Possessors and Users of
animals
Vestil v. IAC Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog
while she was playing with the child of
Vestils
Rushed to Cebu Gen Hosp
Treated for multiple lacerated wounds
on the forehead
Discharged after 9 days, but
readmitted because she started
vomiting of saliva
Child died
Cause of death: broncho-pneumonia
Uy v Vestils
Vestils: Andoy was a tamed animal,
no one witnessed it bite Theness
CFI Cebu: dismissed
IAC: reversed
Vestils were in possession of the
house and the dog and so should
be responsible under 2183 for the
injuries caused by the dog
Died as a result of dog bites
Ordered to pay damages 30k
W/n Vestils can be held liable for damages
YES
Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his estate
has not yet been partitioned and there are other
heirs to the property.
even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog
simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs
However, that is hardly the point. What must be
determined is the possession of the dog that
admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the
house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage which
it may cause, although it may escape or be lost.
'This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damages should come from force majeure from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City
and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her
own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house,
once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, and used it virtually as a second house.
Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the

Owners of Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers and
Processors
Coca-Cola Bottlers v CA
Geronimo- proprietess of
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen
- Sale of soft drinks and other
goods
Discovered presence of fiber-like
substances in the contents of some
unopened Coke bottles and plastic
matter in Sprite
DOH: adulterated
Sustained losses: from 10 cases to 2
to 3 cases a day
Closed shop, became jobless
Geronimo v Coca-cola for damages
Coca-cola: MTD: based on breach for
warranty, should have been filed
within 6 mos (1571)
RTC: granted MTD
CA reversed
house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by
the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until
1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is
also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist
the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although
Purita said she knew them only casually.
Ausal connection between dog bites and death:
The Court need not involve itself in an extended
scientific discussion of the causal connection
between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death except to note that, first, Theness developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the
dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was
a complication of rabies.
Prescribed?
No.
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of
action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore,
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it
prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the
allegations in the complaint, more particularly
paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated
food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with
respect to the warranties against hidden defects of
or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited
to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code
which provides:
- Existence of contract does not
bar action for quasi-delict
- Quasi-delict: 4 yrs
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562,
1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect
between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price,
with damages either
case.
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the
contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case
the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
14 Under the law on obligations, responsibility
arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations
and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Responsibility arising from negligence is also
demandable in any obligation, but such liability may
be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay in the performance of their obligations and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages.
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While
it may be true that the pre-existing contract
between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the
applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability
may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e.,
the acts which breaks the contract may also be a
quasi-delict.
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer
or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other
grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as
culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-
delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under
the common law, which includes not only

Municipal Corporations
RA 7160, Section 24
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death
or injury to persons or damage to property.
City of Manila v Teotico
RA 409:
The city shall not be liable
or held for damages or
injuries to persons or
property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any
other city officer, to enforce
the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said
provisions.
2189
Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by
reason of defective
conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings,
and other public works
under their control or
supervision.
Teotico was waiting for a jeepney to
take him down town.
When he was about to board
jeepney, after a few steps, he fell
inside an uncovered and unlighted
catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos
Ave
His eyeglasses were broken
- Pierced his left eyelid, impaired Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
his vision
Contusions on the left thigh, arm,
leg, and lip
Allergic eruptions caused by anti-
tetanus injections
Teotico v City of Manila, mayor, city
engineer, health officer, treasurer,
chief of police
CFI dismissed
- Reports of iron covers missing,
immediately attended to
- Changes made in the position of
catchbasins to prevent theft
CA affirmed, except City of Manila
- Ordered to pay P6,750
negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
whether the present case is governed by Section 4
of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) or 2189 of Civil Code?
2189.
Section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence,
in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas
streets," in particular. Since the present action is
based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
W/N City of Manila can be held liable to Teotico for
damages:
1) The accident involving him took place in a
national highway.
- Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is
not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province,
city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city
or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore,
a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from its
"control or supervision" by the City of

