1. REPUBLIC V.

JUDGE EUGENIO
G.R. NO. 174629,
14 FEBRUARY 2008

FACTS:
After the Agan v. PIATCOr u l i n g , a s e r i e s o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a w a
rd of the NAIA 3c o n t r a c t s t o P I A T C O w e r e u n d e r t a k e n b y t h
e Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC). The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLCs assistance in
o b t a i n i n g m o r e e v i d e n c e t o c o m p l e t e l y r e v e a l t h e financial trail of corruption
s u r r o u n d i n g t h e N A I A 3 Project
, and also noting that the Republic was
presentlyd e f e n d i n g i t s e l f i n t w o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n c a s e s . T h e C I S c
o n d u c t e d a n i n t e l l i g e n c e d a t a b a s e search on the financial transactions of certain
individualsinvolved in the award, including Alvarez (Chairman of t h e P r e -
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n B i d s a n d A w a r d s T e c h n i c a l Committee). By this time, Alvarez
h a d a l r e a d y b e e n charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J)of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
1The searchrevealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6different banks The AMLC issued a
resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign and verify an application to inquire
intot h e d e p o s i t s o r i n v e s t m e n t s o f A l v a r e z
e t a l . a n d t o authorize the AMLC Secretariat to conduct an inquiryonce the RTC grants the
application. The rationale for t h e r e s o l u t i o n w a s f o u n d e d o n t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e C I S that
amounts were transferred from a Hong Kong bank account to bank accounts in the Philippines
maintainedb y r e s p o n d e n t s . T h e R e s o l u t i o n a l s o n o t e d t h a t b y a w a r d i n g t h e c o n t r
a c t t o P I A T C O ( d e s p i t e i t s l a c k o f financial capacity) Alvarez violated Section 3(E) of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2The MAKATI RTCrendered an Order granting the AMLC the authority
toi n q u i r e a n d e x a m i n e t h e s u b j e c t b a n k a c c o u n t s o f Alvarez
et al.In response to a letter of Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio,A M L C i s s u e d a R e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g i t s E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r t o i n q u i r e i n t o a n d
e x a m i n e t h e a c c o u n t s o f Alvarez, PIATCO, and several o ther entities involved inthe nullified
contract. AMLC filed an application beforethe MANILA RTC to inquire into the accounts alleged
as
1 Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.
- In addition to acts oromissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, thefollowing shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer andare hereby declared to be unlawful:(j) Knowingly approving or granting
any license, permit, privilegeor benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled
to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of amere representative or dummy of one who
is not so qualified or entitled.
2( e ) C a u s i n g a n y u n d u e i n j u r y t o a n y p a r t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted
benefits,a d v a n t a g e o r p r e f e r e n c e i n t h e d i s c h a r g e o f h i s o f f i c i a l administ
rative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provisionshall apply to officers and employees of offices or governmentcorporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or otherconcessions.
having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. The
ex parte
application was granted and the MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order.Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously
learned of the bankinquiry order, which was issued following an
ex parte
a p p l i c a t i o n , a n d h e a r g u e d t h a t n o t h i n g i n t h e A n t i - Money Laundering Act (AMLA) authorized
the AMLC tos e e k t h e a u t h o r i t y t o i n q u i r e i n t o b a n k a c c o u n t s
ex parte
.A f t e r s e v e r a l m o t i o n s , m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , o r d e r s a n d resolutions the case went up to
the SC. Alvarez
et al
.sposition:
The AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has noretroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not
apply todeposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of theAMLA (17 October 2001). The subject bank accounts,
opened in1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order without violating the
constitutional prohibition against expost facto laws.
3
I
SSUE
:
Whether or not the proscription against
ex post facto
laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a provisionw h i c h d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a p e n a l s a n c t i o n B U T
w h i c h merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accountsand deposits).
4
HELD: YES.
It is clear that no person may be
prosecutedu n d e r t h e P E N A L p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A M L A f o r a c t s committed prior to
the enactment of the law (17 October2001).With respect to the AUTHORITY TO INSPECT, it should
ben o t e d t h a t a n
ex post facto
l a w i s o n e t h a t ( a m o n g others) deprives a person accused of a crime of somelawful protection to
which he has become entitled, suchas the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or aproclamation of
amnesty.PRIOR to the AMLA:
(1) The fact that bank accounts were involved in activities latero n e n u m e r a t e d i n t h e
l a w d i d n o t , b y i t s e l f , r e m o v e s u c h accounts from the shelter of absolute confidentiality.(2) In order
that bank accounts could be examined, there wasneed to secure either the written permission of the depositorOR
a court order authorizing such examination, assuming thatthey were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject matter
of the litigation.

