British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19(5) 2011: 837848

ARTICLE

METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1: AN ARGUMENT

OF IDENTITY

Laura M. Castelli

The paper analyses the argumentative structure of a dicult passage

from Aristotles Metaphysics XII 7 on the basis of a topos of sameness
provided in Top. VII 1. In doing this the article gives an example of how
Aristotles treatises on dialectic can prove useful to understand what he
says in his more philosophically committed writings. The article also
shows how general argumentative techniques and more or less explicit
specic philosophical assumptions interact in shaping Aristotles
arguments and how the distinction of these dierent factors can help
us have a better grasp on Aristotles text.

KEYWORDS: Aristotle; identity; dialectic; intelligible; desirable

1. INTRODUCTION

In Metaphysics XII 7, 1072a27-b1 Aristotle gives an argument to prove

that the rst object of desire ( ) is the same as the rst
object of thought ( ). The precise structure of the
argument is very dicult to grasp. In this article, I shall attempt a
reconstruction of it on the basis of Topics VII 1, in which Aristotle
provides a list of argumentative patterns (topoi) to support or disprove
identity claims in dialectical debates. The article proposes a close reading
of these two texts in order to enlighten the structure of the argument in
Met. XII 7. I do not address the larger philosophical signicance of the
argument for Aristotles metaphysics and cosmology in general, although a
better reading of the passage may contribute to a better understanding of
broader philosophical issues.
The article is divided into three sections. In x2 I present Met. XII 7,
1072a27-b1, providing a rst reading of the argument. In x3, I analyse the
topos about numerical sameness in Top. VII 1, 152a5-30. In x4, I go back to
Met. XII 7 with Top. VII 1 in mind. Although I think that this analysis
allows a better understanding of what Aristotle is doing, I do not claim that

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

ISSN 0960-8788 print/ISSN 1469-3526 online 2011 BSHP
http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2011.599565
838 LAURA M. CASTELLI

this analysis makes the argument in XII 7 cogent. Rather, it makes easier to
see where the weaknesses of the argument are.

2. METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1

Met. XII 6 introduces the inquiry into eternal unmovable substances and
argues for the necessity of some eternal unmoved mover(s). XII 7 proceeds
in this line of investigation. The possibility of a mover, which moves without
being moved by anything else, is shown by the way in which we are moved
by the object of desire and the object of thought. In fact the object of desire
and the object of thought move desire and thought respectively, without
being in their turn moved by anything else. It is at this point that Aristotle
oers an argument to prove that the rst object of desire
( ) and the rst object of thought ( )
are the same.
In order to make my analysis easier to follow, I provide a rst
presentation of the argument as it appears in Aristotles text, without
projecting on it the structure of what I take to be a corresponding topos in
Top. VII 1.

[0]
[1]
[2]

[3]

[4]
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

1
And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being
moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the
object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of wish. But desire is consequent on
opinion rather than the opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is
moved by the object of thought, and one side of the list of opposites is in itself the object of
thought; and in this, substance is rst, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually.
(The one and the simple are not the same; for one means a measure, but simple means that
the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the good, also, and that which is in itself desirable are
on this same side of the list; and the rst in any class is always best, or analogous to the best.
(translation by W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford
 METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1 839

[0] provides the general context of the argument and is not a part of it
strictly speaking.
[1] is the thesis which has to be proved. I take the plural
to refer to the rst object of desire and the rst object of thought, which
will be demonstrated to be one and the same thing.2 Note that, although this
is the conclusion of the argument, it is not repeated at the end of the
passage.
[2] introduces the rst part of the argument,3 dealing with the object of
desire, [3] marks the transition from the object of desire to the object of
thought, and sections from [4] to [8] deal with the object of thought and
complete the argument. I shall now take a closer look at [2][8].
In [2] Aristotle species the link between the object of desire ( )
and what is beautiful ( ). Aristotle argues that is
by arguing that some forms of (apparent or real) are the
object of the species of desire. The argumentative strategy lying on the
background is the following: if the object of each species of desire is ,
we can infer that the object of desire taken as a genus is what is .4

Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, 1984) Vol. II, p. 1694). The Greek text is
taken from W. D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle. Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924).
2
A. Laks oers a paraphrase of what Aristotle could mean by the use of the plural in these
terms: But one has to see that contrary to what the duality of the terms suggest the rst
desirable and the rst intelligible are but one and the same thing. More generally the very fact
that one and the same thing can be referred to as if it were two is the main feature of identity
problems. Aristotle himself points out that identity uses the same thing as if it were two in Met.
V 9, 1018a7-9.
It has been objected to me by an anonymous reader that what Aristotle wants to prove here
is not that the rst object of thought and the rst object of desire are the same, but that they are
loosely similar in the way they move. Although I think that a qualication of the precise
meaning of [1] is required (see p. 842.), I continue to think that what Aristotle wants to show is
that the rst object of thought and the rst object of desire are extensionally the same thing
picked out in two dierent ways. Although their reconstructions of the argument dier from
mine, it seems to me that all commentators agree on taking [1] as a claim of sameness (in some
sense of sameness) and not of mere similarity. Apart from Laks, explicit remarks are put forth
by ps. Alexander (Michael Hayduck (ed.), Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica
Commentaria (Berlin, 1891), 693, ll. 334); Albert Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles
(Tubingen, 18478) 259; Leo Elders, Aristotles Theology (Assen, 1972) 16572; Carlo Natali,
Cosmo e divinita (LAquila, 1974) 83.
3
I take the to introduce the whole argument and not only the rst sentence in [2].
4
Alexander (cit., 693, ll. 34.), Aquinas (In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, edited by
P.Fr.M.-R. Cathala (Torino, 1935) 7124) and Schwegler (cit., p. 259) take [2] to introduce the
distinction between the object of irrational appetite ( ) and the object of rational wish
( ). According to these reconstructions, only the second is relevant for the argument by
showing a case where desire is guided by thought. This connection would bridge the gap
between object of desire and object of thought. I do not think that [2] has this function (which I
rather ascribe to [3]), nevertheless it is true that the formulation of [2] draws on Aristotles
distinction between irrational and rational appetite (cf. De An. 433a22-26).
840 LAURA M. CASTELLI

Ross5 and Bonitz6 take these lines to say that the rst object of desire is
, in the sense that the proper object of desire is . I think this
is true, but it should be better qualied. It seems to me that the lines do
support the general claim that the proper object of desire is what is .
From this general statement, a stronger claim could be drawn (which does
not seem to be what Ross and Bonitz maintain), namely that [2*] since what
is is the proper object of desire, what is beautiful in its own right is the
rst object of desire, i.e. what is really beautiful in its own right is the most
properly desirable thing. In other words: or is
. I think [2*] is true, but Aristotle does not put it forth
explicitly.
As for [3], two opposite interpretations have been given. On the one hand,
Ross7 says that this portion of text does not provide an essential piece of the
argument, as it doesnt prove that the object of desire and the object of
thought are the same. Rather, it makes clear the relation of priority
obtaining between desiring something and having an opinion or thinking of
something. We desire something because we think it is or because it seems to
us to be beautiful and not the other way round. In this sense thought is prior
to desire.
On the other hand, Laks8 maintains that [2] establishes the identity of the
rst desirable and the rst intelligible, providing a condensed version of
the argument in De An. III 10. For more detailed criticism of Laks
interpretation, I refer to footnote 8. Here I conne myself to suggesting an
intermediate interpretation: with Ross, I take the argument to be developed
5
W. D. Ross, Aristotle. Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924) Vol. II, p. 375 ad 1072a27-b1.
6
Hermann Bonitz Aristotelis Metaphysica (Bonn, 1848) 497.
7
W. D. Ross, cit. Vol. II, p. 375 ad 1072a27-b1.
8
A. Laks, cit. p. 223. Laks develops his reading of lines 1072a26-b4 on p. 2207 of his afore
mentioned article. On p. 221 he makes clear what he takes to be the two fundamental steps of
the argument: (a) the identication of the desirable with the intelligible in so far as they are
rst; (b) the identication of the desirable-intelligible with the beautiful and/or the good.
Although I think that both (a) and (b) grasp some aspects of the argument, I do not think that
Laks analysis is the best to understand its structure. It is true that the overlapping of what is
desirable and what is intelligible is not complete and Aristotle wants to make a point concerning
the rst desirable and the rst intelligible (a). It is also true that the identication of desirable
and intelligible with what is beautiful plays a fundamental role in the development of the
argument. Still it seems important to me that the desirable and the intelligible are said to be
beautiful or good each separately, and not as a whole desirable-intelligible. In my interpretation
of the argument this is a basic point. The identication of the rst desirable and the rst
intelligible is stated precisely on the basis that each of them is beautiful in the highest degree.
The fact that there are cases where desirable and intelligible do not overlap does not seem very
relevant here, while the fact that both the rst desirable and the rst intelligible are beautiful is
the means to prove that they are identical rather than a consequence of their identication as
one desirable-intelligible. Nevertheless I should add that Laks is not the only one to take [3] as
the pivotal passage for the whole argument: before him ps. Alexander (cit., p. 694, ll. 615) and
Aquinas (cit., p. 712 xx 25223) seem to take the argument for the identity of the rst object of
thought and the rst object of desire to be concluded with [3] and take the following lines as
additional qualication of the rst unmoved mover and its properties.
 METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1 841

