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Andrew Chesterman
To cite this article: Andrew Chesterman (2001) Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath, The Translator,
7:2, 139-154, DOI: 10.1080/13556509.2001.10799097
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The Translator. Volume 7, Number 2 (2001), 139-154 ISBN 1-900650-50-9
ANDREW CHESTERMAN
University of Helsinki, Finland
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In the Hopi Indian culture, the Spider Grandmother is the mythical figure
who oversees the spiritual development of humankind. She gave two basic
ethical rules, not just to Hopis but to all humanity. She said, Dont go around
hurting each other, and she said, Try to understand things (Heat-Moon
1984:187).
These two ethical principles one negative and one positive may take
us a long way toward an ethics of translation. This paper first offers an analy-
sis of the current state of affairs, and then offers an alternative proposal.
language are legally equivalent to any other language version, perfect repre-
sentatives of each other, and that no single version is privileged as a source
text, in theory (for a detailed discussion of the EU translation situation, see
Koskinen 2000a).
Another line of inheritance of this ethic has to do with the long tradition
of representing the Other, the relation with alterity. It comes to the fore par-
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with others. To recognize the Other as a subject, with whom one can in-
deed communicate, is a primary ethical act, for Levinas, because this step
takes you out of your own ego-confined world (for an accessible but very
brief introduction to Levinas, see Melby 1995:119f.; see also Levinas 1982,
1987). In translation theory, the focus is naturally on communicating across
linguistic or cultural boundaries.
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Norm-based ethics. This model of translation ethics has arisen either explic-
itly or implicitly from descriptive translation studies and norm theory.
Following Toury (e.g. 1995), descriptive translation studies investigates the
norms that determine or influence translation production and reception. These
norms state what acceptable translation products should look like, and how
they vary from period to period and from culture to culture. The norms thus
represent expectations, mainly in the target culture, about what translations
are supposed to be like in that culture at that time. The norms are generally
accepted (in a particular culture) insofar as they appear to serve prevailing
values, including ethical values such as truth and trust (see Chesterman
1997:169f.). Behaving ethically thus means behaving as one is expected to
behave, in accordance with the norms, not surprising the reader or client.
142 Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath
fession as a whole.
2. Problems
There are several reasons for the current unease in translation studies about
questions of ethics. One is the lack of compatibility between available mod-
els. Each of the four models outlined above highlights different ethical values:
truth (representation), loyalty (service), understanding (communication), trust
(norm-based). Are some values higher than others? In the sense that some
may depend on or promote others, the answer to this question is perhaps
yes. People who speak the truth are more likely to be trusted than those
who do not. People who are loyal are also likely to be trusted by those whom
they are loyal to (but not necessarily by outsiders; indeed, an outsider might
have good reason not to trust them). Truth and trust may lead to understand-
ing. However, none of the models is very clear about what the appropriately
ethical action might be in a situation where values (or loyalties) clash. On
what grounds can we simply say: choose this model when it seems appropri-
ate, and that model at other times? Would such a solution itself be ethical?
The different models do nevertheless have different scopes and limita-
tions of application: some models have been applied more to literary or Biblical
translation, others to technical or administrative translation. The representa-
tion model is vulnerable to arguments about the impossibility of totally true
representation, about the relative status of originals and translations, about
the illusion of perfect equivalence. How might it be applied to translation
tasks that call for radical rewriting or adaptation or improvement to the text?
For some scholars, the representation model nevertheless seems to be the
only one, since ethical problems are sometimes discussed almost entirely
from this angle (for example, Lane-Mercier 1997).
The service model stresses the translators expertise, but also seems to
make a virtue of translatorial invisibility, weakening the translators autonomy
to some extent. One might even argue that it can promote a mercenary atti-
tude and a meek and passive habitus. How might it be applied to a freelance
translator initiating the translation of an avant-garde Italian poet?
