the time and manner of
advertising.
The laws concern is not with the message or
content of the ad but with ensuring media
equality between candidates with deep
pockets, as Justice Feliciano called them in his
opinion of the Court in NPC, and those with
fewer resources.
There is no total ban on political ads, much less
restriction on the content of the speech. Given
the fact that print space and air time can be
controlled or dominated by rich candidates to
the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a
substantial or legitimate governmental interest
justifying exercise of the regulatory power of
the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of the
Constitution
They only prohibit the sale or donation of print
space and air time to candidates but require the
COMELEC instead to procure space and time
in the mass media for allocation, free of charge,
to the candidates. In effect, during the election
period, the COMELEC takes over the
advertising page of newspapers or the
commercial time of radio and TV stations and
allocates these to the candidates.
The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any
restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is
no more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in
the use of mass media for political advertising.
The restriction on speech, as pointed out in
NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR
No. 119654, May 22, 1995
 Facts:
The case involves the constitutionality of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 which
requires newspaper companies and the like to
provide in their publications a COMELEC
Space which shall be allocated for the
candidates for free.
Issue: W/N COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is
constitutional?
Held/Ratio: NO
To compel print media companies to donate
"Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified
in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less
than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of
private personal property for public use or
purposes.
The taking of private property for public use is,
of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation"
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for
"Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission.
There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper
and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does
not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide
free print space for Comelec purposes. Section
2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
Telecom v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337 [1998]
Facts:
This case involves the constitutionality of
Section 92 of BP881 which provides for
COMELEC Time as applied to broadcast
media. The main contention of the petitioners
is that Section 92 of BP881 constitute
deprivation of property without just
compensation because it requires air time to be
given to the COMELEC for free, as opposed to
print space.
Issue: W/N the assailed section is
constitutional?
Held/Ratio: YES
The law prohibits mass media from selling or
donating print space and air time to the
candidates and requires the COMELEC
instead to procure print space and air time for
allocation to the candidates. It will be noted that
while 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the
COMELEC to procure print space which, as we
have held, should be paid for, 92 states that
air time shall be procured by the COMELEC
free of charge.
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
assign.9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject,
among other things, to amended by Congress
in accordance with the constitutional provision
that "any such franchise or right granted . . .
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee
of some form of public service.
What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise
or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution,
among other things, is the use by media of
information of their franchises or permits, while
what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is
the sale or donation of print space or air time
for political ads. In other words, the object of
supervision or regulation is different from the
object of the prohibition.
49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which 92 of B.P.
Blg. 881 was taken, expressly provided that the
COMELEC Time should be considered as part
of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the
dissemination of public information and
education under their respective franchises or
permits. There is no reason to suppose that
92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC
Time therein provided to be otherwise than as
a public service which petitioner is required to
render under 4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252).
In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid
amendment of petitioners franchise but the
enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by
 petitioner in accepting a public grant of
privilege.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, Jan.
28, 2000
Facts:
This case involves the exit polls conducted by
ABS-CBN. A TRO was issued by COMELEC
against such activity and broadcasting for
possible conflict with the results of the count
made by COMELEC and Namfrel.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC can ban the
conduct of exit surveys?
Held/Ratio: NO
First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at
random, so that the results will as much as
possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or
group polled. Second, the survey result is not
meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled
individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections,
which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding
and the reporting of the results of exit polls
cannot undermine those of the elections, since
the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the
outcome of one can only be indicative of the
other.
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec
cannot, therefore, be justified.
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination
of their results through mass media constitute
an essential part of the freedoms of speech and
of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban
them totally in the guise of promoting clean,
honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite
the contrary, exit polls properly conducted
and publicized can be vital tools in
eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud.
Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize
or suppress the incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in
any manner the fundamental rights of our
people.
SWS v. COMELEC, GR No. 147571, May 5,
2001
Facts:
The case involves the validity of Section 5.4 of
RA9006 which provides that Surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days before an election.
Issue: W/N the assailed section is
constitutional?
Held/Ratio: NO
5.4Iays a prior restraint on freedom of speech,
expression, and the press prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a
national election seven (7) days before a local
election. Because of the preferred status of the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and
the press, such a measure is vitiated by a
weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any
system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy Presumption
against its constitutional validity
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C,
4 of the Constitution, which gives the
COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the
operation of media of communication, no
presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure
like 5.4.
For as we have pointed out in sustaining the
ban on media political advertisements, the
grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-
C, 4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity,
time, space, and the right to reply" as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the
use of such media facilities "public information
campaigns and forums among candidates.