through [2][8] and, in particular, I take [4][8] to be essential to the

conclusion that the rst desirable and the rst intelligible are one and the
same thing. Accordingly, I do not think that [3] encloses the bulk of
the argument. At the same time, [3] is necessary for the argument, though
not in itself sucient to establish the conclusion. Aristotle needs the object
of thought to be capable of being beautiful and this is what [3] says: [3]
makes explicit the link between being an object of thought and being
beautiful.9 In other words, [3] makes clear that the class of objects of
thought and the class of good things do overlap in a non-accidental way. In
fact, we desire something because we somehow think that it is good. In this
perspective, [3] adds an important qualication and in a way strengthens the
argument: it shows that the rst object of thought and the rst object of
desire are connected not accidentally. If the rest of the argument proves that
they are the same, then [3] adds that they are not accidentally the same.
In [4] Aristotle shifts the attention from the object of desire to the object
of thought ( ) and in [5] he determines the domain of things that
are per se object of thought. Objects of thought per se are those beings which
belong to the positive side of being, where the negative or privative half of
being can be thought of just in virtue of the positive one. For instance, we
can think of what is blind just in so far as we can think of things having
sight: we think of blindness as the privation or lack of sight.10 Within the
positive side of being, which is per se object of thought, the rst rank is
occupied by substance and, among substances, the rst is the simple
substance which is pure act.
[6] claries the characterisation of the rst substance as simple. Aristotle
distinguishes between being simple and being one. Simplicity is a
qualitative mark or a way of being of the rst substance(s), while being
one means having the function of measure as indivisible principle of
knowledge. According to Aristotle, this property of being one is in the rst
instance realised by the numerical one, which is the principle of number.11
But for Aristotle numbers are not substances. Therefore, it seems that by [6]
Aristotle wants to avoid the identication (endorsed by other philosophers)
of the rst substance (which is simple) and the one which is the principle of
numbers.12 With a very condensed remark, Aristotle would thus be alluding

9
I am thankful to Lindsay Judson for helping me sharpen this point.
10
The division of beings into two opposite coordinate sides (systoichiai), a positive and a
negative one, is a Pythagorean inheritance. Aristotle himself claims (cf. Met. IV 2, 1004a2; X 3,
1054a20.; X 4, 1055a38-b29) to have worked out a system of basic oppositions under which all
beings can be ordered. The basic opposition is one of possession and privation.
11
Cf. Met. V 6, 1016b17-21; X 1, 1052b18-24.
12
ps. Alexander (cit. 695, ll. 1017) interprets the remark dierently: by saying that the rst
substance is simple but not one Aristotle would leave open the possibility that there is more
than one simple substance, i.e. more than one unmoved mover. In this perspective, the
argument in XII 7 turns out to be an argument about a certain kind of substance and not about
a certain individual (the rst unmoved mover). On this point see p. 842.
842 LAURA M. CASTELLI

to the mistake of those who identify the rst substance with the principle of
numbers: the numerical one is no doubt simple, in the sense that it cannot be
divided or analysed any further.13 Nevertheless, being simple is not the
same as being (the numerical) one there is no contradiction in
ascribing ontological simplicity to something which is not the principle of
numbers.14
After the parenthetical remark in [6], [7] introduces a further step for the
argument. In fact [7] says that and (what is
per se worthy of choice) both belong to the positive systoichia, which
corresponds to the domain of what is per se . In other words, being
beautiful and being in itself worthy of choice are properties belonging to
those beings which are per se objects of thought. In particular, as [8] states,
the rst is also what is in the highest degree.
The conclusion of the argument is stated in [1]: the rst object of desire
and the rst object of thought are the same. Despite appearances, it is not
very clear what this means exactly. There seem to be two main options
which, to my knowledge, are not distinguished in any interpretation of the
passage. [1] could say that [1i] both the rst object of desire and the rst
object of thought are the same as what is beautiful and, for this reason, they
are in their turn one and the same (i.e.: ). According to this
interpretation, the argument is making a point about a general character-
isation of the proper objects of desire and of thought: they are the good
things. The fact that there could be some object displaying all three
properties to the highest degree, i.e. that there could be something which is
desirable, intelligible and good in the highest degree, might follow,
but wouldnt be the main and most straightforward conclusion of the
argument.
I am not sure this is the best way to interpret it. In fact, a stronger
conclusion could be drawn: from [8] and [2*] we could conclude that [1ii] the
rst and the rst are numerically one and the same thing. But
an additional complication raises here as to the qualication of this thing.
It is in general very dicult to say whether in Met. XII 6-7 Aristotle is
dealing with a special kind of highest substance or with individual
substances. The same diculty holds with reference to [1ii], which leaves
room for two alternative specications, depending on whether we consider
[1iia] coextensive classes of individuals (rst substances), or [1iib] two
descriptions picking out one and the same individual. In [1iia] the thing