Jimenez v City of Manila
Guilatco v City of Dagupan
Jimenez went to Sta. Ana public
market to buy bagoong at the time
when said market was flooded with
ankle deep rainwater
Stepped on uncovered opening
which could not be seen because of
the dirty rainwater
- Nail pierced left leg
- Felt ill, confined at Vet Med for
20 days; high fever and severe
pain
Jimenez v City of Manila Asiatic
Integrated Corp under whose admin
the public market had been placed
by virtue of contract
CFI: dismissed
CA: only Asiatic liable
Guilatco, court interpreter, while she
Manila
- "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and
the storm drains and manholes thereof
covered by the defendant City and the
officers concerned" who "have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance
of their respective functions and duties
as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the
City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its
control and supervision.
2) Negligence decided affirmative by the CA.
W/N City of Manila jointly and severally liable with
Asiatic for injuries petitioner suffered
YES.
City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation
being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code
It appears evident that the City of Manila is likewise
liable for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, respondent City having retained control and
supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as
tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were
no openings in the middle of the passageways and if
any, that they were adequately covered. Had the
opening been covered, petitioner could not have
fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of
Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered,
the City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by
the peti- 4 petitioner.
W/N control or supervision over a national road by
 was about to board a tricycle,
accidentally fell into a manhole
located on the sidewalk
- Fractured her right leg
- Lost several punds
- Unable to perform religious,
social activities
- Unable to report to work
Said manhole was partially covered
by concrete flower pot
Tangco, City Engineer admitted the
existence of manhole, and that it
was owned by natl govt
- Supervises the maintenance of
manholes
TC: City of Dagupan liable for actual,
moral, exemplary damages,
dismissed against city engineer
CA: Reversed; no evidence was
presented to prove that the City of
Dagupan had "control or
supervision" over Perez Boulevard
National road= not under control or
supervision
the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city
to answer for damages in accordance with article
2189 of the Civil Code
YES.
The liability of public corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from
the defective condition of roads is expressed in the
2189 Civil Code.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City
Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway
Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau
of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as
Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the
following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from
Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public
Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works
and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively."
This function of supervision over streets, public
buildings, and other public works pertaining to the
City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance
Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although
these last two officials are employees of the National
Government, they are detailed with the City of
Dagupan and hence receive instruction and
supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer
exercises control or supervision over the public
works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to
the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is
clear.
Building Proprietors
De Roy v CA
Engineers/Architects/Contra
ctors
Juan Nakpil and Sons v CA
The applicable law
governing the rights and
liabilities of the parties
herein is Article 1723 of the
New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 1723. The engineer or
architect who drew up the
plans and specifications for
a building is liable for
damages if within fifteen
years from the completion
of the structure the same
The firewall of a burned-out building
owned by De Roy collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of Bernal
- Injuries
- Death of Marissa Bernal,
daughter
Bernals had been warned to vacate
their shop in view of their proximity
to the weakened wall; failed to do so
RTC: De Roy liable, gross negligence
CA affirmed
Philippine Bar Association decided to
construct an office building on its lot
in Intramuros
The construction was undertaken on
administration basis, as suggested
by Carlos as president of said corp
Proposal approved by PBA
Juan Nakpil and Sons prepared the
plans and specifications for the
building
Completed on June 1966
1986, earthquake
Building sustained major damage
Tenants vacated
Shored up by United Construction
PBA v United and president for
De Roy liabe?
YES
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument
that private respondents had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the
warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded,
since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable
to this case.
whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong
earthquake-which caused the failure of the building,
exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise
liable because of their negligence
No
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article
1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation
due to an "act of God," the following must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event
must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and (d) the debtor must be free from any
should collapse by reason
of a defect in those plans
and specifications, or due
to the defects in the
ground. The contractor is
likewise responsible for the
damage if the edifice fags
within the same period on
account of defects in the
construction or the use of
materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to
any violation of the terms
of the contract. If the
engineer or architect
supervises the
construction, he shall be
solidarily liable with the
contractor.
Acceptance of the building,
after completion, does not
imply waiver of any of the
causes of action by reason
of any defect mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought
within ten years following
the collapse of the building.
damages arising from partial
collapse of the building
- Defects in the construction, the
failure of the contractors to
follow plans and specifications
and violations of terms of
contract
United filed against Juan Nakpil and
Sons architects who prepared the
plans and specifications, including
Ozeta, president of United
Commissioner findings:
- while the damage sustained by
the PBA building was caused
directly by the August 2, 1968
earthquake whose magnitude
was estimated at 7.3 they were
also caused by the defects in
the plans and specifications
prepared by Nakpils' architects,
deviations from said plans and
specifications by the United
contractors and failure of the
latter to observe the requisite
workmanship in the
construction of the building and
of the contractors, architects
and even the owners to exercise
the requisite degree of
supervision in the construction
of subject building.
TC: agreed with Commisioner except
as to the holding that the owner is
charged with full nine supervision of
the construction
The amicus curiae gave the opinion
that the plans and specifications of
the Nakpils were not defective. But
the Commissioner, when asked by
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.
The negligence of the defendant and the third-party
defendants petitioners was established beyond
dispute both in the lower court and in the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United
Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made
substantial deviations from the plans and
specifications and to have failed to observe the
requisite workmanship in the construction as well as
to exercise the requisite degree of supervision; while
the third-party defendants were found to have
inadequacies or defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by them. As correctly
assessed by both courts, the defects in the
construction and in the plans and specifications were
the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building
unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2,
1968. For this reason the defendant and third-party
defendants cannot claim exemption from liability.
We deem it reasonable to render a decision
imposing, as We do hereby impose, upon the
defendant United and Nakpil (with the exception of
Roman Ozaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723, Civil Code)
indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association
 Us to comment, reiterated his
conclusion that the defects in the
plans and specifications indeed
existed.

