TORTS AND DAMAGES
-includes assault, batter, false imprisonment,
CLASS NOTES
Torts: not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law
BUT many scattered provisions on tortuous acts
-usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies
granted; (3) social/public policy protected
Damages: much longer treatment in the NCC; more
practical importance on damages
Practical Legal Relevance: vehicular accidents
Intentional tort: not a delict (any act or omission
punishable by law)
Why? Intentional act causing damage to another, not a
crime
Act: intentional, voluntary
-damage
-may or may not violate a crime
Negligence: any act or omission causing damage to
another but w/o intent (only difference w/intentional tort)
Strict liability: it doesnt matter if youre negligent or if
you intended it as long as sets of circumstances make
you liable
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Definitions
1. Tort and Quasi-delict
a. Tort
Naguiat v NLRC
FACTS: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of
Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFT). Due to the phase-out of the
US bases in the country, Clark Air Base was closed and
the taxi drivers of CFTI were separated from service.
The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of sep. pay
due to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat
and the company solidarily liable for the payment of sep.
pay.
ISSUE: WON Naguait should be held solidarily liable
with CFTI. YES.
HELD: Under the Corporation Code, Naguait is liable
bec: (1) he actively managed the business; (2) there
was evidence that CFTI obtained reasonably adequate
insurance; and (3) there was a corporate tort in this
case.
Our jurisprudence is wanting to the definite scope of
corporate tort. Essentially, tort consists in the
violation of a right given or the omission of a duty
imposed by law. Simply stated, it is a breach of legal
duty.
CLASS NOTES
CORPORATE TORT: in regards to liability of President
of CFTI: no definition of corporate tort
2 definitions: long and short (legal basis)
Short definition: from a law dictionary
Whats wrong with the definition in Naguiat? TOO
BROAD. Any breach of legal duty becomes a tort (so it
would include crimes, QD, breach of contract)
very sloppy definition but its the only case that
defines Tort
Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine
the liability of the officers (Naguiat) so is it part of the
ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI
liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to
establish liability through tort
AQUINO (pp. 1-2)
Tort: taken directly from the French and is derivation of
the Latin word torquere meaning to twist
-common law: an unlawful violation of private right, not
created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for
damages
-an act or omission producing an injury to another,
without any previous existing lawful relation of which the
said act or omission may be said to be a natural
outgrowth or incident (other definitions not discussed)
-no universal formula for torts liability
-includes intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability
*Intentional tort: includes conduct where the actor
desires to cause the consequences of his act or
believes the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it.
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defamation, invasion of privacy and interference of
property
*Negligence: involves voluntary acts or omissions
which result in injury to others, without intending to
cause the same
-actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts
or omissions
*Strict Liability: where the person is made liable
independent of fault or negligence upon submission of
proof of certain facts
DE LEON (pp. 1-3)
Tort: common law expression
-used in French to mean wrong, derived from Latin
tortus meaning twisted, as if to say tortuous conduct is
twisted conduct or conduct that departs from the existing
norm
- a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is
subject to civil liability
-fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission +
resulting in breach of a private legal duty (distinguished
from a mere breach of contractual duty) + damage from
said breach of duty (of such character as to afford a
right of redress at law in favor of the injured party
against the wrongdoer)
Note (explained definition in Naguiat vs. NLRC): the
term tort used by SC has same meaning as tort in
common law jurisdictions, as it was used in cases
involving QD and delicts
Tortious act: a wrongful act
-commission or omission of duty of an act by one,
without right, whereby another receives some injury,
directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation
(74 Am. Jur. 2d 620)
Essence of tort: defendants potential for civil liability to
the victim for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly
Art. 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
the victims potential fro compensation or other relief
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
b. Quasi-delict
CLASS NOTES
A 2176 explanation: First sentence refers to ALL CIVIL
LIABILITIES. Second sentence limits QD.
Barredo v Garcia
FACTS: A Head-on collision between a taxi and
carretela resulted in the death of a 16-yr old boy who
was a passenger of the carretela. The taxi driver was
convicted in a crim case but the right to file a sep civil
action was reserved. The parents of the boy sued
Barredo, the drivers employer for damages. Barredo
contends that under the RPC, his liability is only
subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil
action has been filed against the driver.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs, may bring this separate civil
action against Barredo, making him primarily liable as
employer under the CC. YES.
HELD: The same negligent act causing damage may
produce civil liability arising from a crim under the
RPC or create an action for quasi-delict under the
CC. Thus, there were 2 liabilities of Barredo: a
subsidiary one arising from the drivers crim negligence
nd a primary one as employer under the CC. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and
they preferred the second remedy. They were acting
within their rights in doing so.
CLASS NOTES
-during that time, culpa aquiliana (QD) doesnt cover
acts against law? A1903, old CC expressly exclude
acts not punishable by law
-SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow
what the old law says because if A1903 applied literally
there would be no culpa aquiliana, if read together with
RPC (all acts would be under criminal negligence and
imprudence)
-so in this case, emphasize scope of culpa aquiliana
and delict; why needed? Barredo was arguing that he
was not solidarily liable and should only be subsidiarily
liable
-if applied today, would the result be the same? YES
through stare decisis + QD definition changed, removed
phrase not punishable by law
Elcano v Hill
FACTS: In criminal case where Reginald Hill was
charged with the killing of Agapito Elcano, the former
was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake. The deceaseds parents thereafter sued
Reginald and his father for dmages. CFI dismissed the
civil cases on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by
Hills acquittal in the crim case. NO.
HELD: Hills acquittal in the crim case has not
extinguished his liability for QD, hence the acquittal is
not a bar to the instant civil action.
Art. 2176 where it refers to fault or negligence,
covers not only acts not punishable by law but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent.
CLASS NOTES
-why make intentional acts under QD? To make father
and son liable
-A 2177, NCC expressly points out that theres a
separate civil liability from criminal negligence BUT it
seems to apply to QD only so court dealt with this
limitation by upholding the construction that upholds
the spirit that giveth life rather than that which is
literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker (A2176
is not just QD, so A2177 really has no problem)
Cinco v Canonoy
FACTS: Cincos car and a eepney collided. Cinco filed a
civil action for damage to property against the eepneys
driver and operators. Thereafter, he also filed a crim
case against the eepney driver. CFI upheld the
PAGE 2
suspension of the civil case pending the determination
of the crim case.
ISSUE: WON there can be an independent civil action
for damage to property during the pendency of the
criminal action. YES.
HELD: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case
may proceed as a separate and independent civil action
as specifically provided for in Art. 2177 of the CC.
Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. It makes no distinction bet. Damage to
persons and damage to property.
CLASS NOTES
Relevance: clarified that QD includes damage to
property (same highlight in reviewer)
Problem: A2191(2) gave example where QD and
damage to property [liability of proprietors of excessive
smoke]; but this is a Tort on STRICT LIABILITY, not QD!
Baksh v CA
FACTS: Baksh was sued for damages for his breach of
promise to marry. CA affirmed TCs award of damages,
relying on Art. 21 CC.
ISSUE: WON damages may be recovered for a breach
of promise to marry based on Art. 21 of the CC. YES.
HELD: Art. 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or QD
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books.
Art. 2176 which defined a QD is limited to negligent
acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willingness or intent. Torts is much broader than
culpa aquiliana bec. it includes not only negligence,
but intentional criminal acts as well.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
CLASS NOTES
so whats correct? Include or not to include intentional
acts? In Baksh, Davide showed role of A21, so he
limited A2176 to negligent acts or omissions. A2176
discussion is not necessary for the disposition of
the case (OBITER) THEREFORE, QD still includes
intentional acts!
***Issue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? If it
covers intentional acts..
Fr litigation pt of view: it doesnt matter
Fr academic pt of view: it matters!
2. Damages
AQUINO (pp. 842-843)
-Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it
that whenever a right is transgressed, every manner of
loss or injury is compensated for in some way or
another.
-A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to
all obligations regardless of source (delict, QD, contract,
or quasi-contract).
-A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice
to special provisions on damages provided elsewhere in
the Code.
-A2198: principles of general law on damages are
adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
NCC.
-Indemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the
loss caused thereby.
-In actions for damages, courts should award an amount
(money value) to the winning party and not its equivalent
in property.
SANCO, (pp. 940-941)
Basis of Law: introduced in NCC mostly from American
Law since they were either not expressly recognized or
rarely allowed under old code, particularly on subject of
moral damages
Scope of applicability of provisions on damages:
applicable to all obligations arising from sources
enumerated in A1157, NCC, without prejudice to special
provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in said
code.
-dont apply to compensation of workmen and other
employees in cases of death, injury or illness
-in other special laws: same rules observed insofar as
not in conflict with Civil Code
Concept of damages:
Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or
imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a
consequence of a breach of a contractual obligation or a
tortious act
-pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach
of some duty or violation of some right.
Kinds: compensatory, punitie, liquidated damages
(damages recoverable upon breach of a contract, as
stipulated by the parties), nominal damages (given in
vindication of a breach of duty which does not result in
any actual or pecuniary damages)
Damage, damages, injury: material distinctions
Injury: Illegal invasion of a legal right
Damage: loss, hurt, or harm which results from an
injury; in a popular sense, it is the depreciation in value,
regardless if caused by a wrongful or legal act; as
defined by statutes providing for damages: actionable
loss, injury or harm which results from unlawful act,
omission or negligence of another
-not synonymous to example, fine, penalty, punishment,
revenge, discipline, chastisement
Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for
damages suffered.
Pecuniary loss: loss of money or something by which
money or something of money value may be acquired
People v Ballesteros
FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder.
They were ordered to pay actual, compensatory, and
moral damages to the heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES
HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right.
PAGE 3
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded
in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. The party claiming such must present the
best evidence available such as receipts.
Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant
has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety,
physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had
furthermore shown that these were the proximate result
of the offenders wrongful act or omission.
Custodio v CA
FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the
passageway to Mabasas apartment narrower. Mabasa
filed a civil action for the grant of easement of right of
way against them. CA, aside from granting right of way,
awarded damages to Mabasa.
ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO
HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage,
there was no legal injury. Custodio et als act of
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of
their right as owners.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is
the loss, hurt or harm, which results from the injury.
Damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded fro the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone.
b. Damnum absque injuria
AQUINO (pp. 843-845)
-There is no liability even if there is damage because
there was no injury. Mere damage without injury does
not result in liability.
-A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum
facit one who exercises a right does no injury.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Custodio v CA, supra
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
B. History and Development
AQUINO (pp.1-5)
Tort provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish,
French and Anglo-American Law. Therefore, RP SC
borrows heavily from decisions of the Court in other
countries especially Spain and US and relies from
annotation of foreign author.
Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite
evident in the field of QD: it added 4 new category of
obligations that arise quasi ex delicto (a. liability of a
judge who misconducts a case or gives a wrong
decision; b. liability of an occupier of a building for
double the damage caused by anything thrown or forced
out of the building, no matter by whom, on to a public
place[A2193]; c. liability of the occupier if he keeps any
object suspended from the building which would do
damage if it fell; and d. the liability of the shop keeper,
innkeeper, or keeper of a stable for any theft or damage
caused by slaves or employees, or in case of the
innkeepers, of permanent residents [A2000].)
-Code Commission initially wanted to adopt the word
tort in our NCC but decided later against it because
tort in Anglo-American law is much broader
(includes negligence, intentional criminal acts, false
imprisonment, deceit) than the Spanish-Philippine
concept of obligations arising from non-contractual
negligence. Intentional acts would be governed by
RPC. However, some provisions used tort and
therefore recognize it as a source of liability [Sec22
& 100, Corporation Code; Art.68 Child and Youth
Welfare Code; Sec. 17(a)(6) of the Ship Mortgage
Decree]. Even SC used the term tort in deciding
cases involving negligent acts or omissions as well
as involving intentional acts. They defined it in
Naguiat vs. NLRC.
-There is an evident intent to adopt the common law
concept of tort and to incorporate the different,
intentional and unintentional common law torts in the
NCC. Tortious conduct for which civil remedies are
available are embodied in different provisions of the
code. E.g. Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36; A2199 on
contributory negligence and proximate cause (however,
a blending of American and Spanish-Philippine Law)
NCC
SANGCO (pp. xxxi-xl)
Civil Code of the Philippines: based on Civil Code of
1889 (Spanish and French in origin); but many
provisions from codes of other countries were adopted.
Rules from Anglo-American law were adopted because
of element of American culture that has been
incorporated into Fil life during US occupation; because
economic relations that continue between US and RP;
and because US and English Courts have developed
certain equitable rules that are not recognized in the
1889 Civil Code
1889 Civil Code
1. Civil Liability Arising From Criminal Offenses
A1089: Civil obligations arise only from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law and
quasi-delicts.
-civil obligations from crime or misdemeanor was
governed only by Penal Code (A1092) so when criminal
action was instituted, the civil action arising from the
crime is impliedly instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately
(A122, Law of CrimPro)
-right to recover damages arising from crime is
completely dependent on the result of the criminal case.
If an earlier civil action is instituted, upon start of criminal
case, the civil action is suspended and would be
determined by the result of the criminal case. If criminal
action is dismissed, civil action is also deemed
dismissed, regardless if instituted with the criminal
action or separately. Civil liability is treated as purely
incidental to the criminal liability of the offender. The
cases of Springer vs. Odin, Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co., US vs. Guy Sayco, US vs. Bernardo, and
Wise & Co. vs. Larion were ruled using this principle. As
ruled in rakes, any civil action not predicated on offense
committed or charged (based on law, contract, quasi-
contract, or QD) cannot be instituted with the criminal
action.
PAGE 4
-When Penal Code revised, RPC retained what is now
contained in A100; Rules on CRimPro retained what is
contained in Rule 107 (check if still correct)
2. Civil Liability arising from QD
A1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable fro the damage done
In re: A1903: punish wrongful acts or omissions not
punishable by law
-said articles are not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute either punishable offenses(delicts) or
breach of contract.
-thus, the liability of employers, et. al. under now A2180
are only subsidiary (in accordance with penal laws)
-QD or culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual culpa:
causative act or omission not punished by law and is
done ONLY negligently, where civil liability could arise
as governed by the Civil Code (not by penal laws), and
the party aggrieved could file an ordinary civil action for
damages using only preponderance of evidence. It gives
rise only to civil liability. Here, the employers liability for
his employees NONCRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is direct
and primary and not subsidiary, and he could be directly
imputed in an action for recovery of damages.
-an act or omission will give rise to civil liability only if it
causes damage or injury to another or others.
DE LEON (pp.4-8)
Tort law emerged out of criminal law; originally
concerned principally with violent breaches of the place.
(1) Common law tort judges usually define what
counts as torts and how compensation is to be
measured. Still, a statute or even Consti may
make certain conduct legally wrongful and may
permit recovery of damages for such conduct.
(2) No clear distinction between tort and crime
initially, this was the case sine the development
of anything like a clearly formulated conception
of a tort is comparatively recent.
(3) Notion of tort as a specific wrong there was
an attempt in 1720 to consider several specific
wrongs in a work consolidating them under the
general heading of torts. Torts of a specific
character have been increasing.
(4) Place of torts in the Philippine law even if RP
was a civil law country, some of the provisions
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
in the 1889 CC dealth with cases of the nature
of torts + with US occupation, a number of laws
patterned after Anglo-American models have
been passed amplifying the field of torts in
Philippine legal system.
Functions or goals of tort law
Medieval England: discourage violence and revenge
Today: compensation of injured persons and deterrence
of undesirable behavior:
System of thoughts (sorry, no parallelism in the
enumeration of de leon):
(1) Morality or corrective justice defendants should
be liable fro harms they wrongfully caused and no
others; liability imposed when and only when it is right
to do so
(2) Social utility or policy a good-for-all-of-us view:
provide a system of rules that works toward the good of
society
(3) Legal process litigation process is a good to be
preserved rather than abstract ideal of justice or social
utility
(4) potential conflicts between justice and policy
outlook and legal process outlook
(5) distribution of loss the cost of loss suffered by
plaintiff is not simply transferred to the defendant but is
distributed through the defendant to a large number of
individuals
(6) redress of social grievances tort law a popular
mechanism that permits ordinary people to put authority
on trial
(7) a mixed system tort law a mixed set of functions
CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts
II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
A. Elements
Art. 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
Garcia v Florido
FACTS: A public utility car and a bus collided, resulting
in injuries to Garcia et al. The chief of police filed a
criminal case against the bus driver. Garcia et al filed a
civil action for damages against the owners and drivers
of both vehicles. Bus company and driver filed a motion
to dismiss. CFI dismissed the civil action holding that the
right to file a separate civil action was not reserved and
that the action was not based on QD.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case was proper. NO
HELD: The action was based on QD and it may proceed
independently. The essential averments for a QD action
are present in this case, namely:
(1) act or omission of private respondents;
(2) presence of fault or negligence or lack of due care in
the operation of the passenger bus by its driver resulting
in the collision;
(3) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
(4) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
(5) the absence of preexisting contractual relations
between the parties.
