Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.

Wednesday, January 23, 2008

Ejectment ,statute of frauds, formalities of contracts

For purposes of legal research, readers may find useful the

discussions/citations in the position paper below that I have prepared in an
ejectment case which involved the issues of stature of frauds and formalities
of contracts.

POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF

THE PLAINTIFF, by counsel, respectfully states:

I. PROPERTY INVOLVED.

The property subject matter of the instant ejectment case is the residential
house and lot located at xxx., xxx Subd., xxx, xxx City, with an area of 240
sq. m. and covered by TCT No. xxx registered in the name of A, plaintiff in
the instant ejectment case.

Attached as Annex A hereof is a certified true copy of the said TCT No. xxx
to prove the ownership in fee simple by plaintiff A of the subject property.[1]

II. EJECTMENT COMPLAINT

The verified complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) filed by the herein
plaintiff A , thru her former counsel, Atty. Xxx, prayed for a judgment in favor of
the said plaintiff and against the defendants B, et. al. directing the latter to (a) Vacate
the aforesaid residential house and lot and to peacefully surrender the same to
herein plaintiff; (b) Pay the plaintiff in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Pesos
(Php 48,000.00) for actual damages sustained as a result of loss of employment in
Japan and for the monthly rent for the townhouse unit; (c) Pay the plaintiff in such
amounts representing for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, as this
Honorable Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may determine; (d) Pay the
plaintiff in the amount of Php25,000.00 and Php2,000.00 per court appearance as
Attorneys fees; and (e) Pay the cost of the suit.

The allegations of the ultimate facts of the instant ejectment complaint are
quoted hereinbelow:

x x x.

1. That plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino and a resident of

xxx Street, Unit xxx, xxx Subdivision, xxx City
 where she may be served with summons and other
processes of this Honorable Court;

2. That defendants are all of legal age and are presently

unlawfully residing at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx II, xxx City and may served with summons and
other legal processes therein by this Honorable
Court;

3. Plaintiff is the lawful owner of a parcel of land

situated in the Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx
evidenced by Transcript of Certificated of Title No.
xxx issued by the Register of Deeds of xxx City,
Metro Manila and more particularly described as: X
x x x x.

4. It was solely out of the compassion and tolerance of the

plaintiff, A which enabled all of the defendants to
temporarily reside at her paraphernal property located
at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision, xxx City. As
members of the same family, complainant willingly
allowed the defendants to briefly reside therein
together with her minor child, K and eldest son, V
while plaintiff continued her employment at Japan;

5. It was their understanding then that they were to reside

therein by tolerance and rent-free, but as soon as the
time comes that the plaintiff would need a residential
unit for her or her immediate familys need, all of the
named defendants would necessarily vacate the
premises and surrender the peaceful possession thereof
to the plaintiff;

6. On September 7, 2006, plaintiffs son got

married. Necessarily and by reason of the fact that
they do not have any other residential unit available,
they required the defendants to vacate the premises
and seek another place to stay. Unfortunately, this
infuriated the defendants most specifically,
defendant B who maintained that she was allegedly
allowed to permanently reside therein, after having
been allowed by the plaintiff to allegedly construct
improvements, and to allegedly pay the necessary
bills and dues of the household;

7. That by reason of the persistence of the defendants,

they confronted the plaintiffs son and forcibly asked
him to vacate the residential unit. In order not to
create any commotion and by reason of the delicate
 condition of his wife, they provisionally departed his
mothers residential house and lot;

8. All of the defendants are at present still occupying the

residential house and lot and refuse to vacate and
surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff who immediately left Japan to console her
sons predicaments. She immediately asked the
defendants to vacate the premises upon her return but
(was) simply threatened (by the defendants) and was
forcibly asked (by the defendants) to leave her
property;

9. Plaintiff initially made an attempt to settle the matter

amicably by filing a Sumbong (Complaint) before
the Barangay Pamplona Dos Barangay Council
against the defendants for unlawfully depriving her
of the peaceful possession and enjoyment of her
residential house and lot. She sought their assistance
to peacefully lead away the said defendants and for
the plaintiff to get back the physical possession of the
house and lot rightfully belonging to her. X x x.

10. However, no amicable settlement was reached upon

by the parties. In fact, they disregarded the initial
notice sent by the Barangay and even ignored the
scheduled meetings/dialogues before the Lupon. On
a mediation proceedings on the matter, defendants
unwaveringly manifested their refusal to vacate the
premises before the Honorable Barangay Captain
Romualda Villalon who mediated the parties;

11. Thus, on (17 November 2006), the Tanggapan ng

Kapitan ng Barangay issued a Certification
(Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman)
authorizing the plaintiff to file the appropriate action
unto this Honorable Court stating that walang
nagawang pagaayos o pagkakasundo sa mga partido
was reached. x x x.

12. On an effort to settle the matter, plaintiff through the

undersigned counsel transmitted through registered
mail with return card a Final Demand Letter to
Vacate dated 21 November 2006 addressed to all of
the defendants to vacate the premises within
FIFTEEN (15) days from receipt of the demand letter
which defendants received on 23 November 2006. x
x x.
13. On 28 November 2006, the undersigned counsel
received a letter in response to the demand letter
transmitted to the defendants. As a reply, the claimed
counsel of the defendants with much regret informed
the undersigned counsel that his clients cannot
comply with the final demand to vacate the property
located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision, xxx
City. X x x.