1. The findings of the commissioner negate the

premise that, the subject building collapsed;
hence, article 1723 does not apply.

UNITED wishes to stress that subject building did not

disintegrate completely as the term "collapse" is
supposed to connote.

On April 30, 1970 the building was authorized by the

trial court to be demolished at the expense of the
plaintiff. Note that a needed demolition is in fact a
form of "collapse".

The bone of contention is therefore, not on the fact

of collapse but on who should shoulder the damages
resulting from the partial and eventual collapse. As
ruled by this Court in said decision, there should be
no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are liable
for the damage.

2. The legal duty of PBA to provide fulltime and

active supervision in the construction of the
subject building is imiposed by public
intterest usage and custom; failing in that
duty, pba must bear and/or share in any
liability for damages in the premises.

- Apart from the fact that UNITED seems

to have completely contradicted its own
view that this construction involves
highly technical matters and therefore
beyond the ambit of ordinary
understanding and experience, the
contrary appears to be more in accord

Abuse of Rights and acts
contra bonos mores
(against good morals)
Rellosa v Pellosis
Pellosis, etc.- lessees o land owned
by Marta Reyes
Pellosis built their houses
Marta died, Victor inherited
Victor informed Pellosis that they
would have a right of first refusal for
being lessees for more than 20 yrs
Without knowledge of Pellosis, etc.,
with ordinary practice, which is to avail
oneself of the services of architects and
engineers whose training and expertise
make them more qualified to provide
effective supervision of the construction.
In fact, it was on the suggestion of Juan
F. Nakpil, one of the petitioners herein,
that the construction was undertaken on
an administration basis. Thus, the trial
court did not err in holding that charging
the owner with fun time supervision of
the construction has no legal or
contractual basis
3. Liability, if any, for the damage of the subject
building must be borne by all the parties in
accordance with the commissioner's findings
and with due regard to the condition of the
building prior to PBA's demolition
thereof.
- It was held that such wanton negligence
of both the defendant and the third-party
defendants in effecting the plans,
designs, specifications, and construction
of the PBA building is equivalent to bad
faith in the performance of their
respective tasks
W/N the premature demolition of respondents'
houses entitled them to the award of damages
YES
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity
guaranteed under a constitution, statute or
decisional law, or recognized as a result of long
 the land was sold to Ortega who was
able to secure title
Ortega filed petition for
condemnation of structures
Pellosis filed declaration of nullity of
sale predicated on their right of first
refusal
Office of the Bldg: ordered
demolition
Timely intervention of Western Police
District, the demolition was stopped
because the order was not yet final
and executory
Pellosis appealed
Rellosa and Ortega proceeded with
the demolition
Pellosis filed for damages before the
RTC
RTC: dismissed, ordered Pellosis to
pay Rellosa (father of Ortega) and
Ortega moral damages
CA: reversed
usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of
one person against another.
Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land,
with the right to enjoy and to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof,but the
exercise of these rights is not without
limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to
act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. When a right is
exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held
accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so
much about the existence of the right or validity of
the order of demolition as the question of whether or
not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and
not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of
the Civil Code.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of
demolition, barely five days after respondents
received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final
and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day
appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official
but by the precipitate action of petitioners in
demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the
expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were
effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
the order of demolition was later affirmed by the
Department of Public Works and Highways was of no
moment. The action of petitioners up to the point
where they were able to secure an order of
demolition was not condemnable but implementing
the order unmindful of the right of respondents to
contest the ruling was a different matter and could
only be held utterly indefensible.
Cebu Country Club v
Elizagaque
Article 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the
performance of his duties,
act with justice, give
everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good
faith.
Article 21. Any person who
willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or
public policy shall
compensate the latter for
the damage.
Ricardo Elizagaque was designated
as as a special non-proprietary
member of San Miguel Corp
Filed application for proprietary
membership with CCCI
Bought P3M share of a certain Dr.
Butalid
Proprietray Ownership Certificate
was issued to Elizagaque
The board deferred and disapproved
application
Letter of reconsideration
CCCI did not reply
Filed with RTC for damages against
CCCI
RTC: ordered CCCI to pay Elizagaque
CA: affirmed
whether in disapproving respondents application for
proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are
liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether
their liability is joint and several
YES, jointly and severally.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to
respondent despite the lack of evidence that they
acted in bad faith in disapproving the latters
application; and in disregarding their defense of
damnum absque injuria.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret
balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting
wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot
box. A white ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black ball means
disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended,
cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is
required. When respondents application for
proprietary membership was voted upon during the
Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of
unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its
Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or
disapprove an application for proprietary
membership. But such right should not be exercised
arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
In rejecting respondents application for proprietary
membership, we find that petitioners violated
the rules governing human relations, the basic
principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for

