Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................................1
Argument..................................................................................................................16
IV. Plaintiffs make no plausible claim under the Ku Klux Klan Act. .................28
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)........................................................................... passim
Barrett v. State,
705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ................................................... 6, 22
Foster v. State,
705 So. 2d 534 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) ..........................................................6
Givens v. Zerbst,
255 U.S. 11 (1921)...........................................................................................9
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Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874 (1994).......................................................................................24
Robertson v. Bartels,
148 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.N.J. 2001) ................................................................29
Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970).......................................................................................29
Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986).........................................................................................24
Washington v. Finlay,
664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981) .........................................................................26
Constitutional Provisions
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Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2) ................................... 14, 23, 24
Rules
FED. R. CIV. P. 12 ............................................................................................. passim
Regulations
28 CFR § 51.36 ........................................................................................................23
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Other Authorities
5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1990) ............................................9
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INTRODUCTION
Rights Act, gives citizens the right to challenge the State’s implementation of its
laws “with respect to voting.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). But Plaintiffs are not
bringing this case to challenge the State’s implementation of its voting laws. They
are bringing it as a last-ditch effort to block the State from enforcing its gambling
laws. There is not even a colorable argument that federal law gives them a right to
do that.
The Alabama Constitution and Code prohibit gambling generally, and slot
machines in particular. They have for decades. But in recent years, gambling
interests defiantly built casinos throughout the State and filled them with slot
machines. They claimed that their machines played a form of “bingo” that is legal
have repeatedly made clear, however, that those amendments legalize only the
traditional form of “bingo” that grandmothers have long taught their grandchildren
on summer vacations. See City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435, 436 (Ala.
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___ So. 3d ___, 2009 WL 3805712, at *18 (Ala. Nov. 13, 2009). And anyone who
saw these machines operate knew that they were not playing the game traditionally
known as bingo. As the Alabama Supreme Court explained last year, the
Id. at *18.
Governor Riley created a Task Force on Illegal Gambling and made John Tyson its
other law-enforcement officers took various steps to rid Alabama of these illegal
machines. Now, casinos that once operated in counties throughout the State—in
not only Greene and Macon County, but also Houston, Jefferson, Lowndes,
Force’s efforts in state court, those who support illegal gambling have now sought
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refuge here, in federal court, under the most baseless of theories. They have tried
law—and thus, whether the State has been correct in seizing these machines—into,
precedent makes clear that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act has no application here.
And Plaintiffs’ claims under § 2 of that Act, the Reconstruction Amendments, and
the Ku Klux Klan Act have even less merit. This Court should dismiss the
Complaint (Doc. 1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (citations
omitted).
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The Iqbal Court explained that “[t]wo working principles underlie” the
12(b)(6) analysis, id., and both are critical here. First, “the tenet that a court must
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id.
at 1950. When “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
8(a)(2)).
and in light of the background principles of Alabama law against which Plaintiffs
are making their assertions that Governor Riley and Commander Tyson have
Rule 12(b)(6).
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Alabama Supreme Court has defined for constitutional purposes as including all
forms of gambling for prizes awarded predominately on the basis of chance. See
Opinion of the Justices No. 373, 795 So. 2d 630, 634–35 (Ala. 2001). Similarly,
Alabama law has for nearly a century prohibited the possession or use of any “slot
machine,” ALA. CODE § 13A-12-27, which the Code broadly defines as any
operates, either completely automatically or with the aid of some physical act by
the player, in such a manner that, depending upon elements of chance, it may eject
that use this language, including those governing Greene and Macon Counties). In
a 1994 case, City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1994), the Alabama
Supreme Court held that the term “bingo” in the Calhoun County amendment,
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ALA. CONST. amend. 508, did not allow a city to authorize its residents to play a
game, called “instant bingo,” that did not incorporate the traditional elements of
bingo, because that game was not the game “commonly known as bingo.” See 642
So. 2d at 436–37. Later Alabama decisions confirmed that the term “bingo” in the
Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); accord Foster v.
the Alabama Constitution was again amended to add local “bingo” amendments in
Greene County and Macon County. See Doc. 1 at 9–12, ¶¶ 41–51. It is those two
The Greene County amendment, ALA. CONST. amend. 743, authorizes the
Using similar language to that employed by the Alabama courts when construing
the Calhoun County amendment, the Greene County amendment says that “bingo”
is “[t]hat specific kind of game commonly known as bingo.” ALA. CONST. amend.