14. By reason of the defendants unjustified refusal to

vacate the premises, plaintiff would be compelled to
stay at the Philippines for a period of time and as a
result would necessarily lose her employment.
Plaintiff normally receives FORTY THOUSAND
(Php40,000.00) a month as salary from her
employment. Likewise as a result of the unlawful
possession of the residential house and lot, plaintiff
was constrained to rent a residential townhouse unit
at xxx Subdivision for which the plaintiff is
constrained to pay at a month rental of EIGHT
THOUSAND (Php 8,000.00) pesos a month;

15. Defendants, who have been unlawfully possessing

and occupying the subject parcel of land, and despite
due notice and demand to vacate the same,
unjustifiably failed and refused and continue to fail
and refuse to vacated the said premises. Thus, due to
defendants wanton disregard and deliberate
violation of the plaintiffs right to enjoy the rightful
possession of her property, herein plaintiff has
suffered and continuously suffers sleepless nights,
serious anxiety and other similar sufferings from
which entitle her to the recovery of damages in such
amount as this Honorable Court, in its wise
discretion, may determine;

16. By reason of the gross and evident bad faith of the

defendants when they deliberately refused to vacate
the aforesaid premises and by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral damages, plaintiff herein is duly entitled for
the payment of exemplary damages in such amount,
as this Honorable Court, in its wise discretion, may
determine;

17. Due to defendants refusal to vacate the premises,

plaintiff was constrained to engage the services of a
legal counsel to protect her own rights, interests, and
for whose services she agreed to pay the amount of
 TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(Php25,000.00) as attorneys fees plus Php2,000.00
per court appearance.

X x x. (end of quote)

The herein plaintiff adopts into this position paper, by incorporation and reference,
all of the foregoing allegations in her verified Answer.

In controverting the instant ejectment complaint, the defendants B, et. al.

raised the defense that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the property to B, without
presenting any proof of the due execution and authenticity of any
written/documented or oral contract or agreement to positively prove and
substantiate the alleged transaction.

Further, the defendants B, et. al. in the instant ejectment case cited the
pendency of the case of B vs. A before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
xxx, of xxx City, for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. xxx.

In the said RTC-level civil complaint, B (plaintiff in the said RTC-level case)
prayed in her Amended Complaint as follows:

X x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully

prayed that after due hearing judgment be rendered as to the
principal cause of action:

a) Ordering defendant A to execute the deed of

sale in favor of the plaintiff over the house and
lot located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision,
xxx City and covered by the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. xxx of the registry of
Deeds of xxx City;
b) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the
following amount:
i) P300,000.00, as moral damages;
ii) P200,000.00, as exemplary damages;
iii) P100,000.00, as attorneys fees; and
iv) To pay the costs of suit:

In the alternative, judgment be rendered:

a) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the

following sums:
i) P1,351,265.66 representing reimbursement to
the plaintiff for the expenses of the renovations
and Improvements, insurance premiums, real
property taxes homeowners association dues
 and payment for compromise settlement on the
property in question, plus legal interest thereof
from the date of the filing of the complaint:
ii) P55,000.00, representing the funeral
expenses of defendant A minor son, K, plus
legal interest thereof from the filing of the
complaint:
b) Ordering defendants A and V to pay plaintiff
jointly and severally the following:
i) P1,414,928.20, representing reimbursement
to the plaintiff for the payment of defendant Vs
car, including the insurance thereof, as well as
payment for the debts and loans incurred by
defendant A son, herein defendant V, plus legal
interest thereof from the filing of the complaint:
ii) P1,000,000.00 representing reimbursement
to the plaintiff for the support of defendant A
eldest son, herein defendant V:

iii) P2,105,000.00, representing rentals

payments from August 2001 to October 2006
for the business xxx Enterprise, which was set
up by the plaintiff for defendant V, plus legal
interest thereof from the filing of the complaint:

iv) P100,000.00, as attorneys fees.

Plaintiff prays for such other relief as may be just and

equitable in the premises.

X x x. (end of quote).

For the record, in the said Civil Case No. xxx, A -Seiwa (defendant in the
said RTC-level case and plaintiff in the instant ejectment case before this
Court) and her husband K alleged in their original Answer[2] filed thru their
former counsel, Atty. Xxx, the following basic legal and factual defenses:

Xxx.

1. Defendants deny the allegations stated in paragraph 6 of the

complaint. The truth of the matter being that no written nor oral
arrangement was ever reached by the parties with respect to the
sale or transfer of the paraphernal house and lot registered under
the name of the Defendant A before she contracted marriage with
defendant K;

2. Defendants resolutely maintain that no earnest efforts towards an

amicable settlement were conducted between the parties. She was
surprised to find out that the instant case was filed by the plaintiff
and that inappropriate and dishonest measures were undertaken
 which evidently showed her ungratefulness and greediness
towards her sister, defendant A.

3. Plaintiff has no legal right over the property of the defendant.

Plaintiff was permitted by tolerance to stay at the property of the
defendant as a mere transient. It is solely by reason of the
compassion of the defendant towards her sister, the plaintiff herein
and her brothers that they were permitted to stay at
her paraphernal house and lot located at No. xxx Avenue, xxx
Subdivision, xxx City. Along with them then was their biological
mother, C who had predeceased this controversy and her
ungrateful children, B, R and C. Defendants mother stood as the
guardian of V, K1 and K2 as opposed to the allegation of the
plaintiff that she agreed to the proposal that she would stand as the
guardian of the children of the defendant which is self-serving in
nature and cannot be substantiated by the plaintiff by evidence
oral or documentary;

