1.

SECRETARY VS LANTION
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government
of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests
of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty.
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed
that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international
law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

2. GO VS NAPOLCOM
Petitioner Edgar M. Go had been a member of the Olongapo City Police Department since April 18, 1974.
On December 16, 1983, he was dismissed for alleged involvement in illegal gambling, more particularly
the operation of jai-alai bookies. I
It was alleged that the Petitioner was apprehended on two occasions inside their residence when a team
of police raided the house. The first complaint after the first raid was dismissed by the Fiscal. However,
the second complain after the second raid prospered.
According the Dismissal Board, respondent inspite of several notices failed to appear before the board in
order to refute the charges against him. The board in its desire to base the instant case with impartiality,
objectivity and legality has to postpone the hearing of the case for several times, just to allow the
respondent and his witnesses to appear before the Board, but all our efforts proved futile with the refusal
of the respondent to appear before the Board in spite of all notices duly served to him by the [illegible]
Metropolitan District Command. So, after four (4) months of several postponements, the Board
proceeded with the hearing and considered the non-appearance of the respondent as a waiver on his
part to present his evidence.

Petitioner was informed of his dismissal in a memo, by Lt. Col. Ferdinand A. Lagman. He appealed to the
Director General of the PC/INP, complaining of denial of due process. He claimed that no copy of the
complaint with supporting affidavits had been served on him as required by NAPOLCOM Resolution No.
81-01.
Petitioners appeal was denied as the Director General of the PC/INP noted in a decision, dated August
21, 1990, that "there appears a factual basis which is legally unassailable" for the summary dismissal
boards findings.
Petitioner appealed to the National Police Commission which likewise dismissed his appeal for "utter lack
of merit." In its decision, dated March 5, 1992, the NAPOLCOM held:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner had been denied due.
Ruling:
Yes. We find petitioners claim meritorious.
We think it is time this Court firms up its position on the validity of Section 40 of the Civil Service Act. It is
clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed
or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an
employee must be informed of the charges preferred [sic] against him, and that the normal
way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges
made against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still
remains consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is
that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges
levelled again him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. These are not the only
indispensable requirements of procedural due process; they are, however, most directly involved in the
matter of whether or not an investigation of charges against a civil service employee is essential.
The INP record of this case does not show that a formal complaint was ever filed against petitioner. Nor
are there attached to such record supporting affidavits of witnesses, if any, against him. Neither the
decision of the board, nor that of the Director General of the PC/INP denying reconsideration, nor the
decision of the NAPOLCOM on appeal contains reference to any written complaint with supporting
affidavits filed against petitioner.
The formal investigation, which is dispensed with in summary dismissal proceedings, refers to the
presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to the requirement that the respondent in
the administrative case be notified of the charges and given the chance to defend himself.
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the fact that the charge
against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is in the opinion of his superiors strong can
compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases such as
this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those who are
innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.

3. SUMMARY DISMISSAL VS TORCITA

Facts: Major Lazaro Torcita was offduty , coming from a party was driving and was overtaken by Mazda
pick-up w/ afterwards pick up speed. Upon entering the compound of HDA Aimee , Torcita was denied
entry. They complained that Torcita confronted them and that he was yelling and hurling incentives. They
filed 12 complaints against him and was consolidated for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The
board dismissed the complaint but found him guilty of simple irregularity, suspending him for 20 days for
being having alcoholic drink during the incident. Torcita appealed and RTC / CA reversed the dispositive
portion. Petitioner contend that Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer is broad enough to include any
act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization.
Issue: Whether or not conviction is null on the ground of lack of procedural due process of law?
Decision: CA decision affirmed, dispositive portion of SDB decision annulled. It is glaringly apparent from
a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that
none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in
the performance of official duty. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of
the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. It is a requirement of due process that the parties
be informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the Court

4. TANADA VS TUVERA
Taada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to
be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before
its enforcement.
RULING:
Yes, publication is necessary.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide
for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when
it goes into effect. Article 2 does not dismiss with the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

5. LIM VS CA
FACTS: On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions inspected
and investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This
caused the stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant operations. Lim also refused to accept
Bistros application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the
year 1993.
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license and work permits violated the
doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras, to wit: "Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business."
Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed temporary
restraining order on December 29, 1992.
However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations even
sending policemen to carry out his closure order and continued disrupting Bistro's business operations.
Meanwhile, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the
case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and
their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits
and licenses.
ISSUE: WON Bistro is being denied of their property rights as protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution
HELD: Yes, Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila
without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor
authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there
is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should
have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with
law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant case, we find that
Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process
clause of the Constitution.

6. PP VS NAZARIO
Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to
Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended.
He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the
Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966.
Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty
thus this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and
uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes
with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite
only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario.
The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond
started operating in 1964.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the amendment under
Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made
punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty.

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

7. COATES VS CITY OF CINCINATTI

Facts:
The appellants were convicted of violating the ordinance, and the convictions were ultimately affirmed by
a closely divided vote in the Supreme Court of Ohio, upholding the constitutional validity of the
ordinance. 21 Ohio St. 2d 66, 255 N. E. 2d 247. An appeal from that judgment was brought here under
28 U.S.C. 1257 (2), 2and we noted probable jurisdiction, 398 U.S. 902 . The record brought before the
reviewing courts tells us no more than that the appellant Coates was a student involved in a
demonstration and the other appellants were pickets involved in a labor dispute. For throughout this
litigation it has been the appellants' position that the ordinance on its face violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Cf. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 .
In rejecting this claim and affirming the convictions the Ohio Supreme Court did not give the ordinance
any construction at variance with the apparent plain import of its language. The court simply stated:
"The ordinance prohibits, inter alia, `conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by.' The word `annoying'
is a widely used and well understood word; it is not necessary to guess its meaning. `Annoying' is the
present participle of the transitive verb `annoy' which means to trouble, to vex, to impede, to
incommode, to provoke, to harass or to irritate. [402 U.S. 611, 613]
Issue:
The issue before us is whether this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face.
Ruling:

We conclude, as did the Supreme Court of the United States in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 , 616,
in which the issue of the vagueness of a statute was presented, that the ordinance `clearly and precisely
delineates its reach in words of common understanding. It is a "precise and narrowly drawn regulatory
statute [ordinance] evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be . . . proscribed."'" 21
Ohio St. 2d, at 69, 255 N. E. 2d, at 249.
We are thus relegated, at best, to the words of the ordinance itself. If three or more people meet
together on a sidewalk or street corner, they must conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police
officer or other person who should happen to pass by. In our opinion this ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and
unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense
that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 .