743. The amendment says that “bingo” can be played “on a card or electronic
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marking machine,” id., but as the Alabama Supreme Court has recognized,
“electronic marking machines” are an entirely different type of machine from the
slot-machine devices being used in these “electronic bingo” casinos. Thus, the
materially different from the types of electronic gaming machines at issue” in these
The Macon County amendment, ALA. CONST. amend. 744, is identical in all
material respects to the Calhoun County amendment that the Alabama Supreme
or other lawful purposes shall be legal” in Macon County. ALA. CONST. amend.
744. It does not purport to broaden the term “bingo” beyond its traditional
slot machines.
Department of Justice has not precleared the substance of these amendments under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Complaint alleges, somewhat ambiguously, that
the Greene County and Macon County amendments were “precleared by the
Attorney General of the United States.” Doc. 1 at 9, ¶ 42; id. at 11, ¶ 47. But “the
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tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; and if Plaintiffs are
alleging that DOJ approved the these amendments’ provisions allowing “bingo,”
that conclusion is false. Under § 5’s plain terms, DOJ must preclear only changes
added). It said nothing about the substance of the amendments themselves. Thus,
while the Complaint may plausibly allege that DOJ precleared the election at
Complaint does not plausibly allege that DOJ actually precleared the amendments’
provisions making “bingo games” legal in those counties. Preclearing that sort of
thing is simply not within the job description of the DOJ’s Voting Section.
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signing Executive Order 44. Doc. 1 at 12–13, ¶¶ 52–53. The Order stated that
“there is occurring at sites across this State, under the name of ‘bingo,’ gambling
activity which no reasonable observer could assert in good faith to be ‘the ordinary
game of bingo.’” Exh. A at 2.1 The Order reported that in the casinos recently
built throughout the State, “an electronic device or system automatically processes
an instant game of virtual ‘bingo’ upon activation and a wager by the human
player, the outcome of which is based predominantly on chance rather than on any
meaningful human interaction and skill.” Id. The Order stated that this form of
“slot-machine style gambling” is illegal. Id. And the Order took note that there
1
This Court may consider the entire Order, for the purposes of determining
its contents, when addressing this motion to dismiss. See Bryant v. Avado Brands,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (“‘[i]n determining whether to grant a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court primarily considers the allegations in the
complaint, although matters of public record ... may be taken into account.’”
(quoting 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1357, at 299 (2d ed. 1990)); see also Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11,
18 (1921) (President’s order “was a part of the law of the land, which we judicially
notice without averment or proof”). Accordingly, the entirety of Executive Order
44, as amended, is attached as Exhibit A.
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created the Task Force. The Task Force consists of various law-enforcement
Department of Public Safety and the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
See id. The Order also states that the Task Force’s “Commander” is a “Special
the State in “the prosecution or defense of any case related to gambling activity in
the State of Alabama.” Id. Governor Riley amended the Order in 2010 to mandate
that the Commander could be a sitting district attorney. See id. at 5 (citing ALA.
CODE § 12-17-184(10)). Governor Riley then appointed Tyson, the sitting district
attorney from Mobile County, to serve as Commander and Special Prosecutor. See
Commander Tyson have enforced Alabama’s law against slot machines. To this
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end, Plaintiffs allege that Commander Tyson, exercising “the purported law
warrantless police raids against bingo operations in Macon and Greene Counties.”