5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is
a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the
 governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
Section 5. Favorable Recommendation for
Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of
Sentence
No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
Power of COMELEC to Recommend
Executive Clemency
Section 6. Free and Open Party System
A free and open party system shall be allowed
to evolve according to the free choice of the
people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771,
May 6, 2010
Facts:
The case involves the registration of
political coalitions, the grant of
accreditation to the dominant parties
and validity of the Comelec en bancs
authority to act on the registration of
political party coalitions.
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with
the COMELEC its petition for
accreditation as dominant minority
party. On the same date, the
Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)
filed a petition for registration as a
coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it
be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes of
the May 10, 2010 elections.
The Liberal Party, who was also
seeking accreditation as dominant
minority party, objected to this petition.
Held: In the absence of any note, explanation
or reason why the deadline only mentions
political parties, the term political parties
should be understood in its generic sense that
covers political organizations and political
coalitions as well.
Doctrine: The registration of political parties,
their accreditation as dominant parties, and the
benefits these recognitions provide constitute
distinct advantages to any party and its
candidates, if only in terms of the ready
information enabling them to react faster to
developing situations. To the public, the proper
registration and the accreditation of dominant
parties are evidence of equitable party
representation at the scene of electoral action,
and translate in no small measure to
transparency and to the elections credibility.
Section 7. No Block-Voting
No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system
as provided in this Constitution.
Section 8. Prohibition on Political Parties
Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not
be represented in the voters' registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards
of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.
Section 9. Election Period
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in
special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of
election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Power to Fix Election Period in Special
Cases
Election Period vs. Campaign Period
Election period refers to the period of
time needed for administering an
election. It can thus go beyond the date
for the casting of ballots.
Campaign period refers to the period
of active solicitation of votes. This may
be set by the legislature for a period
less than the election period (cannot
extend beyond the election day)
Section 10. No Harassment and
Chairman; and
Discrimination 2 Commissioners
Bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of Appointment:
harassment and discrimination. Appointed by the President with the
Equal protection of all candidates consent of the Commission on
Discrimination Appointments.
i.e. Unequal treatment in the availment Appointment to any vacancy:
of media facilities. Shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the
predecessor.
Section 11. Funds In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a
Funds certified by the Commission as temporary or acting capacity.
necessary to defray the expenses for holding
regular and special elections, plebiscites,
initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445
provided in the regular or special
appropriations and, once approved, shall be Facts:
released automatically upon certification by the The case involves the validity of COA Decision
Chairman of the Commission. No. 77-142, which signed only by the Manager,
Technical Service Office of the COA and was
later on ratified by then COA Chairman
Francisco T. Tantuico, Jr. to Atty. Juan T.
D. Commission of Audit David."
Held: The "Espiritu decision" was void ab
Section 1. Qualifications; Term initio.As manager of the COA Technical
Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no
Qualifications: power whatever to render and promulgate a
1. Natural-born citizens of the decision of or for the Commission. Indeed,
Philippines; even the Chairman, alone, had not that power.
2. At least 35 years of age at the time of As clearly set out in the Constitution then in
their appointment,; force, the power was lodged in the Commission
3. Certified Public Accountants with not on Audit, composed of a Chairman and two
less than 10 years of auditing Commissioners.
experience, or members of the
Philippine Bar who have been Doctrine: It was the Commission, as a
engaged in the practice of law for at collegial body, which then as now, had the
least 10 years; jurisdiction to decide any case brought before
4. Must not have been candidates for any it within sixty days from the date of its
elective position in the elections submission for resolution, subject to review by
immediately preceding their the Supreme Court on certiorari.
appointment.
(At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.) Section 2. General Function; Powers
Powers and Duties
Term: (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
7 years (without reappointment). power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
Of those first appointed: and settle all accounts pertaining to the
The Chairman shall hold office for 7 revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
years; uses of funds and property, owned or held in
1 Commissioner for five years: and trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
1 Commissioner for 3 years. any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned
Composition: or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post- audit basis: government expenditures;
(a) constitutional bodies, commissions To settle government accounts;
and offices that have been granted To define the scope of techniques for
fiscal autonomy under this its own auditing procedures;
Constitution; To promulgate accounting and
(b) autonomous state colleges and auditing rules including those for the
universities; prevention and disallowance of
(c) other government-owned or irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
controlled corporations and their extravagant, or unconscionable
subsidiaries; and expenditures,
(d) such non-governmental entities To decide administrative cases
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or involving expenditures of public funds.
indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by
law or the granting institution to submit Examine and Audit: Government revenues
to such audit as a condition of subsidy and Government expenditures
or equity.
