BROTHERHOOD LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

ZAMORA

G.R. No. L-48645 January 7, 1987

FACTS:

BLUM filed a complaint with the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations, charging San Miguel
Corporation, and the following officers: Enrique Camahort, Federico Ofiate Feliciano Arceo,
Melencio Eugenia Jr., Ernesto Villanueva, Antonio Bocaling and Godofredo Cueto of unfair labor
practice as set forth in Section 4 (a), sub-sections (1) and (4) of Republic Act No. 875 and of
Legal dismissal. It was alleged that respondents ordered the individual complainants to
disaffiliate from the complainant union; and that management dismissed the individual
complainants when they insisted on their union membership.

On their part, respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the
complainants are not and have never been employees of respondent company but employees
of the independent contractor; that respondent company has never had control over the
means and methods followed by the independent contractor who enjoyed full authority to hire
and control said employees; and that the individual complainants are barred by estoppel from
asserting that they are employees of respondent company.

ISSUE:
The question of whether an employer-employee relationship exists

HELD:

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are

generally considered are the following:

(a) the selection and engagement of the employee;

(b) the payment of wages;

(c) the power of dismissal; and

(d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by
which the work is to be accomplished. It. is the called "control test" that is the most important
element.

The existence of an independent contractor relationship is generally established by the

following criteria: "whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the
nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the
right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the
work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the
contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises tools,
appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment"

The records fail to show that a large commercial outfit, such as the San Miguel Corporation,
entered into mere oral agreements of employment or labor contracting where the same would
involve considerable expenses and dealings with a large number of workers over a long period
of time. Despite respondent company's allegations not an iota of evidence was offered to prove
the same or its particulars. Such failure makes respondent SMC's stand subject to serious
doubts.

LVN PICTURES, INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PHILIPPINE MUSICIANS Guild (FFW) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents-
appellees.

FACTS:

Petitioners herein, LVN Pictures, Inc. and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. seek a review by certiorari of
an order of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 306-MC thereof, certifying the
Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW), petitioner therein and respondent herein, as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agency of all musicians working with said companies.

In its petition in the lower court, the Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW), hereafter referred to as
the Guild, averred that it is a duly registered legitimate labor organization; that LVN Pictures,
Inc., Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., and Premiere Productions, Inc. are corporations, duly organized
under the Philippine laws, engaged in the making of motion pictures and in the processing and
distribution thereof; that said companies employ musicians for the purpose of making music
recordings for title music, background music, musical numbers, finale music and other
incidental music, without which a motion picture is incomplete; that ninety-five (95%) percent
of all the musicians playing for the musical recordings of said companies are members of the
Guild; and that the same has no knowledge of the existence of any other legitimate labor
organization representing musicians in said companies. Premised upon these allegations, the
Guild prayed that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for all musicians
working in the aforementioned companies.

In their respective answers, the latter denied that they have any musicians as employees, and
alleged that the musical numbers in the filing of the companies are furnished by independent
contractors. The lower court, however, rejected this pretense and sustained the theory of the
Guild, with the result already adverted to. A reconsideration of the order complained of having
been denied by the Court en banc, LVN Pictures, inc., and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., filed these
petitions for review for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the musicians in question are employees of the film companies.

HELD: Yes.

The Court agreed with the lower courts decision, to wit:

Lower court resorted to apply R.A. 875 and US Laws and jurisprudence from which said Act was
patterned after. It ruled that the work of the musical director and musicians is a functional and
integral part of the enterprise performed at the same studio substantially under the direction
and control of the company.

In other words, to determine whether a person who performs work for another is the latter's
employee or an independent contractor, the National Labor Relations relies on 'the right to
control' test . Under this test an employer-employee relationship exist where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved,
but also the manner and means to be used in reaching the end. Notwithstanding that the
employees are called independent contractors', the Board will hold them to be employees
under the Act where the extent of the employer's control over them indicates that the
relationship is in reality one of employment.

The right of control of the film company over the musicians is shown (1) by calling the
musicians through 'call slips' in 'the name of the company; (2) by arranging schedules in its
studio for recording sessions; (3) by furnishing transportation and meals to musicians; and (4)
by supervising and directing in detail, through the motion picture director, the performance of
the musicians before the camera, in order to suit the music they are playing to the picture
which is being flashed on the screen.