Nikko Hotel v Reyes
Doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria
The doctrine of volenti non
fit injuria (to which a
person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury)
refers to self-inflicted injury
or to the consent to injury
which precludes the
recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and
Mr. Reyes was allegedly invited by
Dr. Filart to a party at the hotel s
penthouse in celebration of birthday
of hotels manager, Mr. Tsuruoka
He then carried the basket of fruits
which was Filaryts present for the
celebrant
Inside the penthouse, Ruby Lim told
him to leave the party
Reyes tried to explain that he was
invited by Filart but Filart ignored
him
Policeman escorted him
the stability of social order. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals aptly held that
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad
faith in disapproving respondents
applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable
for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section
3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special
or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to
CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the
required number of votes needed for admission of
an applicant as a proprietary member.
As to petitioners reliance on the principle of
damnum absque injuria or damage without injury,
suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In
Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does
not apply when there is an abuse of a persons right,
as in this case.
W/N Hotel and Lim are liable?
No
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim
acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a.
Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not
invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming
liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable,
whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is
solidarily liable with her.
Article 21refers to acts contra bonus mores and has
voluntarily exposed himself
to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As
formulated by petitioners,
however, this doctrine does
not find application to the
case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to
leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of
the New Civil Code, were
still under obligation to
treat him fairly in order not
to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
Filed for damages P1M actual, 1M
moral and exemplary plus attys fees
RTC: dismissed
CA: reversed
- the actuation of Ms. Lim in
approaching several people to
inquire into the presence of Mr.
Reyes exposed the latter to
ridicule and was uncalled for as
she should have approached Dr.
Filart first and both of them
should have talked to Mr. Reyes
in private
- Hotel Nikko, Filart, and Lim to
pay for damages
the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is
done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed,
Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not
know each other personally before the evening of 13
October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer
for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive
conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being
single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and
prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by
her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen. The lameness of this argument need
not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint
based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but
innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked
Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we
cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts
declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from
Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise
to a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness
or lack of consideration of one person, which calls
not only protection of human dignity but respect of
such dignity. Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot
amount to abusive conduct especially because she
did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her
that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms.

UE v Jader
It should have practiced
what it inculcates in its
students, more specifically
the principle of good
dealings enshrined in
Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the
performance of his duties,
act with justice, give
everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good
faith.
Art. 20. Every person
who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Jader- 4th yr, failed to take regular
final examination
- Given an incomplete grade
- Filed for removal
- Approved by Dean Tiongson
- Took the exam
- Given a grade of 5
His name appeared on the tentative
list of candidates
Attended investitutre ceremonies
Tendered blow-out
Enrolled at the pre-bar review class
of FEU
Learned of deficiency
Dropped his review classes
Not able to take the bar
Jader v UE
- moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings
and sleepless nights when he
was not able to take the 1988
bar examinations arising from
the latter's negligence
UE: never led respondent to believe
that he completed the requirements
for a Bachelor of Laws degree when
his name was included in the
tentative list of graduating students
TC and CA in favour of Jader
Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done
with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
W/N UE had no liability to respondent Romeo A.
Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate
cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter
arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from
the professor concerned the result of his removal
exam
NO.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or
learning institution, a contract of education is
entered into between said institution and the
student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired
by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the
students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of
the person/persons who may be affected by his act
or omission can support a claim for damages. Want
of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations
coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make
the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have
known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of
his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent
will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that
is precisely the immediate concern after graduation
of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at
any time because a student has to comply with
certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
submission of requirements for taking the bar.
Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly

Security Bank v CA
Article 22 of the Civil Code
which embodies the maxim,
Nemo ex aIterius
incommodo debet
lecupletari (no man ought
to be made rich out of
another's injury) states:
"Art. 22. Every person who
through an act of
performance by another, or
any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of
something at the expense
of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return
the same to him."
SBTC and Manhit contracted Ferrer
to construct the building of SBTC in
Davao for 1.76M
Contract: finish the construction in
200 days
Ferrer completed but was compelled
by a drastic increase in the cost of
construction materials to incur
expenses of about 300k
Said demands were supported by
receipts and invoices
The recomm only amounted to 200k
SBTC denied ever authorizing
payment of any amount beyond
theoriginal contract price
Ferrer v SBTC for breach of contract
with damages
TC: in favour of Ferrer
CA affirmed
inform respondent of the result of an examination
and in misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all requirements for the course.
Moral damages deleted
As a senior law student, respondent should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his
affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order.
W/N Security Bank is liable
Yes.
It is not denied that private respondent incurred
additional expenses in constructing petitioner bank's
building due to a drastic and unexpected increase in
construction cost. In fact, petitioner bank admitted
liability for increased cost when a recommendation
was made to settle private respondent's claim for
P200,000.00. Private respondent's claim for the
increased amount was adequately proven during the
trial by receipts, invoices and other supporting
documents.
Under Article 1182 of the Civil Code, a conditional
obligation shall be void if its fulfillment depends
upon the sole will of the debtor. In the present case,
the mutual agreement, the absence of which
petitioner bank relies upon to support its non-liability
for the increased construction cost, is in effect a
condition dependent on petitioner bank's sole will,
since private respondent would naturally and
logically give consent to such an agreement which
would allow him recovery of the increased cost.
Further, it cannot be denied that petitioner bank
derived benefits when private respondent completed
the construction even at an increased cost.

Car Cool v Ushio
Sps Lopez leased theproperty to Car
Cool for 2 yrs
Expiration of written agreement,
verbal agreement: Lopez allowed
Car Cool to occupy said property
upon payment of monthly rental
Sps Lopez intended to sell property
and gave CarCool the option to buy
Car Cool respond to the offer
Terminated verbal lease agreement
Ushio purchased the property
Demanded Car Cool to vacate
Car Cool alleges the existence of a 2-
yr contract and advance monthly
payment
Ushio broke into the leased property,
demolished improvements, and
threatened and injured employees of
Car Cool
Car Cool v Ushio for robbery with
force upon things, malicious
mischief, grave coercion
- Specific performance and
damages
Ushio filed ejectment case
MTC: ordered Car Cool to pay
monthly rental from October 1995
CA affirmed but modified date to
December 1995 (receipt of demand)
Hence, to allow petitioner bank to acquire the
constructed building at a price far below its actual
construction cost would undoubtedly constitute
unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of
private respondent. Such unjust enrichment, as
previously discussed, is not allowed by law.
whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages by way of rentals and attorneys fees in
favor of USHIO
No.
In this case, there is no dispute on the ownership of
the property. An Absolute Deed of Sale dated 14
September 1995 shows that the Spouses Lopez sold
the property to USHIO Realty.[9] On 19 September
1995, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued a
Transfer Certificate of Title for the property in the
name of USHIO Realty. On 3 December 1995, USHIO
Realty sent a final demand to CAR COOL, giving it a
non-extendible 15 days within which to vacate the
property. When CAR COOL still refused to vacate the
property, USHIO Realty filed the complaint for
ejectment on 19 December 1995.
USHIO Realty, as the new owner of the property, has
a right to physical possession of the property. Since
CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property,
CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rentals as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property.
Contrary to CAR COOLs allegations, the payment of
damages in the form of rentals for the property does
not constitute unjust enrichment. The Court of
Appeals held:
x x x [T]he alleged payment by the petitioner as
rentals were given to the former owner (Lopez) and

