Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
From Territorial to
Nonterritorial Capitalist
Imperialism: Lenin and the
Possibility of a Marxist Theory of
Imperialism
Spyros Sakellaropoulos & Panagiotis Sotiris
Published online: 07 Jan 2015.
To cite this article: Spyros Sakellaropoulos & Panagiotis Sotiris (2015) From Territorial
to Nonterritorial Capitalist Imperialism: Lenin and the Possibility of a Marxist Theory
of Imperialism, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 27:1,
85-106, DOI: 10.1080/08935696.2014.980676
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the Content) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or
suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed
in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should
not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
Rethinking Marxism, 2015
Vol. 27, No. 1, 85106, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2014.980676
rivalries on the basis of the geopolitics of resources and scarcity, the tendency to
define hierarchies in the international system in terms of empire building, and the
recurring temptation of superimperialist theories all persist.
A theoretical debate on imperialism is thus more than necessary. In constituting a
Marxian approach to the concept, we should ensure that we do not limit ourselves to
the theoretical premises of realism as it has been defined within mainstream
international relations theory. While realism is seen as having merit when contrasted
with the idealist rhetoric of most current globalization or cosmopolitan democracy
theories, the simplistic Hobbesian conceptions of political power and great power
rivalry that are the backbone of realist theories of international relations theory
do not offer a possible way to theorize either the complexity of determinations
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
within the international plane or the interrelation between economic, political, and
ideological antagonisms.1 Realism remains, moreover, a theoretical paradigm that
leads to a rather schematic territorial conception of the stakes in international
conflicts and antagonisms.
Unfortunately, this territorial logic is also echoed in many recent Marxist
interventions. It is echoed, in our opinion, in David Harveys notion of an imperialism
based on accumulation by dispossession. For Harvey, capitalism not only induces a
logic of endless flows of capital but also brings forward the particular importance of
spatiotemporal fixes in a social process of production of space that leads to the
historical geography of imperialism. This is also the basis of a certain territorial logic
used to ground the tendency toward imperialism under capitalism. Here, accumula-
tion by dispossession acquires importance, especially in a period of capitalist
overaccumulation, in the sense of a predatory imperialist quest for assets all over
the world,2 in a form similar to Rosa Luxemburgs (1951) insistence on capitalisms
constant need for an outside as a means to counter inherent crisis tendencies. That is
why Harvey (2003, 183) insists, Imperialism of the capitalist sort arises out of a
dialectical relation between territorial and capitalistic logics of power.
In a similar vein, Alex Callinicos (2009, 83) has insisted on the need to incorporate
the state system and the conflicts and antagonisms at that level as a dimension of
the capitalist mode of production leading to the combination of two forms of
competition: one among capitals and another geopolitical competition between
states (see Callinicos 2005, 2007, 2009). But the problem, as Gonzalo Pozo-Martin
(2007) has shown, is that this realist or geopolitical moment needs much more
There are two possible readings of Lenins theory of imperialism. One is to consider it
a Marxist version of classical theories of colonial empire building: a version either of
those theories relating imperialism to an overabundance of capital in tandem with
growing social instability or of those theories considering imperialism an expression of
certain factions of the ruling bloc that sought to gain from overseas expansion and
military buildup (Hobson 1902). According to this view, Lenin presents a theory of
irremediable capitalist stagnation and overproduction that can only be temporarily
dealt with by colonization, the latter providing the necessary outlet for idle capital
and a means of social pacification through the creation of a labor aristocracy.
3. Despite this criticism, we have to stress that Panitch and Gindins (2012) recent Making of
Global Capitalism is one of the most detailed and wide-ranging accounts of American
imperialism.
88 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
(a) Lenin (1917) endorsed Bukharins book on world capitalism. Bukharin, although
not a theorist of a global, unified capitalist system in the strict sense, tended to
present an image of global capitalism as an integral system in which antagonistic
relations occur not only between states or power blocs but also between big
capitalist trusts, thus underestimating the importance of the role of states in
international relations and conflicts.4
(b) Lenin emphasized the formation of monopolies as a distinctive feature of the
imperialist stage, sometimes underestimating competition between capitals.
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
(c) He tended toward an instrumentalist theory of the state as a tool in the hands of
monopoly capital and big trusts.
(d) He defined imperialism (and monopoly capital) as inherently parasitic and crisis
prone.