Post-audit
The provision on post-audit is a
However, where the internal control system of
recognition of the fact that there are
the audited agencies is inadequate, the
certain government institutions which
Commission may adopt such measures,
can be hampered in their operation by
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
pre-audit requirements.
necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts
The COA has only post-audit authority over:
of the Government and, for such period as may
Constitutional bodies, commissions
be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
and offices that have been granted
other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution;
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive
Autonomous state colleges and
authority, subject to the limitations in this
universities;
Article, to define the scope of its audit and
Other government-owned controlled
examination, establish the techniques and
corporations and their subsidiaries;
methods required therefor, and promulgate
Such non-governmental entities
accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
including those for the prevention and
indirectly, from or through the
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
government, which are required by law
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
or by the granting institution to submit
expenditures or uses of government funds and
to such audit as a condition of
properties.
subsidy or equity.
General Function:
If the internal control system of audited
To examine the accuracy of the
agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
records kept by accountable officers
adopt such measures, including temporary or
and to determine whether
special pre-audit, as are necessary and
expenditures have been made in
appropriate to correct any deficiencies.
conformity with law.
It is therefore through the Commission
In cases where pre-audit is allowed and pre-
on Audit that the people can verify
audit has already been performed, the
whether their money has been properly
Commission is not estopped from making a
spent.
post-audit.
Classification of Functions:
Public corporations may employ private
To examine and audit all forms of
auditors (COA's power to examine and audit is
government revenues;
non-exclusive)
To examine and audit all forms of

While, the COA's authority to define the scope
of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive. However, the COA's
findings and conclusions necessarily prevail
over those of private auditors, at least insofar
as government agencies and officials are
concerned.
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Tantuico 163 SCRA
716 [1988]
Facts:
Sometime in 1976, respondent Acting
Chairman of the COA initiated a special audit
of coconut end-user companies, which include
petitioners, with respect to their Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections
and the subsidies they had received. The
petitioners question the respondents' authority
to audit them. They contend that they are
outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power
which is confined to government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Held: COA has authority to audit petitioners.
Doctrine: Private entities which handle
government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said
funds by the government auditors.
DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 [1994]
is thus of no moment. To begin with, there was
never any retroactive application of post-audit.
Doctrine:
Article IX(D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution
expressly grants respondent Commission the
power to conduct a post-audit.
To wit: Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit
shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit
basis:
(a) constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
(b) autonomous state colleges and
universities;
(c) other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
(d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by
law or the granting institution to submit
to such audit as a condition of subsidy
or equity x x x

Facts:
COA Circular No. 89-299 was passed lifting the Eslao v. COA 236 SCRA 161 [1994]
pre-audit of government transactions. A new
Facts:
Corporate Auditor was assigned to petitioner.
The case is a Petition for Certiorari filed by
After a post-audit, the new Corporate Auditor
Eslao in his capacity as President of the
sent an "Auditor's Notice to Person's Liable" to
Pangasinan State University ("PSU") to set
the Chairman of DBP notifying him of the
aside COA decisions which denied honoraria
disallowance of the amount of P246,539.25
and per diems claimed under National
representing customs duties and taxes and at
Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU
the same time holding him, along with the other
personnel including petitioner. The COA
petitioners herein, jointly and severally liable for
apparently does not agree with the policy basis
the aforesaid sum.
of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No. 80-4
since COA argues that loan proceeds
Held: Regardless of the result of the pre-audit,
regardless of source eventually become public
it cannot be denied that respondent COA is so
funds for which the government is accountable.
empowered to conduct a post-audit. DBP is no
The result would be that any provisions under
doubt a government corporation and the
any foreig] loan agreement should be
question of whether COA Circular 86-299 was
considered locally-funded.
retroactively applied to the subject transaction
 made a factual finding on the amount
Held: The COA is not authorized to substitute reasonably due to petitioner and scrutinized the
its own judgment for any applicable law or evidence to sustain the claim.
administrative regulation with the wisdom or
propriety of which it does not agree at least not Doctrine:
before such law or regulation is set aside by the Unliquidated claims present a
authorized agency of government as justiciable question ripe for judicial
unconstitutional or illegal and void. determination which is beyond the
powers of the COA to adjudicate.