Doc. 1 at 13, ¶ 55. Although Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants have raided bingo
facilities without obtaining judicial warrants only in Macon and Greene Counties,”
id. at 13–14, ¶ 56, they do not allege, and could not plausibly allege, that Governor
Riley and Commander Tyson have “shut[] down the bingo operations in Greene
and Macon Counties,” id. at 15, ¶ 61, they do not allege, and could not plausibly
allege, that these are the only two counties where the Task Force has fulfilled its
mandate.2
2
Indeed, published newspaper reports indicate that no so-called “electronic
bingo” facility within the State’s jurisdiction is currently operating. See Sebastian
Kitchen, VictoryLand Closes as Raid Looms, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Aug. 10,
2010 (reporting that the VictoryLand casino in Macon County “voluntarily closed
its doors” in response to the Task Force’s actions and that VictoryLand had been
“the only non-Indian casino still open in the state”); Bob Riley, Luck Running Out
for Casinos, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010 (noting that even before
VictoryLand’s decision to close, “[t]he task force succeeded in helping to stop
illegal slot machine operations in Houston, Etowah, St. Clair, Jefferson, Mobile,
Lowndes, Walker, Madison and Greene counties”). Although this Court need not
consider this fact when evaluating this motion to dismiss, the Governor and
Commander bring it to the Court’s attention for informational purposes.
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numerous opinions validating the Task Force’s work. The Supreme Court has held
that the Governor had the power under Alabama law to create the Task Force and
to direct its members to enforce the law throughout the State.3 The Court has
the Task Force’s seizures of these slot machines—or to preempt, via declaratory-
judgment actions, the Task Force’s attempts to enforce the law through forfeiture
actions.4 And the Court has repeatedly held that the term “bingo” in the local
constitutional amendments means only the traditional game with all of its human
skill and interaction, thus indicating that the game played on these so-called
3
See Tyson v. Jones, Nos. 1090878 & 1090939, ___ So. 3d ____, 2010 WL
2983188, at *11–*17 (Ala. July 30, 2010); Ex parte State, No. 1090808, ___ So.
3d ___, 2010 WL 2034825, at * 12–30 (Ala. May 21, 2010).
4
See Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, No. 1090548, ___ So. 3d
___, 2010 WL 415271, at *2 (Ala. Feb. 4, 2010); Barber v. Houston County Econ.
Dev. Ass’n, No. 1090444 (Ala. Jan. 15, 2010) (unpublished order); see also Docs.
1-1, 1-2, & 1-3 (unpublished orders from Greene County case).
5
See Barber, 2009 WL 3805712, at *18 (noting that the ordinary game of
bingo is “materially different from the types of electronic gaming machines at
issue here”); id. at *17–*18 (describing six-part test to determine whether a game
is “bingo”); Ex parte State, 2010 WL 2034825, at *24 (noting that the Governor’s
position on the legality of “electronic bingo” is “consistent with at least three
appellate decisions”); Surles v. City of Ashville, Nos. 1080826 & 1081015, ___ So.
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V. Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Plaintiffs allege that they are African-American citizens and either registered
voters in Greene and Macon Counties or state representatives for those Counties.
See Doc. 1 at 3–7, ¶¶ 4–34. None alleges that he or she voted for the local
amendments authorizing charitable bingo in those counties, but one Plaintiff does
allege that he sponsored the bill that “became” the Macon County amendment. Id.
First, Plaintiffs assert that the Governor and Commander have violated § 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Section 5 requires Alabama
to preclear, with either the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, certain changes in the law “with respect to voting.” Id. In an
attempt to support their claim under that statute, Plaintiffs allege that the Governor
and Commander have “overridden” and “exercised veto power” over the local
amendments authorizing “bingo.” Id. at 15–16, ¶ 65. Plaintiffs further allege that
the Governor, by directing Commander Tyson to enforce the law in Greene and
3d ___, 2010 WL 336689, at *6–*8 (Ala. Jan. 29, 2010) (reaffirming Barber’s six-
part test and confirming that only bingo played on paper or printed cards is
permitted).