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner,

vs.
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
G.R. No. 170281 January 18, 2008

FACTS:
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for
issuance of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits in
account number CA-005-10-000121-5 maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. The case, filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107319.
Acting on the Republics urgent plea for the issuance of a TRO, the executive judge 4 of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour
TRO dated July 21, 2003. The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 47 and the hearing on the application for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was set on August 4, 2003.
After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August 8, 2003.
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its last known
address.
On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of
court to serve summons by publication. In an order dated October 15, 2003, the trial court directed the issuance
of alias summons. However, no mention was made of the motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve
the alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its
pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to
serve the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it did not resolve the Republics motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication declaring:
Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action on [the Republics] motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication would be untenable if not premature.
On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriffs
return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer
holding office at the given address since July 2002 and left no forwarding address.
Meanwhile, the Republics motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication remained unresolved. Thus,
on August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court
to serve summons by publication.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgows "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)"
dated August 11, 2005
ISSUE:
(1) WON the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served on it;
(2) WON the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or
other criminal violations implicating Glasgow

HELD:
The Complaint Was Filed In The Proper Venue
Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture
provides:
Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in
any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds
representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are
located; provided, however, that where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in Manila
or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located,
at the option of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture
cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing,
involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the
account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly,
the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of
the RTCs of the NCJR,10 it was a proper venue of the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgows account.

The Complaint Was Sufficient In Form And Substance

The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:
SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering.
(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the
unlawful activity as herein defined.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any
offense or violation under this Act without prejudice to the freezing and other remedies provided.
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:
Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering
 (a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the
unlawful activity as defined under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any
offense or violation under the AMLA without prejudice to the application ex-parte by the AMLC to the
Court of Appeals for a freeze order with respect to the monetary instrument or property involved therein
and resort to other remedies provided under the AMLA, the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws
and rules. (emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:
Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary. No prior criminal charge, pendency of or
conviction for an unlawful activity or money laundering offense is necessary for the commencement or
the resolution of a petition for civil forfeiture. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal prosecution for the unlawful activity or for
money laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may be separately and independently prosecuted and resolved.

3. Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016
Facts
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality
of Section 11 of R.A No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money
Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry
into certain bank deposits and investments, including related accounts based on probable cause.

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth
of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public
officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.

From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including
accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was
most concerned with the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank
Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into
the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a family member was once a partner.

xx xx
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law
Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's assets"
reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to
examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional examination of its
bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to
this Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money
Laundering Act is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the
affected party: (1) It violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.

Issues:
1. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.
2. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.
 3. Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

Rulings
1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte
application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due
process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage.
In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both
remedies' effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of
property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular
deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or
property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on
particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the
freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the
account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance
of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by
the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.

2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the
next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in
the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage by
the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the
sole issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be
filed and does not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during
the pre-trial or even during trial.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering
offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an
investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry
court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy
enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be
furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents
and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket
authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2)
violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money
laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance
and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that
it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of
preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:
1. The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank
inquiry order;
 2. The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a
money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;
3. A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court
order ex-parte for the principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately
based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired
into; and
4. The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts
shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing
demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and
solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration
by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental
action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of
SPCMB' s letter request for information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order
involving its accounts.

