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Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016

Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris

To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2016) Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:6, 368-376, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2016.1241520

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016
VOL. 72, NO. 6, 368376
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1241520

NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK

Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 130140 warheads and appears to have plans to Defense; India; missiles;
increase its arsenal further. With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium MRBM; nuclear weapons;
production reactors, and expansion of uranium enrichment facilities, the countrys stockpile will Pakistan; SRBM
likely increase over the next 10 years, but by how much will depend on many things. Two key
factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Islamabad plans to deploy, and how much
the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Based on Pakistans performance over the past 20 years and its
current and anticipated weapons deployments, the authors estimate that its stockpile could
potentially grow to 220250 warheads by 2025, making it the worlds fifth-largest nuclear
weapon state. Pakistans deployment of short-range, so-called tactical nuclear weapons is causing
considerable concern in South Asia and in the US Government about warhead security and
lowering of the threshold for nuclear weapons use.

Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with
more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing
fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large
number of commercial satellite images of Pakistan
army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear
to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that
might be related to nuclear forces.
We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weap-
ons stockpile of 130140 warheads (see Table 1). This
stockpile exceeds the projection made by the US
Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan by
2020 would have 6080 warheads (US Defense
Intelligence Agency 1999, 38).
With several delivery systems in development, four
plutonium production reactors, and its uranium
enrichment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan
has a stockpile that will likely increase further over
the next 10 years. The size of that increase will depend
on many factors. Two key factors will be how many
nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy,
and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows.
Speculations that Pakistan may become the worlds
third-largest nuclear weapon state with a stockpile
of some 350 warheads a decade from now are, we
believe, exaggerated, not least because that would
require a buildup two to three times faster than growth
over the past two decades. We estimate that its stock-
pile could more realistically grow to 220250 warheads
by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens,
it would make Pakistan the worlds fifth-largest nuclear
weapon state. But unless India significantly expands its
arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it
seems reasonable to expect that Pakistans nuclear
arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but
might begin to level off as its current weapons pro-
grams are completed.
Nuclear policy developments
Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new
short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to coun-
ter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts
seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed
not only to respond to nuclear attacks but to counter
an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani
territory.1 This development has created considerable
concern in other countries, including the United States,
who fear that the development lowers the threshold for
nuclear use in a military conflict with India.
The National Command Authority (NCA), which
includes all government agencies involved in the
nuclear mission, met on 24 February 2016 under the
chairmanship of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz
Sharif to review a study of the growing conventional
and strategic weapons development around Pakistan.
The NCA pledged to take all possible measures to
make national security robust including effectively
respond to the threats to national security without
indulging in arms race (Pakistani Inter Services
Public Relations 2016).

CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen hkristensen@fas.org

2016 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 369

Table 1. Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016.

Number of Warhead x Number of
Type NATO designation launchers Year deployed Range1 (km) yield (kt)3 warheads2
Aircraft
F-16A/B ~24 1998 1600 1 bomb ~24
Mirage III/V ~12 1998 2100 1 bomb (or Ra-ad) ~12
Subtotal: ~36 ~36
Land-based ballistic missiles
Abdali (Hatf-2) n.a. (2017)4 180 1 low kt n.a.
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) ~16 2004 250 1 512 kt ~16
Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) ~16 2003 750 1 512 kt ~16
Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4) (2017) 900 1 512 kt n.a.
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) ~12 2014 1500 1 512 kt ~12
Shaheen-3 (Hatf-10?) (2018) 2750 1 512 kt n.a.
Ghauri (Hatf-5) ~24 2003 1250 1 512 kt ~24
NASR (Hatf-9) ~24 2013 60 1 low kt ~245
Subtotal: ~92 ~92
Cruise missiles