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sheriffs “with an official appointed by the Governor.” Id. at 16, ¶ 66. Plaintiffs
conclude from these assertions that the Governor’s and Commander’s “executive
orders, police raids and law enforcement actions” are “standards, practices, and
procedures affecting voting,” id. at 15, ¶ 64; and they assert that the State’s failure
to preclear these “executive orders, police raids and law enforcement actions” with
Second, Plaintiffs assert that Governor Riley and Commander Tyson have
violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which precludes the State from imposing or
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(a). Plaintiffs try to support this theory by alleging that “African Americans
constitute” large majorities of the “voting age population” in Greene and Macon
Counties. Doc. 1 at 17, ¶ 72. Plaintiffs conclude that the Governor’s and
procedures that have” abridged or diluted their right to vote “in violation of § 2.”
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members of the class they seek to represent the ability to choose by constitutional
amendment the laws and means of their enforcement in their own counties.” Id. at
19, ¶ 78. Plaintiffs further allege that Governor Riley and Commander Tyson
denying African Americans the ability to exercise home rule in their respective
counties.” Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiffs assert that this alleged “purposeful discrimination”
violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Finally, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action under the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), which makes it unlawful for “two or more persons in any State
another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws.” To support that claim,
Plaintiffs assert that Governor Riley and Commander Tyson have implemented
Executive Order 44 “for the purpose of threatening and intimidating plaintiffs and
African-American members of the class they seek to represent, and for the racially
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constitutionally approved by plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.” Id. at
20, ¶ 82.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs are insulting the letter and the spirit of nation’s most important
Civil Rights laws by invoking them to shield illegal gambling. Plaintiffs are not
really alleging, and cannot possibly allege, that the Governor and Commander have
violated their right to vote. At best, what Plaintiffs are really alleging is that the
is no plausible argument that such an allegation states a claim under the Voting
Rights Act, the Ku Klux Klan Act, or the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Rule 12(b)(6).
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provision alone (Docs. 3–5 & 12)—their § 5 claim is squarely foreclosed by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S.
491 (1992). Section 5, by its terms, requires the State to obtain federal
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” that was not in place on
Presley that this language means precisely what it says: for § 5 to apply, the
changes at issue must be “changes in voting” or “election law.” 502 U.S. at 501
(internal quotation marks omitted). Presley held that an attenuated link between
the “change” and voting will not suffice: the “change” must have “a direct relation
to voting and the election process.” Id. at 503. Plaintiffs have not alleged, and
could not possibly allege, any “change” that comes close to satisfying that
standard.
position that these machines are illegal, and their attempts to enforce the law based
seriously maintain that the State’s enforcement of these laws has “a direct relation
to voting and the election process.” Presley, 502 U.S at 503. The Presley Court
held that only four types of “changes” generally meet the “direct relation” test:
those that (1) “involve[] the manner of voting”; (2) “involve candidacy
electorate that may vote for candidates for a given office”, or (4) “affect[] the
The Presley Court had good reason for ruling as it did. If Plaintiffs were
right, then every time a citizen believed that a state executive official was
misinterpreting a state law in a covered jurisdiction, that citizen could file a federal
suit alleging that the official’s interpretation constituted a “change” affecting his or
her voting rights. That would require DOJ to review virtually every state executive
elections, before he or she enforced that interpretation. And that cannot be the law.
Section 5 protects voting rights and the integrity of state elections. It does not
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provide a forum for resolving the meaning of state laws that have nothing to do
with voting, and it does not require advance federal approval each time a covered
Tyson as Task Force Commander—and his directive that Tyson, rather than local
officials in Greene and Macon County, enforce the anti-gambling laws against
statutory provisions giving the Governor power to issue such directives were
around long before Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. See ALA. CODE 1940,
Tit. 13, § 229(11). But even more critically, Presley squarely held that
“changes.” 502 U.S at 508. The plaintiffs in Presley, represented by the same
attorney who is representing Plaintiffs here, argued that transfers of duties among
had to be precleared with DOJ. See id. at 493. The Supreme Court rejected that
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argument, finding that such changes do not have a “direct relation to voting and the
election process.” Id. at 503–08; accord Patterson v. Esch, Civ. A. No. 3:09cv438,
2009 WL 2424408, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 5, 2009) (holding that “drastic changes
in the power and authority of the office of mayor” were not subject to preclearance
in light of Presley).