(e) He agreed with Hilferdings (1981) original position that the export of capital
toward the periphery was the result of limits to capital accumulation in the
imperialist center, as well as with Hilferdings conception of the predominance of
monopolies and cartels.
(f) He held the opinion that imperialism leads to some sort of bribing of sections of
the working class in order to form a labor aristocracy, which was a rather
simplistic and misguided description of the concessions the labor movement had
been able to secure from the bourgeoisie.
4. In this sense, we disagree with Alex Callinicoss (2009, 41) reference to a Lenin-Bukharin
synthesis.
5. On classical theories of imperialism see Milios (1988, 1146).
LENIN AND NONTERRITORIAL IMPERIALISM 89
conditioned by their social structure and the balance of forces in the class struggle.
Imperialism is not the outcome of a simple drive toward territorial expansion but is
the result both of specific tendencies in the development of capitalist accumulation
(e.g., relative surplus value as the predominant form of surplus extraction, the real
subsumption of labor to capital, the concentration and centralization of capital) and
of the contradictions that arise out of capitalisms class-antagonistic nature. This is
why Lenin considers imperialism to be a specific stage in the development of capital.
However reminiscent of an evolutionary theorization of capitalist development this
conception of stages can be, it nevertheless has the advantage of linking interna-
tional behavior to capitalist accumulation and class contradictions. For Lenin,
moreover, the internationalization of capital is not an expression of capitalist
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
6. A Marxian theory of uneven development will pay special attention to the uneven and
combined development of modes of production, to the uneven ebb and flow of the various
fundamental class processes and their conditions of existence that characterize any and every
social formation (McIntyre 1992, 91).
90 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
antagonistic total social capitals and the fragmentation into different and mostly
national polities. In this process, different class histories led to different balances
of forces between dominant and subaltern classes (but also among power blocs)
and consequently to different paths for state formation and also to differing domestic
and international strategies. Uneven development and the different strategies for
capital accumulationnot only in terms of international market antagonism but also
in terms of states promoting the interests of antagonistic total social capitals and
bourgeoisiescreate the material conditions for conflict. It is exactly this articula-
tion of the economic and the political, itself uneven, contradictory, and contingent
on the dynamics of the conjuncture, that leads to interimperialist rivalry and war.7
Consequently, in Lenins theoretical intervention, imperialism undergoes a
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
7. The difference between Kautskys (2004) vision of ultraimperialism and Lenins emphasis on
interimperialist antagonism is analytical and concerns Lenins insistence that uneven develop-
ment and antagonism are essential characteristics of the imperialist chain, whereas forms of
interimperialist cooperation are contingent outcomes of particular conjunctures.
8. Imperialism, in turn, is the set of conditions that shape and are shaped by the existence of
this exploitation. Yes capitalist imperialismnot because capitalists always get what they want,
nor because forms of colonial expansion and domination did not predate the emergence and
development of capitalism, nor finally because imperialism can be reduced to or explained
entirely in terms of the economy (capitalist or otherwise)but because the particular forms of
imperialism I am referring to, from the British annexation of India to the U.S. military barrage on
Iraqi forces and the new war on terrorism, cannot be divorced from those (complex, changing)
conditions and effects of capitalism to which I just referred (Ruccio 2003, 87).
LENIN AND NONTERRITORIAL IMPERIALISM 91
out of their own willLenin insisted that the policies of states are governed by
the internal class balance of forces, the degree of capitalist development, and
the particular class strategies around that development.
(b) Lenins emphasis on capital exportsnot simply as productive investments abroad
but as the expansion of capitalist social relationsas the predominant form of
the internationalization of capital, and also on the internationalization of capital
as the material basis of imperialism, had revolutionizing effects. Contrary to the
traditional conception of international power politics as expressions of conflicting
national interests, Lenin insisted on the internationalization of capital as a
contradictory expansion of capitalist social relations resulting in singular
articulations of capitalist and noncapitalist modes and forms of production, but
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
with capitalist social forms being dominant not necessarily quantitatively though
surely qualitatively in the sense of inducing the transformation of all social
relations and practices. International conflicts must be viewed as class antagon-
isms mediated by nation-states and as expressions of the long-term interests of
the power blocs in these states: namely, alliances of the dominant classes, in
which capitalist classes play a leading role.