13
For the intuition that the numerical one is the limit of division see for instance Met. V 6,
1016b25.
14
In more than one passage Aristotle stresses that there are some analogies between numbers
and substances, but that such analogies have been misinterpreted by other philosophers, who
have taken analogies for straightforward sameness. Apart from the identication of the one
with the rst principle of all beings (cf. Met. X 2, 1053b11-12; XIV 4, 1091b1-3; 1522), see also
Met. VII 11, 1036b7-13; VIII 3, 1043b32.
 METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1 843

would be a class of objects, in [1iib] the thing would be an individual

object.15 It is important to stress that in either case what the argument shows
is extensional sameness, i.e. co-extensiveness of classes or co-reference of
singular terms or denite descriptions. In other words, the argument does
not show in any case that being the rst object of thought and being the rst
object of desire mean the same, but only that rst object of thought and
rst object of desire pick out the same thing(s). It is precisely for this reason
that [3] is particularly relevant, because it rules out merely accidental co-
extensiveness or co-reference.
I am going to argue that if Top. VII 1 provides us with the correct
interpretation of XII 7, it will turn out that [1iib] is the appropriate reading
of the passage.

3. TOPICS VII 1, 152A530

Top. VII 1 presents a list of argumentative patterns to support or disprove

statements of numerical sameness. These patterns are quite dierent in
nature and scope, but I need not discuss this aspect here. The topos I am
going to focus upon appears at ll. 152a5-30.

[A] You must also examine, when one of two things is said to be
something in a superlative degree, whether the other of these same
things also attains a superlative degree in the same respect
(
).

[B] For instance, Xenocrates tries to show that the happy life and the good
life are the same, since of all lives the good life and the happy life are most
worthy of choice ( ); for only one thing can be characterized as
the most worthy of choice and the greatest. So likewise with all other such
things also.

[C] But each of two things which is described as greatest or most worthy of
choice must be numerically one, otherwise it will not have been shown
that they are the same (
);

[D] For it does not necessarily follow that, if the Peloponnesians and the
Lacedaemonians are the bravest of the Greeks, the Peloponnesians are
the same as the Lacedaemonians, since neither Peloponnesian nor
Lacedaemonian is a numerically single thing; but it merely follows that the

15
Both readings are compatible with Aristotles use of numerical sameness between pairs of
terms: in Top. I 7 and VII 1 both cases of predicates with the same extension (synonymous
terms, deniendum and deniens, a subject and its proprium) and of descriptions or singular
terms with the same reference (Socrates and the one whos sitting there) are contemplated.
844 LAURA M. CASTELLI

one group must be included in the other, just as the Lacedaemonians are
included in the Peloponnesians. Otherwise, if one group is not included in the
other, the result will be that each is better than the other. [. . . ]

[E] It is obvious, therefore, that what is described as best and greatest

must be numerically one if it is going to be shown to be the same
as something else (
).

[F] For this reason, too, Xenocrates does not prove his contention; for neither
the happy life nor the good life is numerically one, so that they are not
necessarily the same because they are both most worthy of choice, but 5he
proves4 only that one must fall under the other.16

In [A] Aristotle gives the general structure of an argument meant to support

or disprove numerical sameness between two terms. The statement at issue is
something of the form A is the same as B, where A and B are two terms,
and what we want to do is to see whether the statement is true. One way to
tackle the problem, Aristotle says, is to see whether there is a property P that
A has in the highest degree within a domain of things W. If B has P in the
highest degree with reference to the same W, then A and B can17 be the
same; if B fails to comply with this requirement, A and B are surely not
the same and the statement at issue is disproved.
In [B] Aristotle provides an example of how such an argument should
work. We can display the structure of Xenocrates argument in the following
way:

A the happy life

B the good life
P being worthy of choice
W the class of lives.

