PINLAC VS.
CA (T)hat the case involves three parcel of lands, to wit: Lot
G.R. NO. 91486
19 JANUARY 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant case springs from a contentious and
protracted dispute over a sizeable piece of real property
situated in what is now known as Old Balara, Sitio
Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon
City. There are numerous claimants, titled and untitled
alike, each either pressing to own a piece of it, or striving
to protect ones right as a titled owner.
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their
dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they
filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-35672. In particular,
petitioners claimed that the real property, which has an
aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest
lands belonging to the government; that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property
continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than
thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly filed
applications for land titling in their respective names with
the appropriate government agency.
While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was
part of the public domain, they named as respondents
several persons and corporations who are titled owners
of subdivided parcels of land within the subject
property. One of those so impleaded as a party-
respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision
(hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The individual lot owners of the said
subdivision, however, were not specifically named. Since
personal service of summons could not be effected on
Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents,
petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons
by publication which was granted. Accordingly, the
summons was published in the Metropolitan Newsweek,
a periodical edited and published in the City of
Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.[1]
Some of the named respondents filed their
respective responsive pleadings, while the others,
including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus
declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were
allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
defaulted respondents. The court a quo found the
following facts to be conclusive:
situated at Barrio San Francisco, San Juan, TCT No.
1 & 2 situated at the Old Balara, Diliman, Quezon City
and Lot 3 situated at Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and
Silangan, Quezon City containing an aggregate area of
502 hectares more or less; that Lot 1 is covered by TCT
No. 5690 in the name of defaulted respondent Jose V.
Bagtas, which title emanated from TCT No. 48546 in the
name of Emiliana Vda. De Vera Cruz which contains an
actual area of only 294.6 sq. meters, but, when said TCT
No. 5690 was issued the same was illegally and
fraudulently expanded to cover 23.5767 hectares
through fraudulent resurveys without proper judicial
proceedings; that on said illegally expanded area of TCT
No. 5690 in the name of respondent Jose V. Bagtas,
more than 363 transfer certificates of title were
subsequently issued including those belonging to some
of the defaulted respondents thereof; that TCT No. 5690
contains no technical description on its face; that Lot 2 is
covered by TCT No. 3548 in the name of Eustacio Maloles
married to Soledad Villegas and Vicente B. Vilar doing
business under the name and style of defaulted
respondent Vilma Maloles Subdivision Inc., which title
was derived from TCT No. 33531 in the name of Oscar L.
Uy which in turn came from TCT No. 26285 in the name of
Maria Lim which was immediately derived from OCT No.
614 which contains no technical description on its face,
that TCT No. 3548 likewise contains no technical
description on its face; that however, on the face of TCT
No. 33531 of Oscar L. Uy from which TCT No. 3548 of
defaulted respondent Vilma Maloles Subdivision Inc., was
derived, it appears that said TCT No. 33531 was
cancelled by another title, TCT No. 1713 and not by TCT
No. 3548, the supposed derivative thereof, which title,
from the foregoing facts, seems to have come from
nowhere considering that no document could be
produced by the representative of the Register of Deeds
of Pasig, relative to the origin of the aforesaid title and
which register of deeds has jurisdiction over the same;
that from this spurious and fraudulent TCT No. 3548 which
contains no technical description on its face, numerous
TCTs were subsequently issued, some of which belong to
the defaulted respondents hereof, that despite the
issuance has not been cancelled by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City; that Lot 3 was originally covered
by OCT No. 333 from which 846 questionable TCTs
emanated and issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City perpetrated and made possible by the
illegal expansion of the actual area thereof from 4,574
Sq. Meters, more or less, to 407,3875 (sic) hectares
without proper judicial proceedings; that as an example
of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, TCT No. 26205
covers a lot situated at Barrio Ermitao, San Juan del
Monte, TCT No. 26287 covers a lot located at Barrio
Talipapa, Novaliches, TCT No. 33531 covers a lot located
at the District of Cubao. TCT No. 47705 covers a lot
133770 covers a lot located at San Bartolome, Caloocan
City, TCT No. 45741 covers a lot located at San Francisco
del Monte, San Juan, TCT No. 45636 covers a lot located
at the municipality of San Juan, TCT No. 19-6370 covers a
lot located at Kamuning District, TCT No. 188447 covers a
lot located at San Francisco del Monte with a different
mother title, OCT No. 515, TCT No. (22092) 61850 covers a
lot located at Tala Estate Caloocan City, TCT No. 14645
covers lot located at Kamuning District and TCT No.