(c) Lenins emphasis on the internationalization of capital through capital exports
dealt a decisive blow to the notion of imperialism as simple territorial expansion.
Despite Lenins many references to the division of the world among the Great
Powers, the core of his argument regarding capital exports is that the expansion
of capital no longer requires territorial annexation or formal empire but rather
the articulation of capital accumulation and political power. His insistence on
antagonism, moreover, and on conflict and on the particular, nonuniform
dynamics related to a given conjuncture of interimperialist rivalry prevent his
position from falling into the teleology of a uniform transition and development.
(d) Lenins emphasis on the role of states in imperialist dynamics and rivalries and on
the necessity of state apparatuses for the expression and mediation of capitalist
interests in the international system leads also to a political theory of
imperialism. Imperialism presupposes political power as a condensation of class
interests, and interimperialist rivalries are political rivalries, struggles between
different power blocs, including struggles between alliances of states, something
that can also account for the importance of international organizations. This
emphasis on the relative autonomy of the political protects Lenins argument
from economistic reductionism and keeps capital accumulation and capitalist
class interests as the necessary material ground of the whole process. That is why
Lenin proposed a possible explanation for World War I as the culmination of rival
strategies for leadership and dominance in the imperialist system. It can also
explain the possibility that the international is also the plane where internal
contradictions and political strategies are being played out, from the many
examples of aggressive military campaigns in order to galvanize domestic consent
along nationalist lines to the current use of international economic organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund to promote political agendas that were
initially domestically articulated.
(e) Also important in Lenins thought is the emergence of the concept of the
imperialist chain as a suitable description of the hierarchal, uneven, and
92 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
Lenins endeavor was to prove that a new form of imperialist expansion had
emerged. Our intention is to show that this conception is still theoretically viable and
offers a way to of thinking about capitalist imperialism without resorting to
noncapitalist conceptions of empire building.
In this section we offer the theoretical framework we will use regarding the
specificity of political power, state formation, and hegemony in social formations in
which capitalism plays a nodal role in the articulation of modes of production. In our
opinion, only such a theorization can help us explain the articulation of the
internationalization of capital with interstate conflict and antagonismthat is, the
emergence of imperialist strategies and hierarchy in the international system
without resorting either to a territorial logic of expansion or to some variety of the
empire metaphor.
In contrast to the tautologies used in traditional political science, in which political
power is simply taken as a given, Marxism offers a definition of power as the
capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests (Poulantzas 1978,
104, emphasis in the original). This priority of exploitation over domination offers an
explanation of power as class power, the ability of social groups to control the
extraction and distribution of surplus labor because of their specific objective
structural class position. It offers a possible explanation of the class character of
power relations and struggles and therefore also of state apparatuses. We do not deny
that there have been many cases of economistic readings of Marxism that transform it
into a historical metaphysics of economic reductionism and technological evolution-
ism, but we believe that there have also been readings that insist on a non-
economistic and more dialectical approach involving the uneven and overdetermined
relations between productive relations, political power, and ideological representa-
tion, beginning with the seminal work of Louis Althusser (1969, 1971). The key point,
9. On the importance of the concept of the imperialist chain see Poulantzas (1974, 203) and
Althusser (1965, 926).
LENIN AND NONTERRITORIAL IMPERIALISM 93
in our opinion, is to stress at the same time the analytical priority of exploitation over
repression and domination and the importance of the fact that political practice has
as its object the condensation of all the contradictions of the various levels of a social
formation (Poulantzas 1978, 41). This notion of the political escapes the shortcomings
of both mainstream political sciences notion of political power as administrative
command and also the notion of political power as direct control of the state by
capitalist factions as portrayed by many varieties of economistic Marxism. In this
noneconomistic reading of Marxism, the insistence on the class character of political
power is combined with the position that class strategies are also necessarily political
strategies: strategies aimed at reproducing or destabilizing social formations as
complex and contradictory unities of economic, political, and ideological relations
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
and practices. It is in this sense that we can accept both Marxs (1894, 778) insistence
that the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of
direct producers is the innermost secret of every social structure and Althussers
(1969, 113) warning that although economic relations are determinant in the last
instance, the lonely hour of the last instance never comes. It is a conception of
political power that manages to maintain the link between politics and the economy
and at the same time to ground the necessary relative autonomy of the political that
is an indispensable presupposition if we want to avoid both the economism of
traditional Marxism and the groundless conception of politics found in traditional
politics.