The allegation that private respondents violated traffic
rules does not detract from the nature and the character
of the actions as one based on culpa aquiliana.
Excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence.
CLASS NOT E
Important: Take note of 4 elements of QD: (1)
acts or omission constituting negligence; (2)
damage; (3) direct causal connection between
damage and act or omission; (4) no preexisting
contractual relation.
The case mentions 5 elements but Prof. Casis
mentioned 4.
Andamo v CA
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette
caused the construction of waterpaths and contrivances
PAGE 5
in its compound. This allegedly caused flooding and
damage to the adjacent lot, property of the Andamo
spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for
destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a
civil action for damages against respondent corporation.
The civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as
the crim case was field ahead of it.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may
proceed independently of the criminal case. All the
elements of QD are present in the complaint, to wit:
(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
CLASS NOT E
Important: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1)
damages suffered by plaintiff; (2) fault or
negligence of defendant; (3) fault of defendant
caused damages suffered by plaintiff
Taylor v MERALCO
FACTS: 15-year old David Taylor with 2 others (Manuel
and Jessie) experimented with detonating caps were
taken from the premises of MERALCO. David and
Manuel ignited the contents of the cap, resulting in an
explosion which led to Davids loss of his right eye.
Davids father filed an action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages in this
case.
HELD: NO. In order to recover damages, the following
must be established:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
CLASS NOT E
Important: Qualification of negligence fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when
between such negligence and the injury there
exists the relation of cause and effect
Tayag v Alcantara
FACTS: Tayag who was riding on a bicycle along
McArthur Highway was bumped by a bus and died. His
heirs sued the bus owner and driver for damages. A
crim case was also filed against the bus driver. The bus
driver was acquitted in the crim case on the ground of
reasonable doubt. CFI sustained private respondents
MTS the civil case on the ground of lack of COA due to
the acquittal of the bus driver in the crim case.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: No. The petitioners COA being based on a QD,
the acquittal of the driver in the crim case is not a bar to
the civil case for damages based on QD.
All the essential averments for a QD action are
present, namely:
1) Act or omission constituting fault or negligence
on the part of private respondent;
2) Damage caused by the said act or omission;
3) Direct causal relation between the damage and
the act or omission; and
4) No pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties.
CLASS NOT E
Important: There must exist a direct causal connection
1. act or omission
I SANGCO (pp. 1-4)
- Conduct may be legally described in terms of action
and inaction or misfeasance or nonfeasance.
Misfeasance is active misconduct working positive
injury to others; while nonfeasance is passive
inaction or failure to take steps to protect them from
harm
- Liability in tort may be predicated upon an injury
resulting from an unlawful or illegal act or omission,
whether injury is on property or person
2. cause damage
I SANGCO (pp. 87-90)
- QD liability presupposes 2 conditions: (1) a
connection of cause and effect between the person
liable and the fact from which damage results; (2) a
fault of this person, which implies at once an act of
intelligent volition that is illicit, or contrary to law
- It must be shown that the damage to the plaintiff,
who must prove it, was the natural and probable, or
direct and immediate consequence of defendants
culpable act or omission
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.
3. fault or negligence
I SANGCO (p5-7)
- Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably impose. When the
danger is great a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary
care.
- Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind or the
use of sound judgment.
- Negligence is a matter of risk that is to say, of
cognizable danger of injury. The actor does not
desire to bring about the consequences which
follow, nor does he know that they are substantially
to occur, or believe they will. There is merely a risk
of such consequences sufficiently great to lead a
reasonable man in his position to anticipate them,
and to guard against them.
- The culpability of the actors conduct must be
judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to
him at the time and not by looking backward with
the wisdom born of the event. The standard must
be one of conduct, rather than consequences. At
PAGE 6
the same time, the standard imposed must be an
external one, based upon what society demands of
the individual rather than upon his own notion of
what is proper.
- Intentional omissions must not be treated as cases
of negligence. These are not cases of omissions;
they are cases of positive action.
B. Distinguished
A. Quasi-delict v Delict
Art 2177, NCC
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
Art 365, RPC. Imprudence and Negligence.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstance regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate not
he danger clearly manifest.
Barredo v Garcia, supra
RULE: A QD or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the CC, with a substantially all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from crime.
CLASS NOT ES
Delict Quasi-Delict
Public interest Private interest
Penal Code Civil Code
Punished only by penal Any kind of fault of
law negligence
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Guilt beyond reasonable Preponderance of
doubt evidence
People v Ligon
FACTS: Based on the testimony of a taxi driver, Gabat
was convicted of Robbery with Homicide committed
against a 17-yo student working as a cigarette vendor.
ISSUE: WON Gabats guilt was proven BRD.
HELD: NO. Gabats guilt has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt, but preponderance of
evidence establishes that by his ct or omission, with
fault and negligence, he caused damage to the victim
and should answer civilly for the damage done.
It does not follow that a person who is not criminally
liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal case must be established BRD,
only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes civil liability only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
CLASS NOT ES
Need to indemnify heirs even if not criminally
liable.
Padilla v CA
FACTS: Padilla, a municipal mayor, together with
policemen and a civilian, demolished a store and took
away its contents, pursuant to a municipal ordinance.
CA acquitted them of the charge of grave coercion
based on reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay
damages.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in requiring petitioners to pay
damages after acquitting them of the criminal charge.
HELD: NO. The civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
count as only a preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases.
There is nothing contrary to Art 29,CC in the
rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment
awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two
can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates
to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however,
extinguish the civil liability unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which civil liability might arise
did not exist.
incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
Cruz v CA
of the latter has become final and executory by reason
FACTS: Ninevetch Cruz, a surgeon, was convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
ISSUE: WON Cruzs conviction is supported by the
evidence.
HELD: Her guilt was not proved BRD. However, the
Court finds her civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali,
for while a conviction requires proof BRD, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil
liability.
CLASS NOT E
Important: elements of reckless imprudence:
(1) the offender does or fails to do an act; (2)
doing or failure to do the act is voluntary; (3)
without malice; (4) material damage results
from the reckless imprudence; (5) there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and
place
Philippine Rabbit v People
FACTS: Philippine Rabbits employee was convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property, and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages.
PAGE 7
The driver jumped bail. Phil Rabbits notice of appeal
was dismissed.
ISSUE: WON an employer who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused employee may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
NO.
HELD: The subsidiary liability of Phil. Rabbit is
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability
of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has
also become immediately enforceable.
Under the 2000 Rules of Crim Proc., the civil
liability of the accused arising from the crime is deemed
impliedly instituted in a crim action unless the offended
party waives the action, reserves the rt to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the crim action. Hence,
the subsidiary liability of the employer under Art 103,
RPC, may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
The 2000 Rules of Crim Proc deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal
actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Arts 32, 33,
34 & 2176 of the CC shall remain separate, distinct and
independent of any crim prosecution based on the same
act.
CLASS NOT E
Important: Clarified 2000 Rules of Court
B. Quasi-Delict v. Breach of Contract
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is
demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action
for future fraud is void.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES PAGE 8
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in Doctrine: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are True of False-a breach of contract is not a
the performance of every kind of obligation is also broader. Plaintiff with a pre-existing contractual relation basis for QD: FALSE
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by may still sue for QD so long as had there been a no Court in Sangco said that the circle is
the courts, according to the circumstances. contract, there is still a quasi-delict. CONCENTRIC: QD is larger and that culpa
contractual is the yolk
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor Notes: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if So Cangco doesnt say that the two are
consists in the omission of that diligence which is Cangco did not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the mutually exclusive and therefore Cangco is
required by the nature of the obligation and 4 main differences of QD and BoC in this case: consistent with Air France
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of Vinculum juris distinction doesnt matter
the time and of the place. When negligence shows Under QD Under BoC because here the act & the breach coincided
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, 1. liability of Presumptive Direct and
paragraph 2, shall apply. defendant liability immediate Fores v Miranda
employer
If the law or contract does not state the 2. defendant Rebut Prove FACTS: Miranda was a passenger of a jeep which hit a
diligence which is to be observed in the performance, employers presumption performance of wall and fractured his right humerus. He sues under
that which is expected of a good father of a family defense through proof of contract or contract of carriage. CA awarded him with moral
shall be required. the exercise of contributory damages.
due care in negligence
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are selection and HELD: SC deleted moral damages. Moral damages are
also applicable to a quasi-delict. supervision not recoverable for actions based on BoC unless there
3. vinculum juris Created by the Independent the is bad faith. There was no bad faith because: [1] mere
Notes: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the (legal tie) wrongful or breach of the carelessness of the driver does not justify the inference
same way as provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue negligent duty assumed by of bad faith; and [2] under Art 1756, the presumption is
for negligence, you can base the action on quasi-delict, act/omission the parties that common carriers acted negligently (and not
delict, or contract. itself maliciously)
4. what a Defendants The contract and
plaintiff needs fault or its Doctrine: Differences between QD and BoC in this
to prove negligence nonperformance. case:
The negligence Under QD Under BoC
need not be 1. moral Anywhere there Recoverable
Cangco v Manila Railroad proven damages are physical only if

injuries (Art passenger dies
FACTS: Cangcos arm was amputated because he was 2219[2]) or there is
CLASS NOT ES malice or bad
drawn from under a railroad car. His foot alighted upon a
melon at the moment he stepped upon the platform. He What is the breach of contract committed? faith
sues for negligence in the performance of a contract. Negligence, failure to exercise due care 2. defendant Proof of due (proof of due
MR argues that [1] the breach was due to negligence of Art. 1903 not applicable in cases where there is carriers diligence in diligence not
servant and [2] it exercised due diligence in selection preexisting relationship defense selection and available)
and supervision. Held: MR is liable. The contract to Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a supervision
transport carries with it the duty to provide safe means contract of carriage at issue? It should be a 3. what plaintiff Carriers fault or Injury to
of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary for contract of employment. needs to prove negligence passenger. No
plaintiff for BoC to prove the breach was due to MERALCO was held liable for breach of need to prove it
negligence. When a contractual relation exists, the contract. What was the breach? was carriers
obligor may break the contract by means of an act which Failure to exercise due diligence Fault


would have constituted a violation of an extra- This is a landmark case because there is a
contractual obligation had no contract existed. glaring statement in Cangco that contradicts
the other cases CLASS NOT ES

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Does not say that when there is a contract, you
cant sue for QD.
A2176 expressly excludes cases where there is
a pre-existing contractual relationship. But
even if there is a pre-existing contractual
relationship, there is still a cause of action for
quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited.
The ruling on the interpretation of A2176 is not
ratio, just obiter.
Case is not basis of mutual exclusivity
Rakes v Atlantic
FACTS: Rakess leg was amputated because it was
crushed by an iron rail he was carrying on a hand car for
Atlantic, his employer. He sues for damages because of
Atlantics negligence in not repairing the weakened
track. Atlantic argues that remedey for injuries through
negligence lies only in a criminal action
HELD: Atlantics liability to Rakes ariss out of the
contract of employment because failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for its workmen
Doctrine: Employers liability arising out of negligence in
contract of employment may be enforced separate from
criminal action.
CLASS NOT ES
Statement that you cant sue for QD when
there is a contract is mere obiter, not ratio.
Court already decided that employee is liable
Art 1092 & 1903 come from pre existing
relationship
Rakes is not the basis of the doctrine that
quasi-delict may arise from breach of contract.
If there is no contract, it does not mean that
there is no existing relationship
Far East v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which
was dishonored at a despedida party due to a hotlist
policy compelled by the loss of the complementary card.
PAGE 9
He sues for damages. RTC awarded him moral and Passengers have a right to be treated by the carriers
exemplary damages. employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without
the contract, the act or omission complained of cannot
by itself be an actionable tort. Moral damages were CLASS NOT ES
deleted because negligence in failing to give personal Doctrine: The act that breaks the contract may also be
notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or a tort. why discuss this? To determine damages
bad faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because contradicts A2176? No. This is tort not QD
DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be PSBA v CA
deemed to underlie the BoC s where, without a pre-
existing contract between 2 parties, an act or omission FACTS: A PSBA student was stabbed and killed by
can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself. non-students while in the school premises. His parents
sued PSBA and its officers under A2180 for ther
negligence, recklessness and lack of security measures.
CLASS NOT E
Defendants argue that they are not covered by 2180 as
Qualifies Air France case: QD should be they are an academic institution. RTC and CA denied
independent of BoC motion to dismiss.
HELD: The school is not liable under QD because [1]
Notes: Differences between QD and BoC in this case:
A2180 applies only if damage was caused by students
Unde QD Under BoC
or pupils [2] a 2176 applies only if there isno contractual
1. award for Injury If there was bad relation. However, the SC ordered the remand of the
moral damages faith or gross case because there was a contractual obligation to
negligence
provide both education and security. Trial must proceed
2. award for Gross negligence Act that is to determine if the breach was due to negligence.
exemplary as to wanton,
damages approximate fraudulent,
Doctrine: Qualified Air France v Carrascos
malice (Art 2231) reckless, pronouncement by saying the phrase, the act that
oppressive or breaks the contract may also bea tort only applies if the
malevolent (Art. BoC was done in [1] bad faith and [2] in violation of Art
2232) 21 (willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy)
Air France v Carrasco
CLASS NOT E
FACTS: Carraso was told by the manager that he must QD not applicable when there is a contract
st
vacate his 1 class seats because a white man who had According to Prof. Casis, the court said that
a better right to it. RTC and CA awarded moral A2176 only applies if no contract exists. But in
damages. Air France argues that there was no finding of the latter part, it ruled that A2176 can apply if a
bad faith to justify the award of moral damages contract exists.
This statement (cant have QD if theres a
HELD: Although there was a pre-existing contract, the contract) contradicts Air France yet later on it
stress of the action was put on the wrongful expulsion, cites Air France
which is a violation of a public duty, which is a QD.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES PAGE 10
Based on the cases, the second statement of Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Culpa Contractual (BoC) 2. Burden of Proof
2176 defines a QD but it is not laying down a Independent contract Foundation of liability is a. Falls on the person claiming damages
rule that when there is a pre-existing the contract and its breach b. To be established with satisfactory
contractual relationship, there can be no QD. Defense is available No defense of diligence of evidence
Air France is safer, it said tort referring to first a good father of a family in c. Negligence is not presumed. Only
sentence of 2176 such that if there is pre- the selection and under Arts. 2180, 2183, and 2191 is
existing contractual relationship there can still supervision of employees presumed and burden of proof shifts
be a tort. to defendant
Employers employers liability is 3. QD arising from BoC
Syquia v CA responsibility is direct and immediate a. the existence of a contract does not
presumptive preclude the commission of a QD..
FACTS: The parents and siblings of the deceased b. Contractual responsibility and extra-
Syquia file suit for damages arising from BoC and/or QD 2. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Crimes contractual liability exclude each other
against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery because the Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Crimes and cannot be cumulated.
coffin was flooded due to a hole in the wall of the Affect Private Public Interest
concrete vault placed by defendants. CA determined Concerns Tort liability arises from BoC when the is
that there was no negligence. Indemnification Penal Code Punishes act or omission is in itself wrongful
Repairs Damage or Corrects independent of the contract, the breach of
HELD: Action is based on BoC. The Deed of Sale and which being merely incidental to the
Broad- include all acts Narrow punished
Certificate of Perpetual Care govern the relation of the commission of the tort.
where any fault or only if there is a penal
parties and defined their rights and obligations. There is negligence intervenes law punishing it
no stipulation that the vault would be waterproof. Plus, 4. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual
Employers liability is Employers liability is
Memorial exercise the diligence of a good father of a Distinguished
direct and primary subsidiary
family in preventing the accumulation of the water inside Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Culpa Contractual
the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of (BoC)
3. Concurrence of Causes of Action
earth around the grave filling the same with earth. Wrongful or negligent The act or omission is
- Far East Banc v. CA a single act or
act or omission itself merely an incident in
omission may give rise to two or more causes
Doctrines:[1] If there is a pre-existing contractual the source of the the performance of an
of action (i.e. delict, QD, or BoC)
relation, then any negligence would be actionable under obligation obligation
- liability for a tort may arise even under a
BoC, not QD. [2] If there is no stipulation or legal Plaintiff has burden to Plaintiff need not
contract, where tirt us that which breaks the
provision to the contrary, the diligence to be observed in prove the defendant plead or prove it was
contract, where an act which constitutes a
the performance of a contractual obligation is that which was at fault or defendants fault or
breach would have itself constituted the source
is expected of a good father of a family. negligent negligence
of a quasi-delictual liability has the contract not
existed. No presumption that Mere proof of
defendant was at fault existence of a contract
or negligent and its breach raises

presumption of fault or
De Leon (pp.157-160) negligence
CLASS NOT ES
1. Requisites of QD: Governed by Art. Governed by Arts.
The notes in this case are rather confusing. 2176; and also 1170- 1174
a. An act or omission by defendant
Prof. Casis asks how putting a hole in the vault governed by Art.
b. Fault or negligence by defendant
would prevent water from entering it. 1172-1174 under Art.
c. Damage or injury to plaintiff
d. Direct relation of cause and effect 2178
between act or omission and the Based on voluntary act or omission which has
damage caused damage to another
AQUINO (pp. 25-26) Requires only preponderance of evidence
e. No pre-existing contractual
1. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Culpa
relationship
Contractual
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
CLASS NOT ES
Note from discussion: (hindi ko alam kung
saang case to related) if there is a pre-existing
contractual relation, base action on Art. 21.
III. NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept of Negligence
1. Definition; Elements
Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall
apply.
If the law or contact does not state
the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a father of a family shall be required.
CLASS NOT ES
AQUINO on negligence (pp. 23-27)
Actionable negligence may either be culpa contractual,
culpa aquiliana and criminal negligence. Thus, an action
for damages for the negligent acts of the defendant may
be based on contract, quasi-delict or delict. The bases
of liability are separate and distinct from each other
even if only one act or omission is involved.
Picart v Smith
FACTS: Picart improperly pulled his horse on the right
side (wrong side of the road) of the bridge. Smith drove
his car toward the horse, veering away only when the
car was only a few feet away from the horse. The horse
got spooked and got killed.
HELD: Smith is liable for damages because applying
the standard of a prudent man, he was negligent. A
prudent man would have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a
reasonable consequence of that course. Smith should
have: 1. Stopped 2. Slowed down or 3. Veered to the
right.
Doctrines: 1. The Constitutive fact of negligence is the
reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this pre-vision.
2. Test of negligence would a prudent man foresee liable for hitting a man?
harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued?
3. Take note however, that a person can be expected to
take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Omniscience of the future is
not a requirement.
Notes: The car was on the proper side of the bridge.
Sir thinks that the ruling is problematic because had the
car veered away, it would then be on the improper side
of the road.
CLASS NOTES
definition: conduct is said to be negligent when
a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Test: prudent man
o fictitious character: ordinary prudent
man
o can be reasonably foreseen
o knowledge of tortfeasor at that time
Wright v MERALCO
FACTS: An intoxicated Wright was thrown off his
calesa after it was pitched forward by Meralcos
protruding railtrack. CFI awarded him damages but
apportioned the same since he was negligent as well,
PAGE 11
although not as negligent as Meralco in failing to
maintain the tract. Both appealed.
HELD: Wright was not negligent because the sudden
falling of the horse, would ordinarily be sufficient to
throw a sober man from the vehicle.
Doctrine: If a persons conduct is characterized by s
proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial
whether hi is drunk or sober.
Notes: Sir asks the question following the doctrine: If
this happened today, would an intoxicated driver be held
CLASS NOTES
- mere intoxication is not in itself negligence
- inconclusive factor
Corliss v Manila
FACTS: Plaintiff orliss husband died of some serious
burns because the jeep he was driving collided with
Manila Railroads train at the railroad crossing because
of his eagerness to beat the locomotive and reach the
other side.
HELD: Complaint is dismissed. Husband was negligent
because [1] one approaching a railroad crossing do so
cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and
do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do
before he attempts to cross the track; [2] a prudent man
under similar circumstances would have heeded the
siren of the oncoming train, stopped and allowed the
train to pass; [3] the train driver had already applied its
brakes and was running at 23-30kph; and [4] he had the
duty to stop his jeep to avoid a collision because the
driver of the locomotive was not qualified to do so at the
time.
Doctrine: Negligence is defined as the want of care
required by the circumstances. It is not an absolute
term and its application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a higher degree of care is necessary.
Notes: Sir says that based on jurisprudence, the
standard of care required for crossing railroads is stop,
look and listen. Nevertheless as provided by the SC in
this case, we cannot provide a standard for all specific
cases because it is difficult. There is no formula to
determine negligence. Every case must be dependent of
its facts.
Valenzuela v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Valenzuela was hit by defendants car
while she was attending to a flat tire. She sued for
damages based on QD. He argues that he is not liable
because of her contributory negligence in parking in a
no-park zone and he was driving at a safe speed of
55kph.
HELD: The average motorist alert to road conditions
would have had no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by him. Therefore his
failure to be alert must be due either to his intoxication
or his speeding. Also there was no contributory
negligence because the Emergency Rule exempts
plaintiff from negligence since the time for reflective
thought or opportunity to weight the situation was absent
because she was confronted by danger.
Doctrines: [1] adds to the definition in Corliss v. Manila
negligence is conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others it is the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury
[2]the emergency rule can be considered a defense.
Notes: SC took into consideration normal human
circumstances in determining WON defendant was
negligent. (Examples: the light rainfall, visibility of the
street 100 meters away, etc.)
Far Eastern v CA
PAGE 12
FACTS: While on compulsory pilotage for docking, the people would be looking up) in determining WON
vessel rams into pier because anchor did not take hold defendant was negligent. But sir asks, what if the
planes had already landed?
HELD: Both the shipmaster and compulsory pilot are
liable. The shipmaster is liable because of his blind 2. Standard of conduct
reliance on the compulsory pilot and because he
supinely stood by with no watchful vigilance on his 1. the prudent men
part. The compulsory pilot is liable because he failed to 2. children
react (or reacted too late) and because he miscalculated
3. experts. Professionals
the bulk and size of the vessel.
4. intoxication
Doctrines: [1] Unmindful disregard or neglectful 5. insanity
relinquishment of duty is tantamount to negligence [2]
Extraordinary risk demands extraordinary diligence. [3] 1. The Prudent Man
The presumption of fault against a moving vessel that
strikes a stationary object is rebuttable by proof that the Picart v Smith
driver was without fault, the collision was the fault of the
stationary object, or that it was the result of an inevitable Doctrines: [1] The standard of care is that of a prudent
accident. man [2] the conduct of a prudent man is determined in
the light of human experience an in the particular case
Notes: The defense of liability of another person is not
available to join tortfeasors. I Sangco (pp.7-8)
1) STANDARD OF CONDUCT
Civil Aeronautics v CA - it is impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all
conceivable human conduct because of the infinite
FACTS: The plaintiff broke his thigh bone because he variety of situations which may arise
slipped over a 4-inch elevation at the end of the - standard of conduct must be:
viewing deck of the airport since he wanted a better i. external and objective
view of the incoming passengers including his future ii. the same for all persons
son- in- law. He filled an action for damages based on iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to
QD. the act for his capacity to meet it and for the
circumstances under which he must act
HELD: Defendant is liable for exemplary damages since
there was gross negligence in failing in its duty to insure a. Children
the safety of the viewers because the tendency of the Article 8, RPC
viewers on the deck would be to look to where the A minor fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable
planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look of committing a crime and is to be held criminally liable
down on the floor or pavement. therefore. (this was in Taylor. This also might mean Art
80 RPC)???
Doctrines: [1] An object can still be placed negligently
even if it has a legitimate purpose for being there. [2]
Definition of gross negligence as equivalent to
notorious negligence which consists in the failure to
CLASS NOT ES
The new law on negligence of children would
exercise even slight care still not affect the laws on negligence outlined
by Sangco because it does not expressly
Notes: SC, just like in Valenzuela v. CA, took into repeal the provisions of the RPC.
consideration normal human circumstances (i.e. that
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
RA 9344 does not affect presumptions of
negligence. However, it affects Art. 2180, CC.
Taylor v Manila Railroad
FACTS: David Taylor, 15, and MANUEL, 12, were
experimenting with fulminating caps they found lying
around the companys premises. After applying a lighted
match to an opened cap, it exploded causing injuries.
Davids father filed a complaint for damages.
HELD: In the Turntable and Torpedo cases, the owner
of the premises was held liable because of the doctrine
1
of implied invitation . This doctrine, however was
overturned by Railroad Company vs. Stout which held
that while it is the general rule in regard to an adult that
to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case. The law fixes no arbitrary
age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts. Plaintiff was
sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted for his own
deliberate act. Although the owner of the premises was
negligent leaving the caps exposed n its premises,
plaintiffs own act was the principal and proximate cause
of the accident.
RULE: The care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only and this is to
1 In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an
implied license might sometimes arise when it not on behalf of others. Thus
leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would
be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them
to make use of it; and perhaps, if one were to throw upon his premises, near
the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should
arise.
be determines in each case by the circumstances of the
case.
CLASS NOTES
when children trespass
child & adult: not same appreciation with
regard to contributory negligence
for children, you dont stop at age, you look at
circumstances as well
2 cases: Torpedo (flare gun cases) and matter of law.
Turntable (DJ stuff) cases: the question
involved has been whether a railroad company
is liable for an injury received by an infant of
tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or
for purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where
the railroad company's premises, at a place
where the railroad company knew, or had a
good reason to suppose, children who would
likely to come, and there found explosive signal
torpedoes left exposed by the railroad
company's employees, one of which when
carried away by the visitor, exploded and
injured him; or where such infant found upon
the premises a dangerous machine, such as a
turntable left in such condition as to make it
probable that children in playing with it would
be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and
where the infant did in fact suffer injury in
playing with such machine. In these, and in a
great variety of similar cases, the great weight
of authority holds the owner of the premises
liable.
Examples: What if its a 25-year old with the
mental capacity of a 9-year old? What if its a
9-year old with the mental capacity of a 25-year
old? Would the doctrine still apply?
Jarco Marketing v CA
FACTS: Zhieneth, 6, was pinned by the bulk of the
department stores gift-wrapping counter/structure and
died. The department store contended that it was the
PAGE 13
childs own act of climbing into the structure that was the
proximate cause of the fall of the counter.
HELD: (Citing Sangco) Since negligence may be a
felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to
be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of
lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the
case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is
rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that the
child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
RULE: A child under 9 years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Casis: Does this mean that Sangco did not set a
standard of conduct for children but merely a formula?
No. The court did not cite him correctly. Sangco had the
standard of an ordinary prudent child.
CLASS NOTES
Make a distinction between children as a
tortfeasor and children as a victim
If a child is 8 years old and makes a counter fall
over another person who dies, QD can still be
filed because negligence is not equal to
liability
Difference between accident and negligence:
an accident cannot be foreseen while
negligence can be foreseen. So in this case,
negligence and accident cannot coincide.
Companys counterargument: It never
happened before.
In citing Sangco, there is an analogy between
the RPC and the new Civil Code. If below 9,
presumed incapable of negligence (conclusive
presumption), if above 9 and below 15,
rebuttable presumption of incapacity of
negligence, if above 15, that of a prudent child
or adult.
Prof. Casis asks what about a child who is
exactly 9 years old? Apply the rules on above
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9 below 15 because the law should be
construed in favor of the accused.
Is there mutual exclusivity between negligence
and accident? According to the Jarco case,
none.
Magtibay v Tiangco
FACTS: Rowel Tiangco, under 18, was found guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence. Being under 18,
his sentence was suspended until he reached majority.
Later, in view of his conduct, his lawyer recommended
the dismissal of his case. CFI dismissed but reversed
the right of the heirs to recover damages in a civil action.
HELD: The suspension of sentence did not wipe out his
guilt, but merely put off the imposition of the
corresponding penalty in order to give the delinquent
minor a chance to be reformed. When, therefore, after
he had observed good conduct, the criminal case was
dismissed, this does not mean that he was exonerated
from the crime charged, but simply that he would suffer
no penalty. Nor did such dismissal of the case obliterate
is civil liability for damages.
RULE: Liability of an infant in a civil action for his torts is
imposed as a mode, not of punishment but of
compensation. For every tortuous act of violence or
other pure tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and in
the same extent as an adult.
CLASS NOTES
Minority is not a factor to escape liability
because even though minority is not a factor
for negligence, it is a factor for liability
Del Rosario v Manila Electric
FACTS: Alberto Del Rosario, 9, despite the warning of
one of his companions, after saying that he had been in
the habit of touching wires, put out his index finger and
touched a fallen electrical wire. He immediately fell face
downwards, exclaiming Ay! Madre. The end of the wire
remained in contact with his body which fell near the
post. Upon being taken to the hospital, he was
pronounced dead.
HELD: It is doubtful whether contributory negligence
can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and natural curiosity which a child would
feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere
fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a
companion of the age of 8 years does not alter the case.
But even supposing that the contributory negligence
could in some measure be properly imputed to the
deceased, yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal
to the right of action in this case,not having been the
determining cause of the accident.
RULE: It is doubtful whether contributory negligence
can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and natural curiosity.
CLASS NOTES
Different from Taylor:
o Taylor contributory negligence, child
as tortfeasor
o Del Rosario victim only
Immaturity and natural curiosity taken into
account
Ylarde v Aquino
FACTS: Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig
beside a 1 ton concrete block in order to make a whole
to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the
loose soil around the open hole but allegedly telling
them not to touch the stone. They, however, playfully
jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete
block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasnt able to
climb out and he died because of the injuries sustained.
HELD: The child Ylarde cannot be charged with
reckless imprudence. (citing Sangco) The degree of
care required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person engendered to care for himself. A
minor should not be held to the same degree of care as
PAGE 14
an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to
the average conduct of persons of his own age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a child
must conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same
age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience
under the same or similar circumstances. (RULE)
CLASS NOTES
Kid was 10/11 yo: *disputable presumption
under Sangco*
*in a case between children and adults, the
trend is that adults should know better*
SANGCO (pp. 70-74)
UNDER 9 YEARS conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment and is exempt from criminal
liability
OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15 may or may not be guilty
of contributory negligence, depending upon his mental
development and other circumstances (rebuttable
presumption)
OVER 15 YEARS presumed to have sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of danger
with the power to avoid it
(STANDARD is still that of a child his age and capacity,
and not that of an adult.)
STANDARD: ORDINARILY PRUDENT CHILD
The standard of conduct which a child must
conform for his own protection is that of a
reasonable person of like age, intelligence and
experience under like or similar circumstances
or that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances.
TEST as to whether an infant can be subjected to the
same standard of care as an adult:
1. type of activity involved is one that is usually
engaged in by children
2. one involving the use of potentially
dangerous, adult-oriented instrument, like a car.
WHERE CHILD IS HELD TO THE STANDARD OF
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
CARE OF AN ADULT, his violation of a statute or
other enactment entails the same consequences as
those of an adult.
3. Experts, professionals
Culion v Phil. Motors
FACTS: When Culion wanted to get his motor
schooner repaired, he went to PMC where Quest,
PMCs manager decided to oversee the repairs.
Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and
the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel
mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine
compartment. Quest attention was called on this but he
took it lightly. When the engine was started, there
was a backfire and burned the boat.
HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would
not be followed by any disaster, but here the leak
along the pipeline and the flooding of the
carburetor created a dangerous situation, which a
prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat
engines, would have taken precaution to avoid.
When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest
is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but
not that of boats. A person skilled in dealing with
boats would have been sufficiently warned by the
circumstances to cause him to take precaution
against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert
in repairing gasoline engine on boats.
RULE: When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do.
CLASS NOTES
Johnny Quest
when a person who holds himself out as being
competent to do things, he will be held liable
for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care &
skill of an expert
high degree of care
US v Pineda
FACTS: Pineda, a pharmacist, sold barium
chlorate(poisonous) instead of potassium chlorate
which killed 2 horses.
HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding
care and skill. The responsibility to use care has
been variously qualified as ordinary care, care of
a specially high degree, the highest degree of
care known to practical men, which is the highest
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness,
vigilance, and the most exact and reliable
safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct
of business, in order that human life may not
constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the
substitution of deadly poison for harmless medicine.
The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands. The question of
negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is
responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he
sells.
RULE: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding
care and skill. The responsibility to use care has
been variously qualified as ordinary care, care of
a specially high degree, the highest degree of
care known to practical men.
CLASS NOTES
Relationship: danger
PAGE 15
o pharmacist: knowledgeable
o buyer: cant check for himself
Consider nature of work and danger involved
Cruz v CA
FACTS: Lydia Umali underwent a surgery under Dr.