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC
for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is
declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, Petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL A. MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-YAP

G.R. No. 192302 June 4, 2014

FACTS:
On July 18, 2003, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented in this case by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. R.A.B. Realty, Inc., et
al.,"6docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107308, before the Manila RTC.
Subsequently, or on July 21, 2003, it filed a second complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et
al.,"7 docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107325 (collectively, civil forfeiture cases), also before the same RTC.8 In the
said civil forfeiture cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and government
securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were related to the unlawful
activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public,9 in violation of the Securities Regulation Code10 as
well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.11
On September 25 and 27, 2006, herein respondents filed separate Motions for Leave to Intervene and Admit
Attached Answer-in Intervention12 (separate motions for intervention), in the civil forfeiture cases, respectively,
alleging, inter alia, that they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof. In this relation, they
asserted that in a separate petition for involuntary insolvency proceedings, i.e., Spec. Proc. Case No. 03-026 filed
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 204 (insolvency case), they were appointed as assignees of the properties of
Spouses Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay) (as well as their conduit companies) who were impleaded
as defendants in the aforementioned civil forfeiture cases.
On August 8, 2007, the Manila RTC rendered a Joint Order 14 denying respondents separate motions for
intervention, citing Section 35 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture. Dissatisfied, respondents moved
for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Manila RTC in an Order 17dated January 10, 2008, prompting
them to elevate the case to the CA on certiorari. In a Decision19 dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents
petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents separate motions for
intervention. It found that respondents were able to establish their rights as assignees in the insolvency case filed
by Sps. Baladjay. As such, they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject of the civil forfeiture
cases.20 Moreover, a reading of Section 35 of the Civil Forfeiture Rules as above-cited revealed that there is
nothing therein that prohibits an interested party from intervening in the case before an order of forfeiture is
issued.21
Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution22dated May 17, 2010, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Joint Order dated August 8, 2007 and the Order dated January 10, 2008 which denied respondents separate
motions for intervention in the civil forfeiture cases
HELD:
The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value
or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on the ground of mootness,26 as a judgment in a case which presents a moot question can no longer be enforced