To this we must add the importance and theoretical fruitfulness of the Gramscian
concept of hegemony (see Gramsci 1971; Buci-Glucksmann 1980; Boothman 2008;
Thomas 2009). For us it does not simply imply the combination of coercion and
consent. Rather, it refers to the complex modalities of social and political power in
capitalist societies that make a social class become the leading social force in a
society. The concepts of hegemony and hegemonic apparatus, moreover, as part of
Gramscis (1971, 239; and see Thomas 2009, 137141) theorization of the integral
state, also offer a way to theorize the extent and complexity of state apparatuses
and their economic, political, and ideological practices and interventions. Along with
Althussers (1971, 1995) conception of ideological state apparatuses and their role in
social reproduction and Poulantzass relational conception of the state as a
condensation of social forces (Poulantzas 1980), this theoretical direction maintains
the relation between state functioning and social class formations, brings forward the
role of the state in the elaboration of class strategies and the transformation of class
interests into political projects, and stresses how the state is being traversed and
conditioned by class struggles and antagonisms.
That is why one cannot take states as self-sufficient actors in shaping the
international plane but must look at the different class alliances and power blocs
and how these affect the formation of capitalist class strategy, state policy, and
consequently international policy. States behaviors on the international plane are
conditioned by the articulation of class contradictions and political strategies and the
emergence of hegemonic power blocs. Interstate relations can be viewed as class-
based relationsas relations (and conflicts) between different power blocs. The
current return of geopolitics is a welcome refusal of the economistic idealism of the
globalization rhetoric. It poses the danger, however, of a return to a pre-Marxist
94 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
production in Europe, does not mean that all the social relations and forms it was
associated with were intrinsically capitalist. This is not to underestimate the many
ways capitalism incorporates noncapitalist forms of exploitation into highly original
new combinations, from plantation slavery in the Americas until the nineteenth
century to all current forms of forced labor or even modern slavery being part of
regimes of exploitation that contribute to forms of capitalist accumulation.10
Second, although so-called primitive accumulation was linked to territorial colonial
expansion, and although Marx in Capital presents a very clear picture of how colonial
rule was a necessary prerequisite,11 territorial expansion should not be projected to
the whole history of capital as an essential feature.
Third, we think that a distinction has to be made between precapitalist and
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
capitalist forms of trade and commerce, despite the coexistence of both forms in the
early colonial era. Capitalist trade increases the pressure for surplus extraction in the
labor process; in contrast, precapitalist trade connected the center of production
with a distant market to gain profits and had the ability to set prices monopolistically
and to use direct physical control and military force (Rosenberg 1994; Wood 2003).
Fourth, although colonial expansion was at first necessary to violently expand the
reach of capitalist social relations in noncapitalist parts of the world, imperial
colonialism in the twentieth century ceased to be a necessary aspect of the
reproduction of capitalist accumulation. This was not the result of some immanent
teleology but of a series of historical factors. The changes associated with rising
productivity in the capitalist center, itself the result of technological innovation and
the turn toward forms of relative surplus-value extraction, had repercussions in the
relative importance of colonial production. During the nineteenth century, developed
capitalist industry used the colonies for exports. About 1 million yards of cotton cloth
were exported from Britain to India in 1814 and around 2,050 million in 1890; these
imports covered about 5575 percent of total textile consumption and reflected
technological innovations that raised British productivity. Globally, the share of third-
world manufacturing in world production fell from 73 percent in 1750 to 7.5 percent
in 1913 (Bairoch 1986, 1989). On the eve of the First World War, the industrial
independence of the capitalist core countries in terms of the means of production had
been accomplished. Some 99 percent of metals used by developed countries
industries came from the developed world; 90 percent of its textile fibers and 100
10. On the relation between early capitalist development and slavery see Blackburn (1998). On
classical liberalisms acceptance of slavery see Losurdo (2011). On contemporary forms of forced
labor, see the ILO (2009).
11. The different moments of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now, more or less
in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. In
England at the end of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, embracing
the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system.
These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But, they all employ the
power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, hot-house
fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist
mode (Marx 1887, 477).