Xenocrates would prove that the happy life (A) and the good life (B)
are one and the same thing because they both have the property of
being worthy of choice (P) to the highest degree within the domain of
lives (W).
The sentence closing the presentation of Xenocrates argument (for only
one thing can be characterised as the most worthy of choice and the
greatest) is quite dicult to interpret. In the rst place, it is not clear
whether it is supposed to be part of Xenocratess argument rather than a
remark by Aristotle himself. In both cases, the sense of the statement would

16
Translation by E. S. Forster, Topica (London/Cambridge Mass, 1960).
17
It will become apparent in the next paragraphs why this is not sucient to prove the
numerical identity of A and B.
 METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1 845

be that the two things which are proven or disproven to share in the same
property in the highest degree must be individuals whether or not they are
the same individual is what has to be ascertained. If the claim is part of
Xenocratess reasoning, then there is a aw in the argument: it would
assume that from the mere fact that we are adopting superlative denite
descriptions of the form the most . . . we may infer that we are talking
about individuals. But this is not the case, as we will see in a moment. If, on
the other hand, the sentence is a remark by Aristotle, then it would
anticipate the problem with Xenocratess argument (which is made explicit
in [F]): the two terms of which we want to test the identity must stand for
individuals, while the good life and the happy life do not denote a single
individual life but kinds of life.
That A and B refer to individuals is a necessary condition for the argument
to be cogent. Therefore, the argument has a very limited constructive force:
at most it can prove that two singular terms happen to be co-referential. In
this perspective, it is important to notice that the semantics of the phrase the
most F alone is not sucient to guarantee that such a condition is met. [C]
makes clear the requirement that A and B cannot denote classes of objects:
they must denote some individual item. [D] explains what kind of problem
arises if A and B happen to pick out classes rather than individuals and shows
why, in this case, the argument is ineective.
Let us consider A the Lacedaemonians, B the Peloponnesians,
P being brave, W the Greeks. Let us say that we want to prove that
the Lacedaemonians are one and the same with the Peloponnesians by
showing that they both possess the property of being the bravest among the
Greeks. We can have two premises, both true:

(Hp. 1) The Lacedaemonians are the bravest among the Greeks

(Hp. 2) The Peloponnesians are the bravest among the Greeks.

From these, it does not follow that the Lacedaemonians and the
Peloponnesians are one and the same. Since both terms stand for groups
of individuals, it might be the case (as it is indeed) that one group is included
in the other. But the very fact that the class designated by one of the two
terms is bigger than the one designated by the other implies that the two
terms cannot be one and the same, since they have dierent extensions. In
other words, if A and B are general terms, the topos at issue is not enough to
prove that A and B are the same.
The fact that both (Hp. 1) and (Hp. 2) can be true suggests how to make
sense of Aristotles understanding of the claim:

The As are the most F.

It seems that a good paraphrase could be:

Nothing which is not A is as F as or more F than any A.

846 LAURA M. CASTELLI

Notice that this reading does not rule out at all the possibility of nested
classes (like Lacedemonians and Peloponnesians) as it does not rule out the
possibility of dierent degrees of F-ness among the As. We can consider
some examples of how this applies. (Hp.1) and (Hp.2) would mean:

(Hp.1*) no one, who is not Lacedemonian, is as brave as or braver than

any Lacedemonian;
(Hp.2.*) no one, who is not Peloponnesian, is as brave as or braver than
any Peloponnesian.

This would be consistent with the fact that the Lacedemonians are braver
than other Peloponnesians: they are Peloponnesians themselves, which is
consistent with (Hp.2*). At the same time, one can accept the fact that some
Lacedemonians are braver than other Lacedemonians and, in particular, the
fact that one Lacedemonian, say Leonidas, is the bravest among
Lacedemonians. The very claim that Leonidas is the bravest among
Lacedemonians would be that there is no one, who is not Leonidas, who is
as brave as or braver than Leonidas.
As a consequence of all this, it seems that the argument can be
cogent only if ([E]) both A and B denote something which is numerically
one, i.e. an individual. For these reasons ([F]) Xenocratess argument is not
a good one, since the good life and the happy life do not denote
individuals but classes of individuals (the class of good lives and the class of
happy lives).