Doctrine: The COA, like all other government Recovery based on quantum meruit is
agencies, must respect the presumption of in the nature of such claim because its
legality and constitutionality to which statutes settlement requires the application of
and administrative regulations are entitled until judgment and discretion and cannot be
such statute or regulation is repealed or adjusted by simple arithmetical
amended, or until set aside in an appropriate processes.
case by a competent court and ultimately the There is nothing in the cited cases
Court. which would imply that only the COA
can determine the specific amount due
to a contractor guided by the equitable
F.F. Manacop v. CA 266 SCRA 235 [1997] principle of quantum meruit.
Facts:
FF Manacop Construction Company
Inc, was contracted by MIAA to
construct a perimeter fence from Asia
Overseas Inc to Airscope Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan 265 SCRA 121
Development Corp. for and in [1996]
consideration of the quoted price of DBP v. COA, 422 SCRA 459 [2004]
307,440.00. Due to the urgency of the Home Development Mutual Fund v. COA, GR
need, petitioner proceeded with the 142297, June 15, 2004
fence construction even if the Notice to DBP v. COA 498 SCRA 537 [2006]
Proceed has not yet been signed by
Nava v. Palattao 499 SCRA 745 [2006]
the General Manager. By the time of
the halt in construction it is already
95% finished which was worth
282,068.00.
During trial it has been found that MIAA
is liable to pay 238,501.48 based upon Gualberto De Llana v. COA, GR 180989, 7 Feb.
quantum meruit since there is an 2012
absence of a written contract between
parties. On appeal the Appellate Court
held that the computation for the
obligation owed by MIAA should be
Candelario L. Versoza Jr. v. Guillermo N
referred to the Commission on Audit.
Held: No need to refer to COA since the LC Carague, GR 157838, 7 February 2012
has already determined the actual amount
owed by MIAA to FMCC. In the cases of Eslao
and Royal Trust, the Court found it necessary
to refer to the COA the task of determining the Philippine Coconut v. Republic 663 SCRA
total compensation due to the claimants 514 [2012]
considering that the matter on the exact
amount was not at issue and the determination
thereof involves a review of the factual findings
and evidence in support thereof. On the other
hand, the lower court in this case, had already
Audit Jurisdiction

The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under
this Constitution; (b) autonomous state
colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of
the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies.
It shall keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period as may be
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
Mamaril v. Domingo 227 SCRA 206[1993]
The Commission shall have exclusive
authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties
Caltex v. COA 208 SCRA 726 [1992]
COA sent a letter to Caltex, directing it to remit
its collection to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF), excluding that unremitted for the years
1986 and 1988, of the additional tax on
petroleum products authorized under the PD
1956
Pending such remittance, all of its claims for
reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in
abeyance. The grant total of its unremitted
collections of the above tax is P1,287,668,820.
Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the
payment and the recovery of claims.
COA approved the proposal but prohibited
Caltex from further offsetting remittances and
reimbursements for the current and ensuing
years. Caltex moved for reconsideration but
was denied.
ISSUE: WON COA has authority to disallow it?
YES
DOCTRINE:
COAs powers under the Constitution are
broader and more extensive than the ones
under 1973 Constitution.
Indeed, when the framers of the last two (2)
Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more
active role and invested it with broader and
more extensive powers, they did not intend
merely to make the COA a toothless tiger, but
rather envisioned a dynamic, effective, efficient
and independent watchdog of the Government.
Narciso Mamaril was formerly an
Evaluator/Computer of the LTO at its San
Pablo City Branch. In the course of the
performance of his duties, he committed errors
in his evaluation and computation, resulting in
the under collection of registration, license and
other miscellaneous fees and penalties.
Petitioner availed of the Early Retirement
Program under RA 6683.
As a result of the decision of the COA, holding
that the amount of P44,515.90 be withheld from
petitioners terminal leave pay other than his
retirement gratuity, he has not received in full
the benefits due him from his retirement.
 Petitioner contended that he could not be held
liable on the audit disallowances because he
was not an accountable officer within the
meaning of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445 (1978)
since: (a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he did
not come into possession of any money or
property for which he is now asked to pay; and
(c) he did not act in bad faith or with gross
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA has the power
over non accountable officers? YES
DOCTRINE:
The responsibility for state audit is vested by
the Constitution on the COA. State audit is
not limited to the auditing of the accountable
officers and the settlement of accounts, but
includes accounting functions and the
adoption in the audited agencies of internal
controls to see to it that the correct fees and
penalties due the government are collected.
The verification of the correctness of the
evaluation and computation of the fees and
penalties collectible under the Land
Transportation Law are parts of the
functions of the COA, which examines and
audits revenue accounts.