96 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
percent of its energy had the same origin. In sum, the self-sufficiency of developed
countries in raw materials was about 968 percent around 1913 (2089).12
The industrial independence of the core countries became even more evident in
the period between the two wars. Barriers to free trade led developed countries to
find substitutes for imported raw materials through the invention of artificial
fertilizers, synthetic rubber, rayon, nylon, and a vast range of plastics (Harman
2003). The incapacity of the colonies to develop their own industry combined with
the consequences of the Depression in 192933 so that colonial governments were
forced to increase the duties on imported industrial products, even those coming
from the colonies metropolises, including Britain and France (Hobsbawm 1995,
2046). The result was the adoption of a policy of import substitution and the
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
creation of indigenous industry (Tomlinson 1996, 1503), a trend that led to the
formation of an indigenous bourgeoisie, even though in most cases it led to forms of
domination without hegemony (Guha 1997). A whole series of struggles, uprisings,
and revolutions challenged not only colonial rule but also many of the social relations
and forms associated with it, leading to the emergence after World War II of many
new nation-states, to the end of colonialism, andat least partly as a result of
workers and peasants struggles and the influence of socialist, communist, and
radical nationalist ideasthe recognition of social and political rights to large parts
of formerly colonial populations.
Fifth, refusing a strategy of territorial imperialism, the United Statesespecially
after World War IIchose a completely different course of action. The U.S. ruling
class had realized that territorial enlargement was necessary only as a means to
enhance primitive accumulation. U.S. elites adopted an overseas economic expansion
backed by military bases in contrast to propositions that favored colonialism (as in
the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) (Tully 2005; Parrini and Sklar
1993), whereby Britain and the other imperial states were trapped in a strategy
related to a previous phase of capitalist development. This does not imply that
American imperialism was less violent but that the exercise of force was aimed at a
different form of imperialism. The insistence, therefore, on the relation between
imperialism and territorial expansion cannot explain the emergence of the United
States as the leading capitalist social formation in the twentieth century, nor can it
explain the emergence, especially in the postWorld War II era, of a nonterritorial
imperialism based on the internationalization of capital and on hegemonic relations
within an imperialist chain of territorially sovereign nation-states.
12. At the same time, a great part of British investment was directed toward its dominions
(Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) and toward the United States, Argentina,
and Uruguay (Hobsbawm 1989, 66).
LENIN AND NONTERRITORIAL IMPERIALISM 97
13. The notion of the encounteralthough associated with Althussers (2006) post-1980 texts,
which were published posthumouslywas in fact a central tenet of his theoretical endeavor
from 1966 onward. The following passage from a 1967 text exemplifies this nonteleological
reading of the emergence of capitalism: But capitalism is the result of a process that does not
take the form of a genesis. The result of what? Marx tells us several times: of the process of an
encounter of several distinct, definitive, indispensable elements, engendered in the previous
historical process by different genealogies that are independent of each other and can,
moreover, be traced back to several possible origins: accumulation of money capital, free
labour-power, technical inventions and so forth. To put it plainly, capitalism is not the result of a
genesis that can be traced back to the feudal mode of production as if to its origin, its in-itself,
its embryonic form, and so on; it is the result of a complex process that produces, at a given
moment, the encounter of a number of elements susceptible of constituting it in their very
encounter. Evolutionist, Hegelian or geneticist illusions notwithstanding, mode of production
does not contain potentially, in embryo, or in itself, the mode of production that is to
succeed it (Althusser 2003, 296).
98 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
imperialism. But we want to suggest in the next section that the end result of this
process without telos has been the full actualization of a nonterritorial logic.
imperialist formations, with the United States in the hegemonic role of politically and
militarily guaranteeing the global collective capitalist interest.
The development of the centralization and concentration of capital and of capital
exports, the rising role of finance capital, and the importance of interimperialist
rivalriesand the fact that the very process of the expansion of capitalist relations of
production through colonialism eventually led to the emergence of aspiring
bourgeoisies that demanded national liberation and territorial integration (in most
cases under the pressure from movements or alliances of subaltern classes demanding
social and political emancipation)created conditions for a new form of imperialism
that did not specifically refer to the possession of colonies (Brewer 1990). This does
not mean that the evolution of capitalism led to a world of peacefully coexisting
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
This does not mean that territorial expansion, integration, and conflict have not
been important aspects of the history of capitalism. The modern nation-states
emerged through the formation of bourgeois power blocs and their claims for national
sovereignty (as a necessary condition for the expanded reproduction of capital
accumulation and bourgeois rule), claims that more often than not led to war and
interstate conflict. National liberation and/or integration have beenand still are
important motives for war, but this should not be confused with imperial ambition
and interimperialist conflict, even in cases where interimperialist rivalry is presented
in the more legitimate vocabulary of national dignity.