tried to manufacture two exceptions to Presley, and they have tried to squeeze their
case into those two purported exceptions. But neither gambit gets their Complaint
erroneous premise, assert that the asserted transfer here counts as a § 5 change
backwards. The Presley Court held not that the particular transfer of power at
issue there was exempt from preclearance because it was “routine,” but rather that
because all such transfers are “routine.” Presley, 502 U.S. at 507–08. The Court
explained that if preclearance were required “every time a state legislature acts to
diminish or increase the power of public officials,” DOJ’s supervision over the
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States’ affairs would become “limitless.” Presley, 502 U.S. at 505–06. That is
precisely why the Presley Court held that courts must “formulate workable rules to
Tyson to enforce the provisions set out in Amendments 743 and 744, defendant
Riley has implemented a de facto replacement of” local elected officials in Greene
and Macon Counties. Doc. 1 at 16, ¶ 66. Presley expressly holds that when a State
transfers power between elected public officials and appointed ones, the State will
not be deemed to have engaged in a de facto replacement of the official who lost
Plaintiffs do not allege, and could not possibly allege, that the elected local sheriffs
in Greene and Macon Counties have not “retain[ed] substantial authority.” Id.
They do not allege, and could not plausibly allege, that the Governor’s directive to
Tyson has deprived the sheriffs of all their power to conduct investigations and
arrest those who commit crimes in their counties. Indeed, the local sheriffs still
retain substantial authority to regulate legal “bingo” within their jurisdictions. All
they may not do under longstanding Alabama law is “broaden[] the scope of the
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Constitution” by authorizing gambling activities that are not, in fact, the traditional
game of bingo. Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529, 532 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
would “exacerbate the substantial federalism costs that the preclearance procedure
constitutionality.” Reno v. Bossier Parrish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Yet that is precisely what Plaintiffs are asking
this Court to do. They want the Court to hold that before the Governor may
exercise his authority to enforce his State’s criminal laws—in a way that has
federal executive officials in Washington, D.C. And Plaintiffs want this Court to
require the Governor to seek DOJ preclearance not only of his “executive orders,”
but also of any “police raids” or “law enforcement actions” that he may determine
from fulfilling his constitutional obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.” ALA. CONST. Art V, § 120. If Plaintiffs’ view prevails, then the next
time an illegal casino opens, the Governor will not be able to immediately bring it
into compliance with Alabama law. He will need to seek DOJ’s permission first.
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move forward quickly, because those same regulations give DOJ “60 days” to rule
on any preclearance request. 28 CFR § 51.9(a). Only after those months have
passed—and after the casino has reaped millions in illicit profits off Alabama’s
citizens—will the Governor be able to fulfill his constitutional mandate. And even
Such a world would be a casino boss’s dream, but it is not a world the
Voting Rights Act creates. This Court should dismiss Count One under Rule
12(b)(6).
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
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nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
their choice.” Id. § 1973(b) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has therefore
reasoned that “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice,
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
Thus, the same arguments that doom Plaintiffs’ § 5 claim doom their § 2 claim,
too. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A]t least for
action for “purposeful discrimination” under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as well
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Amendment. But that Count fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
discrimination” claims on the notion that Governor Riley and Commander Tyson
have deprived them of their right to vote, those claims fail for the same reasons
discussed above: the Complaint does not plausibly allege that the Governor and
claims depend expressly on the premise that Governor Riley and Commander
Tyson have impaired their voting rights. See supra at 23 (discussing § 2’s
Amendment claim on premise that the defendants have compromised the plaintiffs’
“ability to” enact laws “by constitutional amendment”); U.S. CONST. amend. 15, §
because the Complaint does not allege—and could not plausibly allege—that
Governor Riley and Commander Tyson’s enforcement of the state’s gambling laws
has caused “slavery” or “involuntary servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. 13, § 1; cf.