4. Defendant belies the allegation of the plaintiff that the former was
required to stay at Japan most of the time having the resident status
therein and being married to a Japanese national. To prove the
contrary, defendant incorporates her Philippine Passports issued
on March 1, 2006, February 14, 2001 and February 6, 2006
respectively x x x.. The annotations therein will show that
defendant was at constant connections with her children, her
mother, C and her paraphernal property;

5. xxx that defendant was never in default in meeting with her

obligations as well as that of her children. She was a frequent
vacationer here in the Philippines who at all times have shouldered
the necessary payments for the obligations enumerated by the
plaintiff upon her return and through her money transfers from
Japan in order to pay these obligations;

6. This is the primary reason why the various receipts (various

attachments supplied by the plaintiff in her complaint) are issued
under the name of the defendant and significantly not under the
name of the plaintiff precisely because these were in fact paid by
the defendant or by the defendants child, V or by the plaintiff in
a few instances using the money provided by the defendant;

7. Further, no contract express or implied would indicate the claimed

allegation of the plaintiff that she was to permanently reside on
the property of the defendant and introduce improvements
thereon, pay the legal taxes due, and support the defendants son,
V with his various obligations;

8. Significantly, the improvements introduced by the plaintiff were

constructed without the knowledge or the express consent or
 authority of the defendant who is the registered owner of the house
and lot as perused from the Transfer Certificate of Title No. xxx
registered with the Registry of Deeds of xxx City. X x x.

9. The allegation that the defendant be required to sell her house and
lot to the plaintiff by virtue of the supposed verbal communication
does not have any legal or factual basis. It is relevant t point out
that under Article 1403of the Civil Code of the Philippines, among
the following contracts that are considered unenforceable are:

(2) Those that do not comply with the statute of frauds as

set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action, unless the same or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged,
or his agent; evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot
be received without the writing or as secondary evidence of
its contents:

(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or

miscarriage of another.

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than

one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein. X x x.

10. Furthermore, the complaint merely alleges that defendant is liable

to pay plaintiff for moral and exemplary damages. The operative
or constructive facts making up the pleaded cause of action for
damages were not stated in the complaint for which no credit
should likewise be given thereto; x x x. (end of quote)

In their same Civil Case No. xxx, A and her spouse K raised the following
counterclaim:

X x x.

By way of COUNTER-CLAIM, the foregoing paragraphs are

herein repleaded and reproduced insofar as they are herein
relevant, material and significant;

11. As a result of this present controversy, defendant was

compelled to stay at the Philippines for a period of time and
as a result lost her employment in Japan. Defendant
receives a monthly equivalent of Forty Thousand Pesos
(Php 40,000.00) a month as salary from her employment for
which the plaintiff must be required to pay by way of actual
damages. A copy of the Certificate of Possible Salary
Payment, the Withholding Exemption Certificate of earned
Income, and the Incumbency Certificate of the defendant
 are herein attached and made an integral part of this Answer
with Counter-Claim x x x.

12. Likewise and as a result of the unlawful possession by the

plaintiff of the residential house and lot of the defendant,
the latter was constrained to rent a residential townhouse
unit at xxx Subdivision for which the defendant was
constrained to pay a monthly rental of EIGHT
THOUSAND (Php 8,000.00) pesos a month for which once
again the plaintiff must be compelled to pay by way of
actual damages. X x x.

13. By reason of this baseless complaint, defendant, A suffered

and continuously suffers sleepless nights, serious anxiety
and other similar sufferings from which entitles her to the
recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable
Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may determine;

14. Also, by way of example or correction for the public good,

in addition to the moral damages, defendants herein are
duly entitled for the payment of exemplary damages in such
amount, as this Honorable Court, in its wise discretion, may
determine;

15. Lastly and by reason of the baseless and unfounded

complaint, defendant was constrained to litigate this case
and in order to protect their rights and interests was
constrained to engage the services of counsel whom she was
obligated to pay the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00). X x x. (end of quote)

Further, in the said Civil Case No. xxx, A and her spouse K (defendants
therein) prayed for the following reliefs in their original Answer:

X x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most

respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court to dismiss
the instant complaint, as to the counter-claim, after due
hearing be ordered to pay the defendant, B the following
amounts:

Forty Thousand Pesos (Php 40,000.00) respecting

the monthly income lost by the defendant from
her employment in Japan;

Monthly rentals of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php

8,000.00) incurred and continually incurred by
the defendant as a result of the refusal of the
 plaintiff to surrender the peaceful possession of
the defendants paraphernal property;

Moral and Exemplary damages in such amount as

determined by this Honorable Court;

Attorneys fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand

Pesos (Php 50,000.00)

Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed

for.

X x x. (end of quote)

For the record, the herein plaintiff A hereby adopts into this Position Paper, by
incorporation and reference, all her foregoing allegations, counterclaims and prayers
as stated in her original Answer in the said Civil Case No. xxx.

III. EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF

IN THE INSTANT EJECTMENT CASE

In addition to the aforementioned Title of the herein plaintiff (TCT No. xxx, marked
as Annex A hereof, supra), the plaintiff respectfully submits to this Honorable
Court the following documentary evidence in support of her ejectment complaint
against the defendants:

1. Annex B - Letter (re: Final Demand Letter To Vacate), dated

November 21, 2006, addressed to B signed by Atty. Xxx, former counsel
for A.

2. Annex C Letter, dated November 8, 2006, addressed to B Herrera, et.

al., and all persons claiming possession of the subject property owned by
A, signed by Atty. Xxx. Tafalla, former counsel for A. It proves the
jurisdictional demand made by the plaintiff to the defendants to vacate
the subject property under Rule 70 and the earnest efforts of the plaintiff
to exhaust all remedies before commencing the instant court action.