The musical directors have no such control over the musicians involved in the present case. Said
musical directors control neither the music to be played, nor the musicians playing it. The film
companies summon the musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film companies,
through the musical directors, fix the date, the time and the place of work. The film companies,
not the musical directors, provide the transportation to and from the studio. The film
companies furnish meal at dinner time.

What is more in the language of the order appealed from "during the recording sessions,
the motion picture director who is an employee of the company" not the musical director
"supervises the recording of the musicians and tells them what to do in every detail". The
motion picture director not the musical director "solely directs and performance of the
musicians before the camera". The motion picture director "supervises the performance of all
the actors, including the musicians who appear in the scenes, so that in the actual performance
to be shown in the screen, the musical director's intervention has stopped." The movie director
"directly controls the activities of the musicians." He "says he wants more drums and the
drummer plays more" or "if he wants more violin or he does not like that."
It is well settled that "an employer-employee relationship exists . . .where the person for whom
the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also
the means to be used in reaching such end . . . ."

Dy Keh Beng vs. Intl Labor and Maritime Union

FACTS:

A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, a proprietor of a basket factory,
by dismissing Solano and Tudla for their union activities.

Dy Keh Beng contended that he did not know Tudla and Solano was not his employee because
the latter came to the establishment only when there was work which he did on pakiaw basis.

Dy Keh Beng countered with a special defense of simple extortion committed by the head of
the labor union.

ISSUE: W/N there existed an employee-employer relation between petitioner and respondents

HELD:

Yes. Evidence showed that the work of Solano and Tudla was continuous except in the event of
illness, although their services were compensated on piece basis. The control test calls for the
existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the
right considering that Dy Keh Beng is engaged in the manufacture of baskets known as kaing,
those working under Dy would be subject to Dys specifications such as the size and quality of
the kaing. And since the laborers are done at Dys establishments, it could be inferred that Dy
could easily exercise control upon them.

As to the contention that Solano was not an employee because he worked on piece basis, the
court ruled that it should be determined that if indeed payment by piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. Payment cannot be construed
by piece where work is done in such establishment so as to put the worker completely at liberty
to turn him out and take it another at pleasure

Justice Perfecto also contended that pakyaw system is a labor contract between employers and
employees between capitalists and laborers.

Wherefore, the award of backwages is modified to an award of backwages for 3 years at the
rated of compensation the employees were receiving at the time of dismissal.

Investment Planning v. SSS

FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in business management and sale of securities. It
has 2 classes of agents selling investment plans: 1) salaried employees who have fixed hours of
work under the control of the company; 2) registered representatives are on commission basis.

Petitioner applied to SSS for exemption of coverage of these registered representatives.

However, it was denied on the ground that these registered employees are employees of the
petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners registered representatives are employees

HELD:

No. These representatives are in reality commission agents. They are not required to report for
work anytime. They shoulder their own selling expenses as well as transportation and they are
paid with commission based on a certain percentage of their sales.

Where there is no element of control and where a person who works for another is not subject
to definite hours of work and in turn compensated according to the result of his efforts and not
the amount thereof, there is no employer-employee relationship.

Insular Life v. NLRC (Nov. 15, 1989)

FACTS:

Insular Life (company) and Basiao entered into a contract by which Basiao was authorized to
solicit for insurance in accordance with the rules of the company. He would also receive
compensation, in the form of commissions. The contract also contained the relations of the
parties, duties of the agent and the acts prohibited to him including the modes of termination.

After 4 years, the parties entered into another contract an Agency Managers Contact and
to implement his end of it, Basiao organized an agency while concurrently fulfilling his
commitment under the first contract.

The company terminated the Agency Managers Contract. Basiao sued the company in a civil
action. Thus, the company terminated Basiaos engagement under the first contract and
stopped payment of his commissions.

ISSUE: W/N Basiao had become the companys employee by virtue of the contract, thereby
placing his claim for unpaid commissions

HELD: No. Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for in the
Insurance Code. These rules merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the
mutually desired result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it.
Its aim is only to promote the result, thereby creating no employer-employee relationship. It is
usual and expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its
commission agents in selling its policies which prescribe the qualifications of persons who may
be insured. None of these really invades the agents contractual prerogative to adopt his own
selling methods or to sell insurance at his own time and convenience, hence cannot justifiable
be said to establish an employer-employee relationship between Basiao and the company.