5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

COUNCIL, Petitioner,
vs.
CABRINI GREEN & ROSS, INC., MICHAEL J. FINDLAY and JANE GELBERG, Respondents,
x----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 154694 May 5, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Petitioner,
vs.
R.A.B. REALTY, INC., MULTINATIONAL TELECOM INVESTORS CORPORATION, ROSARIO A.
BALADJAY and SATURNINO M. BALADJAY, Respondents,
x----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 155554 May 5, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO N. MISA, MICHAEL Z. LAFUENTE, JESUS SILVERIO, REYNALDO NICHOLAS and REX D.
JAO, Respondents,
x----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 155711 May 5, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO DE LOS REYES, LORENZO CASTRO, HERMIE DE VERA, EDUARDO LAZO and DANILO
LIWAG,Respondents.
G.R. No. 154522 May 5, 2006
FACTS:
In the exercise of its power under Section 10 of RA 9160,1 the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)
issued freeze orders against various bank accounts of respondents. The frozen bank accounts were
previously found prima facie to be related to the unlawful activities of respondents.
Under RA 9160, a freeze order issued by the AMLC is effective for a period not exceeding 15 days unless
extended "upon order of the court." Accordingly, before the lapse of the period of effectivity of its freeze
orders, the AMLC2filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)3 various petitions for extension of effectivity of its
freeze orders.1avvphil.net
The AMLC invoked the jurisdiction of the CA in the belief that the power given to the CA to issue a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of injunction against any freeze order issued by the AMLC
carried with it the power to extend the effectivity of a freeze order. In other words, the AMLC interpreted
the phrase "upon order of the court" to refer to the CA.
However, the CA disagreed with the AMLC and dismissed the petitions. It uniformly ruled that it was not
vested by RA 9160 with the power to extend a freeze order issued by the AMLC.
ISSUE:
which court has jurisdiction to extend the effectivity of a freeze order?
HELD:
During the pendency of these petitions, or on March 3, 2003, Congress enacted RA 9194 (An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001").6 It
amended Section 10 of RA 9160 as follows:
SEC. 7. Section 10 of [RA 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. The Court of Appeals, upon application ex
parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or
property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Sec. 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze
order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20)
days unless extended by the court.7 (emphasis supplied)
Section 12 of RA 9194 further provides:
SEC 12. Transitory Provision. Existing freeze orders issued by the AMLC shall remain in force for a
period of thirty (30) days after the effectivity of this Act, unless extended by the Court of Appeals.
(emphasis supplied)
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Remand Cases
to the Honorable Court of Appeals (with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction)."8 The OSG prayed for the remand of these cases to the CA pursuant to RA
9194. It also asked for the issuance of a TRO on the ground that the freeze orders would be automatically
lifted on April 22, 2003 by operation of law and the money or deposits in the concerned bank accounts
may be taken out of the reach of law enforcement authorities. The OSG further manifested that pending
in the CA were 29 other cases involving the same issue. It requested that these cases be included in the
coverage of the TRO prayed for.
On April 21, 2003, the Court issued a TRO in these cases and in all other similar cases pending before all
courts in the Philippines. Respondents, the concerned banks, and all persons acting in their behalf were
directed to give full force and effect to existing freeze orders until further orders from this Court.
On May 5, 2003, the OSG informed the Court that on April 22, 2003 the CA issued a resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 69371 (the subject of G.R. No. 154694) granting the petition for extension of freeze
orders.9 Hence, the OSG prayed for the dismissal of G.R. No. 154694 for being moot. It also reiterated its
earlier prayer for the remand of G.R. Nos. 154522, 155554 and 155711 to the CA.
The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on the jurisdiction of the CA over the
extension of freeze orders. As the law now stands, it is solely the CA which has the authority to issue a
freeze order as well as to extend its effectivity. It also has the exclusive jurisdiction to extend existing
freeze orders previously issued by the AMLC vis--vis accounts and deposits related to money-
laundering activities.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 154694 is hereby DISMISSED for being moot while G.R. Nos. 154522, 155554
and 155711 are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Pending resolution by the
Court of Appeals of these cases, the April 21, 2003 temporary restraining order is hereby MAINTAINED.

