Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court
of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a
decision[2] and resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order of
the trial court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private
respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to
submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity
testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for
support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in
1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise
and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused
Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed
for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old
Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel
sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This
incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed
with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.[6]
2
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469)
it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly
to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and
reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA
testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In
that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit
Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of
his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself,
violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed
this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of
object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the
realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,[28]hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have
also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on
the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of
adultery,[31]expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the
tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody
footprints.[33] In Jimenez v. Caizares,[34] we even authorized the
examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed
by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her
10
orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures
were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them
were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our
ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade
us. In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in
Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of
searches and seizures,[37] and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination
is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason
that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case,
an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit
to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner
herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be
ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United
States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In
the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general
acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State Supreme
Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules
of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so
commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the
procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St.
Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior
acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law,
specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the
11
Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge,
to order DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of
paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-
five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and
liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such
acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to
section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health
law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and
in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or
administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be
rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the court to
vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the
date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to
establish a support order) relating to the child in which either
signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which
the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the
expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment,
either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in
court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests
or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance
with this article. Neither signators legal obligations, including the
obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may
be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except
for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind
an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged
father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis
of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate
the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a
12
copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the childs
birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry
operated by the department of social services pursuant to section
three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition,
if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment
is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article
three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide
a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the
social services district that provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or
through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family
Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or
reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more
genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion
or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA
tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an
accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal
department of health and human services and performed by a
laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the
commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the
determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of
the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a
written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests
of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married
woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic
marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to
section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be
received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where
no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if
such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived
13
and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests
indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity,
the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a
child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test
pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision
(a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if
offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If
the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court
may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test,
if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the
funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such
test be apportioned between the parties according to their
respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who
does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is
financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought
to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W.,
was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of
conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of
Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York
Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment
vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a
genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case,
G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social
Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s
father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while
ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-
modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of
14
Epilogue
The Court finds the instant motion meritorious under the principle
of stare decisis. The said doctrine embodies the legal maxim that
a principle or rule of law which has been established by the
decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other
cases involving similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity or privy of parties. This is explicitly ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system. Such decisions assume the same authority as the statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control
the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto
(Kilosbayan, Inc. et al. vs. Manuel Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July
17, 1995).
In the instant cases as well as in Civil Case No. 93-68351 (the
Mendoza case), not only are the legal rights and relations of the
parties substantially the same as those passed upon in Civil Case
22
No. 94-71403 (the Rodrigo case), but the facts, the applicable laws,
the causes of action, the issues, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case,
i.e. the Rodrigo case in Civil Case No. 94-71403, under the rule
of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue.[20]
Simply put, the sole issue is whether the present case is barred
by this Courts ruling in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases. Commented [6]:
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties,
the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and
the evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be
argued. The issue has been settled and this Courts final decision
in the said cases must be respected. This Courts hands are now
tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but
to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
142, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.[1]
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of x
x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
reclusion temporal as maximum.[11] For these reasons the use of
the term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is
not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the trial court to set the
minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA
6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant
case since the former involves an appeal
from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the
case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is the
Constitution itself which empowers this Court to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments of lower courts in all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.[13] Commented [13]:
All the foregoing issues boil down to the issue of whether or not
the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103
to the effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party
in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 is obiter dictum. Commented [19]:
that BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extensions and
its supporting documents, but more importantly, it interviews the
applicants and evaluates their papers before making a
recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and
when it finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum of
Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety of
the applications. Petitioner is principally accountable for certifying
the regularity and propriety of the applications which he knew were
defective.
In this motion for reconsideration, petitioner submits that it is the
BSI that interviews applicants and evaluates their papers before
making a recommendation to the BOC, but argues that such
recommendation is not binding on the BOC. He asserts that the
final decision on whether to approve or disapprove the applications
rests with the BOC acting as a collegial body. He insists that by
approving the applications notwithstanding alleged defects thereof,
the BOC had implicitly determined them as inconsequential and
had effectively sanctioned petitioners actions.
A review of petitioners arguments persuade us that indeed, while
it is BSI which screens the applicants and evaluates their papers,
it is the BOC which ultimately reviews and approves the
39
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for
participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded
gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
40
"simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts
as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room
for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it
proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced
from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This
is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the
case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is
within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema
to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal
Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the
construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has
taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal
issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines
drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity
of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity
distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle
which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.
Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d.,
901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d.,
p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into
which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between
undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the
Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with
these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for
purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will
46
Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus
conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest
is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not
they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's
contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the
term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that
the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the
opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift
enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the
element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is
prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73;
Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88;
State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132
P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of
the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery,
a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it
exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration
(E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio
vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis,
12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P.,
389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54
C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The
apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the
specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some
cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift
enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in
others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance
has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352,
citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great
Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from
this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every
case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question
is used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of
lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid
51
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Second Division) in CA-G.R. No. 38363-R, entitled "Leoncio
Barrameda, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines (Naga Branch, Naga City), Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang, defendants-appellees," which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil
Case No. 5697, "dismissing the complaint with costs against
plaintiff".
Appellate Court's decision has the following dispositive portion:
We therefore find that the appealed judgment should be
reversed and set aside and another one entered
declaring (1) null and void the sale executed on
September 3, 1963, by defendant Development Bank of
the Philippines in favor of its defendants Rodolfo General
and Carmen Gontang, (2) T.C.T. No. 5003 cancelled and
(3) the mortgaged property redeemed; and ordering the
Clerk of the lower court to deliver the amount of
P7,271.22 deposited to defendants Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang and the Register of Deeds to issue a
new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff in
lieu of T.C.T. No. 5003 upon payment by him of
corresponding fees; with costs against the defendants in
both instances.
Undisputed facts are:
53
The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the DBP Commented [26]:
as, in the case at bar, Section 31, C.A. No. 459; that the ruling in
the case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, July 31, 1962,
cited by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its decision, is
not applicable to the case at bar because this Court based its
Agbulos ruling on Section 26 (now Sec. 90) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, wherein it is not clear when the period of redemption
should start (date when execution sale was conducted, or when
the certificate of sale was executed by sheriff, or when the
certificate of sale was registered in the registry of deeds), and this
Court ruled that as the land involved in that case is registered under
the Torrens system, the date of redemption should begin to run
from the date of registration, unlike in the case at bar where Section
31 of Commonwealth Act 459 specifically and clearly provides that
the running of the redemption period shall start from the date of the
auction sale; and that the ruling of this Court in Gonzales vs.
P.N.B., 48 Phil. 824, also invoked by respondent Appellate Court
as a basis for its decision, is likewise not applicable to the case at
bar because the provisions on the matter of the P.N.B. Charter, Act
No. 2938, are different from that of Commonwealth Act 459.
Section 32 of Act 2938, which is now Section 20 of R.A. No. 1300
(PNB Charter) provides that the mortgagor shall have the right to
redeem within one year the sale of the real estate. This is Identical
to the provision appearing in Sec. 26, now Sec. 30, Rule 39, Rules
of Court, while under Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459,
the period of redemption should star, on the date of the auction
sale, and the latter provision is applicable specifically and
expressly to the case at bar.
It is also petitioners' principal argument that the ruling in
Metropolitan Insurance Company, substituted by spouses Loreto
Z. Marcaida and Miguel de Marcaida vs. Pigtain 101 Phil. 1111,
1115-1116, wherein this Court, in construing Sec. 6 of Act No.
3135, categorically stated that the one year redemption period
55shall start from the date of sale and not from the report of the
sale or the registration of the sale certificate in the office of the
Register of Deeds, is more applicable to the present case. The
pertinent portion of the decision in the Marcaida case follows:
But again the appellants claim that in this particular
case, the statutory redemption period of one year should
begin from December 17, 1954, when the auction sale
was actually recorded in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Manila and not from December 15, 1953, when
56
why we should not so hold if we find that such fish fall within the
scope of the meaning of the term. Of necessity, the products of
land tend constantly to multiply in number and variety, as
population increases and new demands spring up. In California
there are farms devoted to the growth of frogs for the market. In
many places in North America foxes and other animals usually
found wild are reared in confinement for their fur. In Japan land is
devoted to the culture of the silkworm and the growth of the plants
necessary for the food of those insects. Bees are everywhere kept
for the wax and honey into which the land is made to produce by
those engaged in these occupations are "agricultural products" in
the same sense in which poultry, eggs, and butter have been held
to be agricultural products.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Now, if the purpose of agriculture, in the broader sense of the term,
is to obtain from the land the products to which it is best adapted
and through which it will yield the greatest return upon the
expenditure of a given amount of labor and capital, can it not be
said that it is just as much an agricultural process to enclose a
given area of land with dykes, flood it with water, grow aquatic
plants in it, and feed fish with the plants so produced as to fence in
it and allow poultry to feed upon the plants naturally or artificially
grown upon the surface? In the last analysis the result is the same
- a given area of land produces a certain amount of food. In the one
case it is the flesh of poultry, in the other the flesh of fish. It has
been agreed between the parties that an important article of diet
consumed by fish grown in a pond consists of certain marine plants
which grow from roots which affix themselves to the bottom of the
pond. In a real sense, therefore, the fish are just as truly a product
of the land as are poultry or swine, living upon its vegetable
growths, aquatic or terrestrial. Thus, land may truly be said to
produce fish, although it is true that the producer is not a fisherman.