3. Annex D - Letter dated November 24, 2006, addressed to Atty. Xxx,

former counsel for A, signed by Atty. Xxx of xxx Law Offices, counsel
for B, et. al., denying and rejecting the demand of plaintiff B to vacate
the subject property. It proves the recalcitrance of the defendants in
ignoring and rejecting the extrajudicial demands of the plaintiff.

4. Annex E Patawag issued by Barangay Pamplona II, dated

November 13, 2006, addressed to A and B, et. al.. (Although defendant
Maria xxx was not named therein, she had actual and constructive
knowledge thereof, being an actual resident of the property under the
control and subsidy of B; but Maria xxx chose not to voluntarily
participate therein)
5. Annex F Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman, dated
November 17, 2006, issued by the said Barangay addressed to A and B,
et. Al.. It shows the failure of the defendants to settle with the plaintiff
the instant ejectment controversy, thus, compelling the plaintiff to seek
judicial redress.

6. Annex G Engagement Contract, dated September 26, 2006,

addressed to A, signed by her former Atty. Xxx, showing the expenses
for professional fees incurred by the plaintiff in hiring the services of
Atty. Xxx to protect her rights against the unjust acts of the defendants.

7. Annex H Letter, dated April 15, 2007, addressed to Atty. Xxx, re:
Notice of Termination of Lawyer-Client Relationship and Legal
Services, signed by A and K.

8. Annex I Letter, dated April 3, 2007, addressed to A and K thru N re:

Attorneys Fees, signed by Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr., current counsel for
A.

9. Annex J Legal Retainership Agreement, dated April 3, 2007,

signed by N and the Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices, thru Atty.
Manuel Laserna, Jr., showing the litigation expenses incurred by A
in hiring the legal services of the said law firm to protect her rights
against the unjust acts of defendants B, et. al.

10. Annex K Special Power of Attorney in favor of the Laserna Cueva

Mercader Law Offices acting thru Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. and/or
Atty. Myrna C. Mercader, dated April 11, 2007, signed by A and K and
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan.

11. Annex L - Special Power of Attorney in favor of V dated January 12,

2007, issued by A and notarized by Atty. Xxx in xxx City.

12. Annex M (with sub-markings)- Appraisal Report, dated October

27, 2006, on the subject property, issued by the xxx Co., Inc., with
supporting documents, showing the fair marker value of the subject
property and the improvements thereon. It proves the huge economic
opportunity losses the plaintiff and her children are incurring by reason
of the unjust act of the defendants in dispossessing the plaintiff of her
subject property, which the plaintiff owns in fee simple as its lawful and
registered owner.

13. Annex N - Contract of Lease, dated September 16, 2006 of the son
of the plaintiff, V, who was harassed by defendants B, et. al. to move out
of the subject property owned by his mother (herein plaintiff) A, thus,
constraining him to lease a property in xxx City, at P8,000.00/month,
where he and his wife could reside and where his mother could reside
whenever she returns to the Philippines for vacations.
14. Annex O (with sub-markings) - Various proofs of payments caused to
be paid/remitted by plaintiff A either directly or thru her duly authorized
representatives, e.g. his son V, et. al., for the premiums of the fire
insurance policies of the subject property, the various monthly dues,
charges and fees caused to be paid by the plaintiff to the

15. xxx Homeowners Association as a member in good standing of the

Association being a homeowner therein, and the various annual local
real estate taxes caused to be paid by the plaintiff to the local government
of xxx City, They disprove the claim of B that she was the one who had
spent for all such expenses.

16. Annex P (with sub-markings) - Employment records of the plaintiff

A as an employee in Japan, e.g., Incumbency Certificate, showing her
incomes/salaries and financial capacity as such, as well as the Japan-
based incomes that she had lost/waived for attending to the litigation of
the pending cases involving her property in the Philippines.

17. Annex Q (with sub-markings) Proofs of various dollar remittances

the plaintiff A had made from Japan to her son V and the defendant B
for the support, sustenance, personal businesses and other expenses and
costs of living of the son of the plaintiff, V, the burial of another son of
the plaintiff, K, the upkeep and maintenance of the subject property, and
all other related necessary expenses relative to the children of the
plaintiff and to the subject property. They disprove the claim of the
defendant B that she was the one financially supporting the living
expenses, education, businesses, etc. of the children of the plaintiff or
that she was the one spending for the maintenance of the subject property
or that she was the one who funded the burial of the deceased K.

18. Annex R (with sub-markings) - Various business records of xxx

Enterprise owned by the son of the plaintiff, V, which the plaintiff had
helped fund and organize. They show the financial capacity of V to
support himself, his wife, his business-related transactions, and his costs
of living expenses, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the
one who had funded the same.

19. Annex S - The passports of V showing his business travels abroad.

They show the financial capacity, personal maturity, and business
acumen of V as a businessman, contrary to the claim of defendant B that
she was the one who was supporting the personal maintenance and
business operations of V.

20. Annex T (with sub-markings) - Business records of xxx Enterprise

and yyy Collection (registered in the names of defendants B and R),
which the plaintiff A, as we well-earning Japan-based employee, had
helped put up and fund at a time when the said B and R were basically
penniless or under financial straits. Please note that the business names
 xxx and yyy were patterned after the names of the children of the
plaintiff.

21. Annex U (with sub-markings) Records of the checking account of

V in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC), showing that he had paid
his business loans thru his said account, contrary to the claim of the
defendant B that she was the she who paid such business loans of V.