8. RADIO COMM VS NTC

FACTS:
On January 4, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the
Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities under NTC Case No. 84-003. On January 25,
1984, the respondent Commission provisionally approved and set the case for hearing within the
prescribed 30-day period allowed by law.
Later, on February 2, 1984, the respondent Commission issued a notice of hearing, setting private
respondent PLDT's application for hearing on February 22, 1984 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning ( Rollo, p.
37). In the aforementioned notice of hearing, herein petitioners except Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation were not included in the list of affected parties ( Rollo, p. 38). At the hearing,
petitioner PT & T Co., along with other petitioners which came to know of the pending petition through
the former, appeared and moved for some time within which to file an opposition or reply to said
application. Petitioners alleged that neither respondent Commission nor private respondent PLDT
informed them of the existence of this provisional authority (Rollo, p. 10).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority in favor of PLDT, without prior notice to the petitioners.
Ruling:
No. The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act (C.A. No. 146) provides for the fixing of rates, by the Commission,
which shall be imposed and observed by any public service, as follows:
Sec. 16 (c). To fix and determine individual and joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules
thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed,
observed and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in
its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any
hearing but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days, thereafter , upon publication and notice to
the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business shall
be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Public Service Commission found that the application involved in the present petition is actually an
application for approval of rates for digital transmission service facilities which it may approve
provisionally and without the necessity of any notice and hearing as provided in the above-quoted
provision of law.
Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is empowered to approve provisionally
rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior hearing (Republic v. Medina, 41 SCRA 643 [1971]). Under
the Public Service Act, as amended (CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can
fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing.
Further, the Public Service Act makes no distinction between initial or revised rates. Moreover, the
Commission can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The reason is
easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to
adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing and it was so stated in the
case at bar, in the National Telecommunications Commission's order of January 25, 1984.
Finally, there is a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable and it must be conceded that the fixing
of rates by the government through its authorized agent, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion,
and unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere (Ynchausti Steamship Co. v.
Public Utility Commissioner, supra;Manila Electric Company v. De Vera, et al., 66 Phil. 161 [1938]).
Likewise, as a rule, the court does not interfere with administrative action prior to its completion on
finality (Matienzo v. Abeller 162 SCRA 1 [1988]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall
prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect
but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.

9. ESTATE OF GREGORIA VS CA
Facts
A Quonset in Basilan constructed in 1944 by the American LiberationForces; purchased by Gregoria
Francisco (died in 1976) in 1946; stands onland owned by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
was ordereddemolished by the Municipal Mayor, Valencia.Proc. No. 83 issued by Pres. Quirino declared
land for the exclusive use of port facilities.
January 10, 1989: PPA issued to Tan Gin San, the husband of deceasedFrancisco, a permit to occupy the
building for a year, until December 31,1989. May 8L Mayor notified Tan Gin San by mail to relocate
or remove hisQuonset by virtue of Zoning Ord. 147 stressing the clean-up campaign onillegal squatters
and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard. May 19, another notice was sent. May 24:
demolition was ordered byMayor.
Petitioner filed with RTC suit for a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction anddamages. RTC: denied writ,
upheld power of Mayor to order demolition without judicial authority. Sept. 6: Quonset was completely
demolished
CA (1st decision): reversed TC; Quonset not a nuisanceper se; Mayor needed judicial decision
CA (2nd decision): reversed itself; deficiency (lack of judicial declaration)cured when petitioner filed the
petition for prohibition and was heard onoral argument.
Issue
: WON Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolitionof petitioners Quonset
building.
Held/Ratio:
NO. There is no doubt that the Quonset is a non-conforming structure as per theMunicipal Ordinance;
and that in the event that an immediate relocation of thebuilding cannot be accomplished, section 16 of
the Ordinance provides that thenon-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the owners
expense.
a.This provision does not empower the Municipal Mayor to order a summaryremoval of the structure. If it
does, it must be struck down for being incontravention to the requirements of due process
.b.Violation of the ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial
remedies. The Local Government Code imposes upon the Mayor the duty to cause to beinstituted judicial
proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances.
NOT ABATEMENT OF NUISSANCE (police power) without judicialproceedings.
a) Only applies tonuisance per se
affects the immediate safety of personsand property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v Generoso)
b)Storage of copra in the Quonset is a legitimate business, cannot be said tobe injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community.
c)If it is a nuisance per accidens, it must be proven in a hearing conductedfor that purpose.
d) Sanguniaang Bayan cannot DECLARE a particular thing as a nuisanceper se
can ONLY BE adjudged by judicial determination

10. RIVERA VS CIVIL SERVICE

Facts:
Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority
required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had
investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced
by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation.

Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective 19 February
1988). After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby
receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules.
He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without
separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera.

Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276. And then
to the SC.

On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioners failure to sufficiently show
that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution.
Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting
that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity
as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBPs motion for reconsideration,
also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioners motion for
reconsideration with the CSC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner was denied due process when the one who rendered the decision reviews
the same.