Babur (Hatf-7) ~12 20146 3507 1 512 kt ~128

Raad (Hatf-8) (2017) 350 1 512 kt n.a.
Subtotal: ~12 ~12

Total ~140

1
Range listed is unrefueled combat range with drop tanks.
2
There may be more missiles than launchers but since each missile is dual capable, this table assigns an average of one warhead per launcher unless noted
otherwise.
3
Yield estimate is based on the range of yields measured in the 1998 nuclear tests. It is possible that Pakistan since has developed warheads with lower and
higher yields.
4
After six test launches, the Abdali might be in the process of introduction with the army.
5
Each NASR launcher has up to four missile tubes. But since NASR is a dual-capable system and the primary mission probably is conventional, this table
counts only one warhead per launcher.
6
For unknown reasons, the Babur has not been test launched since 2012.
7
The Pakistani government claims the Babur range is 700 km, twice the 350-km range reported by the US intelligence community.
8
Each launcher has three missile tubes. But since Babur is a dual capable system and the primary mission is probably conventional, this table counts only
once warhead per launcher.

The NCA also reviewed the security and safety
mechanism of the nuclear arsenal and expressed
deep satisfaction with Pakistans existing security of
weapons and installations. Furthermore, the NCA
expressed full confidence in the reliability of the
nuclear weapons command and control system and
satisfaction with the high standard of operational
preparedness of the nuclear arsenal (Pakistani Inter
Services Public Relations 2016).
The meeting praised nuclear deterrence as the factor of
stability in South Asia and the NCA pledged to maintain
Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of
Credible Minimum Deterrence. At the same time, the
NCA reemphasized a desire for establishing a Strategic
Restraint Regime in South Asia and the inescapable
need of a meaningful and sustained comprehensive dialo-
gue process for resolution of all outstanding disputes . . .
(Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations 2016).
The NCAs statement on security and safety was, in
part, a response to international concern that
Pakistans evolving arsenal and particularly its growing
inventory of short-range nuclear weapon systems raise
questions about warhead management and command
and control of the weapons. Satellite images show that
security perimeters around many bases and military
facilities have been upgraded over the past five years,
possibly in response to terrorist attacks.
Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear
weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed
considerably from confidence to concern, particularly
as a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weap-
ons. In 2007, a US State Department official told
Congress that, were, I think, fairly confident that
they have the proper structures and safeguards in
place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces
and not to allow any compromise (Boucher 2007). In
stark contrast, the US Statement Department assess-
ment in 2016 was: We have been very concerned
about Pakistans deployment of battlefield nuclear
weapons. Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very
nature, pose [a] security threat because youre taking
battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you
know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure. So
were really quite concerned about this, and we have
made our concerns known, and we will continue to
press them about what we consider to be the destabi-
lizing aspects of their battlefield nuclear weapons pro-
gram (Economic Times 2016).
370 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
Pakistani officials reject such concerns and insist
that nuclear weapons security is adequate. Samar
Mubarik Mund, the former director of the National
Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani
nuclear warhead is assembled only at the eleventh
hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three
to four different parts at three to four different loca-
tions. If a nuclear weapon doesnt need to be launched,
then it is never available in assembled form (World
Bulletin 2013).
As for the unique effect of tactical nuclear weapons,
other Pakistani officials insist that the weapons are
neither destabilizing nor lowering the nuclear thresh-
old. In 2015, General Khalid Kidwai, a member of
Pakistans NCA, explained: Pakistan opted to develop
a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons,
also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons, as a defensive,
deterrence response to an offensive doctrine by India
(A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 45).
Kidwai said the NASR short-range weapon, speci-
fically, was born out of a compulsion of this thing that
I mentioned about some people on the other side
[India] toying with the idea of finding space for con-
ventional war, despite Pakistan nuclear weapons.
Pakistans understanding of Indias Cold Start strategy
was, he said, that it envisioned launching quick strikes
into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine
brigades simultaneously (A Conversation With Gen.
Khalid Kidwai 2015, 8, 9). Such an attack force might
involve roughly 32,00036,000 troops.
I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of
tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistans inventory, and in
the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the ave-
nues for serious military operations by the other side,
Kidwai concluded (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid
Kidwai 2015, 45).
After Kidwais statement, Pakistans Foreign
Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the
existence of Pakistans low-yield, tactical nuclear
weapons, apparently the first time a top government
official has done so (India Today 2015). But the New
York Times reported that although an unknown num-
ber of the tactical weapons had been built, they had not
yet been deployed with warheads in the field (Sanger
2015).
In September 2016, an attack on Indian military
barracks in Kashmir triggered widespread rumors in
India that Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja M. Asif,
in an interview on Geo News, had threatened use of
tactical nuclear weapons in response. But the interview
was aired the day before the attack and mentioned
potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in general
terms. We are always pressured time and again that
our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a
superiority, that we have more tactical weapons than
we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a
superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if
anyone steps on our soil and if someones designs are a
threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those
weapons for our defense (Scroll 2016).
Nuclear weapons production complex
Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile mate-
rial production complex that is expanding. This
includes the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant to the
east of Islamabad, which appears to be under expan-
sion, and probably a second enrichment plant at
Gadwal to the north of Islamabad. Four heavy-water
plutonium production reactors appear to have been
completed at what is normally referred to as the
Khushab Complex some 33 km (20 miles) to the
south of Khushab. Three of the reactors at the complex
have been added in the past 10 years.
To reprocess spent fuel and extract plutonium, the
New Labs Reprocessing Plant at Nilore to the east of
Islamabad has been expanded and supplemented by
possible completion of a second reprocessing plant
located at Chashma in the northwestern part of
Punjab Province (Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini
2015).
Development and production of nuclear-capable
missiles and their mobile launchers are done at the
National Defence Complex (sometimes called
National Development Complex) facilities in the Kala
Chitta Dhar mountain range to the west of Islamabad.
The complex is divided into two sections. The western
section, south of Attock, appears to be involved in
development, production, and test launching of mis-
siles and rocket engines. The eastern section north of
Fateh Jang is involved in production and assembly of
road-mobile Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs)
designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images
show the presence of launchers for Shaheen I and
Shaheen II ballistic missiles and Babur cruise missiles.
The Fateh Jang section has been expanded significantly
over the past 10 years with several large launcher
assembly buildings. Other launcher and missile-related
production and maintenance facilities may be located
near Tarnawa and Taxila.
Little is known about the production of warheads,
but the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) near Wah
to the northwest of Islamabad have been suspected for
many years to serve a role. One of the factories to the
northeast of Wah is located near a unique facility with
six earth-covered bunkers inside a multilayered safety