The respondents limit themselves to pointing out that Basiaos contract with the company
bound him to observe and conform to such rules. No showing that such rules were in fact
promulgated which effectively controlled or restricted his choice of methods of selling
insurance.

Therefore, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an
independent contract whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an
ordinary civil action.

Wherefore, the complain of Basiao is dismissed.

JOSE SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 138051

June 10, 2004

Facts: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and
Development Corporation (MJMDC). ABS-CBN was represented by its corporate officers while
MJMDC was represented by Sonza, as President and general manager, and Tiangco as its EVP
and treasurer. Referred to in the agreement as agent, MJMDC agreed to provide Sonzas
services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay Sonza
a monthly talent fee of P310, 000 for the first year and P317, 000 for the second and third year.

On April 1996, Sonza wrote a letter to ABS-CBN where he irrevocably resigned in view of the
recent events concerning his program and career. After the said letter, Sonza filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a complaint alleging that ABS-CBN did not pay his
salaries, separation pay, service incentive pay,13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance
and amounts under the Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP). ABS-CBN contended that no
employee-employer relationship existed between the parties. However, ABS-CBN continued to
remit Sonzas monthly talent fees but opened another account for the same purpose.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that there is no employee-employer
relationship. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA also affirmed the decision of
NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Ruling: Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employee-employer relationship
are selection and engagement of the employee, the payment of wages, the power of dismissal
and the employers power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the
work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called "control test", is the most important
element.

Sonzas services to co-host its television and radio programs are because of his peculiar talents,
skills and celebrity status. Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique
skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific selection
and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by
ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent
contractual relationship. All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of
negotiations that led to the Agreement. For violation of any provision of the Agreement, either
party may terminate their relationship. Applying the control test to the present case, we find
that SONZA is not an employee but an independent contractor.

The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing an employee from
an independent contractor. This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a
worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker
is deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well the less control the hirer exercises,
the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor. To perform his work,
SONZA only needed his skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television,
and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBNs control. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to
perform his job. ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify the program format and airtime
schedule "for more effective programming." ABS-CBNs sole concern was the quality of the
shows and their standing in the ratings.

Clearly, ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance of
Sonzas work. A radio broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is an
independent contractor. Sonzas work as television and radio program host required special
skills and talent, which SONZA admittedly possesses.

ABS-CBN claims that there exists a prevailing practice in the broadcast and entertainment
industries to treat talents like Sonza as independent contractors. The right of labor to security
of tenure as guaranteed in the Constitution arises only if there is an employer-employee
relationship under labor laws. Individuals with special skills, expertise or talent enjoy the
freedom to offer their services as independent contractors. The right to life and livelihood
guarantees this freedom to contract as independent contractors. The right of labor to security
of tenure cannot operate to deprive an individual, possessed with special skills, expertise and
talent, of his right to contract as an independent contractor.

Dayag vs. Canizares

Facts: The seven petitioners, William Dayag, et.al, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13 th month
pay, and actual, moral and exemplary damages against Alfredo Young, a building contractor
doing business under the firm name Youngs Construction. They filed the complaint with the
NCR Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The case was subsequently assigned to Labor Arbiter
Canizares. According to the petitioners, they were hired by Young to work as tower crane
operators at the latters construction site in San Juan, Metro Manila then they were transferred
to Cebu City to work at the construction of his Shoemart Cebu project. The petitioners left Cebu
for Manila purportedly due to harassment by Young.

Instead of attending the initial hearings set by the labor arbiter, Young filed a motion to transfer
the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region VII of the NLRC. He claimed that the
workplace where petitioners were regularly assigned was in Cebu City and that, in consonance
with Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the case should have
been filed in Cebu City. The labor arbiter, agreeing that petitioners workplace when the cause
of action accrued was Cebu City, granted Youngs motion and ordered the transmittal of the
case to the regional arbitration branch of Region VII. The petitioners promptly appealed said
order to the NLRC, which, however, dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, the recourse
to this Court by petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the proper venue is at Cebu City, being the workplace of the complainants

Ruling: No. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC this Court held that the question of
venue essentially pertains to the trial and relates more to the convenience of the parties rather
than upon the substance and merits of the case. It underscored the fact that the permissive
rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and
his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. With more reason does the principle find
applicability in cases involving labor and management because of the doctrine well-entrenched
in our jurisdiction that the State shall afford full protection to labor.