Ninevetch Cruz wherein the untidy clinic ran out of
medicine, blood and oxygen that the patient had to be
transferred to another hospital, where she died.
HELD: While it may be true that the circumstances
seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence
on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is best
arrived at not through the educated surmises nor
conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the
unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For
whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion
of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that
the circumstances cited are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same
operation.
RULE: The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating.
CLASS NOT ES
Plaintiff has burden of proof; present expert
testimony
BPI v CA
FACTS: BPIs money market people pre-terminated
Fernandos placement through a phone call and only
verified her identity by phone. The phony Fernando
deposited the two BPI checks to China Bank and
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thereafter withdrew it all. BPI claimed reimbursement
from China Bank under its clear warranty.
HELD: By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
employees and officials is far greater than those of
ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons,
the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree
of diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. No matter how many justifications both
banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase
the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising
extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervisions
of employees.
RULE: The banks are expected to exercise the highest
degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees (stems from the nature of their industry)
CLASS NOTES
Nature of banks: imbued with public interest so
there is a higher degree of diligence required
4. Intoxication
CLASS NOTES
Not negligence in itself but it can be a factor
*questions to ask: (1) how do you know if a
person is intoxicated or not? (2) when is it a
factor enough that it impairs your judgment?*
Wright v Manila Electric
FACTS: Plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing
the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled,
leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike out
of the rails with great force, throwing the plaintiff from
the vehicle and causing injuries. The tops of the rails
appear to be 5 or 6 inches more above the level of the
street. Plaintiff was intoxicated at the time.
HELD: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the
mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care. General rule: it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence
can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is
required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his
own protection than by a sober one. If ones conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence,
it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. It is
impossible to say that a sober man would not have
fallen from the vehicle under the conditions. A horse
crossing the tracks with not only the rails but a portion of
the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason
of unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing
against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this
might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no
matter what his condition; and to conclude that a sober
man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is
to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of
speculation and guesswork.
RULE: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the
mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary
care.
CLASS NOTES
Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence
Inconclusive factor
5. Insanity
Art. 2180, NCC
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
PAGE 16
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. Even though the former
are nor engaged in any business or industry.
The state is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2182
If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
US v Baggay
FACTS: In a song service, Baggay suddenly, without
provocation attacked a woman with a bolo on her head ,
from which she died. He likewise inflicted various
wounds on other women with the same bolo, including
his own mother. Since defendant was suffering from
mental aberration, trial court rendered him exempt from
criminal liability but was obligated to indemnify the heirs
of the murdered woman.
HELD: In the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in
spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and
justly liable with his property for the consequences of his
acts, even though performed unwittingly, for the reason
that his fellows ought not to suffer from the disastrous
results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in
spite of his unfortunate condition. According to law, the
person in the first place liable are those who have the
insane party under their care or guardianship, unless
they prove that there was no blame or negligence on
their part; but if the demented person or imbecile lack a
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guardian or some person charged with his care, or if the
latter be insolvent, then his own property must meet the
civil liability.
RULE: Although he may not be held criminally liable, a
lunatic or imbecile is still held civilly liable. The person
in the first place liable is those who have the insane
party under their care or guardianship.
CLASS NOTES
Exemption form criminal liability doesnt mean
exemption from civil liability
B. Degrees of Negligence
Art. 2231
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.
CLASS NOTES
Grossly negligent vs slightly negligent
degree of danger
cf. value
RA 9044 Sec. 6: child 15 & below-incapable of
negligence
question still to be resolved is the laws effect
on 2180 CC
Amedo v Rio
FACTS: Filomeno Manguit, a seaman, jumped
overboard from his ship into the water to retrieve a 2-
peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea. He
drowned.
HELD: He failed to exercise even the slightest care and
diligence, that he displayed a reckless disregard of the
safety of his person, that he could not have been but
conscious of the probable consequences of his
carelessness and that he was indifferent, or worse, to
the danger of his injury. There is more reason to hold
that his death was caused by his notorious negligence.
If while he was working, his bill merely fell from his
pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor something
accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would
surely be entitled to compensation, his act being
obviously innocent. Jumping into the sea, however, is
entirely different, the danger which it entails being clear,
potent and obvious.
RULE: Notorious negligence has been held to be
tantamount to gross negligence, which is want of
even slight care and diligence.
- what determines if an act if negligent is the
danger of an act
- the nature of the act of jumping into the sea
involves danger
CLASS NOTES
What determines if an act if negligent is the
danger of an act.
The nature of the act of jumping into the sea
involves danger per se.
Why notorious negligence? Because
compared with other cases, the danger is
apparent and imminent because the shore is
1 miles away from the location of the ship. It
was not a case of the money falling off
someones pocket to the floor. He is not said
to be a good swimmer but he jumped into the
water as opposed to Cuervo vs. Barretto
wherein the emoloyer ordered him to jump into
the water to protect the property of the
company.
What determines the grossness of negligence?
The degree of danger and other factors which
would justify the dangerous act.
Marinduque Iron Mines v Workmen's
Compensation
PAGE 17
FACTS: Mamador hitched a ride together with other
laborers on a company-owned truck. When the truck
tried to overtake another truck, it collided with a coconut
tree, which resulted in his death. There was a company
prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks.
Petitioner claims that such violation was the laborer's
notorious negligence which, under the law, precludes
recovery.
HELD: Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. Violation of a rule
promulgated by a commission or board is not
negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence.
Under the circumstances, the laborer could not be
declared to have acted with negligence since the
prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of
riders. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's
haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence, because no
danger or risk was apparent.
RULE: Violation of a rule promulgated by a
commission or board is not negligence per se; but it
may be evidence of negligence.
CLASS NOTES
Theres only an alleged prohibition on part of
employer
Even if there was indeed a prohibition, violation
of policy is not necessarily negligence per se
but it may be an evidence of negligence
SANGCO (10-12)
The amount of care demanded by the standard of
reasonable conduct must be proportionate to the
apparent risk.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE:
SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE - an absence of that degree of
vigilance which persons of extraordinary prudence and
foresight are accustomed to use. (failure to exercise
care)
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
GROSS NEGLIGENCE described as failure to
exercise even that care which a careless person would
use. There is no generally accepted meaning, but the
probability is that it signifies more than ordinary
inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious
indifference to consequences. (extreme departure from
the ordinary standard of care)
WILFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS quasi-intent,
lying between intent to do harm and the mere
reasonable risk of harm to another. They apply to
conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many
respects as if it were intended (actor has intentionally
done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a
risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly
probably that harm would follow).
There is often NO CLEAR DISTINCTION between the
above and gross, and the two have tended to merge
and take on the same meaning as an AGGRAVATED
form of negligence, differing in QUALITY rather than in
DEGREE from ordinary lack of care.
C. Proof of Negligence
1. Burden of Proof
RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF AND
PRESUMPTIONS
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must
prove his own affirmative allegations. Evidence need not
be given in support of a negative allegation except when
such negative allegation is an essential part of the
statement of the right or title on which the cause of
action or defense is founded, nor even in such case
when the allegation is a denial of the existence of a
document the custody of which belongs to the opposite
party. The burden of proof lies on the party who would
be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases.
Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions.
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. -
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. - The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such , whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of his jurisdiction;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed;
ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long
as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
Sec. 6. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. -
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child born after three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the
spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of such child must prove his allegation.
1. Presumption
Art. 2184
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented
the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless
PAGE 18
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Art. 2188
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from
his possession of dangerous weapons or substances,
such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
Art. 1734
Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international
or civil;
(3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing
or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Art. 1735
In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3,
4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
CLASS NOTES
Art 2184 CC
disputable presumption:
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
o 2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos:
guilty of reckless driving / violation of
traffic rules
if the owner is not in the car, does the
disputable presumption apply?
o n/a when the owner is not in the car /
common carrier
requires conviction
Art 2185 CC
disputable presumption: violate traffic
regulation
o no conviction required
o however, Sangco says this also
requires conviction
** but when is one found guilty of traffic
violation?
Art 2188
prima facie presumption
o injury results from possession of
dangerous weapons/ substances,
except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his
occupation/business
Arts 1734 & 1735
common carriers
loss, destroyed, deteriorate
presume negligence common carrier
o UNLESS prove extraordinary
diligence
SANGCO (18-27)
It is NEGLIGENCE PER SE when:
1. a professional driver permits any
unlicensed person to drive the car placed
under his responsibility
2. violation of an ordinance prohibiting
pedestrians from crossing a street in
places other than regular cross-walks
3. driving a motor vehicle without a license, at
a high rate of speed and under the
influence of alcohol
Where there is NO local regulation restricting the
pedestrians rights in the use of a street, a pedestrian
HAS THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL upon roads and streets
WHETHER THERE BE SIDEWALKS OR NOT, although
he should have due regard for the rights of motor
vehicles and should exercise due care for his own
safety.
Where proof of violation makes:
1. a prima facie case of negligence
2. gives rise to a presumption of lack of
ordinary care
PRESUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE
FOUR GENERAL GROUNDS OR EXCUSES FOR
VIOLATION OF A STATUTE:
1. anything that would make it impossible to
comply with the statute or ordinance
2. anything over which the defendant has no
control and which places him or an
instrumentality that he is operating in a
position contrary to that required by the
statute or ordinance
3. an emergency not of the actors own
making which causes him to fail to obey
the enactment
4. conduct which comes within an excuse or
exception provided in the statute
One who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality EXTREMELY DANGEROUS in character
is bound to take EXCEPTIONAL precautions to prevent
injury being done thereby.
- The care required is a great or high
degree, or the HIGHEST degree of
precaution.
- The presumption DOES NOT APPLY to
those whose occupation or business
REQUIRES the possession or use of a
firearm, such as peace officers or armed
forces, or in the case of poison, the drug
companies or stores.
WRT to COMMON CARRIERS
Common carriers from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy are bound to observe
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in the vigilance over the
goods and safety of passengers transported by them
according to all circumstances of each case.
- The law on averages under the Code of
Commerece cannot be applied in
PAGE 19
determining liability where there is
negligence.
IN ALL CASES, violation must be the PROXIMATE
CAUSE.
3. Res Ipsa Loquitor
Layugan v IAC
FACTS: A truck bumped into the plaintiff while he and a
companion were repairing the tire of their parked truck
along the right side of the highway. He sustained
injuries. Defendant contends that the proximate cause
was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install
an early warning device. IAC concluded that under the
doctrine, the plaintiff was negligent. The question is
whether the doctrine was applicable.
HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself)
Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have he management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. It is not rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. It can be involved when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. It cannot
be availed of when the plaintiff has knowledge and
testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of
negligence which is the cause of injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of
the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant to the occurrence appear. The absence of
want of care of the driver has been established by clear
and convincing evidence. The doctrine does not apply.
RULE: Res ipsa can be involed when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.
CLASS NOTES
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
RIL made a special defense by Isidro to allege
negligence of the truck driver and Layugan.
IAC ruled RIL as the basis for holding Layugan
negligent.
RIL N/A because theres direct (clear &
convincing) evidence
Why? Because the mode of proof only, so
when theres evidence, use evidence / facts so
that judgment will be based on facts and not
presumptions
Ramos v CA
FACTS: Ramos, undergoing a gall bladder operation,
went comatose because she was incorrectly intubated.
HELD: Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for
itself) the fact of the occurrence of the injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make
out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question
of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Requisites are:
1. the accident is of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of
someones negligence
2. it is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants
3. the possibility of contributing conduct
which would make plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
The fundamental element is control of instrumentality
which caused the damage. Generally, expert testimony
is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove a physician
has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from
the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine is
availed of by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. In cases where the
doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. The doctrine is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised.
RULE: In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the
court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
CLASS NOTES
RIL applicable:
No expert testimony
Court adjudicated based on common
knowledge fund
The foundation of RIL is common knowledge
evidentiary rule: doesnt do away with
presenting evidence
must prove these elements:
accident doesnt occur w/o persons negligence
defendant has exclusive control over the
instrumentality
no contributory negligence on plaintiffs part
RIL & malpractice suits:
o Gen rule: expert testimony needed
(Cruz v CA)
o Exception: If case can be gleaned
from common knowledge (Ramos v
CA)
in Cruz, they didnt provide expert testimony
therefore they lost
in Ramos, can use common knowledge
medical malpractice
domain of medical science: expert needed
RIL
common knowledge: no need for expert
preparation for procedure
if theres failure / didnt get the results
expected, RIL n/a
*question: when is a medical malpractice case
common knowledge or in the domain of
medical science?*
RIL is NA in malpractice suits if the only
showing is that the desired result was not
PAGE 20
accomplished if the problem is based on
medical science (Cruz vs. CA). But if common
knowledge can be applied, RIL applies.
Batiguin v CA
FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation
on a patient. Afterwards, she was found to be feverish.
When the patient submitted herself to another surgery,
she was found to have an ovarian cyst on the left and
right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material
was embedded on the right side of the uterus.
HELD: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes the
injury is shown to under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the
management used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from ordinary want of
care. All the requisites are present in this case. (1) The
entire proceedings of the caesarian were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin.
(2) The patient underwent no other operation which
could habe caused the offending piece of rubber to
appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that it could
habe only been a by-product of the caesarian section.
RULE: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the Defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary
care.
CLASS NOTES
RIL applies; all elements present:
o entire C-section under control &
management of doctor
o no other operation after C-section
although there is no proof directly linking Dr.
Batiquin to the rubber, applying RIL, Dr. is
liable
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Theoretical basis for RIL: The proof should
come from the defendant (RIL is the bridge
which allows the plaintiff to reach the
defendant).
DM Consunji v CA
th
Facts: A construction worker fell from the 14 floor
when the platform assembly he was standing on fell
down.
Held: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its
necessity, i.e., that the necessary evidence is not
available. The defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and the plaintiff has no such knowledge.
It furnishes a bridge by which the plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who
knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of
care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter
of which the plaintiff complains. It is a rule of necessity.
Rule: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its
necessity.
CLASS NOTES
RIL applies
theoretical basis:
o proof is in exclusive control of
defendant
o bridge that connects plaintiff to the
proof
Prof. Casiss problem: theres evidence (police
report, testimony & affidavit). It is like saying
that even if there is evidence, one could still
argue RIL to win the case.
Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victims fault for
falling off the platform.
SANCO (27-32)
RES IPSA LOQUITOR the facts or circumstances
attending an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or permit an inference, of negligence on
PAGE 21
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be
charged with negligence. awarded.
It relates to the MODE rather than the BURDEN of
establishing negligence.
CLASS NOTE
It is NOT an exception to the rule of initial presumption
of negligence, but is DESCRIPTIVE of a class of cases Applies only when both parties are negligent.
wherein the initial presumption is overcome by evidence
inherently carrying with it implications of negligence Manila Electric v Remonquillo
without the necessity of proof of specific facts or
conduct. FACTS: Magno was repairing the media agua when
he was electrocuted to death. The galvanized iron
WHEN DOES IT APPLY? Upon the satisfaction of 3 sheet he was holding came in contact with the electric
conditions: wire.
1. The accident was of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur unless someone is negligent HELD: Court said Meralco was not negligent. But
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused assuming it was Magnos heirs still cant recover
the injury was under the exclusive control of because the proximate cause of the electrocution was
the person charged with negligence not the electric wire but the reckless and negligent act of
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
any voluntary action or contribution on the part iron sheet without precaution. It is assumed that due to
of the person injured his age and experience, he was qualified to do the job.
COURTS ADD A FURTHER CONDITION:
Prior and emote cause
4. Plaintiff had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident
CLASS NOTES
F. DEFENSES
1. Plaintiffs negligence
proximate cause: negligence of repairman in
turning with GI sheet
difference between this & Astudillo v. Manila
2. Contributory negligence
3. Fortuitous event Electric Co.:
4. Assumption of risk o Meralco wouldve had to have been
5. Due diligence more careful if public place
6. Damnum absque injuria * The son could have sued stepbrother of his
7. Prescription father for building the house so close to the
8. Double recovery wire*
1. Plaintiffs Negligence
Art. 2179, NCC Bernardo v Legaspi
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiffs
the immediate and proximate cause being the automobile by reason of defendants negligence in
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover causing a collision. Court also dismissed a cross-
complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
on the ground that the injuries sustained by his
automobile, and those to the plaintiffs car were caused
by plaintiffs own negligence.
HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant
were negligent in handling their automobile so both
cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a negligence action
by his own carelessness contributes to the principal
occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he
cannot recover.
RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and
the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident,
they cannot recover from each other.
Bernal v House
FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street,
with the child a few steps ahead. She got startled by an
automobile and ran back to her mother. She fell into a
ditch with hot water and later died. CFI denied damages
to parents because they were negligent.
HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had a
right to be on that street. There was nothing abnormal
in letting a child run along a few paces ahead of the
mother. Contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but
could only result in reduction of damages.
CLASS NOTES
No contributory negligence of mother & kid
Even if they did have contributory negligence, it
is not a bar to recovery; only mitigates
PLDT v CA
FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Estebans jeep ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system.
HELD: The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio. His jeep was running along the inside lane of
the street but it swerved abruptly, causing the jeep to hit
the mound. Proximate cause was the unexplained and
abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the
jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio
was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his
wife, but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages.
NOTES: negligence imputed included knowledge of the
place. The Estebans passed that mound several times.
2. Contributory Negligence
Art. 2179, NCC
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2214, NCC
In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
CLASS NOTE
Contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in
awarding damages.
Genobiagon v CA
PAGE 22
FACTS: Rig driven by appellant bumped an 81 y.o. lady
who was crossing the street. His defense was that it was
the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
HELD: Court said that the alleged contributory
negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate
accused. The defense of contributory negligence does
not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
Rakes v Atlantic
FACTS: The truck plaintiff was riding fell because the
track sagged. The rails that they were transporting slid
off the truck and caught his lag. Later, his leg was
amputated. Company said Rakes was negligent
because: (1) he continued his work despite having
noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked
on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of
along the boards.
HELD: As to the first, Court held that Rakes had been
working for less than 2 days. He could not have known
that one rail was lower than the other or that the
stringers and rails joined in the same place. As to the
second, Court found that there was a general prohibition
against walking by the side of the car. The disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not
its primary cause. The Court made a distinction between
the accident and the injury. If the plaintiffs negligence
contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. But if his
negligence only contributed to his injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the
accident should pay fpr the injury, less a sum deemed
an equitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
CLASS NOTES
accident v. injury
o accident: cant recover
contrib. to primary event
o injury: may recover
Defendants contrib.
Plaintiffs contrib. = Recovery
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
2 kinds of contribution: (1) contribution to the
principal event; (2) contribution to his own
injury
Phil. Bank of Commerce v CA
FACTS: For over a year, RMCs secretary had been
depositing the companys money to her husbands bank
account, without the company noticing it. RMC sued
PBC to collect the money.
HELD: Court held that the proximate cause was the
negligence of the bank. The bank teller was negligent in
validating the duplicate copy of the deposit slip even if
ccount name was left blank, contrary to the banks self-
imposed procedure; and PBC was negligent in the
selection and supervision of employees. However, Court
found that RMC was also negligent in not checking its
monthly statements of account for more than one year.
This omission by RMC amounts to contributory
negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may
be awarded to it. Therefore: 60 - 40 ratio in damages.
CLASS NOTES
Both negligent but proximate cause is the teller
allowing the practice of validating incomplete
form
Solution to proximate cause issue: 60-40
*Sir has doubts as to the use of the Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance in this case*
3. Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174, NCC
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
3-fold rule ininvoking the defense of fortuitous
event
CLASS NOTES
** Is this really a defense? **
theres only one case cited because in Transpo
course, Court was not always consistent
whether a tire blowout is a fortuitous event or
not
*how different is a tire blowout from a fire?*
*memorize elements of Fortuitous Event*
NOTES: Sir said force majeure is not the same as Acts
of God.
Juntilla v Funtanar
FACTS: Plaintiff was seated in the front passenger seat
of a public utility jeepney when the right tire blew up. He
was thrown out of the jeep and suffered injuries. He
also lost his omega watch.
HELD: SC said that there are specific acts of
negligence on the part of the respondents. Jeep was
running at a very fast speed and was overloaded. In
this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of human will. It was
caused either through the negligence of the driver or
because of the mechanical defects in the tire.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASO FORTUITO:
1. Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation must be independent of human will.
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it is
impossible to avoid.
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner
4. Obligor must be free from participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
PAGE 23
CLASS NOT ES
Many possibilities were pposed by the Court to
justify that the tire blowing up was not a
fortuitous event.
Important: memorize characteristics of caso
fortuito
Hernandez v COA
FACTS: Hernandez encashed 2 checks salaries of
employees and operating expenses of the project. He
chose to bring the money with him to his house in
Bulacan instead of returning to the office in Cavite. On
his way home, 2 robbers boarded the jeep and took the
money. He ran after them, but was only able to
apprehend one. He filed a request for relief from money
accountability. COA denied the request.
HELD: SC held in favor of Hernandez. The decision he
made seemed logical at that time and one that could be
expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if,
as it happened, the 2 robbers attacked him in broad
daylight in the jeep, while it was on a busy highway, and
in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said
that all this was a result of his imprudence and
negligence. It was a fortuitous event, something that
could not have reasonably be foreseen though it could
have happened, and it did.
NOTES: This case doesnt say that robberies are
fortuitous events. It just said that this particular robbery
was a fortuitous event.
CLASS NOTES
robbery in this case was FE
o but not all robberies are FEs
some human acts can be considered FE
it may be an accident but not really FE
Gotesco Investment v Chato
FACTS: Chato and 15 yo daughter went to see a movie
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
at the theater owned by Gotesco. Balcony collapsed
and they sustained injuries. Chato even went to Illinois
for further treatment. Gotescos defense: force
majeure.
HELD: (1) Having interposed force majeure as a
defense, Gotesco had the burden to prove that the
collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. This
Gotesco did not do. Its own witness admitted that he
could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed.
(2) Force majeure inevitable accident or casualty;
even which we could neither foresee nor resist; any
accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively
without human intervention, such as could not have
been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care
reasonably to have been expected.
(3) Assuming that the cause was force majeure,
Gotesco could still be held liable because it was guilty of
negligence.
NOTE: Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
CLASS NOTES
Ongs incompetence is not equal to Act of God
not necessarily Act of God just because there
are no / unknown explanations
even assuming that theres FE, Gotesco is still
liable because theres implied warranty in
public places
o still negligent
Just because you cannot explain it, it does not
necessarily mean that it is fortuitous.
Servando v Philippine Steam
FACTS: Plaintiffs loaded their cargo on board
appellants vessel. Cargoes were discharged unto the
warehouse of Bureau of Customs. A fire of unknown
origin razed the warehouse, destroying the remaining
cargo.
HELD: Court said that where the fortuitous event is the
immediate and proximate cause of the loss, obligor is
exempt from liability for non-performance. Caso fortuito
an event that takes place by accident and could not
have been foreseen. In this case, there was not a shred
of proof that the cause of the fire was in any way
attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its
employees.
NOTE: This case established that fire is a fortuitous
event.
CLASS NOTES
fire was FE
*it was taken for granted that a fire is a
fortuitous event (there was no explanation
given why fire was a fortuitous event)*
National Power v CA
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for damages
against NPC for loss of lives and property caused by the
flooding of Norzagaray, Bulacan. They claimed that
despite knowledge of the impending entry of the
typhoon Kading, NPC failed to exercise due diligence in
monitoring the water level so when the water level went
beyond the maximum allowable limit, NPC suddenly,
negligently and recklessly opened 3 of the dams
spillways.
HELD: SC did not accept defense of force majeure.
PRINCIPLE OF ACT OF GOD strictly requires that the
act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence
of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering inot the cause of the mischief.
When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered,
is found to be in part the result of the participation of
man, whether to be from active intervention or neglect,
or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby
humanized.
CLASS NOTES
the flooding of the Angat River was not FE but
due to the negligence of NPC
is typhoon a force majeure? No because in this
case there was negligence
*so is force majeure really a defense then?*
PAGE 24
Southeastern College v CA
FACTS: During a typhoon, schools roof was partly
ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of respondents house. A team of
engineers conducted an ocular inspection and found
that the causes may have been the U-shaped formation
of the building and the improper anchorage of the
trusses to the roof beams.
HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted
by the engineers, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the incident. Respondents
did not even show that the plans, specs and design of
the school building were defective. On the other hand,
city building official testified that the school obtained
both building permit and certificate of occupancy; same
official gave go signal for repairs of damage of typhoon
th
and subsequently authorized the use of the entire 4
floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and
repair of the school building was regularly undertaken;
and that no complaints have been lodged in the past.
Therefore, petitioner has not been shown negligent or at
fault regarding the construction and maintenance of the
school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause.
CASO FORTUITO event which takes place by
accident and could not have been reasonably foreseen,
it is an unexpected event or act of God which could
neither be foreseen nor resisted.
2 GENERAL CAUSES:
1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.
2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits,
governmental prohibition, etc.
CLASS NOTES
typhoon is FE
flying roof is FE
typhoon was proximate cause of damage to
neighboring house
*take this case for definition of force majeur*
*credibility of ocular inspection discredited so
this is strange because this runs counter to
Gotesco*
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
*they could have used RIL*
4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Afialda v Hisole
FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao
and he later died as a consequence of his injuries.
Action was predicated on Art 1905 CC.
HELD: Court said A1905 makes possessory user of
animal liable for any damages it may cause. In this
case, the animal was under the control of the caretaker.
It was his business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury to anyone, including himself. Being
injured by the animal under these circumstances was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
CLASS NOTES
inherent risks voluntarily & knowingly assumed
by caretaker when he agreed to be caretaker
Ilocos Norte v CA
FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her
house to check on her grocer store. She waded in waist-
deep flood and got electrocuted. According to the NPC
Engr, there were no INELCO linemen who were going
around.
HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioners claim, the
maxim violenti non fit injuria does not apply here.
Isabel should not be punished for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon
her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the
risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger, he must abide by the consequence, if an
emergency is found to exist, or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
CLASS NOTES
Rule is the Emergency Rule: A person is
excused from the force of the assumption of
risk rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril, or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
*SANGCO (pp.81-84)
NOTES:
VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: applies to non-
contractual relations;
3 requisites:
(1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
damage;
(2) he understood an appreciated the risk from
danger;
(3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
5. DUE DILIGENCE
Ramos v PEPSI
FACTS: Ramos car collided with Pepsi truck driven by
Andres Bonifacio.
HELD: SC found Bonifacio negligent, but absolved
Pepsi for having sufficiently proven that it exercised due
diligence in the selection of its driver (background
check, clearance, previous experience, physical exam,
drivers exam- theoretical and practical driving exams).
In order that defendant may be considered as having
exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional drivers license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his
PAGE 25
qualifications, his experience and record of service. The
presumption of negligence on the part of the master or
employer, either in the selection of servant/ employee or
in their supervision, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant/employee may be rebutted if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
the selection and supervision, he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family.
Metro Manila v CA
FACTS: A jeep and a bus collided. Their owners
refused to pay damages to the injured passenger.
HELD: SC held that testimonial evidence of due
diligence, in order to hold sway, must be corroborated
by documentary evidence. Mere formulation of various
company policies on safety (as testified by Christian
Bautista), without showing documentary proof that they
were being followed or complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of
its employees.
NOTES: defense of due diligence is plausible when
defendant has presented enough evidence to overcome
the presumption of negligence. It is not enough that it is
alleged.
(Sir: MMTC said that it was not enough to issue manuals
etc, but implementation or actual enforcement is more
important.)
CLASS NOTES
it is not enough that the company provides
manuals
there has to be proof of enforcement and
actual application
6. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
7. PRESCRIPTION
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Kramer v CA
FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided
- 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision
was due to M/V Asias negligence
nd
-1982: Coast Guard suspended 2 mate of M/V Asia.
-1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damages
against respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the
basis of prescription.
HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to
Art. 1146, action based on quasi-delict must be
instituted within 4 yrs. Prescriptive period begins from
the day the quasi-delict was committed.
Allied Banking v CA
FACTS: Apr 1, 1976 Yujuico obtained loan fr
GenBank payable on or before Apr 1, 1977
- Mar 25, 1977 Monetary Board issued resolution
forbidding GenBank from doing business in Phils.
- Allied acquired all assets and assumed all liabilities of
GenBank
- Feb 7, 1979 Allied filed complaint against resp
Joselita for collection of a sum of money
- 1987 in the course of the proceedings, resp sought
to implead Central Bank and Aurellano as 3 party
rd
defendants. It was alleged that by reason of the tortous
interference by the CB with affairs of GenBank, resp
was prevented from performing his obligation under the
loan.
rd
- RTC denied admission of 3 party complainant.
- Petitioner claims that cause of action has already
prescribed. Since it was founded on tortuous
interference, it prescribes in 4 yrs. Petitioner believes
that the cause of action accrued on Mar 25, 1977, the
date when Monetary Board ordered GenBank to desist
from doing business in the Philippines. Complainant
should have filed before Mar 25, 1981.
- Respondent relies on the Doctrine of Relations or
Relations Bank Doctrine to support his claim that the
rd
cause of action as against the proposed 3 party
defendant accrued only on Dec 12, 1986 when the
decision became final and executory.
rd
Thus, it is
contended that while the 3 party complaint was filed
only on Jun 17, 1987, it must be deemed to have been
instituted on Feb 7, 1979, when the complain in the case
was filed.
HELD: Action for damages arising from QD should be
filed within 4 yrs from the day cause of action accrued.
The cause of action in this case accrued on Mar 25,
1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GenBank to
rd
desist fr doing biz in the Phils, while 3 party complaint
was filed only on Jun 17, 1987 the action has
prescribed.
NOTE, MEMORIZE ME (in footnote so not doctrine)!
Relations Bank Doctrine principle of law by which
an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law
to have been done at some antecedent period. It is a
doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well
recognized application to proceedings at law; a legal
fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or to
prevent injustice and the occurrence of injuries where
otherwise there would be no remedy.
CLASS NOTES
Take note of Relations Bank Doctrine
*Not sure if Relations Bank Doctrine is ratio in
this case*
8. DOUBLE RECOVERY
Art. 2177, NCC
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant.
IV. CAUSATION
A. Proximate cause
CLASS NOTES
Usually its the shorter definition thats being cited in the
other cases. So for our purpose-shorter version
PAGE 26
The longer version can be shortened by removing
sufficient intervening cause
*memorize definition of proximate cause*
1. Definition
Bataclan v Medina
FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at
2am when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which
the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and
turned turtle. 4 passengers were unable to get out of
the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in the
neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men came, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
fueled with petroleum. When they approached the bus,
a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4
passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it,
and that the lighted torch set it on fire.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that
burned the bus, is the proximate cause. The coming of
the men with the torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help.
CLASS NOTES
Definition #1 of proximate cause according to
Bataclan v. Medina:
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred.
Definition #2 of proximate cause according to
Bataclan vs. Medina:
More comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the
injury either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an in jury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Fernando v CA
FACTS: Bertulano was invited to bid for the re-
emptying of a septic tank, which had not been cleaned
for 19 years. Before the award was made (he lost), he
and 4 companions surreptitiously entered the septic
tank, without clearance from the market master. They
died in the septic tank due to the intake of toxic gas
produced from the waste matter therein.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the death of
the victims?
HELD: The proximate cause of the death of the victims
was their failure to take precautionary measures for their
safety. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a
septic tank, especially one which has not been cleaned
for years, an ordinarily prudent person would
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. More so
with Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who
is presumed to know the hazards of the job.
Note: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of
proximate cause.
CLASS NOT ES
Government negligence was not the proximate
cause because it was not continuing.
The claimant must establish that he had no
negligence.
A higher degree of diligence is expected from
an expert.
Prof. Casis included the case to show that it is
not necessary to attend school to be an expert.
Quoted Taylor, but it should have been Rakes
Urbano v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in
his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who
issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9
days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in
dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On
November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON the hacking by Urbano of Javier was the
proximate cause of Javiers death. ---NO.
HELD: The tetanus, not the hacking, was the proximate
cause of Javiers death. The death of the victim must be
the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused (People v
Cardenas). Medical findings lead to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime.
Note: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of
proximate cause.
Phoenix Construction Inc. v IAC
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked
askew on the right hand side of the street in such a
manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna St., partly
blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30AM,
Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights
allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
bright and saw the truck looming 2 meters away
from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The wrongful and negligent parking of the truck,
and not the negligence of Dionisio, was the proximate
cause of the accident.
The truck drivers negligence was far from being a
passive and static condition and was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause.
The collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
PAGE 27
drivers negligence. The improper parking of the truck
created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down General Lacuna St. and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held liable.
What the petitioners describe as an intervening cause
was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the
risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck
driver had parked the dump truck.