The communication model risks expanding the translators responsibility
to cover aspects of cross-cultural relations that may have more to do with
clients and readers than with the translator. Suppose the cross-cultural un-
derstanding and cooperation is successful but promotes evidently unethical
ends, as for instance in the task of translating instructions for making a cheap
Andrew Chesterman 143
campaign in the EU, which seeks to promote clarity both in original docu-
ments and in translations. To be unclear is felt to be a betrayal of loyalty to
the reader, and also to the client, who presumably wishes readers to under-
stand a translation. Popper (1945/1962:308) has even argued that clarity is a
precondition for all rational communication, without which society cannot
exist. But what is meant by clarity?
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We might start with virtues rather than values. This is the position taken by
the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), who argues interestingly against
Andrew Chesterman 145
Lets unpack that a bit. The key ideas are cooperative human activity and a
striving for excellence. Paraphrasing, we could say that a practice is the kind
of cooperative activity that involves the desire to get better and better at it.
Examples given by MacIntyre are football, chess, architecture, farming, phys-
ics, medicine, painting, music, politics. Thus defined, all practices involve
human relationships.
Excelling in a practice brings a sense of satisfaction in its own right (what
MacIntyre calls internal goods), quite apart from any external benefits.
Entering into a practice means entering into a relationship with its history
and tradition (its narrative, in fact) and its contemporary practitioners. It also
means accepting the authority of prevailing standards of excellence (at least
initially), and striving to achieve them, even to exceed them. Achieving this
excellence not only enriches the person involved but also the community at
large. Roughly speaking, a virtue can then be defined as an acquired human
quality that helps a person strive for excellence in a practice (MacIntyre
1981:178). Such virtues include trustworthiness, truthfulness, fairness, and
the courage to take risks in caring for others. Apart from virtues, practices
also involve purely technical skills. And they need institutions to support
them.
How does this point of view help us in searching for a professional ethics
of translation? Some would argue that translation is not a true profession in
the first place, because it does not seem to have a monopoly on a value goal
that is not shared by other groups (compare medicine, with the value goal of
health; law, for justice; teaching, for human growth; and the police, for secu-
rity) (Airaksinen 1991/1993). After all, the values of cross-cultural
understanding and cooperation are also shared by such people as diplomats
and language-teachers. But translation is clearly a practice. As such, it is
146 Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath
Then there are the general virtues I have already mentioned, such as fair-
ness (the comparative value assessment of alternative actions must not be
deliberately biased), truthfulness (the assessment must be as honest as possi-
ble), and trustworthiness (the translator must be able to defend the decisions
taken, to give evidence of reliability). To these we might also add empathy,
i.e. the ability to put oneself in someone elses place the readers, the origi-
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4. An ethics of commitment
I take commitment to be the glue that binds practitioners to the values of the
practice. It is thus also a virtue, supporting the striving for excellence, the
wanting to be a good translator. A commitment is often stated overtly, as a
148 Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath
promise or oath in the marriage service, for instance. Oaths are quintessen-
tially statements of contractual ethics: they constitute contracts, binding
promises; but they may also have utilitarian aspects, such as reference to
desirable or undesirable results. Let us look at two examples of oaths of com-
mitment to a practice. The first example is one of the oldest of all the medical
professions Hippocratic Oath. Here it is in full, with paragraph numbers
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added:
(1) I swear by Apollo the healer, by Aesculapius, by Health and all the pow-
ers of healing, and call to witness all the gods and goddesses that I may
keep this Oath and Promise to the best of my ability and judgment.
(2) I will pay the same respect to my master in the Science as to my parents
and share my life with him and pay all my debts to him. I will regard his
sons as my brothers and teach them the Science, if they desire to learn it,
without fee or contract. I will hand on precepts, lectures, and all other
learning to my sons, to those of my master and to those pupils duly ap-
prenticed and sworn, and to none other.
(3) I will use my power to help the sick to the best of my ability and judg-
ment; I will abstain from harming or wrongdoing any man by it.
(4) I will not give a fatal draught to anyone if I am asked, nor will I suggest
any such thing. Neither will I give a woman means to procure an abor-
tion.
(5) I will be chaste and religious in my life and in my practice. I will not cut,
even for the stone, but I will leave such procedures to the practitioners of
that craft.