14692 covers a lot located at Bo. San Isidro, Caloocan
City, yet these TCTs were utilized by some people to
claim an area located inside the litigated premises
despite the fact that their technical descriptions, as
aforementioned, are different from the lands being
sought to be covered therewith; that Lots 1, 2 & 3 have
been under the possession of petitioners for a
continuous, public, open, & uninterrupted period of 30
years through World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc., by the principle of tacking possession;
that the Bureau of Forest Development has certified that
Lots 1, 2 & 3 are part of public forest belonging to the
government not yet certified for disposition and
alienation; that the Bureau of Forest Development knew
and encouraged petitioners occupancy and possession
of said lots as in fact ordinary residential permits were
issued by said agency to some of herein petitioners and
even helped in petitioners acquisition of electrical
facilities from the MERALCO.[2]
Resolving the sole issue of whether or not petitioners
were entitled to the land they occupy and possess, even
when said land was allegedly part of unclassified public
forest land and yet covered by transfer certificates of
title in the names of the defaulted respondents, the
court a quo rendered a Partial Decision in favor of
petitioners, based on the following disquisition:
First, because as established from the foregoing facts,
OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690, TCT No. 3548 covering Lots 1
& 2 of the disputed land, not having technical
descriptions appearing on their respective face, clearly
are null and void by reason thereof. This is because a
torrens title is the certificate of ownership issued under
the Register of Deeds naming and declaring the owner
in fee simple of the real property DESCRIBED therein, free
from all liens and encumbrances except such as maybe
expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law.
(Philippine National Bank vs. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil.
317). Without any technical description a title is fictitious
and the mere issuance thereof is fraudulent. Such being
the case, it follows that none of the title holders
subsequently issued out of said void titles could say that
he or she is an innocent purchaser for value. For in the
1
case at bar, there are really no rights that could be
transferred to them since even the titles of those
supposed owners thereof originally are themselves
fictitious. x x x Second, because although the Bureau of
Forest Development maintains, as in fact, it certified that
Lots 1, 2 & 3 are part of the unclassified public forest land
of the government, and therefore, are not susceptible of
private appropriation, still, due to the established fact
that the lots involved are under the present occupancy
and possession of petitioners with the knowledge and
tolerance of the Bureau of Forest Development, the true
and real nature of said lands as being public forest has
become highly dubious and in the opinion of this Court
could not overcome the presumption that said lands are
agricultural. For the mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral wealth within it, is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forest land and the other
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent as
well as of the present or future value of the land as forest
or mineral. It must be shown that the land is more
valuable for the forestry or the minerals which it contains
than it is for agricultural purposes. Land may be classified
as forest or mineral today and after the exhaustion of the
timber or minerals contained therein may be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. Hence, in case of doubt and
considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippines are agricultural
lands, it was rightly held that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary any land may be presumed to be
agricultural. And that being the case, it is clear that
petitioners have acquired legally a title over Lots 1, 2 & 3
of this case through extra-ordinary prescription of thirty
(30) years of continuous, public, open and uninterrupted
possession thereof, the lands being agricultural and, thus,
are susceptible of private ownership by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioners and against the
defaulted respondents:
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners
hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena,
Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as
absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1,
2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with
the exception of the lands covered by the respective
transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents;
2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No.
5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom,
with the exception of those titles belonging to the non-
defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 as
well as the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating
therefrom, with the exception of those titles belonging to
the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;
4) Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true
and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs
subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, covering the area in excess of said actual area,
with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio;
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No.
333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with
the exception of those titles belonging to the non-
defaulted respondents;
6) Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated
August 7, 1985, in so far as those areas covered by the
cancelled OCTs and TCTs hereof are concerned, as
permanent;
7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue
herein petitioners the corresponding individual transfer
certificate of titles upon proper application made
thereof.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On May 17, 1989, or exactly one (1) year and fifty-
seven (57) days after the above-quoted judgment by
default was rendered, a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus[4] was brought before the Court of Appeals
by the titled owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-
Ma. They assailed the default judgment which nullified all
their titles, arguing that the court a quo had no
jurisdiction over them and their respective titled
properties. They also alleged that they only came to
know of the adverse judgment when petitioners sought
the execution of the judgment by attempting to
dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots and
making formal demands for them to vacate their
respective properties.