Ruling:
Yes.
In Zambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned
an appeal from the Secretarys own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent
Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said:

"In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not
admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case."

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit
herself totally from any participation in resolving Riveras appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not
participate in MSPBs decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate,
indeed has concurred, in MSPBs resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of
MSPBs decision of 29 August 1990.

11. EXECUTIVE VS SOUTHWING

FACTS: This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial Court which
declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said EO 156 prohibits the
importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156 entitled "Providing
for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its
implementing guidelines." The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles
in the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions.
 Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries
Inc,Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp , and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay
Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156
unconstitutional and illegal.
The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an
unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the proviso is
contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport.
The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the
President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an
exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by
the President through an executive issuance is void.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the Presidents quasi-legislative
power.
HELD:
1. YES BUT
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue
of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation
confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by
the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of the law and implement legislative policyprovided that it must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and statutory bases.
Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the
procedures and limitations imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that
paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence of substantive
due process in the issuance of the EO
In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third requisite as
administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. In the
instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of
used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by
extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to
some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the
"customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 which
states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."
Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is unreasonable. Since the nature
of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing
firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to
the Freeport Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor
vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will
not arise.
The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is made applicable within the
secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base areabut is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs
territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area
as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax
and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the
Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded
therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine
territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to
the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with
respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

12. PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June
17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant
to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements
of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent.
In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

13. FABELLA VS CA
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school
teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September
to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances
and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases
against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass
action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents,
through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they
were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access
to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their
innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment
violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of
the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents
guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. The respondents filed an injunctive suit and a petition of
certiorari and mandamus with RTC and were denied. They went with the SC which ruled for the
reinstatement of the action. RTC then granted their petition. CA affirmed such grant by the RTC. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?
HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case,
the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents
did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed
to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They
could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement
of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents
are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in
their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such
organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization
possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating
committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of
public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers
appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by
a teachers organization as its representative in said committee.
Thus, the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the teachers right to
due process.
Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

14. SECRETARY VS LANTION

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government
of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests
of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties
under a treaty.
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed
that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international
law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both
statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

15. CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it
did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exerciseof Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Modality employed is unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as
the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in
the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair
relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.

Topic: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

de Guzman, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 129118; July 19, 2000
Purisima

Facts:

Republic Act No. 8189 otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996"
was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11,
1996 whereby Section 44 thereof provides all Election Officers holding office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years, either at the time of the
approval of the said Act or subsequent thereto, in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to a new
station outside the original congressional district. COMELEC promulgated Resolution
Nos. 97-0002 and 97-0610 for its implementation. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued
several directives reassigning City or Municipal Election Officers to different stations.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, Agrapino A. de
Guzman, Jr., et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the
validity of Section 44 of RA 8189. One of the contentions is that Section 44 of RA 8189
violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. de Guzman, Jr., et al.
theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the
1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the
COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more
than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them
and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the
objective of the provision of law under attack.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8189 is violative of the equal protection clause enshrined in

the Constitution.
Held:

No. The Court was not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "equal
protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under
Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Topic: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OTHER CASES

City of Manila, et al. v. Laguio, Jr. and Malate Tourist Development Corporation
G.R. No. 118127; April 12, 2005
Purisima

Facts:

Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the

business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court against City of Manila, et al.
praying that the Ordinance, entitled An ordinance prohibiting the establishment or
operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, prescribing penalties for violation thereof, and
for other purposes which was enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. The RTC of Manila rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3],
Series of 1993 null and void. However, City of Manila, et al. filed with the lower court a
Notice of Appeal manifesting that they are elevating the case to this Court under then
Rule 42 on pure questions of law. In the Petition and in its Memorandum, City of Manila,
et al. in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that
it enjoys the presumption of validity. MTDC on the other hand maintains that the
Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It
reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is
violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its
lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on
petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the
Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinance is infringes the due process clause of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

Held:

Yes. The Court held that the City of Manila, et al. cannot order the closure of the
establishments enumerated under the Ordinance enacted without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.

In the case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was
involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct
business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as
the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a
regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful
curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be
upheld as valid.

Topic: VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E.
EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., Respondents
G.R. NO. 157036; June 9, 2004
Sandoval

Facts:

In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before

the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, Director
General Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Acting on President Arroyos directive,
Director General Ebdane issued the Guidelines to implement the ban.

Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus,
Chavez filed a petition impleading Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives
Division. One of the ground of his petition was the invalid exercise of police power.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an invalid exercise of police power.

Held:

No. The Court held that the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of
residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences
may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the
carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals
carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their
homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam
around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend
them.

Note:

In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police
measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power;
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the
constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-
impairment of property rights.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL

DEL MAR, INC. and GO CHIU, Petitioners-Appellees, v. THE HONORABLE CITY
 MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant, VICTOR ALABANZA, Intervenor-
Appellee
G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967
Fernandez

Facts:

The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 and was
approved by Vice-Mayor Herminio , then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence
of the regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the Mayor for the reasons stated
in his 4th Indorsement.

The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and

guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times,
and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. Moreover, license fees was
increased to discourage"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal and at the same time, to increase the income of the city government.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar, Inc.,
and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the Mayor of the City of Manila praying for a judgment declaring the
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is valid.

Held:

Yes. The Court held that An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside
unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police
regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for
evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual
foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail.
 Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a manifestation of a police power
measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is immune from any
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers extending as it does "to all the great public needs."

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,

petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,
respondents
G.R. No. L-34915; June 24, 1983
GUTIERREZ, JR.