22. Annex V (with sub-markings) - Business and financial records of xxx

Management Inc., re: the purchase and full payment of a Mitsubishi
Lancer vehicle made by the said corporation, whose major stockholders
are the xxx Clan. The natural father of V belonged to the said Clan. The
said records show that the amortizations for the said car were made and
paid by the said Corporation and xxx Clan for the benefit of the latter
and that the payments were made thru the account of the said corporation
in BPI Family Bank, contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was
the one who had paid for the said car.

23. Annex W (with sub-markings) Records of the amicable settlement

of Civil Case No. xxx (RTC Branch xxx, xxx City), entitled Sps. N v.
A (represented by her [late] mother C), involving the subject
property. They prove that plaintiff A had paid for all the expenses (taxes,
registration fees, etc.) related to the Deed of Exchange, the Compromise
Agreement, and the registration of the titles involved therein, contrary to
the claim of defendant B that she was the one who paid for all such
expenses.

24. Annex X (with sub-markings) Records of the amicable settlement

of Civil Case xxx (RTC, Branch xxx, xxx City) which A filed against
the University of Perpetual Help Hospital and its attending doctors to
seek damages for the death of K, a son of the plaintiff A. The records
show that the defendant B, as attorney in fact of A, received P600,000.00
from the University of Perpetual Help Hospital, et. al. as settlement
money for the death of K (son of A) and showing that Atty. Xxx, counsel
for B in the instant ejectment case, received 10% thereof as his fees. The
said amount was used by B to renovate/improve and maintain the
expenses for the subject property and/or other expenses relative to the
children of A and to defray some of the litigation expenses of the said
civil case. B made it appear claimed that the funds she used for the said
purposes came from her own pockets.

25. Annex Y (with sub-markings) Passports of A and her husband K,

showing their various travels to the Philippines to care for and supervise
As children in Metro Manila and to monitor their education, good
conduct and businesses. They disprove the claim of B that A had
abandoned her children to her care.

IV. APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE

A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The alleged contract of sale between the plaintiff A and the defendant B is
unenforceable and cannot be raised as a valid legal and factual defense in
the instant ejectment case, that is, assuming that such an agreement actually
existed, an allegation which is vehemently denied by the plaintiff for being
false, untrue and fabricated.

Under Art. 1403, Civil Code, the following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Fraud as set forth in this number.In
the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action,
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed
by the party charge, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a

year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage
of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a
mutual promise to marry;
(d) An Agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action,
at a price not less that five hundred pesos unless the buyer accept
and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or
some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some part
of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and
entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the
sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price,
names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is
made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year,
or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds. Under
the Statute of Frauds, the only formality required is that the contract or agreement
must be in writing and subscribed by party charged or by his agent.For example,
a telegram advising a person to whom a verbal promise for the sale of land had been
previously made to come at once in order to complete the purchase, but which
telegram neither describes the property nor states the purchase price, and which is
not signed by any person having authority to bind the seller, is not a sufficient
memorandum of sale to satisfy the requirement of the statue.

Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are susceptible of

ratification.According to Art. 1405 of the Civil Code, such contracts may be ratified
either (1) by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the
same, or (2) by the acceptance of benefits under them. Art. 1405 provides that
contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are
ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the
same, or by the acceptance of benefits under them while Art. 1406 provides that
when a contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and a public document is
necessary for its registration in the Registry of Deeds, the parties may avail
themselves of the right under article 1357.

The primordial aim of the provisions is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted
memory of witnesses (Shoemaker vs. La Tondea, 68 Phil. 24). Although the said

provisions simply provides for the form or method by which contracts coming within
its terms may be proved, nonetheless, the claimant must first prove the existence and
due execution of such a contract, notwithstanding its formal defects, if any. (Conlu
v. Araneta, 15 Phil. 387; Gallemit v. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. 241; Kuenzler & Streff v.
Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111; Gomez v. Salcedo, [26 Phil. 485]; Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33
Phil. 471; Magalona v. Paratcim 59 Phil. 543).

Although the Supreme Court has held in many cases that no particular form
or language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in
writing under the statute of frauds, nonetheless, such memorandum of note should
be in the form of a document or writing, formal or informal, which had been written
either for the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose
which satisfies all the statutes requirements as to contents and signature would be
sufficient.

In one case, the Supreme Court held that a voucher or entry in an

accountants book of account purporting to show payment of a specified amount as
consideration for the sale of leasehold right over a house was, however, held
insufficient where the same was not signed by the alleged vendor but merely by the
accountant who claimed (without establishing) that he was the vendors agent
(Reyes vs. Lopez, 76 Phil. 568).

The settled rule is that the statute applies only to executory (Factoran vs.
Laban, 81 Phil. 512; Cocjin vs. Libo, 91 Phil. 777), that is, a contract that has not
been completed or executed yet. Performance, whether total or partial, takes a
contact out of the operation of the statute. (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 493; Hernandez
v. Adal, 78 Phil. 196; Almirol vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil. 512; Robles vs. Lizarraga

Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387; Diama vs. Macalibo, I74 Phil. 70; Barcelona vs.
Barcelona, 53 O.G. 373; Carbonnel v. Poncio, 55 O.G. 2415). Performance must be
duly proved.