The rationale for the rule is obvious. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party
whether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest
governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and
the other party is not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another
place as this will unduly burden the former. In fact, even in cases where venue has been
stipulated by the parties, this Court has not hesitated to set aside the same if it would lead to a
situation so grossly inconvenient to one party as to virtually negate his claim.

In the case at hand, the ruling specifying the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch as the
venue of the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young. His residence in
Corinthian Gardens also serves as his correspondent office. Certainly, the filing of the suit in
the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila will not cause him as much
inconvenience as it would the petitioners, who are now residents of Metro Manila, if the same
was heard in Cebu. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite proceedings and bring
about the speedy resolution of instant case.
SAN MIGUEL v. BERSAMIRA

G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990

FACTS:

Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with
Lipercon and D'Rite (independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE). In said contracts, it
was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be
paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig.
There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers,
on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) is the duly
authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom
the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union advised SanMig that some
Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization
of their employment with SMC.

On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from
SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union
busting

Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and
D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices.

On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages

ISSUE:
Whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute

HELD:

A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee."

A labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relationship of employer and employee"

That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the
Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in
effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on
the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and
conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing
the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent
those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective
bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no
employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand
violates the terms of their CBA.

RONALD CABE and PURITA CABE, petitioners, vs. SOTERO L. TUMANG, Assistant Regional
Director for Arbitration, and AMBROCIO SISON, Acting Sheriff, Region 1, Ministry of Labor
and Employment, and SAMUEL TAMAYO, respondents.

Facts:

Samuel Tamayo agreed in March, 1979 to construct for the spouses Ronald Cabe and Purita
Cabe their residential house for P106,000 in accordance with the plans and specifications
prepared by an architect.

The Cabes dispensed with his services when he allegedly made certain deviations from the
plans. The house was finished by other persons.

Tamayo on June 28,1979 sued the Cabes in the Regional Office of the Department of Labor in
Laoag City for the recovery of P7,000 as payment of labor and materials. He filed the case as
head carpenter of his 18 co-workers, whose wages he had advanced, and for reimbursement of
materials which he had purchased

Issue: Tamayo was an independent contractor and not an employee of the Cabes.

Held:

Tamayo was an independent contractor and not an employee of the Cabes. The Labor Regional
Office and the National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction over his claim. Their
jurisdiction is confined to claims arising from employer-employee relationship

Molave Motor Sales vs. Judge Laron

Facts:

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles.Private respondent
is the sales manager of PLAINTIFF. At the pre-trial conference, the DEFENDANT raised the
question of jurisdiction of the Court stating that PLAINTIFF's complaint arose out of employer-
employee relationship, and he subsequently moved for dismissal. Such complaint was
dismissed by the judge because it must be the juris of the LA and NLRC to decide cases on ER-EE
relationship. However, although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the
Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. In this case, PLAINTIFF had
sued for monies loaned to DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and
for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have no relevance to
the Labor Code. hence, the civil has the juris over the matter.

Issue

Whether or not there was still a relationship of employer and employee between the parties.

Held

The dismissal of the case below on the ground that the sum of money and damages sued upon
arose from employer-employee relationship was erroneous. Claims arising from employer-
employee relations are now limited to those mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217.
There is no difficulty in stating that those in the case below should not be faulted for not being
aware of the last amendment to the frequently changing Labor Code.

The claim of DEFENDANT that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF, because
the latter has not sought clearance for his separation from the service, will not affect the
jurisdiction of respondent Judge to resolve the complaint of PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT could still
be liable to PLAINTIFF for payment of the accounts sued for even if he remains an employee of
PLAINTIFF.

PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY et. al., vs HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, et. al.,

G.R. No. L-58877 March 15, 1982

FACTS:

Respondent Abraham Tumala, Jr. was salesman petitioner company in Davao City. In the annual
Sumakwel contest conducted by the company, he was declared the winner of the Lapu-Lapu
Award for his performance as top salesman of the year, an award which entitled him to a prize
of a house and lot. Petitioner company, despite demands, have unjustly refused to deliver said
prize.