Facts:

Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, regulating the
establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial
ground within the jurisdiction of quezon city and providing penalties for the violation
thereof. Section 9 of the said ordinance provides that at least six (6) percent of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years
prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later
than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the
aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a
resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon
City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. reacted by filing with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution,
the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative
Code. The lower court declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void. A
motion for reconsideration was also denied.

The City Government and City Council filed a petition contending that the taking
of the Himlayang Pilipino, Incs property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and
resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein." On the other hand, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
argued that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.They also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source
of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright
under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is
urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The
respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent
the spread of a conflagration.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police

power.

Held:

No. The Court held that the police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section
00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a
few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it
for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare
as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms. "It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a
person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation."
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR
OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, Petitioners, v. ROBERTO REY
C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, Respondents
G.R. No. 89572; December 21, 1989
Cruz

Facts:

Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. San Diego took the NMAT three times and
flunked it as many times and when he applied to take it again, his application was
rejected on the basis of the rule that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to
take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to
take the NMAT for the fourth time. San Diego then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, San Diego was
allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong rendered a decision on July 4,

1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Dizon-
Capulong held that San Diego had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue:

Whether or not there has been an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Held:

No. The Court held that Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within
the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients
may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The
three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is
entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer
the link, the longer the bridge to ones ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less
worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. A
person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one
who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he
may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
however appropriate this career may be for others.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by
the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a
carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case,
the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed
by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president
under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue
letters of instruction that had the force of law.

ISSUE:
WON police power was invalidly exercised in this case?

HELD:
YES. .

The Court find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997]
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine
Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

FACTS:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment
of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbour Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association,
through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation
of PPA-AO No. 04-92On.

March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C.
Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
WON respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative
Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders?

HELD:
The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right
against deprivation of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court said that In order to fall
within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and
that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is
readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the
CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person,
group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie
or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and
12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the
said ticket.
 Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the
Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June
30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan
constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and
constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by
the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the
interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In
other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid
exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their
own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person
who did not approve could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be
upheld as valid.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL,
JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR.,
ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
 No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including
examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their
own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC
to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution.

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case
and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it
found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

HELD:
It is not Constitutional.

The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent
PRC.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees'
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become
public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their
endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote
their personal growth.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004]
 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O.
MONTESCLAROS, respondent.

FACTS:
Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and
equal protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension.
GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.

ISSUE:
WON Sec. 18 of PD 1146 valid?

HELD:
The court held that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros
claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory
and denies equal protection of the law.

The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner
within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving
spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the
purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance
benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and
retirement of the government employees.

SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall
receive the applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act:
Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage
with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension
shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as
of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being
received at the time of death. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156278 March 29, 2004
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Planters Products, Inc. ("PPI") and respondent Fertiphil Corporation ("Fertiphil") are
domestic corporations engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals. On the strength of Letter of Instruction No. 1465 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on June 3, 1985, Fertiphil and other domestic corporations engaged in the fertilizer business paid
P10.00 for every bag of fertilizer sold in the country to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), the
government agency governing the fertilizer industry. FPA in turn remitted the amount to PPI for its
rehabilitation, according to the express mandate of LOI No. 1465.2

After the EDSA I revolution in 1986, the imposition of P10.00 by the FPA on every bag of fertilizer
sold was voluntarily stopped. Fertiphil demanded from PPI the refund of P6,698,144.00 which it paid
under LOI No. 1465. PPI refused. Hence, on September 14, 1987, Fertiphil filed a collection and damage
suit against FPA and PPI before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City docketed as Civil Case No. 17835
demanding refund of the P6,698,144.00. Fertiphil contended that LOI No. 1465 was void and
unconstitutional for being a glaring example of crony capitalism as it favored PPI only. PPI filed its answer
but for failure to attend the pre-trial conference, it was declared in default and Fertiphil was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte.

On November 20, 1991, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 147, decided in favor of Fertiphil
declaring LOI No. 1465 void and unconstitutional. It ordered PPI to return the amount which Fertiphil
paid thereunder, with twelve percent (12%) interest from the time of judicial demand.

On April 5, 2001, the court issued another order, upon PPIs motion, directing Fertiphils banks to
deliver to the Deputy Sheriff the garnished deposits maintained with them and for the levying upon of the
surety bond posted by Fertiphil.

Fertiphil moved to reconsider the Orders dated April 3 and 5, 2001, to no avail. Hence, on
October 30, 2001, it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the two orders.4 The Court of Appeals partially
granted the petition and set aside the Order dated April 3, 2001. It ruled that although PPI filed its
appeal in 1992, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should nevertheless be followed since it applies to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. Due to PPIs failure to pay the appellate
docket fee for three (3) years from the time the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997
until Fertiphil moved to dismiss the appeal in 2001, the trial courts decision became final and executory.

ISSUE:
WON PPIs appeal is within a reasonable time?

HELD:
As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, the general rule is not without an exception.
Retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired.6 Thus, in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. de Leon7 our ruling that the appropriate mode of review from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts is a petition for review under Sec. 60 of R.A. No. 6657 and not an ordinary appeal as Sec. 61
thereof seems to imply, was not given retroactive application. We held that to give our ruling a
retrospective application would prejudice petitioners pending appeals brought under said Sec. 61 before
the Court of Appeals at a time when there was yet no clear pronouncement as to the proper
interpretation of the seemingly conflicting Secs. 60 and 61. In fine, to apply the Courts ruling
retroactively would prejudice LBPs right to appeal because its pending appeals would then be dismissed
outright on a mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits of the cases.