They likewise claimed that the Partial Decision
against the defaulted respondents was null and void on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, for
the reasons that:
(1) Civil Case No. Q-35672, while it was a
petition to quiet title, was a collateral
proceeding, not a direct action attacking
their duly registered titles. Besides, a
petition for cancellation of title can only
be filed by a registered owner or a person
having an interest in registered property,
and must be filed in the original land
registration case in which the decree of
registration was entered.
(2) They were never made parties to Civil
Case No. Q-35672, nor were their lots
described in the complaint, published
summons, and Partial Decision. Named
defendant was VIL-MA, a totally separate
and independent entity which had
already ceased to exist way back in
January of 1976. Moreover, the summons,
as well as the Partial Decision was not
published in a newspaper or periodical of
general circulation. Thus, the defective
service of summons to said defendant did
not place the individual lot owners under
the trial courts jurisdiction, nor are they
bound by the adverse judgment.
(3) They were denied due process of law as
they were not given their day in
court. They should have been included
as indispensable parties-respondents in
Civil Case No. Q-35672 since the
petitioners therein were seeking to annul
their respective transfer certificates of title.
(4) Their duly registered titles cannot be
defeated by the alleged adverse,
continuous and notorious possession of
the petitioners since their titles are
indefeasible and cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
(5) If, indeed, the subject property is
unclassified forest lands, it is not capable
of private appropriation. The court a
quo is bereft of authority to declare motu
proprio that the subject property should
be reclassified as agricultural, not forest
land.
(6) The trial court violated Section 3(c), Rule
10 of the Rules of Court which provides
that when some of several respondents
2
 fail to answer, the court shall try the case
against all upon the answers thus filed
and render judgment upon the evidence
thus presented, whenever a complaint
states a common cause of action against
several respondents. Accordingly, the
defense interposed by those who answer
or appear to litigate the case should inure
to the benefit of even those who fail to
appear or answer.
(7) The trial court cannot render null and void
in the default judgment the mother title
(OCT No. 614), from which the petitioners
transfer certificates were derived, which
the Supreme Court had already declared
valid and legal.
To impress upon the Court of Appeals that they
have a meritorious defense and that their petition was
not intended to delay or frustrate the final disposition of
the case, the titled owners cited the case of De La Cruz
v. De La Cruz,[5] where the Supreme Court traced the
origins of OCT 614. It was held in that case, that:
x x x. The Piedad Estate consists of a vast tract of land
originally registered on March 12, 1912 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal in the name of the Philippine
Government.
The Piedad Estate was one of the so-called friar lands
which were purchased by the government of the
Philippines pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands
Act, Public Act No. 1120 which was enacted on April 26,
1904. x x x.
As specifically stated above, the said lands are not
public lands in the sense in which those words are used in
the Public Land Act Numbered Nine Hundred and
twenty-six and cannot be acquired or leased under the
provisions thereof. In the case of Jacinto vs. Director of
Lands (1926) 49 Phil. 853, the Supreme Court held that
the so-called friar lands, to which the government of the
Philippines holds title, are not public lands but private or
patrimonial property of the government.
xxxxxxxxx
As held in Lorenzo vs. Nicolas, No. L-4085, 30 July 1952, 91
Phil. 686, from the provisions of sections 11, 12 and 16 of
Act No. 1120, it is apparent that the pervading legislative
intent is to sell the friar lands acquired by the government
to actual settlers and occupants of the same.[6]
Claiming that their individual transfer certificates of
title were derived from subsequent subdivisions and
transfers of the lots within the Piedad Estate, the
defaulted registered owners invoked the Comments and
Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee created
by the then Ministry of Natural Resources, tasked to
investigate the historical background of the Piedad and
Payatas Estates in Quezon City, containing evidence
which they would have substantiated had they been
given their day in court. The Ad Hoc Committee
reported, to wit:
FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
The Piedad Estate, situated in the Municipality of San
Mateo and Caloocan during the time of registration in
1910, covers an area of 3850.7226 hectares. The
Registration of Title under Case No. 5975 was published in
the January 21, 1910 issue of the Official Gazette.