It was alleged that in 1980, petitioner company, in a manner oppressive to labor and without
prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor, arbitrarily and illegally terminated his employment.
Hence, Tumala filed a complaint in the CFI Davao and prayed that petitioner be ordered to
deliver his prize of house and lot or its cash equivalent, and to pay his back salaries and
separation benefits.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent

Tumala maintains that the controversy is triable exclusively by the court of general jurisdiction
ISSUE:

Whether it is the court of general jurisdiction and not the Labor Arbiter that has exclusive
jurisdiction over the recovery of unpaid salaries, separation and damages

HELD:

NO. SC ruled that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given
by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit
of doubt.

Under the Labor Code, the NLRC has the exclusive jurisdiction over claims, money or otherwise,
arising from ER-EE relations, except those expressly excluded therefrom. The claim for the said
prize unquestionable arose from an ER-EE relation and, therefore, falls within the coverage of
P.D. 1691, which speaks of all claims arising from ER-EE relations, unless expressly excluded by
this Code. To hold that Tumalas claim for the prize should be passed upon by the regular courts
of justice would be to sanction split jurisdiction and multiplicity of suits which are prejudicial to
the orderly of administration of justice.

Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission

No. L-68544. October 27, 1986

Doctrine: It is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and not the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) that has jurisdiction over a dispute involving the termination of a
bank manager as a result of his non-reelection, thereto, as prescribed in the Banks by-laws.

It is no hindrance to SEC jurisdiction that a person raises in his complaint the issues that he was
illegally dismissed and asks for remuneration where complainant is not a mere employee but a
stockholder and officer of the corporation.

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo C. Dy, Zosimo Dy, Sr., William Ibero, Ricardo Garcia and Rural Bank
of Ayungon, Inc. assail in this Court the resolution of public respondent NLRC dismissing their
appeal from the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter in Cebu City which found private
respondent Carlito H. Vailoces to have been illegally dismissed by them.

Private respondent Vailoces was the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon (Negros Oriental), a
banking institution duly organized under Philippine laws. He was also a director and stockholder
of the bank.

On June 4, 1983, a special stockholders meeting was called for the purpose of electing the
members of the banks Board of Directors. Immediately after the election, the new Board
proceeded to elect the banks executive officers.
Pursuant to Article 4 of the banks by-laws, providing for the election by the entire membership
of the Board of the executive officers of the bank, i.e., the president, vice president, secretary,
cashier and bank manager, in that board meeting of June 4, 1983, petitioners Lorenzo Dy,
William Ibero and Ricardo Garcia were elected president, vice president, and corporate
secretary, respectively. Private respondent Vailoces was not re-elected as bank manager.
Because of this, the Board passed a Resolution relieving him as bank manager.

Subsequently, Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment against herein petitioners, asserting that an illegal stockholders
meeting was held. In their answer, petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal. The
Executive Labor Arbiter found that Vailoces was illegally dismissed due to the resentment of
petitioners against Vailoces and consequently ordered the individual petitioners Lorenzo Dy
and Zosimo Dy, Sr. to pay Vailoces jointly and severally the sum of P111,480.60 and reinstate
the latter to his position as bank manager, with additional backwages.

Petitioner Lorenzo Dy appealed to the NLRC, assigning error to the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, one being that the matter of Vailoces relief was within the adjudicatory powers of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The NLRC bypassed the issues and dismissed the appeal
for having been filed late. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC, and not respondent NLRC, has jurisdiction over the dispute.

RULING: YES. While the comment of Vailoces traverses the averments of the petition that of
the Solicitor General on behalf of public respondents perceives the matter as an intra-corporate
controversy of the class described in Section 5, par. (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,
namely:

Original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

Xxxx

Xxxx

(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or

managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.

explicitly declared to be within the original jurisdiction of the SEC, and recommends that the
questioned resolution of the NLRC as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter be set aside as
null and void.