Almario v PAL Almario, 39 yrs old and a Boeing 737
First Officer at PAL successfully bid
for the higher position of Airbus 300
First Officer
Higher position=addl training
not to the private respondent who was not privy to
the transaction. As a matter of fact, it never
benefited financially from the alleged transaction.
Aside from that, the postdated checks the private
respondent admitted to have received, as rental
payments for September to December 1995, were
never encashed. On the contrary, the private
respondent even offered to return the same to the
petitioner, but was refused. [T]herefore, it did not
amount to payment.
We have held that [t]here is unjust enrichment when
a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. Article 22 of the
Civil Code provides that [e]very person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just
or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The
principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22
requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
(2) that such benefit is derived at anothers expense
or damage.
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who
will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. Under
Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
USHIO Realty has the legal right to receive some
amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOLs
occupation of the property.
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in holding that Article 22 of the Civil Code can
be applied to recover training costs which were
never agreed to nor included as reimbursable
expenses under the CBA
 - At PALs expense, he underwent
5 mos of training consisting of
ground schooling in Manila and
flight simulation in Melbourne
Afterwards, served as A 300, but
after 8 hours of serving as such, he
rendered his resignation for
personal reasons
Letter from VP stating that the
company invested heavily in the amt
of 786k on the basis that Almario
continue to serve approximately 3
yrs or 36 mos.
Reimburse upon resignation
PAL filed complaint for
reimbursement
Almario: no agreement to that
effect, prayed for award actual
damages on acct of PALs
withholding of necessary clearances
RTC: in favour of Almario, but denied
claim moral damages, and monetary
equivalent of family trip pass
benefits
CA: reversed
- Almario ordered to pay PAL for
559k
No.
It bears noting that when Almario took the training
course, he was about 39 years old, 21 years away
from the retirement age of 60. Hence, with the
maturity, expertise, and experience he gained from
the training course, he was expected to serve PAL
for at least three years to offset the prohibitive costs
thereof.
The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale
aside, contrary to Almarios claim, Article 22 of the
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him,
applies.
This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the
principle that one may not enrich himself at the
expense of another. An authority on Civil Law writes
on the subject, viz:
Enrichment of the defendant consists in every
patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as
it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some
positive pecuniary value incorporated into the
patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the
enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2)
the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to
the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether
real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property
of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of

Grandteq Industrial v Margallo, sales engineer of
Margallo Grandteq, claimed that she availed
herself of the car loan program
offered to her by Grandteq as a
reward for being Salesman of the
Year
Paid downpayment on brand new
Toyota corolla out of her own pocket
Monthly amo: 10k (5k her share, 5k
share of Grandteq)
Disciplinary action for committing
moonlighting, sabotage, and breach
of trust
Asked to resign so that she will still
be paid her commissions and other
benefits and reimbursed of her car
loans
Tendered irrevocable resignation
Commissions were not paid,
Grandteq sold her car to Estrella
Margallo v Grandteq and Gonzales
(president) before the Labor Arbiter
the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of
preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a
right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of
the conditions of life of the defendant.
Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario
to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill,
proficiency, or technical competence so that he
could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First
Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover the
training costs by availing of Almarios services for at
least three years. The expectation of PAL was not
fully realized, however, due to Almarios resignation
after only eight months of service following the
completion of his training course. He cannot,
therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training
without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the car
loan agreement between Grandteq and Margallo,
particularly the provision therein on the forfeiture of
car loan payments in favor of Grandteq should
Margallo resign from the company, as null and void
No.
Said provisions plainly are contrary to the
fundamental principles of justice and fairness. It
must be remembered that Margallo herself paid for
the down payment and her share in the monthly
amortization of the car. However, she did not get to
leave with the car when she resigned from
Grandteq. In effect, Margallo parted with her hard-
earned money for nothing, being left, as she is, with
an empty bag. The inequitableness in the conduct of
Grandteq and Gonzales is heightened by the fact
that after they regained possession of the car, they
resold the same to another employee under a similar
contract bearing the same terms and conditions
signed by Margallo.
 for recovery of sales commission,
cash incentive and car loan
payment, damages, attys fees
LA: dismissed claims for sales
commission, cash incentives (no
proof of claims), and car loan
agreement (stipulation that in case
of resignation, forfeited)
NLRC: modified, granted her claims
CA: affirmed decision
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich
oneself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alteris
detrimento locupletari potest) is embodied in Article
22 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of
which were formulated as basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social
order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience; [are] guides
for human conduct that should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
dominance of justice. There is unjust enrichment
when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss
of another, or when a person retains the money or
property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is unjust
enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited,
and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another. The main objective of the
principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from
enriching oneself at the expense of another. It is
commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means
that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at anothers expense. One
condition for invoking this principle is that the