Quoting Posser and Keeton on Foreseeable intervening
causes: If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonable to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligent xxx because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may e negligent only
for that reason. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the
defendants negligence.
Note: Court mentioned foreseeability.
Pilipinas Banking v CA
FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks.
To cover the face value of the checks, he requested
PCIB to effect a withdrawal from his savings account
there and have it deposited with his current account with
Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the
wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the
name of Florencio Reyes as the depositors name. The
Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing
that the account number coincided with the name
Florencio, deposited the amount in the account of
Florencio Amador.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to
Reyes?
HELD: The proximate cause of the injury is the
negligence of Pilipinas Banks employee in erroneously
positing the cash deposit of Reyes in the name of
another depositor who had a similar first name. The
employee should have continuously gone beyond mere
assumption.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of
and without which would not have occurred and from
which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably
anticipated by a person of ordinary care that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result
therefrom as a natural and probable cause.
Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This
case adds the element of foreseeability.
Prof. Casiss opinion: Theres no basis for this additional
element. Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a
factor.
CLASS NOT ES
*Sir said that there is a problem with foreseeability as an
element. So as a solution, if theres a case similar to
Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank definition*
Quezon City v Dacara
FACTS: At about 1AM, Dacara, (son of petitioner), while
driving a Toyota Corolla, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings (accident mound) found at
Matahimik St. The lower court found that no evidence
was presented that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed in the said street.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The negligence of the Quezon City Government
was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise.
Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.
Note: Followed Bataclans definition.
CLASS NOT ES
An admission by the court that proximate cause
is what they think is fair in each case.
2. Distinguished from other kinds
a. Remote
Gabeto v Araneta
FACTS: Gayetano (husband of plaintiff) and Ilano took a
carromata to go to a cockpit. When the carromata was
about to move, Araneta held the reins of the horse,
saying he hailed the carromata first. Driver Pagnaya
pulled the reins to take it away from Aranetas control,
as a result of which, the bit came off the horses mouth.
Pagnaya fixed the bridle on the curb. The horse, free
form the control of the bit, moved away, causing the
carromata to hit a telephone booth and caused it to
crash. This frightened the horse and caused it to run up
the street with Gayetano still inside the carromata.
Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, causing injuries
from which he soon died.
ISSUE: WON Araneta is liable for Gayetanos death. ---
NO.
HELD: Aranetas act of stopping the rig was too remote
from the accident to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. After Pagnaya alighted, the
horse was conducted to the curb and an appreciable
interval of time elapsed before the horse started to
career up to the street. Moreover, by getting out and
taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was
the person primarily responsible for the control of the
animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for
the accident resulting from the action of the horse
thereafter.
CLASS NOT ES
Classical description of remote cause with
series of events.
PAGE 28
It is not the counting of the time but the
SERIES
Urbano v IAC
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in
his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who
issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9
days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in
dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On
November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON the hacking was the proximate cause of
Javiers death. ---NO.
HELD: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javiers death with which
Urbano had nothing to do.
Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo: A prior
and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened except but for such condition or occasion.
CL ASS NOTE
The remote cause was noted to be the wound
of Urbano.
b. Concurrent
Far Eastern Shipping Company v CA
FACTS: A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron
of the pier. Kavankov was the master of the vessel.
Gavino was the compulsory pilot.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
ISSUE: Who was negligent --- Gavino or Kvankov? ---
BOTH.
HELD: Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov
(master of the vessel) were concurrently negligent.
Gavino was negligent for failing to react on time;
Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking
procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant.
Negligence, in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. Where several causes
combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved
from liability because he is responsible for only one of
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and
is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the
injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the whole damage.
Reason: It is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury.
Note: Liability of concurrent negligence = solidary.
CL ASS NOTE
If the concurrent act was the proximate cause, the
degree of participation does not matter.
What is the rule on liability? liability is
impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury
Sabido v Custodio
FACTS: Custodio, a passenger of a bus, was hanging
onto its left side. While the bus was negotiating a sharp
curve of a bumpy and downward slope, a speeding truck
going in the opposite direction side-swiped Custodio,
who died as a result thereof.
ISSUE: Who was negligent and what is the extent of
liability? ---BOTH solidarily liable.
HELD: The carrier and its driver were negligent for
allowing Custodio to hang by the side of the bus. The
truck driver was also negligent for speeding through the
middle portion of the road.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the
truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are
the proximate cause of Custodios death.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tortfeasor.
CL ASS NOTE
Prof. Casis thinks that this is a problematic
case because the facts would indicate that the
victim was at fault because he was negligent.
3. Tests
a. But for
Bataclan v Medina
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Note: Italicized phrase=but for test
CL ASS NOTE
Refers to absolute cause
This is the strictest test
b. Substantial Factor
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v IAC
FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers to Pangasinan
when its right rear wheel became detached, causing it to
be unbalanced. The driver stepped on the brake, which
made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the opposite
PAGE 29
lane. A Philippine Rabbit Bus from the opposite lane
bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers
of the jeep died as a result.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the bus driver was
negligent. It applied the substantial factor test: It is a
rule under this test that if the actors conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm to
another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable.
ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep.
HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the
application of the substantial factor test. Even though
the bus was driving at 80-90 kph, it was still within the
speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver had little
time to react and had no options available: it could not
swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and
had tall grasses; already near the canal) or to the left (it
would have it the jeep head-on).
Note: The substantial factor test contains no element of
foreseeability.
CL ASS N O T E S ()
Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be
cited for the substantial factor test because
the SC did not apply the test; only the CA
did.
Substantial factor = Main cause, not the only
cause
Important : memorize the test
*This is the only case that defines substantial
factor test*
*Also see Pilipinas Bank*
1 SANGCO (pp. 103-114)
Tests of proximate cause
1. Cause in fact
Traditionally, courts have used the term
proximate cause as descriptive of the actual
cause in fact relation which must exist
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
between a defendants conduct and a plaintiffs
injury before liability may arise.
The first step is to determine whether the
defendants conduct was a factor in causing
plaintiffs damage.
If the injury as to causes, in fact show that the
defendants conduct was not a factor in
causing plaintiffs damage, the matter ends
there. But if it shows that his conduct was a
factor in causing such damage then the further
question is whether his conduct played such a
part in causing the damage as would make him
the author of such damage and be liable in the
eyes of the law.
2. Effectiveness of the cause; but for rule
Whether such conduct is a cause without which
the injury would not have taken place (referred
to as the sine qua non rule) or is the efficient
cause which set in motion the chain of
circumstances leading to the injury
A cause need not be the sole cause of the
injury but it is enough that it should be the
concurrent proximate cause
It is useful and generally adequate for
determining whether specific conduct actually
caused the harmful result in question but it
cannot be indiscriminately used as an
unqualified measure of the defendants liability
because an actors negligence is not a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another if the harm was sustained even if the
actor were negligent.
The converse of the rule: a negligent act
cannot be said to be the proximate cause of an
accident unless the accident could have been
avoided without such negligent act.
3. Substantial factor test under Restatement
Question to ask: Was the defendants conduct
a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs
injuries?
The actors negligent conduct is a legal cause
of harm to another if:
a) his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm
b) there is no law relieving the actor of
liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in
the harm
It is preferable to use the but for test in
connection with the substantial factor test since
the former is the adverse of the restatement
formulation.
The Restatement adopts the rule that if the
actors conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm to another, the fact
that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner
in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable.
4. Foreseeability test
Negligence involves a foreseeable risk, a
threatened danger or injury and conduct
unreasonable in proportion to danger.
Foreseeability becomes a test in an effort to
limit liability to a consequence which has a
reasonably close connection with the
defendants conduct and the harm which it
originally threatened.
When the result complained of is not
reasonably foreseeable in the exercise of
ordinary care under all the facts as they
existed, an essential element of actionable
negligence is lacking.
The foreseeability test is applied in conjunction
with the natural and probable consequences
test.
5. Natural and probable consequence test
This test is designed to limit the liability of a
negligent actor by holding him responsible only
for injuries which are the probable
consequences of his conduct as distinguished
from consequences that are merely possible.
For this purpose, the term probable is used in
the sense of foreseeable.
An injury is deemed the natural and probable
result of a negligent act if after the event, and
viewing the event in retrospect to the act, the
injury appears to be the reasonable rather than
the extraordinary consequence of the wrong, or
such as, according to common experience and
the usual course of events, might reasonably
have been anticipated.
PAGE 30
The consequence of the negligent act must be
within the range of probability as viewed by the
ordinary man.
The natural and probable consequences have
been said to be those which human foresight
can anticipate because they happen so
frequently they may be expected to recur.
6. Ordinary and natural or direct consequences
This test states that, as a matter of legal policy,
if negligence is a cause in fact of the injury
under the criteria previously discussed, the
liability of the wrongdoer extends to all the
injurious consequences.
This is based on the principle that in tort, the
wrongdoer is liable for all the consequences
which naturally flow from his wrongful act,
provided only that they are not too remote, and
that as far as proximate cause is concerned,
the question is not whether the damage was
foreseen or foreseeable, but rather, where it in
fact resulted as a direct consequence of the
defendants act.
7. Hindsight test
The hindsight test eliminates foreseeability as
an element.
A party guilty of negligence or omission of duty
is responsible for all the consequences which a
prudent and experienced party, fully
acquainted with all the circumstances which in
fact exist, whether they could have been
ascertained by reasonable diligence, or not,
would have thought at the time of the negligent
act as reasonably possible to follow, if they had
been suggested to his mind.
8. Orbit of the risk test
This was intended to be a test of duty and not a
test of proximate cause.
If the foreseeable risk to plaintiff created a duty
which the defendant breached, liability is
imposed for any resulting injury within the orbit
or scope of such injury, it is not the unusual
nature of the of the act resulting in injury to
plaintiff that is the test of foreseeability but
whether the result of the act is within the ambit
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
of the hazards covered by the duty imposed
upon the defendant.
CL ASS NOTE
Prof. Casis thinks that the 8 tests mentioned in
Sangco are not practical and relevant because
they are all similarly described and the courts
never use them.
c. Cause and Condition
Phoenix v CA
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked
askew on the right hand side of the street, in such a
manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna Street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30
am, Dionisio was on his way home when his car
headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on bright and saw the truck looming 2
meters away from his car. His car smashed into the
dump truck.
HELD: The distinctions between cause and condition
have already been almost entirely discredited.
Posser and Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the
result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active
forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter
are the result of other active forces which have gone
before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during
which the condition remains static will not necessarily
affect liability. It is not the distinction which is important,
but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.
CLASS NOTES
The cause is the active aspect whereas the
condition is the passive action that may
produce the injury.
It is difficult to distinguish between a cause
and a condition because of the time element.
A condition was a cause at some point in
time.
It cannot be cited in saying that cause and
condition are no longer applicable in our
jurisdiction because it only said that it is
discredited.
Manila Electric v Remonquillo
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below
Pealozas 3-storey house. In the course of the repair,
the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into
contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila
Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The
distance from the electric wire to the media agua was
only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of
Manila requiring 3 feet.
ISSUE: What was the cause and condition of the
accident?
HELD: The cause was Magnos own negligence. The
condition was the too close proximity of the media agua,
or rather, its edge, to the electrical wire of the company
by reason of the violation of the original permit given by
the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of media agua.
Rodrigueza v Manila Railroad
FACTS: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were
burned when a passing train emitted a great quantity of
sparks from its smokestack. Rodriguezas house was
partly within the property of the Manila Railroad.
ISSUE: WON Manila Railroads negligence was the
proximate cause of the fire
HELD: Yes. The fact that Rodriguezas house was partly
on the defendants property is an antecedent condition
that may have made the fire possible but cannot be
imputed as contributory negligence because: (1) that
condition was not created by himself; (2) his house
remained on this ground by the tolerance, and thus
consent of the train company; (3) even supposing the
house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify
the defendant in negligently destroying it. Rodriguezas
PAGE 31
house was built on the same spot before the defendant
laid its tracks over the land.
Note: Condition = plaintiffs house was partly within the
defendants property. Cause = the sparks on the train
which was the negligent act of the defendant.
CLASS NOTES
Rodrigueza was not guilty of contributory
negligence
Even if condition was created, the company is
not going to be justified in negligently
destroying the house
4. Efficient Intervening cause
CLASS NOT ES
The efficient intervening cause destroys the
link between the negligent act and injury. It
should occur after the purported proximate
cause because it would then be a condition.
Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by
the negligence of the plaintiff.
The efficient intervening cause is actually a
proximate cause.
Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by
the Court, any violation of administrative
ordinances and the like would either be seen
as 1) negligence per se or 2) prima facie
evidence of negligence.
It is not an efficient intervening cause when it is
already in existence during the happening of
the proximate cause.
McKee v IAC
FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling
in opposite directions. When the car was 10 meters
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into the
cars lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the
left and entered the trucks lane. He then switched on
the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his
lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck.
ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause
YES.
HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car
driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence
of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
It was the truck drivers subsequent negligence in failing
to take the proper measure and degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision, which was the
proximate cause of the tragedy.
Bataclan v Medina
FACTS: A bus was speeding on its way to Pasay City at
2AM when one of its front tires burst, as a result of
which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch,
and turned turtle. Four passengers were unable to get
out of the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in
the neighborhood. At 2:30AM, 10 men came, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a
wick fueled in petroleum. When they approached the
bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4
passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it,
and that the lighted torch set it on fire.
ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause
NO.
HELD: The coming of the men with the torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus, the trapping of passengers and the call for
outside help.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say,
by lightning, or if some highway men after looting the
vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause
of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle.
CLASS NOT ES
The Court did not agree with the theory of the
defense that it was the bringing of the torch
which was the proximate cause as it was an act
of rescue and hence cannot be considered as
negligence
Manila Electric v Remonquillo
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below
Penalozas 3-story house. In the course of the repair,
the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into
contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila
Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The
distance from the electric wire to the media agua was
only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of
Manila requiring 3 feet.
ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause
YES.
HELD: Efficient intervening cause: the negligent and
reckless act of MAgno in turning around and swinging
the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to
avoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering the
latters length of 6 feet.
CLASS NOT ES
The IC here was the turning
What could have been the IC now becomes the
remote cause
Teague v Fernandez
PAGE 32
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture
had only one stairway, in violation of an ordinance
requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby store
and the students panicked and caused a stampede.
Four students died.
ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening
cause NO.
HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended
to prevent. In the present case, the violation was a
continuing violation in that the ordinance was a measure
of safety designed to prevent the specific situation of
undue crowding in case of evacuation.
Note: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought
about by the violation. However, the court did not
specifically identify the violation itself as the PC.
CLASS NOT ES
Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which
the statute violated tended to prevent, the
violation of the statute can be considered
negligence per se and is the proximate cause.
But this is only of limited application and is not
yet settled.
Effects of violation of statute is not settled. It
can be: a) negligence per se, b) prima facie
proof of negligence, c) rebuttable proof of
negligence, d) proof of negligence
*Limited application because its municipal
ordinance. Can you apply this if what is
involved is a national statute?- You might be
able to use argument by analogy*
Urbano v IAC
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in
his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who
issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9
days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in
dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. ON
November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON there was efficient intervening cause
YES.
HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. The medical findings, in the case at bar, show
that the infection of the wound by the tetanus was an
effacing intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of death.
CLASS NOT E
Was there expert testimony here or did they
use RIL?-no discussion in the case
4. Last Clear Chance
CLASS NOT ES
Take note of the definition of last clear chance
in all the cases.
Picart v Smith
*Provides for the classic definition of Last Clear Chance:
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of
the road. Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane
and so both Picart and Smith were on the same lane.
Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to the other lane
quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became
frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of
the pony and got injured. Picart then filed a case against
Smith
RATIO: The negligent acts of both parties were NOT
contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the
negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. th saw
the pony when he was still far and he had control of the
situation. was his duty to avoid the threatened harm by
bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to
avoid the collision. t take into consideration the
NATURE OF HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT BEING
ACQUAINTED TO CARS. ligence of Smith: when it
exposed Picart and pony to danger. This negligence of
Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the
accident and the antecedent negligence of Picart was a
more remote factor
-Applied the LCCD and made the defendant liable
CLASS NOT E
Important: there should be a sequence of
events
Bustamante v CA
- Practical importance of LCCD
The negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has
been grossly negligent in placing himself in
peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or
should have been aware of it in the reasonable
exercise of due care, had in fact had an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to
avoid an accident
FACTS: Collision between a truck and a bus when the
bus tried to overtake a hand tractor. Bus saw that the
trucks wheels were wiggling and that truck was heading
towards his lane. Still, bus driver did not mind and
instead applied more speed. Thus, many were killed
and injured. Victims heirs filed this case to claim
damages from bus and truck
RATIO: Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. The practical
PAGE 33
import (stated above) provides that negligent defendant
shall be liable to negligent plaintiff. Thus, the LCCD
does not arise where the passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. The doctrine also cannot be extended into
the field of joint tortfeasors as a test whether one of
them should be liable to the injured person. So, the
doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a
suit between owners and drivers but a suit brought by
the heirs of the deceased passengers against both
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles
- did not apply LCCD
CLASS N O T E S ()
Last clear chance contemplates a series of
negligent acts.