perimeter. The security perimeter was expanded signif-
icantly between 2005 and 2010.
Estimating the size of the Pakistani nuclear warhead
stockpile is fraught with uncertainty. A frequent mis-
take is to derive the estimate directly from the amount
of weapons-grade fissile material produced. As of late
2015, the International Panel on Fissile Materials esti-
mated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately
3100 kg of weapon-grade (90% enriched) highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and at least 190 kg of
weapon-grade plutonium (International Panel on
Fissile Materials 2015: 16, 25, 27). This material is
theoretically enough to produce 204306 warheads,
assuming that each warheads solid core uses either
1218 kg of weapon-grade HEU or 46 kg of
plutonium.2
However, calculating stockpile size based solely on
fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology
that tends to produce inflated warhead estimates.
Instead, warhead estimates must take into account
several factors, including: the amount of weapon-
grade fissile material produced, warhead design profi-
ciency, warhead production rates, numbers of opera-
tional nuclear-capable launchers, how many of those
launchers are dual capable, nuclear strategy, and state-
ments by government officials.
At their outset, estimates must take into account
that not all of a countrys fissile material ends up in
warheads. Like other nuclear weapon states, Pakistan
probably maintains a reserve of fissile material.
Moreover, Pakistan simply lacks enough nuclear-cap-
able launchers to accommodate 200300 warheads;
furthermore, all of Pakistans launchers are thought to
be dual capable, which means that some of them,
especially the shorter-range systems, presumably are
assigned to nonnuclear missions as well. Finally, offi-
cial statements often refer to warheads and weap-
ons interchangeably, without making it clear whether
it is the number of launchers or the warheads assigned
to them that are being discussed.
Despite these uncertainties, Pakistan is clearly
engaged in a significant buildup of its nuclear forces
and has been for some time. In 2008, Peter Lavoy, then
a US National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, told
NATO that Pakistan at that time was producing
nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country
in the world (US NATO Mission 2008). Six years later,
in 2014, Lavoy described the purpose of the expansion
of Pakistans nuclear weapons program to include
efforts to significantly increase fissile material produc-
tion to design and fabricate multiple nuclear warheads
with varying sizes and yields, to develop, test and
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 371
ultimately deploy a wide variety of delivery systems
with a wide range to include battle field range ballistic
delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons as they are
often called3 (Voice of America, 2014) (Emphasis
added).
Today, Kidwai acknowledged in March 2015,
Pakistan possesses a variety of nuclear weapons, in
different categories. At the strategic level, at the opera-
tional level, and the tactical level (A Conversation
With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 6).
How far Pakistan plans to go in terms of its devel-
opment of a full-spectrum deterrent posture is unclear.
It has provided no public statements about its intent.
In 2015, however, Kidwai stated that the program is
not open ended. It started with a concept of credible
minimum deterrence, and certain numbers [of weap-
ons] were identified, and those numbers, of course,
were achieved not too far away in time. Then we
translated it, like I said, to the concept of full spectrum
deterrence in response to Indias Cold Start doctrine.
As a result, the numbers were modified. Now those
numbers, as of today, and if I can look ahead for at
least 10 to 15 more years, I think they are going to be
more or less okay. In terms of the required size of
Pakistans nuclear arsenal, Kidwai said, were almost
90, 95% there in terms of the goals that we had set out
to achieve 15 years ago (A Conversation With Gen.
Khalid Kidwai 2015, 6, 12).
We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing
sufficient fissile material to build 1427 new warheads
per year (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2013),
although we estimate that the actual warhead increase
in the stockpile is probably closer to an average of 10
warheads per year.
Nuclear-capable aircraft
Pakistan probably assigns a nuclear strike mission to
select F-16A/B and Mirage III/V fighter squadrons.
The F-16 was probably the first aircraft in the nuclear
role, but the Mirage quickly joined the mission.
The F-16A/Bs were supplied by the United States
between 1983 and 1987. After 40 aircraft had been
delivered, the US State Department told Congress in
1989: None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is
about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery
and Pakistan will be obligated by contract not to
modify additional F-16s without the approval of the
United States (Schaffer 1989). Yet, there were multiple
credible reports at the time that Pakistan was already
modifying US-supplied F-16s for nuclear weapons,
including West German intelligence officials reportedly
372 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
telling Der Spiegel that Pakistan had already developed