After the Piedad Estate was registered in Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 in the name of the
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the
area was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of
subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition,
the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of
these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales,
under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records
show that even before the Second World War, all lots in
the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. Owing
perhaps to the scarcity of land applicants at the time, it
will be observed that a number of applicants have
acquired several lots totalling several hectares. Among
the vendees with several lots are the Philippine Trust Co.,
the Zuzuarreguis and the Metropolitan Water District, to
name a few. A list of lot holders in the Piedad Estate with
the corresponding lot numbers, lot areas and date of
purchase from the Bureau of Lands is hereto attached
and marked as ANNEX B.
Thru a series of transfer of lots from one owner to another
attended at times by subdivision into smaller lots and at
other times by consolidation of several lots into one, most
of the lots of the Piedad Estate have lost their identity
both in original ownership structure and lot
descriptions. Piedad Estate now embraces and includes
a number of private residential subdivisions among
which are the following:
1. Villar Maloles Subdivision (owned by Villar Maloles, Psd-
21997)
2. U.P. Sites Nos. 1 and 2
3. Sunnyville Subdivision (Owned by the Delos Santos
family)
4. Sterling Meadows Subdivision (LRC) Pcs-11110
5. Dona Patrona Subdivision
6. Far Eastern University (43 has.)
7. Luis Reyes (Psd-19419)
8. Jose Yulo (PLS-336-D)
By virtue of subsequent changes in political boundaries,
Piedad Estate is now within Quezon City. It is located on
both sides of Luzon Avenue and is bounded on the North
by the Republic Avenue; on the East by private
residential subdivisions which includes the B.F. Homes
(LRC) Psd-133236, the Villa Ligaya Subdivision (Psd-
65729), the Kapalaran Subdivision (Pcs-47850), the
Kasiyahan Subdivision (LRC) Pcs-12091, Zuzuarregui
Property (Psd-34912) and the Doa Beartiz Subdivision
under Psd-39351; on the South by the Don Mariano
Marcos Avenue; and on the South-West and West by the
U.P. Sites Nos. 1 and 2.
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION
There is no doubt that Piedad Estate has long been
segregated from the mass of the public domain and
have become private lands duly registered under the
Torrens System following the procedure for the
confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus
the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of
the public domain. Neither are these lands forest lands,
in the classification of lands for forest purposes, the main
criterion prescribed in Section 15 of P.D. 705, the Forestry
Code, is its slope. Those beyond 18% are to be preserved
for forest purposes while those below are to be released
as not needed for forest purposes, hence, as alienable
and disposable. By its physical nature, location and
historical use, the land in question can hardly be
considered and classified as forest land. Physically, it is
first, level and at most slightly rolling land. Location wise,
it used to be within the periphery and now in the heart of
3
a metropolis. While originally it was used for agricultural
purposes, it has later become urban due to population
pressure and rapid urbanization in the Metro Manila
area. It is devoid of any timber land, more so if we talk of
forest of commercial value. In fact, the Composite Land
Classification Committee of the MNR composed of the
Directors of BFD, BL, BFAR and BMGS, has already signed
a land classification map and recommended for its
release because it has absolutely no forest value.
On the basis of existing records of the Bureau of Lands
and the area of the Piedad Estate as contained in the
Technical Descriptions of the said Estate published in the
January 21, 1910 issue of the Official Gazette, there is no
expansion or enlargement of the area, hence, it is
recommended that existing titles within the area should
be respected and their validity upheld.
xxxxxxxxx
In view of all the foregoing, the committee recommends
that all existing titles validly issued within the area be
respected and their validity upheld.[7] (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, the defaulted titled owners prayed
that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the aforesaid Partial Decision on defaulted
private respondents as null and void;
2. Declaring all Residential Use Permits issued by the
Director of Forest Management Bureau as null and void;
3. Declaring all Transfer of Certificates of Titles of the
petitioners (respondents herein) emanating from OCT 614
and TCT 3548 (1713) as valid;
4. Ordering private respondents (petitioners herein), their
agents or representatives and all other persons claiming
right under them to vacate the respective titled lands of
the petitioners squatted by the former;
5. Ordering the dismissal of Hon. Judge Reynaldo Roura
from the Regional Trial Court, Macabebe, Pampanga on
the grounds of gross incompetence and gross ignorance
of the law (Adm. Circular No. 4 of the Supreme Court,
dated January 27, 1988).