When any person is indebted to any
government agency, the COA may direct the
proper officer to withhold the payment of any
money due such person or his estate to be
applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
Philippine Airlines v. COA 245 SCRA 39
[1995]
FACTS:
PAL usually gets their fuel supply from Petron,
Caltex and Shell
But COA issued a directive mandating PAL to
CIR v. COA 218 SCRA 203 [1993]
only get fuel supply from PETROPHIL Corp
(PETRON) because according to existing
government regulations, all government
institutions shall only procure fuel from
PETRON
ISSUE: WON COA has exceeded their
jurisdiction NO; but because of PALs
justifications, they are not covered with said
directive; moreover, the case has been moot
and academic
DOCTRINE:
The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the
"exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in
this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules, and regulations
including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties."
The authority granted under this constitutional
provision, being broad and comprehensive
enough, enables COA to adopt as its own,
simply by reiteration or by reference, without
the necessity of repromulgation, already
existing rules and regulations.
It may also expand the coverage thereof to
agencies or instrumentalities under its
audit jurisdiction.
Its multiple supplier set-up was designed
precisely to meet every contingency that might
disrupt its fuel supply.
It bespoke of foresight, careful planning and
sound business judgment on the part of PAL.
As a business operation heavily dependent on
fuel supply, for PAL to rely solely on a single
supplier would indeed be impracticable.
To compel it to do so would amount to a grave
abuse of discretion on its part as this might well
lead to irregular, excessive or unconscionable
expenditures, the very evil sought to be
avoided in the creation of the COA.
Repeat case
The issues joined in these consolidated
petitions focus, as it were, on the general audit amount of revenues actually received, the net
jurisdiction of the Commission of Audit vis-a-vis effect is that the government still gains from the
the Bureau of Internal Revenue's power to remaining amount paid, which otherwise would
determine entitlement to the tax informer's have been lost to it.
reward under Section 316 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner Tirso B. Savellano furnished the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with a CSC v. Pobre, GR 160568, Sept. 15, 2004
confidential affidavit of information2
denouncing the National Coal Authority (NCA)
Repeat case
and the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC) for non-payment of taxes totalling
Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former
P234 Million on interest earnings of their
government official who retired from the
respective money placements with the
government service three times
Philippine National Bank (PNB)
He was a retired COA Commissioner,
Then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr.
Chairman of Board of Accountancy and
recommended to the Minister of Finance
Associated Commissioner of PRC
payment to petitioner Savellano of an
On his third retirement, respondent Pobre
informer's reward equivalent to 15% of the
claimed payment of his terminal leave based
amount of P15,986,165.00 paid by NCA, or
on his highest monthly salary as PRC chairman
P2,397,924.75
but to be reckoned from the date he first
This was approved by the Department of
entered the government service as budget
Finance
examiner in the defunct Budget Commission in
respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
1958
rendered COA Decision No. 7407 disallowing
CSC: DENIED, only from the time he assumed
in audit the payment of informer's reward to
as PRC commissioner
petitioner Savellano in the NCA case on the
Pobre challenged CSCs jurisdiction, saying it
ground that payment of an informer's reward
was COA which has jurisdiction
under Section 281 of the National Internal
Revenue Code is conditioned upon the actual
ISSUE: WON COA has jurisdiction YES
recovery or collection of revenues, and no such
revenue or income was actually realized or
DOCTRINE:
recovered on any benefit accrued to the
While the determination of leave benefits is
government
within the functions of the CSC as the central
ISSUE: WON COA has authority to disallow the
personnel agency of the government, the duty
payment? YES; WON the disallowance was
to examine accounts and expenditures relating
valid? NO
to such benefits properly pertains to the COA.
DOCTRINE:
Where government expenditures or use of
The exercise by respondent COA of its general
funds is involved, the CSC cannot claim
audit power is among the constitutional
exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave
mechanisms that give life to the check-and-
matters are involved.
balance system inherent in a republican form
Thus, even as we recognize CSCs jurisdiction
of government such as ours.
in this case, its power is not exclusive as it is
Taken in this light, such exercise cannot be
shared with the COA.
regarded as an unlawful or unwarranted
invasion of, or interference with, the authority
and power of the executive agency concerned
to determine whether or not a person is entitled
to a reward provided by law and the amount Luciano Velos, et al. v. Commission On Audit,
thereof
GR 193677,6 Sept. 20011
However, the delinquencies of these agencies
are not condoned, much less rewarded. It is the
person whose information led to the discovery Repeat case
of their transgressions who is being rewarded.