sophisticated computer and electronic technology to
outfit the US F-16s with nuclear weapons (Associated
Press 1989). Delivery of additional F-16s, including the
more modern F-16C/D version, were delayed by con-
cern over Pakistans emerging nuclear weapons pro-
gram and withheld by the United States in the 1990s.
But the policy was changed by the George W. Bush
administration, which supplied Pakistan with the more
modern F-16s.
The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at
Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, 160 km
(100 miles) northwest of Lahore. Organized into the
9th and 11th Squadrons (Griffins and Arrows, help from its Chinese ally for the JC-17/FC-1 jet
respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1600 km
(extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most
likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb
on the centerline pylon. Security perimeters at the base
have been upgraded since 2014. Nuclear bombs are
probably not stored at the base itself but kept at the
Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex 10 km to the
south. In a crisis, the bombs could be flown in or the
F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage
facilities to pick up the weapons.
The newest F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at
Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad. The wing upgraded
to F-16C/D from Mirage in 2011, and so far has one
squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the Falcons).
The base has been under significant expansion, with
numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. There
are also F-16s visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base north-
west of Islamabad, although that might be related to
industry at the base.
Some of the Mirage III and/or Mirage V aircraft
apparently have been equipped for nuclear weapons
and have been used in test-launches of the nuclear-
capable Raad air-launched cruise missile. The
Pakistani Air Force is adding aerial refueling capability
to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance a
nuclear strike mission.
The Mirage fighter-bombers are focused at two bases.
Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing
with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron (Bandits),
8th Squadron (Haiders), and 22nd Squadron
(Ghazis). A possible nuclear weapons storage site is
located five kilometers (three miles) northwest of the
base (Kristensen 2009), and since 2004, unique under-
ground facilities have been constructed at Masroor that
could potentially be designed to support a nuclear strike
mission. This includes a large underground facility within
a high-security area and a possible alert hangar with
underground weapons-handling capability.4
The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air base near
Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two
Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron (Cobras) and
the 27th Squadron (Zarras).
There are also rumors that Pakistan intends to make
the Chinese-supplied JF-17 fighter nuclear-capable.
According to the Pakistani Senate Defense Committee
on National Defence, the pursuit of the JF-17 program
was partially triggered by the US military export sanc-
tions in response to Pakistans nuclear program,
including the withholding of F-16 aircraft. With
spares for its top-of-the-line F16s in question, and
additional F-16s removed as an option, Pakistan sought
(Senate Committee on National Defense 2016).
Ballistic missiles
Pakistan appears to have six currently operational
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the short-range Abdali
(Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) and
NASR (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5)
and Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6). At least two other nuclear-cap-
able ballistic missiles are under development: the med-
ium-range Shaheen-1A and Shaheen-3.
The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has
undergone significant development and expansion over
the past decade. This includes four or five possible
missile garrisons along the Indian border for short-
range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1, NASR)
and three other garrisons further inland for medium-
range systems (Shaheen-2 and Ghauri).5
The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali
(Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time.
The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali
appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing
resumed in 2002 and it was last test launched in 2013.
The 180-km (111-mile) missile has been displayed at
parades several times on a four-axel road-mobile TEL.
The three-year gap in flight testing indicates the Abdali
program may have encountered technical difficulties.
After the 2013 test, the Inter Services Public Relations
(ISPR) stated that Abdali carries nuclear as well as
conventional warheads and provides an operational-
level capability to Pakistans Strategic Forces. ISPR
said the test launch consolidates Pakistans deterrence
capability both at the operational and strategic levels
(ISPR 2013).
The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi
(Hatf-3) was likely derived from the Chinese M-11
missile, of which Pakistan acquired approximately 30
in the early 1990s. In 1996 two years before