Our emphasis on the nonterritorial character of specifically capitalist imperialism
should not be read as a negation of the territorial or spatial aspects of capitalist
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
In vast swaths of the third world, but also in some areas of the so-called developed
world, the prevailing social and economic forms are inextricably bound up with
relations to the land and to the natural world and are erected on the basis of
relations between people (not necessarily relations of kinship), resulting in a plethora
of social relations of ownership, or the absence of ownership, of land and available
resources. The presence or not of markets, of caste relations, of gender relations,
and of race relations plays an important role. Capitalist social relations of production
may be introduced into such regions in two ways: through violent expropriation of
land for the implementation of so-called development plans, with all the radical
deterioration of living conditions that this entails; or through a multitude of
interventions from various international organizations and NGOs, which the inhabi-
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
tants are supposed to accept exactly because they are thought to be in a state of
capitalist underdevelopment. Such interventions aim at ensuring their exodus from
the supposed underdeveloped environment in which they find themselves (Chakra-
barti and Dhar 2009, 956).
The above undoubtedly constitutes aspects of the reality being experienced by
communities that are characterized by noncapitalist relations. But this does not
contradict the main tendencynamely, the expansion of capitalist social relations
through the internationalization of capital. The predominance of a mode of
production and its complex articulation with different modes of production is never
quantitative but qualitative, recalling Lenins analysis of the development of
capitalism in Russia. In the postWorld War II period, with the end of colonialism,
the capitalist mode of production established itself in many social formations in an
uneven, complex, and overdetermined relation of coexistence and transformation
with other modes and forms of production. This does not mean that tendencies
countervailing capitalist modernization have not been important, including the tragic
history of Soviet-style socialist construction, certain sui generis revolutions (neither
socialist nor capitalist, the Iranian Revolution being such an example; see Gabriel
2001), and experiments with socialist transformation in Latin America. The expansion
of capitalist relations through the internationalization of capital is not a natural
tendency but a contingent result of class struggles and the balance of forces between
different social and political strategies.
An important role in this has been played by the fact that, under U.S. hegemony,
Western capitalist countries were victorious in their antagonism with the USSR and
other socialist countries. The current prevailing tendency has thus been the
economic, political, and military extension of the influence of capitalist imperialism,
contributing to the emergence of a capitalist framework within which almost the
entire planet is being subsumed. Even in China, where there was no regime change, a
series of openly neoliberal reforms and strategies has led to a regime of capitalist
accumulation that brings back memories of the first stages of capitalist exploitation.
It is obvious that we oppose a teleological schema whereby capitalism unfolds
within various social formations, moving from stage to stage and establishing the
imperialist chain in a uniform course. Class struggle is never-ending and unpredict-
able. What we have tried to describe are the powerful tendencies that characterize
the historical trajectory of the capitalist system. We are not implying that all the
developments noted are of the same character or follow an identical course, nor are
102 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
In light of the above, we can discuss hierarchy in the imperialist chain, especially
since the current return of the notion of imperialism in political and theoretical
debate is also a result of the United States openlyand unilaterallyasserting its
leadership. Can the role of the United States be described simply as world dominance
or power supremacy, through the use of force and the ability to guarantee trade and
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
capital flows and access to contested territories and scarce resources?14 We think
that such a view regresses to a more traditionally realist view of international
relations and a territorial logic of interstate relations. Moreover, the Hobbesian view
of power antagonism between self-sufficient and selfish agents, which charac-
terizes realism, is inadequate to theorize the complex dialectic of competition and
cooperation, antagonism and interdependence, conflict and alliance that is building
in the international system. The United States has not been simply imposing its will
on unwilling subjects (despite the occasional twist of arms) but manages (at least up
to now) to assume a position of leadership in what is at the same time a terrain of
antagonisms and an imperialist bloc. What can be described as the more geopolit-
ical moment of current imperialismnamely, the safeguarding of the flow of oil
toward the Westcannot be theorized in territorial terms since the current American
military interventionism in the Middle East is performed in the name of the collective
interest of the capitalist world to have access to energy resources, and not in the
name of direct American colonization.