Examples of performance include: (a) a sale of real property which has been
consummated by the delivery of the property to the vendee (Soriano v. Heirs of
Magali, L-15133, July 31, 1963; Diama vs. Macalibo, supra); (b) or which has been
partially executed by payment of a part of the price to the vendors and the
delivery of the land to the vendees (Almirol vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387).
 In one case, it was held that the transaction is not taken out of the coverage of
the statute of frauds by the mere allegation that plaintiff had taken possession of the
land as a tenant and that he had made substantial improvements thereon, such
allegation being an insufficient basis for proving the oral contract had been
executed or performed. There must be an allegation to the effect that he had taken
possession of the land in view of a supposed verbal contract he had with the
defendant to purchase it, or that he has made improvements thereon because and as
a consequence of said supposed contract to sell (Pascual vs. realty Investment,
Inc. 91 Phil. 257).

Partial performance does not of itself exclude the application of the Statute of
Frauds. Firstly, in order that a contract not to be performed within one year may be
taken out of the operation of the statue, it must appear clearly that full or complete
performance has been made by one party; nothing less will suffice, and if anything
remains to be done after the expiration of the year besides the mere payment of
money, the statute would apply (Babao vs. Perez, 54 O.G. 2888).

The doctrine of partial performance cannot be invoked against the statute

where the contract is vague, ambiguous and uncertain in its terms and as to subject
matter. For, obviously, there can be no partial performance until there is a definite
and complete agreement between the parties. For the doctrine to be availed of, the
parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite, clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal in this terms and as to subject matter, aside from being fair, reasonable,
and just in this provisions. This is so because the doctrine is based on equity, and it
would be inequitable to enforce an agreement that does not satisfy the above
requirements (Babao vs. Perez, Babao v. Perez, 54 OG 2888).

B. Forms of Contracts

The defense of the defendants that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the subject property
to defendant B fails to meet and comply with the strict procedural and evidentiary
requirements set forth in Articles 1358, et. seq. of the Civil Code as to the forms or
formalities of a contract or an agreement.

Under Art. 1358, Civil Code, the following must appear in a public
instrument:

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real
property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;

(2) The cession, repudiation or enunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the

conjugal partnership of gains;

(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its
object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or
should prejudice a third person;

(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public
document.
Although, as a general rule, contracts hall be obligatory, in whatever from they may
have been entered into, yet there are certain contracts falling within the purview or
scope of this rule which, by reason of their importance, should be executed in
accordance with certain formalities in order to insure their efficacy and to protect
the interests of the contracting parties as well as that of third persons. The Civil
Code, recognizing this necessity, enumerates in Art. 1358 the different classes of
contracts which must appear either in a public or in a private document, and grants
in Art. 1357 a coercive power to the contracting parties by which they can
reciprocally compel the observance of the required form.

Under Art. 1359, Civil Code, when, there having been a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting
to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end
that such true intention may be expressed. If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or
accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is
not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.

C. EJECTMENT LAW AND CASES

The instant ejectment complaint fully complies with technical and substantive
requirements of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and with the relevant jurisprudence
applicable thereto.

Thus, considering the summary nature of the instant ejectment suit, the same
should be resolved by the Honorable Court on the merits in favor of the plaintiff A-
Seiwa, regardless of the pendency of the RTC-level case filed by B.

The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession
of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure (Gutierrez vs.
Magat, 67 SCRA 262). The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession
or possession de facto over the real property. The questions to be resolved simply
are these: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second,
was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint
by force, threat, strategy, or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his
possession? Any controversy over ownership rights should be settled after the party
who had the prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property (Dizon
vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897).

The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall

be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building and that such judgment shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the fact therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession.
 Section 1, Rule 70 provides that a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

Section 2, Rule 70 provides that, unless otherwise stipulated, such

action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by
serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the
premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found
thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the
case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a summary procedure,

and that all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of
the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided.

Under Sec. 16 of Rule 70, when the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Under Sec. 18
of the Rule, thejudgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land
or building.

Sec. 17 of the Rule provides that if after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of
rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not
true, it shall render judgment

for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the

court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party
and award costs as justice requires.

In view of the summary nature of an ejectment suit, Sec. 19 of Rule 70

provides that if judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall
issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and
the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to
pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits
with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court
the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the
lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.
The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action
is appealed. Under Sec. 21 of the Rule, the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.

The action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature (Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27
SCRA 822; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1256). As such, it is inadequate for the
ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted real property. In an
unlawful detainer case suit, while the court cannot adjudicate on the issue of
ownership, it may receive evidence on possession de jure to determine the nature of
possession (Consing vs. Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1).

It is fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases that a mere
plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as
a sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action
for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the
property (Prado vs. Calpo, et. al., G.R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964, cited in Spouses
medina and Bernal vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278).

In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
se forth in his pleading. As incidents of the main issue of possession de facto, the
inferior court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between
the parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease contract
between the parties, the period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease
contract has already expired; (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the
date when it will take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the premises against
the will of the landlord; and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial
and valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the ownership
of the land and the building, their rights according to the Civil Code. Defendants
claim of ownership of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not
sufficient to divest the inferior detainer. (Alvir vs. Vera, 130 SCRA 357).

An unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land
or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the
expiration or termination of the detainers right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract express or implied (Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pharma Industries,
Inc., vs. Pajarillaga, L-53788, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 339; Ching Pue vs.
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 (1950); Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil 868 (1956); Teodoro vs.
Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956); Pardo de Tavera vs. Encarnacion, et. al., 22 SCRA
632 (1968).

An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action
for reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the
issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for
reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for
reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal
court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it
preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue
involved is material possession or possession de facto (Ramirez vs. Bleza, L-45640,
July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187).

This is so because the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or

detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shallnot bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case of action not involving
possession. The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved (Republic vs.
Guarin, 81 SCRA 269). It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It
is time procedure designed to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs. Madela, Jr. 121
SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay
eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial
justice (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that judgment must
be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further
damages arising from loss of possession (Salinas vs. Navarro 126 SCRA 167).

Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be divested of its jurisdiction
over ejectment cases simply because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership
over the litigated property (Alilaya vs. Espaola, 107 SCRA 564; Dehesa vs.
Macalalag, 81 SCRA 543; Castro vs. delos Reyes, 109 Phil. 64).Even where
defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer,
it is declared in a great number of cases that the trial court will not be divested of its
jurisdiction by such allegations alone (Savinada v. Tuason, et. al., G.R. No. L-2132,
May 30, 1949; Loo Soo v. Osorio, R.G. No. L-1364, May 30, 1951; Cruz v. Lunsang,
G.R. No. L-2332, October 4, 1959; De Los Rey7es v. Elepanio, et al., G.R. No. L-
3466, October 13, 1950; Mediran V. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).

Where the possession of defendant is by tolerance on the part of the plaintiff, or

his predecessor, the possession or detainer becomes illegal from the time that there
is a demand to vacate (Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1951). It is not necessary
that there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit
may be filed against a possessor by tolerance. Neither is prior physical possession
of the property by plaintiff necessary (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136; Pharma
Industries, Inc. vs. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339).When consent is withdrawn and
owner demands tenants to leave the property, the owners right of possession is
deemed asserted. (Philippine National Bank vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735).

A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a
lease continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate (Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146; Canaynay vs. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36;
Robles vs. San Jose, 52 O.G. 6193; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257, citing
Montelibano vs. Hingaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803).

D. RECENT EJECTMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The plaintiff A further cites the following recent ejectment-related

jurisprudence in support of her complaint.

In the case of HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, et. al. vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA
JIMENEZ, Respondents, G. R. No. 107036, February 9, 1993, it was held ha
on the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled principle is that a municipal court
has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if the
question of the ownership of the property is raised by the defendant. The
exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment case
that it cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first ascertained.
In the case of CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, et. al. vs. TEODORICO T.
MARAYAG, respondent [G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000], it was held
as a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the
mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising
ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of
equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from
the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. Thus:
X x x.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70
are designed to summarily restore physical possession
of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally
or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical
possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held
that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of
public order by those who would take the law in their
hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession." [Vda [de Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA
135, September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.] In these
cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession,
and pronouncements made on questions of ownership
are provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action
involving ownership of the same property does not justify
the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The
underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the
actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve
physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few
occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was
merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former
could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the
ejectment action and there resolved." [Wilson Auto
Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, April
10, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ. In this case, the Court also
held:
"1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in
ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other
courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920
(1966)) do not abate the latter; and neither do
proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98
Phil. 868 (1956), citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil.
81, (1950)).
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment
suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza,
106 SCRA 187 (1981)).
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is
concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial
Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the
judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only
issue involved is the material possession or possession
de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa Sr. v. CA et
al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 (1988)).
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to
an ejectment suit involving the same property (Quimpo v.
de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not
affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a
lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184
(1966); Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632
(1968); Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 (1987);
Commander Realty, Inc. v. CA, 161 SCRA 264 (1988)).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed
of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does
not suspend an ejectment suit between the same
parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 (1975)).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion
reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits
regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8
SCRA 549 (1963); Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167;
De la Cruz v. CA, 133 SCRA 520 (1984); Drilon v.
 Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v. Malaya, 153
SCRA 412 (1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v.
CA, 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517
(1989); Guzman v. CA (annulment of sale and
reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604 (1989); Demamay v. CA,
186 SCRA 608 (1990); Leopoldo Sy v. CA et al.,
(annulment of sale and reconveyance), GR No. 95818,
Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or
document affecting property operate to abate ejectment
actions respecting the same property (Salinas v.
Navarro, 126 SCRA 167 (1983) - annulment of deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the
same an equitable mortgage; Ang Ping v. RTC , 154
SCRA 153 (1987) - annulment of sale and title; Caparros
v. CA, 170 SCRA 758 (1989) - annulment of title; Dante
v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 - annulment of sale with
damages; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. , 177
SCRA 288 (1989) - annulment of document).
In the case of Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank [G.R. No. 129887. February 17, 2000], it was
held that nothing is more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely
concerned with the issue of physical or material possession of the subject
land or building. However, if the issue of possession depends on the
resolution of the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the
complaint, the municipal trial court may resolve the latter [Refugia v. Court
of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347,366 (1996)] although the resulting judgment
would be conclusive only with respect to the possession but not the
ownership of the property [Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure].
In the caser of Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., [G.R. No. 134651. September
18, 2000], it was held that the rule is settled that although a question of
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, the same must not
result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play, such as where the issue was
raised by petitioners for the first time only in a Petition for Review and only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals; and where
petitioners participated actively in the proceedings before the MeTC [Refugia
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 347, citing
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29264, 29 August 1969, 29 SCRA 419;
Navoa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59255, 29 December 1995, 251 SCRA
545.] and invoked its jurisdiction with the filing of their answer, in seeking
affirmative relief from it, in subsequently filing a notice of appeal before the
RTC, and later, a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. Thus:
X x x. Be that as it may, we find no error in the
MeTC assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter. A
complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges
that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate
is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. [Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 372;
 Pangilinan v. Aguilar, No. L-29275, 31 January 1972, 43
SCRA 136]. As correctly found by the appellate court, to
which we agree, the allegations in the complaint
sufficiently
established a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The
complaint clearly stated how entry was effected and how
and when dispossession started - petitioners were able
to enter the subject premises as sublessees of Purisima
Salazar who, despite the termination of her lease with
respondent, continued to occupy the subject premises
without any contract with it; thus, their stay was by
tolerance of respondent.