Pakistans nuclear tests a classified US National
Intelligence Estimate on Chinas missile-related assis-
tance to Pakistan concluded that the latter probably
had developed nuclear warheads for the M-11 (Smith
1996). The Ghaznavi was test launched twice in 2014.
After the second test on May 8, 2014, the ISPR said the
Ghaznavi was capable of delivering nuclear and con-
ventional warheads, and that the test was the culmi-
nating point of the Field Training Exercise of Army
Strategic Forces Command which was aimed at testing
the operational readiness of a Strategic Missile Group
besides up gradation [sic] of various capabilities of
Weapon Systems (ISPR 2014a). Its short range of
290 km (180 miles) the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC) reports the range to be
250 km (155 miles) means that the Ghaznavi cannot
strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and Army units
equipped with the missile are probably based relatively
near the Indian border.6
The Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel,
dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a max-
imum range of 750 km (466 miles) that has been in
service since 2003. The Shaheen-1 may be a reverse-
engineered Chinese M-9 missile and is carried on a
four-axle, road-mobile TEL similar to the one used for
the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, Shaheen-1 test-launches have
involved an extended-range version widely referred to
as Shaheen-1A. The Pakistani Government, which has
declared the range to be 900 km (560 miles), has used
both designations: Shaheen-1A in 2012 (ISPR 2012a)
and Shaheen-1 in 2013 (ISPR 2013). Potential Shaheen-
1 deployments locations include Gujranwala, Okhara,
or Pano Aqil.7
One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable
missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the NASR (Hatf-9), a
short-range, solid-fuel missile with a range of only
60 km (37 miles). With a range too short to attack
strategic targets inside India, NASR appears intended
solely for battlefield use against invading Indian
troops.8 According to the Pakistani Government, the
NASR carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield
with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes and was
developed as a quick response system to add deter-
rence value to Pakistans strategic weapons develop-
ment program at shorter ranges in order to deter
evolving threats (ISPR 2011b). The four-axle, road-
mobile TEL appears to use a snap-on system that can
carry two or more launch-tube boxes. The most recent
test on September 26 2014 involved launching four
missiles from a road-mobile quadruple box launcher.
The US intelligence community has listed the NASR as
a deployed system since 2013 (NASIC 2013), but
because there have been just four test events, involving
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 373
launch of a total of 12 missiles, we estimate that opera-
tional deployment of the nuclear version may still be in
its early stages. Potential deployment locations include
Gujranwala, Okhara, or Pano Aqil.9
The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-2
(Hatf-6) appears to be operational after many years of
development. Pakistans National Defense Complex has
assembled Shaheen-2 launchers at least since 2004 or
2005 (Kristensen 2007), and a 2013 US intelligence
community report said that the Shaheen-2 probably
will soon be deployed (National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2013). The Pakistani
Government described the most recent Shaheen-2
test-launch, in November 2014, as a training launch
marking the culminating point of the Field Training
Exercise of Army Strategic Forces Command which
was aimed at ensuring operational readiness of a
Strategic Missile Group (ISPR 2014b). The US
NASIC has several times set the Shaheen-2s range at
2000 km (1243 miles), but after the November 2014
test the Pakistani Government reported the range as
only 1500 km (932 miles). The Shaheen-2 is carried on
a six-axle, road-mobile TEL.
Pakistan conducted two test launches of the med-
ium-range Shaheen-3 in 2015. The Pakistani
Government said the missile was capable of delivering
a nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of
2750 km (1709 miles). Since the range exceeded the
north-to-south length of Pakistan, the Shaheen-3 test-
launch had an impact point in the Arabian Sea (ISPR
2015a). The Shaheen-3 is carried on an eight-axle TEL
supplied by China and was displayed publicly for the
first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. The
Shaheen-3 will still require several more test launches
before it becomes operational.
The range of the Shaheen-3 is sufficient to
target all of mainland India from launch positions in
most of Pakistan to the south of Islamabad. But
apparently, the missile was developed to do more
than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of
2750 km was determined by a need to be able to
target the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the east-
ern part of the Indian Ocean that are developed as
strategic bases where India might think of putting
its weapons (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid
Kidwai 2015, 10). But for a 2750-km range Shaheen-
3 to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it
would need to be launched from positions in the