The notion of hegemony discussed above (see Rethinking Political Power,
Hegemony, the State, and International Antagonism) offers ways to think through
the complexity of relations and hierarchies in the international system. It presents
political power and class domination as the dialectic of direction, coercion, and
consent and offers a wider sense of class antagonisms and political struggles, going
beyond both realist cynicism and idealistic legalism. Hegemony, in this view,
comprises political direction, social class alliance building, social, political, and
military repression, ideological misrecognition, and material concessions.15 Hege-
mony is not simply coercion plus legitimization; an attempt to theorize the
complexity of class antagonism and political power thus offers a better description
both of social antagonism and of the hierarchies arising on the international plane.
Moreover, since hegemony refers to a power relation, it consequently entails conflict
and antagonism.
If the notion of the imperialist chain is accurate as a description of the contradictory,
hierarchical, uneven, and interdependent character of an international system based
14. See, for examples of this reading, the work of Andrew Bacevich (2002, 2005).
15. Lenin (1970a, 109) uses the notion of hegemony but in a more geopolitical sense: An
essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the striving for
hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken
the adversary and undermine his hegemony.
LENIN AND NONTERRITORIAL IMPERIALISM 103
upon the enlarged reproduction of capitalist social relations in nation-states, then the
notion of hegemony can help explain the mechanisms of leadership in the imperialist
chain. The leading social formation is not just the most powerful, either economically
or politico-militarily; above all it must be able to offer plausible strategies for the
collective capital interest of the whole imperialist chain. Hegemony can account for the
dialectic between antagonism and hierarchy better than traditional power-politics
approaches that can account only for contingent balance-of-force hierarchies and not
for cases of strategic political and moral leadership.
This notion of hegemony in the imperialist chain should not be seen as an altruistic
attitude. It refers rather to historically specific conjunctures wherein fulfilling the
prerequisites for the long-term interests of the ruling bloc of the leading imperialist
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
formation also induces the safeguarding of certain of the class interests of the ruling
classes in the other formations in the imperialist chain. Naturally, there is also plenty of
room for antagonisms and even for crises of hegemony. American foreign policy after
1945 aimed not only at guaranteeing American supremacy but also at offering elements
of a collective strategy for the whole imperialist chain (rapid industrialization, Fordist
accumulation strategies, mass consumerism and individualism, a combination of
anticommunism and technocratic ideology). Even the most openly geopolitical forms
of American political and military interventionwhich can indeed be used as an
illustration of an attempt toward world domination, for instance with the extended
network of military and air force bases and CIA stationscan be best interpreted by
reference to a hegemonic strategy. They are not imperial outposts but mainly make
manifest the ability of the United States to militarily guarantee a capitalist social order
all over the world. American political and military intervention during the past sixty
years did not solely aim at guaranteeing American interestsnor did it aim at creating
coloniesbut it also aimed at safeguarding the reproduction of capitalist social
relations, bourgeois rule, and capitalist accumulation.
This complexity of hegemony in the imperialist chain means that we should always
be very careful when talking about imperial decline. The crisis of hegemony cannot
be a simple-factor process. In the 1970s the United States suffered actual military
defeats in southeast Asia as well as capital overaccumulation, fiscal crisis, and the
economic challenge posed by Japan and West Germany. Yet the United States not only
managed to retain global leadership but also to eventually offer in the 1980s and
1990s a hegemonic strategy that combined neoliberalism, capitalist restructuring,
the intensification of the internationalization of capital, the lowering of barriers to
the free flow of capitals and products, the incorporation in the imperialist chain of
former socialist formations, an authoritarian backlash against labor, and a more
aggressive form of imperialist interventionism. In this sense the current conjuncture
of a global capitalist crisis surely poses a test and challenge for U.S. hegemony but
should not be considered as automatically leading to imperial decline.
Conclusion
also bring forward the many ways we can combine the struggle against imperialism
with the struggle against capitalism.
References
imperial-manual.html.
Frankel, B., ed. 1996. Realism: Restatements and renewals. London: Frank Cass.
Gabriel, S. 2001. A class analysis of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In Re/presenting
class: Essays on postmodern Marxism, ed. J. K. Gibson-Graham, S. A. Resnick, and
R. D. Wolff, 20626. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Gowan, P. 1999. The global gamble. London: Verso.
Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence and
Wishart.
Guha, R. 1997. Dominance and hegemony: History and power in colonial India.
Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
Harman, C. 2003. Analysing imperialism. International Socialism Journal 99 (Sum-
mer). http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj99/harman.htm.
Harvey, D. 2003. The new imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hilferding, R. 1981. Finance capital: A study of the latest phase of capitalist
development. London: Routledge.
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1989. Age of empire: 18751914. New York: Vintage Books.
. 1995. Age of extremes: 19141991. London: Abacus.
Hobson, J. A. 1902. Imperialism: A study. New York: James Pott.
ILO (International Labor Organization). 2009. The cost of coercion. Geneva: ILO
Publications.
Kagan, R. 1998. The benevolent empire. Foreign Policy, no. 111: 2435.
Kautsky, K. 2004. Ultra-imperialism. Marxists Internet Archive. Last updated 30 June.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htm.
Lenin, V. I. 1929 [1915]. Introduction to Imperialism and world economy, by N.
Bukharin, 914. London: Martin Lawrence Limited.
. 1964a. Letters from afar. In Collected works, vol. 23, 295312. Moscow:
Progress Publishers.
. 1964b. On the slogan for a United States of Europe. In Collected works, vol. 2,
33942. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
. 1966. The second congress of the Communist International. In Collected
works, vol. 31, 21363. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
. 1970a. Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism: A popular outline.
Peking: Foreign Language Press.
. 1970b. Left-wing communism: An infantile disorder. Peking: Foreign
Language Press.
. 1977. Collected works. Vol. 3. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Losurdo, D. 2011. Liberalism: A counter-history. London: Verso.
Luxemburg, R. 1951. The accumulation of capital. London: Routledge.
106 SAKELLAROPOULOS AND SOTIRIS
Marx, K. 1887. Capital. Vol 1. Trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling. Marxists Internet
Archive. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm.
. 1894. Capital. Vol. 3. Vol. 37 of Collected works, by K. Marx and F. Engels.
London: Lawrence and Wishart.
McIntyre, R. 1992. Theories of uneven development and social change. Rethinking
Marxism 5 (3): 75105.
Milios, J. 1988. Kapitalistische Entwicklung, Nationalstaat und Imperialismus.
Athens: Kritiki.
Panitch, L., and S. Gindin. 2004. Global capitalism and American empire. Socialist
Register, no. 40: 142.
. 2012. The making of global capitalism: The political economy of American
empire. London: Verso.
Downloaded by [Johns Hopkins University] at 06:25 13 January 2015
Parrini, C. P., and M. J. Sklar. 1993. New thinking about the market, 18961904: Some
American economists on investment and the theory of surplus capital. Journal of
Economic History 43 (3): 55978.
Poulantzas, N. 1974. Fascisme et dictature. Paris: Seuil.
. 1978. Political power and social classes. London: Verso.
. 1980. State, power and socialism. London: Verso.
Pozo-Martin, G. 2007. Autonomous or materialist geopolitics? Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 20 (4): 55163.
Rosenberg, J. 1994. The empire of civil society: A critique of the realist theory of
international relations. London: Verso.
Ruccio, D. F. 2003. Globalization and imperialism. Rethinking Marxism 15 (1): 7594.
Thomas, P. 2009. The Gramscian moment: Philosophy, hegemony and Marxism.
Leiden: Brill.
Tomlinson, B. R. 1996. Imperial power and foreign trade: Britain and India (1900
1970). In International trade and British economic growth: From the eighteenth
century to the present day, ed. P. Mathias and J. Davis, 14662. Oxford: Blackwell.
Trotsky, L. 2007. History of the Russian Revolution. Vol. 1. Marxists Internet Archive.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/index.htm.
Tully, J. 2005. On law, democracy, and imperialism. Paper presented at the Twenty-
First Annual Public Lecture of the Centre for Law and Society, University of
Edinburgh, Scotland, 1011 March. http://www.law.uvic.ca/demcon/documents/
Tully%20Presem%20-%20Edinburgh%20draft%20criculation%20paper.doc.
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of international relations. Boston: McGraw Hill
Wight, M. 1994. International relations: The three traditions. London: Leicester
University Press.
Wood, E. M. 2003. Empire of capital. London: Verso.