X x x.

The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a

tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
has continued by tolerance of the owner. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. [Vda. De Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L-
31985, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 172, citing Calubayan v.
Pascual, No. L-22645, 18 September 1967, 21 SCRA 146; Yu
v. de Lara, No. L-16084, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.]. X
x x.

In the case of TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN, Spouses ADOR

and TESS TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND
ZENAIDA ANZURES, respondents, [G.R. No. 106214. September 5, 1997],
it was held that the one-year reglamentary period under Section 1, Rule 70
for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time of the "unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs
upon expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. And such right
legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to vacate [Sy
Oh v. Hon. Garcia and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil. 777]. Thus:

X x x. In this case, although possession by petitioners (other

than Villaluz) lasted beyond March 31, 1988 (the date they
were supposed to vacate the premises in accordance with the
agreement between petitioner Villaluz and private
respondents), nevertheless their continued possession from
April 1, 1988 up to the time they received the demand to vacate
on February 23, 1989, is considered as possession by tolerance.
Said petitioners are not lessees but their status is analogous to
that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but
whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Their
 right of possession of the said property stems from their being
employees of petitioner Villaluz who only allowed them to
occupy the premises for a certain period. As such, their
possession depends upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz.
Having merely stepped into the shoes of the latter, said
petitioners cannot acquire superior rights than that of petitioner
Villaluz. It has been ruled, that "the person who occupies the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate the same upon demand," otherwise
the remedy of ejectment may be availed of to oust him from
the premises. [ Refugia v. CA, 258 SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De
Lara, 6 SCRA 785 (1962)]. In such case, the one year
prescriptive period for filing the appropriate action to remedy
the unlawful withholding of possession is to be counted from
the date of receipt of the last demand to vacate [Calubayan v.
Pascual, 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that time that
possession becomes illegal. 28 [ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes,
14 SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil.
36]. Accordingly, since the complaint for ejectment was
instituted on July 12, 1989, or a mere four (4) months from the
time of the last demand to vacate, the same was timely filed
within the prescriptive period. X x x.

In the case of ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES,
INC., respondents[G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999], it was held that a
judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the
suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are:
a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the
defendant fraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;

b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the

permission of the defendant;

c) transferees pendente lite;

d) sublessee;

e) co-lessee; or

f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the

defendant.
 [I Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 793
(1997)]
The above doctrine expressly and properly applies to co-defendant MARIA
xxx, who is an aunt of the defendants B, et. al. and who lives with them, who
is under their direction, control, supervision, subsidy and assistance, and
who had actual and constructive knowledge of the existence of the
mandated Barangay conciliation and mediation proceedings but
nonetheless impliedly waived her appearance thereto by not voluntarily
appearing and participating therein despite such knowledge. The foregoing
facts were not denied (in fact, admitted sub silencio) by the other defendants
in their past pleadings in this case.
V. CONCLUSION

It is an established principle in law that one who comes in equity must come
with clean hands. (Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 137533, 22 November 2002, 392 SCRA 506). One who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. He or she who has done inequity shall not have equity.The courts may deny
equitable relief on the ground that the conduct and actions of a party are inequitable,
unfair, dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. (Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 149615, 29
August 2006; Abacus Security vs. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483
SCRA 315.)

VI. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that instant
ejectment suit be decided in favor of the plaintiff A and against all of the
defendants, ordering the defendants to VACATE and SURRENDER the de
facto/material possession of the subject property to the plaintiff or her duly
authorized legal representative/s, with awards of damages, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit, as duly proved by the various documentary
evidence attached to this Position Paper.
Las Pinas City, January 9, 2008.
LASERNA CUEVA MERCADER LAW OFFICES

New Counsel for Plaintiff

Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Ave.

Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1743

Tel/Fax 8742539, 8725443

MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.

Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85

IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907

IBP PPLM Chapter

 PTR No. 9400055, 1/5/07, Las Pinas

MCLE Exemption No. II-000844 (3/31/07)

[1] Other than the notice of lis pendens filed by B in re: Civil Case No. xxx,
which case is discussed in this position paper, the said Title of A contains no
other annotations of any lien or encumbrance.

[2] Sps. A and K will file their Amended Answer to the Amended Complaint
of B in the said RTC-level civil case as soon as the said Court shall have
resolved their pending motion to compel B to first pay the mandated and
jurisdictional additional docket and filing fees, per Rule 141, based on her
new/additional financial and non-financial prayers as stated in her Amended
Complaint.

Posted by Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. at 3:08 PM

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About Me
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
as City, Metro Manila, Philippines
L J. LASERNA JR.- Partner, Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices. Admitted to the Bar
(3rd placer, 1984 bar exam). Law professor of FEU, Manila, 1985 to 2006 (ret.). Educ.:
n., UP, Diliman, QC, 1975; Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.), cum laude, FEU, 1984; Master of
L.M.), UST, (cand.), Manila [as FEU fellow, 1998-2000]. Honors: 3rd placer, 1984 Bar
(90.95%; only 22% passed); Meralco pre-law scholar; Cocofed law scholar; Cocofed
ment scholar (AIM, Makati); FEU fellow (LLM, UST). Bar leader in southern Metro Manila
ce 1995. Founded Las Pinas City Bar Assn (2001). Served as director/sec./vice pres.,
LM Ch., 1995-2007. - Contact: Email "lcmlaw@gmail.com". Google Maps - "Laserna
Mercader Law Offices".
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