(6) Whenever I go into a house, I will go to help the sick and never with the
intention of doing harm or injury. I will not abuse my position to indulge
in sexual contacts with the bodies of women or of men, whether they be
freemen or slaves.
(7) Whatever I see or hear, professionally or privately, which ought not to be
divulged, I will keep secret and tell no one.
(8) If, therefore, I observe this Oath and do not violate it, may I prosper both
in my life and in my profession, earning good repute among all men for
all time. If I transgress and forswear this Oath, may my lot be otherwise.
(Translated by J. Chadwick and W.N. Mann, in Hippocratic Writings,
Penguin Books, 1950.)
ting for the stone means a promise not to do things the promiser is not quali-
fied to do: surgical operations to remove kidney or gall stones were the tasks
of other professionals in Ancient Greece. Paragraphs 6 and 7 formulate posi-
tive and negative promises about the abuse of ones professional position
and the importance of professional secrets.
My second example is a modern one in fact, it is no more than a pro-
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posal for an oath. It has been suggested as a possible professional oath for
engineers by Arto Siitonen (1991/1993:279), in a Finnish collection of arti-
cles on professional ethics. He calls it the Archimedean Oath. This is my
translation:
This is no more than a proposal, and much might be said about the details
of the formulation: the text does not have the form of an oath, for instance.
But certain points of content are of interest. The proposal starts with a state-
ment of the general aim of engineering. It contains both positive and implied
negative prescriptions. It includes an overt statement about striving for fur-
ther development, i.e. towards excellence. And it suggests that engineers
should reflect on what they do, in addition to being good at it.
In the light of these examples and the preceding discussion, suppose we
now try to formulate a similar oath for professional translators: a Hieronymic
Oath. It is perhaps surprising that no such international oath exists. After all,
translation itself is what Maria Tymoczko (1999:110) calls a commissive
act. When submitting a translation, a translator in effect makes a promise: I
hereby promise that this text represents the original in some relevant way.
(Let us not get bogged down here in arguments about definitions of equiva-
lence. The translator claims that the translation is, in some way, equivalent;
in fact, he or she implictly promises this. If the client and readers trust the
translator, the claim is believed.) This act of commitment reminds us of the
etymology of the words profession and professional: they derive from the
idea of professing, of publicly affirming something, in the form of a public
vow.
At the national level we can find examples of such oaths. Many countries
have a national accreditation system of sworn translators or licensed trans-
lators who commit themselves to a basic code of conduct. The current Finnish
150 Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath
This statement is laid down by Finnish law, in the statute on licensed transla-
tors and their accreditation (statute 626, dating from 1989). It highlights the
virtues of loyalty and trustworthiness, but does not enter into any of the
specificities of the translators task. Indeed, it is so general that it might be
applied to practically any occupation at all, just by changing the reference to
the profession in question.
As a second and rather more detailed example, I cite below the first sec-
tion of the code used by the American Translators Association (available at
<http://www.atanet.org/codeofprof.htm>). The second section concerns the
obligations of employers, which are not my concern in this article. The first
section runs as follows:
This code makes explicit appeal to the virtue of striving for excellence,
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and also mentions some supporting skills. The preamble implies that being
a bridge for ideas is the aim of translation; it perhaps also implies the need
to ensure some understanding of the ideas, but this is not stated explicitly.
Merely being a bridge might be seen as rather a passive kind of aim. Point
A appeals first to an ethics of representation (faithfully), and then shifts to
an ethics of service (the needs of the end user(s)). There is no mention of
the needs of the original author. The end user is presumably the reader, not
the client. Point B has to do with truthfulness, points C-F with trustworthi-
ness. The points are formulated at the level of good business practices, rather
than in terms of ethical principles or values.