Although this results in a reduction in the the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the
Conferment of Exemplary Public Service
Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who
Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive
Terms in the Same Position
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of
Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time
served in the position for three (3)
consecutive terms, subject to the availability
of funds as certified by the City Treasurer
It even made partial payments
But this was being questioned for being
excessive and tantamount to double
compensation
COA: it was deemed double compensation
ISSUE: WON COA has authority to disallow the
disbursement YES
DOCTRINE:
COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the
government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise
covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy,
autonomous state colleges and universities,
other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, and such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity from or through the government
The power of the COA to examine and audit
government agencies cannot be taken away
from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution mandates that no law shall be
passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the [COA].
pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of
public funds, the COA is vested with broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the
uses of public funds and property.
This includes the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for such
review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations
The Court had therefore previously upheld the
authority of the COA to disapprove payments
which it finds excessive and disadvantageous
to the Government; to determine the meaning
of public bidding and when there is failure in the
bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds
unnecessary
Boy Scout of the Philippines v. COA, GR
177131, 7 June 2011
Repeat case
A COA Resolution was issued whereby the
COA is to conduct an annual financial audit of
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) in
accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. BSP is now questioning whether it
can be subject to thre COAs audit jurisdiction?
Does the BSP fall under the COAs audit
jurisdiction?
YES
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are
subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the COA has jurisdiction
over the BSP
HELD: Yes
POLITICAL LAW: Jurisdiction of COA
After looking at the legislative history of its
amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both
parties, we find that the BSP is a public
corporation and its funds are subject to the
COAs audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111,
approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An
Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known
as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to
Define its Powers and Purposes" created the
BSP as a "public corporation"
There are three classes of juridical persons
under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP,
as presently constituted under Republic Act No.
7278,falls under the second
classification.Article 44 reads:

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities
for public interest or purpose created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and
associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member.
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a
public interest or purpose, is subject to the law
creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1
and 2 of the preceding article are governed by
the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of
general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning
partnerships.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its
amended charter shows that it was created in
order to implement a State policy declared in
Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which
reads:
Dela Llana v. COA 665 SCRA 176 [2012]
Repeat case
FACTS:
In 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002,
which reinstituted the selective pre-audit of
government transactions in view of the rising
incidents of irregular, illegal, wasteful and
anomalous disbursements of huge amounts of
public funds and disposals of public property. 2
years later, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002,
which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions implemented by Circular No.
2009-002. Petitioner alleges that the pre-audit
duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by
a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2
of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate on the COA. NO.
DOCTRINE:
There is nothing in Sec. 2 of Article IX-D that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference
to a pre-audit requirement is found in Sec. 2,
par. 1, which provides that a post-audit is
mandated for certain government or private
entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited
entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the
deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit
is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on
its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination
Settle Government Account
Philippine Operations, Inc. v. Auditor General,
94 Phil 868 [1953-1954]
Repeat case
Petitioner claims unliquidated damages for the
failure of Burau of Prisons to deliver sawed
lumber.
In these cases involving unliquidated
damages, the most important questions to be
determined are judicial in nature, involving the
examination of evidence and the use of judicial
discretion. To assume that the legislature
granted this jurisdiction to an administrative
officer like the Auditor General is not
 warranted, because it would amount to an
illegal act, as a delegation of judicial power to
an executive officer. If the power were
interpreted as having been granted to the
Auditor General to pass upon the rights of
private persons, without the judicial process
established by the Constitution and the laws,
private parties would be deprived of their
property without due process of law. The term
used under the law is moneyed claims
ICNA v. Republic, 21 SCRA 40 [1967]
Repeat case
Consignee filed a claim against the Bureau of
Customs, as arrastre operator.
NHC v. COA 226 SCRA 55 [1993]
The Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau
of Customs, answered and alleged among
others, non-suability and non-compliance with
Act 3083, which requires money claims to be
filed with the Auditor General.
On grounds of public policy, the Republic of the
Philippines or its agencies, may not be sued for
the performance of arrastre operations as a
function necessarily incidental to the
governmental function of taxation.
Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782 [1988]
Layson was hired as a casual employee in the
Bureau of Treasury Office in order to do away
with the hiring of a private carpenter and
electrician. COA subsequently reduced his
daily rate for being "excessive and
disadvantageous to the government
Not only is the Commission on Audit (COA)
vested with the power and authority, but it is
also charged with the duty, to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to ... the
expenditures or uses of funds ... owned ... by,
or pertaining to, the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities
(Article IX [D], Section 2 [1],1987 Constitution).
That authority extends to the accounts of all
persons respecting funds or properties
received or held by them in an accountable
capacity (Section 26, P. D. No. 1445). In the
exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines
whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests
directly with the head of the government
agency has been properly and effectively
discharged (Section 25.), and whether or not
there has been loss or wastage of government
resources. It is also empowered to review and
evaluate contracts (Section 18 [4].).