6. Making the preliminary injunction as permanent; and
7. Ordering the private respondents (petitioners herein)
to pay jointly and solidarily to the petitioners the sum of
P200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, plus the
sum of P5,000.00 per lot of the petitioners as attorneys
fee, aside from cost of suit, and for any other relief just
and proper.[8]
On June 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted
respondents (petitioners therein) application for writ of
preliminary injunction, ruling that:
When this case was called for hearing on June 21, 1989
on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the parties and their respective
counsel appeared and orally argued their respective
stand on the matter. It is admitted that the herein
petitioners, indispensable parties in the case, were not
individually served with summons.
We believe and so hold that there is merit in the instant
application for preliminary injunction, hence, the same is
hereby GRANTED. Upon the posting by the petitioners of
a bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), subject to Our approval, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue enjoining the respondents
(petitioners herein), and all persons acting for and in their
behalf, to desist and refrain from enforcing or
implementing, or from attempting to enforce and
implement, the questioned writ of execution of the
partial judgment, dated March 21, 1988, rendered in Civil
Case No. Q-35672, entitled: Teofilo M. Gariando, et al.,
petitioners versus Gregorio Dizon, et al., respondents, until
further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On November 15, 1989, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision[10] granting the
petition and annulling the Partial Decision in Civil Case
No. Q-35762 based on its finding that the trial courts lack
of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents ---
x x x becomes all the more apparent when petitioners
claim or asseverate that the assailed Partial Decision can
not bind Vilar-Maloles (VILMA), the umbrella name, for
the simple reason that said PARTNERSHIP was dissolved
on January 26, 1976, for it can no longer be sued as it
had no more juridical personality.
xxxxxxxxx
Furthermore, petitioners contend that the summons and
the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper
edited in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan known as
METROPOLITAN NEWSWEEK implying that said summons
and Partial Decision were not published in a newspaper
of general circulation in Quezon City as required by PD
1079, Sec. 1 thereof. Petitioners not having been duly
notified of the hearing/proceedings, the Partial Decision
being assailed is without significance to them or as far as
petitioners are concerned said Partial Decision is null and
void.[11]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in
a Resolution dated December 21, 1989.[12]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari which raises
the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS QUESTIONED DECISION HAS
VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS BY IGNORING AND LEAVING
UNDECIDED ALL THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE
ANSWER OF PETITIONERS IN CA-G.R. NO.
SP-17596.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A-QUO HAS
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
RESPONDENT VILMA MALOLES
SUBDIVISION BY THE PUBLICATION OF THE
SUMMONS AND PETITION AS ORDERED BY
THE COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-35672
AND SO THE PARTIAL DECISION (ANNEX B)
WAS LEGAL, VALID AND PROPER.
III. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PER THEIR PETITION BEFORE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS HAS A VALID CAUSE
OF ACTION CONSIDERING THEY ADOPTED
CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS OR THEORIES
OF THE CASE, AND THAT RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION (ANNEX G)
IS VOID.[13]
We find no merit in the instant petition.
The case before the Court of Appeals was one for
annulment of judgment, certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. In resolving the same, the Court of Appeals
need not retry the facts. An action for annulment of
judgment is grounded only on two justifications: (1)
extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process.[14] All that herein private respondents had to
prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that
they were prevented from having a trial or presenting
their case to the trial court by some act or conduct of
4
petitioners;[15] or that they had been denied due process
of law. Thus, the Court of Appeals need only to resolve
the issues of lack of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic
fraud, and denial of due process of law.
The action for annulment of judgment cannot and
was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The
very purpose of the action for annulment of judgment
was to have the final and executory judgment set aside
so that there will be a renewal of litigation.[16] Whether or
not the assailed Partial Decision based solely on facts
and evidence presented by the petitioners is meritorious
is irrelevant and immaterial. Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err, nor did it violate the petitioners right to due
process of law, when it refused to consider all the factual
issues raised by petitioners.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals
conclusion that the Partial Decision is null and void
insofar as private respondents are concerned since the
latter were not duly served summons or notified of the
proceedings against them. The summons and the Partial
Decision were published in a local newspaper edited
and published in Caloocan City and Malolos,
Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the
publication in said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan
Newsweek, to be invalid because the said periodical is
not considered a newspaper of general circulation in
Quezon City where the subject property is located, as
required by Presidential Decree No. 1079, Section 1.