In the instant case, at the time PPI filed its appeal in 1992, all that the rules required for the perfection of
its appeal was the filing of a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or order
appealed from, within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.8 PPI complied with this requirement when it
filed a notice of appeal on February 20, 1992 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 147, after receiving
copy of its Order dated February 13, 1992 denying its motion for reconsideration of the adverse Decision
dated November 20, 1991 rendered in Civil Case No. 17835. PPIs appeal was therefore already perfected
at that time.

Thus, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997 and which required
that appellate docket and other lawful fees should be paid within the same period for taking an appeal,9
cannot affect PPIs appeal which was already perfected in 1992. Much less could it be considered a
ground for dismissal thereof since PPIs period for taking an appeal, likewise the period for payment of
the appellate docket fee as now required by the rules, has long lapsed in 1992. While the right to appeal
is statutory, the mode or manner by which this right may be exercised is a question of procedure which
may be altered and modified only when vested rights are not impaired.10 Thus, failure to pay the
appellate docket fee when the 1997 Rules of Procedure took effect cannot operate to deprive PPI of its
right, already perfected in 1992, to have its case reviewed on appeal. In fact the Court of Appeals
recognized such fact when it gave PPI a fresh period to pay the appellate docket fee in an Order dated
April 9, 2002 issued in UDK-CV-No. 030411 directing it to pay the fee within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005]
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

FACTS;
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is
entitled

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES

PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

ISSUE:
WON the court erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power?

HELD:
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment
of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section
16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.

The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance
are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
FACTS:
The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which is entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila" on December 3, 1992.

Petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying that the ordinance be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. RTC eventually rendered its decision declaring the said ordinance null and void. It
was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutional of the ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void.

RULING:
Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme Court, is to eliminate and if not,
minimize the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals by
themselves are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State.
However, the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes
even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as police power measure. It must appear that the interest of the public, generally, as
distinguished from those of particular class, require an interference with private rights and that the
means employed be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of the private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
between the purpose of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI

FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent
G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007

FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for
Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove
the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus
operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be
declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of
public land transportation units over their respective terminals

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:
Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the
respondents terminals.

Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact
increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government under an express delegation by the LGC of 1991.

Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the
thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police
power.

On Constitutional Law, The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 107845. April 18, 1997]
PAT. EDGAR M. GO, INP., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Edgar M. Go had been a member of the Olongapo City Police Department since April 18, 1974.
On December 16, 1983, he was dismissed for alleged involvement in illegal gambling, more particularly
the operation of jai-alai bookies.

Petitioner was informed of his dismissal in a memo, dated December 20, 1983, by Lt. Col. Ferdinand A.
Lagman, District Superintendent, INP of the Olongapo Metropolitan District Command.i[2] He appealed to
the Director General of the PC/INP, complaining of denial of due process. He claimed that no copy of the
complaint with supporting affidavits had been served on him as required by NAPOLCOM Resolution No.
81-01; that he was simply ordered by radio to appear before the summary dismissal board for
investigation; that he went to attend the hearing on May 9, 1983 but neither the complainant nor his
witnesses were present and he was advised by the boards chairman, a certain Colonel Cinco, to secure
the services of a lawyer for the next hearing; that at the hearing on September 6 or 9, 1983, the
members of the board and complainant and his witnesses were again absent; that the third hearing
scheduled on September 21, 1983 was also postponed because of the absence of the members of the
board; that although a hearing had allegedly been held on October 19, 1983, he was not able to attend it
because he had not been previously notified; that he heard nothing more about the case until he was
informed of the decision dismissing him, a copy of which was received by him only on February 20, 1984.

ISSUE:
WON that petitioner was denied the due process of law
HELD:
YES. The Court conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the
fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is in the opinion of his superiors
strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case.

The Court firms up its position on the validity of Section 40 of the Civil Service Act. It is clear to
that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed
even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to that an employee must be
informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so
informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges made against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remains consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some
misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is
to say, his defenses against the charges levelled again him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. The ordinary way by which a Civil Service employee is given this opportunity is by holding an
investigation, in the course of which the employee may assert his defenses and present his supporting
evidence. If Section 40 of the Civil Service Decree is to be saved from unconstitutionality, it cannot be
interpreted or applied in such a manner as to deprive a respondent employee of these two (2) minimum
rights. These are not the only indispensable requirements of procedural due process; they are, however,
most directly involved in the matter of whether or not an investigation of charges against a civil service
employee is essential.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed
in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the
government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the
requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is
P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to
P200, or both.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

HELD:
The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50
from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because
it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent,
part-time, rank-and-file or executive.

[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only
to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]
 RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned there from upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy.

ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

HELD:
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision
and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,
Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
deserving members of Congress is achieved.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health

FACTS:
RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country.
Section 7 thereof provided for the phase-out of all commercial blood banks within 2 years after its
effectivity. The Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to transmission of
diseases, and that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more likely to have
blood transfusion transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine National Red Cross. Prior to
the expiration of the commercial blood banks licenses, they filed a petition assailing the constitutionality
and validity of RA 7719 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, for discriminating against
freestanding blood banks in a manner, which is not germane to the purpose of the law.

ISSUES:
1. W/N RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause

HELD:
NO. One, RA 7719 is based on substantial distinctions. Nonprofit blood banks operate for purely
humanitarian reasons and as a medical service, and encourage voluntary blood donation. On the other
hand, commercial blood banks are motivated by profit and treat blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the
classification and the consequent phase-out of blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, which
is to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phase-out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a
business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered
unsafe. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not
solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to existing
conditions. Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

DOCTRINE:
Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited; but classification on a
reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

FACTS:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively
replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in
Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management
system and a compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose
positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization
act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal
protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees.
Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause,
provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor
General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees
is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.