Everett Steamship v CA Hernandez Trading Co imported 3
crates of bus spare parts from
Maruman Trading Co
aggrieved party has no other action based on a
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict, or any
other provision of law.
This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting
a positive provision of law or judicial rule. Rather,
equity is exercised in this case as the complement of
legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to
complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt
their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent to do so.
The principle against unjust enrichment obliges
Grandteq and Gonzales to refund to Margallo the car
loan payments she had made, since she has not
actually acquired the car. To relieve Grandteq and
Gonzales of their obligation to reimburse Margallo
would, indeed, be to sanction unjust enrichment in
favor of the first two and cause unjust poverty to the
latter.
The Court rigorously disapproves contracts that
demonstrate a clear attempt to exploit the employee
and deprive him of the protection sanctioned by
both the Constitution and the Labor Code.
Grandteq and Gonzales have the burden of proof to
show, by substantial evidence, their claim that
Margallo was not entitled to sales commissions
because the sales made by the latter remained
outstanding and unpaid, rendering these sales as
bad debts and thus nullifying Margallos right to this
monetary benefit. Grandteq and Gonzales could
have presented pertinent company records to prove
this claim.
Entitled to full recovery despite stipulation of limited
liability?

Thoughtless Extravagance
Disrespect of Persons
Spouses Hing v Choachuy
Shipped from Japan to Manila on
board Adelfaeverete, owned by
Everett Orient Lines
Upon arrival in Manila, it was
discovered that one of the crates
was missing
Hernandez Trading Co. Formal claim
for the value of 1.55M Yen
Everett offered to pay only 100k yen
as the max amt stipulated in the bill
of lading limiting liability
Hernandez filed suit for collection
RTC
RTC: in favour of Hernandez
CA affirmed, deleted attys fees
Choachuy Sr. owns Aldo auto-repair
No.
ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers
liability is limited to the value of the goods
appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or
owner declares a greater value, is binding.
ART. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be
recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if
it is reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.
It seems clear that even if said section 4 (5) of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act did not exist, the
validity and binding effect of the liability limitation
clause in the bill of lading here are nevertheless fully
sustainable on the basis alone of the cited Civil Code
Provisions. That said stipulation is just and
reasonable is arguable from the fact that it echoes
Art. 1750 itself in providing a limit to liability only if a
greater value is not declared for the shipment in the
bill of lading.
In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its
liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, Maruman
Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation
if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited
liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper
did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to
blame for not complying with the stipulations.
In fine, the liability of petitioner for the loss of the
cargo is limited to One Hundred Thousand
(Y100,000.00) Yen, pursuant to Clause 18 of the bill
of lading.
Right to privacy violated, entitled to writ of Prelim
 shop adjacent to te property of
Spouses Hing
Aldo v Hing
- Injunction and damages for
- constructing a fence without a
valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the
wall of its building, which is
adjacent to petitioners property
- denied for lack of evidence;
- that, in order to get evidence to
support the said case, they
illegally set-up and installed on
the building of Aldo Goodyear
Servitec two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners
property;
- Through their employees and
without the consent of Hing,
also took pictures of petitioners
on-going construction; and that
the acts of respondents violate
petitioners right to privacy.
RTC:Prelim Inj against Choachuy
granted, remove camera
CA: reversed since the property was
not used as a residence and
Choachuy are not owners but
stockholders of Aldo
inj?
YES.
Enshrined in our Constitution and our laws, The right
to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain
individuals are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
protects an individuals right to privacy and provides
a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals. It
states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers
residence;
The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or
even situations which an individual considers as
private. And as long as his right is recognized by
society, other individuals may not infringe on his
right to privacy.
The "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.
 In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the
right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation
of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
community norms, and practices may, therefore,
limit or extend an individuals "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness
of a persons expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends
on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are

installed practically everywhere for the protection
and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless
the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers
residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of

privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the
installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear
violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.
Dereliction of Duty
Philippine Match Co. V City
of Cebu
The trial court dismissed the
Petitioner, engaged in
manufacturing of matches, assails
the legality of the tax which the city
treasure collected on out-of-town
deliveries of matches by virtue of
the city ordinance which taxes good
stored and/or sold within the city.
The company sought refund of the
sales tax and for damages against
the city treasurer fo r not following
the advise of the city fiscal, as legal
adviser of the city, that all out-of-
town deliveries of matches are not
subject to sales tax.
complaint against the city treasurer.
WON the city treasurer can be held liable for
damages under art. 27 of the CC
NO
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person
suffering material or moral lose because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken." Article 27
presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public
official is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence. In the case at bar, the records clearly
show that the city treasurer honestly believed that
he was justified under the ordinance to collect taxes.
The fiscals opinion on the legality of such or any
other ordinance is merely advisory and has no
binding effects.