very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian
border. If deployed in the Western parts of the
Balochistan province, the range of the Shaheen-3
would for the first time bring Israel within range of
Pakistani nuclear missiles.
374 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
Pakistans oldest nuclear-capable medium-range bal-
listic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel
Ghauri (Hatf-5), was test launched on April 15 2015.
The government said the launch was conducted by a
Strategic Missile Group of the Army Strategic Forces
Command for the purpose of testing the operational
and technical readiness of Army Strategic Forces
Command (ISPR 2015b). The extra time needed to
fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more
vulnerable to attack than solid-fuel missiles, so it is
possible that the longer range versions of the Shaheen
may eventually replace the Ghauri.10 Potential deploy-
ment areas include the Sargodha Central Ammunition
Depot area.11
Cruise missiles
Pakistan is developing two new nuclear-capable
cruise missiles, the ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7)
and the air-launched Raad (Hatf-8). There are
rumors that the Babur is also being converted for
use on ships or submarines. According to the
Pakistani Government, the Babur and Raad both
have stealth capabilities and pinpoint accuracy,
and each is described as a low-altitude, terrain-hug-
ging missile with high maneuverability (ISPR 2011a,
2011c). They are both much slimmer than Pakistans
ballistic missiles, suggesting success with warhead
miniaturization based on plutonium instead of
uranium.
The Babur is a ground-launched, subsonic, dual-
capable cruise missile that looks similar to the US
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese
DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the
Russian air-launched AS-15. The Babur has been test
launched 11 times (last in 2014) and is probably opera-
tional with the armed forces. Its road-mobile launcher
appears to be a unique five-axle TEL with a three-tube
box launcher that is different than the quadruple box
launcher used for static display. The Pakistani
Government normally reports the range as 700 km
(435 miles) (ISPR 2012b, 2012c), but the US intelli-
gence community sets the range much lower, at
350 km (217 miles) (National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2013).
Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National
Defense Complex for several years and have recently
been seen at the Akro garrison northeast of Karachi.
The garrison includes a large enclosure with six
garages that have room for 12 TELs and a unique
underground facility that is probably used to store
the missiles.12
The second cruise missile under development, the
air-launched, dual-capable Raad (Hatf-8), has been
test-launched six times, most recently in February
2016, and might be entering service soon. The test
launches have been conducted from a Mirage III
fighter-bomber. The Pakistani Government states that
the Raad can deliver nuclear and conventional war-
heads with great accuracy (ISPR 2011c) to a range of
350 km, and complementing Pakistans deterrence
capability by achieving strategic standoff capability
on land and at sea (ISPR 2016).
A potential deployment site for the Raad is Masroor
Air Base outside Karachi, which is home for several
Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground
facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons
storage and handling.13
There are also indications that Pakistan is develop-
ing a nuclear weapon initially probably a nuclear-
capable cruise missile for deployment on submarines.
In 2012, the Pakistani navy established Headquarters
Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC) for the
development and deployment of a sea-based strategic
nuclear force. The government said that this command
would be the custodian of the nations 2nd strike
capability to strengthen Pakistans policy of
Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional
stability (ISPR 2012d). It is possible that the naval
weapon will be a modified version of the Babur
ground-launched cruise missile.
Kidwai in 2015 publicly acknowledged the need
for a sea-based second-strike capability. Although a
land-based capability can also provide a second-
strike capability, that is not assured. The assured
second strike capability comes from being sea
based, he explained. Therefore, without calling it
a specific nuclear submarine, or something, broadly
speaking a second-strike capability, a limited sec-
ond-strike capability, a modern second-strike cap-
ability for Pakistan, I think will be helpful (A
Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 15).
Kidwai confirmed that the technologies needed to
acquire a sea-based nuclear capability are being
developed. I can say with confidence that we are
not too far away from it. So, comprehensively speak-
ing I think this capability will come into play in the
next few years (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid
Kidwai 2015, 16).
In 2015, the Pakistani Ministry of Defence
Production reported a new contract for the indi-
genous development of 1 [one] ship-borne system
with 1 [one] Land Attack Missile to be completed
by October 2018 (Government of Pakistan [2014]
2015).