HELD:
Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee
status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of
greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the
BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by
the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.
 PARREO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
523 SCRA 390 JUNE 7,2007
Facts:

Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32
years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of
2nd Lieutenant.
Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years
pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen.
In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650.
Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in
the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the
request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.
In its 9 January 2003 Decision, the COA denied petitioners claim for lack of jurisdiction and
advised claimant to file his claim with the proper court of original jurisdiction
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly pension involves government funds, the reason
for the termination of the pension is subject to COAs authority and jurisdiction.
13 January 2004 Resolution, the COA denied the motion
The COA further ruled that even if it assumed jurisdiction over the claim, petitioners
entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon
the loss of his Filipino citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

ISSUES

1. Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional;

2. Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of

PD 1638, as amended;

3. Whether PD 1638, as amended, has retroactive or prospective effect.

HELD:
1. YES Petitioner alleges that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, deprives him of his property which
the Constitution and statutes vest in him. The court said that PD 1638, as amended, does not impair
any vested right or interest of petitioner. It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a
vested right to retirement benefits. At the time of the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its
amendment, petitioner was still in active service. Hence, petitioners retirement benefits were only
future benefits and did not constitute a vested right.

As to the contention of the OSG and the petitioner that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is
unconstitutional. The OSG argues that the obligation imposed on petitioner to retain his Filipino
citizenship as a condition for him to remain in the AFP retired list is contrary to public policy and welfare,
oppressive, discriminatory, violative of the due process clause of the Constitution and discriminates
against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality. The court said that the proviso has complied
with the conditions to a reasonable classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class. There is a substantial
difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino
citizenship by naturalization in another country, such as petitioner

There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP
had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Petitioner had the opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he requested
for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of his
pension. The Judge Advocate General denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Moreover petitioner has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his monthly
pension. Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino
citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned
from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.

2. NO Although the petitioner filed a money claim which should be filed before COA, the jurisdiction
of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the
constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts.
Petitioners money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
money claim.
3. PROSPECTIVE Petitioner alleges that PD 1638, as amended, should apply prospectively. The Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner. The OSG argues that PD 1638, as amended,
should apply only to those who joined the military service after its effectivity. The court do not agree
with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to
those who joined the military after its effectivity. Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new
system of retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its approval.
PD 1638, as amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Petitioner retired in 1982, long after
the approval of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to
petitioner.
 CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO
G.R. NO. 118127

FACTS:

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beer houses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns.
Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business
operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds
allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional.

HELD:

SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of
the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance
have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will
not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance
forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to
wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed
business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two
types of taking: A possessory taking and a regulatory taking. The latter occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is
reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on
substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Courts view,
there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see
the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.
 NUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. L-50581-50617 JANUARY 30, 1982
FACTS:

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree
creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial document committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all
public officials, in several cases. The information were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26,
1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such motion. There was
a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating
the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the
Constitution.

ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution, thus declaring it unconstitutional?

HELD:

No, the petition then cannot be granted.

The unconstitutionality of such decree cannot be adjudged. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason for the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the
claim of petitioner.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to
criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. This Court
holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.

Petition dismissed. No costs.

GUTIERREZ vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

G.R. No. 153266 March 18, 2010

FACTS: Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12
directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by
employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that
the employees may be receiving from such consolidation. Thus:

Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. -- All allowances, except for representation
and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine
officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise
specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary
rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received
by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to
be authorized.

Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated
September 30, 1989,1 covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges,
and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations
which were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance
(COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3,
2004.2

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of other
government employees violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: NO, the Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to
the exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must
also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that Congress intended the uniformed personnel to be
continually governed by their respective compensation laws. Thus, the military is governed by R.A.
6638,34 as amended by R.A. 916635 while the police is governed by R.A. 6648,36 as amended by R.A.
6975.

Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other national
government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of
internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They are
likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay does not
vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living
in higher cost areas.

MIRASOL VS.DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS AND TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
G.R. No. 158793. June 8, 2006

FACTS:

On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of the following administrative
issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access
Highway Act" enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; (b) DPWH
Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access
Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out

motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport and violates the right to travel.

RULING:

No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely
being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1
does not infringe upon petitioners right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. There
exists real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification
based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may
lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.
 TIU V CA
G.R. NO. 127410. JANUARY 20, 1999

FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227. This was for
the conversion of former military bases into industrial and commercial uses. Subic was one of these
areas. It was made into a special economic zone.

In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There was also tax incentives and
duty freeimportation policies under this law.

On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying
the application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that
On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital
goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ

On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business
enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.

Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying
the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.

Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be
the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos
and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods,
equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free.

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal
protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the entire area
of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is
unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to
the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section
12 of the law.

Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the
secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not
owing to a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD. No. Petition dismissed.

Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo,
(2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.
However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval base only.

OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.

Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses. This
was really limited to the military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked the BCDA
to specifically develop the areas the bases occupied.

Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-
free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no
foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident
status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target of
the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.

Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to
have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to
extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of
laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of
the constitutional clause.

Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital into it.

RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment
center. There will really be differences between it and the outside zone of Olongapo.

The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and businesses in the zone. They are
similarly treated to contribute to the end goal of the law.

LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 128096, JANUARY 20, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven persons, believed to
be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said
that what happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that
Republic Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and is
plan from the facts and was made to suit the petitioners case, thus, making it an ex-post facto law that
would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto law that may affect
the petitioners right to due process?

HELD: No.

There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 an ex post facto law generally provides for a retroactive
effect on penal laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines,
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof;
or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. Republic Act 8249
is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex
post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive effect
and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
 DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE
GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was a naturalized
American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225. Upon approval
of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006.
Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights.As such,
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance withRA 9225.