Neither is one who grows foxes for their pelts a hunter. As
contended by counsel, the inquiry is not whether fish in general
constitute an agricultural product, but whether fish artificially grown
and fed in confinement are to be so regarded. Honey produced by
one who devotes his land to apiculture might be so regarded, even
if we were to admit that wild honey gathered in the forest is not.
Pigeons kept in domestication and fed by the owner would fall
within the definition. Wild pigeons obtained by a hunter would not.
Firewood gathered in a natural forest is not an agricultural product,
64
but firewood cut from bacauan trees planted for that purpose has
been held to be such a product, and its producer exempt from the
merchant's tax. (Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32
Phil. Rep., 271.) Other comparisons might be made, many of which
will be found in the opinion in which two of the members of the court
expressed their dissent from the original majority opinion, but
enough have been given to make our position
clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
During the many hears that the statute before us has been in
existence, since it first appeared, substantially in its present form,
in section 142 of Act No. 1189, passed in 1904, no attempt has
been made, until this case arose, to construe it as not applying to
fish grown in ponds, and much weight should be given to this long
continued administrative interpretation. The opinion of the
Attorney-General, cited by Justice Malcolm, will be found on
examination to have no bearing upon the present inquiry, as in that
case question was, not whether fish grown and fed in ponds were
agricultural products, but whether ". . . fishermen, shell and pearl
gatherers . . ." were liable to the occupation tax. There is nothing
in the opinion to indicate that the word "fishermen" was used to
mean men growing fish in ponds, and it must, therefore, be
assumed that it was used in its proper grammatical sense to
designate persons engaged in catching fish not artificially
produced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The decision in the case of The United States vs. Laxa (36 Phil.
Rep., 670) is not controlling, as the reasoning upon which it is
based was not concurred in by four members of the court.
Furthermore, the Laxa case might be distinguished from the one
now under consideration, were it necessary to do so, in that it has
been stipulated in this case that fish cultivated in ponds subsist
largely upon aquatic plants which grow from roots which attach
themselves to the bottom of the pond, and are therefore in a real
sense a product of the land, while in the Laxa case the evidence
was that they subsisted solely upon free floating
algae.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision
heretofore rendered herein must be set aside, and the judgment of
the lower court affirmed. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Araullo, J., dissents.
65
case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such
salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-
selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question
of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can
justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of
judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced
what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of
House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article
VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they
reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Until the
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional
provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are
exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing
which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not
favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in
that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection
of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section
13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
67
equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its
purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a
limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not
restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on
which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the
Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk
thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions
allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married
person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national
revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be
large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not
affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that
prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the
same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court
declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the
independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for
exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege
. It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the
fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public
interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial
thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short
duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal,
eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and
training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join
its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth
year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he
does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in
a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather
to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more
benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the
meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income
tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid
would be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or
abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public
72
interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged
with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House
of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach
of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the
session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally
liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical
person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and
Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are
extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy
this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from
taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when
used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive
income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government
bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or
interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal
Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments
or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under
the laws of the United States administered by the United States
Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act
No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United
States, allowances earned by virtue of such services
corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are
exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment
of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army
Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from
taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of
public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary
obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public
policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to
exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as
not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the
independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the
73
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has Commented [35]:
of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall
have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is Commented [36]:
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over
the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion
to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for
the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which
sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security
empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of
executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation
is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against
specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing
legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three
justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the
house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three
members to be designed by the majority party and three by the
minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The
foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15,
1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to
be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate
and two representatives to be designated one each from the two
major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding
representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September
24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of
either house and all cases contesting the election of any of
85
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National
Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental
power of regulation in such cases had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to
be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the
Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had
been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not
be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of
the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to
be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required
by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat
in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of
Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation
is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the
member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges
of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of
England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A.,
99
December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of
the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the
scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the
Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.