Notes
1. For insightful analysis of Pakistans nuclear policy, see:
Siddique and Faisal (2016); Dalton and Krepon
(2015).
2. These amounts of fissile material per warhead are
conservative estimates and may be less (Cochran and
Paine 1995, 9).
3. Gul (2014); One year after providing this description
of the Pakistani nuclear warhead program, Lavoy was
appointed as Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for South Asia at the National
Security Council.
4. For analysis of possible nuclear facilities at Masroor
Air Base, see: Kristensen (2016).
5. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see:
Kristensen (2016).
6. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see:
Kristensen (2016).
7. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see:
Kristensen (2016).
8. For en excellent analysis of the doctrine and Pakistans
potential use of battlefield nuclear weapons, see:
Nayyar and Mian (2010).
9. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see:
Kristensen (2016).
10. The Ghauri MRBM is based on North Koreas No
Dong missile.
11. For analysis of possible missile brigade locations, see:
Kristensen (2016).
12. For analysis of possible missile brigade locations, see:
Kristensen (2016).
13. For analysis of possible nuclear facilities at Masroor
Air Base, see: Kristensen (2016).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the
authors.
Funding
This research was carried out with grants from the New
Lands Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.
Notes on contributors
Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear
Information Project with the Federation of American
Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on research-
ing and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the
policies that direct them. Kristensen is a coauthor of the
world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook
(Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the
news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations.
Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales St NW,
Sixth Floor, Washington, DC, 20,036 USA; +1 (202)
546-3300.
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 375
Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of
American Scientists in Washington, DC. His principal areas
of expertise include writing and research on all aspects of the
nuclear weapons programs of the United States, Russia,
Britain, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and
Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie
R. Groves, the Manhattan Projects Indispensable Man (2002).
He has coauthored the Nuclear Notebook column since May
1987.
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