I will now draw on all the foregoing discussion and examples in propos-
ing a possible Hieronymic Oath. But before I do so, let me return to the
Hopis Spider Grandmother. Note that of her two ethical principles, one is
negative and one positive. The negative one is given prominence, as it comes
first. It is very similar to the commitment made in the Hypocractic Oath: do
no harm. Compare also the Archimedean Oath: avoid harmful effects. Why
this emphasis on the negative? Most of the Old Testaments Ten Command-
ments are negative, too. I suspect one reason is that it is easier to define and
agree about harm and suffering than about happiness or other values. There
is something obvious about suffering or harm: you can see immediately that
it is not good. Injustice is easier to see than justice. Negative ethics ena-
bles us to be more practical, working for the elimination or reduction of the
obviously bad, rather than building utopian castles in the air.
What is the harm that ethical translators seek to reduce? Maybe we could
call it communicative suffering (Chesterman 1997:184-86). Communica-
tive suffering arises from not understanding something that you want to
understand, from misunderstanding or inadequate understanding, and from
not being able to get your own message across. It also arises from a lack of
communication at all. Translators are like doctors in that their task is to inter-
vene in certain cases of communicative suffering: those involving language
and culture boundaries. Not all cases of communicative suffering, note (just
as Greek doctors were not competent to cure all diseases); just some. Their
job is to cure or alleviate these particular kinds of communicative suffering.
Their intervention may not always lead to perfect communicative health,
any more than a doctors intervention always leads to a perfect cure. But the
aim is at least to reduce this suffering.
152 Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath
One might even call this a Buddhist attitude to translation in that it takes a
kind of suffering as its starting point, as a fundamental fact, and tries to do
something about it. Compare the Christian alternative of starting with sin,
with the impossibility of perfection (ideal equivalence), and the resulting
implication of permanent failure. Devy (1999) makes a related point about a
difference between Western and Indian metaphysics. In the West, translation
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has been metaphorically linked to the fall from an original state, and hence to
the secondary status of derived, non-original production. In India, on the other
hand, translation is readily associated with the migration of the soul from
one incarnation to another. During this cycle of rebirths the soul does not
lose any of its original significance; on the contrary, it ideally makes some
progress towards a better state, as it is revitalized over and over again.
The Spider Grandmothers second injunction is also interesting. Try to
understand things things in a very general sense, of course. A similar
point is made in the engineers oath, about pondering on developmental trends.
For a translator this is naturally a primary task: to understand what the client
wants, to understand the source text, to understand what the readers can be
expected to understand, and so on. If communicative suffering is our nega-
tive pole, understanding is the positive one.
This brings us back to the axiological level, the discussion of values. I
suggest that understanding is the highest value for translators albeit in a
wide and varied sense. All other relevant professional values truth, clarity,
loyalty, trust are subordinate to understanding. This, I submit, is the defin-
ing limit of a translators professional ethics, and also of their professional
responsibility, the responsibility of their practice. The translator might of
course feel personally responsible for the consequences of this understand-
ing; and this feeling of personal responsibility might well affect their decisions
about whether, or how, to translate. (Compare the point made above about
excluding the translators political engagement from professional ethics.) What
communicating parties do with their resultant understanding is a matter of
their own ethical principles whether they use it in order to cooperate, for
good or evil, or whatever. Furthermore, any professional ethic must be sub-
servient to more general or universal ethics, since professions and practices
only concern subsets of societies, just as societies are subsets of humankind
as a whole, and humankind of organic life in general.
5. A Hieronymic Oath?
So, here is a proposal for a universal Hieronymic Oath. A first draft, submit-
ted for responses and criticisms of all kinds, to be developed and maybe
expanded, or indeed rejected. It is influenced by the above discussion of cur-
rent ethical models and values, by the notion of virtues, by the examples of
professional oaths we have looked at, and also by the Spider Grandmother.
Andrew Chesterman 153
1. I swear to keep this Oath to the best of my ability and judgement. [Com-
mitment]
2. I swear to be a loyal member of the translators profession, respecting its
history. I am willing to share my expertise with colleagues and to pass it
on to trainee translators. I will not work for unreasonable fees. I will al-
ways translate to the best of my ability. [Loyalty to the profession]
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ANDREW CHESTERMAN
Department of Romance Languages, Yliopistonkatu 3, 00014 University of
Helsinki, Finland. Andrew.Chesterman@Helsinki.Fi
References