The definition of last clear chance in the case
of Bustamante is deemed to be the common
definition (from the point of view of recovery of
plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a
rule.
The doctrine of last clear chance would apply
even if the plaintiff is grossly negligent.
Exceptions, however, include joint tortfeasors
(according to Americn Jurisprudence).
Last clear chance cannot apply when there are:
1) contractual relations, 2) joint tortfeasors, 3)
concurrent negligence
Phoenix Construction v IAC
- basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of
the Last Clear Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179.
However, the statements made on the Last Clear
Chance Doctrine were merely obiter
FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails
and dinner-meeting when he collided with the dumptruck
of Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the
road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for damages against
Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance
Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of
avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to
take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries
alone
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
RATIO: The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the
Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction by
Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether,
or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code
of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by
Common Law because they had a rule that contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent
plaintiff. BUT in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of
the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine
of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case
stated that it does not believe so that the general
concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our
jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is
not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is
important is the negligent act or omission of each party
and the character and gravity of the risks created by
such act or omission for the rest of the community. To
say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would
come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a
man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of
his own negligent act or omission.
-LCCD was not applied because the court thinks that
it is not applicable in our jurisdiction
CLASS NOT ES
The issue on the element of foreseeability:
There is no general concept of last clear
chance. Rather, what is more important is the
nature, not the order of events. In last clear
chance, timing is of the essence.
In the case at hand, the truck drivers parking
askew led to an increased diligence for the
driver of the car. court should allocate risks
(policy of consideration)
Historical function of last clear chance: mitigate
harshness of doctrine of contributory
negligence
Nature of negligent act should determine
liability, not sequence of events
Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand?
Yes, because it was still used in later cases
Phoenix-1987, PBC-1997: appreciably later in
time
Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA
- apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or
negligence is difficult to attribute
FACTS: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of
RMC was tasked to deposit its money. However, it turns
out that the Secretary would leave blank the duplicate
copy of the deposit slip where the banks teller would
validate it. Instead of writing the account number of the
company in the original copy retained by the bank,
Secretary would write the account number of husband.
Thus, RMCs funds were now in Secretarys husbands
account. RMC discovered this after 7 yers and then
filed a case against PBC to return its money
RATIO: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller,
validated a blank duplicate copy of the deposit slip.
PBC was also lackadaisical in its selection and
supervision on the teller since it never knew that blank
deposit slips were validated until this incident . Court
also applied Last Clear Chance Doctrine in saying that
PBC was really negligent.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Aka supervening negligence or discovered peril
Where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequence thereof
The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their self-imposed validation procedure. Still, court said
that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Applied 2179 of CC on
contributory negligence. 60-40 ratio! 40% of the
damages shall be borne by RMC; 60% by PBC
-applied LCCD in knowing whether PBC was
negligent
CLASS NOT ES
Elements: 1) 2 parties negligent, 2) appreciable
time bet. 2 negligent acts and it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused
injury
Problem: overlaps with doctrine of concurrent
negligence
PAGE 34
Glan Peoples Lumber & Hardware v IAC
- may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last
Clear Chance Doctrine in the case of Phoenix
FACTS
jeep and cargo truck collided
jeepney driver came from a beach party
jeep was zigzagging
cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line
in the road was wrongly painted
case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died
as a result of the collision
RATIO:
- The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be
held liable. Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear
Chance also cannot apply because there is no
negligence of the other party
- Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the
doctrine of Last Clear Chance would still absolve him
from any actionable responsibility for the accident
because both drivers had full view of each others
vehicle.
The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by
this time, the jeep should have stopped or swerved
Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident
It was the jeeps driver who had the duty to seize the
opportunity of avoidance and not merely rely on a
supposed right to expect that the truck would swerve
and leave him a clear path
- The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid
and complete defense to accident liability today as it
did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of
Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts
- Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate
truck driver
- did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance
because the other party was not negligent
CLASS NOT ES
How did the case of Glan Peoples Lumber
affect the case of Phoeix? In the case of Glan,
last clear chance was deemed to be a valid
defense.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Pantranco North express Inc v Baesa
- awareness and opportunity
FACTS:
Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when
Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepneys lane
Heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this
case against Pantranco
Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of
Last Clear Chance against the jeepney driver saying
that the jeepney driver had the last clear chance in
avoiding the collision.
RATIO:
- Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for
the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff
who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat
claim for damages
- Thus, Pantranco raises the doctrine in order to
escape liability
- However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear
chance cannot be applied in this case!
- For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedlty had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it
In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the
impending danger because he must have assumed
that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite
direction
- Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered
In this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at
the speed of the approaching bus prevented
jeepney driver from swerving to avoid collision
Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it
- Sole and proximate cause of the accident:
Pantrancos driver in encroaching into the lane of the
incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its
own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney
coming from the opposite direction
- did not apply LCCD because there was no
opportunity to avoid the accident and the jeepney
driver was not aware of the peril.
CLASS NOT E
Do not apply last clear chance under the
emergency rule
Important: memorize emergency rule
Ong v Metropolitan Water District
-Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied in this
case because there was no negligence on the part of
the Metropolitan Water District
FACTS
Kid drowned in one of the pools of Metropolitan Water
District
Reason why the kid drowned is unknown
Employees of the Metropolitan Water District acted as
soon as calls for help were heard and tried to revive
the kid but he still died
Case filed by parents of kid who drowned claiming
damages against Metropolitan Water District
Parents of kid claim that Metropolitan Water District
may still be held liable for the doctrine of Last Clear
Chance because it had the last opportunity to save
the kid
RATIO:
There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan
Water District had taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patron or prevent
accidents which may cause their deaths
PAGE 35
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: negligence of a
claimant does not preclude recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence
The Last Clear Chance doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril
is or should have been discovered.
In this case, it was unknown how the kid got into the
pool and whether the kid violated one of the
regulations of Metropolitan Water District because he
went unaccompanied. It also appears that the
lifeguard responded to the call for held and
immediately made all efforts to resuscitate the kid
There is no room in this case for the application of the
doctrine!
LCCD not applied because no negligence on the
part of Metropolitan Water District was proven
Anuran v Buno
FACTS:
A passenger jeepney was parked at the side of the
road since one of the passengers alighted
A motor truck, speeding, then bumped into the
jeepney from behind with such violence that 3
passengers died
Thus, this case was filed by the heirs of the deceased
and of the injured to recover damages from the driver
and owner of the truck and the owner of the jeepney
CA: applied the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance and
held that only the truck was liable because although
the jeepney was guilty of antecedent negligence, the
truck was guilty of greater negligence which was the
efficient cause of the collision
RATIO:
Disagreed with the CA and held that both the truck
and jeepney were liable
The principle of Last Clear Chance would call for the
application in a suit between the owners and drivers
of the 2 colliding vehicles. It does NOT arise where a
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence
- did not apply LCCD because there was a
contractual obligation on the part of the carrier to
transport its passengers safely
Canlas v CA
-Last Clear Chance Doctrine can apply in commercial
transactions
FACTS:
2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to
Manosca
Manosca issued 2 check that bounced
Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings
Bank with the 2 parcels of land as security
2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the
spouses Canlas
mortgage was foreclosed
Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the
mortgage of Manosca of the 2 properties without their
consent
Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of
real estate mortgage against ASB
RATIO:
ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify
the identity of the sps Canlas
The Bank should have required additional proof of the
true identity of the impostor aside from their residence
certificate
Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which
states that:
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciable later in a point of time that
that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about
the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom
In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent
fraud, by simple expedient of faithfully complying with
the requirements of banks to ascertain the identity of
the persons transacting with them
For not observing the degree of diligence required of
banking institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued
upon
-applied the LCCD
CLASS NOT ES
The Canlas sps. were negligent in giving their
title to the property to Maosca.
With regard to the special power of attorney:
the SPA given to Maosca was to mortgage so
the presence of the Canlas sps. was actually
not a requirement.
Was there really negligence on the part of the
bank even if Manosca had an SPA and the
land title?
In Canlas, the Court talked about 2 definitions-
short and long: take note of these
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in
culpa contractual
FACTS:
LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank.
After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took
so long so he had to leave the passbook
Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody
else (not the messenger or any employee of LC Diaz)
and was able to withdraw P300,000.00 from its
account.
Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum
of money against Solidbank
PAGE 36
CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the
last clear chance to avoid the injury if it had only
called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal
RATIO:
In this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract
due to negligence or culpa contractual
The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care, always having
in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
However, in this case, they failed to do this.
Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only
to the depositor or his authorized representative, but
here, Solidbank through teller gave it to someone else
Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return
the passbook only to the authorized representative of
LC Diaz
Thus, Solidbank was negligent in not returning the
passbook to messenger of LC Diaz proximate
cause
CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance
Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case
because Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due
to negligence in the performance of contractual
obligation to LC Diaz
This case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear
chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by
the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of
damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the
defendant from his breach of contract
LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing
withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to
fall into the hands of an impostor and so liability of
Solidbank should be reduced.40-60
- LCCD not applied
CLASS NOT E
Implied that the last clear chance doctrine is
not applicable to culpa contractual
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Engada v CA
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead
applied the emergency rule.
- Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because
there was no clear chance emergency situation.
FACTS
Iran driving a tamaraw jeepney
In the other lane was an isuzu pick-up that was
speeding.
Right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left
and encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney
Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the Isuzu pick-up but
Isuzu pick-ip swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was
going and so they collided
Information was then filed against the driver of the
Isuzu pick-up charging him with serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence
RATIO:
It was the Isuzu pick-up trucks negligence that was
the proximate cause of the collision
- Isuzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it
that the opposite lane was free from on-coming
traffic and was available for safe passage.
- After seeing the tamaraw, Isuzu did not slow down
Iran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he
swerved to the lane of Isuzu to the lane of Isuzu to
avoid collision
Isuzu drivers acts had put tamaraw driver in an
emergency situation which forced him to act quickly
EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, it not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence
Defense of Isuzu: invoked Last Clear Chance
Doctrine
SC: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident
- However, no convincing evidence was adduced to
support this defense
- Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be applied
because there was no time or opportunity to ponder
the situation at all. There was no clear chance to
speak of
Thus, driver of Isuzu guilty!
- did not apply LCCD because no clear chance
1 Sangco, (pp. 74-81)
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Also known as the doctrine of discovered peril,
doctrine of supervening negligence, humanitarian
doctrine, doctrine of gross negligence
The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where
it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.
A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of
the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities,
should have been aware of it in the reasonable
exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later
than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
1. As a phase of proximate cause principle
The doctrine of last clear chance negatives an
essential element of the defense of contributory
negligence by rendering plaintiffs negligence a
mere condition or remote cause of the accident.
The failure to avoid injuring a person occupying a
position of peril may be a supervening cause.
2. Elements and conditions of doctrine
Facts required:
o That the plaintiff was in a position of danger
and by his own negligence became unable to
escape from such position by the use of
ordinary care, either because it became
physically impossible for him to do so or
because he was totally unaware of the danger.
o The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a
position of danger and further knew, or in the
PAGE 37
exercise of ordinary care should have known
that the plaintiff was unable to escape
therefrom
o That thereafter the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of
ordinary care but failed to exercise such last
clear chance and the accident occurred as a
proximate result of such failure
To state a cause of action, the pleader must
disclose:
o The exposed condition brought about by the
negligence of plaintiff or the injured party
o The actual discovery by the defendant of the
perilous situation of the person or property
injured in time to avert injury
o Defendants failure thereafter to exercise
ordinary care to avert the injury
3. Parties who invoke doctrine
Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last
clear chance is not available to defendant. LCC
can only be invoked in favor of the person injured,
since it implies contributory negligence on his part,
and is, generally speaking, only operative in those
cases where, notwithstanding the injured persons
want of care, another person wantonly, or with
knowledge of the perilous situation of the person
injured carelessly or recklessly injured him.
The doctrine embraces successive acts of
negligence: primary negligence on the part of the
defendant then contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff which creates a situation of
inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive
or static followed by the subsequent negligence of
the defendant in failing to avoid injury to the plaintiff.
Although the defendant may not invoke the
doctrine, it does not preclude him from proving that
the plaintiff had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury complained of and thus establish that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused the accident and consequently
bars plaintiffs recovery.
Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot be
extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test
of whether only one of them should be held liable to
the injured person by reason of his discovery of the
latters peril and it cannot be invoked as between
defendants concurrently negligent.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES PAGE 38
LCC applies in a suit between the owners and the parties was not and should only apply when there is a time
drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where who caused negligent sequence.
a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier the collision) Other names: doctrine of discovered peril,
to enforce its contractual obligations. Pantranco v Heirs of the No There was no doctrine of supervening negligence, doctrine of
Baesa passengers opportunity to gross negligence, humanitarian doctrine.
Summary on Last Clear Chance of jeepney avoid the Last clear chance doctrine considered to
- The Last Clear Chance Doctrine renders plaintiffs (no contract) accident and determine the proximate cause.
contributory negligence as a mere condition driver was not Last clear chance doctrine should not apply
- Invoked by the plaintiff aware of the when there is a time sequence.
- Cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors peril The elements of the doctrine of last clear
Case Plaintiff WON Why? Ong v Parents of No Defendant was chance:
applied Metropolitan the not negligent a) the plaintiff is in danger
the deceased b) the defendant knew of plaintiffs state
LCCD Anuran v Heirs of the No There was c) the defendant had the last clear chance to
Picart vs. Picart (one YES Smith had a Buno passengers contractual avoid the accident
Smith of the clear of jeep (with relation Who may invoke? Solely for plaintiffs benefit
parties who opportunity contract)
caused the to avoid the Canlas v CA Canals (one Yes Defendant bank V. STRICT LIABILITY
collision) accident of the had the last
Bustamante Passengers NO No parties who clear chance to Blacks Law Dictionary definition:
Picart v Picart (one Yes Smith had clear caused the prevent the Liability does not depend on actual negligence or intent
Smith of the opportunity to incident) fraud to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute
parties who avoid the for the Note: there was duty to make something safe. It most often applies
caused the accident annulment no contractual either to ultra hazardous activities or in product liability
collision) of the deed relation cases. It is also known as absolute liability or liability
Bustamante v Passengers No No negligent between Canlas without fault.
and the bank

CA of the bus plaintiff
because the Consolidated LC Diaz No Liability of bank
plaintiff in the Bank v CA for the arose from CLASS NOT E
case are the recovery of culpa Test: when the conditions provided in the law
passengers of the sum of contractual and exist, you are already liable
the bus who are money so doctrine
asking for cannot be A. Possessor of animals
damages applied
Phoenix v Phoenix No Doctrine was Engada v CA Inured party No There was no Art. 2183, NCC
IAC (one of the not carried over (owner of clear chance in The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
parties who to the CC the avoiding the of the same is responsible for the damage which it may
caused the Tamaraw) accident cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
collision) because it was responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
Philippine RMC (one of Yes Just to know if an emergency should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
Bank of the parties PBC was situation person who has suffered damage.

Commerce v who caused negligent but
CA the damages were
CLASS NOT ES Vestil v IAC
accident) divided 40-60
Glan v IAC Heirs of the No Truck driver According to Sangco, the last clear chance
driver of the (other party in doctrine is a phase of contributory negligence. FACTS: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of
jeep (one of the collision) It is considered in determining proximate cause Vestils father, when the victim was playing with Vestils

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TORTS AND DAMAGES
child in their compound. Theness, who was only 3 yrs
old, was brought to the hospital and was later
discharged, but after 9 days she was readmitted for
exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva.
The next day she died of broncho-pneumonia.
-Uys sued Vestil for being the possessor of Andoy.
Vestils claimed that they dont own the dog, that it was a
tame animal, and that Theness provoked the dog so it
bit her.
HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service
must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate,
there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even
tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness
was only three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have
done to the animal.
CLASS NOT ES
Remote control argument does not lie. This is a
strict liability case.