HELD:

We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
for:1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country;2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the
law, becomes citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are not deemed to have
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioners oath of
allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further
requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is
disqualified from running for vice mayor.
 PHILRECA V. SECRETARY OF DILG (2003)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a class suit in behalf of other electric cooperatives duly organized under PD No.
269 and registered with the National Electrification Administration.
Section 39 of PD No, 269 grants tax exemptions to said electrical cooperatives.
From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects, the National Economic
Council together with the NEA entered into 6 loan agreements with the USAID. The loan
agreement contained the following stipulations:

Section 6.5. Taxes and Duties.The Borrower covenants and agrees that this Loan Agreement
and the Loan provided for herein shall be free from, and the Principal and interest shall be paid
to A.I.D. without deduction for and free from, any taxation or fees imposed under any laws or
decrees in effect within the Republic of the Philippines or any such taxes or fees so imposed or
payable shall be reimbursed by the Borrower with funds other than those provided under the
Loan. To the extent that (a) any contractor, including any consulting firm, any personnel of such
contractor financed hereunder, and any property or transactions relating to such contracts and
(b) any commodity procurement transactions financed hereunder, are not exempt from
identifiable taxes, tariffs, duties and other levies imposed under laws in effect in the country of
the Borrower, the Borrower and/or Beneficiary shall pay or reimburse the same with funds
other than those provided under the Loan.

Petitioners now seek to annul as unconstitutional sections 193 and 234 of the Local Govt Code.
The pertinent provisions are:
 Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Section 234. Exemptions from real property tax The following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax:

(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No.
6938

They claim that the LGC provisions violate the equal protection clause by exempting
cooperatives registered under RA No. 6938 but not electric cooperatives organized under PD
No. 269. This meant discrimination to them.
o They maintain that electric cooperatives registered with the NEA under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and electric cooperatives registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) under R.A. No. 6938 are similarly situated for the following reasons:
a) petitioners are registered with the NEA which is a government agency like the
CDA;
b) petitioners, like CDA-registered cooperatives, operate for service to their
member- consumers; and
c) prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code, petitioners, like CDA-
registered cooperatives, were already tax-exempt.
They also argue that the provisions violate the non-impairment clause for infringing on the
alleged tax exemption granted under the loan agreements with USAID.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.

RULING : NO.

The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable
classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.
There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.
 For cooperatives registered with the CDA, capital contributions are required. RA 6938
enumerates the elements for a cooperative: a) association of persons; b) common bond of
interest; c) voluntary association; d) lawful common social or economic end; e) capital
contributions; f) fair share of risks and benefits; g) adherence to cooperative values; and g)
registration with the appropriate government authority.
Meanwhile, under PD No. 269, no capital contributions are required. To qualify as a member of
an electric cooperative under P.D. No. 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership fee is
required.
Another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant
to this principle, the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives
do not posses the capability nor the resources to do so and only upon the request of such
cooperatives.
o The State shall maintain the policy of noninterference in the management and operation
of cooperatives.
o Cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Meanwhile, electric cooperatives are subject to the control and supervision of the NEA.
Also, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the
purpose of the law.
o MCIA v Marcos: the limited and restrictive nature of the tax exemption privileges under
the Local Government Code is consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy of
local governments and the objective of the Local Government Code to grant genuine
and meaningful autonomy to enable local government units to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the
attainment of national goals.

WoN there is a violation of the non-impairment clause. NO.

To constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with
reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties.
Petitioners insist that Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code impair the obligations
imposed under the six loan agreements executed by the NEA as borrower and USAID as lender.
No such impairment will result. There is no tax exemption granted under the loan agreements. It
simply states that the loan proceeds and the principal and interest of the loan, upon
repayment by the borrower, shall be without deduction of any tax or fee that may be payable
under Philippine law as such tax or fee will be absorbed by the borrower with funds other than
the loan proceeds.
The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan
agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan.
Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sections 193 and 234 of the tax
exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower,
the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as in fact, no tax exemption is granted
therein.

DISPOSITION: Denied.
 QUINTO vs. COMELEC,
1 DECEMBER 2009

FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369, amending
the previous act.

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.-

a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
position.

SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on
regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which
shall be until midnight.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition
and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null
and void.

ISSUES:

1. Do petitioners have locus standi?

2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection clause?

HELD:

1. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the
compelling state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for
the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for
elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable
damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's
manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation,
entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional,
issues.

The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A
restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to
choose their public officials.

The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners
and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election
laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that
would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010
elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing
of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners' candidacy.

2. It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two
fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association.

Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and
8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically
the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there
is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely:
 (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not
germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court
finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision
pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they
occupy high positions in government or not. Second, the provision is directed to the activity of
seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character,
whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.

MIAA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 155650, JULY 20, 2006
FACTS:

The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such
operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March
1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA under Section 21of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June
2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
airport lands and buildings .At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion
No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show
proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is
exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain
the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale
the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Hence, MIAA
filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its
charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a
justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and public
service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque invokes
Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and
controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. It asserts that an international airport is
not among the exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted and
published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon
before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain
the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was received
only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax?

HELD:

The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments.
Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.133(o) of the LGC, which provides that
the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.

These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power totax. The rule is that
a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the lawimposing the tax. This rule applies
with greater force when local governments seek to taxnational government instrumentalities.
Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally infavor of national government instrumentalities.MIAA
is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of
the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back
to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any
consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership
remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from
public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not
subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax. However,
portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real
estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a
taxable person.
 SJS V Atienza
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

FACTS:

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and
Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section
1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.

But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered
by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that
the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.

Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents
defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the
MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8027
HELD: Yes to both, Petition granted

1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable
or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus
will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and
thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.

2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance
No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. CONRADO CRUZ
G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009

FACTS: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections,
some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City2 filed with the RTC a petition
for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on the
following arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection
of the law.