Petitioners, however, contend that the service of
summons by publication was legal and in accordance
with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules
of Court. The service by publication was done pursuant
to the orders of the trial court dated May 5, 1993 and
September 29, 1983.[17]
While the service of summons by publication may
have been done with the approval of the trial court, it
does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan
Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in
Quezon City. The Rules strictly require that publication
must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in
such places and for such time as the court may
order.[18] The court orders relied upon by petitioners did
not specify the place and the length of time that the
summons was to be published. In the absence of such
specification, publication in just any periodical does not
satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete
directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective
publication of the summons rendered the service by
publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons
should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the respondents,[19] and failure
to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in
the service of summons.[20] It cannot be overemphasized
that the statutory requirements of service of summons,
whether personally, by substituted service, or by
publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully,
and any mode of service other than that prescribed by
the statute is considered ineffective.[21]
Be that as it may, even granting that the
publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of
summons would still be ineffective insofar as private
respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint
for Quieting of Title was filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma
Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical
entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was
dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced by
a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC dated
January 26, 1976.[22] Consequently, it could no longer be
sued having lost its juridical personality.
It was also established that all the lots within the
subdivision had been disposed of to private individuals,
herein private respondents. As the titled owners, they
should have been impleaded as party-respondents
before the court a quo. They were not made
respondents, neither were they informed of the adverse
proceedings that would result in the nullification of their
duly registered titles.Clearly, there was a blatant
disregard for their rights as registered owners. Private
respondents titles and rights as owners have been
unjustly violated. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err
in granting private respondents petition by annulling and
setting aside the Partial Decision rendered by the court a
quo for lack of jurisdiction and for denial of due process
of law.
Petitioners failed to show that they were the
aggrieved parties. If ever there was denial of due
process, it was private respondents who suffered
therefrom. Whether by petitioners failure to effectively
serve summons or by omitting to name private
respondents as respondents, the trial courts Partial
Decision declaring private respondents titles null and
void was clearly violative of the due process requirement
of the Constitution. It is elementary that before a person
can be deprived of his right or property he should first be
informed of the claim against him and the theory on
which such claim is premised.[23] The courts will not
countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due
process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.[24]
The Partial Decision was a judgment by default,
which is generally looked upon with disfavor,[25] for it
cannot pretend to be based on the merits of the
controversy.[26] As in this case, the judgment by default
may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to
private respondents. Hence, justice and equity demand
that this case be litigated anew.[27] It is evident that the
reopening of the case would not amount to an exercise
in futility nor is it intended to further delay the final
resolution of this controversy. The court a quo should give
all the necessary parties every chance to fight their case
fairly and in the open, without resort to technicalities.[28]
Finally, the conclusion that the Partial Decision of
the court a quo is void finds support in Rule 10, Section
5(c) of the then Rules of Court, which provides:
(c) Effect of partial default. - When a pleading asserting
a claim states a common cause of action against
several defending parties, some of whom answer and
the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case
against all upon the answers thus filed and render
judgment upon the evidence presented.
In fact, the court a quo enumerated in the Partial
Decision those who filed responsive
pleadings. Considering that petitioners in their complaint
stated a common cause of action against all the named
respondents, the court a quo should have heard the
case as against all respondents, the defaulted
respondents included. However, the trial court, unmindful
of the above-quoted rule, proceeded to receive
evidence ex parte only against the defaulted
respondents. The trial courts disposition is not only
violative of the rules but also a clear negation of the
defaulted respondents limited rights.
Whatever defense and evidence the non-
defaulted respondents may present which would be
applicable to the situation of the defaulted respondents
should inure to the benefit of the latter. The nullification
of OCT 614 adversely affected the answering
respondents for they all share the same mother title. In
effect, the court a quo pre-judged the case even
against the answering respondents, for how could OCT
614, the mother title, be valid for one set of respondents
and null and void for the other respondents? In fine, the
Partial Decision was procedurally flawed.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596
is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
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