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Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 927 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he [Thirteenth]
Second and perhaps even more importantly, all these claims are due to be
Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts setting forth a plausible claim that Governor
show that a state actor undertook a course of action “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 129 S. Ct. at
(1979)). The Court emphasized that to survive Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations that
the defendant acted with such a motive cannot be “conclusory.” Id. at 1951.
purposeful discrimination against a racial group will not suffice if there are “more
As was the case in Iqbal, Plaintiffs have not “‘nudged [their] claims’ of
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). As an initial matter, their allegation that
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That allegation is thus “conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” Id.
intentional discrimination. The only fact on which Plaintiffs appear to rely on this
See Doc. 1 at 17–18, ¶¶ 72–73. “But given more likely explanations” for Governor
Riley and Commander Tyson’s actions, the mere fact that those counties have large
purpose.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Executive Order 44 called for the Task Force
gambling laws.” Exh. A at 3. The Complaint does not allege, and could not
plausibly have alleged, that the Task Force failed to enforce the State’s gambling
is thus a “more likely explanation[]” for their acts in Greene and Macon County.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. “As between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’” and
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IV. Plaintiffs make no plausible claim under the Ku Klux Klan Act.
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Ku Klux Klan Act should be dismissed as well.
That Act makes it unlawful for “two or more persons in any State or Territory [to]
Tyson because the State and the officials who act on its behalf “constitute[] a
single legal entity that cannot conspire with itself” for the purposes of § 1985(3).
Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 768 (11th Cir. 2000). But
more critically, for the reasons given above, Plaintiffs have made no plausible
allegation that Governor Riley and Commander Tyson have acted to “depriv[e]”
anyone “of the equal protection of the laws” here. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiffs
are complaining because Governor Riley and Commander Tyson have followed
Executive Order 44’s mandate, which by its terms expressly called for the equal
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CONCLUSION
has discretion to exercise jurisdiction over, and dismiss, all of Plaintiffs’ claims.
See Clayton v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 317 F. Supp. 915, 920
(E.D.N.C 1970) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402–05 (1970)). The
panel should do so. Alternatively, the three-judge panel also has discretion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 5 claim and then transfer jurisdiction over the remainder of the
claims to the single-judge court, which may then dismiss them under Rule
12(b)(6). See Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443, 461–62 (D.N.J. 2001) .
29
Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 13 Filed 08/27/10 Page 36 of 37
Respectfully submitted,
__s/Henry T. Reagan_____
Attorney for Defendant
Governor Bob Riley
OF COUNSEL:
Henry T. Reagan (REA021)
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB RILEY
600 Dexter Avenue
Montgomery, Alabama 36130
(334) 242-7120
(334) 242-2335 (fax)
__s/Martha Tierney_____
Attorney for Defendant
Commander John M. Tyson, Jr.
OF COUNSEL:
Martha Tierney (TIE001)
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB RILEY
600 Dexter Avenue
Montgomery, Alabama 36130
(334) 242-7120
(334) 242-2335 (fax)
30
Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 13 Filed 08/27/10 Page 37 of 37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On August 27, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the
Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of the filing to the
following counsel of record:
Edward Still
2112 11th Avenue South
Suite 541
Birmingham, AL 35205
205-320-2882
fax 205-449-9752
E-mail: still@votelaw.com
James U. Blacksher
P.O. Box 636
Birmingham AL 35201
205-591-7238
Fax: 866-845-4395
E-mail: jblacksher@ns.sympatico.ca
Fred D. Gray
Bar No. ASB-1727-R63F
Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan,
Gray & Nathanson
P. O. Box 830239
Tuskegee , AL 36083-0239
334-727-4830
Fax: 334-727-5877
E-mail: fgray@glsmgn.com
s/ Henry T. Reagan
OF COUNSEL
31