The judgment of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution of the NLRC are void for lack of
jurisdiction. It is of no moment that Vailoces, in his amended complaint, seeks other relief
which would seemingly fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, because underpayment
of salary and non-payment of living allowance show that they are actually part of the
perquisites of his elective position, hence, intimately linked with his relations with the
corporation. The question of remuneration involving a person who is not a mere employee but
a stockholder and officer of a corporation is not a simple labor problem but a matter that
comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate
controversy in contemplation of the Corporate Code.

Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the NLRC
dismissing petitioners appeal are hereby set aside for being rendered without jurisdiction.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUSTICO

VEGA G.R. No. 80774, May 31, 1988

FACTS:

San Miguel Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program and under which, the management
undertook to grant cash awards to all SMC employees except higher-
ranked personnel who submit to the Corporation ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial t
o the Corporation. Rustico Vega then submitted a proposal but was not accepted. Vega filed a c
omplaint against the company with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, contending that he
should be paid 60,000 since his idea was implemented. The petitioner in his answer stated that
they turned down the proposal for lack of originality. The labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the money claim is not a necessary incident of his employment. Upon appe
al of Vega to the NLRC, it ordered the petitioner to pay the 60,0000. Petitioner then seek to ann
ul the judgment on the ground that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over the ca
se.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fact that the money claim of an employee arose out of or in connection wit
h employment relation with his company, is enough to bring such money claim within the origin
al and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter.

HELD:

No, just because the claim arises from employer-

employee relationship, it does not follow that it is automatically within the jurisdiction of the La
bor Arbiter.

The companys undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforce
able contractual (facio ut des) obligation on the part of petitioner Corporation under certain cir
cumstances. Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had
arisen between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of thi
s case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questi
ons not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or o
ther terms and conditions of employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.

If the relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations
statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over th
e dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In s
uch situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations
nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the applica
tion of the general civil law.

ALFREDO F. PRIMERO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DM TRANSIT G.R. No. 72644
, December 14, 1987

FACTS:

Primero was discharged from his employment as bus driver of DM Transit Corporation. Primero
instituted proceedings against DM with the Labor Arbiters of the Department of Labor, for illeg
al dismissal. Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Primero and ordered the employer to give separati
on pay. After, Primero brought suit against DM in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking rec
overy of damages caused not only by the breach of his employment contract, but also by the op
pressive and inhuman, and consequently tortious, acts of his employer and its officers antecede
nt and subsequent to his dismissal from employment without just cause.

While this action was pending, Labor Arbiters jurisdiction was once again revised. It restored th
e principle that exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in la
bor arbiters. In effect, Trial Court rendered dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of juri
sdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be splitting of cause of cause of action in a labor case.

HELD:

No, splitting of cause of action is not allowed in labor case. An employee who has been illegally
dismissed, in such a manner as to cause him to suffer moral damages has a cause of action for r
einstatement and recovery of back wages and damages. When he institutes proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter, he should make a claim for all said reliefs. He cannot, to be sure, be permitte
d to prosecute his claims piecemeal. He cannot institute proceedings separately and contempor
aneously in a court of justice upon the same cause of action or a part thereof. He cannot and sh
ould not be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement and r
ecovery of back wages, or for separation pay, upon the theory that his dismissal was illegal; and
two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that th
e manner of his dismissal was unduly injurious, or tortious.

Consequently, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter granting Primero separation pay operated as a
bar to his subsequent action for the recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance und
er the doctrine of res judicata.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) VS. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police and that
they informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their proposed demonstration.

The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after learning the about the planned
mass. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union, explaining
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed out that the demonstration was not a
strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.

Company informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed.

Another meeting was convoked Company. It reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, those from the
1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of
their Collective Bargaining

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA

2. Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing its employees

RULING:

1. No. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but
also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his
full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
 merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also
in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed.

2. Company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on its part to
permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) workers from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid
or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974 BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE
ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the
company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow Membership union
shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by
this agreement. RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection
(a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization
Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a
formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning
from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the
appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for
injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD:

the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not
require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any
particular religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a
religious sect that prohibits its member from joining a labor union as a condition on
qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts member with such
religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act to exercise the right to join or to
resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any closed shop agreement
that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of
constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful in itself by
vering or following a legal way to do it.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

70 pHIL 726

Facts:
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission,
prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certainstreets in Manila.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?

Ruling:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer
legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down
by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be
said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.