Does it matter if the dog is tame? No. Law
covers even tame animals as long as they
produce injury
Dog follows the house: accessory follows the
principal (so would a rat living in the house
make the house owners liable if the rat bites a
guest and causes the latters death?)
B. Things thrown or falling from a building
Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or
a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling from the same.
CLASS NOT ES
This provision applies regardless of
how things fell from the house.
Dingcong v Kanaan
FACTS:
-The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central
Hotel. Kanaan, et.al. rented the ground floor of house
where they established the American Bazaar.
Echeverria rented room in the hotel.
-One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open
when retiring to bed, causing the water to run off and
spill to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise
of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the ground floor.
Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria
and Dingcongs.
HELD:
-Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by
his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the
water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and
merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel,
with complete possession of the house, must also be
responsible for the damages caused. He failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent these damages, despite his power and authority
to cause the repair of the pipes.
CLASS NOT E
Is A2193,CC applicable in this case? Prof.
Casis seems to believe otherwise since A2193
speaks of the liability of a head of family when
a structure or similar object falls off the balcony
or second storey of his building. Dingcong is
not the head of a family.
Can water be considered as a thing thrown or
falling?
C. Death/Injuries in the course of employment
PAGE 39
Art. 1711 Owners of enterprises and other employers
are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or
injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other
employees, even though the event may have been
purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if
the death or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment. The employer is also liable
for compensation if the employee contracts any illness
or disease caused by such employment or as the result
of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due
to the employee's own notorious negligence, or
voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be
liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of
due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.
CLASS NOT ES
Who is liable? Employers, owners of
establishment
Who are they liable to? Laborers, employees
Under what conditions? Death or illness arising
out of the course of employment
Art. 1712 If the death or injury is due to the negligence
of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be
solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's
intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death
or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's
fellow worker.
Afable v Singer Sewing Machine
FACTS:
-One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan, a
collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, while
riding his bicycle was run over and killed by a truck. At
the time of his death he was returning home after
making some collections.
-The widow and children of Madlangbayan brought an
action to recover from the defendant corporation under
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812. The
complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought
to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428.
RATIO:
-The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in
section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812
to "arising out of and in the course of".
-The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of
the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while
the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. By
the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee
while in the course of the employment, but only for such
injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar
to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's
employment of incidental to such employment, and
accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to
some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed
in a special degree by reason of such employment.
Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally
exposed and not traceable in some special degree to
the particular employment are excluded.
-As a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover
from personal injuries resulting from an accident that
befalls him while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise
out of and in the course of his employment.
-If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from
San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a
bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk,
as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle
or require him to use one; and if he made collections on
Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his
employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury
sustained by him.
CLASS NOT E
Defenses available to an employer: a)
notorious negligence, b) voluntary act of the
employee and c) drunkenness.
Case distinguishes arising out of and in the
course of. The first refers to the origin or cause
of the accident. The latter refers to the time,
place, and circumstances under which the
accident takes place.
D. Product liability
Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for
death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful
substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.
CLASS NOT ES
Who is liable? Manufacturers and processors
of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles
Under what circumstances? Death or injuries
caused by noxious or harmful substances
Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed
goods (even if goods were stolen)
Consumer Act
Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. - Any
Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any
importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of
fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects
resulting from design, manufacture, construction,
assembly and erection, formulas and handling and
making up, presentation or packing of their products, as
well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on
the use and hazards thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer the safety
rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances
into consideration, including but not limited to:
(a) presentation of product;
(b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
(c) the time it was put into circulation.
A product is not considered defective because another
better quality product has been placed in the market.
The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall
not be held liable when it evidences:
(a) that it did not place the product on the market;
PAGE 40
(b) that although it did place the product on the
market such product has no defect;
(c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at
fault.
Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service
supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for
damages caused to consumers by defects relating to
the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient
or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards
thereof.
The service is defective when it does not provide the
safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking
the relevant circumstances into consideration, including
but not limited to:
(a) the manner in which it is provided;
(b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be
expected of it;
(c) the time when it was provided.
A service is not considered defective because of the use
or introduction of new techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held liable
when it is proven:
(a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation.
The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing,
exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for
damages effected, as provided for in this and in the
preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more
than one person responsible for the cause of the
damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress
established in the pertinent provisions of this Act.
However, if the damage is caused by a component or
part incorporated in the product or service, its
manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who
incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.
Art. 107. Penalties.
Any person who shall violate any provision of this
Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with
respect to any consumer product which is not food,
cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon conviction,
be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
(P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more that one
(1) year or both upon the discretion of the court.
In case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed
upon its president, manager or head. If the offender is
an alien, he shall, after payment of fine and service of
sentence, be deported without further deportation
proceedings.
CHAPTER VI. Prohibited Acts and Penalties (RA3720
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)
Sec. 11. The following acts and the causing thereof are
hereby prohibited:
(a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of
any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or
misbranded.
(b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic.
(c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as
authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow
samples to be collected.
(d) The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to
in Section twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or
undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon
a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by,
and containing the name and address of, the person
residing in the Philippines from whom he received in
good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the
giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section
twelve (b) which guaranty or undertaking is false.
(e) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely
representing or without proper authority using any mark,
stamp, tag label, or other identification device authorized
or required by regulations promulgated under the
provisions of this Act.
( f ) The using by any person to his own advantage, or
revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or
employees of the Department or to the courts when
relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any
information acquired under authority of Section nine, or
concerning any method or process which as a trade
secret is entitled to protection.
(g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration,
or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or
the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug,
device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article
is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results
in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
(h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any
advertising relating to such drug, of any representation
or suggestion that an application with respect to such
drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof, or
that such drug complies with the provisions of such
section.
(i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales
promotion of any reference to any report or analysis
furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof.
CLASS NOT ES
Is a restaurant owner a seller or a processor?
Could the company stipulate limited liability?
No. A106 of the Consumer Act. If basis is not
Consumer Act, you can use 2187 on strict
liability which is a powerful provision except
against sellers (law on SALES will be the basis
in this case)
Elements of 2187: 1) causal link 2)
manufacturers, processors
What do you mean by similar goods?-Sangco-
consumed by humans. Question: What about
those consumed by animals?
Do you apply strict liability even if defendant
exercised due diligence? Yes. Precisely why it
is called strict liability
Coca-Cola v CA
FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school
canteen. A group of parents complained that fibrous
materials were found in the softdrink bottles bought by
their children. Upon inspection by the DOH, the bottles
were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo
drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop.
She brought an action for damages against Coca-cola
and the trial court ruled that the complaint was based on
a contract, not quasi-delict and should have been filed
within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks.
Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict
and should prescribe in 4 years.
HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendees
remedies against a vendor with respect to the
PAGE 41
warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances
upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in
A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of
the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case
the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
CLASS NOT ES
Requisites of 2187: 1) death or injury caused
by noxious substance and 2) by manufacturer
or processor
What is similar goods? Anything intended to
be consumed by humans.
What if the person who consumed the goods
did not buy them but stole them? The
manufacturer/processor may still be held liable.
II SANGCO (p. 714-734)
Product Liability
1. Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC
The elimination in this article of both fault or
negligence and contract as the basis of liability
thereunder are the essence of strict liability. The
consumers cause of action does not depend upon
the validity of his contract with the person from
whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected
by any disclaimer or other agreement.
However, Art. 2187 does not preclude an action
based on negligence for the same act of using
noxious or harmful substance in the manufacture or
processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles, or
similar goods which caused the death or injury
complained of, if the injured party opts to recover on
that theory. Neither does this article preclude an
action for breach of contract and warranty.
2. Requisites of liability under Art. 2187, Civil Code
(1) Defendant is a manufacturer or processor of
foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods;
(2) He use noxious or harmful substances in the
manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks,
toilet articles consumed or used by the plaintiff;
(3) Plaintiffs death or injury was caused by the product
so consumed or used; and
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
(4) The damages sustained and claimed by the plaintiff
and the amount thereof.
The burden of proof that the product was in a
defective condition at the time it left the hands of
the manufacturer and particular seller is upon the
injured plaintiff.
3. Persons who may be held liable, and for what
products
Manufacturers and processors who used noxious
or harmful substances may be held liable.
-sellers of the enumerated goods which turn out to be
injuriously defective CANNOT be held liable for the
obvious reason that they have nothing to do either with
the defect or with the manufacture of such product
Products: limited to foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles
and similar goods
4. Proof that food product was defective or
unwholesome
The one seeking to recover is under the duty of
proving with reasonable certainty that the food
eaten was in fact deleterious.
Proof of a defect in the product may not be supplied
by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, unless the
product is one whose character and content must
necessarily have remained unchanged since it left
the manufacturers possession.
Expert testimony is generally necessary to prove
the defect in the product.
It must appear that the unwholesome or unsound
quality of the food product in question existed at the
time the defendant sold it, and did not come into
existence thereafter.
5. Proof of causation
One seeking recovery has the burden of proof that
the resulting illness was caused by the deleterious
food.
A manufacturers strict liability in tort should be
defined in terms of the safety of the product in
normal and proper use. The plaintiff must allege
and prove that he was using the product in the way
it was intended to be used.
6. Who may recover
A purchasing and non-purchasing consumer or
user of a defective food product or toilet article is
entitled to recover damages for physical injuries
caused thereby.
7. Compensable Damages
Expressly limited to death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substance used by
manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods.
Applicable only to personal injuries, which includes
death, and only damages arising therefrom. This
precludes claims for purely pecuniary or commercial
losses in absence of personal injuries.
8. Unavoidably unsafe product
The seller of unavoidably unsafe products, with
qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with apparently reasonable risk.
Liability for negligence in food products.
To constitute negligence an act must be one
from which a reasonably careful person would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him to forego the act or to
do it in a more careful manner.
Whether recovery is sought under strict liability
or on fault or negligence, it would seem
contributory negligence would diminish
recovery.
a. Duty of care of manufacturer or processor of
food.
The duty owed to the consumer by the manufacturer of
food products intended for human consumption is
commensurate with the danger and the possible and
probable result of a lack of care.
A high degree of care is required of the producer of
foods (in the production of such product, advertising,
inspecting the ingredients and warning the consumers of
possible injury from consumption of a food).
PAGE 42
b. Duty of care of restaurant operator
A restaurateur has no duty to serve perfect products.
But the law of negligence requires him to exercise a
care proportionate to the serious consequences that
may follow from a want of care.
c. Duty of seller other than restaurant operator.
A vendor of provisions selected, sold, and delivered to
the purchaser for his immediate use is bound to know
the peril that the provisions are sound and wholesome
and fit for immediate use, and if they turn out to be
unsound and not wholesome, and the purchaser is
injured thereby, the vendor is liable to him.
d. Duty of warning; inspecting; testing.
A manufacturer or seller of a product which, to his actual
or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has
a duty to give warning of such danger. As a matter of
elementary logic, no duty to warn arises with respect to
a product which is not in fact dangerous.
The vendor of food should indemnify his vendee against
latent defects contained in the product which the
vendee, by inspection or taste, could not have
discovered himself.
The test of commodities required is no more than that
commonly or usually practised by careful dealers under
the same conditions and circumstances, which is at
least as high a duty of care as the consumer expects or
has the right to expect of his groceryman or food dealer.
Note:
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a
safe condition and subsequent mishandling or other
causes makes it harmful by the time it is consumed.
CLASS NOT ES
Important: Requisites of 2187 in Sangco
If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for
breach of contract? Sangco says, yes.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
E. Interference with contractual relations
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the
other contracting party.
Gilchrist v Cuddy
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar.
Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They
entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to
Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a
week for P125.
-Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the
money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the
film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350
for the film for the same period.
-Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for
damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for
interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and
Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the
parties
HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for
interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This
liability arises from unlawful acts and not from
contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist.
-ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or
omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage
done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a
condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he
causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order
that the injured party may recover for the damages
suffered.
CLASS NOT ES
Had legal liability but not under A1314.
Is malice required to apply A1314?
No damages were due from Espejo because
no malice was proven (the motive was only to
make profit).
Is malice an element of tortuous interference?
Court does not say that it is.
So Ping Bun v CA
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease
agreement with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo.
The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued
on month to month basis upon expiration of the 1 yr. Tek
Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek Hua
formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong
as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls were
occupied by the grandson (So Ping Bun) of one of the
original incorporators of Tek Hua under business name
Trendsetter Marketing.
-new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to
THE, although not signed.
-THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the
stalls so THE would be able to go back to business BUT
instead, SO PING BUN SECURED A NEW LEASE
AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN.
ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous
interference of contract
HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned
with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of
action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful
interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other
of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner,
Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent of the latters property right.
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the
private use and enjoyment of asset if: a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the
invasion; d) the invasion is either intentional and
PAGE 43
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the
general negligence rules.
- elements of tort interference:
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its
existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal
justification or excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek
Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in
asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor
was unlawful interference.
- The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted
solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial
or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that
the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that
So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record
imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the
part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the
award of damages.
- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous
interference is Article 1314.
CLASS NOT ES
Did not include malice as one of the
elements under A1314. Then discussed
Gilchrist in saying that to award damages,
there should be malice but it was never
mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place.
Implied malice as an element.
De Leon included malice as an element.
Sir said as guidance: If we apply Gilchrist
and So Ping Bun, we need malice in 1314.
But if question is just on the elements, just
answer the three elements given by So
Ping Bun.
So Ping Bun was okay had it not cited
Gilchrist
Sir said that it seems this is the case right
now: You can compete in Business
Contracts as long as intention is financial
interest and there is no malice. If this is the
case, then one cannot recover from 1314
as against the third party.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES
AQUINO, (pp. 795-801)
Interference with contracts:
A. Statutory provision and rationale: Under Article
1314 of the Civil Code, a third party may sue a third
party not for breach of contract but for inducing another
to commit such breach. This tort is known as
interference with contractual relations. Such interference
is considered tortious because it violates the rights of
the contacting parties to fulfill the contract and to have it
fulfilled, to reap the profits resulting therefrom, and to
compel the performance by the other party. The theory
is that a right derived from a contract is a property right
that entitles each party to protection against all the world
and any damage to said property should be
Competition in business also affords a privilege to
interfere provided that the defendants purpose is a
justifiable one and the defendant does not employ fraud
or deception which are regarded as unfair.
D. Extent of liability: The rule is that the defendant
found guilty of interference with contractual relations
cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which
the party who was induced to break the contract can be
held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the
contracting party who was induced to break the contract
was in bad faith. However, when there is good faith, the
party who breached the contract is only liable for
consequence that can be foreseen. In fact, it is possible
for the contracting party to be not liable at all, as in the
PAGE 44
by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
- It is not even necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective
road or street.
- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the
City Engineer.
The charter only lays down general rules regulating that
liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189
applies in particular to the liability arising from defective
streets, public buildings and other public works.

compensated. case where the defendant prevented him from
performing his obligation through force or fraud.
B. History: This particular tort started in the UK in CLASS NOT ES
Lumley vs, Gye in 1853 and was first adopted in the F. Liability of local government units Can last clear chance apply? Wasnt it
Philippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs Cuddy. Guilatcos fault that she was negligent in
alighting a tricycle? No because it is under
Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
C. Elements: strict liability.
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
1. Existence of a valid contract: This existence is Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
necessary and the breach must occur because of the PLDT and the accident mound case (DACARA)
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
alleged act of interference. No tort is committed if the
works under their control or supervision.
party had already broken the contract. Neither can
action be maintained if the contract is void. However,
there is authority for the view that an action for Guilatco v City of Dagupan
interference can be maintained even if the contract is
unenforceable. The view is that inducement, if
FACTS: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole
reprehensible in an enforceable contracts, is equally
at Perez Blvd. which is owned by the national
reprehensible in an unenforceable one.
Government. She fractured her right leg, thus was
2. Knowledge on the part of the third party of the
hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer
existence of the contract: The elements do
testified that he supervises the maintenance of said
not include malice as a necessary act in interference.
manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered.
However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings have
City Charter of Dagupan also says that the city
held that the aggrieved party will only be entitled to
supervises and manages National roads and national
damages if malice was present in the commission of the
sidewalks.
tortious act. It was held that mere competition is not
sufficient unless it is considered unfair competition or
HELD: City liable
the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury.
- The liability of private corporations for damages
3. Interference of the third party without legal
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
justification or excuse: In general, social policy
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil
permits a privilege or justification to intentionally invade
Code as follows:
the legally protected interests of others only if the
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and
defendant acts to promote the interests of others or
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
himself if the interest which he seeks to advance is
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
superior to the interest invaded in social importance.
Jec