6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

COUNCIL, Petitioners
vs.
JOCELYN I. BOLANTE, OWEN VINCENT D. BOLANTE, MA. CAROL D. BOLANTE, ALEJO LAMERA,
CARMEN LAMERA, EDNA CONSTANTINO, ARIEL C. PANGANIBAN, KATHERINE G. BOMBEO,
SAMUEL S. BOMBEO, MOLUGAN FOUNDATION, SAMUEL G. BOMBEO, JR., and NATIONAL
LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (Formerly Livelihood Corporation), Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190357
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, Presiding Judge of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court in Makati City,
JOCELYN I. BOLANTE, ARIEL C. PANGANIBAN, DONNIE RAY G. PANGANIBAN, EARL WALTER
G. PANGANIBAN, DARRYL G. PANGANIBAN, GAVINA G. PANGANIBAN, JAYPEE G.
PANGANIBAN, SAMUEL S. BOMBEO, KA THERINE G. BOMBEO, SAMUEL G. BOMBEO, JR.,
NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY LIVELIHOOD
CORPORATION), MOLUGAN FOUNDATION, ASSEMBLY OF GRACIOUS SAMARITANS
FOUNDATION, INC., ONE ACCORD CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY ENDEAVOR FOR SALVATION &
SUCCESS THROUGH POVERTY ALLEVIATION, INC., SOCIETY'S MULTI-PURPOSE FOUNDATION,
INC., ALLIANCE FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ENVIRONMENT OF PANGASINAN, INC., AND STA.
LUCIA EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BULACAN, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 186717
April 17, 2017
FACTS:
In April 2005, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) a series of suspicious transaction reports involving the accounts of Livelihood Corporation
(LIVECOR), Molugan Foundation (Molugan), and Assembly of Gracious Samaritans, Inc.
(AGS).5 According to the reports, LIVECOR transferred to Molugan a total amount of' 172.6 million in a
span of 15 months from 2004 to 2005.6 On 30 April 2004, LIVECOR transferred 40 million to AGS,
which received another P38 million from Molugan on the same day. 7 Curiously, AGS returned the P38
million to Molugan also on the same day.8
The transactions were reported '"suspicious" because they had no underlying legal or trade obligation,
purpose or economic justification; nor were they commensurate to the business or financial capacity of
Molugan and AGS, which were both lowly capitalized at P50,000 each.9 In the case of Molugan, Samuel
S. Bombeo, who holds the position of president, secretary and treasurer, is the lone signatory to the
account. 10 In the case of AGS, Samuel S. Bombeo shares this responsibility with Ariel Panganiban. 11
On 7 March 2006, the Senate furnished the AMLC a copy of its Committee Report No. 54 12 prepared by
the Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations. 13
Committee Report No. 54 14 narrated that former Undersecretary of Agriculture Jocelyn I. Bolante
(Bolante) requested the Department of Budget and Management to release to the Department of
Agriculture the amount of 728 million for the purchase of farm inputs under the Ginintuang Masaganang
Ani Program. This amount was used to purchase liquid fertilizers from Freshan Philippines, Inc., which
were then distributed to local government units and congressional districts beginning January 2004.
Based on the Audit Report prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), 15 the use of the funds was
characterized by massive irregularities, overpricing, violations of the procurement law and wanton
wastage of scarce government resources.
Committee Report No. 54 also stated that at the time that he served as Undersecretary of Agriculture,
Bolante was also appointed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as acting Chairman of LIVECOR.
The AMLC issued Resolution No. 75 16 finding probable cause to believe that the accounts of LIVECOR,
Molugan and AGS - the subjects of the suspicious transaction reports submitted by PNB - were related to
what became known as the "fertilizer fund scam." The pertinent portion of Resolution No. 75 provides:
Under the foregoing circumstances, there is probable cause to believe that the accounts of the
foundations and its officers are related to the fertilizer fund scam. The release of the amount of 728
million for the purchase of farm inputs to the Department of Agriculture was made by Undersecretary
Bolante. Undersecretary Bolante was the Acting Chairman of LIVECOR. LIVECOR transferred huge
amounts of money to Molugan and AGS, while the latter foundations transferred money to each other. Mr.
[Samuel S.] Bombeo was the President, Secretary, and Treasurer of Molugan. He, therefore, played a
key role in these transactions. On the other hand, Mr. [Ariel] Panganiban was the signatory to the account
or AGS. Without his participation, these transactions could not have been possible.
The acts involved in the "fertilizer scam" may constitute violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
x x x as well as violation or Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder).
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Republic committed forum shopping in filing CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024 before the CA
2. Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there exists no probable cause to
ailow an inquiry into the total of 76 deposits and investments of respondents
HELD:
The Republic committed forum shopping.
The RTC's finding that there was no
probable cause for the issuance of a
bank inquiry order was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

7. RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA Y. LIGOT, and
MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL,