As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion

Tuzon v CA The Sangguniang Bayan of
Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted
Resolution No. 9. Said resolution
authorized the municipal treasurer
to enter into an agreement with all
thresher operators who apply for a
in matters brought before him and when so acting
he is usually given immunity from liability to persons
who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or
mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of
are done within the scope of the officer's authority
and without malice, or corruption. It has been held
previously by the SC that an erroneous
interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute
nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an
aggrieved party to an award for damages Cabungcal
vs. Cordovan 120 Phil. 667).
Whether or not petitioners are liable in damages for
having withheld Mayors permit and license because
of respondents refusal to comply with said
Resolution.
NO.
 Permit to Thresh Palay to donate 1%
of all the palay threshed by them.
Thereafter, Jurado offered to pay the
license fee for thresher operators.
Municipal Treasurer Magapu refused
to accept payment and required him
to first secure a Mayors permit.
Mayor Tuzon said that Jurado should
first comply with Resolution No. 9
and sign the agreement before the
permit could be issued.
Jurado filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan for mandamus,
and another with the same court for
judgement against the said
resolution.
CFI upheld the Resolution, and
dismissed the claim for damages.
CA affirmed the validity of the
Resolution and found Tuzon and
Mapagu to have acted maliciously
and in bad faith when they denied
Jurados application.
Article 27 presupposes that the refusal or omission
of a public official to perform his official duty is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence.
There was no evidence offered to show that
petitioners singled out respondent for persecution.
Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to
gain personally from refusing to issue the mayors
permit and license. Moreover, the resolution was
uniformly applied to all the threshers in the
municipality without preference. A public officer is
not personally liable to one injured in consequence
of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority and in line of his official duty. In the
absence of a judicial decision declaring said
Resolution invalid, its legality would have to be
presumed. As executive officials of the municipality,
they had the duty to enforce it. An erroneous
interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute
nor amount to bad faith.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged
that the Mayor Tuzons refusal to act on the private
respondents application was an attempt to compel
him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his
application. It cannot be said either that the mayor
and the municipal treasurer were motivated by
personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing
to issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been
offered to show that the petitioners singled out the
private respondent for persecution. Neither does it
appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally
from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit
and license he needed. The petitioners were not
Jurados business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his
competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses
that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the
threshers in the municipality without discrimination

Torio v Fontanilla On October 21, 1978, the municipal
council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan
passed 2 resolutions: one for
management of the town fiesta
celebration and the other for the
creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee.
The Executive Committee, in turn,
organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman.
The council appropriated the amount
of P100.00 for the construction of 2
stages, one for the "zarzuela" and
another for the cancionan.
While the zarzuela was being held,
the stage collapsed. Vicente
Fontanilla was pinned underneath
and died in the afternoon of the
following day.
Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint
for damages with the CFI of Manila.
The defendants were the
municipality, the municipal council
and the municipal council members.
In its Answer, defendant municipality
argued that as a legally and duly
organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and
the holding of a town fiesta was an
exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can
arise to answer for the negligence of
or preference.
Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a
municipal council a governmentalfunction of the
municipality?
NO.
No governmental or public policy of the state is
involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
1. political and governmental
- Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by
the are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such
they are officers, agents, and servants of
the state.
2. private, proprietary or corporate right, arising
from their existence as legal persons and not
as public agencies
- Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in
behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not
for the state or sovereign power.
Municipailty liable?
YES
Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability
under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. The municipality acting
through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as
chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment
and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela"
stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the
Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent
superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible
or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within
his assigned tasks.
 any of its agents.
The defendant councilors, in turn,
maintained that they merely acted
as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance
providing for the management of the
town fiesta celebration and as such
they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not
one for profit; furthermore, they had
exercised due care and diligence in
implementing the municipal
ordinance.
CFI held that the municipal council
exercised due diligence in selecting
the person to construct the stage
and dismissed the complaint.
CA reversed the decision and held
the councilors jointly and solidarity
liable with the municipality for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code which provides that d any
person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause to perform his
official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief at the
latter.
Are the municipal councilors who enacted the
ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable
for the death of Fontanilla?
NO.
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against
the for this particular article covers a case of
nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer
of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of
negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official
duty.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under
review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by
the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a
governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The
legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality
stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its
board of directors. It is an elementary principle that
a corporation has a personality, separate and
distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-
responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the
corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence
on their part.
On these people We absolve the municipal
councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said
petitioners directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they
personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.