III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the
three-term limit for barangay officials under the following reasoning:

When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith,
a different term was ordained. Here, this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section
43 of the Code specifically exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3)
consecutive term limit rule considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective
officials was significantly separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b)
is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective officials
except barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to include barangay
elective officials, then no excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof
or, by implication, the contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated ahead of the contents of
paragraph (b).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991") is unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which
provides: "Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Essentially, the equality
guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one
another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or
persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.20

Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that
no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials
differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant
distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear
distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year
term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the
three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not
only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the
Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these
conditions.

From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because
the challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all
other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the
challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING

FACTS:

The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents.

The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a
salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two
significant economic disadvantages foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the dislocation factor
and (b) limited tenure.
The compensation scheme is simply the Schools adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.

Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Schools system of compensation is violative of the principle of equal pay for
equal work

RULING: Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135,
for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to female employees as
against a male employee for work of equal value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in an
labor organization.

Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and
human experience. If the employer has discriminated against an employee, it is for the employer to
explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities,
which they perform under similar working conditions.

(1) GSIS vs Montescarlos (434 S 441)

Facts:
Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal
protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS
denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
Issue: Whether or not the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282
violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution.
Held:
YES. The classification violates the equal protection clause because: (1) it is not germane to the purpose
of the law.
Classifying dependent spouses with respect to their entitlement based on whether the marriage was
contracted
before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears
no relation to
the achievement of the police objective of the law, which is to provide meaningful protection to
members and their
beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies
resulting in
loss of income or financial burden. (2) it is not based on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary
and
discriminatory. It unfairly lumps marriages contracted after the members retirement as sham
relationships or were
contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse.
The proviso also violates the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose
respective
marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors
benefits. There
is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be
heard. The
proviso creates the presumption that marriages contracted after the members retirement date were
entered into for
the purpose of securing benefits under RA 8282. This presumption is conclusive because the said
surviving spouses
are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose, thereby also depriving
them the
opportunity to be heard.

(Germane to the purpose of law)

(2) 237 SCRA 538 Himagan vs Pp

Facts:
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin
Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section
47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law
provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case
shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of
the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides
that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
Held: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP
charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other.
The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial
should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil
liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his
right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the
court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

(3) G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA

RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.

Facts:

Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's
Budget and Fiscal Management Division.The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. There were allegations that there were unfilled
positions which are illegally disbursed hence the presence of ghost agents, and that he was supporting
RAM wherein he is involved, that he owns 30 minu Muzis and a Maxima 87 car. Almonte denied all their
allegations and said that the issue on unfilled plantilla positions has been cleared by COA, that he does
not own Maxima 87 and that the 20 mini Uzis were issued to him by the Assistant Commissioner wherein
he is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such according to memorandum order number 283 signed
by the President of the Republic of the Philippines effective 9 Jan. 1990. Petitioner contended that the
subpoena mandates them to look for evidences against themselves hence violating equal protection of
laws. It is also a violation of petitioners right to self incrimination.

Issue: WON the subpoena issued by the Ombudsman violates equal protection clause.

Held: NO.

Ratio: t is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and
those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or
custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for
personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the
examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.

(4) G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009

DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
orderassails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE
GUZMAN fromrunning as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.Petitioner was a naturalized American.
However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225. Upon approval of his
application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines onSeptember 6, 2006. Having
reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights.As such, qualified to
run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija inthe
May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance withRA 9225.

Held:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his
American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
for:

1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
ascitizens of a foreign country;
2. 2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of
aforeign country.
3. The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their
Philippinecitizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225
which furtherrequires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreigncitizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is
disqualified from running for vicemayor.

(5) Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)

The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the tax and
duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within
the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld
the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are
excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality
and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the
Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However,
EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the
entire zone would apply to the present fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It has thereby
excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the
law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in
the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance
fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.
Held: The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not
violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane
to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class.Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.

(6) G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.

ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati,
and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid,
JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City
and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO
QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and
in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Sharia Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts
and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,

vs.

HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

Facts:
The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No.7354. These measures withdraw the franking
privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,
along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel
that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition
assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354(see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the petitioners).
Issue:
WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the followinggrounds:1) its *title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes;(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members
before its passage; and(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
Held:
:1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body
of the act, orto be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance withthe
constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, therepealing clause which includes the withdrawal of
frankingprivileges is merely the effect and not the subject of thestatute; and it is the subject, not the
effect of a law, whichis required to be briefly expressed in its title.

1. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the mechanism for

compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. It may propose an entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in questionwas
duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification
bySenate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved
by President the President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond
the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An Enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look into the petitioners charges. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by
such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government.3. Yes, the clause denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If
the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems
to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favoured, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.

(Not limited to Existing Conditions)

(7) Ormoc Sugar Company vs Treasurer of Ormoc (22 SCRA 603)

FACTS:
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a
tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar
alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar
paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax
in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and
any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge
for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is
found in the city.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
Held: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already
been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and
merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The
ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject
to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.

(8) Central Bank Employees vs Bangko Sentral (446 SCRA 229)

Facts:

RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the
earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8
2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15
(i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a
compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall
under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner
contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The
said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other
hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is
construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative
autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as
counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is based on
real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it
distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater
benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP
receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the
salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

(9) LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC (571 SCRA 263)

Facts:

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in
Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11
The Congress. During the 12th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving point Resolution No.
29.During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution
No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009
. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the
equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities
will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code.
Issue:
WON the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Held:
Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Ratio:Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city.
Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

(10) PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of
congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted bylaw. The immunity
from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-
appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.11, Art. VI of
the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
Appellants status to
That of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.