G.R. No. 176944 March 6, 2013

FACTS:
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with the CA
against certain monetary instruments and properties of the petitioners, pursuant to Section 10 4 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, as amended (otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001).
This application was based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of the Ombudsman to the AMLC,
recommending that the latter conduct an investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible
violation of RA No. 9160.5
In support of this recommendation, the Ombudsman attached the Complaint6 it filed against the Ligots for
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and for violations of Section 8 7 of RA No. 67138 and
RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Ombudsmans Complaint
a. Lt. Gen. Ligot and immediate family
The Ombudsmans complaint alleges that Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) for 33 years and 2 months, from April 1, 1966 as a cadet until his retirement on August 17,
2004.9 He and Mrs. Ligot have four children, namely: Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot,
George Y. Ligot and Miguel Y. Ligot, who have all reached the age of majority at the time of the filing of
the complaint.10
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that as of December
31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and
Three Pesos (3,848,003.00).11 In contrast, his declared assets in his 1982 SALN amounted to only One
Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (105,000.00).12
Aside from these declared assets, the Ombudsmans investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his
family had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least Fifty Four
Million One Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos (54,001,217.00).
b. Edgardo Tecson Yambao
The Ombudsmans investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligots younger brother, Edgardo Tecson Yambao.
The records of the Social Security System (SSS) revealed that Yambao had been employed in the private
sector from 1977 to 1994. Based on his contributions to the SSS, Yambao did not have a substantial
salary during his employment. While Yambao had an investment with Mabelline Foods, Inc., the
Ombudsman noted that this company only had a net income of 5,062.96 in 2002 and 693.67 in 2003.
Despite Yambaos lack of substantial income, the records show that he has real properties and vehicles
registered in his name, amounting to Eight Million Seven Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (8,763,550.00), which he acquired from 1993 onwards. The Office of the Ombudsman
further observed that in the documents it examined, Yambao declared three of the Ligots addresses as
his own.
From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao acted as a dummy and/or nominee
of the Ligot spouses, and all the properties registered in Yambaos name actually belong to the Ligot
family
As a result of the Ombudsmans complaint, the Compliance and Investigation staff (CIS) of the AMLC
conducted a financial investigation, which revealed the existence of the Ligots various bank accounts
with several financial institutions.20 On April 5, 2005, the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Officers issued a resolution holding that probable cause exists that Lt. Gen. Ligot violated
Section 8, in relation to Section 11, of RA No. 6713, as well as Article 183 21 of the Revised Penal Code.
On May 25, 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005, directing the Executive Director of
the AMLC Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and
the members of his family with the CA.22 Subsequently, on June 27, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Application with the appellate court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of
the Ligots and Yambao.
ISSUE:
WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
extended the freeze order issued against him and his family even though no predicate crime had been
duly proven or established to support the allegation of money laundering.

HELD:
I. Procedural aspect
a. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available in cases involving
freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall
not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs
otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari,
and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the
freeze order over their properties.
b. Applicability of 6-month extension period under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005. Section 59 provides
that it shall "apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order" at the time of its
effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20, 2005 resolution extending the
freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order on September 28, 2005.
Significantly, the CA only acted upon this motion on January 4, 2006, when it issued a resolution denying
it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this motion was actually a motion for
reconsideration, as it sought the reversal of the assailed CA resolution. Since the Ligots motion for
reconsideration was still pending resolution at the time the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect
on December 15, 2005, the Rule unquestionably applies to the present case.
II. Substantive aspect
a. Probable cause exists to support the issuance of a freeze order
The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended by RA No.
9194, which states:
Section 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. The Court of Appeals, upon application ex
parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or
property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section
3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a
period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court. [italics supplied]
The Ligots claim that the CA erred in extending the effectivity period of the freeze order against them,
given that they have not yet been convicted of committing any of the offenses enumerated under RA No.
9160 that would support the AMLCs accusation of money-laundering activity.
We do not see any merit in this claim. The Ligots argument is founded on a flawed understanding of
probable cause in the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding31 or freeze order application
b. A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
Assuming that the freeze order is substantively in legal order, the Ligots now assert that its effectiveness
ceased after January 25, 2006 (or six months after July 25, 2005 when the original freeze order first
expired), pursuant to Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases (A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC). This
section states:
Section 53. Freeze order.
 xxxx
(b) Extension. On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of twenty days from issuance of a
freeze order, the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months.
[italics supplied; emphasis ours]
The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that
are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from utilizing
them during the duration of the freeze order.39 The relief is pre-emptive in character, meant to prevent the
owner from disposing his property and thwarting the States effort in building its case and eventually filing
civil forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the point of view of the
freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the maximum period of time that the freeze
order can be extended by the CA. The final sentence of Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001 provides, "the freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court."
In contrast, Section 55 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of extension "for a period
not exceeding six months" "for good cause" shown
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not exceeding six
months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for
civil forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset
preservation order or it should have filed the necessary information.

In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any explanation why it took six years (from
the time it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the clear tenor
of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension of a freeze order for only a period of six
months. All the Republic could proffer is its temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases; in effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these
circumstances, we cannot but conclude that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the six-
month period violated the Ligots right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.