Petitioner argues that the renewal of the loan
agreement with the KFW would have been
jeopardized if it did not agree to the extension
of the services of Engr. Murdoch. The petition
at bar assails the disallowance by the
respondent COA of a contract extending the
services of a foreign consultant.
The power of the Commission on Audit to
audit and examine government
expenditures is enshrined in Section 2 (1),
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The
Constitution also granted to COA the power
to "promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for
the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties."
Pursuant to the said constitutional mandate,
COA promulgated Circular No. 88-55-A dated
September 8, 1985 defining the term
"unnecessary" expenditures, Unnecessary
expenditures are those not supportive of the
implementation of the objectives and mission of
the agency relative to the nature of its
operation. . An expenditure that is not essential
or that which can be dispensed with without
 loss or damage to property is considered governed by the Local Government Code
unnecessary. provisions on supply and property
management and their implementing rules and
There can be no dispute on the proposition that regulations promulgated by the COA pursuant
the continued extension of the services of Engr. to Section 383 of said Code.
Murdoch as a foreign consultant constitutes an
unnecessary expense. Crystal clear from the
records is that the nature of the terminal phase
of the Dagat-Dagatan project does not require Define Scope and Techniques of Auditing
the expertise of a foreign consultant. Procedures

Euro-Med v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA The power of the Commission to define the
30 [2006] scope of its audit and to promulgate auditing
rules and regulations and the power to disallow
unnecessary expenditures, is exclusive, but its
This case is a complaint for sum of money filed power to examine and audit is not exclusive.
by petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc.
against respondent Province of Batangas. The
resolution of this case turns on whether it is the
COA or the RTC which has primary jurisdiction Danville Maritime v. COA,175 SCRA 701 [1989]
to pass upon petitioners money claim against
the Province of Batangas. SC ruled that COA
Petitioner seeks to set aside the letter-directive
has jurisdiction
of respondent COA disapproving the result of
the public bidding held by the PNOC of the sale
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if
of its tanker-vessel "T/T Andres Bonifacio" on
a case is such that its determination requires
the ground that only one bidder submitted a bid
the expertise, specialized training and
and to direct COA to approve the said sale.
knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative
1988 Amendments to the Implementing Rules
proceeding before resort to the courts is had
and Regulations to P.D. No. 1594 (Prescribing
even if the matter may well be within their
Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for
proper jurisdiction.
Government Infrastructure Contracts provides:
At the time of opening of bids, there shall be at
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of
least two (2) competing bidders. In case there
a claim for a certain amount of money against
is only one bidder, the bid shall be returned
a local government unit. This brought the case
unopened and the project shall be advertised
within the COAs domain to pass upon money
anew for bidding.
claims against the government or any
subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the
SC sees no reason to disturb the interpretation
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:
given by the COA to the term "public bidding"
and what constitutes its "failure." The
The authority and powers of the
Constitution has ordained that the COA
Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and
shall have exclusive authority to define the
comprehend all matters relating to x x x x
scope of its audit and examination,
the examination, audit, and settlement of all
establish the techniques and methods
debts and claims of any sort due from or
required therefore, and promulgate
owing to the Government or any of its
accounting and auditing rules and
subdivisions, agencies, and
regulations, including those for the
instrumentalities.
prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
Second, petitioners money claim was founded
unconscionable expenditures, or use of
on a series of purchases for the medical
government funds and properties.
supplies of respondents public hospitals. Both
parties agreed that these transactions were
Promulgate Accounting and Auditing Rules
This includes those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
expensive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds
or property.
Leycano v. COA, 482 SCRA 215
Petitioner Manuel Leycano, Jr. was the
Provincial Treasurer of Oriental Mindoro and at
the same time a member of the Provincial
School Board (PSB) of that province
Inspectorate Team which, according to him,
had the function of monitoring the progress of
PSB projects.
In the year 1995, several checks were issued
to various private contractors in connection
with the repair, rehabilitation, and construction
projects covered by the Special Education
Fund (SEF) of public schools in Oriental
Mindoro. The Special Audit Team, COA
Regional Office No. IV found deficiencies in the
projects.
In light of this function of the Inspectorate
Team, its members may be held liable by the
COA for any irregular expenditure of the SEF if
their participation in such irregularity can be
established. While petitioner, in his capacity as
member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an
accountable officer he may, nonetheless, be
held liable by the COA under the broad
jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution.