4. BACK TO METAPHYSICS XII 7

If we now go back to Met. XII 7 in the light of Top. VII 1, it is possible to

detect a similar argumentative strategy. The relation of sameness must be
tested between the two terms and .
Both are meant to be singular denite descriptions. We can sketch the basic
elements in the following way:

A
B
P
W the domain of beings and, more precisely, the positive systoichia.

[2] provides the basis for arguing that A has P in the highest degree (what I
have called [2*]); [4][8] show that also B has P in the highest degree with
reference to W. [3] shows that A and B are non-accidentally connected. The
requirement of numerical unity could be fullled if we take into account Met.
XII 8, 1074a3137, where Aristotle argues explicitly that the rst mover of
the universe (which coincides with the rst being in the positive systoichia) is
 METAPHYSICS XII 7, 1072A27-B1 847

one in number. Even if the passage does not belong in the argument in XII 7,
it seems relevant that at least somewhere Aristotle states explicitly what the
argument implicitly requires.
To conclude, I would like to add a few remarks on the assumptions lying
behind the use of such an argument and about the way I have reconstructed
the topos so far. I start from this last point.
One might wonder why I say that the argument in Top. VII 1 makes
reference to a property P which belongs to some individuals in the highest
degree and why I do not rather go for a less complicated version (dealing
with three singular terms instead of two singular terms and a predicate)
namely:

A the most P
B the most P
hence
A B.

It seems to me that the interpretation I provide is not just closer to

Aristotles text in [A], but it also avoids a kind of redundancy in the text of
Top. VII 1. What I have labelled a few lines above as a less complicated
version is actually presented as an independent topos on its own in Top. VII
1, 152a3132. This last topos is based on the transitivity (or triangularity18)
of identity holding between pairs of terms. It seems to me that the reference
to a general property possessed by something in the highest degree makes a
better sense of VII 1, 152a5-30 and ts well together with the argument in
Met. XII 7. In the latter passage, Aristotle shows in the rst place that the
objects of desire on the one hand and the objects of thought per se on the
other hand have the property of being beautiful. From this and some
supplementary assumptions, it follows that the rst object of desire and the
rst object of thought have this property to the highest degree and are,
therefore, the same.
If the parallel with VII 1 is plausible and if the argument in XII 7 is meant
to be cogent, then the argument in Met. XII 7 assumes that the rst object
of desire and the rst object of intellection are denite descriptions
referring to some singular object and not to classes of individuals. This
result corresponds to [1iib] above. The justication of the assumptions, that
the rst object of thought and the rst object of desire exist, that each of
them is one and only one, falls outside the scope of the argument itself. Such
assumptions are pieces of the metaphysical doctrine to which the dialectical
technique is applied in this case. Whether Aristotle does actually provide

18
What I call triangularity of identity can be considered as the ancient version of the
transitivity of identity, starting from the relation of two terms, A and B, with a third term C: if
A is the same as C and B is the same as C, then A is the same as B.
848 LAURA M. CASTELLI

evidence for these additional assumptions is a further question falling

outside the scope of this article.19

Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnes, J. (ed.) The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford

Translation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Bonitz, H. Aristotelis Metaphysica (Bonn: Ad. Marcus, 1848).
Cathala, R. (ed.) S. Thomae Aquinatis in Metaphysicam Aristotelis
Commentaria (Torino: Marietti, 1935).
Elders, L. Aristotles Theology. A Commentary on Book L of the Metaphysics
(Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. N. V., 1972).
Forster, E. S. Aristotle. Topica (London: William Heinemann Ltd,
Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Hayduck, M. (ed.) Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica
Commentaria (Berlin: Reimer, 1891).
Laks, A. Metaphysics L7, in Aristotles Metaphysics Lambda. Symposium
Aristotelicum, edited by M. Frede and D. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon,
2000) 20744.
Natali, C. Cosmo e divinita. La struttura logica della teologia aristotelica
(LAquila: Japadre, 1974).
Ross, W. D. (ed.) Aristotle. Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction
and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924).
Ross, W. D. (ed.) Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici elenchi (Oxford: Clarendon,
1958).
Schwegler, A. Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Grundtext, Ubersetzung und
Commentar (Tubingen: L. Fr. Fues, 18478).

19
I should like to thank Bruno Centrone and Lindsay Judson for reading previous versions of
the article. I am also very grateful to Nathanael Stein for correcting my English and for his
helpful comments on many points.