27. IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY.

LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND

MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO
IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS

OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA AND IBP BOARD
OF GOVERNORS
[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003.]

Facts:
Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a petition seeking the disqualification
of respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections.

Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past
president and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners contended
that respondent's transfer from Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur
Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to the
lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the
IBP.

Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude for the position. According to
petitioners, respondent De Vera was previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the
integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that respondent De Vera
could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law.

Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy contending that the
election of the officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the
organization, is purely an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and admin-
istered by the IBP. Respondent also averred that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter
or transfer his chapter membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He
also stressed that the right to
transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the
first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its
members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint
filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral
qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court has no jurisdiction over the IBP.
2. Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected Governor in the IBP.

Held:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear and decide the present controversy. Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the
IBP and implicit in the constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election
of its officers. The power of supervision over the IBP has been demonstrated in the past when it looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. The Court likewise amended several
provisions of the IBP By-Laws.

2. The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that a member of the IBP is entitled to select, change or
transfer his chapter membership. Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws allows a member to change his chapter membership,
subject only to the condition that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of
officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In the case at bar, respondent De Vera's transfer to
the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held
on February 27, 2003.
The Court also ruled that there is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before
he can run for IBP governorship. The Court emphasized that the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral
fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by the Court or conviction by
final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.

In In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard
De Vera, Respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. The Court
held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitution-
ality of the Plunder Law. The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for
which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude as "an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals."

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in Cali-
fornia, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the
charge. Bare allegations and unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof.

The Court also ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit under Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that only nominees can file a written protest setting forth the ground therefor. Petitioner Garcia is
from Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP and
are not qualified to run for IBP governorship of Eastern Mindanao pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in Sec-
tions 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court also held that the instant petition was premature as no nomination of
candidates has been made by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao, and assuming that
respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

57. JOSE TOLOSA, complainant, vs. ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.

A.C. No. 2385. March 8, 1989

Law Principle of the Case:

1.LEGAL ETHICS; FAILURE OF A LAWYER TO COMPLY WITH THE RIGOROUS

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT REQUIRED OF MEMBERS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS
OF THE COURT. A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting moral standards.

2. LAWYERS MUST NOT ONLY BE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER BUT MUST

LIVE AND BE SEEN TO BE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. As officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the commu-
nity.

3. IMPOSITION OF REPRIMAND UPON A LAWYER FOR CONDUCT UNBECOM-

ING A MEMBER OF THE BAR. The Court will imposed REPRIMAND for those conduct
of unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN that continuation
of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.

Facts of the Case:

On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit-Complaint a disbar-
ment case towards Attorney Alfredo Cargo claiming immorality. Complainant claimed that re-
spondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and else-
where. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal home and went
to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that
since then has been living with respondent at that address.

Respondent denied allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's

wife had been seeing him but that she had done so in the course of seeking advice from respond-
ent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of complainant
against her), as to what to do about the "continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the
beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former.

The complainant moreover alleged that respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife during latters confinement, and that respondent visited her at the hospital
everyday; he still added that the respondent paid for the rental of his wife and that all the appli-
ances in the said house was bought buy the respondent;

The respondent, on the other hand, deniedthe further allegations of complainant, and stating that
he had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance dur-
ing her confinement in the hospital and she did not pay the house rental nor bought household
appliances of complainants wife.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Cargo be disbarred?

Decision:

The complainants allegations does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had
indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality.
The Court do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be
properly imposed upon respondent.

However, the Court agrees that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding
any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing
possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and
an officer of the court."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbe-
coming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of
the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.