COA has jurisdiction to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by,
or pertaining to, the Government. The
authority of the COA to hold petitioner liable
is also implied in its duty to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
Decide Administrative Cases Involving
Expenditures of Public Funds
NCMH v. COA, 265 SCRA 390 [1996]
An increase in its budgetary allocation of from
P145 million in 1987 to P191 million in 1988
enabled petitioner NCMHM, headed by Dr.
Brigida Buenaseda, to finally undertake the
rehabilitation, apparently long overdue, of
various facilities in the NCMHM.
COA adopted the findings of SAT. Petitioners
argue that findings and recommendations of
the SAT (Special Audit Team) have been made
without fully appreciating the circumstances
peculiarly attendant to the operation of the
center: Incurrence of unnecessary,
extravagant and excessive expenditures in
violation of COA Circular No. 85-55A.
COA Circular: Unnecessary expenditures are
those not supportive of the implementation of
the objectives and mission of the agency
relative to the nature of its operation.
SC ruled: While the items for renovation and
improvement of the center, on the surface,
might seem not too urgent in nature,
petitioners, however, did plausibly come out
with the fact that the questioned transactions
were indeed long overdue. The delay made it
most compelling to fast track what had been felt
to be essential in providing due and proper
treatment and care for the center's patients.
Nothing before us suggests, even remotely,
that the disbursements have been made for
personal or selfish ends. Decision of COA is set
aside.
Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 [1971]
FACTS:
The provincial fiscal of Rizal wanted to conduct
a preliminary investigation against petitioners
even after the Auditor General approved the
vouchers subject to an alleged malversation by
the petitioners. They allege that it is the AUditor
General, and not the fiscal, who has the
responsibility to determine whether criminal
 responsibility for the anomaly discovered in the
courage of his audit.
DOCTRINE:
The fiscal has the authority to investigate
whether a criminal act had been committed or
not in the disbursement of public funds, and the
Courts to try any person involved in the alleged
malversation of public funds. This is not
curtailed by the administrative findings of the
Auditor General.
Salva v. Carague, 511 SCRA 258
FACTS:
Salva was the president of Palawan State
University, and was held to be personally liable
for the excess amount in the building of a multi-
purpose building in PSU. She contested the
computation, as well as her personal liability to
pay the excess, amounting to P274K.
DOCTRINE:
While the COA has the authority to make an
Approved Agency Estimates (AAE), the same
can exceed when there is justifiable reason to
do so. Likewise, the petitioner justified the
additional costs, such as the need to construct
temporary roadway for heavy equipment, thus
making it important to pay for the additional
costs. Likewise, there was no showing that
there were disbursements made for personal or
selfish gain.
City of Basilan v. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711
[1974]
FACTS:
The City Council of Basilan passed an
ordinance creating the position of Asst. City
Auditor, to which Antonio was appointed. A few
years later, the city enacted another ordinance,
this time abolishing the position of Asst. City
Auditor.
DOCTRINE:
The office of the Asst. City Auditor is not just a
municipal creation. It is part and parcel of a
highly responsible task, national in scope, that
of auditing. This is provided for by the
Constitution, and the Administrative Code.
Where ordinance conflicts with statute,
ordinance must give way. Municipal
Corporations are without authority to abolish,
by ordinance, position or office created by
statute.
Section 3. COA Jurisdiction
Luciano Veloso v. Commission on Audit, GR
193677, 6 September 2011
FACTS:
The City of Manila passed an ordinance
authorizing the conferment of Exemplary
Service Award (EPSA) to elective officials of
the city who have been elected for three
consecutive terms. Their pay was equivalent to
the time served in the position for three
consecutive terms.
DOCTRINE:
The COA is vested with authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs,
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of these funds. LGUs,
although with fiscal autonomy, are still within
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
The COA is vested with authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs,
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 4. Annual Report to the President and
to Congress
Supreme Court to submit, within 30 days from
the opening of each regular session of
Congress, to the President and to Congress an
annual report on the operations and activities
of the Judiciary.
Unido v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Osmena v. COMELEC 199 SCRA 750 [1991]
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR
No. 119654, May 22, 1995
Telecom v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337 [1998]
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, Jan.
28, 2000
SWS v. COMELEC, GR No. 147571, May 5,
2001
Section 5. Favorable Recommendation for
Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of
Sentence

Section 6. Free and Open Party System

Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771,
May 6, 2010

Section 7. No Block-Voting

Section 8. Prohibition on Political Parties

Section 9. Election Period

Section 10. No Harassment and

Discrimination

Section 11. Funds